G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
L-1411 September 29, 1953
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate,
Inc., in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he
sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on
ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko
appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that
was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions
is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and,
as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120
and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all
private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being
practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means
provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two
provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except
"upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely
by way of reciprocity.
G.R. No.
DIONISIO RELLOSA, petitioner, vs. GAW CHEE HUN, respondent.
DOCTRINE:
The “In Pari Delicto” doctrine provides that the proposition is universal that no
action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained
for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation.
FACTS:
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land,
together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines,
for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of the property under a
contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same parties.
Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being
a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration
in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese
authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that, even if said
requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII,
section 5, of our Constitution.
The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking the annulment of the sale
ISSUES:
1. Whether the sale was void because it is against the constitution
2. Whether the petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the
property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts
HELD:
1) Yes, the court held that under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands. This matter has been once
more submitted to the court for deliberation, but the ruling was reaffirmed. This
ruling fully disposes of the question touching on the validity of the sale of the
property herein involved.
2) No, even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution to set aside the sale in
question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the
lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that
what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape this
conclusion because they are presumed to know the law.
G.R. No. L-17587 September 12, 1967
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA
SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LUI SHE in
her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng,
deceased, defendant-appellant.
DOCTRINE:
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a
constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null and void.
FACTS:
Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the
portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres
street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to
withdraw at any time from the agreement.
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the
leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of
P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the
food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to
exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine
citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it
was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a
petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would
confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings
were abandoned.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect
the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date
(November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the
various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements
practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the
contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
HELD:
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered
collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece
of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only
of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it— rights the sum
total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban
against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, vs.ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich (the foreigner) and Antonietta Descallar (the Filipina girlfriend)
were designated as buyers in a Contract to Sell a house and lot located in Agro-
Macro subdivision, Mandaue City. They were also designated as buyers in the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the property.
When the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register
of Deeds, the Register of Deeds refused registration on the ground that Wilhelm was
an alien and could not acquire land. Consequently, Wilhelm’s name was erased from
the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, his signature remained on the left hand
margin of page 1, beside Antonietta’s signature as buyer on page 3, and at the
bottom of page 4 which is the last page of the deed. The Register of Deeds issued
several TCTs in Antonietta’s name.
The couple parted ways. Subsequently, Wilhelm became indebted to Camilo, a real
estate dealer who repaired Wilhem’s speedboat. To pay his debt, Wilhelm sold his
rights and interests in the Agro-Macro property to Camilo for PhP250,000, as
evidenced by a “Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment.”
When Camilo sought to register the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment with the
Register of Deeds, he discovered thatthe TCTs to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of Antonietta, and that the property has already been
mortgaged.
Camilo filed petitioner filed a complaint against Antonietta for recovery of real
property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. According to Camilo:
. . . the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for
the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute
owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue
of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor.
On the other hand, Antonietta:
. . . belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price.
On the contrary, she claimed that she “solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question,” and
that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
Philippines.
The regional trial court ruled in favor of Camilo. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Antonietta. The Court of Appeals ruled:
We disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. The circumstances involved in the
case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court
which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are
absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the
subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al.,
vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159
SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547;
Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject
property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant.
Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. . .
ISSUE:
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian
Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the
name of respondent?
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and agreed with the regional trial
court.
With respect to the issue of who purchased the house and lot, the Court stated that
the evidence presented before the trial court indicate that Wilhelm possessed the
financial capacity to purchase the Agro-Macro property and that Wilhelm was the
source of funds used to purchase the property. On the other hand, Antonietta (who
used to work as a waitress) was unemployed at the time of the purchase and did
not substantiate her alleged source of income.
Thus, the Court ruled that Wilhelm “has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interests and participation over the subject properties” to Camilo by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Having found that Wilhelm is the true owner of the properties, the Court then
addressed the issue of the effect of the registration of the property in the name of
Antonietta. The Court stated:
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively
and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that
it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions
to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire
the subject properties for a valuable consideration. This is the situation in the
instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any
savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
On the issue of Wilhelm’s ineligibility of acquire land, the Court reiterated its earlier
rulings that the while the acquisition of land by a foreigner violates the Constitution,
its subsequent transfer to a qualified Philippine national cured the defect in the
original transaction. According to the Court:
The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is
an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in
a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006 RATIO DECIDENDI:

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA
MULLER, Petitioner, vs.HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of
a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of
a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the
name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do
indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties

before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It
also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired
by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the
court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However,
it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for
the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for
the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
Property of public domain, which generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.
Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
xxx It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
FACTS:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration
of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious,
exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-
grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became
the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter succeeded his
parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and
disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v
Hebierto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
HELD:
No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect
them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD
1529 along with CA 141
 It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests
the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529
Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.
 It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable”
from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we
may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not
Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC did not
acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
 The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied
when at the time of the application, the land is already classified as
alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
 A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the
right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at
the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.
 The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession
even if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
 It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of
men and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive
or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
 It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when
no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as
held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive
act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
 Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive
act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and disposable, that
the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
 Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was
1948. No other substantive evidence was presented.
 Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Petition Denied.
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),
Petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
Confirmation of imperfect title must comply with the requisite proof of possession
and occupation provided by law for the applicant to be entitled registration.
Reclassification of lands as alienable and disposable is necessary only to dispute the
presumption of inalienability, and in itself does not place the property within the
scope of acquisitive prescription.
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco. Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
To support his petition, Malabanan presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that the property has been
classified as alienable or disposable since March 15, 1982. The RTC granted the
petition. The Solicitor General appealed, arguing that Malabanan had not proven
that the land was alienable or disposable, or that Malabanan and his predecessors
had possessed the land long enough for confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
The CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any
period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. The CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982. Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not therefore be tacked to Malabananan’s
period of possession. Pending appeal before the CA, Malabanan passed away. His
heirs then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The SC ruled that
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree were applicable, and pegged the date for the declaration of the land subject
of the application for registration as alienable and disposable at June 12, 1945.
Malabanan failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the property since on or before June 12, 1945, this the petition for
certiorari was denied. In the motion for reconsideration,
Malabananan’s heirs argued that mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State, and that this opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code. Thus,
the ten-year period should apply in their favor. The Solicitor General, in their motion
for partial reconsideration, sought clarification with reference to the application of
the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, upon which the Malabanan heirs relied on.
ISSUES/HELD:
Could Malabanan acquire the property by acquisitive prescription?
RATIO:
The Court, in dismissing the motions for reconsideration, discussed the various
classifications of property under the 1987 Constitution.
Particularly, public land classification according to alienability, and stated that only
agricultural lands can be alienated. Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141)
provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In particular, Sec. 11 (4b) provides that acquisition by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles is done by administrative legalization. The Court read this together
with Sec. 48 (b), which provided that registration may be done by citizens of the
Philippines who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In sum, the Court provided the following must be satisfied for an application for
registration to be granted: The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
application; The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious; The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership; The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and The property subject of the application must be
an agricultural land of the public domain.
The Court further interpreted Sec. 48(b) to mean that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over
it. Ownership and title were determined by possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier. The argument of Malabananan’s heirs was rejected by the
Court. The Court ruled that the requirement that the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application
for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable. It does not operate to make acquisitive prescription apply in favor of
Malabanan or his heirs. Acquisitive prescription, as well as other modes of
acquisition under the Civil Code, would only apply to lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth.
DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration is denied, and CA decision is upheld.
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.,
respondent.
FACTS:
In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for
the registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of
56.4007 hectares. To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued
by CENRO and FMS-DENR and both certifying that the land applied for was
alienable and disposable. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, opposed the application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did
not prove that the land was alienable and disposable.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable.
RULING:
No. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to
registration is alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable. In the present case, T.A.N.
Properties did not provide the needed proof. For the documents provided by
the company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20 (DAO No. 20)
and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to issue
certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO No. 38
provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a
maximum area of 50 hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of
56.4007 hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the
aforementioned DAO’s that the documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.REMMAN ENTERPRISES,
INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro
Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with
an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and
set it for initial hearing on May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published
in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondent’s application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent
failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12,
1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador
and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally
owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds
of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943.
Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who
continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in
1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the
certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following
documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador
and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties;
(3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s
Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6)
certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior
Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration
should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and
below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part
of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA,
claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the
topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted
by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he
found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That
upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002,
Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from
11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on
the actual topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the
request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No.
3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No.
3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that
the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same
was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey
on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the
preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always
remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties may have already
changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic
map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method
used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50
m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna
Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake
extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only
those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake
form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be
reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are
more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry
and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The
RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of
12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of
the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject
properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily
mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject
properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part
of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed
to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands
not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain
part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable."
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
"under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to
prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the 1)
certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must 2) prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public
domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the
legal custodian of the records.
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in
T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied
for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She
submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no
information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title
under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its
application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject
properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian
thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the
application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting
that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article
4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out
that its application for registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC
prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and
granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements
in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of
non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that
the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it
was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
"Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists
merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the
testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the
respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the
possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject
properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of
specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject
of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest have indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily
follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the
manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the
possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive
and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The
possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties
presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain
why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property
since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared
for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the
respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.
G.R. No. L-50340 December 26, 1984 Regalian doctrine: all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE F. SALAZAR, conservation of such patrimony.
JESUS F. SALAZAR, PEDRO F. SALAZAR and AURORA F. SALAZAR,
respondents. if land is w/in the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be
beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens
FACTS: System

 Land situated in Obando, Bulacan Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may
have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
 May 10, 1976: The Valerianos claimed that they are the co-owners in fee
simple of the land applied for partly through: The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged
o inheritance - 1918; and titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as
o purchase - May 2, 195 alienable and disposable.

 Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that
the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan,
per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the
unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of
the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain
Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification
. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the
subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter
of classification of the land in question.

 Land was found to be an Unclassified Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC

Map No. 637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-spot inspection
conducted by a representative of this Office, disclosed that the same was
devoid of any forest growth and forms part of a well-developed and 100
percent producing fishponds. 2 houses of light materials were erected
within the area for the caretakers temporary dwelling.
 CA Affirmed RTC: in favor of the Valerianos

ISSUES:

 W/N the Courts can reclassify public land - NO

 W/N the Valerianos are entitled to judicial confirmation of title - NO

HELD: CA reversed

1. NO

In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from
the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction

The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive

Department of the Government and not of the Courts.

In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

2. NO