Adm. Case No.
2385, Mar 08, 1989 ] where she was living although she had no means of livelihood; and
JOSE TOLOSA v. ALFREDO CARGO +
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an
Affidavit-Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of
respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed the respondent had been seeing his (complainant's)
wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further
alleged that in June 1981, his wife left their conjugal home and went to
live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila and that since then, has been living with respondent at that
address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment
and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations
complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been
seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice from
respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital
accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant's
mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of
his wife and mother as to what to do about the "continuous quarrels
between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries
(sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo,
p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982to respondent's
"Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations, to
wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent
had taken
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent
but that she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further
allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had merely
given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial
assistance during herconfinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The
Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from
21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and
respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to
establish in the following terms:
of
''1. That respondent has been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12,
1982, 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in 1980 in Cubao
and Sto. Domingo, Quezon, City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at
No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with respondent at
No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16-
17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household
appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of
income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985; Exh. 'M', 'N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU
Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. pp.
18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent and
complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept 20, 1983,
Exhibits 'C' and 'C-1').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place
involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8-10, July 29, 1983 Exh. 'B',
'B-1' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and
complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and
'G'.)
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against
respondent with the CLAO, and that respondent was suspended for one
year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E')." (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the
following manner:
"a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult
relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she
suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or
caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No.
45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the
house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client
whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as
assistance in her medical expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for
lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being
investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her
in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa
Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab
him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was between
Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45
Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to
intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984)."
(Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
"F I N D I N G S
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. 1 Lopez
Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they
(complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences
being one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice,
because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45
Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the
house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of
respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in
Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed
happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1
Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or
three houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and
suspended for one year.'' (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of
immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same
time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not
been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
"1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's
suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner
is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in
spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved in various incidents
involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', 'B-1', 'F', 'G', [G-
1'] and ['I']).
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was
confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with
complainant." (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to
properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which
may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible trouble
in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General
recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been co-habiting
with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For
this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be
reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct
appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the
court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses[1] but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent
attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of
the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar
conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
[ Adm. Case No. 1334, November 28, 1989 ]
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR,
RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground
of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty.
Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of
her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology
subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires.
Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent,
through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of
complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and
by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose
morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University,
the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp.
11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to
approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would
pass the said subject (pp. 15, 16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go
with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42,
50, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx xxx xxx;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the
same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila: from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they
stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish
restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp.
56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where
respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18,
1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for
her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects
(p. 61, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx xxx xxx;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was
suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn,
July 17, 1975); xxx xxx xxx;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college
of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon
her (p. 82, tsn, July 17, 1975); xxx xxx xxx;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Mansanto
fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas, she was given an injection and
an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn,
July 17, 1975);
13) as a result she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion
had already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt
pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); xxx xxx
xxx (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom
complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel
(pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant,
testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the
lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality
(Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except
in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila
(p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo. pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent:
the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar:
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with
him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13,
1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge leveled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent
by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-
1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended
that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the
hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the
complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:
"From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to
Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to
do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a
medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was
Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to
believe him.
"It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent
to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had
carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his
lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-
1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975;).
"On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the
hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar
Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every
time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of
help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and
slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at
Ambassador Hotel. xxx xxx xxx Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in
December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14,
1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the
present case" (Rollo. pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence, both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficent and
uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor
General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice
of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in
the premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which
would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion
praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together
with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo. p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of
the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in
the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to
his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the
self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf,
the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act
complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of
complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador
Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present
any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a
criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his
silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to
satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high
and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21
SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and
show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the case of United
States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court,
said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State.
If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. It he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if
he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it
may assist him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man with children, respondent should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo,
p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated
April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had
already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his
recommendation for a three (3) year suspension and respondent is not
practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the
respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case
dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent
reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More
importantly, complainant's knowledge of respondent's marital status is not
at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's
solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and
fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the
latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his
threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile
to inform the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a
very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession
before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per
se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich
man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law
exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v.
Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice. x x x." In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA
591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral
conduct, as follows:
"A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
"It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is 'grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
"Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
"Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the
father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral
conduct was justified (in re Hicks, 20 Pac. 2nd 896)."
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man
with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
AM No. RTJ-93-1033, Oct 10, 1995 ]
MARIBETH CORDOVA v. EMMA C. LABAYEN +
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the matter of the order we issued on
November 23, 1994,[1] requiring Atty. Salvador T. Sabio, counsel for
herein complainants, to show cause and explain why he should not be
administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
and the Compliance[2] filed by Atty. Sabio, the Court issued a Resolution
on May 30, 1995,[3] further referring the matter to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. On July 7, 1995, the latter
submitted a Report and Recommendation[4] finding Atty. Sabio guilty of
violating Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of Canon I, which the Court hereby approves
with modifications.
The present incident is an offshoot of an administrative complaint[5]
filed by complainants Maribeth and Christopher Cordova, through their
aforesaid counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein respondents for disbarment,
dismissal from office and disqualification to hold public office with
forfeiture of employment benefits for their involvement in Civil Case No.
7092 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City. The
administrative complaint, however, was dismissed by this Court on the
basis of a Memorandum Report[6] dated October 17, 1994 submitted by
Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis, who likewise
recommended that Atty. Sabio be required to explain why he should not be
administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 on
the ground that:
"Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio 'clearly instigated' the filing of
this complaint is also not totally baseless.
In her comment, Judge Moscardon stated that 'x x x the original counsel
on record unquestionably accepted the Decision of the appellate RTC court
(sic). On the other hand, the petitioners now, as well as their present
counsel who are not fully conversant (with) the circumstances
surrounding the matter, now attempt to mislead the High Court x x x.'
Also worth mentioning were the allegations that (1) the respondent sheriffs
were criminally charged for robbery, grave threats and malicious mischief;
(2) that the plaintiffs re-occupied the premises after being ejected
therefrom; (3) Atty. Sabio had been charged for crimes involving
dishonesty.
The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of Professional
Ethics, particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 (A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law x x x) and Rule 1.03 (A lawyer shall
not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man's cause)."
The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of
whether the writs of execution were issued and implemented by herein
respondents in gross violation of Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with
grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty.
Sabio asserts that the writ of execution was issued pending appeal despite
the filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of advance rentals. A
review of the complaint, comment and answer filed in this case will readily
show that the writs in question were issued strictly in accordance with
Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provide:
"SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. - If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or city
court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First
Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due
from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of
the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract, he shall
deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by
the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or
city court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance
to which the action is appealed."
"SEC. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court. - Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the restoration of
possession, shall not be stayed unless the appellant deposits the same
amounts and within the periods referred to in Section 8 of this rule to be
disposed of in the same manner as therein provided."
The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for
ejectment filed against the predecessor in interest of herein complainants,
[7] judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the Municipal Trial Court,
Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering defendants to
vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for rentals from
May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit. On August 20, 1992, the
Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that that there
was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.
A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on
September 4, 1995, to which an Opposition and Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the
writ of execution was issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the
afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order of September 28, 1992 granting the motion
for execution, on the ground that they could not file the supersedeas bond
because the court allegedly failed to apprise them of the amount thereof
and, at the same time, attaching to said motion a bond in the amount of
P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional
Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of which the writ of
execution previously issued was implemented on October 8, 1992 and
plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession of the subject premises.
Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari with injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision
promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29102, said appellate
court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result,
the lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of
Execution filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants. An alias
writ of execution was subsequently issued on April 26, 1993.
The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants,
as heirs and successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves
around the validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge Moscardon
and the alias writ of execution issued by Judge Labayen.
1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge
Moscardon is being controverted on the ground that a supersedeas bond
had been validly filed in this case and periodic rentals had been paid,
hence said supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should have
legally stayed execution pending appeal.
Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate
execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the
defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas
bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the
pendency of the appeal.
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages
and costs accruing down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed
from, the amount of which is to be determined from the judgment of said
court. The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the
execution sought was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond
was sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the
circumstances then obtaining.
First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily
discernible from the dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal
trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a deliberate falsity,
for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond
because that court failed to determine the same.
Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal
trial court had rendered judgment against complainants, which judgment
was immediately executory, without prejudice to the right of appeal. As
the records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on
September 29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the
aforementioned Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting
the motion for execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the
impression thus created that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory
afterthought on the part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain
attempt to remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the same necessarily
had to fail for being frivolous.
Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the
rendition of the decision either in the court of origin or in the appellate
court. The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory.
[8] Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court without
filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright execution
of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate
court to order the execution of the appealed decision being thereby
ministerial and imperative.[9]
Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00
deposited by defendants therein represented rental payments for the
period from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of execution had by
then already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore,
the amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of
a supersedeas bond. Thus:
"Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that she had
deposited with the public respondent court the amount of P18,000.00
representing the money judgment, to stay execution pending appeal. The
court noted that the said amount represented the rental payments only for
the months from May 1991 to April 1992. It is for this reason that this
Court, in its Resolution dated October 9, 1992 (p. 60, Rollo), ordered
petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made pursuant to
Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It appears, however, that a Writ of
Execution was already issued and even implemented (par. 5, Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 98-99, Rollo;
Delivery of Possession, p. 118, Rollo) that a preliminary injunction is
thereby rendered nugatory x x x."[10]
While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which
approximates the monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same
was filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas bond. What is
considered material for purposes of staying execution pending appeal
under Rule 70 is not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the
timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of
P18,000.00 was correctly applied as mere rental payments from May,
1991 to April, 1992. On this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was
perfectly justified in issuing the writ of execution and respondent sheriffs
in implementing the same. Of these legal considerations, Atty. Sabio
could not have been unaware.
The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations
with respect to the application of the P12,000.00 which complainants
supposedly deposited with the court a quo. Atty. Sabio insists that said
amount was intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after the
rendition of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs
contrary to the facts obtaining in this case. The decisions of the Municipal
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are silent on this point except for a
statement found in the higher court's decision that "this Court, in its
Resolution dated October 9, 1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of
subsequent payments made." Also, in the order of Judge Moscardon dated
October 1, 1992, she stated that "the record does not show that the
defendants had likewise paid the periodical rentals." Also, in the complaint
filed in this administrative matter, it is alleged that the defendant
consigned the rentals from May, 1991 until April, 1992 in the amount of
P12,000.00.
In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that
there is not enough evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a
specific determination thereon. Nevertheless, whether or not periodic
rental payments were made during the pendency of the appeal no longer
carries any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not
be legally stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the purported
supersedeas bond.
Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution allegedly because it should have
forwarded the records of the case to the court of origin for proper
implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court
may issue execution immediately after judgment if no action was taken
therefrom by defendants. But, after the perfection of the appeal, it is
obvious that the jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to the
Regional Trial Court, hence the motion for execution of the judgment was
properly filed in and granted by the latter court.[11]
2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by
Judge Labayen, Atty. Sabio avers that the same is void for the reason that
he was not furnished a copy of the order, dated April 21, 1993, which
granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that the
same was issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals
had not yet become final and executory since it was still pending review
before the Supreme Court.
Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court shall likewise not be stayed unless the appellants deposit
the amount of rent due from time to time. In the case at bar, no proof has
been presented to show that the monthly rentals which fell due after the
rendition of the trial court's decision had been duly paid. Assuming
arguendo, as claimed by Atty. Sabio, that the P12,000.00 deposited with
the Regional Trial Court should answer for said rentals, the same was not
sufficient to cover rentals due during the entire pendency of the case
before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. At most, such
amount could apply only to rental payments from May, 1992 to December,
1992. Of these facts, again, Atty. Sabio could not have been completely
oblivious.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is
absolutely nothing in the records to show that herein complainants made
further payments aside from the P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited
with the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, respectively.
In Addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in
paragraph 6 of the complaint filed in this administrative matter, that
complainants reentered and remained in possession of the premises, and
it appears that they continued to do so despite the prior implementation of
the original writ of execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants
to make periodic deposits during the pendency of the appeal and their
continued occupancy of the premises, the issuance of the alias writ of
execution was a ministerial and mandatory duty of respondent judges.
Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was
not served a copy of the order dated April 21, 1993[12] which granted the
motion for alias writ of execution. He rationalizes that:
"x x x The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993 was not
furnished the defendant's counsel.
Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel filed his
Urgent Motion to Lift Alias Writ of Execution, x x x.
It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 26,1993
issued by the defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday, was improperly
issued, considering that the Order of the court granting the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution dated April 21, 1993 was not furnished the
undersigned counsel, and, it is only through the resourcefulness of the
undersigned of following-up this case that he came to know of the said
Order dated April 21, 1993.
Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation, when he
was confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April
26, 1993 was issued without his knowledge of the prior Court Order dated
April 21, 1993.
It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he has a well
grounded complaint against respondents Clerk of Court and process
server for their negligent act." (Italics in the original text.)[13]
That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was
unwittingly disclosed by the aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his
compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him nor did he invoke any
authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support
his theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not
served a copy of the order even where the grant thereof had become a
matter of right. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the filing of
the present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious,
and was resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of
counsel.
It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against
herein respondents only after the Court of Appeals had rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiffs. This in itself is already a clear indication
that the acts of respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted
in instituting these baseless charges against respondents to their proven
prejudice.[14] As correctly observed by the Bar Confidant, under the given
circumstances, it is apparent that complainants decided to institute the
present case only on the advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It
also bears stressing that respondent Judge Labayen even waited for the
Court of Appeals' decision before acting on the motion for an alias writ of
execution of plaintiffs, if only to obviate any imputation of bias or
partiality.
We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty.
Sabio, the issuance of the writ of execution was done in the valid and
judicious exercise of the functions and duties of respondent judges. We
have carefully examined and analyzed the procedure adopted by
respondents in the issuance and enforcement of the questioned writs. It
would be the height of injustice were we to impose any sanction on them
for complying faithfully with the procedural mandate of the rules
governing the matter.
The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible
propensity of disgruntled litigants, most especially their counsel, of filing
totally baseless and unfounded charges against judges and court
personnel in a vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own
negligence or in an effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court.
Judges and court personnel should be protected from unjust accusations
of dissatisfied litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to
comouflage their shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not
enough. There should be evidence to prove the charge,[15] which is
obviously absent in the case at bar.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to
impede or pervert, the administration of justice. The present
administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent
judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they represent, in
flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus
deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative
complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually
to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently
obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his receipt of
a copy of this decision. He is warned that a more severe sanction shall be
imposed should he commit another administrative offense. Let copies
hereof be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May
22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein
made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below,
the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting
the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final
and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or
withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert
the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be
paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels
for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek
reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
"professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs
adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of
merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of
the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted
litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was
designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners'
counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy,
the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner
spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by
the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied
shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this
position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein
Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end
the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the
projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality
of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as
represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary
injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case
39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after
Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the
rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife,
Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for
an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said
court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any
action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October
31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4,
1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the
respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear,
however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to
have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not
have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and,
anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3,
1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic
civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on
August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied
shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt,
the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez
failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as
in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled
hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this
morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the
fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view
thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence
in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said
urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge
Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be
enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her
husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of
execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the
Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of
Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction
sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied,
Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November
8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's
above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the
order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not
legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez
spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when
the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for
Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five
days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent
Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted
litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the
various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of
petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent
events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by
their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to
foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious
that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they
ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted,
they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second
time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this
Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid
civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and
regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent
Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an
independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the
projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks
should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in
the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed
of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting
satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could
not be branded as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted
statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only
in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently
instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they
accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases
were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance
of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil
cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not
have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of
their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a
court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and
the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and
55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal
action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue
with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs.
Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above
mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case
39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former
case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963,
upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually
deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari
with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds
proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on
March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency
then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because
petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the
lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath
to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this
case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that
the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against
the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when
we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who
were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final
judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had
rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on
record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own
admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for
Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to
the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that
he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with
Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it
appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed
by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was
over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas &
Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said
urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously
enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our
decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys.
Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the
treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed
by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano
R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to
give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the
latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap
(Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the
late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of
Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total
estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3
dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after
respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He
then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high
moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal
wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with
Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused
respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the required
authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a
25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the
August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap
assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July
16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for
the corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio
B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer
this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)
year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539
dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus,
be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards
whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997
letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly,
respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits
a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not
obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four
children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral
fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The
settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently,
We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to
have been sufficiently established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some
form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its
output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money
to a single person without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that
respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his
actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with
great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as
member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or
committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found
GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective
upon notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9000 October 5, 2011
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
 Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-
Gumba for gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in Naga City,
filed a verified Complaint1 against respondent, also a resident of Naga
City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur
Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3,2 Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to
the IBP Board of Governors for proper disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent asked to
be lent ₱ 350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay the
principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise offered
by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20553 and registered in
her father’s name. Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of
Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent’s parents, and verbally assured
complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire
property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured
that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant
agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte,
respondent executed in complainant’s favor an "open" Deed of Absolute
Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant
was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the
loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered.
Accordingly, he gave the amount of ₱ 350,000.00 to respondent.
Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay
the same despite complainant’s repeated demands. Left with no recourse,
complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find
out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent
the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage
the property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent
money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but this was
the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous
results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit or
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations,
respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive
Pleading5 but no answer or comment was ever filed by her before the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed
respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by
complainant but she did not file any answer thereto.6 She also chose not
to attend the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June
13, 2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed
to have waived her right to participate in the proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. rendered
his report7 finding respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, 8 Rule 1.019
and Canon 710 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law for one
year. Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to
be a co-owner of the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back
of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the property has been sold to her, it
was evident that she employed deceit and dishonest means to make
complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to
sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit
verified Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory conference,
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. 11
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a
reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the
principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.121avvphi1
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.13 Verily,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.
Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same
Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant
into lending money to her through the use of documents and false
representations and taking advantage of her education and complainant’s
ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have
never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondent’s
misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if
respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the "open"
deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan.14 By her misdeed, respondent has
eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal profession but the
public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for
which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
xxxx
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of
the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for the mandatory
conferences despite due notice. Respondent should bear in mind that she
must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority
over her as a member of the IBP.15
Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however,
that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only
in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.16 In this case, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of
suspension for one year too severe. Considering the circumstances of this
case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After
all, suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means
to protect the public and the legal profession.17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent’s record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9868 April 22, 2015
[formerly CBD Case No. 05-1617]
ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. E. HANS A. SANTOS and AGNES H. MARANAN, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 filed by Atty.
Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. (complainant) against Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and
Agnes H. Maranan (respondents) for committing an unethical act in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Factual Background
In his complaint, the complainant related that the respondents initiated
Civil Case No. 70251 for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (RTC Pasig) and used a deceptive ploy to prevent the payment of
the proper docket fees. Knowing that the complaint was actually one for
damages, the respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action
for specific performance and injunction (where the amount involved is
incapable of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately omitted to specify the
damages prayed for amounting to ₱68,000,000.00 in the prayer of the
complaint in order to avoid paying the proper docket fees. According to the
complainant, this intentional omission to specify the amount of damages
was specifically declared by the Court in Manchester Development
Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals2 as grossly unethical, and thus
constitutes a valid ground for disbarment.3
The respondents denied that they deceived the court in Civil Case No.
70251 by making it appear that the case was an action for specific
performance and injunction. They claimed that at the time the complaint
in Civil Case No. 70251 was filed on January 13, 2005, twelve (12) out of
fifteen (15) checks were not yet due and demandable, clearly indicating
that the complaint was really an action for specific performance and
injunction, rather than an action for sum of money or damages.4
The respondents also claimed that the Manchester doctrine the
complainant invoked was modified less than two (2) years after it was
announced.5
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his Report and Recommendation dated October 29, 2008, IBP
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found that the respondents did not
commit any violation of the code of professional ethics. According to
Commissioner Reyes, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had been
deceived when she assessed the filing fees due on the complaint in Civil
Case No. 70251. A reading of the prayer in Civil Case No. 70251 shows
that there were clear and unequivocal references to paragraph 2.27 of the
complaint, which detailed the amounts of the post-dated checks. There
was also a specific reference in the prayer to the amount of ₱9.5 Million
representing the value of the checks that had become due.
Moreover, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had made any
mistake in the assessment of the docket fees since the court never issued
an order for reassessment or payment of higher docket fees.
Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment case be dismissed
for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors’ Findings
In a resolution6 dated December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the
IBP resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on
record, and by the applicable laws and rules.
The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion in a resolution7 dated January 3, 2013.
On April 5, 2013, the complainant filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the IBP’s findings. The complainant reiterated that:
(1) The respondents’ omission to state, in the prayer of the complaint, the
amount claimed in the action is an "unethical practice";
(2) The case filed by the respondents in Civil Case No. 70251 is one for the
collection of a sum of money; and
(3) The respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically, Canon 1, Rule 1.01; and Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and
10.03.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents’ omission of the
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint is
unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful study of the record, we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The complainant argued that the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation is contrary to the Court’s pronouncement in Manchester
Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals.8 The material
portions of the Manchester doctrine provide:
"The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this
case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over Seventy-Eight Million Pesos (₱78,000,000.00)
is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee."
"The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition
of this unethical practice."
In that case, the Court observed that the lawyer’s act of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint,
although the amount was alleged in its body, "was clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to
mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee."9 It noted the
lawyer’s fraudulent act of avoiding payment of the required docket fees,
and declared the said act as unethical. Following this pronouncement, the
Court required lawyers filing an original complaint to specify the amount
of damages prayed for not only in the body of the pleading, but also in the
prayer. After a careful study of the import of the Manchester doctrine and
the arguments of the parties, we find as the Investigating Commissioner
did that the respondents did not commit any violation of the Code of
Professional Conduct.
We stress that the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a
lawyer has committed serious professional misconduct sufficient to cause
disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer’s conduct shows him or her to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or
whether it renders him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.10 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant; and the Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint with clearly preponderant evidence.[[11
In the present case, the respondents’ administrative liability would depend
on the resolution of the following sub-issues: (1) whether the respondents
employed a deceptive ploy to avoid payment of the docket fees; (2) whether
the respondents’ failure to specify the amount of damages in the prayer of
the complaint constitutes an unethical practice; and ultimately; (3)
whether the respondents violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Liability.
We agree with the respondents that they did not deceive the court in Civil
Case No. 70251 in its assessment of the correct docket fees. Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Liability provide:
"CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
On the other hand, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 provide:
"CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
Contrary to the complainant’s allegation that the respondents had
defrauded the court, the element of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit" was not
present in this case.
First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a clear
and express reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which listed
and described in detail the date of the checks, the check numbers, and
their corresponding amounts.
Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the amount of
₱9.5 Million representing the value of the checks that had already become
due.1âwphi1 Thus, we find unmeritorious the complainant’s claim that
the respondents intentionally and deceptively omitted to specify the
amount of damages in the prayer.
Third, despite the complainant’s move for the dismissal of Case No. 70251
on the ground that the proper docket fees were not paid, the RTC Pasig
Clerk of Court neither reassessed the filing fees, nor required the plaintiff
in that case to pay additional filing fees.
Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has not
issued an order requiring the reassessment, recomputation, and/or
payment of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC Pasig Clerk of
Court did not make any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees.
Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer in
Civil Case No. 70251 shows that the case is really an action for specific
performance and injunction. The complaint sought to judicially require the
complainant to deliver the actual and physical checks enumerated in
paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel him to account for the checks
that he may have had already encashed; and to restrain him from
negotiating, transacting, and encashing the checks in his possession.
Clearly, the complaint was an action for specific performance, rather than
for a sum of money.
Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph 2.27 of
the complaint does not fully comply with the Manchester doctrine, this
Court still finds that it is not a sufficient ground for disbarment. As
discussed above, there is no clear showing that the respondents defrauded
or misled the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there any proof that
the respondents have maliciously disguised their complaint as an action
for specific performance and injunction so as to evade the payment of the
proper docket fees. Clearly, the complainant's allegation is merely
anchored on speculation and conjecture, and hence insufficient to justify
the imposition of the administrative penalty of disbarment.
We are likewise not convinced that the respondents violated Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The record of the case do not show
that the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood,
or had misused the rules of procedure. In the absence of such proof, the
presumption of innocence of the lawyer remains and the complaint against
him must be dismissed.12 Viewed in these lights, the disbarment
complaint against the respondents Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H.
Maranan should be dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for
review for lack of merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the IBP Governors' (1)
Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-602 dated December 11, 2008; and (2)
Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-09 dated January 3, 2013.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015 ]
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment[1] filed by Atty. Roy B.
Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of
authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that
respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from
the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they
were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar
in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with
whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to
Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These
alleged illicit relations involved:
AAA,[2] who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law,
from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such
illicit relations;
BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to
1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being
romantically involved with DDD;
DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still
being married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with
CCC;
EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from
May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically
involved with CCC.[3]
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without
remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor,
thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in
truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.[4]
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime
during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings
filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However,
despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent
conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted
KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the
Philippine Government.[3]
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe
then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation
proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting
KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla
XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen
several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and
parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself.
[6]
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims
that respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant
faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of
the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report
No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees
recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well
as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct
or violation of the Revised Penal Code.[7]

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry,
respondent even attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting
complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B.
Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta,
Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, however, was
refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject
of the Senate Inquiry.[8]
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.
[9]
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an
educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College
of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male
students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the
romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades.
[10]
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order[11] dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline,
Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified
answer.
In his undated Answer,[12] respondent opted not to present any counter-
statement of facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply
argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive
infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or
charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal
requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition
were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.[13] He claims that the identities of the owners of the
e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of
authority, were not properly established. Respondent further argues that
the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and
deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),[14] stating
that the allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of
respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his
Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),[15] respondent simply
denied all of complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack
of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity thereof."[16]
On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory
conference on August 28, 2007,[17] which respondent failed to attend. It
appears that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,[18] praying for
the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously
scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by
complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order[19] dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation[20] praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons
who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by
Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the
presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the
respective subpoenas[21] were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration,[22] praying that the Order dated August 28,
2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the
third week of October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD
that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore eyes"
and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks
while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies
of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was
suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant
opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal
verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for hearing
on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is
another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that
complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited
period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's
motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses.
[23]
Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor
General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos),
Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty.
Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection
that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish
that the email messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from
respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the
email messages which contained references to his daughter, his
relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD
to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw
respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his
wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party
sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent
had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students during
their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements
about respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also
testified that DDD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to
inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning
that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her
telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter
his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that
during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent
introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or
2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the
execution of their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the
affidavits that complainant included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the
mandatory conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were
directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the transcript
of stenographic notes. After which, the case was considered submitted for
report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Manifestation (with Comments),[24] pertaining to respondent's Motion to
Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for
records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's
claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled
mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with Comments),[25] submitting the certified
photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution
dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated
June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.
[26] Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations,[27] asserting that
respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper
and that any decision or judgment would have to be based solely on
complainant's Verified Position Paper.[28]
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation,
Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report,[29] finding that there is more
than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal
Code[30] and/or RA 3019[31] as reflected in the Senate Report, the
Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid
found that despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to present
certified true copies of the relevant documents which support his
allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid
discredited complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross
immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on
the Report, complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving
the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this adulterous affair;
thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid
found merit in complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all
while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".[32]
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:
V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than
sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting
his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. this Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a Reconsideration).[39]
manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility."[33] Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion
for Reconsideration with Leave[40] dated September 12, 2013, as well as a
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition[41] dated September 20, 2013.
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
Resolution[34] adopting and approving, with modification, the Report and On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution
Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of denying respondent's motion for reconsideration.[42] Thereafter, the
Governors disbarred respondent, thus: Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court
on November 11, 2014.[43]
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973 The Issue
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and The Court's Ruling
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED
and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys. CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for PROCESSES.
Reconsideration[35] dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant was
required to submit his comment.[36] Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP- deceitful conduct.
CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)[37] dated August 17, 2013. Similarly,
respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
Order[38] dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue
to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.[44] Good moral
character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be
retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.[45]
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify
the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This,
We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule
133. in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the
court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the
trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it docs not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the
party with the burden of proof according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.[46]
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the
grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers
who were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in
their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the
institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an
extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.[47]
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court
revoked his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was
proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.[48] We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the
exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license
and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative
and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar.[49]
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan
Catindig,[50] the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly
and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to
various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second
marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons
his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman
who has borne him a child.[51] (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on
several adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as
well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD
and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the
same were not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply
argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not
supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's
allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and
even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit
relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated
Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.[52] (emphasis
in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner
Villadolid's findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a
Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against
him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and
Justice & Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by
the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report
No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned
committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as
evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case
for graft and corruption against him is still pending with
Sandiganbayan.''[53]
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his
Answer that complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case
had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were
merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his
Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments for
"lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report,
viz:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his
Answer were made in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent
could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the
same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to
take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not present in the
country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the
issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01
and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the
rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an
the officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that
Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the
original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention
but to mislead the IBP, which intention was more so established because
complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of
certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution,
and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent
violated the lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar,
which states:

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; [will support its Constitution and obey laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly
nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any menial
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his
legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to
participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to
ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and
adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond
A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating
Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 ]
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, RESPONDENTS.
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed
by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on
August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and
Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been
friends since the mid-1960's when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
[2]
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily
Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the
Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a
Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.[3]
Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he
got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal
out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.[4]
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a
divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he
would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and
that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.[5]
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State
of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed
with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.[6]
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is
a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican
Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured
Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He
also promised to legally adopt their son.[7]
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to
legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez
to the said petition.[8]
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous
letter[9] in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig's scandalous affair with
Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter[10]
written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001.
In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five
months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put
a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the
annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a
petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.[11]
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their
son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City
where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.[12]
In a Resolution[13] dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the
respondents to file their respective comments, which they separately did
on November 25, 2002.[14]
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,[15] admitted that he married Gomez
on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with
her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that
while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply
deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation
in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a
mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property
regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple
to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value
it may have and comfort it may provide them.[16]
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of
San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted
that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.
[17]
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including
the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does
not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that
the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez
demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in July 1984 in the USA.[18]
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not
valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that
he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of
losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy
to their relationship.[19]
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned
sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any
acrimony from developing.[20]
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez,
claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early
as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did
not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty.
Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.[21]
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty.
Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she
was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig's romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he
was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being
turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why
she resigned from his law firm.[22]
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
within 90 days from notice.[23]
On June 2, 2003, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
issued an Order[24] setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29,
2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were
already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already
submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty.
Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17,
2003[25] and October 20, 2003,[26] respectively. Dr. Perez filed her
position paper[27] on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,[28]
which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty.
Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and
illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral
conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was
not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law,
both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary
behavior. Respondent's bigamous marriage and his proclivity for
extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and
teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his
students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model
worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In
contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he
has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery
of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally
accepted moral standards of the community.[29]
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez
failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged
affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,[30] which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration[31] of the December 10, 2011
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating
Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez's uncorroborated
allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite
the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez' testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any
felony; that he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In
fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with
both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution[32] dated December 29,
2012, denied Atty. Catindig's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,[33] the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order
to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's
property, reputation, his life, his all."[34] (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia,
for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor."[35] Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[36]
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts
to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindig's own admission, indeed establish a pattern
of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled,
but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central
Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic
wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their
paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four
children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez' serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation
from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a
divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr.
Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted
with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he
obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in
our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time.
He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding,
he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
Atty. Catindig's sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant
and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that
his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he
wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig's claim is true, it
matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact
still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render
a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act
is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the
various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a
semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to
pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral
conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court's finding of
gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig's desertion of Dr.
Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'"[37] In various
cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer
abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another
woman who has borne him a child.[38]
Atty. Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of
the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the
process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be
the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig's claim that Dr. Perez's allegations against him are not
credible since they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that
he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with
Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis
for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there
is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between
the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to
prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her
that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love
letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.[39]
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez
only proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the
alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of
the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only
proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for
her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with
Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig
is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath
and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that
of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.
8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through
The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of
said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June
7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues
raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
(2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations
readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not
the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by
it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we
deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue
with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has
made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as
a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance
of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. ...
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a
man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such
as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that,
in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using
a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of
the public. Technological development in the profession may
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform
all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively
to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to
the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought
to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited
from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular
lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of
law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
be Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson
to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services
through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal
right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle
for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270).
It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons
who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish
the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims
that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal
advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers
and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may
be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to
the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that
at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however,
seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in
essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters.
It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the
Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the
law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the
subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that
secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in
fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents
to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and)
by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers
or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In
the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law)
involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty
of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use
of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage
a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code
and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to
legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind
of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar,
he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer
in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But
if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle
it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800,
cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of
the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular
client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what
may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,
absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.
The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication
of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two,
that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the
situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to
a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and
sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no
legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment
or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing
house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the
kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of
advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment
of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder,
348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650).
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law,
or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105
Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney
or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations
to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out
of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering,
to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents
and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action
to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the
fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving
legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in
the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was
given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we
start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you
how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature,
they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-
up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine.
It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services
is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings
it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed
in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI,
said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed
by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there
also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons
are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts
as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation
and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar
from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter
for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it
has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies
and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation
has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants,
Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out
by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the
law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not
been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion
of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure
of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives
of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the
case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or
solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result
of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons,
of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be
misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices
in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which
he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of
a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or
the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of
Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless
and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes
to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked
by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the
case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about
lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public
opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal
and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the
kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject
to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49
Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of
the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality
of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be RESOLUTION
passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing CORONA, J.:
into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be services.
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation.
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious
the alleged support services. collection on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is persistently called them and sent them text messages.
the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever
factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s
charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein Front
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or LAW OFFFICE
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Fe Marie L. Labiano
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Paralegal
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City Tel: 362-7820
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, Fax: (632) 362-7821
vs. Cel.: (0926) 2701719
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report
and recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the
professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other
canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent
but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent
into complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the
CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known.
Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents
as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his
talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he
later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating
Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the
rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the
latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never
denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection
to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep
into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so
that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It
seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well
as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends
money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional
stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer
to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25
which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of
anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold
the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of
the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended
by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner.
A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For
this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance."
The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their
legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar
and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules
1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of
the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR.,
in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information
Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number
and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four
to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a
fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case
and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in
the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office,
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of
Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the
time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban
on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated
from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to
law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6
finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8
which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated
October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution
on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on
April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of
pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their
clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of.
He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he
had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the
Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself
as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or
unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the
use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office
and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in
legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use
of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in
a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon,
of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of
clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
the journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which
he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of
a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO
is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective
upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
law Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
legal SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13,
1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published
the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted
having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy"
of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement
was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at
law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from
the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services
and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case,
however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy,
and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves,
the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required
of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the
approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance
with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not
exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six
(36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six
(6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills
equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution
equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and
procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may
be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period
shall begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these
Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or
readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods
shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of
the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the
MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups,
namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR)
or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to
Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned
to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity
wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with
the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar
after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the
appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the
date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin
on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on
the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply with
the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education
activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall
be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in
proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number. LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU) COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement EDITOR
under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers participation in the 2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing credit units INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
and the supporting documents required therefor: CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE COMPLIANCE PERIOD
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES 2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH 2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF
NUMBER OF HOURS BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF DIRECTOR
RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS
CERTIFICATION SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION or non-participatory.
COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM
MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units
ORGANIZATION may be claimed for:
FACILITATOR
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences,
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW conventions, symposia, in-house education programs, workshops,
dialogues or round table discussion.
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK (b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in
approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit
units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or
accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or
book review which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the members practice
or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed
based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest
one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of
the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of
the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government
Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy;
and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of
the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP
Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A
member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption
(such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in
accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first
day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections
1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or
modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported
by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing
regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1)
the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal
education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical
content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to
legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession activities
(e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the
ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive
written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials
must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location
so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other
distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall
be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group
may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be
accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers
shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the completion
date. The provider shall include the member on the official record of
attendance only if the members signature was obtained at the time of
attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain
the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify
the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the
amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics,
etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities
prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by
the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members
of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff
Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The
provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the
activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this
program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be
subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider
may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails
to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide
satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any
provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the
MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF
PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education
activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate
fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the
MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance
period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has
complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying
the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to
the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall
maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the
MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by
the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record
of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory
activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section
3 of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall
constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance
period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of
such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance
notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended
to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance.
-Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating
the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following
language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH
THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF
NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND
SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may
use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for
compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless
units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess
may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is
in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply
with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has
expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member
for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to
accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is
listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member
shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with
the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A
member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for
the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive
status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior
compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The
termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature
AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five
(5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and
four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and
associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.
They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years
and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and
adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP
Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval
of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme
Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary
to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other
necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit
to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to
establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000,
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995 ]
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M.
CASTILLO AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged
Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction
of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7653-55, for estafa, against the Sps.
Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case
No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment
and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and
registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was
attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the
aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed Civil Case
No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note,
also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the
said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this
case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the
necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against
them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio
Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property
previously attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3)
aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija
placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number,
to wit: Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City,
PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that Civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio
Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the
satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in
Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with the
following findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and
attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which
Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of
the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum
Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta
and her husband was registered and annotated in said title on February 7,
1989; whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989.
Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her
husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel
spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing
conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might
obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their
appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-
88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for
using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP
National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and
current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on
Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester
Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993 that it was all
her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings of Atty. Castillo and in
failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer,
deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of
every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time,
especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the
Supreme Court.
of WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is
well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue
to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty
from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this
reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty of
committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be
spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,- versus -ATTY. VENANCIO B.
PADILLA,Respondent.
A.C. No. 9387
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)
Present:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint[5] with
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against
her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla
Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the
respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D.
Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale
executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral
damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants
Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their
behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief.
Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the
Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the
appeal was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because
respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness
amounting to malpractice of law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed
to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse
decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent several
times about the status of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately
withheld response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.[4]
The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004.
Complainant was informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when
the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the
Resolution.
the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds:
deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral
damages in the amount of ₱350,000.
Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline
Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the
Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the
outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He
averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13
December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her
husband who had personally transacted with him. According to
respondent, the husband despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the
CA was to lapse within two or three days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that
he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that it is
this pleading which was required.[9]
Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband
to settle the case. The latter allegedly gestured approval of the advice.[10]
After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing,
respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the
husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent
received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the
Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he instructed his office staff to contact
Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no avail.
[11] Thus, when complainants husband went to the office of respondent to
tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the
CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised.
The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO.[12]
In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland
R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that
respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on
28 August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the
relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January
2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15]
partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month
suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter[16] addressed to then Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This
Court, however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-
month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board
originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the
mandatory conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against
him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the
appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-
appellants therein, including complainant and her husband.[17] The
pleading starts with the following sentence: DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS,
by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and
further allege that: x x x.[18] Nowhere does the document say that it was
filed only on behalf of complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him
and complainants husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer
relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared
by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could
not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of
his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x[19]
As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client
relationship, he also alleges that complainants husband never contacted
him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to
respondent, this behavior was very unusual if he really believed that he
engaged the formers services.[20]
Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer,
because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of
₱7,000.
According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim
that he charged ₱7,000 as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the
preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of
Appeal: x x x.[22]
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[23]
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the
client with competence and diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill
this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that
complainants husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he
filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he honestly believed that this was
the pleading required, based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5
January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his
client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to know
the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court,
respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41
of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of
the said Rules applies.[25]
When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a
Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary
appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44
requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know
this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have
been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the
rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of
the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming
that the reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he did
not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual
milieu of the case. The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly
reduced the penalty originally imposed.
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with
the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was
not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this
fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the
Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of
time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come
up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27]
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact
that he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by
filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the
CAs Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that
complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he
had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters
Memorandum of Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed
himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the
moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But
because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the
status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule
18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least
respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why
he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case
and informed the court that he could no longer contact them.[28] His
failure to take this measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment
on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of
the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise
their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for
disciplinary action.[29]
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer
violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and
unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.[30]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of
violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of
respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES DAVID and A.C. No. 6353
MARISA WILLIAMS,
Complainants,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 27, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------
x
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct
unbecoming an attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint
Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses David W.
Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to
the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her
favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an
American citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with
falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-
affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2).
He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue
that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship
when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in
the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites
Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she
would not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she
renounced it in a specific act.
2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring
that her act of marrying her husband was equivalent to renouncing her
citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution
supports his position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who
knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not
prevail in the end.[6]
In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondent enumerated
matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of
complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint for
disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges
against the complainants, and that the charges against him were bereft of
any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for
mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared.
The parties were then directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had
maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his
acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint
complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other
pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams
was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her
marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the
modification that respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice
to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients.
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his
actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa
Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her
Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases
cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they
refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives:
(a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the
administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated
Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly
promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the
significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive
orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated
by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice.
The lawyers life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his
skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and
become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)[9]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest
laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is
his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on
the issues and legal problems confronting a client.[12] In this case, the law
he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,[13] the most
basic law of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty
to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the
interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided
by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be
dismissed on a technical ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both
substantive and procedural laws.[17]
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating
Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer
of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be
imposed as a penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar
Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering
further that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of
reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will
suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly
invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it
unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be
determined on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is
REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give
to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DOROTEO IGOY, A.M. No. 2001-9-SC
Complainant,
-Versus-
ATTY. GILBERT F. SORIANO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 14, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 11, 2001, this Court unanimously ruled to dismiss
respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and indefinitely suspended him from the
practice of law. We denied with finality respondents motion for
reconsideration on June 10, 2003.
On March 31, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and
Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law alleging that his
dismissal from the service and suspension from the practice of law for
more than five years now is ample penalty for his transgressions. He
claimed that at 61 years of age, he may no longer find gainful employment
but as a lawyer, he could still be a productive citizen and family provider.
On even date, respondent also filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Recover Money
Equivalent of Respondents Accrued Leave Credits which he earned during
his 28 years of service in the judiciary.
On May 22, 2006, respondent filed a Supplement to Ex-Parte Plea for
Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law
and submitted certifications attesting to his good moral character issued
by (a) Rev. Fr. Ariel O. Tecson, Parish Priest of Our Lady of the Most Holy
Rosary Parish, Paraaque City; (b) Sr. Silvana Rescigno of the Franciscan
Sisters Adorers of the Cross; (c) Rev. Fr. Christopher Salonga of the Fr.
Hannibal Foundation Center in Paraaque City; (d) Rev. Fr. John Lucas of
Di-Francia Center of Studies in Paraaque City; (e) Joseph Tan of the
Knights of Columbus; and (f) Eduardo Timbungco, Bgy. Secretary of
Manuyo Dos, Las Pias City. At the same time, respondent prayed for the
lifting of the prohibition for his re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
In fine, respondent is now asking this Court (a) to lift the order suspending
him from the practice of law; (b) to release the monetary equivalent of his
accrued leave credits; and (c) to lift the order prohibiting his re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Without overlooking respondents infractions which caused his dismissal
from the service and suspension from the practice of law, we take a second
look at the penalties imposed upon him.
The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily as a punishment, but
as a measure of protection of the public and the profession,[1] the lifting of
which is based on the same criterion used by the Court in applications for
reinstatement to practice law, that is, whether or not the public interest in
the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
[respondents] participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law.[2] The respondent must, like a candidate for admission
to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character a
fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into
consideration his character and standing prior to the suspension, the
nature and character of the charge for which he was suspended, his
conduct subsequent thereto, and the time that has elapsed after his
suspension.[3]
In this case, respondent manifests that he is sincerely repentant and
deeply remorseful for the wrong he committed having realized that as a
lawyer of the Highest Court of the Land, he should have lived up to the
strictest standards of integrity in the public service bearing in mind that
the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. He also
undertakes to always faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of
the legal profession once his suspension is lifted.
Respondent has been suspended from the practice of law since October
11, 2001. Thus, for more than five years, respondent had ample time and
opportunity to amend his erring ways and rehabilitate himself as proven
by the certifications attesting to his moral character. Thus, he has shown
that he is worthy once again to enjoy the privilege of being a member of
the Bar. The lifting of the order suspending him from the practice of law is
therefore in order.
Similarly, we find merit in respondents plea for the release of the monetary
equivalent of his accrued leave credits. Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides in part:
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless
otherwise provided in the decision.
The above Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
specifically Section 86 thereof, repealed Section 9, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), which provides for the forfeiture of not only the
retirement benefits but of the leave credits as well. By so repealing, it must
have been the intent of the framers of the Rules to exclude the forfeiture of
the latter as one of the penalties inherent in the penalty of dismissal.
In Villaros v. Orpiano,[4] the Court noted that even when the penalty is
dismissal, the forfeiture of the leave credits is not imposed by the
applicable rule found in Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. In Paredes v. Padua,[5] the Court held that
despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are
entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of
their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be
deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their
dismissal. Considering the foregoing cases and the provisions of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the release of
the monetary equivalent of respondents accrued leave credits is hereby
ordered.
However, we cannot grant respondents plea for the lifting of the
prohibition for reemployment in the government service. The records show
that during the investigation of the instant case, respondent offered to
retire not once, but twice. In the Memorandum of the Office of
Administrative Services dated December 3, 2001, it was noted that
Lastly, respondent claims that his offer to resign was erroneously
construed as an admission of guilt. He broached the idea that such offer
came at a time when he was emotionally, intellectually and physically
wrecked by the filing of the complaint. The OAS cannot simply bite this
self-serving claim. The offer to retire/resign came initially as part of the
first comment submitted by respondent on November 6, 2000, where in
the ultimate portion, he stated that if you find that I have committed a
misconduct in helping Mr. Taneo despite my explanation, may I request
Your Honor that I just be allowed to retire from the service (underscoring
supplied). By saying so, all along respondent honestly believed that he
committed a misconduct.
It may be true that by then, respondent was still emotionally bothered,
which is why he reacted the same. However, what OAS cannot surmise is
why on January 8, 2001, respondent reiterated the same offer through a
letter of even date addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice. This only
means that he made this reiteration after he already had sufficient
opportunity to determine the consequence or effect of the first offer.
Considering that he is bent in doing so, it is reasonably assumed he made
the subsequent offer to resign/retire freely and voluntarily.
We also note that when respondent filed the Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency
and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law on March
31, 2006, he prayed only for the lifting of his suspension from the practice
of law. In fact, he admitted that he is no longer interested in appealing his
dismissal from the service considering the denial with finality of his
motion for reconsideration. He likewise conceded that at 61 years of age, a
senior citizen and almost in the twilight of [his] life x x x [he] may no
longer find a gainful employment x x x.
Records show that this Court denied on June 10, 2003 respondents
motion for reconsideration of his dismissal from the service. The denial
was with finality hence it should no longer be disturbed. Likewise,
pursuant to Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, dismissal from the service carries with it the cancellation
of eligibility and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service.
Besides, mere passage of time is not a license to overlook the infractions of
the respondent which were committed within the hallow grounds of this
Court. Lest it be forgotten, we reiterate our findings thus:
Respondents acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the
public in the entire judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is
the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney
employed in the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his
record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing
he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this
Court is called upon to apply disciplinary sanction on an errant member,
and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes
on respondent the only penalty that he deserves that of dismissal from the
service.
Finally, respondent is sternly warned that the practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions required
for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the order suspending respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano
from the practice of law is LIFTED. The monetary equivalent of his accrued
leave credits is ordered RELEASED. However, respondent shall REMAIN
DISQUALIFIED for re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is directed to compute the
monetary equivalent of respondents accrued leave credits and release the
same to him.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as
well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files
of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO.
72954 AGAINST,
ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6683
Promulgated:
June 21, 2011
PEREZ, J.:
The present administrative case is based on the following facts:
Prelude
Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a
certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court
impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law
that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February
1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated
with nine (9) other petitions[1] voicing a similar concern.
On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing
the consolidated petitions, effectively upholding the validity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 883.[2]
On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the
rollo[3] of G.R. No. 72954 was entrusted to the Courts Judicial Records
Office (JRO) for safekeeping.[4]
The Present Case
On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter[5] to the
Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished several
documents[6] relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to
be informed of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo
claimed that they made contributions to the said fund by way of the
docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.[7]
On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed[8] Atty. Teresita
Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of
G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent
and Mr. Biraogo.
On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No.
72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised[9] Chief Justice Davide that the subject
rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card[10] of
G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been
borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was
never since returned.[11] The tracer card named the respondent, although
acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the
borrower of the subject rollo.[12]
The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action
by directing[13] Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the
respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take
necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo.
Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent
to Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum[14] on 13 August 2003. In
substance, the Memorandum relates that:
1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO,
the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the
legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco).
Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment that the
respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.[15]
2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the
possible return of the subject rollo.[16] Atty. Dimaisip said that the
respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954
through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of Justice
Gancayco.[17]
On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the
JRO.[18]
On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed[19] the Office of the
Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report and
recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT
submitted a Memorandum[20] to the Chief Justice opining that the
respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of
the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the
following significant observations:

1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20
August 1991.[21] However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of
Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to
remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up
their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the
expiration of his extended tenure when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 on 13 September 1991.[22]
2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the
subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal
researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a personal agenda.
[23] By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his confidential position
for which he may be administratively sanctioned.[24]
3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently
no longer in the employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be
sanctioned as such employee.[25] Nevertheless, an administrative action
against the respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains
feasible.[26]
Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a
Resolution[27] on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show
cause why he should not be held administratively liable for borrowing the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of
almost twelve (12) years.
The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his
Respectful Explanation (Explanation)[28] on 21 January 2004. In the said
explanation, the respondent gave the following defenses:
1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized
anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.[29] Instead, the respondent
shifts the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the
tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority, took the subject
rollo in his name.[30] Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as the
author of such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the
same might have belonged to Atty. Banzon.[31]
2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject
rollo just ended up in his box of personal papers and effects, which he
brought home following the retirement of Justice Gancayco.[32] The
respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the
rollo might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and
that through inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box.
[33]
3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the
rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of
personal papers and effects up until that time when he was contacted by
Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo.[34] The respondent
claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his
personal box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and
wasted no time in arranging for its return.[35]
On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to
the OCAT for initial study. In its Report[36] dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT
found the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory.
On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped[37] the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a
final report and recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held by
the OBC wherein the testimonies of the respondent,[38] Atty. Banzon,[39]
Atty. Dimaisip[40] and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco[41] were taken. On 6
August 2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum[42] to the OBC
reiterating the defenses in his Explanation.
 twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the
On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient
Recommendation[43] to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent
defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully accountable for who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely.[44]
The OBC, thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from the Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject
practice of law for one (1) year.[45] rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The
respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been
Our Ruling inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of
We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar Justice Gancayco.[49] However, the respondents convenient surmise
circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended remained just thata speculation incapable of being verified definitively.
penalty.
Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and
The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse
unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the
After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004:
surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is
convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible x x x However, the excuse that the rollo inadvertently or accidentally found
for taking out the subject rollo. its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face
of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information: Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected
to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including
1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for taking
rollo,[46] and home after his term of office in this Court has expired.[50]
2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent,
actually received the rollo from the JRO.[47] Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately
controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent
The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
he never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.
[48] We are, however, not convinced. Respondents Administrative Liability

First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of
that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability.

We begin by laying the premises:
1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and
as such, can no longer be held administratively sanctioned as an
employee.[51] However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the
bar, remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this Court.
[52]
2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his extended
tenure when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September
1991.[53] We must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20
April 1991. Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever reason the
respondent borrowed the subject rollo, it was not for any official reason
related to the adjudication of pending cases.[54]
3. The respondents unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a
considerable length of time all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing
the same. It must be pointed out that the subject rollo had been in the
clandestine possession of the respondent for almost twelve (12) years until
it was finally discovered and recovered by the JRO.
Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable.
First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises,
without the courts consent, is an administratively punishable act. In
Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon,[55] this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for
the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:
Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's
letter-complaint, should be meted the proper penalty, having admitted
taking the records of the case home and forgetting about them. Court
employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records,
papers or documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales
was not only negligent in his duty of transmitting promptly the records of
an appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not
to take the records of the case outside of the court and to subsequently
forget about them.[56] (Emphasis supplied)
Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial
business entails the employment of deceit not becoming a member of the
bar. It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a certain extent,
even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending
of rollos are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.
As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly
violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).
Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year as too harsh for the present case. We
consider the following circumstances in favor of the respondent:
1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was
borrowed on 13 September 1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping
the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is
concerned.
2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which
remained confidential despite the finality of the resolution in G.R. No.
72954, were disclosed by the respondent.

3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the
respondent cooperated with the JRO for the return of the rollo.
We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is
also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged
her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by
the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to
submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a
revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her
husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was
declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to
submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December
1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the
16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing
on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was
rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for
10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed
to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the
Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an
order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties
(respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and
explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal
motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since
then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its
report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any
further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely,
and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent
should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and
out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself
married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public
as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent
Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store
in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his
legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate
from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del
Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses
or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate
family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip
to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children
in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter
Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie
from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take
back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live
with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give
support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon
him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that
he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ...
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes
do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note
that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not
limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already
married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself
arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a
member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for
a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in
full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to
support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with
another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his
disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary
obligations before his own daughter and the community at large. Atty. Salvador Lao
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Chairman, House of Delegates
Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova
submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo
and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that
he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to. Secretary, House of Delegates
SUPREME COURT
Manila Atty. Teodoro Quicoy
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989 Treasurer, House of Delegates
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. Atty. Oscar Badelles

PER CURIAM: Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Atty. Justiniano Cortes
Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine
International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon
the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
alternates) and proclaimed as officers: Atty. Ciriaco Atienza
NAME
Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon
POSITION
Atty. Mario Jalandoni
Atty. Violeta Drilon
Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila
President
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon
Atty. Bella Tiro
Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon
Executive Vice-President
Atty. Teodoro Almine
Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco
Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas
Atty. Ricardo Teruel
Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas
Atty. Gladys Tiongco
Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao
Atty. Simeon Datumanong
Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted
by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to
be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device
safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign
conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989),
were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics"
allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates:
Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly
"poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit
far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant
vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary
Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the
office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in
addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor,
especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid
and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of
their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on
the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed
crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy
in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center
where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution
dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the
IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House
of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to
the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning
in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note
that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors
and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on
reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP
positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to
give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the
one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was
an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal
inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the
1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro
R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the
elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the
Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine
National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the
Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members
of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their
campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials
were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department
were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports
that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty.
Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and
Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who
claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press
Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and
analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived
to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-
political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political,
and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited
and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or
appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof.
A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an
officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to
IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The
following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether
committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by
any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by
himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than
a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a
legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be
done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the
elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as
well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any
person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the
above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of
the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts
and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar
shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon
any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n.,
July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter
presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10,
p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and
met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of
IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President.
He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March
1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the
House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June
29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor
L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado
Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C.
Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores,
Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C.
Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C.
Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio
C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr.,
Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on
the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14
votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is
that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June
29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1
04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and
Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the
Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a
plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet
Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria.
The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo
Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony
Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said
that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane
(t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain
booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to
Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client.
While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on
an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he
would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity
brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride
on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to
Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company
talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and
asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by
Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR
Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain
regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon
that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a
fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity)
went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu)
could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria,
together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon,
Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport
bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch
with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10,
1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez
(Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V.
Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon),
Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western
Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu
for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon
(Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo
(Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco
(Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-
1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S.
Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written
commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce)
"sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-
at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he
Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be
committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n.,
July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh.
D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello
(Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to
be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel
bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day
with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno
Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth
Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A.
Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus
Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was
used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria
Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The
total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked
40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine
Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o
Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements
with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms,
food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid
balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone
conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working
sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)
P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio
20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)
10,000
(d) Jay Castro
10,000
(e) Danny Deen
20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)
10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno
20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel
15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been
contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time,
they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal
aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted
her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in
whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles,
Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee
Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores,
Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a
senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza
so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group
(t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He
admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the
members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma
rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the
members of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the
convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he
paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention,
by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-
floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of
P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager,
respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto
G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for
those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer
Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin,
Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin
Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador
Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray,
Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel
Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E.
Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group
admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did
so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked
about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More
than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is
that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy
Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the
progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of
the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A
total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating
from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of
Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao)
and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where
the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto,
the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts
are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as
wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed
their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000.
They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b],
IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign
materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more
campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal
Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on
Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during
the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA
law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for
or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged
him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and
to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July
3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in
Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in
the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of
Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City,
she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty.
Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room
would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support
during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for
governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino,
who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he
was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an
IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused
to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but
my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs.
Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la
Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room
had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989,
pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels:
Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at
the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He
mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in
Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his
two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their
own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three
weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of
which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The
Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon
City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the
provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and
Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does
not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months
before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills.
Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage
consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of
P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-
political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned
with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of
written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled
up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big
hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB
plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess
their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the
printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in
the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the
employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of
the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-
paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some
families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the
pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from
one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices
made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election
process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded
when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of
the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the
witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that
those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the
campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the
1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar
Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative
of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees
for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason
why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among
the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be
inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP
elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the
seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval
with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the
recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which
seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby
ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House
of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in
Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is
hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-
President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The
incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be
rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding
election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin
anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and
Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House
of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine
(9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the
different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1)
month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall
elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as
possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership
shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine
(9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the
Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the
Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect
from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-
president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the
national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head
3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as
well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed
by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear
that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in
due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the
premises.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER,
BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the
IBP Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of
his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby
immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated
June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles,
Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada,
Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged
notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from
March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as
follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida
C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy
Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro
married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina
notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March
17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and
Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by
the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia
Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and
Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona
Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and
Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized
on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S.
Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18,
2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of
Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco
and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago,
notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and
Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano,
Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on
March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon
married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima,
notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan
and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the
Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while
respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life
Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who
caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement
that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself and it was
either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of the
office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it
was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country
on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the
Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the
letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and
the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate
action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty.
Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30,
2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not
intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and
endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the
country,"4 and that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents
concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note
the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require
respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27
March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were
documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country.
Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by
his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said secretary
notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization
act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that he
had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory conference on
September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a
manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his
attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and
the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only
respondent submitted a position paper,9 to which he added that for 21
years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without
any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession
and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty.
Abelita III)as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the
attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the comment of
respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed
that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly
similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents which he
admitted were notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He admitted
the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not
aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was
established that by his negligence in employing an office secretary who
had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining
to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to
live up to the standard required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his
prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as
notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a
period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said
recommendation in its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of
the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had
happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with
leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence
which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4,
2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief
Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of
documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country
constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that
the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office
secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes
negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a
"Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts
under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent
cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did
not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he
employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary
in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his
secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence.
There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a
mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person
who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims
that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary
public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His
experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have
prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence,
18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public
was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated
by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and
disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to
solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those
directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He
should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public
but also as a lawyer.15 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.16
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his
negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary
public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his
office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without
any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away,
were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein.
They expected that their documents would be converted into public
documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their
documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege
and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who
are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have
declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the
courts, and the administrative offices in general.17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that
the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of
notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty.
Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court
REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take
effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015 ]
JOY A. GIMENO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-264[1] of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which
imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if
existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary
public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial
Practice Rules).[2]
The Case
the
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a
complaint[3] with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty.
Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3)
use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of
lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's
admission[4] to the Bar and receipt[5] of his notarial commission, he had
notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002.[6] She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and
irregular entries in his notarial registers.[7]
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She
engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law
Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and
her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared
against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019[8] that one
Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman.
Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide
violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients'
interests.[9]
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious
extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed
against her.[10] In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings.[11]
According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive
and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his
dealings.
In his answer[12] dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he
did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it
appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document.[13]
Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear
that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended
that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his
separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients
and accommodate their growing number.[14] This explains the irregular
and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did
not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of
ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of
Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo
Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.[15] On this basis, the
respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients'
interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language in his pleadings.[16]
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for
mandatory conference.[17] After this, both parties were required to submit
their position papers.
In his report and recommendation[18] dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner
Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide
administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules,
representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting
language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the
Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial
registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a notary
public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a
chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently
bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial
register at any given time."[19]
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be
held administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The
investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this
issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to
the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.[20]
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved
that Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with
Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally
hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a
law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.[21] But despite this
previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted
that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting
interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty.
Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used
intemperate, offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.[22]
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo
recommended that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for
another six months for employing abusive and insulting language.[23]
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board)
opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the
investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the
recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if
existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary
public.[24]
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration[25] of the Board's November 19,
2011 resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013
resolution.[26]
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and
recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main
issues that the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any
concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt
of his notarial commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial
stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and
the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed
over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document
are his true information. However, he denied that he personally stamped
and signed the document. In fact, this document never appeared in his
notarial register and was never included in his notarial report for the year
2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his
notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized,
Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed.
He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have
obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR 10/28/05
number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, 226
prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002. 46
18
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting 2005
Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, Affidavit of Quitclaim
leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the 10/31/05
document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial 272
commission. 55
18
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only 2005
generated after his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 Affidavit of Loss
document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before us. 4/17/06
54
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices 11
25
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by 2006
maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Because of this Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly 4/17/06
numbered and entered: 310
Document[27] 61
Date 25
Doc. No. 2006
Page Petition for Issuance of Owner's Duplicate copy
Book 4/17/06
Year 72
Special Power of Attorney 15
6/20/05 25
273 2006
55 Affidavit of Parental Consent
18 4/19/06
2005 461
Secretary's Certificate 93
23 interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should
2006 perform it.
Confirmation of Sale
4/21/06 On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in
283 chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant
56 practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the
25 antedating of notarizations.
2006
Deed of Absolute Sale In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed
4/27/06 to maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could
304 accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial
60 services.
25
2006 This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest.[30] A notary
public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public
provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one
active notarial register at any given time."[28] On this basis, Atty. Zaide's Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his
act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant notarial commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the
violation of Section 1, Rule VI. Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It
amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the
only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place legal processes."
to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his Representing conflicting interests
behalf.
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
must also personally administer the notarial acts[29] that the law
authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,[31] the Court laid down the tests to determine if a
lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among
his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty.[32]
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.[33]
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide
appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased
when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged
ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way
connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the
Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide
represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's
relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against
Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for
her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and
for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case
are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the
time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More
importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against
Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he was still
their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
violating the prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language
in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or
any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the
Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."[34] And in
another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following
demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against
his opposing counsel:
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice
in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her
incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental
incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.[35]
(emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of
his words — a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not
offensive.[36]
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to
abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified.[37]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and,
abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial
commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her
heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M.
ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B.
TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order
dated March 17, 1994[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-
5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246,
respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended
complaint[2] before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch
XXVI, against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila,
Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment
of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance
and damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the
basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is
the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco,
succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his name, to the
prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner
among them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and
both were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid
affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties
be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among
the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages
and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case,
petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
52547, T-4666 and T-52546,[3] which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and
1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or
transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered
in the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during
which, on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the
cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.[4] All these motions were denied.
[5]
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6]
dismissing petitioner's complaint and private respondent's counterclaim.
The trial court found that petitioner's cause of action had already
prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7]on December 17, 1993. As before,
respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens[8] dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994.[9] He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"[10]
which was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.[11]
Displaying remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion
for Reconsideration."[12] This time, however, his arguments proved
persuasive. In an Order[13]dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge
ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De
Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance
or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper
grounds, be cancelled notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of
this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding
of this Court that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which finding is
based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was
registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding
being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further,
the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which are: (1) that the
criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B.
Tiongco based on the same deed of adjudication had already been
dismissed with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the
occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly paying rentals to
herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the
latter intervening, much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No.
15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the
true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all,
the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots
consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair
to the defendant who has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely
in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of such a
encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and
upon further review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the
subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued annotation
of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose
B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such
rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14] On March 4,
1994, the public respondent issued an Order[15] reversing himself on the
ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the
expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal
has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16]
against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the
respondent judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which is
quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although
appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of
the records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens
is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been
transmitted to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction
to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No.
T-5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does
not direct cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483
covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters
where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be
taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March
4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February
14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February
14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383
covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby
reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices
of lis pendens.[17]
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed
the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY,
WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED
AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE
SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree
by subsequent alienation.[18] The notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property.[19]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20] and Section
76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[21] otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens.
From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon.[22]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over
the subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.[23]
It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property
sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[24] or substance,[25] the rule is that a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1)
if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse
party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.[26]
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in
past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27] that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This
is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts
and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28] thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari
(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to
issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It
is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from
the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-
was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but
for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction,
would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for
the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals,
passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The
application for the writ of certiorari sought against a City Court was
brought directly to this Court although there is no discernible special and
important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the
information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to
enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof.
(emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding
the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[29]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly
from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30]
Aleria v. Velez, [31] and Tano v. Socrates.[32] Only the presence of
exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule.[33]
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure
to comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy.
There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought
before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the
main case was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is
ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action
is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one,
to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may
acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those
which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation
of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or
removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the
plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any
incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before
final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time
on appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action,
and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis
pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.
[emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals,
the same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal,
thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters
relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant
case will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical
language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for
private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and
the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a
dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad
fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar,"[35] is
impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten
towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36] a
retired police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's
"nio bonito,"[37] an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with
plaintiff for being houseless[38] who rents a place on the subject property
sought to be recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are
unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by respondent
Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin
defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39] and a "horned spinster and
man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at
nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure defendant - if only to please and
attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object of
her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to
laugh at her behind her back."[40] He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer
with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship
with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious enough to
secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her office-mate who
simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an
IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity.[41] In so
doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own
benefit.[42] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out
of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of virtue,
ther's (sic) no happiness."[43]
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character
assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are
cast with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to
obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays
only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give
him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we
expect members of the bar to comport themselves. These provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES,
AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle,[44] we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious
to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of
intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.[45]
We are aghast at the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco
concocts accusations against the opposing party and her counsel,
although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[46] we
dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and
public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even
the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G.
Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready
audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly:
Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat,
omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47]
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 2200. July 19, 1990.]
BASILIO C. GUTIERREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO N. ZULUETA,
Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM.:
This case pertains to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein
complainant Basilio C. Gutierrez against the herein respondent Atty.
Leonardo N. Zulueta.
On October 13, 1980, the complainant filed with this Court a sworn letter-
complaint dated October 11, 1980 seeking the disbarment of the
respondent lawyer on the grounds of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming
of a member of the legal profession.
The complainant alleges that the respondent lawyer was his counsel in
two cases, namely, a workmen’s compensation case and a civil case filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Sur. The
complaint concerns the latter case. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The complainant filed the said civil case against his former employer, the
Singer Sewing Machine Company. The trial court ruled in his favor. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of the company. It is
categorically stated in the said decision that the complainant did not file a
brief. Thus, he maintains that the case was resolved against him primarily
because his lawyer, the herein respondent, did not file the required brief
with the appellate court and such omission is attributable to the
dishonesty of the respondent lawyer.
In support of his contention, the complainant alleges that sometime in
August 1976, the respondent lawyer, who was then in Manila, wired him
to send the amount of P400.00 to cover the expenses in relation to the
preparation and printing of the appellee’s brief, and upon receipt of the
message, he sent the said amount to the respondent lawyer through the
Philippine National Bank. He also alleges that he sent a telegram to the
respondent lawyer for the purpose of informing the latter that the P400.00
can be obtained at the Sampaloc, Manila branch office of the same bank.
It appears that sometime thereafter, the respondent lawyer assured the
complainant that the brief had already been filed in court and that a copy
thereof will be made available to the latter in due time.
It also appears that immediately after the complainant received a copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, he reported the matter to the
provincial governor inasmuch as the respondent lawyer is the provincial
legal counsel. An investigation ensued but the same failed to settle the
problem.
As stated earlier, the complainant eventually brought the matter to the
attention of this Court. On April 20, 1981, the Court resolved to refer the
matter to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In the investigation that ensued, the respondent lawyer testified that he
received the amount of P400.00 from the complainant for the purpose of
preparing the said brief and that he gave the said amount to his secretary
to cover the expenses to be incurred in such preparation. He also testified
that he had to leave for Pagadian City at that time and that he instructed
his secretary to attend to the filing of the brief. He likewise stated that
sometime thereafter, his secretary assured him that the brief had been
filed already. He also said that he could not furnish the complainant with
a copy of the brief inasmuch as his secretary, for undisclosed reasons, left
the office, taking with her his records and his typewriter. The respondent
lawyer admits that he received the additional amount of P100.00 from the
complainant for the purpose of securing a copy of the brief for the latter. 1
In due time, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its report
recommending therein that the respondent lawyer be found guilty of not
having exercised the due diligence required of a member of the legal
profession in connection with his duties to his clients and accordingly
impose upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one year. 2
The record of the case undoubtedly discloses that the respondent lawyer
failed to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest
of his client, the herein complainant. The failure of the respondent lawyer
to undertake the necessary measures to submit the required brief
certainly caused material prejudice to the complainant inasmuch as the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court which was in favor
of the latter. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the
failure is attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit.
A responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with
respect to all the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate
this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were
otherwise, irresponsible members of the legal profession can avoid
appropriate disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and
attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the office secretary.
Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.
In sum, therefore, this Court is of the well-considered opinion that the
respondent lawyer failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a
member of the legal profession. His suspension from the practice of law is
in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonardo N. Zulueta is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from the date of his
receipt of this resolution. He is advised to henceforth exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients. This
decision is immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained. Let copies of this
resolution be attached to his personal record and circulated among the
different courts.

SO ORDERED.