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To cite this article: Paul Giladi (2014) Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism:
A Hegelian Critique of Quine, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22:5,
734-751, DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2014.923016
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2014
Vol. 22, No. 5, 734–751, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2014.923016
nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that
nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and
Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of
philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is
right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact
Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself
requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore,
even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalis-
tic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innova-
tive form of in rebus realism about universals.
Keywords: Hegel; Quine; realism; nominalism; universals; concrete universal
‘There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; this much is prephilosophi-
cal common sense in which we must all agree. These houses, roses, and
sunsets, then, have something in common; and this which they have in
common is all I mean by the attribute of redness.’ For McX, thus, there
being attributes is even more obvious and trivial than the obvious and
trivial fact of there being red houses, roses, and sunsets. (Quine, 1997,
p. 81)
What the basic argument of the realist turns on is what best provides the expla-
nation for why a concrete particular has a certain property: for the realist, ‘par-
ticipating’ in, say, squareness (following Platonic realism), or instantiating that
property (following Aristotelian realism) is the best explanation for why an
object has the property that it has. Quine, however, argues that:
One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny,
except as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have
anything in common. The words ‘houses’, ‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ are true
of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and
the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities
which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition,
any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the
word ‘redness’, nor, for that matter, by the word ‘househood’, ‘rose-
hood’, ‘sunsethood’. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of
them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
that McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the
occult entities which he posits under such names as ‘redness’. (Quine,
1997, p. 81)
For Quine, the explanation for why something is red lies simply in how the
term ‘redness’, or the predicate ‘is red’, is applicable to an object – the truth-
conditions of a proposition such as ‘The chair is brown’, then, according to
Quine are the following: x (some object) is f (some property), because there
exists a term which designates x and that ‘f’ applies to x (cf. Devitt, 1997,
p. 96). Under such a semantic theory, one does not need to be committed to
the existence of a universal to make the proposition true: all that is required is
correctly applying a term to a particular. Quine, after detailing his alternative
semantic theory, then plays his trump card: a commitment to realism is a com-
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We may say, for example, that some dogs are white and not thereby
commit ourselves to recognizing either doghood or whiteness as entities.
‘Some dogs are white’ says that some things that are dogs are white;
and, in order that this statement be true, the things over which the bound
variable ‘something’ ranges must include some white dogs, but need not
include doghood or whiteness. On the other hand, when we say that
some zoological species are cross-fertile we are committing ourselves to
recognizing as entities the several species themselves, abstract though
they are. We remain so committed at least until we devise some way of
so paraphrasing the statement as to show that the seeming reference to
species on the part of our bound variable was an avoidable manner of
speaking. (Quine, 1997, p. 81)
As with the previous passages discussed, Quine maintains that we do not need
to have any metaphysical commitments to occult entities, in order to make
sense of our ontology, nor are we required to offer an explanation of why
things are thus-and-so that goes beyond the nominalist semantic theory that he
(and later Michael Devitt) proposed: if we wish to remain philosophical natu-
ralists, we ought to commit realism about universals to the flames, because it
contains nothing but sophistry and illusion. Quine has now laid down the
gauntlet to defenders of realism, and the question now is whether one can
genuinely be a realist and a philosophical naturalist.
736
OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
trusted, since the spirit believes in an order, a simple, constant, and uni-
versal determination [of things]. This is the faith in which the spirit has
directed its [reflective] thinking upon phenomena, and has come to know
their laws, establishing the motion of the heavenly bodies in a universal
manner, so that every change of position can be determined and [re]
cognised on the basis of this law… From all these examples we may
gather how, in thinking about things, we always seek what is fixed, per-
sisting, and inwardly determined, and what governs the particular. This
universal cannot be grasped by means of the senses, and it counts as
what is essential and true. (Hegel, 1991, §21Z, p. 53)
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
both the nature of the world and the standards of philosophical consciousness.
As he writes:
The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism
of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite
has no veritable being. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at
least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this
principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of reli-
gion; for religion equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being,
as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated,
eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy
has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate,
absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name
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comes from worrying about something that does not need worrying about.
Their meta-objection to realism is that there is in fact no problem of universals,
just a pseudo-problem, which one can solve by realising that the quest for fur-
ther explanation is neither necessary nor desirable.
So, what we are left with now appears to be a philosophic stalemate, with
the additional worry that both the Hegelian realist and the Quinean nominalist
beg the question against one another: for Hegel, there is need to make recourse
to universals, in order to adequately explain predicate ascriptions. For Quine,
there is no need at all to resource to such commitments, in order to adequately
explain predicate ascriptions.
However, one way in which this stalemate could perhaps be broken, in Quine’s
favour, is by looking at Quine’s additional arguments against realism in his
‘Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis’ (1950). In this work, Quine levels the
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same arguments against realism as he did in ‘On What There Is’. However, in
addition to the arguments against ante rem conceptions of universals, Quine
also presents arguments against in rebus conceptions of universals. He argues
that commitment to universals involves a two-step procedure: firstly, we learn
to pool certain objects together by resemblance relations – e.g., we notice that
there are several objects which share the same properties. We then group these
objects together, based on the resemblance relations, to form a set of objects.
Secondly, given that we pool objects together to form sets of certain things,
we then introduce abstract singular terms that hypostatise these properties. Ini-
tially, these universals are regarded as abstracta. However, we find that regard-
ing universals in such a manner entails several serious problems. As such, we
move to a conception of universals that claims that universals are concrete.
Concrete universals, understood as scattered spatio-temporal objects,4 appear to
be cost-free: we can explain an object’s having a certain property, understood
as a concrete universal, as the object being an instantiation of that specific con-
crete universal. However, Quine still thinks such universals are problematic,
and to see why he asks us to consider the example set out at Figure 1.
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Suppose also we construe the shape isosceles right triangle as the total
region made up by pooling all the 16 triangular regions. Similarly sup-
pose we construe the shape two-to-one rectangle as the total region made
up by pooling the four two-to-one rectangular regions; and similarly for
the two trapezoid shapes. Clearly this leads to trouble, for our five shapes
then all reduce to one, the total region. Pooling all the triangular regions
gives simply the total square region; pooling all the square regions gives
the same; and similarly for the other three shapes. We should end up,
intolerably, by concluding identity among the five shapes. So the theory
of universals as concrete, which happened to work for red, breaks down
in general. (Quine, 1950, pp. 627–8)
temporal objects, are metaphysically puzzling, in that it is not clear what their
identity conditions are. However, his argument against in rebus conceptions of
universals is different to his argument against ante rem conceptions of univer-
sals. The latter argument against realism claims that the problem with positing
these kinds of entities is that they are not spatio-temporal and that we still have
to explain what it is for a particular that has a property to instantiate that prop-
erty. The argument against in rebus conceptions of universals claims that the
problem with positing these kinds of entities is that it overcomplicates
740
OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
(A) ‘This rose is red’:5 The property ‘red’ is here understood as something
that belongs to the rose. The rose, of course, is not only red. For, the
rose has a scent, form, texture, all of which are not contained in the
property of being red. The rose being red does not entail that the only
property of the rose is its being red, nor does it entail that the rose
must have a particular scent, form, and texture based on its being red.
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Furthermore, ‘is red’ is not exclusively a property that one rose or all
roses have. The universal is only accidentally related to the object.
Therefore, with these kinds of universals, ‘there is a clear distinction
we can draw between the universal and the individual that possess that
property, and that universal and the other properties it possesses, so
there is no dialectical unity here between these elements’ (Stern, 2007,
p. 128).
(B) ‘All men are mortal’: Judgements of this form, according to Hegel, are
a species of ‘judgements of reflection’, namely quantitative judge-
ments. The property ‘being a man’ is an essential property of all indi-
vidual members of the set of human beings. ‘Being a man’ is not an
accidental property of all individual members of the set of human
beings. ‘Having auburn hair’, for example, is a property which some
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All three judgements are used by Hegel to express a specific stage of the
relationship between the categories of universality, particularity, and individual-
ity. However, (C) is the kind of judgement that arrives at the dialectical rela-
tionship between these three categories. The universal is now concrete,
principally because it is what an individual is, in that an individual is an
instantiation of that kind of universal: Caius is an instantiation of man. By
exemplifying the property of being a man, even though Caius is distinct from
other individual exemplifications of man, Caius is the individual that he is,
742
OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
while his being a man is also required for and compatible with the particular
determinations that make him the specific man he is.
This account of Hegel’s position shows that he can respond to Quine in two
ways. First, he is entitled to claim that Quine’s understanding of concrete
universality, namely the idea of a scattered spatio-temporal object, is not an
accurate conception of concrete universality, especially because the Quinean
characterisation appears to make concrete universals to effectively be some
kind of particular.7 Pace Quine, the concrete universal is not a queer object
that is constituted by individual parts spread across space and time. Rather, the
property ‘human’ should be understood in the following way: all human beings
are part of the human species, by having the species ground the existence of
each individual human being.8 For, each individual human being emerges from
the relationships between other members of the species, namely each individ-
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occur in such a way that is formulated as following a law of nature – i.e., the
paraphrasing of propositions committed to non-Humean laws of nature is not
something that coheres with how science works.12
Therefore, the difference between Hegel and Quine goes deeper than a mere
disagreement over ontological taxonomy, about what exists and what does not
exist. The difference between the two philosophers indicates how radically
opposed are their respective views on the nature of philosophy and how phi-
losophy relates to natural and empirical science: for Hegel, philosophy must be
scientific yet it must go beyond empirical and natural science, and, for Quine,
philosophy must never pass beyond empirical and natural science.13 At first
sight, the possibility of there being some kind of reconciliation between philos-
ophy and natural science in Hegel’s approach may seem to be an idle fancy,
when one considers passages such as the following:
744
OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing has lapsed
into opinion. (Hegel, 1969, pp. 45–6)
What Hegel means by claiming that ancient metaphysics had a ‘higher concep-
tion of thinking’ is unclear, and easily misinterpreted: rather than reading his
affection for ancient metaphysics to amount to a straightforward desire to res-
urrect every single aspect of pre-Kantian metaphysics, we should read Hegel
as making the following claim: ancient metaphysics, pace some kind of empiri-
cist positivism/scientism, understood the world as comprising ideal entities,
entities which provide unity and rational order to the content of our experience.
These entities, crucially, are not objects that can be immediately perceived or
empirically verified in the same way as one can immediately perceive or
empirically verify that a table or a chair exists. Rather, ‘ideal’ kinds, such as
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universals and laws of nature, are part and parcel components of reality that
require us to identify certain properties of the world that are more basic than
immediately observable sensible properties.
However, this does not mean that Hegel thinks that ideal entities require
some spooky cognitive faculty, such as intellectual intuition – it just means that
a discursive consciousness, which takes concepts to be the principal (and in
fact, only) means of cognising objects, must go beyond an epistemic frame-
work which has a narrow/thin conception of thought and experience: as Cinzia
Ferrini (2009a, p. 84) correctly writes in a way which supports my argument,
‘[t]he main target of Hegel’s criticism is not empirical science as such, but
rather any formal and external method of collecting data’. For Hegel, to prop-
erly develop a conception of nature, one must go beyond a particular kind of
empiricism, namely an empiricism which only
The chapter ‘Observing Reason’ then is where Hegel presents his argument
against narrow empiricism.14 Furthermore, that argument of the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, because it is concerned with the respective Weltanschauugen of
narrow empiricism and a more open empiricism, provides the conceptual
resources to enable consciousness to posit concrete universals and arrive at the
standpoint of Science. As Robert Stern (2002, p. 106) writes: ‘[i]n finding
itself drawn away from empiricism15 and [Quinean] nominalism, Observing
Reason gains an important insight into how the world incorporates structures
that can only be uncovered by thought.’ The ultimate advantage of this broader
empiricism is that it is a remarkable improvement over the emaciated
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
16
empiricism of Quinean nominalism. Conceived in this way, the game played
by Quine turns on himself: ostrich nominalism, rather than serve science, is in
fact anti-scientific.
Perhaps what is most interesting about the Hegelian critique of Quine is that
Hegel’s apparent taste for phenomenologically and metaphysically robust land-
scapes, what I have called ‘peacock realism’, can meet Quine’s challenge in
various ways: (i) Hegel’s views on the concrete universal seem to successfully
establish that universals are necessary;17 (ii) Hegel’s views on the concrete uni-
versal are naturalistic,18 where what is naturalistic about Hegel’s notion of the
concrete universal is not just that it is not conceived of in supernaturalist/
spooky terms, but also that it is defended as part of a properly scientific under-
standing of the world;19 (iii) Hegel’s critique of predicate nominalism appears
to offer a compelling case that Quinean nominalism is inconsistent with the
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commitments of natural science. More basically, the allure of the Hegelian cri-
tique of Quine, to use an expression from Adrian Moore (2012), is that pea-
cock realism is better able to make sense of things. As Hegel himself writes on
the necessity and importance of positing universals within a broadly naturalist
framework:
University of Sheffield, UK
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Bob Stern and Ken Westphal for their kind assistance in reading
through an earlier draft of this paper. Above all, I would like to thank the anonymous
reviewer of this paper, who provided very helpful and detailed comments. Their
feedback was invaluable and I am immensely grateful to them.
Notes
1 The important point to always keep in mind when talking about Quine’s nominalism
about universals is that despite dismissing universals from his ontology, Quine
maintains a strict form of Platonism about mathematical entities and sets, and so is
anti-nominalist with regard to abstract objects. Given this, one should be careful
when calling Quine a nominalist. Throughout this paper, ‘nominalism’ and ‘realism’
746
OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
will be used solely in relation to the debate between those who posit universals and
those who reject universals – i.e., the original, metaphysical uses of realism and
anti-realism.
2 However, at least for Hegel, in rebus (or concrete) universals necessarily are essen-
tial properties of objects.
3 See Beiser (2005, pp. 68–71) for a discussion of spirit monism as well as issues
concerning the interpretation of Hegel’s absolute idealism. The spirit monist inter-
pretation has come under great criticism from Findlay (1958), Hartmann (1972),
Pinkard (1994, 2000), and Brandom (2002, 2009). All these philosophers agree that
there is ultimately nothing in the Hegelian text that genuinely supports the spirit
monist interpretation, and that the way one ought to understand Hegel is by regard-
ing him in a thoroughly non-metaphysical manner. J. N. Findlay suggests that
Hegel’s concerns are restricted to providing a criterion for explanation which
regards teleology as indispensable for our understanding of nature. Klaus Hartmann
interprets Hegel as a category theorist who is interested in developing a conceptual
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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
determination of the judgement of reflection which passed from this through some
to allness; instead of all men we now have to say man...What belongs to all the
individuals of a genus belongs to the genus by its nature, is an immediate conse-
quence and the expression of what we have seen, that the subject, for example all
men, strips off its form determination, and man is to take its place. This intrinsic
and explicit connection constitutes the basis of a new judgement, the judgement of
necessity’ (Hegel, 1969, pp. 649–50).
7 It is worth noting that oddly sometimes the British Idealists make this mistake,
which may be the explanation for where Quine got his conception of the concrete
universal from. See Stern (2007) for further on the British Idealists and the concrete
universal.
8 One may well worry here that the Quinean is probably not committed to essential
properties.
9 The following passage from Armstrong is worth noting here: ‘In a statement of the
form “Fa”, [Quine] holds, the predicate “F” need not be taken with ontological seri-
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ousness. Quine gives the predicate what has been said to be the privilege of the har-
lot: power without responsibility. The predicate is informative, it makes a vital
contribution to telling us what is the case, the world is different if it is different, yet
ontologically it is supposed not to commit us. Nice work: if you can get it’
(Armstrong, 1997, p. 105).
10 The term ‘ostrich nominalism’ was initially coined by Armstrong (1978).
11 Peirce’s Hegelianism is in need of qualification: occasionally, Peirce appears to be
greatly indebted to Hegel, whereas he also sometimes appears extremely dismissive
of him. An example of Peirce’s fondness and contempt for absolute idealism is the
following: ‘The Hegelian philosophy is such an anancasticism [evolution by neces-
sity]. With its revelatory religion, with its synechism (however imperfectly set
forth), with its “reflection,” the whole idea of the theory is superb, almost sublime.
Yet, after all, living freedom is practically omitted from its method. The whole
movement is that of a vast engine, impelled by a vis a tergo, with a blind and mys-
terious fate of arriving at a lofty goal. I mean that such an engine it would be, if it
really worked; but in point of fact, it is a Keely motor. Grant that it really acts as it
professes to act, and there is nothing to do but accept the philosophy. But never
was there seen such an example of a long chain of reasoning, – shall I say with a
flaw in every link? – no, with every link a handful of sand, squeezed into shape in
a dream. Or say, it is a pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality does not
exist. If we use the one precious thing it contains, the idea of it, introducing the ty-
chism [evolution by chance, Darwin] which the arbitrariness of its every step sug-
gests, and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the breadth of the
spirit of love, we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism [evolution by
creativity, Lamarck], at which Hegel was aiming’ (Peirce, 1931–1958, vol. 6,
pp. 293–5).
12 Cf. Peirce, 1931–1958, vol. 5, p. 210. He also claims that nominalism’s rejection of
universals and laws of nature make it ‘anti-scientific in essence’ (vol. 2, p. 166).
Peirce’s many arguments that nominalism is anti-scientific are, in fact, Hegelian
arguments: however, Peirce’s claims to this effect have often been better received
and viewed more seriously than Hegel’s, perhaps because the former’s relation to
and understanding of empirical science has generally been taken to be more credible
than Hegel’s. See Stern (2009) for an excellent discussion of Hegel and Peirce’s cat-
egory of thirdness. See Forster (2011) for an excellent discussion of Peirce’s argu-
ments against nominalism.
13 One can note here that this claim can be made either by discussing Hegelian natu-
ralism or by discussing a Hegelian criticism of Quine.
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OSTRICH NOMINALISM AND PEACOCK REALISM: A HEGELIAN CRITIQUE OF QUINE
14 Cf. ‘Observation, which kept [its biological categories] properly apart and believed
that in them it had something firm and settled, sees principles overlapping one
another, transitions and confusions developing; what it at first took to be absolutely
separate, it sees combined with something else, and what it reckoned to be in com-
bination, it sees apart and separate. So it is that observation which clings to passive,
unbroken selfsameness of being, inevitably sees itself tormented just in its most
general determinations – e.g. of what are the differentiae of an animal or a plant –
by instances which rob it of every determination, invalidate the universality to
which it has risen, and reduce it to an observation and description which is devoid
of thought’ (Hegel, 1977).
15 My only concern with what Stern has written is that he has not qualified the sense
of empiricism in his use of ‘empiricism’. As I have been arguing, Hegel is not
rejecting empiricism simpliciter, rather he is only rejecting a particular form of
empiricism.
16 Parallels can be drawn between this expression and Stanley Cavell’s critique of
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