G.R. Nos.

L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City,
Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.

The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code, reading as follows:

(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which,
in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging
that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of
authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi
Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor
Code. 1

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of
illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there
would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee. " 2

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and
September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16
of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of
recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of
the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article
should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner
argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an
offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the
body of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.

Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of
employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic
rule. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the
recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment
and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or
promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers. "

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any
of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in
consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing
with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create
that presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a
public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County
40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates
and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without
previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers
in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater
number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually
reported in the legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and
placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned
savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the
hands of their own countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four informations against
the private respondent reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 97896. June 2, 1997]
TEKNIKA SKILLS AND TRADE SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, acting through Hon. Undersecretary MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR; HON.
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA);
and ROSANNA L. DE LEON, respondents.
The herein petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of the Order[1] of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
denying petitioner’s appeal from the decision[2] of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)[3] which
found petitioner guilty of misrepresentation. As penalty therefor, petitioner’s license was suspended for two (2) months
or, in lieu thereof, there was imposed on petitioner a fine of P 20,000.00. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
The following relevant facts are not disputed:

Private respondent Rosanna de Leon applied for a job with petitioner Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc., a duly
licensed recruitment agency. She sought foreign employment as a nursing aide. At that time, however, petitioner claims
not to have any job order for nursing aides. What vacant positions petitioner had which needed immediate deployment
were those for janitresses.

On February 10, 1988, private respondent was deployed to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as a janitress with salary rate of U.S. $
300.00 a month. It was only in this very date of her departure for Jeddah that the private respondent was given her
Travel Exit Pass. Said Travel Exit Pass indicated her job position to be that of a janitress.

Upon reaching Saudi Arabia, private respondent was brought to Jeddah where she immediately assumed work as a baby
sitter at a ‘social nursery’ or a kind of orphanage. After working for one (1) month, private respondent was paid only
Five Hundred Eighty One (SR 581.00) Rials. After barely two (2) months of service, private respondent was terminated
by petitioner’s foreign principal.

On April 6, 1988, private respondent arrived in Manila. Immediately thereafter, she filed a complaint against petitioner
which gave rise to two (2) separate cases: (a) The money claims which included her demand for salary corresponding to
the unexpired portion of her employment contract; and (b) the administrative case charging petitioner with illegal
exaction of excessive placement fees and acts of misrepresentation in violation of Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the
POEA Rules and Regulations.

With respect to private respondent’s money claims, the POEA found petitioner solidarily liable with private
respondent’s foreign employer, for an amount corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. This court, in
G.R. No. 100399, sustained said award in a Decision[4] promulgated on August 4, 1992.
The other aspect of private respondent’s complaint concerned the administrative charge against petitioner for
illegal exaction and acts of misrepresentation.
On the question of wether or not petitioner was guilty of illegal exaction, the POEA was not persuaded by the
evidence presented before it; hence, it dismissed that charge for lack of merit. The POEA explained:

“Anent the charge of illegal exaction, a careful perusal of the records of the case reveal[s] that no competent and
corroborating evidence was submitted by complainant to contovert respondent’s denial of alleged receipt of the amount
of P 15,000.00. This Office has consistently ruled that the charge of illegal exaction is a serious charge which may cause
the suspension or cancellation of the authority or license of the offending agency. As such, the charge should be proven
and substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, although the complainant was able to present the receipt covering the partial payment of P 3,000.00,
she was not able to present additional receipts which would show that the amount collected by the respondent exceed
that which the law authorizes. Moreover, she failed to specify the exact dates when the alleged payments were
made. Complainant’s bare allegation that only the cash payment of P 3,000.00 out of the total amount collected was
receipt deserves scant consideration. In the absence of any receipt showing that respondent charge more than
that allowed by law, complainant could have supported her allegations by other evidence like statement of witnesses, if
any or a more detailed narration of facts. Complainant however failed to do so. On the other hand, respondent
adduced as evidence the same receipt presented by the complainant covering the amount of P 3,000.00, which is not in
excess of the allowable placement fee. This leads us to conclude that respondent is not liable for illegal exaction.”[5]

The POEA, however, found petitioner guilty of submitting false and deceptive information regarding the
deployment of private respondent as a janitress when she had in fact actually been hired as a nursing aide by petitioner’s
foreign principal. As such, the POEA adjudged petitioner liable for misrepresentation and penalized it with a two-
month suspension license or in lieu thereof, a fine of P20,000.00. More particularly, the POEA ruled:

“As regards the charge of acts of misrepresentation, on the basis of the evidence presented and admissions made by the
respondent, We find respondent liable for acts of misrepresentation for having caused the processing of complainant’s
travel exit pass [TEP] in a job position and salary rate different from that for which she has applied for. It was the
respondent who admitted that complainant has indeed applied for the position of nursing aide with a salary rate of
$325.00 but in the TEP processed by POEA, her position was that of a janitress x x x. We do not find merit in the
respondent’s contention that there was a previous agreement between them and the complainant regarding the
processing of complainant’s TEP. Granting that there was such an agreement, this will not erase the fact that the
respondent had committed acts of misrepresentation. What the respondent violated are POEA rules and
regulations. The travel exit pass is a duly approved and processed official form issued by the POEA. In lieu of
employment contract, the TEP may be used in determining vital information of the terms of employment. x x x [T]hat
the act of respondent as in this case will run counter to those contained in a valid TEP would be an act of
misrepresentation, a violation of the rules and regulations of the POEA (Rule VI, Section 2 (c), Book II). Having
violated the POEA rules and regulations on recruitment and placement, respondent should be penalized
accordingly. Under the Schedule of Penalties, misrepresentation is sanctioned by two months suspension of license [or]
in lieu thereof a fine of P20,000.00.”[6]

On April 11, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforecited Order of the POEA. It
reasoned:

“With due respect, there was no act of misrepresentation, much less, violation of the x x x POEA rules and
regulations. Complainant, while applying for the position of nursing aide, agreed to be deployed as a
janitress. Accordingly, her travel exit pass was duly processed and approved by the POEA for employment as janitress.
She left the country as janitress according to her TEP. There was therefore no misrepresentation that should be
deployed as a janitress as, in fact, she left for Saudi Arabia as a janitress. Now, the fact that she was employed as a
nursing aide in Saudi Arabia, which is a higher category position, is in effect a promotion to which she should not be
denied. There is no POEA rule or regulation that curtails the right of an employee to a promotion.” [7]

On September 21, 1990, the POEA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
POEA disposed of petitioner’s arguments in the following manner:

“Respondent would want to convince this Office that it has not committed any act of misrepresentation that would
warrant the imposition of the administrative penalty of suspension of license. It justified this argument by citing Section
2 (c), Rule VI of Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations and maintains that their act of deploying complainant as
janitress is not the misrepresentation envisioned by the aforecited section of the POEA Rules. Furthermore,
respondent continued to argue that complainant knew before hand that she would be deployed as a janitress but upon
arrival at the jobsite would work actually as a nursing aide. This fact of actually working as a nursing aide which is higher
in category is in effect a promotion which should not be denied the complainant. Moreover, there is no rule or
regulation which could curtain the right of an employee to a promotion.

We find no merit in respondent’s motion.

The quoted provision is clear and unmistakable. For clarity, it is hereto reproduced en toto:

‘Section 2. Grounds for Suspension, Cancellation or Revocation.

A license or authority shall be cancelled, suspended or revoked on any of the following grounds, among others:
c. Engaging in acts of misrepresentation, such as publication or advertisement of false deceptive notices or information
in relation to the recruitment and placement of workers;

The information submitted by respondent for approval of this Office were false [and] deceptive and misrepresented that
the complainant will work at the employ of Arabian Gulf Co. for Maintenance and Contracting as a janitress whereas the
truth of the matter is that the latter was actually hired as nursing aide and had in fact applied as such. This is certainly an
act of misrepresentation aptly covered by the cited section. The misrepresentation was committed against the POEA
when respondent Teknika declared before us that the worker will be deployed as a janitress whereas the truth is that the
worker was hired as a nursing aide. There was also no truth in respondent’s argument that complainant upon reaching
the jobsite was promoted to that of a nursing aide. The pleadings on record [are] replete with facts to the effect that
complainant applied and was hired as a nursing aide. [H]owever, due to lack of available job order for nursing aide, she
was deployed as a janitress. This is the misrepresentation respondent has clearly committed.”[8]

Aggrieved by the POEA ruling above, petitioner appealed [9] therefrom to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Said appeal was grounded on the following postulations:

POEA Administrator ratiocinates that because the complainant applied and was hired as nursing aide, the processing of
her travel exit pass in a position of janitress is an act of misrepresentation.

It is true that complainant did apply for the position of nursing aide. But, with respect to the finding that she was hired
as nursing aide is another thing for such is mere conjecture and surmise. She was definitely hired as nursing aide for the
reason that there was no job order available for said position. Thus, it was complainant herself who agreed to the offer
to be hired as janitress. In fact, she read and signed the travel exit pass for the position of janitress. She is a high school
graduate and it cannot reasonably be said that she was deceived or that the respondent concealed from the position for
which she was being deployed for employment. Accordingly, complainant’s travel exit pass was processed and approved
by the POEA for employment as janitress. She left the country as janitress in accordance with the TEP. It is plain that
there was no misrepresentation that she would be deployed to what she agreed to be hired – as janitress.

x x x When the POEA Administrator concluded that the complainant herein was hired as nursing aide, the same was
actually baseless because the term ‘hire’ assumes that the application for nursing aide was what was accepted. But x x x
complainant could not have been hired as a nursing aide for lack of available job order for that position. Thus, when
complainant was offered to be deployed as janitress and she accepted the offer, she was hired for no other than as
janitress.

It may be true that the complainant expected to work as nursing attendant when she reaches Saudi Arabia. This is
something else. If this happens, it would work to her advantage. It would constitute a promotion in job category and
would result in increase in pay.

x x x [Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations] is clearly designed for the protection of the
applications for overseas employment. This is why the rule speaks loud and clear of ‘publication and advertisement.’
Under this rule, what is prohibited is the misrepresentation made to the applicant or worker for overseas employment,
such as, those publications and advertisement that would deceive and mislead them with false and deceptive information
and notices. What is contemplated in the rule does not refer to what the POEA Administrator had in mind which is the
alleged misrepresentation or false information allegedly given to the POEA to the effect that the complainant was hired
as a janitress when in truth she was hired as a nursing aide. As shown earlier, this is not a correct finding of fact, but
even assuming, arguendo, that it is a correct finding, it is clear that such alleged misrepresentation is not the
misrepresentation to the worker or applicant contemplated by Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules and
Regulations.”[10]

Passing upon the contentions of petitioner in its Appeal, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, speaking
through Undersecretary Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor, rejected the same and forthwith denied the Appeal. Such denial
was worded in this wise:

“We have carefully reviewed the records of the case at bar and we find no cogent reason to reverse or modify the
assailed Order of the POEA Administrator.
Records reveal that respondent admitted that complainant applied for the position of nursing aide and that the Travel
Exit Pass (TEP) it submitted to the POEA stated her position to be that of a janitress because the only available job
order respondent had that time, was only for janitress. Respondent’s contention that there was a previous agreement
with complainant regarding the processing of her TEP cannot be given any consideration. Such an agreement does not
erase the fact that an act of misrepresentation was committed by respondent.

We herein reiterate that the information submitted by respondent for approval by the POEA was false. Respondent
mirepresented that complainant will work at the Arabian Gulf Co. for Maintenance and Contracting as a janitress when
the truth of the matter was that the complainant worked as a nursing aide at a nursery in Saudi Arabia. This is clearly an
act of misrepresentation covered by Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations x x x.”[11]

Hence this petition which essentially reiterates the arguments on appeal raised before the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Invariably, petitioner here re-asserts that:

x x x The alleged admission to the effect that private respondent applied as nursing aide was taken out of context. It is
true, as in fact, it was admitted that private respondent applied for the position of nursing aide. But the position applied
for was not available and thus not considered at all. There was no job order for that position at the time private
respondent applied therefor. Hence, she was not hired for that position.

However, there was then a job opening for janitress, which was offered to private respondent in lieu of the position of
nursing attendant. She agreed to apply for that position x x x .

She read and signed the Travel Exit Pass (TEP) for the position of janitress. x x x

It is of no moment that private respondent originally applied for the position of nursing aide, because that application
was not considered as, in fact, it was in effect rejected. It is petitioner’s respectful submission that if one’s application is
disapproved and another job offer is made to which one agrees to, it is the latter that counts. x x x Thus, when
respondent POEA Administrator concluded that the private respondent was hired as nursing aide, the same was actually
baseless because the term ‘hire’ assumes that the application for nursing aide was what was accepted. But x x x private
respondent could not have been hired as a nursing aide because the position was already filled up at that time. And
when she was offered to be deployed as janitress which she accepted, she was in fact hired as janitress.

It may be true that when private respondent reached Saudi Arabia she was promoted to nursing aide because several
contract workers holding the same position had already completed their contracts and there was shortage in
manpower. But this is something else. It has nothing to do with the charge of misrepresentation. Relevantly, it worked
to private respondent’s advantage as it is a promotion in job category and resulted in increase in pay. x x x

Under [Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations], what is prohibited is the misrepresentation
made to the applicant contained in those publications and advertisements, such as, false and deceptive information and
notices. There was no deception when petitioner advertised for the position of nursing aide; but the position was
already filled up when private respondent belatedly applied therefor. What is clearly contemplated in the rule does not
refer to what respondent POEA Administrator had in mind which is thealleged misrepresentation or false information
given to the POEA to the effect that private respondent was hired as a janitress when in truth she was hired as a nursing
aide. As shown earlier, this is not a correct finding of fact, but even assuming arguendo, that it is, such is not
the misrepresentation to the worker or applicant contemplated by Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules
and Regulations.

x x x So now that it has been demonstrated that the aforementioned rule does not apply to the situation presented by
public respondent, the penalty imposed on petitioner x x x is clearly erroneous, not to say, too harsh and
excessive. Significantly, there was no prejudice or injury to the private respondent that she was deployed as janitress
upon her own voluntary and free will to be deployed as such, more so, is [that] she were subsequently employed as
nursing aide with the corresponding salary increase, which indeed would work to her advantage and benefit.” [12]

The instant petition, with its rehashed arguments above, is utterly without merit.
 First. Petitioner vehemently insists that it hired private respondent as a janitress, not as a nursing aide, for which
reason private respondent’s Travel Exit Pass (TEP) indicated her job position as one for janitress and not for anything
else. The records reveal, however, that the job actually waiting for private respondent in Jeddah was one for nursing aide
and not at all for a janitress. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the first and only work actually performed by
private respondent in the service of petitioner’s principal, was baby-sitting. The oft-repeated theory of petitioner to the
effect that private respondent was promoted from janitress to nursing aide, thus, impresses us as a mere afterthought in
order to explain the discrepancy between the job position indicated on private respondent’s TEP and the actual work
waiting for and in fact performed by, private respondent upon arrival in Jeddah. The records, instead, show as correct
and substantiated, the findings of both the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment, that, with the full
knowledge that the actual work waiting for and to be performed by, private respondent in the service of petitioner’s
foreign principal was that as a nursing aide or baby-sitter, petitioner submitted to the POEA information about the
deployment of private respondent as a janitress. Ultimately, no amount of denial on the part of petitioner can overcome
the blatant and unrebutted fact that the first and only work waiting for and actually performed by, private respondent in
Jeddah, for petitioner’s principal, was that as nursing aide or baby-sitter which was precisely the work applied for by
private respondent when she first sought to be deployed by petitioner for foreign employment. Otherwise put, the
POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment correctly appreciated the evidence upon which their findings of fact
were based, including their finding as to the hiring of private respondent as janitress when in truth and in fact the only
job awaiting for her in Jeddah was that as a nursing aide or baby-sitter. As such, no grave abuse of discretion may be
attributed to public respondents on the ground of misappreciation of facts and evidence.
Second. Petitioner reiteratingly asseverates that the misrepresentation contemplated by Section 2 (c), Rule VI,
Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations is limited to false and deceptive information and notices disseminated to
applicants for overseas employment who, by reason of such misinformation, are victimized by illegal recruiters or in any
way cheated, defrauded, exploited, oppressed or somehow psychologically, financially or culturally affected in an adverse
manner. As such, petitioner submits that excluded from the coverage of this reglementary provision, are acts of
misrepresentation against the POEA itself such as the submission of deployment papers that contain false information,
as in the instant case. Petitioner, however, fails to explain the basis for differentiating between acts of misrepresentation
against the overseas employment applicants themselves and those against the POEA itself. Perhaps this is so, because
there is in fact no difference as the rule itself provides none.
Whether the acts of misrepresentation are committed against the overseas employment applicants or the POEA,
their perpetration are undeniably a proper object for the exercise by the POEA of their supervisory and regulatory
power over placement and recruitment agencies under Section 2 (c), Rule VI, Book II of the POEA Rules and
Regulations. The fact that said rule gives one example of a kind of misrepresentation covered thereby, does not
transmute into a prohibition against including other kinds of misrepresentation and certainly does not justify an
interpretation that limits the application of said rule to that sole specie of misrepresentation exemplified therein.
The TEP of private respondent categorically shows that the job position for which she was deployed was one as
janitress. This only means that the deployment papers submitted by petitioner to the POEA contained information as
private respondent’s deployment as a janitress and not as a nursing aide or baby-sitter. Upon reaching her job site,
however, the one and only work waiting for private respondent was that as a baby-sitter or nursing aide which was the
position admitted by petitioner to be precisely the one applied for by private respondent when she first approached
petitioner for foreign deployment. Of course petitioner now denies having prior knowledge that the actual work to be
performed by the private respondent in Jeddah was one as baby-sitter and explains the discrepancy by insisting that
private respondent was promoted to baby-sitter upon reaching Jeddah. But petitioner’s denial cannot prevail over the
overwhelming evidence on record that petitioner had in fact misrepresented the true nature of private respondent’s
deployment. As such, we find sufficient legal and jurisprudential basis for the herein assailed decisions of the POEA
and the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Needless to say, the instant petition has utterly failed to show any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DISMISSED.
Cost against petitioner.
G.R. No. 113917 July 17, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FELICIA CABACANG Y MAZAMBIQUE, accused-appellant.

An Illegal Recruitment case was filed against appellant FELICIA MAZAMBIQUE CABACANG for allegedly
committing the following act:

That in or about and during the period comprised from March 22, 1990 to April 27, 1990, both dates
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following
persons: Romeo Eguia, Ronnie Reyes, Armando Castro and Dante Eguia, without first having secured
the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment. 1

The case was raffled off to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, 2 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-
93606. A not guilty plea was entered upon her arraignment on July 17, 1991.

The records reveal that the four private complainants are related. DANTE 3 and ROMEO EGUIA are brothers, and
RONNIE REYES 4 and ARMANDO CASTRO are their brothers-in-law. RAMON EGUIA and prosecution witness
WILMA GREGORIO 5 are Dante's and Romeo's siblings.

The prosecution evidence show that appellant who is not a recruiter licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), 6 handled the processing of the papers of cousins Ramon Eguia and Edgardo Santos. In June,
1988, the two were deployed to Abu Dhabi for employment as janitors. 7 Private complainants were encouraged by their
employment, and decided to apply for overseas janitorial work as well. 8

According to private complainant Ronnie Reyes, he was approached in Lipa by appellant who represented herself as the
Assistant Manager of the Lakas Agency Management Corporation located near Robinson's Department Store in Ermita,
Manila. Appellant informed him that there would be a second batch of overseas workers to be deployed to Abu Dhabi.
Ronnie relayed the information to Wilma, who made further inquiries and verifications from appellant about the job
opportunity. 9 Wilma then directly worked out with appellant, the overseas job applications of private complainants.

Private complainants filed their applications and appellant assured them that they would be able to leave for Abu Dhabi
after the processing of their paper. 10 She instructed them to pay their processing fees 11 directly to her. During the period
from March 3, 1990 to April 27, 1990, inclusive, private complainants through Wilma paid appellant a total of THIRTY-
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P32,500.00). 12

Appellant assured private complainants they could leave for Abu Dhabi on May 10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m. 13 The date of
departure came without private complainants leaving Philippine soil. Thereafter, appellant told them to stay put and wait
for the arrival in the Philippines of their prospective Middle Eastern employer. However, no employer arrived, and the
four complainants failed to be deployed by appellant overseas. 14

Private complainants and Wilma returned to the Lakas Agency to look for appellant. They did not find her. It was then
that they found out from the agency's Manager, MR. NARCISO DELA FUENTE, that appellant was merely renting a
table in the office and was not, employed with Lakas. 15 The revelation moved private complainants to file a complaint
against appellant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 16

The NBI was able to work out a settlement between the parties. Appellant agreed in writing to pay back the processing
fees of private complainants. 17 Nonetheless, appellant did not fully fulfill her obligation under the agreement. She only
refunded a total of SIX THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P6,700.00) to private complainants. 18

For her part, appellant admits that she received from private complainants, through Wilma Gregorio, the sum of
THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P32,500.00). 19 She, however, denied that she was merely
renting a table at the office of the Lakas Agency Management Corporation. She insisted that she was an employee of that
recruitment office owned and managed by Mr. Narciso dela Fuente, 20 and that she acted as its liaison officer and
messenger. As liaison officer, she assisted applicants in the processing of their documents in the POEA. She also signed
documents and receipts in behalf of the recruitment agency. 21

According to appellant, it is the Lakas Agency's policy that each applicant be charged FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as processing fee, and that the airline fare of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) in cases of
deployment to Abu Dhabi be shouldered by the applicant. 22 The agency adopted the policy as a result of its alleged
unfortunate experience with Ramon Eguia and Edgardo Santos. The two, she claimed, refused to pay back the cost of
their tickets (THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS [P30,000.00]) which was advanced by the agency. 23

Appellant blamed private complainants for their failure to leave for Abu Dhabi as they were unable to produce the
money for their air fare. 24 Allegedly, Wilma insisted that the SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (60,000.00) for private
complainants' tickets be advanced by Lakas Agency and be repaid by the four once they start working in Abu Dhabi.
Her proposal did not sit well with the recruitment agency, resulting in the shelving of private complainants' deployment
abroad. 25

Appellant further testified that private complainant Ronnie Reyes later withdrew his application and demanded the
refund of his processing fees, plus SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00) to cover miscellaneous expenses. 26Since
private complainants' papers had already been processed in the POEA, Ronnie was informed that the agency was not
obliged to make the refund to him. He was, however, insistent, so appellant took it upon herself to pay him back. 27 As
guarantee for her promise to make the refund, Ronnie allegedly took her Sony stereo worth FOUR THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P4,700.00), which he never returned to her even after she had given him SIX
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P6,700.00). 28

Appellant also alleged that no similar refunds were made to the three other private complainants. Their processing fees
were merely off-set against the existing obligation of Romeo Eguia and Edgardo Santos with the Lakas Agency. 29

At trial's end, appellant was found guilty of illegal recruitment and sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Felicia
Cabacang y Mosambique (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos. 30

Appellant now assails the trial court's Decision with the following arguments:

1. The court a quo erred by failing to appreciate the facts (1) that (appellant) never represented herself as licensed by the
Department of Labor and Employment — Philippine Overseas Employment Administration as labor recruiter, (2) that
what she represented to the applicants is that her employer LAKAS MANAGEMENT AGENCY is a duly licensed
recruitment agency with principals-employers abroad, and (3) that the accused told applicants that she can help them get
employed with the same employer of their relatives who are now working there through her help.

2. The court a quo erred in finding (appellant) at fault and liable for the failure or negligence of her employer LAKAS
MANAGEMENT AGENCY to register her name as its employee at the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.

3. The court a quo erred in finding (appellant) at fault or liable for the decision/policy of her employer, LAKAS
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, or requiring the four (4) complaining witnesses to pay the cost of their plane tickets from
Manila to the jobsite (Abu Dhabi, UAE);

4. The court a quo erred in finding (appellant) guilty of illegal recruitment based on (appellant's) receipt of the P32,000.00
from Wilma Eguia Gregorio intended as placement fees of the four (4) complaining witnesses.

We affirm appellant's conviction with modifications.

The centerpiece of appellant's defense is two-fold: (1) that she cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment since she
never represented herself to private complainants as a POEA-licensed recruiter; and (2) that she was not the one
responsible for the recruitment of private complainants nor for their
non-deployment for work abroad, since she was merely an employee of the POEA-licensed Lakas Agency Management
Corporation. We reject these contentions.

Firstly, it is incorrect to maintain that to be liable for illegal recruitment, one must represent himself/herself to the
victims as a duly-licensed recruiter. Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, as
"(a)ny recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines "recruitment and
placement" as referring to:

(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Clearly, to prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need to be shown, viz.: (1) the person charged with the crime
must have undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as
amended); and (2) said person does not have a license 31 or authority 32 to do so. It is not required that it be shown that
such person wrongfully represented himself as a licensed recruiter.

Secondly, appellant cannot successfully contend she merely performed her duties as an employee of a licensed
recruitment agency. Apart from her uncorroborated testimony on the matter, she failed to present credible evidence to
buttress her claim of employment. Thus, she failed to follow the immutable rule on burden of proof that "each party
must prove his own affirmative allegations by the amount of evidence required by law. 33

On the other hand, the documentary evidence of the prosecution show that appellant received private complainants'
processing fees from Wilma Gregorio in her own behalf. The wordings of Exhibits "C" to "G", inclusive, are strongly persuasive
on this factual issue.

They read, as follows:

Exh. "C": "Received from Wilma Gregorio the amount of 5,000 only";

Exh. "D": "Received from Romeo Eguia amount 5,000";

Exh. "E": "Received from Wilma the amount of 5,000 Wilma — only"

Exh. "F": "Received from Wilma Gregorio amount 7,500 pesos only"; and

Exh. "G": "Received the amount of 10,000 pesos from Wilma Gregorio as Deposit, 4 applicants."

These receipts — which are not written on Lakas agency stationary — show no indication that the payments were
accepted by appellant in behalf of the
Lakas Agency Management Corporation. Exh. "J", which is the Commitment/Agreement executed and signed by appellant
before the NBI further proves that she was acting in her own behalf in receiving Wilma's payment. For, why else would she
personally "promise to return to Wilma Gregorio . . . the amount of P32,500.00" if said sum was for the benefit of the
Lakas Agency?

More importantly, the prosecution demonstrated reasonable doubt that appellant performed recruitment activities
without any license to do so. She informed private complainant Ronnie Reyes that there would be a second batch of
janitors to be deployed to Abu Dhabi. After she accepted private complainants' job applications, she assured them that
they would be able to fly to that Middle Eastern nation after their papers are processed by the POEA. She told them,
through Wilma, to pay their processing fees directly to her, and later personally received the same, in the total amount of
THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00). She issued and signed the receipts evidencing payment to her of
such fees. She processed private complainants' papers at the POEA, and she assured them that they were to fly to Abu
Dhabi on May 10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m. Throughout the entire transaction, private complainants and Wilma Gregorio dealt
with appellant, and with appellant alone. The only time they talked to the manager of the Lakas Agency was after their
aborted flight to Abu Dhabi, when they were trying to locate the whereabouts of appellant.

Clearly, it was appellant who directly recruited private complainants within the meaning of Article 38 (a) and (b) the
Labor Code. Since it is undisputed that appellant is not a holder of a license or authority to recruit from the Department
of Labor, through the POEA, her acts constitute illegal recruitment.

Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment, and a fine which varies by degrees in accordance with
the enumeration made in
Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. In the case at bench, since appellant was charged with and convicted of
illegally recruiting four (4) people, her crime is classified as having been committed in large scale. 34 As such, it is
considered as involving economic sabotage, and carries with it a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00). 35 In addition to these penalties, appellant must also be ordered to indemnify private complainants the
unrefunded portion of their processing fees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated January 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in
Criminal Case No. 91-93606 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that, in addition to being sentenced to suffer
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), appellant Felicia
Mazambique Cabacang is likewise ordered to indemnify private complainants in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P25,800.00). Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rolando Gamalinda for accused-appellant.

This is an appeal by accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. alias "Percy" from the decision 1 dated October 31, 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasisnan, Branch 38 in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994,
L-3996 and L-4000 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

In the light of what has been stated and discussed above, the court finds and holds the accused Fernando Manungas y Go alias
"Percy" guilty beyond peradventure of doubt of the crimes filed against him and conformable thereto, hereby pronounces judgment
as follows:

In Criminal Case No. L-3993, the court declares accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for the sum of
P16,800.00 as alleged in the information filed against him and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term from two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and ten years (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional
as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The court further orders the accused to reimburse the offended party, Wilfrey Mabalot, the sum of sixteen thousand eight hundred
(P16,800.00) pesos which is the amount of money paid and delivered to him by said complaining witness without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-3994, the court likewise declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for the
sum of P17,550.00 as charged in the information. And there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance present, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term from two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and (11) days ofprision
correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The court further directs the accused to reimburse the offended party, Danilo Ramirez the sum of seventeen thousand five hundred
fifty (P17,550.00) pesos which the accused took from the complaint without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-3996, the court also declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for eighteen
thousand six hundred (P18,600.00) pesos as charged in the information filed against him. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance present, and applying the Indeterminate Law in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term from two (2) years, eleven months (11) months and ten (10) days asminimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional as maximumand to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The court also directs the accused to reimburse the offended party the sum of eighteen thousand six hundred (P18,600.00) pesos
which is the amount paid and delivered by the offended party to him without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-4000, the court likewise holds the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Precy" guilty of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment on Large Scale as charged in the information filed against him, defined and penalized under the provisions of
Article 39, par. (a) of Presidential Decree No. 2018 amending Articles 38 and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code
of the Philippines, and conformable thereto, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay
a fine of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to law.

The accused shall serve the penalties herein imposed against him successively or one after the other according to their severity. 2

Based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in April of 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan where he stayed
in the house of Arturo and Lilia de Vera to recruit workers for employment abroad. During his stay, accused-appellant was able to
convince complainants Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to apply as janitors in Saudi
Arabia. He told them to bring all the necessary documents for the processing of their applications to his office in Manila.
On April 29, 1987, complainants went to accused-appellant's office located at Room 611, L and S Bldg., 1414 Roxas Blvd., Ermita,
Manila and paid accused-appellant P250.00 each for their medical examination. Thereafter, accused-appellant required the
complainants to pay, on various occasions, placement fees and other expenses incurred in the processing of their papers and issued
corresponding receipts for said amounts. The total amount paid by the complainants to accused-appellant are the following: Wilfrey
Mabalot — P16,800.00; Danilo Ramirez — P17,550.00, Leonardo Estanoco — 18,600.00, and Crisanto Collado — 13,300.00

When complainants failed to leave for Saudi Arabia, they requested Luis "Jing" Ramirez, to verify with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) whether accused-appellant was licensed to recruit workers for abroad.
They subsequently learned that he was not as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA. 3

Thereafter, complaints filed against accused-appellant complaints for Estafa defined under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale. In due course, informations fro three (3) counts of Estafa
(Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994 and L-3996) and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale (Criminal Case No. L-4000)
were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.

On the other hand, accused-appellant maintained that he was the operations manager of the ZG Recruitment and
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. Sometime in April 1987, he went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug,
Pangasinan and recruited complainants to work in Saudi Arabia as janitors. Unfortunately, the job order for the janitorial
services was awarded to Express Placement Agency instead of ZG Recruitment and Placement agency. Thereafter,
accused-appellant transferred complainants' application for overseas employment to Nora Cunanan of Express
Placement Agency. Accused-appellant also turned over the fees paid by the complainants to Nora Cunanan as evidenced
by the receipts 4 issued by the latter. When Nora Cunanan absconded with the money of the complainants, accused-
appellant filed an estafa case against Nora Cunanan after securing a Special Power of Attorney from the complainants to
prosecute and collect their money. However, he was not able to attend the hearing as he was arrested in connection with
the these cases.

Accused-appellant maintains that he did not make false representations to the complainants when he requited the latter
for employment abroad as he had told complainants that he is only an employee of a licensed recruitment agency in
Manila. He further claims that he was not motivated by any deceitful intentions and had not caused any damage to the
complainants because the amounts of money given to him by the latter were actually spent for their medical tests and
other documents necessary for their overseas employment.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "Recruitment and Placement" as:

Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

In the instant case, accused-appellant told complainants to submit to him their pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances
and the necessary documents for the processing of their employment in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, accused-appellant
collected from each of the complainants payment for the their respective passport, training fee, placement fee, medical
tests and other sundry expenses which unquestionably constitutes acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
Besides, there is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of his ability to send a worker abroad 5 and there is
evidence that accused-appellant had represented to the complainants that he could send them abroad as janitors in Saudi
Arabia. And because of his representation, complainants gave their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in
consideration of the same representation. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:

It may be that at the time appellant recruited private complainants, he was then the operations manager of the ZGR
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. But, as amply established by the evidence, the recruitment of
private complainants was appellant's own personal undertaking. He did not do it for the agency. This is clearly shown by
the sequence of events that led to the consum[m]ation of the transaction in question. Thus: it was appellant who talked
private complainants into applying for employment abroad; when private complainants signified their interest, he alone
was the one who informed them of the documents that they have to secure; he too was the one who demanded and
received from them the fees for medical examination, passport, authentication, training, placement and psycho and
AIDS test; also, he was the one who assured them of employment abroad and of the return of their money in the event
of their non-deployment; moreover, it was he who undertook to inform private complainants of their departure.

But that is not all. When private complainants failed to receive notice of their departure as promised them by appellant,
they had somebody verify with the POEA if appellant was a licensed recruiter. This circumstance shows all the more
that indeed appellant represented himself to be the recruiter, otherwise it would have been the status of the agency with
which he allegedly worked for, that private complainants would have requested to be verified. 6

As to accused-appellant's claim that he did not misappropriate the money given to him by the complainants as he had
turned over the latters' placement fees to Nora Cunanan, who subsequently absconded with the complainant's money,
the trial court correctly held that:

The version of the defense has the nature of a cock and bull story which is difficult and hard to accept. It is something
that is fantastic and ridiculous. It is within the realm of fiction and patently a mere fabrication to exculpate the accused
from the consequences of his nefarious and deceitful activities. If it is really true that the complainants were transferred
and accommodated by the agency of Nora Cunanan, why did not the accused and Mrs. Lydia Zamora who appear to be
both intelligent take the necessary prudence and caution of putting the supposed agreement to transfer in writing
considering the amounts of funds involved in the alleged transfer. Logic and common sense dictate that under such a
situation, the accused and Mrs. Zamora take ordinary care of their concerns. To impress the court that there was really a
transfer made, the accused claimed that there was a estafa case filed against Mrs. Cunanan before the City Fiscal's Office
in Manila. It is however surprising why Atty. Jose Torrefranca who was engaged by the accused to file the estafa case did
not present any letter-complaint or any charged sheet filed against Mrs. Cunanan. He did not even mention the Fiscal
who investigated the case. More intriguing is the fact that counsel does not know what happened to the alleged case of
estafa after he filed the same. Likewise, when Mrs. Lydia Zamora declared, she claimed that the case filed against Nora
Cunanan was before the Regional Trial Court and not in the City Fiscal's Office.

Defense also made capital of the special power of atty. executed by the complainants (exhibit 4) and their letters sent to
the accused (exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8) to convince the court that the real culprit in the whole mess in Nora Cunanan. The
complainants made convincing explanation why they signed the special power of attorney. Wilfrey Mabalot declared that
when the accused asked him to sign the document, he was told that its purpose is to facilitate their departure and when
he signed the letter exhibit "6" he was just told to sign by the accused and because the latter was in [a] hurry, he signed
without knowing its contents. He likewise explained that being a mere high school graduate he was not able to
understand the imports of its contents. Danilo Ramirez explained that when he signed the special power of attorney, he
did not read the contents because the accused was in [a] hurry in returning to Manila and that he sent the three letters to
the accused while he was confined in jail because Manungas asked him to help him (accused) recover the money given to
Mrs. Cunanan. Leonardo Estanoco declared, that he signed exhibit "4" because the accused told him that the document
will be used to facilitate the processing of their papers. He did not understand its contents because he only understands
little English. 7

Thus accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment. Under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, the crime of illegal recruitment is qualified when the same is committed against three (3) or more persons.

A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is
a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in
se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in a large scale,
decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125044. July 13, 1998]
IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR. No. 15624 dated
January 31, 1996,[1] which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite,
convicting accused-appellant, Imelda Darvin for simple illegal recruitment under Article 38 and Article 39, in relation to
Article 13 (b) and (c), of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:

“That on or about the 13th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through fraudulent representation to one Macaria
Toledo to the effect that she has the authority to recruit workers and employees for abroad and can facilitate the
necessary papers in connection thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hire, recruit and promise
a job abroad to one Macaria Toledo, without first securing the necessary license and permit from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration to do so, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the aforesaid Macaria Toledo.

Contrary to law.”[2]

The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of private respondent, Macaria Toledo, shows that
sometime in March, 1992, she met accused-appellant Darvin in the latter’s residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite,
through the introduction of their common friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. In said meeting, accused-
appellant allegedly convinced Toledo that by giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the United
States without any appearance before the U.S. embassy.[3] Thus, on April 13, 1992, Toledo gave Darvin the amount of
P150,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt stating that the ‘amount of P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare.’ [4] After
receiving the money, Darvin assured Toledo that she can leave within one week. However, when after a week, there was
no word from Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire about any development, but could not find
Darvin. Thereafter, on May 7, 1992, Toledo filed a complaint with the Bacoor Police Station against Imelda
Darvin. Upon further investigation, a certification was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) stating that Imelda Darvin is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.[5] Accused-appellant was then charged for estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that she used to be connected with Dale Travel Agency and that in
1992, or thereabouts, she was assisting individuals in securing passports, visa, and airline tickets. She came to know
Toledo through Florencio Jake Rivera, Jr. and Leonila Rivera, alleging that Toledo sought her help to secure a passport,
US visa and airline tickets to the States. She claims that she did not promise any employment in the U.S. to
Toledo. She, however, admits receiving the amount of P150,000.00 from the latter on April 13, 1992 but contends that
it was used for necessary expenses of an intended trip to the United States of Toledo and her friend, Florencio
Rivera[6] as follows: P45,000.00 for plane fare for one person; P1,500.00 for passport, documentation and other
incidental expenses for each person; P20,000.00 for visa application cost for each person; and P17,000.00 for
services.[7] After receiving the money, she allegedly told Toledo that the papers will be released within 45 days. She
likewise testified that she was able to secure Toledo’s passport on April 20, 1992 and even set up a date for an interview
with the US embassy. Accused alleged that she was not engaged in illegal recruitment but merely acted as a travel agent
in assisting individuals to secure passports and visa.
In its judgment rendered on June 17, 1993, the Bacoor, Cavite RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
simple illegal recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Imelda Darvin is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment for having committed the prohibited practice as defined by paragraph (b) of Article
34 and punished by paragraph (c) of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 2018.
Accused Imelda Darvin is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of Four (4) years, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, as
maximum; and to pay the fine of P25,000.00.

Regarding her civil liability, she is hereby ordered to reimburse the private complainant the sum of P150,000.00 and
attorney’s fees of P10,000.00.

She is hereby acquitted of the crime of Estafa.

SO ORDERED.”[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Before this Court, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial and appellate courts in convicting her of the
crime of simple illegal recruitment. She contends that based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, her guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Article 13 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:

“x x x; b) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment. locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided , that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”

On the other hand, Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.

xxx xxx x x x.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the
person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a
license or authority to do so.[9]
In this case, private respondent, Macaria Toledo alleged that she was offered a job in the United States as nursing
aide[10] by accused-appellant. In her direct examination, she testified as follows:
“Atty Alejandro:
Q : How did you come to know the accused?
Witness : I was introduced by my two friends. One of whom is my best friend. That according to them, this
accused has connections and authorizations, that she can make people leave for abroad, sir.
Court : What connections?
Witness : That she has connections with the Embassy and with people whom she can approach regarding work
abroad, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q : When you came to meet for the first time in Imus, Cavite, what transpired in that meeting of yours?
A : When I came to her house, the accused convinced me that by means of P150,000.00, I will be able to
leave immediately without any appearance to any embassy, non-appearance, Sir.
Q : When you mentioned non-appearance, as told to you by the accused, precisely, what do you mean by
that?
A : I was told by the accused that non-appearance, means without working personally for my papers and
through her efforts considering that she is capacitated as according to her I will be able to leave the country,
Sir.
 xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Alejandro : What transpired after the accused told you all these things that you will be able to secure all the
documents without appearing to anybody or to any embassy and that you will be able to work abroad?
Witness : She told me to get ready with my P150,000.00, that is if I want to leave immediately, Sir.
Atty. Alejandro : When you mentioned kaagad, how many days or week?
Witness : She said that if I will able to part with my P150,000.00. I will be able to leave in just one week time, Sir.
xxx xxx x x x.”[11]
The prosecution, as evidence, presented the certification issued by the POEA that accused-appellant Imelda
Darvin is not licensed to recruit workers abroad.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license or authority to engage in recruitment
activities. The pivotal issue to be determined, therefore, is whether the accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment
activities, as defined under the Labor Code. Applying the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce,[12] to prove that
accused-appellant was engaged in recruitment activities as to commit the crime of illegal recruitment, it must be shown
that the accused appellant gave private respondent the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the
private respondent abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to part with her money in order to be so
employed.
In this case, we find no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private
respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent
work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The
claim of the accused that the P150,000.00 was for payment of private respondent’s air fare and US visa and other
expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the P150,000.00, which was presented by both parties during the trial
of the case, stated that it was “for Air Fare and Visa to USA.”[13] Had the amount been for something else in addition to
air fare and visa expenses, such as work placement abroad, the receipt should have so stated.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can
hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that
accused-appellant engaged in recruitment activities. We also note that the prosecution did not present the testimonies of
witnesses who could have corroborated the charge of illegal recruitment, such as Florencio Rivera, and Leonila Rivera,
when it had the opportunity to do so. As it stands, the claim of private respondent that accused-appellant promised her
employment abroad is uncorroborated. All these, taken collectively, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of private respondent that she was offered by accused-appellant
employment abroad, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures, to convict the latter. No sufficient evidence was shown
to sustain the conviction, as the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that accused-appellant indeed
engaged in recruitment activities, thus committing the crime of illegal recruitment.
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of
the offense with which the accused is charged; and if the proof fails to establish any of the essential elements necessary
to constitute a crime, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [14]
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that accused-appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being
proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the
crime of which he stands accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his
innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.[15]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15624 dated January 31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is hereby
ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, let the accused be immediately released from her place of
confinement unless there is reason to detain her further for any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D.
AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.

On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable
under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging —

That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1)
Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez,
(5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y
Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor. 1

On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested.2 Hence,
on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the
accused. 3

Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties, Rogelio Salado, requested on
March 17, 1989 for a copy of the warrant of arrest. 4 Eventually, at around midday of February 26, 1993, Nelly Agustin
was apprehended by the Parañaque police. 5 On March 8, 1993, her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and
requested that it be set for hearing "for purposes of due process and for the accused to immediately have her day in
court" 6 Thus, on April 15, 1993, the trial court reinstated the case and set the arraignment for May 3, 1993, 7 on which
date of Agustin pleaded not guilty 8 and the case subsequently went to trial.

Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he
declared that sometime in March or April, 1987, he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-
applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as
the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be
deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he
gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt. 9

Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of
the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce,
owners of the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of
the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they
subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad. 10

Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-
applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but
Salado failed to leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he
decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover
Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning
that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but
Agustin could only give him P500.00. 11

Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin.
Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to
apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her
husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of
them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00. 12
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office
because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as
payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he
and his wife failed to leave for abroad. 13

Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the
Clover Placement Agency at Parañaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who
introduced herself as the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter.
He submitted several pertinent documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials. 14

In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of
that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the
placement office once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he
failed to leave for abroad as promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma
Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments. 15

As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in
February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Parañaque. She informed
him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in
Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00. 16

On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In
the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he
could leave for abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up
his application but to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only
give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her. 17

Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at
Tambo, Parañaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the
Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned
complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she
acceded. 18

Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the
Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the
complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce
spouses. She failed to do so because in truth, so she claims, she does not know the present address of the couple. All she
knew was that they had left their residence in 1987. 19

Although she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and Alvarez, she explained that it was entirely for
different reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a loan, while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that
time. 20

On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of
P100,000.00. 21

In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments: (1) her act of introducing complainants to the
Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the
Goce spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to the
complainants. 22 These three arguments being interrelated, they will be discussed together.

Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in
Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group.

At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case were not authorized to engage in any recruitment
activity, as evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, on November 10, 1987. Said certification states that Dan and Loma
Goce and Nelly Agustin are neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. 23 Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Appellant, however, denies that she was in any
way guilty of illegal recruitment. 24

It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of
said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them, the
complainants asked her to introduce them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied with
their request. Such an act, appellant argues, does not fall within the meaning of "referral" under the Labor Code to make
her liable for illegal recruitment.

Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 25 On the other hand,
referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected
applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. 26

Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced complainants to the Goce couple or
her actions went beyond that. The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive
of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the
papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the
placement agency.

As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce
the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to
the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. 27

Despite Agustin's pretensions that she was but a neighbor of the Goce couple, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses paint a different picture. Rogelio Salado and Dionisio Masaya testified that appellant represented herself as the
manager of the Clover Placement Agency. Ramona Salado was offered a job as a cutter/sewer by Agustin the first time
they met, while Ernesto Alvarez remembered that when he first met Agustin, the latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis
papunta sa Oman." 28 Indeed, Agustin played a pivotal role in the operations of the recruitment agency, working together
with the Goce couple.

There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad." 29 It is
undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30

It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their applications. Her act of
collecting from each of the complainants payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical
tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law. In fact,
appellant demanded and received from complainants amounts beyond the allowable limit of P5,000.00 under
government regulations. It is true that the mere act of a cashier in receiving money far exceeding the amount allowed by
law was not considered per se as "recruitment and placement" in contemplation of law, but that was because the recipient
had no other participation in the transactions and did not conspire with her co-accused in defrauding the victims. 31 That
is not the case here.

Appellant further argues that "there is no evidence of receipts of collections/payments from complainants to appellant."
On the contrary, xerox copies of said receipts/vouchers were presented by the prosecution. For instance, a cash voucher
marked as Exhibit D, 32 showing the receipt of P10,000.00 for placement fee and duly signed by appellant, was presented
by the prosecution. Another receipt, identified as Exhibit E, 33 was issued and signed by appellant on February 5, 1987 to
acknowledge receipt of P4,000.00 from Rogelio and Ramona Salado for "processing of documents for Oman." Still
another receipt dated March 10, 1987 and presented in evidence as Exhibit F, shows that appellant received from
Ernesto Alvarez P2,000.00 for "processing of documents for Oman." 34

Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were lost, hence only xerox copies thereof were presented and
which, under the circumstances, were admissible in evidence. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be
proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. 35

Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the prosecution as secondary evidence are not allowable in
court, still the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal of appellant. In People vs. Comia, 36where this particular issue
was involved, the Court held that the complainants' failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused
therein, as well as their consequent failure to present receipts before the trial court as proof of the said payments, is not
fatal to their case. The complainants duly proved by their respective testimonies that said accused was involved in the
entire recruitment process. Their testimonies in this regard, being clear and positive, were declared sufficient to establish
that factum probandum.

Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting the version of the prosecution witnesses, their statements
being positive and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than the mere uncorroborated and self-serving
denials of appellant. The lame defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence
presented by the prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 37

The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case essentially involves the credibility of witnesses which
is best left to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence of abuse of discretion therein. The findings of fact of a trial
court, arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of
witnesses, certainly deserve respect by an appellate court. 38 Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court on the matter
of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 39

In a last-ditch effort to exculpate herself from conviction, appellant argues that there is no proof of conspiracy between
her and the Goce couple as to make her liable for illegal recruitment. We do not agree. The evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly establish that appellant confabulated with the Goces in their plan to deceive the complainants.
Although said accused couple have not been tried and convicted, nonetheless there is sufficient basis for appellant's
conviction as discussed above.

In People vs. Sendon, 40 we held that the non-prosecution of another suspect therein provided no ground for the appellant
concerned to fault the decision of the trial court convicting her. The prosecution of other persons, equally or more
culpable than herein appellant, may come later after their true identities and addresses shall have been ascertained and
said malefactors duly taken into custody. We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule and course of procedure should
not apply in this case.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-
appellant Nelly D. Agustin.
[G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BULU CHOWDURY, accused-appellant.

In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale committed as follows:

"That sometime between the period from August 1994 to October 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants: Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C.
Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for employment in Korea without first obtaining the required
license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration." [1]

They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private complainants.[2] The State Prosecutor,
however, later dismissed the estafa charges against Chowdury [3] and filed an amended information indicting only Ong for
the offense.[4]

Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale.[5]

Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella Calleja and Melvin Miranda, and
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.

Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers
(Craftrade) for employment as factory worker in South Korea. Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the
interview. During the interview, Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment. He told him to
submit his passport, NBI clearance, passport size picture and medical certificate. He also required him to undergo a
seminar. He advised him that placement would be on a first-come-first-serve basis and urged him to complete the
requirements immediately. Sasis was also charged a processing fee of P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the requirements in
September 1994. He also paid a total amount of P16,000.00 to Craftrade as processing fee. All payments were received
by Ong for which she issued three receipts.[6] Chowdury then processed his papers and convinced him to complete his
payment.[7]

Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his application but he was always told
to return some other day. In one of his visits to Craftrade’s office, he was informed that he would no longer be deployed
for employment abroad. This prompted him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find Chowdury. After two
unsuccessful attempts to contact him, he decided to file with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) a case for illegal recruitment against Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's
license had already expired and has not been renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a licensed
recruiter.[8]

Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for employment as factory worker in South Korea. She
was interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, he asked questions regarding her marital status, her age and her
province. Toward the end of the interview, Chowdury told her that she would be working in a factory in Korea. He
required her to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. He also obliged
her to attend a seminar on overseas employment. After she submitted all the documentary requirements, Chowdury
required her to pay P20,000.00 as placement fee. Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to Ong for which she
was issued a receipt.[9] Chowdury assured her that she would be able to leave on the first week of September but it
proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was not able to leave despite several follow-ups. Thus, she went to the POEA
where she discovered that Craftrade's license had already expired. She tried to withdraw her money from Craftrade to no
avail. Calleja filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal counsel.[10]
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied him to the office of Craftrade in Ermita, Manila and
introduced him to Chowdury who presented himself as consultant and interviewer. Chowdury required him to fill out a
bio-data sheet before conducting the interview. Chowdury told Miranda during the interview that he would send him to
Korea for employment as factory worker. Then he asked him to submit the following documents: passport, passport size
picture, NBI clearance and medical certificate. After he complied with the requirements, he was advised to wait for his
visa and to pay P25,000.00 as processing fee. He paid the amount of P25,000.00 to Ong who issued receipts
therefor.[11] Craftrade, however, failed to deploy him. Hence, Miranda filed a complaint with the POEA against
Chowdury for illegal recruitment.[12]

Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA testified that she prepared a
certification on June 9, 1996 that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong, were not, in their personal capacities, licensed
recruiters nor were they connected with any licensed agency. She nonetheless stated that Craftrade was previously
licensed to recruit workers for abroad which expired on December 15, 1993. It applied for renewal of its license but was
only granted a temporary license effective December 16, 1993 until September 11, 1994. From September 11, 1994, the
POEA granted Craftrade another temporary authority to process the expiring visas of overseas workers who have
already been deployed. The POEA suspended Craftrade's temporary license on December 6, 1994. [13]

For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty
was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors,
Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency’s President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency's Managing
Director. Chowdury admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different dates. Their office secretary handed
him their bio-data and thereafter he led them to his room where he conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he
had with him a form containing the qualifications for the job and he filled out this form based on the applicant's
responses to his questions. He then submitted them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings. He
never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade on November 12, 1994. [14]

Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the Accreditation Branch of the POEA presented a list
of the accredited principals of Craftrade Overseas Developers[15] and a list of processed workers of Craftrade Overseas
Developers from 1988 to 1994.[16]

The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. It
sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. It further ordered him to pay Aser Sasis the
amount of P16,000.00, Estrella Calleja, P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proved the guilt of
the accused Bulu Chowdury beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large
scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00
under Art. 39 (b) of the New Labor Code of the Philippines. The accused is ordered to pay the
complainants Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00; Estrella Calleja the amount of P20,000.00; Melvin
Miranda the amount of P25,000.00."[17]

Chowdury appealed.

The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:

(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. [18]

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042[19] states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:
 "The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable."

The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitment[20] defines who are the principals, accomplices
and accessories. The principals are: (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly
force or induce others to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.[21] The accomplices are those persons who may not be considered
as principal as defined in Section 17 of the Revised Penal Code but cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous act.[22] The accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manner: (1) by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) by
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
and (3) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt at
the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. [23]

Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-appellant contends that he may not
be held liable for the offense as he was merely an employee of Craftrade and he only performed the tasks assigned to
him by his superiors. He argues that the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers having control,
management and direction of the agency.

As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be
held liable as principal, together with his employer,[24] if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment.[25] It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the
corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously
acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee
or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and
will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his
efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. [26] The law of agency, as applied in civil
cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the commission
of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. [27] The culpability of the employee therefore
hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the
employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he
may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer. [28]

The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in
the commission of the crime charged.

We find that he did not.

Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months of June, August and September
in 1994 at Craftrade's office. At that time, he was employed as interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under
a temporary authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its license. [29] The temporary license included the authority
to recruit workers.[30] He was convicted based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of
Craftrade. Neither was he, in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of
the Rules and Regulation Governing Overseas Employment (1991) requires that every change, termination
or appointment of officers, representatives and personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the POEA. Agents or
representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment agency whose appointments are not previously approved by the
POEA are considered "non-licensee " or "non-holder of authority" and therefore not authorized to engage in
recruitment activity.[31]

Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was
aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this
knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. [32] A mere
employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand
shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly
licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf.
Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed
them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them. Their payments were received by the
agency's cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and
managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's
conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is
without basis.

This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed against them. The
Department of Justice may still file a complaint against the officers having control, management or direction of the
business of Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment
is a crime of economic sabotage which need to be curbed by the strong arm of the law. It is important, however, to
stress that the government's action must be directed to the real offenders, those who perpetrate the crime and benefit
from it.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to RELEASE accused-
appellant unless he is being held for some other cause, and to REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within
ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of
Justice for his information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 112175. July 26, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGINEER RODOLFO DIAZ, accused-
appellant.
Rodolfo 'Erwin' Diaz seeks the mandate of this Court to review the decision dated September 2, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Davao City,[1] in Criminal Case No. 26, 993-92 convicting him of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 plus the costs.
In an Information dated August 15, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor David W. Natividad of Davao City charged
appellant of violating Articles 38 (a) and 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:

"That sometime in the month of July 1992, in the City of Davao, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovementioned accused, purporting himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, particularly Brunei and Japan, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to Mary Anne Navarro, Maria Theresa Fabricante and Maria Elena Ramirez, without
first securing the required license and/or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

The antecedent facts found by the Court a quo reads:

"Mary Anne Navarro was 22 years old, single and a student of the University of the Immaculate Concepcion in
1992, taking up Bachelor of Science in Music, Davao City.
Maria Theresa Fabricante was 23 years old, single and jobless in 1992. She is accordingly a commerce graduate of
the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City.
Maria Elena Ramirez was 27 years old, married and a businesswoman in 1992. She is accordingly a college
graduate of the University of Mindanao in Davao City where she finished the course of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, major in management.
From the combined testimonies of these three complainants, the Court has gathered that this is what happened,
which gave rise to this case:

In June 1992 they were all enrolled at the Henichi Techno Exchange Cultural Foundation in Davao City, studying
Niponggo. Their teacher was Mrs. Remedios Aplicador.

One day Mrs. Aplicador told them that if they wanted to go and work abroad, particularly Brunei where they could
earn a salary of "$700.00 for four hours daily work," she would refer them to Mr. Paulo Lim who knew one Engr. Erwin
Diaz who was recruiting applicants for Brunei (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 10-11 & tsn 9-8-92 p. 34).
Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three complainants went to Mr. Paulo Lim who explained to them that he
was not the one recruiting workers but Engr. Diaz (tsn 9-8-92 p. 34). Mr. Lim informed them that his children had
already applied with Engr. Diaz and that the requirements were bio-data, passport, medical checkup, I.D. and income tax
return, and P2,500.00 for processing of their papers (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 11 & 23-24 & 9-8-92 pp. 46 & 58). Telling them that
he knew "pretty well the recruiter" Engr. Diaz and that "We don't have to worry we can really go abroad and as a matter
of fact he said that his three children were applying (to go) to Brunei," he offered to accompany them to Engr. Erwin
Diaz at the office of the CIS (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 11). They asked Mr. Lim when he was available, and he said July 18 (1992),
Saturday morning (tsn, 9-8-92, p. 34).
On July 18, Mr. Paulo Lim and Mrs. Remedios Aplicador accompanied the three complainants to Engr. Diaz who
was then being detained in the CIS Detention Center in Davao City and introduced them to him. The complainants
asked Engr. Diaz why he was "inside the cell," and he explained that four applicants had filed a case against him
"because they could not accept that they were sick of hepatitis and that the CIS elements are just making money out of
it" (tsn, 9-8-92, p. 35). They asked him if he was "recruiting applicants for Brunei" and "he said yes"; they also inquired
what were the requirements, and he said four passport size pictures of each applicant, bio-data, income tax return,
medical certificate, NBI clearance, passport, P2,500.00 for processing of the papers of each applicant, and P65,000.00 as
placement fee, but only P20,000.00 for plane fare was to be paid by each applicant, the balance of P45,000.00 was to be
paid by means of salary deductions (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 12; tsn, 9-8-92, p. 35 & p. 59). The P2,500.00 for processing of their
respective applications was to be paid at the house of Engr. Diaz at 14 Aries Street, GSIS Heights, Davao City, with
telephone no. 8-46-71 (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 12).
Mary Anne Navarro paid P2,300.00 to Engr. Diaz at his residence on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "C"). There is no
explanation by her why she paid only P2,300.00 and not P2.500.00.
Maria Theresa Fabricante paid only P2,000.00 to Engr. Diaz also on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "E"). She paid only that
amount because, according to her testimony, she already had a passport and Engr. Diaz said she was required to pay
only P2,000.00, (tsn, 9-8-92, p. 35).
Maria Elena Ramirez paid to Engr. Diaz P2,500.00 but she lost her receipt (tsn, 9-8-92, p. 59). However, it was
returned to her by Engr. Diaz on August 17, 1992 (Exh. "G").
Exhibit "G" is a RECEIPT signed by the three complainants acknowledging the return to them respectively of the
amounts of P2,300.00, P2,000.00 and P2,500.00 by the accused and his wife who also signed it as witnesses (tsn, 9-8-92,
p. 43).
After submitting to the accused all the required papers and undergoing medical examination (before the return of
said amounts to the complainants), they asked him when they could leave. The accused told them to wait for three to
four weeks as his papers were still being processed by the CIS (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 15). During this period when the accused
had already been released from detention (testimony of the accused, tsn, 4-27-93, pp. 16-17), the complainants kept
inquiring from him when they would be leaving for Brunei, going to his house several times where they saw many other
applicants like them. But the accused just kept saying that his papers were still with the CIS (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 15).
When he was still detained, he told the complainants that "the name of his agency is confidential but the owner
thereof is Erlinda Romualdez" who "used to be her (sic) mistress" assuring them that "we don't have to worry about it
because he said it is government project and then he said he will escort us to Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing before
leaving for abroad and after the briefing at the Philippine Plaza Hotel we will proceed to POEA where we will sign a
contract that is the time we will give him the amount of P20,000.00 and then we will proceed to the residence of Erlinda
Romualdez where we will be staying for three days" (tsn, 9-8-92, pp. 40-41).
Mary Anne Navarro asked her father for P20,000.00 for her plane fare, and so they mortgaged their piano for
P30,000.00 to Serve Loan Mart as evidenced by a promissory note for P30,000.00 (Exh. "D" & tsn, 9-7-92, p. 16).
From the borrowed P30,000.00, Mary Anne Navarro set aside P20,000.00 "for placement fee and the remaining
P10,000.00 I used in buying traveling bag, dresses, shoes and of course make up (sic) because we were told that we will
be working there as salesgirls. Then hairband, pair of earrings and ring" (tsn, 9-7-92, pp. 16-17). It was the accused who
told them that they would be working in one of the department stores in Brunei and receiving a monthly pay of $700.00
for working only four hours a day (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 17). Earlier, she said Engr. Diaz told her and her co-complainants
herein that the P20,000.00 was for plane fare (tsn, 9-7-92, p. 12).
Maria Theresa Fabricante went home to Cotabato to secure the required P20,000.00. Her father sold a horse for
P5,000.00. As for the balance of P15,000.00 "Our plan was to mortgage our five hectare land to a friend of my father."
"Q Was the land actually mortgage?
"A The money was ready for release.
"Q Now, was the money release?
"A No, sir.
"Q Why?
"A The money was supposed to be released on August 6, but before that date August 3, I came back to
Davao and went to the office of POEA and verify whether Engr. Diaz was indeed a licensed recruiter.
"Q What did you find out when you go there?
"A He is not registered or in the list. His name does not appear on the list.
"Q With whom did you talk to with the POEA?
"A Atty. Evangelio.
"Q Now, upon learning that Mr. Diaz is not included in the masters list, what did you do?
"A After knowing that I went to my two companions Ma. Elena Ramirez and Mary Anne Navarro and
informed them of what I found out that the agency represented by Engr. Diaz was a fake agency and I
advised them they too should follow it up by themselves.
"Q Now, of your own knowledge, did they do?
 "A Yes, sir.
"Q What about you?
""A Yes, sir, we set a date to go to the POEA but before that we agreed that we will go and see Engr. Diaz
to get back the money that we paid as well as the papers.
"Q Did you actually go to Engr. Diaz?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What happened?
"A We went to see Eng. Diaz and when we met him, he greet us by saying: "If you are ready to leave?" But
we told him that we are not going to leave and we are withdrawing our applications because we found
from the office of the POEA that he is a fake recruiter and so he got angry and said that if our purpose
in going there was to withdraw, he said we can and we can get back our documents the next day but he
said we will have to pay him charges. And we said, what for? He said for labor because he already
secured a plane ticket for us and when I asked where the plane tickets are? He said it is in Cagayan"
(tsn, 9-8-92, pp. 38-39).
At the POEA the three complainants learned that the "agency represented by Engr. Diaz was a fake agency" (tsn,
9-8-92, p. 38). The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a CERTIFICATION (Exh. "A") which
reads:

"This is to certify that Eng'r. Diaz a.k.a. Erwin, Rudy, Edwin, Rodolfo, Ariel Mateo of Aries St., GSIS Subd., Matina,
Davao City; Mr. Paulo Lim and Remedios Aplicador both of Sto. Rosario St., Buhangin, Davao City were never granted
an authority to conduct recruitment for overseas employment in Davao City or in any part of Region XI, and that the
agency of the former known as Phil Jap Constr'n and Tanaka and Diaz Asso. were never been a licensed agency for
overseas recruitment.

"This certification is being issued upon the written request of Ma. Elena Ramirez, Mary Anne Navarro and Ma. Theresa
Fabricante for whatever legal purpose it may serve them best.

"14 August 1992 Davao City, Philippines.

(Sgd) GAUDENCIO DELA PEÑA

Unit Coordinator"

The three complainants withdrew their applications from Engr. Diaz without paying his charges. The amounts
they paid for processing fees were all returned to them by Engr. Diaz (Exh. "G").[3]
On September 2, 1993 the trial court rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which states:

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Rodolfo 'Erwin' Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
large scale illegal recruitment and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, plus the
costs."

Accused appellant Diaz predicated the instant appeal on the following assignment of errors:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED NOT ONLY CONFINED HIMSELF TO
FACILITATING THE PASSPORT AND MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF THE COMPLAINANTS BUT ALSO
PROMISED THEM EMPLOYMENT ABROAD.

II
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS MERELY A FACILITATOR
OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND NOT AN ILLEGAL RECRUITER.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED. [4]

The foregoing assigned errors, being intertwined, shall be discussed together.

The crime of illegal recruitment, as defined under Articles 38 (a) in relation to Articles 13 (b) and 34 and penalized
under Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and Presidential Decree 2018, is any
recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34, undertaken by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority.
Thus, in People v. Cabacang[5] this Court ruled that the crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two
elements concur, namely:
1] That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and,
2] That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, provides for the statutory definition of "recruitment and placement,” as follows:

"Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which in any manner offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

In People v. Panis,[6] we made the pronouncement that any of the acts mentioned in Article 13(b) will constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The number of persons dealt with is not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement.
Article 38(a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense which is essentially committed by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a
valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or
authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.[7]
Moreover, recruitment and placement activities of agents or representatives whose appointments by a licensee or
holder of authority were not previously authorized by the POEA shall likewise constitute illegal recruitment. [8]
We ruled in People vs. Goce, in this wise:
"Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment
activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non -licensees or non-
holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides
that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of the qualifying circumstances
exist, namely,
a] when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, that is, if carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another; or,
b] when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, that is, if committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.[9]
Considering the clear import of the foregoing doctrine which spells the unmistakable intent of the specific
provision applicable at bar, the instant case without doubt involves illegal recruitment in large scale.
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, which are undoubtedly present in this case are:
1] the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage in recruitment and placement activity,
 2] the offender undertakes recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34, and
3] illegal recruitment is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. [10]
As can be ascertained after a thorough reading of the records, appellant Diaz was neither a licensee nor a holder of
authority to qualify him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement activity.
Pursuant to the Certification issued by the POEA dated 14th of August 1992, [11] duly signed by Gaudencio de la
Pena, Unit Coordinator, appellant was never granted an authority to conduct recruitment for overseas employment.
As to the third element of the crime, there were obviously three persons who were victims of the appellant's
nefarious act of large scale illegal recruitment.
Relative to the question of whether or not appellant Diaz was engaged in recruitment activity, it is clear from the
testimonies of the three complainants that appellant undertook to recruit them, thus:
Maria Elena Ramirez testified in the following tenor:
Q: When you went to see Mr. Diaz, what happened?
A: We were introduced by Mr. Lim to Diaz; and then we asked Diaz if it is true that he's recruiting applicants for
abroad. He said that he is recruiting applicants for Japan or Brunei and if we have P20,000 we can go to Brunei
and we will be given priority if we have the amount.
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him what were the requirements.
Q: And what did he answer?
A: Well, he told us that we are required to submit 8 copies of passport, ID photos, income tax return, passport,
medical certificate and the amount of P2,500 and he further said that our placement fee will be P65,000 but all we
have to pay in advance is the amount of P20,000 and the remaining balance of P45,000 shall be given through
salary deductions.[12]
Maria Theresa Fabricante testified in the following manner:
She declared:
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him if he is indeed recruiting applicants for Brunei. And he said, Yes. After that we asked him what are
the requirements and he told us that we need passport, four passport size ID pictures, income tax return and NBI
clearance, and if we have diplomas to attach with other documents.
Q: What else did Mr. Diaz tell you to do?
A: He said that if we are interested, he will take care of the processing of the documents by giving him the amount of
P2,500, and that he explained that our placement fee will be in the sum of P65,000 and we will just have to raise
P20,000 for the processing of our visa, plane tickets and POEA expenses. [13]
She continued:
Q: What about your work in Brunei, what did you ask him?
A: I asked Engr. Diaz whether our work would be contract worker and he said yes and we did not have to worry about
it because he said it was a government project and then he said he would escort us to Philippine Plaza Hotel for
briefing before leaving for abroad and after the briefing we will proceed to the POEA where we would sign our
contract and after signing that is the time we would give the amount of P20,000 and then we would proceed to the
residence of Erlinda Romualdez where we would be staying for three days. [14]
The same thing was testified to by Mary Anne Navarro. Appellant told her that he was recruiting contract workers
for abroad, particularly Brunei, and promised her a job opportunity if she can produce various amounts of money for
expenses and processing of documents.[15]
Testifying in his behalf, appellant denied these complainants' allegations. He asserted that he never made a
promise in favor of complainants for employment abroad but assisted them in the procurement of passports and
medical certificates.
This Court is not, however, persuaded by appellant's bare denials.
Evidently, greater weight must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to
the denial of the defendant in weighing contradictory declarations and statements. [16] We stated this rule with curt
emphasis in Goce (supra) that —

"The lame defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt." [17]
 The acts of the appellant, which were clearly described in the lucid testimonies of the three victims, such as
collecting from each of the complainants payment for passport, medical tests, placement fee, plane tickets and other
sundry expenses, promising them employment abroad, contracting and advertising for employment, unquestionably
constitute acts of large scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant sought refuge in the testimonies of his three witnesses that would give credence to the claim that he was
only a facilitator of travel documents and not a recruiter.
The trial court did not give weight to appellant's allegations.
As observed by the trial court, the testimony of Edgar Macomao, is incredible which would raise serious doubts
about his motive as a witness.[18] It also describes the testimony of Paulo Lim as unclear and confusing. [19] Neither was
the testimony of Abednigo Neri given much credit by the trial court.
Admittedly, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are to be given great weight and a high
degree of respect by the Appellate Court.
In People vs. Reyes (242 SCRA 264), we enunciated the rule that —

"When the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will in general not disturb the findings of the trial court
unless certain facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial."[20]

In the case at bar, we see no reason to disturb these observations of the trial court. A careful scrutiny of the
records reveals that no facts or circumstances had been overlooked or misapplied by the trial court which might affect
the result of the case when considered.
As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, to wit:

"With the evidence on record, it is hard to believe that services promised by the appellant to the three complainants were
to consist only of his assistance in the procurement of passports and medical certificates for each of them for they
themselves could have easily secured these documents at a lesser cost. Moreover, the fact that the appellant still
collected P2,000 from Theresa Fabricante who already had a passport belies his claim that his services were limited only
to procuring a passport and medical certificate."[21]

The accused's assertion that he only assisted in the processing of passport and medical certificate is nothing more
than a frivolous excuse to divert the truth.
Likewise, it is the settled rule that a person is guilty of illegal recruitment when he gives the impression that he has
the power to send workers abroad.[22] Appellant Diaz manifestly gave that impression to the three complainants that he
had the ability to send workers abroad. Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, he promised them
work for a fee and convinced them to give their money for the purpose of getting an employment overseas.
The findings of the trial court, to which we agree, were arrived at with meticulous care, to wit:

"There is no direct and express denial by Mr. Diaz of the following testimonies of the complainants:

1] That they had asked Mr. Diaz if he was 'recruiting applicants for Brunei' and he said 'Yes'.

2] That when asked what his requirements were, he said four passport size pictures, bio-data, income tax returns,
medical certificates, NBI clearance, passport, P2,500 for processing fee, and P65,000 as placement fee, but only P20,000
for plane fare was to be paid as the balance of P45,000 was payable by salary deductions.

3] That he was asked by the complainants as to what agency he would be referring them, he said 'the name of the
agency is confidential but the owner thereof is one Erlinda Romualdez, who used to be his mistress'; that the
complainants did not have to worry because 'it is a government project and then he said he'd escort us to the Philippine
Plaza Hotel for briefing before leaving for abroad and after the briefing we will proceed to POEA where we will sign our
contract and after the signing that is the time we will give the P20,000, and then we will proceed to the residence of
Erlinda Romualdez where we will be staying for three days.'

4] That Mr. Diaz told the complainants that they would be working 'as salesgirls in one of the department stores
in Brunei, that they will be getting $700 a month and they will be only working four hours a day'

These are definitely prohibited practices or activities constituting large scale illegal recruitment according to the above
quoted provisions of the law. There is no denial of these by the accused." [23]

This Court is aware of a new law, R.A. 8042, otherwise known as Migrant Workers for Overseas Employment,
which was approved on June 07, 1995. It is An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas Employment and Establish a
Higher Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, their Families and Overseas Filipinos
in Distress and for Other Purposes. This new law, amends the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and gives a new definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and provides for its higher penalty.
We are not in anyway applying the otherwise restrictive provisions of this new law as it is not applicable in the case
at bar, considering the rule that crimes are punishable by the laws in force at the time of their commission.
In synthesis, considering the positive testimonies of the complainants against the negative bare denials of accused-
appellant, no other conclusion could be arrived at but to sustain the conviction of accused-appellant finding the latter
guilty of large scale illegal recruitment beyond reasonable doubt.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the Decision appealed from dated September 2, 1993 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, with costs against accused-appellant Rodolfo Diaz.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131656. October 12, 1998]
ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.
(ACCESS), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO
MEDIALES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM &
SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was two (2) years, from February
28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned after working
for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed
him that he has been dismissed from service. The information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay and salary for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.[1] The dispositive portion reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of complainant’s
dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH LELINA to pay the complainant the
amount of SR 13,200 representing complainant’s payment for the unexpired portion of his
contract and refund of the illegality deducted amount less P5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
“Respondent are further ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment
award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
“All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERD.” (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section 10 R.A. 8042,[2] the
law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondent’s salary for the unexpired
portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but modified the appealed
decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. [3]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiter’s award of SR13,200 in the dispositive
portion of the decision, representing respondent’s salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10
R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its liability for respondent’s salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it
should pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of respondent’s employment and
SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorney’s fees.[4]
The NLRC denied petitioner’s motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondent’s employment
which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the
monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private
respondent’s employment contract is eight (8) months,[6] it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic
salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of
SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as private respondent’s employment started only on
February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is
not the date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the applicability of
R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to
SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the award of attorney’s fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. [7] In the case at bar,
private respondent’s cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his employment or on February 28,
1995. His cause of action arose only from the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996,
after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies
to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract is eight (8) months. Private
respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[8]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his decision.[9] Despite said
computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in
thedispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is
merely a statement ordering nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is
so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[10]
We find that the labor arbiter’s award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was clearly an error for there is
nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award
to private respondent for the unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows
attorney’s fees to be awarded when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover, attorney’s
fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith.[11] The Labor Code,[12] on the other hand, fixes the
attorney’s fees that may be recovered in an amount which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest. Respondent was made
to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with
pay. However, while on board the plane back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed
from his job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private respondent was not
allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an
action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts of SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract, and SR360 for attorney’s fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado,(Chairman), Melo, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 167614
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, PERALTA, JJ.
INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC., Promulgated:
Respondents. March 24, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of poverty.
Their earnings have built houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They
have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided
the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and economies.Yet, only recently have we begun to
understand not only how much international migration impacts development, but how smart public
policies can magnify this effect.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

Global Forum on Migration and Development
Brussels, July 10, 2007[1]

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042,[2] to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne
by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their
employment contract “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” (subject clause). Petitioner claims that
the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and
denies them due process.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the December 8, 2004 Decision[3] and
April 1, 2005 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject
clause unconstitutional.

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month[5]

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.[6]

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.[7] Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as
Second Officer and was repatriated to thePhilippines on May 26, 1998.[8]

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time
of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint[9] against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:

May 27/31, 1998 (5 days) incl. US$ 413.90

Leave pay
June 01/30, 2,590.00
1998
July 01/31, 2,590.00
1998
August 01/31, 2,590.00
1998
Sept. 01/30, 2,590.00
1998
Oct. 01/31, 2,590.00
1998

Nov. 01/30, 2,590.00

1998

Dec. 01/31, 2,590.00

1998

Jan. 01/31, 2,590.00

1999

Feb. 01/28, 2,590.00

1999

Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 days) incl. 1,640.00

 leave
pay

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25,382.23

Amount adjusted to chief

mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1,060.50[10]
1/30, 1998) +
----
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TO US$ 26,442.73[11]
TAL CLAIM

as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary
benefits, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the
complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby
ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of
the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.

The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine
Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S.
DOLLARS (US$ 45.00),[12] representing the complainant’s claim for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant’s (petitioner's) claim for attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the total amount awarded to the aforesaid employee under this Decision.

The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months
only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject
clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month +
US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”[14]

Respondents appealed[15] to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that
petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner also appealed[16] to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[17] that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts.[18]

In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby ordered to
pay complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment the following:

1. Three (3) months salary

$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney’s fees 424.50
TOTAL US$4,669.50

The other findings are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate
from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to
have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.”[20]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject
clause.[21] The NLRC denied the motion.[22]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[23] with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.[24] After
initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution
dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.

In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.[25]

His Motion for Reconsideration[26] having been denied by the CA,[27] petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following
grounds:

I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable
decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the
unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months

II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their
interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law
when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the
Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of
said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers
to three (3) months.

III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in
his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.[28]

On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to
make use of the monetary award for his medical treatment and medication.[29] Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion,
urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the constitutional
question be resolved.[30]
 Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the full merit of the petition
mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.

On the first and second issues

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not
disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of the
lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract
or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the
NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months
and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.[31]

The Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for
and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package.[32] It also impinges on
the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount
of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local
workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between
the two groups;[33] and that it defeats Section 18,[34] Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare
of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.[35]

Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on
the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort
them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.[36]
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit
local placement agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:

Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event
that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its
obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily
penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money claims was reduced under Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042. [37] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of
OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal
dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired employment
contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:

In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they have
to give their employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers the
maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more
than three (3) months.[38]

Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other
emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.[39]
 The Arguments of Respondents

In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was
belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal
before the NLRC.[40]

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)[41] points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have
impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are
deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon
by the parties.[42]

Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their employment, such that
their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish
OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign
employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment;
and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission[43] and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[44] OFWs are
contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular
employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these
peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of OFWs
who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the
Constitution.[45]

Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary
liability of placement agencies for this “redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to
promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are
employed under decent and humane conditions.”[46]

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does
so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination;[47] (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48]and at the earliest opportunity;[49] and (3) that the
constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground.[51]

Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the
labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the subject
clause.

The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised
at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not
raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.[52] Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's
appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal,[53] and reiterated in his Petition
for Certiorari before the CA.[54] Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the
competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function – its function
in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to
resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;[55] thus, its foremost function is to administer and
enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of
judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.[56] Petitioner's interposition
of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its
decision.

The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains because the monetary
claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period
of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.

Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.

Does the subject clause violate Section 10,

Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?

The answer is in the negative.

Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment
and the fixed salary package he will receive[57] is not tenable.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation,[58] and cannot
affect acts or contracts already perfected;[59]however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof.[60] Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties
thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract
between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the
employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have
incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity
and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.[61] Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to
those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.[62]

Does the subject clause violate Section 1,

Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law.
 Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of
deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and
parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by
them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in
like circumstances.[65]

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial
distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.[66]

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest;[67] b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest;[68] and c) strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right[70] or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.[72]

Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications[73] based on race[74] or gender[75] but
not when the classification is drawn along income categories.[76]

It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[77] the constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial institution (GFI),
was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision contained a
suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the
constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy,
to wit:

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The
deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution
requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance
upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions
through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own
problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and
always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our
own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-
all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from
others.

xxxx
 Further, the quest for a better and more “equal” world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of
effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims “equality” as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in “all phases of national development,” further explicitated in Article
XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is
thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
reasonable measure of equality.

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent
not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.

xxxx

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial
scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike
down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing
the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts
will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

xxxx

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of
a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation
packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and
rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers -
who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all.” Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional
desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)

Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination
reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
 Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-

vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more

As pointed out by petitioner,[78] it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[79] (Second Division,
1999) that the Court laid down the following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to
wit:

A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or three (3) months’ salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play
only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident
from the words “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the words “salaries x x x for three
months.” To follow petitioners’ thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply
because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving
effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care
should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the
meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat.[80] (Emphasis supplied)

In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the
remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.

Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian
Center for Career and Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division, October 1998),[81] which involved
an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract,but was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA
declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired portion of his
contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months’ salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:

Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract is eight (8)
months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of
SR3,600.[82]

Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division, December 1998),[83] which
involved an OFW (therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was deemed renewed for
another 12 months. After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court
awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.

The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:

Period Applied in the

Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Computation of the
Period Service Monetary Award

Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months

 Maguad[84]
Bahia Shipping v. 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
Reynaldo Chua [85]
Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
Transmarine v.
dela Cruz l[86]
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
Falcon[87]
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
CA [88]
Oriental v. 12 months more than 2 10 months 3 months
CA [89] months
PCL v. NLRC[90] 12 months more than 2 more or less 9 3 months
months months
Olarte v. Nayona[91] 12 months 21 days 11 months and 9 days 3 months
JSS v. 12 months 16 days 11 months and 24 3 months
Ferrer[92] days
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months and 7 2 months and 23 days 2 months and 23 days
Adelantar[93] days
Phil. Employ v. 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired portion
Paramio,
et al.[94]
Flourish Maritime 2 years 26 days 23 months and 4 days 6 months or 3 months
v. Almanzor [95] for each year of contract
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 months and 6 months or 3 months
Manpower v. months and 28 28 days for each year of contract
Villanos [96] days
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes
OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or
more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their
contracts.

The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for only 2
months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs
in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3
months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period
of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.

To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an employment contract of 10
months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same
monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed
after one month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9
months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired
portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser
amount.
 The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995,[97] illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:

Case Title Contract Period Period of Unexpired Period Applied in the

Service Period Computation of the
Monetary Award
ATCI v. CA, 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
et al.[98]
Phil. Integrated v. 2 years 7 days 23 months and 23 23 months and 23 days
NLRC[99] days
JGB v. NLC[100] 2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
Agoy v. NLRC[101] 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
EDI v. NLRC, et 2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months
al.[102]
Barros v. NLRC, et 12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months
al.[103]
Philippine 12 months 6 months and 22 5 months and 18 5 months and 18 days
Transmarine v. days days
Carilla[104]

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131656. October 12, 1998]

ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.
(ACCESS), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO
MEDIALES, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
 In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM &
SERVICES, INC. (ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was two (2) years, from February
28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned after working
for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While en route to the Philippines, his co-workers informed
him that he has been dismissed from service. The information turned out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay and salary for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.[1] The dispositive portion reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of complainant’s
dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH LELINA to pay the complainant the
amount of SR 13,200 representing complainant’s payment for the unexpired portion of his
contract and refund of the illegality deducted amount less P5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
“Respondent are further ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment
award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
“All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERD.” (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section 10 R.A. 8042,[2] the
law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondent’s salary for the unexpired
portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but modified the appealed
decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. [3]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiter’s award of SR13,200 in the dispositive
portion of the decision, representing respondent’s salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. invoking Section 10
R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its liability for respondent’s salary is for only three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it
should pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the unexpired portion of respondent’s employment and
SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorney’s fees.[4]
The NLRC denied petitioner’s motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondent’s employment
which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed. Petitioner merely impugns the
monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent. It submits that although the unexpired portion of private
respondent’s employment contract is eight (8) months,[6] it is liable to pay respondent only three (3) months of his basic
salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200 (monthly salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of
SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in ruling that as private respondent’s employment started only on
February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is
not the date of employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the applicability of
R.A. 8042. Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to
SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the award of attorney’s fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. [7] In the case at bar,
private respondent’s cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his employment or on February 28,
1995. His cause of action arose only from the-time he was illegally dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996,
after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies
to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract is eight (8) months. Private
respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[8]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his decision.[9] Despite said
computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor arbiter awarded higher sum (SR13,200) in
thedispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is
merely a statement ordering nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is
so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[10]
We find that the labor arbiter’s award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was clearly an error for there is
nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of said higher amount. We reiterate that the correct award
to private respondent for the unexpired portion of his employment contract is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows
attorney’s fees to be awarded when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for whom it is sought. Moreover, attorney’s
fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith.[11] The Labor Code,[12] on the other hand, fixes the
attorney’s fees that may be recovered in an amount which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s bad faith in dismissing private respondent is manifest. Respondent was made
to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with
pay. However, while on board the plane back to the Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed
from his job as he was given only a one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private respondent was not
allowed to return to his jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an
action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts of SR3,600 for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract, and SR360 for attorney’s fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado,(Chairman), Melo, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

[1] Decision, Rollo, pp. 11-20.

[2] Entitled: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
[3] NLRC Decision, dated August 18, 1997; Rollo, pp. 26-32.

[4] Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp. 33-35.

[5] Decision, dated October 14, 1997; Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[6] Respondent was dismissed from service in June 1996 (after his vacation leave), while his employment contract was
supposed to end on February 28, 1997.
[7] Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256 629, 637, [1996], citing Philippine-Singapore Ports. Corp. vs. NLRC, 218 SRA 77 [1993].
[8] Computed as follows: monthly salary of SR1,200 x 3 months.
[9] Supra.
[10] Olac, vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 321, 328 [1992], citing Aguirre vs. Aguirre, 58 SCRA 461 [1974] and Magdalena
Estate, Inc. vs. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964].
[11] Tumbiga vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 274 SCRA 338, 349 [1997].
[12] Article 111, Chapter III, Title II, Book Three.