Since Balatong and Labong did not surrender and file a motion for leave to
avail of remedies, it was incorrect for the trial court to take cognizance of
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2014 REMEDIAL
LAW BAR EXAM
I.
Ludong, Balatong, and Labong were charged with murder. After trial, the
court announced that the case was considered submitted for decision.
Subsequently, the Clerk of Court issued the notices of promulgation of
judgment which were duly received. On promulgation day, Ludong and his
lawyer appeared. The lawyers of Balatong and Labong appeared but
without their clients and failed to satisfactorily explain their absence
when queried by the court. Thus, the judge ordered the Clerk of Court to
proceed with the reading of the judgment convicting all the accused. With
respect to Balatong and Labong, the judge ordered that the judgment be
entered in the criminal docket and copies be furnished their lawyers. The
lawyers of Ludong, Balatong, and Labong filed within the reglementary
period a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. The court favorably granted the
motion of Ludong downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide but
denied the motion as regards Balatong and Labong. (4%)
(A) Was the court correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration?
(B) Can Balatong and Labong appeal their conviction in
case Ludong accepts his conviction for homicide?
ANSWERS:
(A)
No, the court was not correct in taking cognizance of the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration insofar as Balatong and Labong were
concerned.
Under Section 6 Rule 120, if the judgment was for conviction and the
failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available under the Rules of Court and the court shall
order his arrest. The accused may regain the remedies only if he
surrenders and files a motion for leave to avail of the remedies under the
Rules of Court.
Here the failure of Balatong and Labong to appear was without justifiable
cause as even their lawyers were not aware of the reason for their
absence. Hence they lost their remedies under the Rules.
the joint motion for reconsideration insofar as Balatong and Labong were
concerned. The trial court should instead have ordered their arrest.
(People v. De Grano, 5 June 2009, Peralta, J.).
On the other hand, it was correct for the trial court to take cognizance of
the joint motion for reconsideration insofar as Ludong was concerned
since he and his lawyer were present during the promulgation.
(B)
No, Balatong and Labong cannot appeal their conviction in
case Ludong accepts his conviction for homicide.
Since Balatong and Labong failed to appear during the
promulgation of the conviction without justifiable cause, they lost the
remedies under the Rules of Court including the remedy of an appeal.
II.
McJolly is a trouble-maker of sorts, always getting into brushes with the
law. In one incident, he drove his Humvee recklessly, hitting a pedicab
which sent its driver and passengers in different directions. The pedicab
driver died, while two (2) of the passengers suffered slight physical
injuries. Two (2) Informations were then filed against McJolly. One,
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property,
and two, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries. The
latter case was scheduled for arraignment earlier, on which
occasion McJolly immediately pleaded guilty. He was meted out the
penalty of public censure. A month later, the case for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was also set for arraignment. Instead of
pleading, McJolly interposed the defense of double jeopardy.
Resolve. (4%)
ANSWER:
The defense of double jeopardy is meritorious and the second
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide should be
quashed on the ground of double jeopardy.
 The Supreme Court has held that reckless imprudence is a single
crime and that its consequences on persons and property are material only
to determine the penalty.
Here there was only one act and crime of reckless imprudence.
The death, the physical injuries, and the damage to the tricycle are only
consequences of the same reckless act of McJolly. Hence there was
double jeopardy when a second information arising from the same reckless
act was brought against the accused. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 17
November 2010).
III.
While passing by a dark uninhabited part of their barangay, PO2
Asintado observed shadows and heard screams from a distance. PO2
Asintado hid himself behind the bushes and saw a man beating a woman
whom he recognized as his neighbor, Kulasa. When Kulasa was already in
agony, the man stabbed her and she fell on the ground. The man hurriedly
left thereafter.
PO2 Asintado immediately went to Kulasa’s rescue. Kulasa, who was then
in a state of hysteria, kept mentioning to PO2 Asintado “Si Rene, gusto
akong patayin! Sinaksak niya ako!” When PO2 Asintado was about to carry
her, Kulasa refused and said “Kaya ko. Mababaw lang to. Habulin mo si
Rene.”
The following day, Rene learned of Kulasa’s death and, bothered by his
conscience, surrendered to the authorities with his counsel. As his
surrender was broadcasted all over media, Rene opted to release his
statement to the press which goes:
“I believe that I am entitled to the presumption of innocence until my
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although I admit that I
performed acts that may take one’s life away, I hope and pray that justice
will be served the right way. God bless us all.
(Sgd.)
Rene”
The trial court convicted Rene of homicide on the basis of PO2 Asintado’s
testimony, Kulasa’s statements, and Rene’s statement to the press. On
appeal, Rene raises the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in giving weight to PO2 Asintado’s testimony, as
the latter did not have any personal knowledge of the facts in issue, and
violated Rene’s right to due process when it considered Kulasa’s
statements despite lack of opportunity for her cross-examination.
2. The trial court erred in holding that Rene’s statement to the press was
a confession which, standing alone, would be sufficient to warrant
conviction.
Resolve. (4%)
ANSWER:
Rene’s appeal is denied for lack of merit.
1.
The contention that the trial court erred in giving weight to PO2
Asintado’s testimony since he did not have personal knowledge of the
facts in issue is without merit. The contention in effect
challenges Kulasa’s statement for being hearsay.
Under the Rules of Evidence, a statement made immediately
subsequent to a startling occurrence is excepted from the hearsay rule as
part of the res gestae.
Here Kulasa’s statement was made immediately subsequent to a
starling occurrence, that is, her stabbing by Rene, and was made in a
state of hysteria, showing that she was under the influence of the startling
occurrence. Hence testimony regarding the statement is excepted from
the hearsay rule.
Since Kulasa’s statement is an exception to the hearsay rule, Rene
cannot complain that his right to due process was violated when the trial
court considered Kulasa’s statement despite lack of opportunity to cross-
examine her.
There should be no serious question about the admissibility
against an accused of hearsay where this hearsay falls under an exception
to the hearsay rule, especially here where the declarant is dead and thus
unavailable to testify. (ANTONIO R. BAUTISTA, BASIC EVIDENCE 214-215
[2004 ed.]). In U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 (1909), the Supreme Court upheld
dying declarations as an exception to the confrontation clause since “such
declarations have always been regarded as an exception to the general
rule regarding hearsay evidence.”
2.
The argument that the trial court erred in holding that Rene’s
statement to the press was a confession which, standing alone, would be
sufficient to warrant conviction is meritorious.
Firstly, Rene’s statement is not a confession but an admission. A
confession is one wherein a person acknowledges his guilt of a crime,
which Rene did not do. Secondly, even assuming it is a confession,
standing alone it would not be sufficient to warrant conviction since it is
an extrajudicial confession which is not sufficient ground for conviction
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (S3 R133).
Nonetheless this was a harmless error since the admission of Rene
was corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Asintado on Kulasa’s
statement.
IV.
An order of the court requiring a retroactive re-dating of an order,
judgment or document filing be entered or recorded in a judgment
is: (1%)
(A) pro hac vice
(B) non pro tunc
(C) confession relicta verificatione
(D) nolle prosequi
(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?
(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you
recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you
reckon the one (1)-year period within which to file the action?
ANSWERS:
(A)
The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a
collection suit for the P125,000 rentals in arrears and the P12,500 interest
due. The remedy would be expeditious since it would be governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure as the amount of the demand, excluding
interest, does not exceed P200,000.
(B)
The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City,
where Tenant resides.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is
with the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, at the
plaintiff’s election.

Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may
ANSWER: be laid only in Marikina City where the defendant Tenant resides.

(B) (Note: Should be “nunc pro tunc.”). (C)

V. If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-

year period within which to file the action shall be reckoned from the
Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract expiration of 5-days from notice of the last demand to pay and vacate.
with Tenant, a resident of Marikina City, over a residential house in Las (Cruz v. Atencio, 28 February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June 1969).
Piñas City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a monthly
rental of P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-
payment on its due date. Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United
States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his sister Maria, a special
power of attorney to manage the property and file and defend suits over
the property rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals due
for five (5) months. Maria asks your legal advice on how she can
expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests
due. (6%)
 VI.
As a rule, courts may not grant an application for provisional remedy
without complying with the requirements of notice and hearing. These
requirements, however, may be dispensed with in an application for: (1%)
(A) writ of preliminary injunction
(B) writ for preliminary attachment
(C) an order granting support pendente lite
(D) a writ of replevin
ANSWER:
(B)
VII.
Co Batong, a Taipan, filed a civil action for damages with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against Jose Penduko, a news reporter
of the Philippine Times, a newspaper of general circulation printed and
published in Parañaque City. The complaint alleged, among others,
that Jose Penduko wrote malicious and defamatory imputations against Co
Batong; that Co Batong’s business address is in Makati City; and that the
libelous article was first printed and published in Parañaque City. The
complaint prayed that Jose Penduko be held liable to pay P200,000.00, as
moral damages; P150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00, as
attorney’s fees.
Jose Penduko filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
1. The RTC is without jurisdiction because under the Totality Rule, the
claim for damages in the amount of P350,000.00 fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque
City.
2. The venue is improperly laid because what the complaint alleged is Co
Batong’s business address and not his residence address.
Are the grounds invoked in the Motion to Dismiss proper? (4%)
ANSWER:
No, the grounds invoked in the motion to dismiss improper.
1.
The invocation of the Totality Rule is misplaced. Under Art. 360
of the Revised Penal Code, jurisdiction over a civil action for damages in
case of libel is with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial
Court. (Nocum v. Tan, 23 September 2005). The said provision does not
mention any jurisdictional amount over such action; hence the Totality
Rule is inapplicable.
2.
The ground that the complaint mentioned the complainant’s
office address rather than his residence is of no moment since the
complaint also stated that the libelous article was printed and first
published in Paranaque City. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
venue in a civil action for libel also lies in the place where the libelous
article was printed and first published.
VIII.
Johnny, a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (USA) but
formerly a Filipino citizen, executed a notarial will in accordance with the
laws of the State of California, USA. Johnny, at the time of his death, was
survived by his niece Anastacia, an American citizen residing at the
condominium unit of Johnny located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City; a
younger brother, Bartolome, who manages Johnny’s fish pond in Lingayen,
Pangasinan; and a younger sister, Christina, who manages Johnny’s rental
condominium units in Makati City. Johnny’s entire estate which he
inherited from his parents is valued at P200
million. Johnny appointed Anastacia as executrix of his will. (4%)
(A) Can Johnny’s notarial will be probated before the proper court in the
Philippines?
(B) Is Anastacia qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s notarial will?
ANSWERS:
(A)
Yes, the formal validity of a will is governed also by the national law of
the decedent. (Article 817, Civil Code).
A will proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Regional
Trial Court in the Philippines. (S1 R77).

(B)
Yes, assuming that Anastacia is of legal age, she is qualified to be an
executor although an alien because she is a resident of the Philippines. (S1
R78).
IX.
Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a
special power of attorney to sell his house and lot. Agente was able to sell
the property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon.
On his return to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly
received by Agente, sought to recover the amount due him. Agente failed
to return the amount as he had used it for the construction of his own
house.
Thus, Bayani filed an action against Agente for sum of money with
damages. Bayani subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court
granted the ex-parte motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment
upon Bayani’s posting of the required bond. Bayani prayed that the
court’s sheriff be deputized to serve and implement the writ of
attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff served upon Agente the
writ of attachment and levied on the latter’s house and lot. On November
20, 2013, the Sheriff served on Agente summons and a copy of the
complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion to
Discharge the Writ of Attachment alleging that at the time the writ of
preliminary attachment was issued, he has not been served with summons
and, therefore, it was improperly issued. (4%)
(A) Is Agente correct?
(B) Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly executed?
ANSWERS:
(A)
No, Agente is not correct.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a writ of attachment may issue even
before service of summons upon the defendant. (S2 R57).
(B)
No, the writ of preliminary attachment not properly executed.
Under S5 R57, no levy on preliminary attachment shall be enforced unless
there is prior or simultaneous service of the summons and the
accompanying papers. (S5 R The Supreme Court has held that subsequent
service of summons will not cure the irregularity that attended the
enforcement of the writ (Onate v. Abrogar, 23 February 1995).
Here the sheriff levied upon the house and lot prior to the service of the
summons and the complaint upon Agente. Hence the writ of preliminary
attachment was not properly executed. The subsequent service of
summons and the complaint did not cure the irregularity in the
enforcement of the writ.
X.
Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a
commercial building where the former conducted his hardware business.
The lease contract stipulated, among others, a monthly rental of
P50,000.00 for a four (4)-year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On
January 1, 2013, Prince Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed
administrator of the estate of Prince Chong, but the former failed to pay
the rentals for the months of January to June 2013 despite King
Kong’s written demands.
Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
an action for rescission of contract with damages and payment of accrued
rentals as of June 30, 2013. (4%)
(A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
RTC is without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King
Kong also filed the complaint for sum of money during that time, will the
action be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of
the case?
ANSWERS
(A)
No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the RTC is without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is
only P300,000.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here the action is for rescission which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The P300,000 accrued rentals is only incidental to the main
purpose of the action which is to rescind the lease contract.
(B)
No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death
during the pendency of the case.
Under S20 R3, when the action is on a contractual money claim and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment, the action shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment.
Here the action is on a contractual money claim, that is, a claim for
rentals based on a lease contract. Hence it shall be allowed to continue
until final judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).
XI.
A search warrant was issued for the purpose of looking for unlicensed
firearms in the house of Ass-asin, a notorious gun for hire. When the
police served the warrant, they also sought the assistance of barangay
tanods who were assigned to look at other portions of the premises around
the house. In a nipa hut thirty (30) meters away from the house of Ass-
asin, a barangay tanod came upon a kilo of marijuana that was wrapped in
newsprint. He took it and this was later used by the authorities to
charge Ass-asin with illegal possession of marijuana. Ass-asin objected to
the introduction of such evidence claiming that it was illegally seized. Is
the objection of Assasin valid? (4%)
ANSWER:
Yes, the objection of Ass-asin is valid.
Under the Constitution, the right of the people against unlawful
search is inviolable except in cases where a valid search warrant was
issued or in exceptional cases where the law provides for a warrantless
search. (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution). Under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, items seized by virtue of an unlawful search are
inadmissible in evidence. (Sec. 3[2], Art. III, Constitution).
Here the the seizure of the marijuana was illegal since it was not
pursuant to a search warrant. The search warrant was for the search and
seizure of unlicensed firearms not marijuana. Nor would the exception
regarding items seized under plain view apply. The marijuana was
wrapped in newsprint and clearly not in plain sight. Hence the marijuana
may not be introduced in evidence over Ass-asin’s objection.
XII.
Mary Jane met Shiela May at the recruitment agency where they both
applied for overseas employment. They exchanged pleasantries, including
details of their personal circumstances. Fortunately, Mary Jane was
deployed to work as front desk receptionist at a hotel in Abu Dhabi where
she met Sultan Ahmed who proposed marriage, to which she readily
accepted. Unfortunately for Shiela May, she was not deployed to work
abroad, and this made her envious of Mary Jane.
Mary Jane returned to the Philippines to prepare for her wedding. She
secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage. It turned out from the NSO records that Mary Jane had
previously contracted marriage with John Starr, a British citizen, which
she never did. The purported marriage between Mary Jane and John
Starr contained all the required pertinent details on Mary Jane. Mary
Jane later on learned that Shiela May is the best friend of John Starr.
As a lawyer, Mary Jane seeks your advice on her predicament. What legal
remedy will you avail to enable Mary Jane to contract marriage
with Sultan Ahmed? (4%)
ANSWER:
The legal remedy I would avail to enable Mary Jane to contract
marriage with Sultan Ahmed is to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
entries in the marriage contract between John Starr and Mary Jane,
particularly the portion and entries thereon relating to the wife.
Rule 108 may be availed of to cancel erroneous or invalid entries
in the Civil Registry. Here the entry of Mary Jane as the wife of John Starr
is clearly erroneous and invalid as she never contracted marriage with
anybody, much less John Starr. There is no need to file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage since there was no marriage to speak of
in the first place, the marriage contract being a sham contract. (Republic
v. Olaybar, 10 February 2014, Peralta, J.).

XIII.
A foreign dog trained to sniff dangerous drugs from packages, was hired
by FDP Corporation, a door to door forwarder company, to sniff packages
in their depot at the international airport. In one of the routinary
inspections of packages waiting to be sent to the United States of America
(USA), the dog sat beside one of the packages, a signal that the package
contained dangerous drugs. Thereafter, the guards opened the package
and found two (2) kilograms of cocaine. The owner of the package was
arrested and charges were filed against him. During the trial, the
prosecution, through the trainer who was present during the incident and
an expert in this kind of field, testified that the dog was highly trained to
sniff packages to determine if the contents were dangerous drugs and the
sniffing technique of these highly trained dogs was accepted worldwide
and had been successful in dangerous drugs operations. The prosecution
moved to admit this evidence to justify the opening of the package. The
accused objected on the grounds that: (i) the guards had no personal
knowledge of the contents of the package before it was opened; (ii) the
testimony of the trainer of the dog is hearsay; and (iii) the accused could
not cross-examine the dog. Decide. (4%)
ANSWER:
The accused’s objections are overruled.
The objection that the guards had no personal knowledge of the
contents of the package before it was opened is misplaced. The one
testifying is the trainer not the guards and he had personal knowledge of
the circumstances since he was present during the incident. Besides there
is no rule of evidence that one cannot testify about the contents of a
package if he did not have prior personal knowledge of its contents before
opening it.
The objection that the testimony of the trainer of the dog is
hearsay is not valid. Hearsay is an out-of-court declaration made by a
person which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Here what is involved is a dog who is not a person who can make
an out-of-court declaration. (Lempert & Saltzburg, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 370-371 [1982]). A dog is not treated as a declarant or
witness who can be cross-examined. (People v. Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d
279). Hence testimony that the dog sat beside the package is not
testimony about an out-of-court declaration and thus not hearsay.
The objection that the accused could not cross-examine the dog is
without merit. Under the Constitution, the accused’s right of
confrontation refers to witnesses. As previously discussed, a dog is not a
witness who can be cross-examined.
Note: It is urged that utmost liberality be exercised in grading
this number. The answer is not found in Philippine law and jurisprudence
and even in commentaries by writers on evidence.
XIV.
When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC), pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction,
renders an adverse judgment in an application for land registration, the
aggrieved party’s remedy is: (1%)
(A) ordinary appeal to the Regional Trial Court
(B) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court
(C) ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals
(D) petition for review to the Court of Appeals
ANSWER:
(C) (See Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129)
XV.
The Ombudsman, after conducting the requisite preliminary investigation,
found probable cause to charge Gov. Matigas in conspiracy
with Carpintero, a private individual, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
Before the information could be filed with the Sandiganbayan, Gov.
Matigas was killed in an ambush. This, notwithstanding, an information
was filed against Gov. Matigas and Carpintero.
At the Sandiganbayan, Carpintero through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash the Information, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, arguing that with the death of Gov. Matigas, there is no
public officer charged in the information.
Is the motion to quash legally tenable? (4%)
ANSWER:
No, the motion to quash is not legally tenable.
 In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the death of
the public officer did not mean that the allegation of conspiracy between
the public officer and the private person can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished
by the death of the public officer was his criminal liability. His death did
not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and the private person. Hence the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged. (People v. Go,
25 March 2014, Peralta, J.)
XVI.
Plaintiff filed a complaint denominated as accion publiciana,
against defendant. In his answer, defendant alleged that he had no
interest over the land in question, except as lessee
of Z. Plaintiff subsequently filed an affidavit of Z, the lessor
of defendant, stating that Z had sold to plaintiff all his rights and
interests in the property as shown by a deed of transfer attached to the
affidavit. Thus, plaintiff may ask the court to render: (1%)
(A) summary judgment
(B) judgment on the pleadings
(C) partial judgment
(D) judgment by default
ANSWER:
(A) (S1 & 3, R35)
XVII.
A was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a crime of plunder, a non-
bailable offense, where the court had already issued a warrant for his
arrest. Without A being arrested, his lawyer filed a Motion to Quash
Arrest Warrant and to Fix Bail, arguing that the allegations in the
information did not charge the crime of plunder but a crime of
malversation, a bailable offense. The court denied the motion on the
ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and that the accused should be under the custody of the court
since the crime charged was nonbailable.
The accused’s lawyer counter-argued that the court can rule on the
motion even if the accused was at-large because it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. According to said lawyer, there was no
need for the accused to be under the custody of the court because what
was filed was a Motion to Quash Arrest and to Fix Bail, not a Petition for
Bail.
(A) If you are the Sandiganbayan, how will you rule on the motion? (3%)
(B) If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, what judicial remedy should
the accused undertake? (2%)
ANSWERS:
(A)
If I were the Sandiganbayan, I would deny the Motion to Quash Arrest
Warrant and to Fix Bail.
The motion to quash warrant of arrest may be considered since only
jurisdiction over the person not custody of the law is required.
Jurisdiction over the person of A was obtained by his voluntary
appearance made through the filing of the motion seeking affirmative
relief. (See Miranda v. Tuliao, 31 March 2006).
Nonetheless I would still deny the motion to quash arrest
warrant. The ground that the offense charged is malversation not plunder
is not a valid ground to quash the arrest warrant. A should simply file an
application for bail and contend that he is entitled thereto as a matter of
right.
The motion to fix amount of bail, which is in effect an application
for bail cannot be granted unless the accused is in custody of the law.
(Miranda v. Tuliao, 31 March 2006). Here A was not in custody of the law
but still at large. Hence the motion to fix the amount of bail should be
denied.
(B)
If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, the judicial remedy that
the accused should undertake is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Supreme Court. Certiorari is available to challenge
interlocutory orders rendered with grave abuse of discretion since appeal
is unavailable.
Here the order denying the Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant and to
Fix Bail is interlocutory since it does not completely dispose of the case.
Hence certiorari is available. A should aver that the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his motion.

XVIII.
A was charged with murder in the lower court. His Petition for Bail was
denied after a summary hearing on the ground that the prosecution had
established a strong evidence of guilt. No Motion for Reconsideration was
filed from the denial of the Petition for Bail. During the reception of the
evidence of the accused, the accused reiterated his petition for bail on
the ground that the witnesses so far presented by the accused had shown
that no qualifying aggravating circumstance attended the killing. The
court denied the petition on the grounds that it had already ruled that: (i)
the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii) the resolution for the Petition for
Bail is solely based on the evidence presented by the prosecution; and (iii)
no Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition for
Bail. (6%)
(A) If you are the Judge, how will you resolve the incident?
(B) Suppose the accused is convicted of the crime of homicide and the
accused filed a Notice of Appeal, is he entitled to bail?
ANSWERS:
(A)
If I were the judge, I will grant the Petition for Bail if the evidence does
not show any qualifying aggravating circumstance. In such a case the
offense would be only homicide which is bailable.
(i) The ground that the court had already ruled that the evidence of guilt
is strong is improper. An order denying an application for bail is
interlocutory and remains at the control of the court until final judgment.
Hence the court is not bound by its earlier ruling and may reconsider the
same if the evidence or law warrants the same.
(ii) The ground that the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based
on the evidence presented by the prosecution is improper. While S8 R114
provides that the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong, it should not be taken to mean that the
resolution of the bail application is based solely on the prosecution
evidence. At the hearing for the bail application, both the prosecution
and the accused must be given reasonable opportunity to prove or to
disprove, respectively, that the evidence of guilt is strong. (Santos v.
Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56).
(iii) The ground that no motion for reconsideration was filed from the
order denying the petition for bail is improper. As previously discussed,
an order denying bail is merely interlocutory. Hence the failure to move
for reconsideration thereof during the trial will not render the order final
and conclusive.
(B)
No, after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. (S5 R114).
XIX.
A vicarious admission is considered an exception to the hearsay rule. It,
however, does not cover: (1%)
(A) admission by a conspirator
(B) admission by a privy
(C) judicial admission
(D) adoptive admission
(C) Note: a vicarious admission is an extrajudicial admission. Hence C is
not covered by the rule regarding vicarious admissions.
XX.
Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom
Wallis had told Debi Wallis that he wanted the annulment of their
marriage because he was already fed up with her irrational and eccentric
behaviour. However, in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
the correct residential address of Debi Wallis was deliberately not alleged
and instead, the residential address of their married son was stated.
Summons was served by substituted service at the address stated in the
petition. For failure to file an answer, Debi Wallis was declared in
default and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The RTC rendered
judgment declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis. Three (3) years after the RTC
judgment was rendered, Debi Wallis got hold of a copy thereof and
wanted to have the RTC judgment reversed and set aside.
If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what judicial remedy or remedies will
you take? Discuss and specify the ground or grounds for said remedy or
remedies. (5%)
ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Debi Wallis, the judicial remedy I would take is to
file with the Court of Appeals an action for annulment of the RTC
judgment under Rule 47. An action for annulment of judgment may be
resorted to since the remedies of appeal and petition for relief are no
longer available through no fault of Debi Wallis. (S1 R47).
The ground for annulment of judgment would be lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction also covers lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant since the judgment would be void. (1 FLORENZ
D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 558 [7 th rev. ed.,
3rd printing]).
Here the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Debi
since there was no valid substituted service of summons. Substituted
service of summons should have been made at Debi’s residence. (S7
R14). Hence the judgment of the RTC was void. Since the judgment is
void, the petition for annulment thereof is imprescriptible. (S3 R47).
Furthermore, default judgments are not allowed in declaration of
nullity of marriage. (S3[e] R9). Hence the trial court’s rendition of a
default judgment was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
XXI.
Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al Pakino, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for specific performance
against Robert White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert
White filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the
appropriate board resolution from the Board of Directors of Goodfeather
Corporation to show the authority of Al Pakino to represent the
corporation
and file the complaint in its behalf. The RTC granted the motion to
dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Al
Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied. As
nothing more could be done by Al Pakino before the RTC, he filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). Robert White moved for
dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the same involved purely a
question of law and should have been filed with the Supreme Court (SC).
However, Al Pakino claimed that the appeal involved mixed questions of
fact and law because there must be a factual determination if, indeed, Al
Pakino was duly authorized by Goodfeather Corporation to file the
complaint. Whose position is correct? Explain. (4%)
ANSWER:
Robert White’s position is correct. In a case involving similar
facts, the Supreme Court held that the issue of whether or not the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the person who
filed the complaint in behalf of the plaintiff corporation was not
authorized to do so is a legal issue, reviewable only by the Supreme Court
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (Tamondong v. Court
of Appeals, 26 November 2004).
(Note: An alternative answer would be that the appeal raises a
factual question of whether or not Al Pakino was indeed authorized to file
the complaint in behalf of Goodfeather Corporation. A reading
of Tamondong would show that the appellant only raised a legal question
of whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action but did not raise a factual issue as to whether the filer
was in fact authorized by the corporation.).
XXII.
Which of the following decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme
Court (SC)? (Assume that the issues to be raised on appeal involve purely
questions of law) (1%)
(A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
(B) Decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
(C) Decision of the Civil Service Commission.
(D) Decision of the Office of the President.
ANSWER:
(B) Note: In an appeal from RTC judgment in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, the appeal should be to the CA even if the questions are only
legal. Hence A should be excluded. (S2[c] R42).
 XXIII.
Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint
against Ms. Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after due proceedings,
rendered a decision granting the complaint and ordering Ms. Dumpty to
pay damages to Mr. Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the RTC decision. Meanwhile, the
RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s motion for execution pending appeal. Upon
receipt of the RTC’s order granting execution pending appeal, Ms.
Dumpty filed with the
CA another case, this time a special civil action for certiorari assailing
said RTC order. Is there a violation of the rule against forum shopping
considering that two (2) actions emanating from the same case with the
RTC were filed by Ms. Dumpty with the CA? Explain. (4%)
ANSWER:
No, there is no violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Forum shopping applies where two or more initiatory pleadings were filed
by the same party. This is discernible from the use of the phrase
“commenced any action or filed any claim” in S5 R7.
Here the first case involves the filing by Ms. Dumpty of a notice of appeal
which is not an initiatory pleading. Hence there is no forum shopping.
XXIV.
Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In 2010, Solomon contracted a
second marriage with Hope. When Faith found out about the second
marriage of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal case for bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011.
Meanwhile, Solomon filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his first
marriage with Faith in 2012, while the case for bigamy before the RTC of
Manila is ongoing. Subsequently, Solomon filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the bigamy case on the ground of prejudicial question. He
asserts that the proceedings in the criminal case should be suspended
because if his first marriage with Faith will be declared null and void, it
will have the effect of exculpating him from the crime of bigamy.
Decide. (4%)
ANSWER:
Motion to suspend proceedings denied.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prejudicial question arises if
there has been a previously filed civil action. Here the civil action was
filed after the criminal action. Hence no prejudicial question will arise.
Moreover the Supreme Court has held that a pending case for declaration
of nullity of marriage does not raise a prejudicial question to a charge of
bigamy since a person who contracts a second marriage without first
awaiting a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage has already
committed bigamy. (People v. Odtuhan, 17 July 2013, Peralta, J.).
XXV.
Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment against Mr. Jachin before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr. Jachin actively participated in every
stage of the proceedings knowing fully well that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the action. In his mind, Mr. Jachin was thinking that if
the MeTC rendered judgment against him, he could always raise the issue
on the jurisdiction of the MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment
against Mr. Jachin. What is the remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%)
(A) File an appeal
(B) File an action for nullification of judgment
(C) File a motion for reconsideration
(D) File a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
ANSWER:
(A) See S8 R40. R47 is not available since appeal is still available. Not C
since a prohibited pleading.
XXVI.
Parole evidence is an: (1%)
(A) agreement not included in the document
(B) oral agreement not included in the document
(C) agreement included in the document
(D) oral agreement included in the document
ANSWER:
(A) Note: It is suggested that either A or B be considered as correct.
Strictly speaking parol evidence does not have to be an agreement; it is
simply any evidence, whether written or oral, which is not contained in a
written agreement subject of a case and which seeks to modify, alter, or
explain the terms of the written agreement.
XXVII.
Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint
against Ms. Bright for annulment of deed of sale and other
documents. Ms. Bright filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action. Mr. Avenger filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss. State and discuss the appropriate remedy/remedies
under each of the following situations: (6%)
(A) If the RTC grants Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, what will be the
remedy/remedies of Mr. Avenger?
(B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, what will be her
remedy/remedies?
(C) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and, further
proceedings, including trial on the merits, are conducted until the RTC
renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will be the
remedy/remedies of Ms. Bright?
ANSWERS:
(A)
If the RTC grants Ms. Brights’s motion to dismiss, the remedies of
Mr. Avenger are:
(a) File a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37.
(b) Re-file the complaint. The dismissal does not bar the re-filing of the
case (S5 R16).
(c) Appeal from the order of dismissal. The dismissal order is a final order
as it completely disposes of the case; hence it is appealable.
(d) File an amended complaint as a matter of right curing the defect of
lack of cause of action before the dismissal order becomes final. This is
because a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading; hence Mr.
Avenger can amend the complaint as a matter of right. (S2 R10).
(B)
If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, her remedies
are:
(a) File a motion for reconsideration.
(b) Proceed to trial and if she loses, appeal and assign the failure to
dismiss as a reversible error.
(c) File a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus if the denial
of the order to dismiss is made with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
(C)
If the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, Ms. Bright’s
remedies are:
(a) File a motion for reconsideration or new trial under Rule 37.
(b) File an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41.
(c) File an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 if the appeal will
raise only questions of law.
(d) File a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.
(e) File an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 on the ground
of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
XXVIII.
A was adopted by B and C when A was only a toddler. Later on in
life, A filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, as he wanted to reassume the
surname of his natural parents because the surname of his adoptive
parents sounded offensive and was seriously affecting his business and
social life.
The adoptive parents gave their consent to the petition for change of
name. May A file a petition for change of name? If the RTC grants the
petition for change of name, what, if any, will be the effect on the
respective relations of A with his adoptive parents and with his natural
parents? Discuss. (4%)
ANSWER:
Yes, A may file a petition for change of name. Changing name on the
ground that it is offensive and seriously affects the petitioner’s business
and social life is a valid ground especially where the adoptive parents had
given their consent.
The grant of the petition will not change A’s relations with his
adoptive and natural parents. The Supreme Court has held that change of
name under Rule 103 affects only the name and not the status of the
petitioner. (Republic v. CA, 21 May 1992).
XXIX.
Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a
remote part of their barrio in Benguet. However, when she visited the
property after she took a long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see
that her childhood friend, John, had established a vacation house on her
property.
Both Estrella and John were residents of the same barangay. To recover
possession, Estrella filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), alleging that she is the true owner of the land as
evidenced by her certificate of title and tax declaration which showed the
assessed value of the property as P21,000.00. On the other
hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and submitted in
evidence a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the
filing of John’s answer, the MTC observed that the real issue was one of
ownership and not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-blown trial
was conducted as if the case was originally filed with it. The RTC reasoned
that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of
proper jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment
declaring John as the owner of the land and, hence, entitled to the
possession thereof. (4%)
(A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction? Why or why not?
(B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on the assessed value of the
property, the case was within its original jurisdiction and, hence, it may
conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it was originally filed
with it? Why or why not?
ANSWERS:
(A)
No, the MTC was not correct in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that an allegation of ownership
as a defense in the answer will not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in an
ejectment case. (Subano v. Vallecer, 24 March 1959). What determines
subject-matter jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and not
those in the answer. Furthermore, the MTC is empowered under S16 R70
to resolve the issue of ownership, albeit for the purpose only of resolving
the issue of possession.
(B)
No the RTC was not correct in ruling that the case was within its
original jurisdiction and that hence it may conduct a full-blown trial of the
appealed case as if it were originally filed with it.
Under S8 R40, if an appeal is taken from an MTC order dismissing a
case for lack of jurisdiction without a trial on the merits, the RTC on
appeal may affirm the dismissal order and if it has jurisdiction thereover,
try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it.
Here the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case since it is an
ejectment suit cognizable exclusively by the MTC. The assessed value of
the land is irrelevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction in
ejectment suits and would not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in the same
manner as allegations of ownership would not oust the MTC of
jurisdiction.
The RTC should have reversed the dismissal order and remanded
the case to the MTC for further proceedings. (S8 R40).
Note: Utmost liberality should be given to the examinee on this
question as it does not appear to be within the coverage of the remedial
law examination per the bar examination syllabus given by the Supreme
Court.