Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
September 7, 2017
Solving Kant’s Problem
In the paper “Solving Kant’s Problem: KC Bhattacharyya on Self–Knowledge” (2017),
Garfield explains Bhattacharyya’s account of self-knowledge and highlights its innovative features
through contrasting it to Kant’s account of this issue. In this essay I will present a summary of the
main points of Garfield’s account of Bhattacharyya’s theories. Then, I will raise a concern about
Bhattacharyya’s key elements of introspection and freedom, and show how the problems of these
two elements are related. I will then highlight what I found most insightful about Bhattacharyya’s
theory. I will also draw connections between Bhattacharyya’s theory of imaginative perception and
aesthetics with Alva Noë’s theories. Finally, I will discuss features of Bhattacharya's account of
self-knowledge that I find relevant to my own research proposal of thick enactivism. Note that these
sections of the paper will be disjointed, because I am writing this paper with the intent of expressing
my responses to Garfield’s Bhattacharyya, rather than the intent of making a coherent argument.
Garfield situates Bhattacharyya’s theory of self-knowledge as a challenge to Kant’s theory.
Kant claimed that knowledge about the self is impossible, because the self is constituted by
transcendental conditions of objective knowledge, and these transcendental conditions are not
spatio-temporal and cannot be known. Bhattacharyya’s theory demonstrates that self-knowledge is
in fact a precondition for objective knowledge. To deny the former is to reject the latter, and so we
must affirm the former. Bhattacharyya explains that self-knowledge is a multilayered and complex
affair; it involves three distinct stages, which correspond to increasing degrees of freedom. The first
stage involves three modes of awareness of the body (the body as a physical object, as a felt or
proprioceptive experience, and as an object seen by an other’s gaze). The second stage involves two
modes of awareness of cognition (cognition as representations of empirical objects and as a
reflection in the self as the agent of these representations). The third stage involves awareness of a
“pure witnessing consciousness” as the agent of these forms of awarenesses of the body and
cognition. This final stage requires yet another layer of abstraction and self-reflection.
I was immediately struck by how Bhattacharyya’s assumption that introspection is an
accurate, effective method to reach veridical awareness and spiritual subjectivity. A common
objection to the phenomenological method is applicable to Bhattacharyya’s account. This objection
goes as follows: phenomenology involves reflection on experience and claims that this method can
get to the phenomena in themselves; however, reflection will always carry the limitations and biases
of the person doing phenomenology and so does not get to the phenomena in themselves.
Defendants of phenomenology typically defuse this objection by claiming that this criticism applies
only to introspection, and since phenomenology is crucially different than introspection,
phenomenology is immune to it. However Bhattacharyya’s account seems wholly introspective, and
not only terminologically, but also conceptually. His theory of the three stages towards spiritual
subjectivity involve acts of self-reflection (e.g. reflecting on both a psychic fact, or the felt body, and
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the perceived body, and then canceling the perceived body from the psychic fact in order to “distill”
awareness of the pure self) that are undeniably introspective. I believe the only way that
introspection can fulfill the functions that Bhattacharyya assigns to it is if the individual who does
the introspecting has an exceptional personality and immense wisdom, approaching perfect
awareness and rationality of the actual conditions of human existence and the natural world. If we
read Bhattacharyya’s account as purely theoretical, it is permissible for him to assume that the
individual has this extraordinary background, and his account holds. However, if we read his theory
of self-knowledge as applicable to actual human beings, we can see that this demand of an
individual’s background is unreasonable for ordinary people, and so Bhattacharyya’s theory of
self-knowledge lacks a crucial counterpart.
This crucial counterpart would be specifying that the individual pursuing spiritual
subjectivity and freedom must also pursue veridical knowledge of the self and world. The fact that
Bhattacharyya’s theory lacks this counterpart contaminates his claim that the higher stages of
self-knowledge correspond to states of greater freedom. Bhattacharyya claims that contemplation
and introspection can create a distance from first-hand experiences, and this distancing amounts to
increasing an individual’s freedom. But I see that in order for self-reflection to amount to any
realization that enables her to greater freedom, she must already be highly aware of her biases, and
have developed a wise, virtuous character. For example, an individual addicted to drugs, conceivably
can engage in abstracting the pure sense of self from the various forms of awareness and attain
spiritual subjectivity. According to Bhattacharyya, this attainment would correspond to the greatest
freedom. However, I believe that this superior self-knowledge, or metaphysical awareness of a pure
self, does not lead to greater freedom if this individual prioritizes maintaining access to drugs above
everything else. If she is consumed by this drive, then the self-reflective distance from her
immediate experience does not allow her to see more options and make the decisions that would
contribute to her freedom. She will still see entities and events primarily for their utility towards
her drug use. I think Bhattacharyya would need to include the additional criterion of authenticity or
rationality (e.g. pursuit of the objective conditions of her existence and world) in addition to his
criteria of the three stages towards self-knowledge in order to make claims about freedom.1
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One might object to my example that it is impossible for an individual addicted to drugs to attain spiritual
subjectivity due to the fact that she is consumed by an addiction and “isn’t herself” to begin with. I see
truth to this objection, but Bhattacharyya does not talk about selfhood in the sense that is referred to in
the claim that this individual isn’t herself. This particular sense of selfhood involves veridicality conditions
and empirical facts, and Bhattacharyya talks about the self in only a metaphysical, conceptual sense. So
this objection is built on an empirical framework, which Bhattacharyya lacks. This objection could only
succeed if Bhattacharyya worked from an empirical framework, which he does not.
One might also object that freedom is defined in a special sense in Bhattacharyya’s account, and
an individual addicted to drugs would still attain increasing degrees freedom that correspond to an
increasing number of mediating layers of self-reflectiveness. Freedom is not an existential affair, but
rather a impersonal, metaphysical property of cognitive activity. I would want to see Bhattacharyya define
freedom specifically in this way, if it is indeed used in this exceptional sense.
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Although I believe Bhattacharyya’s theory of spiritual subjectivity as it stands is impractical
for ordinary people, I think he is insightful for pointing out how language mediates
self-reflectiveness. Since language is inherently intersubjective, social engagement also plays a role
in self-reflectiveness. It is an empirical question to determine what kind of role sociality has in acts
of self-reflectiveness, and to reckon how important or influential this role is. Returning to my
example of an individual addicted to drugs, it appears that language has an insignificant role when
compared to that of physical, chemical factors, which strongly influence her actions and conclusions
made from self-reflectiveness. Furthermore, I don’t think self-reflectiveness in a linguistic mode is
as crucial to an individual’s subjectivity as to what Bhattacharyya makes it out to be.2 Language is
obviously intersubjective, but language is not necessarily constitutive of the self. I believe that the
self is fundamentally constituted by embodied understandings of social practices and instituted
activities. This understanding is non-representational and skill-based, and any linguistic description
is derivative of this embodied understanding. Language definitely affects a person’s way of life and
being; but perhaps language is not as crucial to shaping subjectivity as socially instituted practices,
which Bhattacharyya fails to touch on. Nonetheless I agree it is a metaphysical truth that we are all
interconnected and any individual’s identity is affected by all others.
I also think Bhattacharyya is ingenious in showing how some form of self-knowledge is a
condition of objective knowledge, and so overturns Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is impossible.
However, it seems that Bhattacharyya can only make this claim if he defines knowledge in a way as to
include experiential and embodied knowledge. It is possible the differences between Bhattacharyya’s
and Kant’s conclusions are a result of a terminological confusion. If Kant solely used knowledge to
refer to empirical, objective knowledge, then his claim stands correct, even under Bhattacharyya’s
framework (however, I am not well-versed in Kant, so I am unaware of how he specifically defines
knowledge). I personally think it’s important to expand the definition of knowledge to include
experiential, non-representational knowledge, so I prefer Bhattacharyya’s argument. I believe this
expanded definition of knowledge is a crucial key to revising theories in cognitive psychology and
making them more explanatorily fruitful.
I also found Bhattacharyya’s distinctions between the varieties modes of awareness of both
body and cognition phenomenologically insightful, or true to first-hand experience and often
unarticulated. His point that the spatial determinacy of the felt body is fundamentally different than
that of all environmental objects is likewise phenomenologically insightful. I think these
distinctions might hint at some deeper causal mechanisms of cognition and could inspire scientific
fields to investigate how these distinct phenomenological experiences come about.
I was also excited by connections I found between Bhattacharyya’s account of
self-knowledge and Alva Noë’s theory of perception. Bhattacharyya’s theory that awareness of
absence as an “imaginative” mode of perception is very similar to Noë’s sensorimotor contingency
theory in Action in Perception (2004) and Varieties of Presence (2012). Bhattacharyya explains that this
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I owe this section of my criticism to John Haugeland. His works Dasein Disclosed (2013) and Having
Thought (1998) are an important inspiration for me.
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awareness of absence involves perceiving one situation and simultaneously imagining another.
Noë’s theory is that all of visual perception involves experiencing the absent as present; when we
see any object in the environment, we perceive the object in its entire volume and detail, even
though the backside, dimensionality, and visual details of the object aren’t literally present in our
visual field. We can perceive in this much depth because we have sensorimotor skills and sensorimotor
knowledge (which are counterparts to Bhattacharyya’s notion of imagination). Exploration of the
environment and previous experience enable an individual to become familiarized with the nuanced
details and possibilities of entities, as well as to learn the law-resembling correspondences between
phenomenological features of a visual field and the immense detail of the empirical objects that
these features signify. I believe Bhattacharyya’s account of awareness of absence could be given
more detail by Noë’s theory. However, I was confused by Bhattacharyya’s point that absent objects
are experienced in relation to the felt body, in contrast to how present objects are experienced in
relation to the perceived or objectified body. I couldn’t make much sense of this point, and I wonder
whether it would have a counterpart in Noë’s theory.
Another connection between Bhattacharyya and Noë is the emphasis on aesthetic seeing as
an opportunity for freedom. In Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (2015) Noë proposes that the
essence of art is that it brings us to awareness of the typically hidden nature and processes of
perception. When we are struck by deeper meanings or are confused and have to search for
meaning upon an encounter with art, we have the opportunity to realize that all of perception
actually involves objects revealing themselves with meaning beyond their literal presence. Just as
how one’s background knowledge, mood, and other features determine how an artwork reveals
itself, all these factors are in play when everyday objects reveal themselves. In other words, Noë
claims the significance and meaning of objects is contingent upon our embodied skills.
Bhattacharyya explains how aesthetic experience invites contemplation of this experience and
awareness of oneself as the agent of this contemplation. It appears to me that Bhattacharyya’s and
Noë’s theories complement each other; Bhattacharyya emphasizes the awareness of a purer sense of
self, and Noë emphasizes the awareness of a purer sense of the nature of the experienced
environment.
I have summarized Bhattacharyya’s theory of self-knowledge, presented interrelating
criticisms of two of his key concepts, elaborated on what I found admirable in his theory, and
connected his theory to Alva Noë’s thought. Finally, I would like to discuss the features of
Bhattacharyya’s account of self-knowledge that I believe contribute to my research. I am interested
in expanding on Gibsonian ecological psychology to modes of perception other than mere sensory
perception. As a consequence, that would also expand Gibson’s theory of affordances to go beyond
involving mere biological utility. I believe visual and sensory properties amount to just one group of
attributives of perception, and that perception should rather be regarded as revealing many more
kinds of attributives—especially existential, social, and aesthetic kinds of attributives. Likewise,
biological utility is merely one kind of functionality that objects can have. I believe objects can offer
existential, social, and aesthetic functions, and these functions can be quite independent of
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self-interest. Furthermore, these existential, social, and aesthetic functions are enacted in the same
way as how visual properties and biological utilities are. I call this theory-in-the-making thick
enactivism (it is an extremely tentative theory and name). Bhattacharyya’s emphasis that
non-objective, experiential knowledge can be counted as knowledge in the same way as objective,
empirical knowledge seems highly relevant to my theory. His emphasis on the importance of
sociality and self-reflection is also relevant. I hope to continue reading into Bhattacharyya and
understanding his thought.
Bibliography
Garfield, Jay L. 2017. “Solving Kant’s Problem: KC Bhattacharyya on Self–Knowledge.” Indian
Epistemology and Metaphysics, 355.