‘The  Effectiveness  of  Radicalisation  &  

Deradicalisation  Discourses’  
Munir  Zamir,  July  2013    
           
Reproduced  kindly  with  the  permission  of  the  a uthor  by  Fida  Management,  an  NGO  and  independent  think  tank.  
 

e n q u i r i e s @ f i d a m a n a g e m e n t . c o m  
  
‘Radicalization  and  Deradicalization  Concepts:  The  effectiveness  of  such  terms  when  

applied  to  AQ  influenced  extremism  in  the  UK  ‘Prevent’  context.’  

i  Abstract:  

This  study  provides  analysis  of  the  discourse  on  radicalization  and  deradicalization  

(herein  referred  to  as  R+DR)  in  regards  their  effectiveness  in  conceptualizing  the  

terrorist  threat  posed  by  Al-­‐Qaeda  (herein  referred  to  as  AQ)  influenced  ideologies  

from  within  a  preventative  counter-­‐terrorism  (herein  referred  to  as  CT)  context  in  

the  UK.  Despite  possessing  a  comprehensive  CT  strategy  (CONTEST)  that  includes  a  

key  ‘preventative’  strand  (PREVENT),  the  evolving  nature  of  AQ  related  terrorism  

presents  continuing  conceptual  and  operational  problems  for  the  UK  CT  community  

when  relating  this  form  of  terrorism  to  the  issue  of  radicalization.  With  greater  

emphasis  being  placed  on  the  relationship  between  shared  values,  integration  and  

democratic  principles  in  elements  of  UK  CT  policy,  this  study  will  highlight  the  

inadequacy  of  the  concepts  of  R+DR  in  attempting  to  capture  the  balance  between  

security  and  the  scrutiny  that  has  developed  as  a  result  of  these  polices.  At  the  heart  

of  this  issue  is  how  the  threat  from  AQ  is  understood  currently  by  applying  D+DR  

concepts,  that  when  critically  examined  appear  either  too  broad  to  be  effective  or  

too  narrow  to  correctly  identify  the  difference  between  religiosity  and  extremism  on  

one  hand  and  terrorism  and  security  on  the  other.  

 
 

  2  
  
 
 
Contents:  
 
i,  Abstract               Page  1  
 
Introduction:               Page  3  
 
Literature  Review:             Page  4  
 
Radicalization:               Page  6  
 
Deradicalization:             Page  28  
 
Al-­‐Qaeda:               Page  32  
 
Key  Findings  and  Analysis:           Page  36  
 
UK  Prevent  Strategy             Page  50  
 
Conclusion:               Page  57    
 
Bibliography:               Page  61  
 
 
 
 
 

  3  
  

Introduction:  

The  impact  of  the  killings  of  Osama  Bin  Laden  (herein  referred  to  OBL)  and  Anwar  Al  

Awlaki  (herein  referred  to  AAA)  in  the  past  two  years,  have  yet  to  be  fully  

understood  within  the  CT  context.  This  is  of  particular  relevance  to  the  on  going  

issue  of  where  to  place  the  discourses  on  Radicalisation  and  Deradicalisation  (herein  

R+DR)  within  current  CT  practice.  The  almost  omniscient  presence  of  R+DR  in  these  

matters  implies  a  key  causal  relationship  to  terrorism,  but  at  the  same  time  the  

events  of  the  last  years  (‘Boston’  and  ‘Woolwich’  included)  have  amplified  the  need  

to  refocus  and  refine  these  understandings  in  order  to  provide  some  form  of  specific  

discourse  on  AQ  related  R+DR.  

Despite  a  large  amount  of  academic  work  in  existence  on  radicalization,  the  basis  for  

much  of  this  work  still  ignores  emphasis  on  R+DR  as  being  ‘mutually  symbiotic’  

phenomena  and  also  lacks  conceptual  clarity  when  drilled  down  to  try  and  

understand  how  R+DR  manifest  within  diaspora  communities  who  are  subject  to  CT  

legislation  and  on  going  media  attention  (Petley  and  Richardson,  2010).    The  key  

focus  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  concepts  of  R+DR  discourses  and  their  

theoretical  origins,  contextualize  these  for  AQ  based  threats  and  analyze  preventive  

UK  CT  policy  in  light  of  these  matters.  The  UK’s  Contest  (CT)  Strategy  and  its  

‘Prevent’  strand  are  the  focus  in  this  regard.  

The  current  ‘Prevent’  strategy  gives  key  focus  to  a  values-­‐based  perspective  as  

opposed  to  a  means-­‐based  rationale  (Birt,  2009).  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  

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R+DR  become  essential  tools  of  CT  efforts  both  strategically  and  operationally  as  

well  as  issues  that  impact  on  the  very  communities  deemed  most  ‘at  risk’  (Thomas,  

2010).  With  no  accurate  understanding  on  the  current  capability  of  AQ  (post  OBL  

and  AAA)  to  execute  sustained  terrorist  activity  and  a  more  values-­‐based  CT  focus,  

R+DR  understanding  become  central  issues  in  the  on  going  pursuit  to  reduce  a  threat  

(AQ)  that  for  all  intention  purposes  remains  some  what  of  an  enigma  (Burke,  2011).  

Literature  Review:  

The  concepts  of  R+DR  reviewed  in  this  section  are  weighted  in  favour  of  

radicalization,  as  there  are  firstly,  more  publically  available  sources  for  this  subject  as  

opposed  to  deradicalization  studies  and  furthermore,  if  concepts  of  radicalization  fail  

to  explain  why  some  people  become  violent  extremists,  then  deradicalization  as  a  

concept  would  indirectly  also  be  based  on  ultimately  weak  foundations  conceptually.    

The  critical  analysis  of  the  latter  would  to  some  extent  become  a  dormant  exercise  in  

this  regard  if  its  ‘symbiote’  source  is  conceptually  weak.    

The  concepts  outlined  by  Borum’s  two  exhaustive  papers  on  radicalization  are  the  

most  detailed  and  contextually  relevant  to  this  study  and  therefore,  Borum’s  work  

forms  the  foundation  of  this  literature  review  in  order  to  relate  other  key  works  and  

academic/  research  offerings  as  and  when  appropriate.  

Fukuyama  maintains  that  ‘ideas’  lack  power  unless  they  address  the  concerns  of  

large  numbers  of  people  and  that  the  determination  of  ideologies  cannot  be  housed  

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solely  on  social  conditions  and  their  related  forces  (Fukuyama,  2012).  He  argues  that  

the  last  three  hundred  years  have  seen  the  forming  of  ideas  based  mainly  on  

religious  merits  when  considering  how  societies  have  been  shaped.  With  the  

exception  of  Confucianism,  the  first  change  to  this  order  has  been  the  lasting  impact  

of  liberalism  and  its  secular  focus.  In  terms  of  the  classical  thinking  behind  liberalism,  

Fukuyama  sees  the  link  between  the  state  and  its  legitimacy  for  authority  as  being  

tightly  connected  to  notions  how  of  the  state  protects  ‘the  individual  rights  of  its  

citizens  and  that  state  power  needs  to  be  limited  by  the  adherence  to  law’  

(Fukuyama,  2012).    

If  AQ  can  be  loosely  seen  as  an  idea  for  a  certain  type  of  social  order,  then  its  basis  

for  realisation  hinges  on  two  key  factors.  Firstly,  its  ability  to  harness  mass  support  

for  its  objectives  and  secondly,  how  a  religio-­‐political  ‘movement’  can  counter  the  

overall  rise  of  the  acceptance  of  liberal  democracy  as  the  default  socio-­‐political  

omnibus  of  our  time.  Of  course,  once  the  violent  and  terrorist  nature  of  AQ  is  

included,  the  dynamics  of  this  question  change  completely.  Therefore,  we  arrive  at  a  

situation  whereby  the  dominant  ideology  of  the  time  is  faced  with  a  rival  that  seeks  

victory  at  any  cost  and  without  regard  for  the  law,  loss  of  human  life  or  damage  to  

social  structures.  It  is  against  this  backdrop  that  the  issue  of  R+DR  becomes  most  

relevant  and  most  vigorously  contested  (Thomas,  2010).    

The  increasing  use  of  military  force  during  the  overt  ‘war  on  terror’  period  

highlighted  the  strain  that  liberal  democracy  is  under  when  both  its  advocates  and  

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adversaries  can  both  use  its  existence  to  justify  its  means  (war  on  terror/  war  on  

Islam  typology).    

Within  this  debate  is  housed  the  relationship  between  preventative  CT  measures,  

state  interference  in  religious  matters  and  how  notions  of  law,  state  and  citizen  

cajole  liberal  idioms  within  a  security  context  (Wilkinson,  2000).  The  war  on  terror  

and  ‘preventing’  terrorism  can  appear  to  be  two  paradoxes,  trying  to  achieve  one  

outcome.  As  such,  do  R+DR  concepts  help  shape  the  lens  of  CT  in  order  to  further  

legitimize  its  existence  and  underpin  the  dominant  ideology  of  the  time?  

Radicalization  as  a  Concept:  

Borum  stresses  that  radicalization  on  its  own  cannot  do  justice  to  why  people  resort  

to  violent  means  to  fulfill  individual  or  group  needs.  Borum  highlights  that  is  it  the  

perceived  causal  link  between  radicalization  and  terrorism  that  is  most  crucial  and  in  

fact  it  is  the  ‘involvement  in  terrorism’  aspect  that  propels  radicalization  into  the  CT  

spotlight  (Borum,  2011).  Viewing  radicalization  as  ‘a  set  of  diverse  processes’  is  

where  this  enquiry  seeks  to  shed  light  on  not  only  the  terminology  but  also  its  usage  

in  CT  efforts.  Borum  is  clear  that  radicalization’s  relevance  conceptually  is  associated  

to  those  actions  ‘that  not  only  justify  violence  but  compel  it,  and  how  they  progress-­‐

or-­‐not-­‐from  thinking  to  action’  (Borum,  2011).  The  emphasis  here  is  on  the  

relationship  between  cause  and  effect  in  terms  of  what  and  how  people  come  to  

think  what  they  do  (Borum,  2011).  This  demonstrates  that  at  many  levels,  there  

could  be  a  multitude  of  personal  and  broader  functions  at  work  and  that  as  a  result  

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any  concept  of  radicalization  must  intend  to  capture  these  but  equally  accept  that  

‘one  size  does  not  fit  all’  (Borum,  2011).    

Borum  goes  onto  to  identify  the  intrinsic  link  between  an  academic  pursuit  of  these  

issues  and  their  key  role  in  informing  how  future  counter  violent  radicalization  

efforts  can  be  shaped  in  the  prevention  context  (Borum,  2011).  Using  the  work  of  

Hopkins  and  Kahani-­‐Hopkins,  Borum  highlights  that  in  terms  of  discussion  and  

forming  some  kind  of  consensus  based  understanding,  current  discourses  are  falling  

short  of  this  aim  at  the  first  hurdle  of  agreeing  what  radicalism  and  extremism  

actually  mean.  Schmid’s  work  on  fostering  an  academic  consensus  definition  of  

terrorism  is  something  R+DR  discourse  is  still  struggling  to  achieve.    

This  indicates  that  radicalization  and  its  link  to  terrorism  studies  may  well  need  to  

pause  to  consider  the  role  played  by  extremism  as  the  potential  ‘middle-­‐man’,  

binding  the  thought  to  the  action  (Borum,  2011).  If  extremism  is  seen  through  a  

conventional  lens  of  understanding,  then  there  is  an  implication  within  it  that  views  

it  as  some  form  of  deviating  process  from  the  norms  and  values  of  a  civilized  society,  

but  as  Borum  points  out,  this  ‘alone  is  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  defining  a  security  

threat’  (Borum,  2011).    

Alongside  this  problematic  conventional  wisdom  approach,  there  is  a  risk  of  

unintentionally  or  intentionally  over  stating  the  link  between  radicalization  and  

terrorism.  For  Borum,  radicalization  is  best  defined  as  ‘the  process  of  developing  

extremist  ideologies  and  beliefs’  and  what  is  key  to  this  definition  is  that  the  term  

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‘developing’  does  not  automatically  imply  ‘adoption’  or  even  ‘actioning’  of  said  

beliefs  (Borum,  2011).  This  point  is  important  given  the  increasing  values-­‐based  

approach  of  UK  CT  policy.  Can  a  ‘belief’  be  prevented  in  the  same  way  an  impending  

action  can?  Again,  on  this  point  Borum  is  keen  to  disconnect  an  imaginary  fixed  

pathway  linking  ideology  to  action.  The  two  do  have  links,  but  not  always  according  

to  Borum  and  to  identify  this  disparity  is  also  a  key  need  for  this  discourse    

(Borum,  2011).  

Borum  further  elucidates  this  by  linking  ‘the  extent  to  which-­‐a  distinction  exists  

between  the  core  doctrine  of  Islam  and  interpretations  and  distortions  of  Islamic  

teachings  by  militant  violent  extremists’  (Borum,  2011).  Such  a  point  strikes  at  the  

heart  of  the  Islam  versus  Islamism  debate  and  is  also  the  place  where  academia  and  

policy  confront  the  two  conflicting  views  on  this  matter.  Robert  Spencer,  in  his  2008  

book  ‘Stealth  Jihad’  and  subsequent  interviews  ultimately  concludes  that  ‘there  is  no  

such  thing  as  moderate  Islam’  (Spencer,  2008).  Spencer’s  comments  are  based  on  

equating  Islam  as  a  fixed  and  codified  doctrinal  system  that  is  only  rendered  

moderate  by  the  practices  of  some  of  its  adherents.  This  view  links  back  to  the  

original  points  made  earlier  that  identified  two  alternate  ‘versions’  of  social  order  

both  competing  for  legitimacy  and  dominance  in  an  ever  shrinking  global  space.      

Interestingly  however,  from  Spencer’s  point  of  view,  this  ‘competition’  is  between  

the  ‘West’  and  ‘Islam’.  This  stance  appears  on  the  surface  to  echo  the  now  classic  

‘clash  of  civilizations’  debate  and  pseudo  -­‐  orientalist  axiom  of  studying  the  ‘other’  

from  an  unbalanced  paradigm  to  begin  with.  However,  this  does  not  really  lend  itself  

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well  to  understanding  radicalization  as  a  human  condition  that  has  no  specific  ethnic,  

theological,  nationalist  or  ideological  root  origin.      

Borum  brings  this  discussion  to  a  new  level  of  succinct  expression  by  stating  that  in  

order  defeat  something  it  would  be  very  helpful  to  know  what  it  is  that  ‘we’  are  

trying  to  defeat.  He  maintains  that  the  credibility  of  those  states  championing  

counter  radicalization  ideas  as  well  as  violence/  force  is  damaged  when  they  are  not  

clear  on  the  ‘ideas’  they  are  opposing  and  those  they  are  comfortable  with    

(Borum,  2011).    

Veldhuis  and  Staun  identify  two  distinct  approaches  to  defining  radicalization  that  

further  cloud  the  discourse  as  a  whole.  They  view  one  path  of  debate  as  being  

centered  on  violent  radicalization  itself  and  another  that  takes  a  broader  scoping  of  

radicalization  as  attempting  ‘far  reaching  change  in  society’  (Veldhuis  and  Staun,  

2009).  The  key  line  of  demarcation  in  this  sense  appears  to  be  the  use  of  violence  to  

achieve  this  change.  Crossett  and  Spitaletta,  who  differentiate  between  those  

groups  who  move  from  a  position  of  participating  in  legal  political  processes,  to  

those  that  use  violence  for  a  political  purpose,  further  supplement  this    

(Crossett  and  Spitaletta,  2010).    

From  an  albeit  loosely  derived  AQ  context,  this  is  interesting  as  the  only  known  

similarity  is  found  within  the  transformation  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt  

who  underwent  the  reverse  process,  but  cannot  technically  be  seen  as  a  true  and  

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accurate  reflection  of  what  is  now  called  AQ  ideology  for  certain  geo-­‐political  and  

historical  reasons  of  disparity  (Ashour,  2010).  

Wilner  and  Dubouloz  take  a  different  path  on  the  matter  of  what  radicalization  is  

and  highlight  ‘both  mental  and  emotional  processes  that  prepares  and  motivates  an  

individual  to  pursue  violent  behavior’  (Wilner  and  Dubouloz,  2010).  This  stance  

includes  an  individualistic  track  but  seems  not  to  augment  it  with  other  factors  such  

as  social,  cultural  and  geo-­‐historical  issues.  Too  some  extent,  this  is  the  difference  

between  a  purely  psychological  approach  and  a  socio-­‐psychological  approach  to  

understanding  this  concept  (Horgan,  2011;  Silke,  2011).    This  leads  neatly  onto  the  

issue  of  examining  radicalization  as  a  process  and  how  thus  far  current  discourse  is  

unclear  as  to  whether  we  are  dealing  with  a  ‘process’  or  a  set  of  ‘processes’.  

Borum’s  work  is  again  a  good  starting  point  in  this  regards  as  he  clearly  seeks  to  

distance  the  discourse  from  a  classical  view  of  terrorism  studies  that  identified  a  

‘condition’  based  problem  to  one  that  looks  at  dynamic  processes  instead  (Borum,  

2011).  This  is  reminiscent  of  the  seminal  works  of  Martha  Crenshaw  who  argued  that  

terrorists  were  ‘rational  actors’  and  the  makers  of  ‘strategic  choices’  as  opposed  to  

those  who  acted  as  a  result  of  a  ‘condition’,  most  usually  seen  in  a  mental  health  

context  (Crenshaw,  1995).  Borum  is  clear  that  the  biggest  problem  facing  this  

discourse  thus  far  is  one  of  conceptual  overload  and  too  little  empirical  evidence  

(Borum,  2011).    

  11  
Classically,  there  are  the  works  of  social  movement  theorists  that  house  the  need  for  

‘change’  in  a  context  of  what  Borum  calls  ‘strained  environmental  conditions’  that  

compel  people  to  seek  radical  change  in  society.  Borum  stresses  however,  that  this  

traditional  approach  to  the  social  movement  theory  was  housed  in  the  ‘irrational  

choice’  model  of  collective  behavior.  The  links  to  deviancy  theories  and  religious  

cults  appear  to  be  close  derivatives  of  this  model  (Borum,  2011).  

Zald  and  McCarthy  take  a  more  considered  approach  by  viewing  social  movements  

as  processes  that  house  ‘a  set  of  opinions  and  beliefs  in  a  population,  which  

represents  preferences  for  changing  some  elements  of  the  social  structure  and/or  

reward  distribution  of  a  society’  (Zald  and  McCarthy,  1987).  This  seems  to  present  

what  the  potential  outcome  of  a  radicalizing  experience  may  be  but  does  not  appear  

to  explain  the  steps  needed  to  arrive  there.  Also,  from  an  AQ  based  threat  context  

there  appears  to  be  a  desire  for  total  social  change  and  not  just  ‘some  change’.  From  

this  perspective,  the  principal  connection  between  social  movement  theory  and  a  

global  –reach  based  ideology  such  as  AQ  is  in  the  element  of  maintaining  its  own  

survival,  something  that  is  also  tied  to  how  social  movements  are  viewed  in  

academia.  (Klandermans  and  Oegema,  1987).    

Dalgard-­‐  Neilson  introduces  the  concept  of  framing  theory,  which  essentially  focuses  

on  ‘how  movements  and  social  collectives  construct,  produce,  and  disseminate  

meaning’.  She  goes  onto  state  that  key  messages  need  to  be  ‘framed’  by  what  she  

calls  ‘idea  entrepreneurs’  in  order  to  be  accessible  and  locatable  within  the  

‘interests,  attitudes,  and  beliefs  of  its  potential  constituency’    

  12  
(Dalgard-­‐Neilson,  2008).    

This  theory  then  links  itself  to  the  concept  of  frame  alignment,  which  starts  to  pick  

up  on  the  growing  convergence  between  individual  attitudes,  interests  and  beliefs  

and  those  of  an  organization  (Wiktorowicz,  2005).  In  fact  Wiktorowicz’s  study  into  

the  UK  based  Islamist  group  Al-­‐Muhajiroun  uses  frame  alignment  to  identify  a  four-­‐

component  model  for  understanding  radicalization  that  includes:  an  openness  to  

new  worldviews  (cognitive  opening),  religious  seeking  that  serves  the  path  of  finding  

meaning,  a  process  of  making  sense  of  things  using  the  group  narrative  (frame  

alignment)  and  finally  the  stage  of  full  indoctrination  into  the  groups  ethos  and  aims  

(Wiktorowicz,  2005).    

This  model  provides  a  useful  route  map  for  contextualizing  radicalization  inside  an  

AQ  influenced  group  once  key  concepts  of  how  religious  cults  form  and  develop  are  

added,  but  is  limited  in  its  understanding  to  apply  to  mass  radicalization  processes.  

This  can  be  seen  in  sharper  focus  in  comparison  with  a  famous  piece  of  research  

conducted  by  Lofland  and  Stark  in  the  1960’s  who  detailed  a  basic  process  of  change  

within  an  individual’s  mindset  that  bears  all  the  hallmarks  of  the  what  is  now  

considered  contemporary  radicalization  phenomena  (Lofland  and  Stark,  1965).    

Their  research  highlights  the  conversion  process  from  within  a  religious  context  to  

‘problem  solving’  issues  that  can  also  be  described  as  key  life  moments  or  life-­‐event  

based  tensions.  Lofland  and  Stark’s  use  of  the  term  ‘religious  seeker’  lends  it  self  

very  well  to  the  contemporary  radicalization  discourse  from  a  simple  and  relatively  

  13  
effective  identification  of  how  ‘critical  turning  points’  in  the  seekers’  life  can  provide  

the  basis  for  conversion  once  an  ‘encounter’  with  the  ‘deviant’  group  has  occurred.  

At  this  stage  the  ‘seeker’  needs  to  form  what  they  describe  as  ‘affective  bonds’  with  

the  group  that  also  enables  any  external  influencing  force  to  be  negated.    

This  process  can  then  culminate  in  the  creation,  at  least  potentially  of  a  ‘deployable  

agent’  (Lofland  and  Stark,  1965).    

Interestingly  though,  further  elaboration  of  this  concept  reveals  that  the  basis  for  

this  view  hinges  critically  on  assigning  both  predisposing  and  situational  factors  to  

the  conversion  process  according  to  Borum,  who  manages  to  find  synergy  in  this  

approach  and  that  of  the  seminal  work  on  how  certain  vulnerabilities  help  to  shape  

the  journey  towards  radicalization  by  Horgan  (Borum,  2011).    

Social  movement  theory’s  biggest  contribution  to  radicalization  discourse  appears  to  

be  centered  on  the  identification  of  role  assignment  processes  within  extremist  

movements  and  the  motives  or  justifications  for  different  type  of  action  taken  as  a  

result  of  role  adoption  (Borum,  2011).  According  to  Borum’s  analysis  this  allows  the  

study  of  militant  Islamic  movements  to  be  framed  with  what  he  calls  a  ‘global  social  

movement’  context,  but  is  difficult  to  use  the  study  of  very  small  cult  based  

movements  outlined  above  and  ascribe  similar  levels  of  understanding  to  post-­‐2002  

Iraq  and  Afghanistan  in  terms  of  radicalization  processes  and  their  causes.    

Borum  disagrees  and  believes  ‘It  provides  a  framework  of  “mobilization  potential”  to  

consider  the  process  by  which  a  movement’s  human  resources  are  developed’.  

  14  
(Borum.  R,  2011).  This  approach  is  seen  as  one  that  allows  the  understanding  of  

recruitment  networks  to  entertain  notions  of  how  such  networks  form  over  time  and  

the  processes  by  which  aspects  of  loyalty,  motivation  and  duty  are  driven  (Sageman,  

2010;  McDonald,  2011).  If  frame  alignment  concepts  are  added  to  this  model,  then  a  

stage  is  reached  where  the  effects  of  belief  and  its  link  to  individually  orientated  

sentiments  through  predisposing  factors  form  a  cohesive  paradigm  through  which  to  

view  radicalization  processes  within  extremist  groups  (Borum,  2011).  

Of  great  significance  to  this  view  is  the  impact  of  contemporary  CT  legislation  and  if  

it  has  affected  the  issue  of  how  such  groups  can  continue  to  remove  barriers  to  

participation  in  the  face  of  legal  pressure  and  greater  law  enforcement  efforts.  The  

desire  to  embed  the  values  based  ethos  on  what  are  best  described  as  religio-­‐

political  movements  inside  nations  with  secular  constitutions  and  whose  states  have  

traditionally  not  seen  interference  in  religious  matters  a  prudent  is  still  a  going  

concern  in  this  regard  (Birt,  2009).  

Through  the  lens  of  social  psychology  and  the  pioneering  work  of  Gordon  Allport  the  

radicalization  discourse  is  further  enhanced  by  locating  ‘in  group/  out  group’  models  

as  part  of  the  ultimate  outcomes  of  such  movements.  Within  this  context,  elements  

of  group-­‐based  decision-­‐making,  increasing  irrational  choice  options  and  an  overall  

lacking  in  notions  of  responsibility  are  created  to  enable  rewards  and  incentives  to  

be  introduced  (Allport,  1954).  Within  this  model,  the  creation  and  development  of  

extreme  attitudes  serve  as  essential  drivers  to  protecting  in  group/  out  group  

perceptions  and  can  reach  to  a  point  whereby  CT  efforts  can  be  seen  as  the  

  15  
manifestation  of  the  out  group’s  total  rejection  of  the  legitimacy  and  ‘righteousness’  

of  extreme  religious  movements  (Wiktorowicz,  2005;  Birt,  2009;  Borum,  2011).    

In  terms  of  understanding  the  relevance  of  such  processes  in  the  AQ  context,  

perhaps  the  most  exhaustive  an  detailed  description  of  the  pathways  to  political  

radicalization  has  been  presented  by  McCauley  and  Moskalenko  who  have  used  the  

social  psychology  school  to  create  twelve  ‘mechanisms’  that  act  as  pathways  

towards  terrorism.  By  the  term  ‘mechanisms’  they  are  referring  to  ‘the  means  or  

manner  in  which  something  is  accomplished.  Thus,  the  mechanism  of  vision  includes  

the  physical  stimulus  and  the  physiological  and  neural  processes  involved.’    

(McCauley  and  Moskalenko,  2008).    

The  twelve  mechanisms  are  sub-­‐divided  into  three  categories  that  include  individual,  

group  and  mass  radicalization  along  a  pyramid  model  of  identifying  cognitive  and  

behavioral  aspects  of  each  mechanism  that  combine  to  form  a  comprehensive  

outline  of  different  stages  and  forces  that  are  both  pre-­‐existing  and  others  that  are  

developed  during  the  process  (McCauley  and  Moskalenko,  2008).  There  is  an  

element  of  interlaying  within  these  sub-­‐categories  that  explains  the  complex  

relationship  between  self-­‐perpetuating  factors  and  the  emergence  of  group  think  

contexts.    

The  first  level(s)  cite  the  existence  of  personal  victimization  that  underpins  the  

creation  of  grievances  that  often  manifest  in  the  political  sphere  of  thought  and  

action.  These  two  layers  then  play  into  the  hands  of  a  group  setting  with  two  further  

  16  
points  of  entry  defined  as  the  ‘slippery  slope’  and  the  ‘power  of  love’.  The  possibility  

of  joining  a  group  due  to  existing  attachments  (relationships)  or  the  creation  of  such  

bonds  in  the  group  setting  contribute  to  the  potential  of  the  slippery  slope,  which  

can  be  seen  as  the  potential  elevation  of  risk  factors  on  an  increasing  scale  

(McCauley  and  Moskalenko,  2008).    

This  ‘risk’  element  emergence  seeks  to  explain  what  is  now  a  growing  academic  

interest  in  the  concept  of  ‘risky  shift’  behavior  that  these  two  authors  term  

‘extremity  shift’.  As  we  move  into  the  group  dynamics  domain  levels,  risky  shift  is  

exacerbated  in  parallel  to  levels  of  increasing  cohesion  and  isolation  as  well  as  threat  

either  perceived  or  real.  The  concept  here  is  one  of  people  being  prepared  to  take  

greater  risks  in  order  to  address  impending  choices,  once  fixed  inside  a  group  setting  

that  reduces  the  ability  for  rational  choices  and  instead  focuses  on  aims  and  

objectives  that  may  be  appearing  to  be  in  a  ever  decreasing  circle  of  control  of  the  

actors  seeking  to  achieve  them.  

 In  terrorist  groups,  this  has  been  evidenced  in  varying  degrees  and  it  may  be  

applicable  for  example  to  the  behavior  of  the  21/7  AQ  plot  members,  who  appeared  

to  display  the  hallmarks  of  increasing  tension  alongside  increasing  levels  of  desire  to  

‘act’  regardless  of  the  risk  being  increased  beyond  the  cognitive  capacity  of  each  

individual’s  own  rational  choice  making  psyche.  The  ‘unsuccessful’  operation  was  

compromised  in  its  decision  making  phase  by  increasing  law  enforcement  efforts  in  

the  wake  of  7/7.  

  17  
The  mechanisms  then  move  to  a  stage  of  understanding  that  captures  the  internal  

and  external  forces  affecting  the  group’s  behavior.  From  the  classic  economic  

concepts  of  competition  via  market  forces,  the  group  needs  to  compete  with  other  

suitors  for  support  from  within  one  ‘market’  or  diaspora.  Notions  of  internal  

competition  for  status  further  compound  this  and  can  be  easily  evidenced  in  the  

creation  of  splinter  groups  and  emerging  leadership  candidates  willing  to  form  new  

groups.  Good  examples  of  this  are  the  Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army  and  AQ,  

with  several  off-­‐shoot  hybrids  forming  over  time  as  a  result  of  internal  forces  and  

external  realities  impeding  sustained  and  cohesive  singular  group  structures  

(Sageman,  2009;  Silke,  2004;  Burke,  2006;  McCauley  and  Moskalenko,  2008).  An  

important  point  here  would  be  to  off-­‐set  this  model  with  the  question  of  whether  

certain  groups  had  already  intended  to  form  ‘new  groups’  as  a  means  of  survival  and  

adaptation  to  emerging  external  threats  from  state  responses  to  terrorism.  There  is  

a  link  here  to  the  issue  of  centralized  or  de-­‐centralized  terrorist  networks,  and  if  they  

are  created  by  circumstance  or  design  (Sageman,  2009,  Hoffman,  2008).      

Moving  onto  the  last  few  mechanisms,  McCauley  and  Moskalenko  introduce  issues  

of  how  through  ‘fissioning’,  greater  pressure  for  cohesion  is  often  a  failed  policy  due  

to  creation  of  intense  rivalry  and  disagreement.  A  slightly  albeit  distinct  level  follows  

that  explains  how  mass  radicalization  can  affect  out-­‐group  behavior  in  the  wake  of  

terrorist  acts.  9/11  is  a  good  demonstration  of  this  is  for  showing  how  the  cohesion  

elements  of  small  groups  are  replaced  by  sentiments  of  nationalism  and  patriotism.  

In  fact,  this  point  can  be  equally  applied  to  victims  of  state  terrorism  and  even  to  the  

victims  of  the  ‘war  on  terror’  who  were  non-­‐combatants  and  have  go  on  to  develop  

  18  
this  mass  radicalization  dynamic.    Are  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  and  too  some  extent  

Pakistan  also  examples  of  how  different  manifestations  of  this  mass  radicalization  

can  occur?  (Zaidi,  2011).    

The  last  mechanism  outlined  neatly  captures  this  process  by  relating  the  out-­‐group  

conflict  to  emerging  feelings  and  sentiments  of  hate,  thus  completing  a  cycle  that  

starts  with  individual  needs  and  ends  with  group  based  hate  and  conflict  as  the  

solution  to  these  needs  (McCauley  and  Moskalenko,  2008).  

Other  disciplines  within  social  science  have  contributed  more  individually  orientated  

approaches  to  understanding  radicalization  processes.  In  what  is  best  described  as  a  

more  integrated  approach,  Rambo  identifies  seven  components  that  he  regards  as  

having  cumulative  as  well  recursive  effects  on  each  other  as  outlined  in  Borum’s  

study  (Borum,  2011).  Rambo  starts  with  a  context  leading  to  a  crisis  that  begins  a  

quest.  This  quest  then  leads  to  an  encounter  allowing  for  interaction  that  creates  

commitment  and  ultimately  leads  to  some  form  of  consequence  (Rambo,  1993).    

 Located  within  the  conversion  theory  studies  paradigm,  Borum  claims  that  ‘this  

seems  to  be  quite  consistent  with  observations  of  the  post-­‐2001  militant  Islamist  

radicalizations  as  well’  (Borum,  2011.)  

However,  despite  seemingly  appearing  an  accurate  expression  of  these  said  

movements,  there  is  a  clear  lack  of  empirical  or  contextual  evidence  to  ultimately  

render  this  model  reliable.  Having  said  this  through,  the  validity  of  the  model  does  

seem  to  add  greater  depth  to  the  radicalization  discourse  (Horgan,  2011).  Kilbourne  

  19  
and  Richardson  view  conversion  theory  as  being  traditionally  divided  into  passive  

and  active  paradigms  with  the  former  being  based  on  a  trauma  or  unfulfilled  needs  

basis  and  the  latter  is  consistent  with  the  ‘rational  actor’  concept  of  the  active  seeker  

who  makes  such  considered  choices  (Kilbourne  and  Richardson,  1989).  

This  juncture  is  a  fitting  point  to  bring  the  attention  of  this  review  to  discussing  

classic  theories  of  new  religious  movements  and  the  emphasis  placed  on  

psychopathological  understandings.  These  theories  are  characterized  by  an  

underlying  assumption  that  some  element  of  abnormality  must  exist  in  order  for  the  

individual  to  enter  and  execute  radical  group  based  situations  (Silke,  2004).  This  

approach  has  not  traditionally  been  supported  by  detailed  primary  research  and  has  

relied  on  secondary  and  anecdotal  evidence  to  support  its  central  thesis  (Silke,  

2004).  This  model  also  is  the  polar  opposite  of  Crenshaw’s  rational  choice  model  

discussed  earlier  and  demonstrates  a  shift  in  the  understanding  of  terrorism  studies  

in  the  wake  of  new  threats  in  the  global  domain  (Hoffman,  2006).        

     

Part  of  this  new  and  emerging  understanding  also  takes  into  account  concepts  and  

issues  of  how  people  can  be  self-­‐radicalized.  According  to  Borum  however,  this  

discourse  is  still  rooted  in  traditional  conversion  theory  understanding  of  ‘conversion  

motifs’  (Borum,  2011).  Encounters  created  as  a  result  of  individual  searches  that  can  

include  reading,  attending  talks  and  other  less  personalized  exchanges.  These  are  

able  to  influence  a  person  to  the  point  of  becoming  self-­‐radicalized  before  a  

traditional  encounter  or  group  setting  is  created  or  needed.  At  the  point  of  

interaction,  the  process  can  fast  track  the  person  to  be  deployable  based  on  the  

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preceding  process  he/she  has  already  undergone.  This  suggests  a  close  link  to  the  

current  risk  posed  by  ‘lone  wolf’  based  radicalization,  particularly  influenced  by  AQ  

narratives  in  the  online  domain  (Ashour,  2010).  

Continuing  on  the  discussion  of  the  conversion  motif  based  approach  to  the  

radicalization  discourse;  Lofland  and  Skonovd  identify  five  such  elements  that  house  

a  different  lexical  approach,  seemingly  aimed  solely  at  the  religiously  based  

conversion  context.  They  start  with  an  epiphany-­‐based  motif  given  the  title  of  

‘mystical’  followed  by  form  of  connection  seeking  process  they  call  ‘experimental’.  

The  third  conversion  stage  is  based  on  the  creation  of  strong  bonds/sentiments  

labeled  ‘affectional’.  At  this  stage  the  group  experience  emerges  and  according  to  

Lofland  and  Skonovd  this  is  classified  as  a  ‘revivalist’  conversion  motif  followed  

finally  by  the  element  of  brainwashing  labeled  as  ‘coercive’    

(Lofland  and  Skonovd,  1981).  

According  to  Borum’s  analysis  of  this  model  ‘the  mystical  and  revivalist  motifs  have  

less  resonance  with  the  radicalization  experience,  but  the  experimental  and  

affectional  motifs  are  clearly  prominent  among  persons  known  to  have  become  

radicalized  into  violent  extremism,  particularly  into  militant  Islamist  movement  and  

terrorist  cells’  (Borum,  2011).  Although  this  model  was  developed  a  considerable  

time  ago,  Borum  is  confident  that  it  still  provides  one  of  best  ‘conceptual  utilities’  in  

radicalization  discourse.  The  relevance  and  reliability  of  such  models  is  likely  to  be  

based  on  their  applicability  to  the  changing  nature  of  AQ  ideology  post  OBL  and  AAA.  

Having  given  detailed  consideration  to  the  extensive  research  conducted  by  Borum  

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in  outlining  key  concepts  within  this  discourse,  Borum  himself  concludes  that  three  

important  lessons  emerge  as  a  result.    

The  first  is  to  view  radicalization  a  process.  Secondly,  he  is  keen  on  the  conversion  

motif  based  model  to  help  identify  the  diverse  range  of  pathways  to  radicalization.  

Thirdly,  Borum  regards  the  use  of  recursive  understanding  in  trying  to  distance  the  

discourse  from  focusing  on  the  dualistic  nature  of  predisposed  and  situational  

conditions  (Borum,  2011).  The  general  basis  for  the  discourse  thus  becomes  one  

where  ‘most  theories  on  radicalization  have  at  least  three  factors:  (1)  developing  

antipathy  toward  a  target  group  (2)  creating  justifications  and  mandates  for  violence  

(3)  eliminating  social  and  psychological  barriers  that  might  inhibit  violent  action.’  

(Borum.  R  2011.)  

Having  considered  the  traditional  concepts  on  radicalization  that  have  been  

presented  via  studies  of  cults,  new  social  movements  and  socio-­‐psychological  

contexts,  it  is  of  equal  relevance  to  this  study  that  a  review  of  emerging  concepts  

and  theories  is  conducted.  This  is  a  useful  way  to  off-­‐set  traditional  understanding  

with  what  can  be  loosely  described  as  post  9/11  thought  on  radicalization  and  its  

processes.    

Immediately,  one  glaring  feature  emerges  when  reviewing  current  discourse  on  this  

subject.  From  a  governmental  or  agency  context,  the  models  appear  to  favour  clear  

and  distinct  ‘stages’  in  the  radicalization  process  that  to  some  extent  seem  to  still  

hinge  on  the  notion  that  the  journey  from  ‘stable’  to  ‘unstable’  is  defined  by  linear  

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progression  that  is  incremental  and  based  on  increasing  levels  of  vulnerability  to  

violence  (Mellen,  2012).  Also,  as  can  be  evidenced  from  the  Federal  Bureau  of  

Investigation’s  (herein  referred  to  as  FBI)  classification  from  2006,  there  is  a  

tendency  to  fragment  basic  human  needs  of  belonging  and  duty  into  complex  and  

distinctive  terms  that  can  potentially  reduce  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  concept  

(McDonald,  2011).    

In  the  case  of  the  FBI  model  this  issue  is  present  by  the  fact  that  the  terms  used  

seem  to  point  to  the  possibility  of  a  person  experiencing  all  four  ‘needs’  or  ‘factors’  

at  the  same  time  as  the  triggers  to  radicalization.  However,  the  model  seems  to  

suggest  that  terms  are  distinctive.  The  FBI  introduce  the  ‘jilted  believer’,  faith  

reinterpretation,  ‘protest  conversion’  and  ‘acceptance  seeking’  as  distinct  types  of  

conversion,  but  it  would  not  be  beyond  the  realms  of  possibility  for  an  individual  to  

arrive  the  point  of  becoming  an  operational  extremist  by  experiencing  each  of  these  

factors  as  part  of  one  overall  moment  or  situation  (Mellen,  2012).    

The  point  here  is  that  given  radicalization  is  part  of  a  human  process  and  therefore  

subject  to  sentiment  and  emotional  leverage,  framing  more  and  more  distinctive  

paths  to  explain  this  may  well  be  missing  the  point  of  conversion  entirely.  Venhaus  

captures  this  conceptual  dilemma  perfectly  when  he  outlines  the  basic  and  

irreducible  functions  that  most  human  beings  are  subject  by  stating  that  ‘the  

recurring  theme  was  that  they  were  all  looking  for  something…they  want  to  

understand  who  they  are,  why  they  matter,  and  what  their  role  in  the  word  should  

be.’  (Venhuas,  2010.)  

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In  fact,  even  when  considering  McCauley  and  Moskalenko’s  model,  it  is  not  possible  

to  produce  empirical  data  to  validate  if  the  twelve  mechanisms  are  sufficient  as  

‘conditions’  for  engagement  in  terrorism  (Borum,  2011).  This  remains  the  Achilles  

heel  of  current  research  into  radicalization  in  the  sense  that  is  it  still  unclear  if  

radicalization  is  the  one  key  component  needed  to  trigger  violent  extremism.    

It  may  well  be  one  of  the  components  but  until  the  rest  of  the  factors  and  motives  

are  identified,  it  may  well  be  pandering  to  the  need  for  making  sense  of  

contemporary  terrorist  threats  as  opposed  to  arriving  at  a  stage  when  the  CT  world  

knows  with  confidence  why  this  threat  is  still  at  large.  It  can  also  be  argued  that  

without  taking  elements  of  existing  theories  on  behaviour  in  a  social  context,  these  

models  will  remain  somewhat  ‘conceptual’  but  not  ‘operationally’  relevant  (Mellen,  

2012;  Borum,  2011).    

Baumeister,  Sternberg,  Matza  and  Sykes  have  all  contributed  in  their  own  right  to  

this  discourse  through  what  are  essentially  more  basic  concepts  that  explain  

behavior.  Using  almost  parallel  terminology  to  that  found  in  online  and  printed  pro-­‐

AQ  content,  these  models  do  keep  the  conceptual  understanding  closely  tied  to  the  

phenomena  it  seeks  to  understand.  The  classic  paradigm  of  ‘good  versus  evil’  has  

served  AQ  and  others  well  and  equally,  using  it  to  make  sense  of  such  actions  serves  

to  locate  the  causal  context  of  radicalization  in  some  form  of  relatable  language.    

Of  course,  these  academics  have  been  able  to  use  the  concepts  of  cognitive  

dissonance,  morality  salience  and  in  group/  out  group  learning  to  place  the  ‘basic  

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ideas’  into  those  that  can  produce  richer  and  more  dynamic  conceptual  

understanding  of  radicalization.  This  usage  of  key  behavioral  concepts  allows  the  

understanding  of  the  radicalization  process  to  almost  mimic  the  evolving  nature  of  

terrorism  and  extremism.  Having  this  flexibility  however,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  

difficult  to  distinguish,  even  using  these  models,  the  extremist  mindset  from  the  

violent  extremist  mindset  (Baumeister,  1997;  Stenberg,  2003;  Bandura,  2004).  

There  are  four  other  models  within  this  discourse  that  have  very  similar  patterns  of  

‘stage’  driven  facets  to  their  outlook.  The  basic  premise  behind  these  models  is  one  

of  either  grievance  based  or  injustice  based  starting  points.  The  New  York  Police  

Department’s  (Herein  NYPD)  model  and  that  of  Danish  government  researcher  

Precht  appear  to  be  stating  that  the  pre-­‐radicalization  stage  is  something  all  Muslims  

are  subject  to  because  they  do  not  outline  how  this  stage  is  different  from  the  social,  

cultural,  political  and  material  conditions  faced  by  the  majority  of  the  Muslim  world,  

which  in  reality  propels  a  tiny  minority  towards  this  path  (Mellen,  2012).  They  also  

seem  to  fail  to  distinguish  between  what  ‘radical  Islam  ‘  means  to  their  models  in  

relation  to  non-­‐violent  or  politicized  variants  of  Islamic  thinking  (Birt,  2009).    

Moghaddam’s  ‘staircase  to  terrorism’  model  and  Borum’s  ‘four-­‐stage’  model  both  

house  the  process  in  some  form  of  grievance  based  beginning  but  do  not  explain  

how  other  Muslims  with  the  same  grievances  or  material  conditions  do  not  resort  to  

violent  extremism  but  may  perhaps  still  be  deemed  to  be  extremist  in  their  outlook  

or  worldview.  Borum  himself  is  keen  to  acknowledge  in  regards  current  discourses  

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that  they  ‘typically  offer  a  logical,  descriptive  narrative  of  a  “typical”  transformation  

process.’(Borum,  2011).  

In  terms  of  a  broader  perspective,  how  involvement  in,  retention  of  support  and  on  

occasion’s  disengagement  from  terrorism  occurs  remain  underdeveloped  concepts  

(Borum.  R,  2011;  Horgan,  2008).  Precht  provides  a  generic  paradigm  for  these  issues  

by  stating  ‘Largely,  homegrown  terrorism  can  be  viewed  as  a  sociological  

phenomenon  where  issues  such  as  belonging,  identity,  groups  dynamics,  and  values  

are  important…religion  plays  a  role…but  for  some  it  rather  serves  as  a  vehicle  for  

fulfilling  other  goals’  (Precht,  2007).  

The  Joint  Military  Information  Support  Centre  has  produced  a  useful  framework  that  

outlines  common  features  of  the  models  currently  permeating  CT  thinking  about  

radicalization.  These  features  capture  the  more  simple  ideas  of  belonging  and  

identity  as  well  as  the  motivational  aspects  of  radicalization  that  are  best  known  as  

‘push  and  pull’  factors.  The  framework  also  includes  the  ideas  of  threat  and  defence  

mechanisms  alongside  the  prerequisite  issue  of  socially  facilitated  entry  mediums  

(Mazaar.  M,  2004).  

Gartenstein–Ross  and  Grossman,  who  identify  ‘six  potentially  observable  

manifestations  of  the  radicalization  process’,  present  by  far  one  of  the  most  

revealing  studies  on  this  issue.  The  key  difference  is  that  these  manifestations  shed  

light  on  what  the  extremist  mindset  may  publically  appear  as  in  terms  of  narrative  

and  behavior.  Their  observations  are  based  on  the  outcome  of  radicalization  

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processes  as  opposed  to  how  the  process  is  formed.  By  adopting  a  legalistic  

interpretation  of  Islam,  trusting  only  select  religious  authorities,  perceiving  a  schism  

between  Islam  and  the  West,  low  tolerance  levels  for  other  views  and  attempting  to  

impose  religious  beliefs  on  others  the,  individual  is  seen  to  be  a  politically  radicalized  

subject  (Gartenstein-­‐Ross  and  Grossman,  2009).    

This  model  lends  itself  well  in  some  aspects  to  the  work  of  Sageman,  but  deviates  

slightly  in  the  identification  of  socio-­‐economic  factors  and  their  link  to  terrorism.  

Sageman’s  work  found  greater  levels  of  affluence  among  the  target  group  whereas  

Gartenstein-­‐Ross  and  Grossman  found  disparities  in  this  regard  (Sageman,  2008;  

Gartenstein-­‐Ross  and  Grossman,  2009).  

One  of  the  biggest  issues  that  this  review  of  radicalization  concepts  has  revealed  is  

the  misappropriation  or  misuse  of  terminology.  For  example,  in  2009  Goli  and  Rezaei  

conducted  an  empirical  study  using  quantitative  methods  (telephone  surveys)  and  a  

stratified  sample  of  1,113  Muslims  from  Denmark.  Their  aim  was  to  ascertain  what  

being  a  ‘radical  Muslim’  means  in  the  context  of  CT.  Their  results  highlighted  that  

70%  of  the  ‘radical’  group  of  the  sample  were  ‘predominantly  Sunni’.  The  term  Sunni  

is  too  broad  to  offer  any  concrete  basis  for  determining  the  radical  ideology  and  

furthermore,  according  to  Githens-­‐Mazer,  does  not  apply  to  what  has  now  been  

labeled  ‘Takfiri  Jihadist  ‘  ideology  (Githens-­‐Mazer,  2010).  Therefore,  if  being  Sunni  

was  the  barometer  for  potentially  being  a  radical,  then  80%  of  the  Muslim  world  

should  be  in  this  category  according  to  the  Sunni-­‐  Shite  demographics  over  the  last  

century  (Malik,  2003;  Goli  and  Rezaei,  2009).  Being  Sunni  lends  itself  to  following  

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one  of  the  four  schools  of  jurisprudence,  which  is  not  in  line  with  the  core  ‘Wahhabi’  

doctrine  of  literalist  interpretation  of  text  without  the  need  for  ‘Taqleed’  (blind  

following)  of  any  school  of  thought  (Malik,  2003).      

If  in  summary  of  this  section  if  it  is  considered  that  Peter  Neumann  once  claimed  

that  ‘radicalization  is  what  occurs  before  the  bomb  goes  off’  and  that  Randy  Borum  

suggests  ‘no  single  theory  is  likely  to  explain  all  violent  radicalization’  then  the  use  of  

this  term  in  CT  efforts  in  the  UK  context  is  open  to  a  great  deal  of  scrutiny  when  the  

latest  version  of  the  Prevent  strategy  is  reviewed  in  comparison  with  its  

predecessors  (Neumann,  2008;  Borum,  2011).  Equally  relevant  is  the  basis  for  

knowing  how  this  concept  explains  or  not  for  that  matter,  the  current  threat  

emanating  from  AQ  ideology.  This  analysis  is  presented  later  in  the  study  as  for  now  

it  is  important  to  outline  the  issues  around  the  use  of  the  term  deradicalisation  in  

the  CT  context.      

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Deradicalization  Concepts:  

Compared  to  what  can  now  only  be  described  as  exhaustive  efforts  to  understand  

radicalization,  deradicalization  studies  on  the  other  hand  are  rarer  and  fewer  in  

number  (Horgan,  2008).  Horgan  points  out  that  this  subject  is  somewhat  of  a  ‘poor  

relation’  to  radicalization  studies,  as  there  seems  to  be  ‘overwhelming  

preoccupation  with  uncovering  the  process  of  radicalization’  (Horgan,  2008).      

Horgan  actually  offers  a  very  interesting  contrast  between  the  terms  deradicalization  

and  disengagement  from  terrorism  (herein  DR+D),  a  contrast  that  this  study  will  

explore  later.  Horgan  is  adamant  that  by  ignoring  DR+D  research,  practical  ideas  

about  CT  policy  remain  largely  on  the  periphery  of  much  contemporary  CT  practice  

 (Horgan,  2008).  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  assess  disengagement  from  

terrorism  in  comparison  with  deradicalization  concepts.  However,  some  discussion  

will  occur  in  the  policy  context  analysis  section.    

Suffice  to  say  at  this  stage  is  that  deradicalization  appears  to  be  even  more  of  a  

contested  concept  that  radicalization  (Birt,  2009).  At  the  most  basic  level,  

deradicalization  can  be  crudely  seen  in  Neumann’s  language  as  what  occurs  to  not  

make  the  bomb  go  off,  but  as  is  self-­‐  evident,  this  would  be  too  simplistic  and  

misleading  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Such  a  statement  does  however  highlight  the  

need  for  conceptual  clarity  for  both  R+DR  for  the  policy  and  operational  realms  of  

the  CT  world  to  be  in  some  form  of  synergy  with  each  other.    

  29  
Demant  et  al  ‘distinguish  between  three  different  type  of  motives  that  play  a  role  in  

deradicalisation’.  These  are  normative,  affective  and  continuance  based  and  are  

essentially  detailing  lack  of  ideological  appeal,  social  /organisational  inadequacy  and  

real  life  circumstances.  They  regard  all  three  types  of  factor  to  have  played  a  role  in  

the  deradicalization  journeys  of  their  research  subjects  (Demant  et  al,  2008).  

Crucial  to  their  research  and  used  in  a  concluding  statement  context,  they  outline  

the  rejection  of  violence,  unachievable  future  outcomes,  changes  in  a  persons  

viewpoint,  disappointment  in  the  movement  and  practical  life  circumstances  as  

common  features  of  the  deradicalization  process  (Demant  et  al,  2008).    

Demant  et  al  go  on  to  describe  community  loyalty,  lack  of  alternatives  and  inner  

barriers  as  hindrances  in  this  deradicalization  process  but  also  state  that  a  

‘significant  other’  can  also  trigger  the  process  in  certain  situations  (Demant  et  al,  

2008)  from  which  a  definition  of  deradicalization  is  proposed  on  a  collective  and  

individual  level  as  ‘this  process  of  becoming  less  radical  applies  to  both  behaviour  

and  beliefs.  With  regard  to  behaviour,  this  primarily  involves  the  cessation  of  violent  

actions.  With  regards  to  beliefs,  this  involves  an  increase  in  confidence  in  the  system,  

a  desire  to  once  more  become  part  of  society,  and  the  rejection  of  non-­‐democratic  

means’  (Demant  et  al,  2008).  

Deradicalisation  -­‐  Theoretical  Frameworks:  

In  terms  of  creating  a  conceptual  framework  for  deradicalization  much  of  what  has  

been  proposed  thus  far  is  based  on  the  work  of  gangs,  cults  and  new  social  

movements  and  this  bears  great  similarity  with  the  concepts  of  radicalization  

  30  
discussed  earlier.  New  Social  Movements  tend  to  suffer  from  demand  and  supply  

issues  as  well  as  having  to  cope  with  the  level  of  ‘value’  they  are  giving  to  members.  

This  process  can  create  a  situation  where  deradicalization  can  occur.  The  notion  of  

‘free  entry’  and  ‘free  exit’  imply  that  constant  levels  of  reflection  may  occur  in  the  

minds  of  members  (Demant  et  al,  2008).  From  a  supply  context  there  is  a  need  for  

formulating  a  core  set  of  ideas  of  formal  ideology  as  Seliger,  quoted  in  Heywood  

states  ‘a  more  or  less  coherent  set  of  ideas  that  provides  the  basis  for  organised  

political  action,  whether  this  is  intended  to  preserve,  modify  or  overthrow  the  

existing  system  of  power’  (Seliger  in  Heywood,  2007).  

The  success  of  an  organization  or  group  in  maintaining  its  support  base  is  largely  

down  to  its  capacity  to  be  flexible  and  if  needed  use  size  and  structures  as  loosely  as  

possible,  using  mutual  trust  and  confidence  as  opposed  to  rigid  hierarchical  

structures  (Demant  et  al,  2008).  This  would  also  apply  equally  to  leadership  issues  

and  how  the  choices  between  formal  or  informal  leadership  can  determine  retention  

or  lessen  the  likelihood  of  deradicalization  or  disengagement  (Heywood,  2007;  

Demant  et  al,  2008).  Silke  points  out  that  age  is  an  important  variation,  particularly  

with  reference  to  young  people  and  their  greater  attraction  to  radical  movements.  

This  can  impact  on  deradicalization  issues  in  the  same  way  it  can  on  radicalization  

potential  (Silke,  2003).  Alongside  these  internal  factors,  certain  external  factors  can  

trigger  or  contribute  to  deradicalization  opportunities.      

  31  
Conflicts  within  society  –  International  or  national  and  local,  competing  movements,  

policy  reform  and  public  support  (active  or  passive)  posses  the  ability  to  affect  

deradicalization  potential  (Cronin,  2006;  Demant  et  al,  2008).    

Compared  to  research  on  radicalization,  there  is  a  distinct  lack  of  study  currently  on  

deradicalization.  Alternatively,  research  on  disengagement  appears  to  be  the  choice  

of  many  academics.  There  can  be  a  number  of  reasons  for  this  disparity,  but  in  

essence  the  main  factor  is  based  on  the  fact  that  data  from  any  projects  or  initiatives  

that  are  based  on  preventative  deradicalization  (UK  Prevent)  are  subject  to  non-­‐

disclosure  (Silke,  2011).  In  contrast,  programs  based  on  disengagement  or  post-­‐

offence  /  incarceration  deradicalization  have  been  more  popular,  particularly  in  Arab  

states  and  some  efforts  to  tackle  right-­‐wing  extremism  in  Norway  and  Sweden  

(Bjorgo,  2009).    

As  the  focus  of  this  study  is  to  assess  concepts  of  R+DR  in  the  context  of  UK  Prevent  

and  from  a  AQ  threat  perspective,  it  prohibits  excessive  attention  being  paid  to  

programs  that  base  their  work  on  prison  based  scenarios.  One  relevant  point  is  

however,  that  programs  aimed  at  tackling  AQ  based  extremism  in  Arab  countries  do  

seem  to  be  based  on  two  main  processes:  firstly,  there  is  emphasis  placed  on  social  

integration  which  seems  a  logical  approach  to  address  certain  socio-­‐economic  

‘factors’.  Secondly,  and  more  difficult  to  metrically  measure  is  the  focus  on  

theological  interventions  that  aim  to  provide  counter-­‐arguments  to  core  narrative  

espoused  by  AQ  related  supporters  (Barrett  and  Bokhari,  2009).  There  is  some  

  32  
linkage  to  this  approach  and  a  key  aspect  of  the  UK  Prevent  strategy  known  as  the  

‘Channel’  project,  which  will  briefly  examined  in  the  research  findings  section.    

Creating  safe  spaces  and  alternate  lifestyle  opportunities  are  fast  becoming  core  

components  of  post-­‐offence  deradicalization  programs,  but  do  seem  distant  from  

conceptual  clarity  or  consensus  on  how  to  measure  their  success  or  outcomes  

(Barrett  and  Bokhari,  2009).    

Al-­‐Qaeda  -­‐  Typologies  and  Perceptions:  

Having  reviewed  the  main  conceptual  efforts  in  understanding  R+DR,  the  findings  of  

this  study  will  be  presented  once  a  brief  review  of  key  discourse  on  AQ  is  presented  

in  order  to  prepare  the  analysis  for  critical  discussion  on  both  R+DR  concepts  and  

their  use  in  the  UK  Prevent  context.  

Although  published  just  over  a  decade  ago,  Gunaratna’s  now  famous  book  ‘Inside  Al  

Qaeda’  retains  some  fascinating  anecdotes  that  do  still  appear  to  have  some  

resonance  within  contemporary  CT  understanding  regarding  AQ.  Most  notably,  and  

somewhat  fortuitously  Gunaratna  presents  a  typology  of  AQ  that  is  basically  a  

median  point  between  the  two  most  hotly  contested  schools  of  AQ  based  terrorism  

studies;  the  work  of  Sageman  and  Hoffman.    

  33  
Due  to  methodological  constraints  and  the  scope  of  this  study,  it  is  only  possible  to  

briefly  present  this  typology  of  AQ,  but  in  analyzing  Gunaratna’s  claim  that        

Al  Qaeda  ‘is…characterized  by  a  broad-­‐based  ideology,  a  novel  structure,  a  robust  

capacity  for  regeneration  and  a  very  diverse  membership  that  cuts  across  ethnic,  

class  and  national  boundaries.  It  is  neither  a  single  group  nor  a  coalition  of  groups’  

(Gunaratna,  2002)  does  offer  this  review  a  critical  point  of  conjecture.  

Although  linguistically  descriptive,  Gunaratna’s  characterization  appears  to  be  

describing  the  basic  manifestation  of  post-­‐modern  human  civilization  as  much  it  is  

describing  AQ.  The  ‘global  village’  and  ‘time  and  space  compression’  concepts  neatly  

encapsulate  a  global  psyche  bound  by  loose  or  lexically  based  affiliations  of  ideology,  

nationality,  religion,  race  and  gender  as  oppose  to  fixed  or  rigid  affiliations  

(Fukayama,  2012).      

What  this  statement  also  offers  is  an  insight  into  two  other  points;  firstly,  that  from  

the  context  of  academia  it  was  and  still  is  a  highly  speculative  exercise  to  ascertain  

the  true  nature  of  AQ  and  secondly,  attempting  to  understand  this  nature  in  an  

evolving  threat  level  context  creates  the  need  for  robust  empirical  research  to  be  

tied  closely  to  specific  manifestations  of  this  threat.  For  example,  geographical  

variations  such  as  the  difference  between  the  Somali  Al-­‐Shabaab  AQ  variant  and  AQ  

in  Iraq  post  -­‐2001  under  Zarqawi,  the  rise  of  Internet  based  propaganda  and  

strategic  messaging,  the  objectives  of  AQ  influenced  networks  in  Europe  as  

compared  to  those  in  Muslim  lands  and  the  rise  of  the  ‘Lone  Wolf’  phenomena  

globally.    

  34  
  

These  variables  and  patterns  demand  detailed  research  and  study  to  enable  the  

discourse  on  AQ  to  move  in  parallel  with  the  ‘beast’  itself  (Pantucci,  2009,  Hoffman,  

2011).  In  fact  the  debate  between  the  Sageman  and  Hoffman  schools  of  thought  are  

now  in  need  of  contextual  refreshment,  given  the  killing  of  OBL  and  AAA  and  the  

continued  political  stability  in  the  Arab  states  since  Egypt’s  Arab  Spring  of  2011.  As  a  

result,  capturing  a  realistic  picture  of  AQ  post  OBL  means  re-­‐framing  the  centralized  

versus  decentralized  typology  debate  to  include  acceptance  that  AQ  represents  

some  form  of  ‘global  brand’  and  as  such  policy,  ideology,  capability  and  market  

forces  are  subject  to  ‘consumer’  and  ‘regulatory’  trends.    

The  War  on  Terror  (herein  referred  to  as  WOT)  has  naturally  had  an  impact  on  AQ  in  

terms  of  its  leadership  and  capability  structures  (Silke,  2011),  but  for  the  purposes  of  

this  study,  there  is  a  need  to  simplify  existing  knowledge  of  AQ  into  a  framework  

that  allows  R+DR  concepts  and  preventative  CT  to  be  its  focal  point.  If  AQ  at  its  core  

is  considered  to  be  globalist  phenomena  that  ultimately  seeks  the  re-­‐creation  of  the  

Islamic  State  and  use  of  Shariah  Law  through  violent/  terrorist  means,  then  even  at  

this  crude  level  of  analysis,  there  are  too  many  variables  at  play  in  regards  how  

concepts  of  R+DR  can  actually  offer  meaningful  traction  to  negating  AQ  ideology  

beyond  superficial  and  mainly  qualitative  means.  The  lack  of  empirical  data  to  

validate  the  concepts  of  R+DR  this  study  has  discussed  renders  their  usefulness  more  

weakened  than  empowered  (Mellen,  2012),  creating  a  situation  where  both  the  

academic  and  policy  worlds  are  second  guessing  currently  as  to  ‘what  works  and  

what  doesn’t  (Thomas,  2010,  Mellen,  2012).    

  35  
  

Despite  this  confusion  there  is  certainly  an  understanding,  that  AQ  presents  an  

ideological  problem  as  much  as  a  security  concern.  On  this  basis,  fully  understanding  

R+DR  processes  in  terms  of  what  extremism  looks  like  compared  to  violent  

extremism  is  in  essential  need  of  clarity.  This  is  evidenced  by  a  claim  made  a  decade  

ago  that  ‘although  it  has  been  weakened  on  a  practical  level,  its  ideology  remains  

unaffected  and  will  continue  to  draw  Muslims,  especially  young  ones,  to  Al  Qaeda’s  

ideal  of  jihad  against  unbelievers’  (Gunaratna,  2002).  Preventative  CT  appears  to  be  

tackling  terrorism  by  not  knowing  fully  how  to  tackle  the  ideology  that  supports  in  

this  context.  

It  can  be  argued  that  AQ  represents  a  ‘precedent’  in  terms  of  size,  aims,  objectives  

and  ‘brand  appeal’  in  either  passive  or  active  forms,  therefore  previous  

understandings  of  terrorists  networks  may  lack  the  necessary  guiding  tools  to  be  

fully  effective  (Silke,  2004;  Hoffman,  2008).  In  this  regard  Schmid  argues  that  post-­‐

9/11  terrorism  research  as  being  informed  by  traditional  concepts  that  are  being  

tailored  to  fit  the  AQ  threat  context,  that  sometimes  are  beset  by  internal  and  

external  criticisms  of  bias  and  policy  driven  objectives  as  well  as  being  unable  to  

empirically  produce  confident  results  from  primary  research  (Schmid,  2011).  This  

also  forms  much  of  the  basis  for  the  emergence  of  the  ‘critical  studies  of  terrorism’  

school,  that  although  is  certainly  critical  of  such  bias  in  the  research,  does  not  seem  

to  be  overly  critical  or  ‘new’  in  any  concepts  of  how  to  address  the  points  made  

above  regarding  ideology  (Schmid,  2011).    

  36  
Findings  &  Analysis:  

The  research  method  chosen  for  this  study  was  a  literature  review  of  key  R+DR  

concepts,  as  this  would  by  default  outline  some  of  the  key  issues  relevant  to  how  the  

AQ  threat  is  also  understood  in  this  context.  By  then  locating  this  within  the  UK  

Prevent  strategy’s  main  aims  and  objectives,  a  series  of  key  themes  may  be  found  to  

highlight  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  preventative  CT  approach.    Borum’s  work  

was  found  to  be  the  most  detailed  on  radicalization  and  equally,  such  detailed  

academic  research  into  concepts  of  deradicalization  appears  not  widely  available  in  

the  public  domain.  The  literature  review  conducted  reflects  this  disparity  and  

suggests  that  national  security  ‘concerns’  may  be  used  as  a  conduit  to  focus  more  on  

radicalization  as  opposed  to  deradicalization  as  the  former  is  seen  as  an  external  

process  towards  criminality  and  not  the  perceived  absence  of  justice  that  the  

‘radical’  espouses.  The  ‘perceived’  absence  of  justice  would  be  a  difficult  political  

and  policy  stance  to  acknowledge  or  add  to  why  people  become  radicalized.    

It  can  equally  be  argued  that  the  over  bearing  shadow  of  state  funded  research  into  

R+DR  conveniently  highlights  grievances  as  always  being  of  the  perceived  nature.  

Are  grievances  not  always  perceived  in  some  shape  or  form  and  does  this  perception  

make  them  any  less  ‘real’?  The  impact  of  the  WOT  and  foreign  policy  on  R+DR  issues  

appear  to  be  sidelined  in  much  of  the  research  reviewed.    

  37  
Radicalization  and  Deradicalization:  

This  study  has  found  that  the  terms  R+DR  are  often  subject  to  a  paradoxical  

relationship  with  approaches  to  CT  that  is  framed  by  competing  needs  and  

expectations.  These  diverse  needs  are  then  compounded  by  a  paradigm  that  appears  

to  conceptualize  R+DR  as  absolute  concepts  as  opposed  to  relative  terms  that  

require  contextual  clarity  for  specific  threats  (Sedgwick,  2010).  The  criticism  of  state  

sponsored  research  that  aligns  some  academic  efforts  to  affirm  trends  and  risks  that  

are  still  emerging  creates  tangible  confusion  in  this  field.  This  is  offset  by  further  sub-­‐

division  of  these  subjects  through  a  foreign  policy,  security  and  integration  context  

that  creates  either  broad  parameters  or  undesirable  or  negative  outcomes  as  a  

result  (Sedgwick,  2010).  The  negative  consequences  include  focusing  on  pathways  to  

radicalization  that  ignore  the  circumstances  and  factors  that  it  can  be  argued  are  just  

as  potent  triggers  to  extremism  as  any  ideological  indoctrination.  

 The  ‘war  on  terror’  and  ‘kinetic  force’  models  of  military  intervention  within  a  CT  

context  seem  underdeveloped  areas  of  current  R+DR  research  studies  based  on  the  

findings  of  this  study.  Another  issue  highlighted  by  this  research  effort  is  how,  even  

when  some  relative  meaning  is  attached  to  these  terms,  it  is  attached  through  an  

obvious  measurement  of  comparing  them  to  the  term  ‘moderate’.  What  this  does  is  

create  the  basis  for  another  anomaly  in  current  policy  based  understanding  that  is  

best  illustrated  by  Herbert’s  analysis  on  the  matter  when  he  states  that  ‘in  reality,  a  

thousand  flowers  are  abloom  in  the  realm  of  Islamic  activism:  to  approach  such  

  38  
diversity  with  a  single  with  -­‐us-­‐or-­‐against-­‐us  dichotomy  primarily  in  mind  is  a  

hopeless,  futile  task’  (Herbert,  2009).  

Such  statements  suggest  that  some  academics  are  able  to  offer  and  present  these  

nuances  in  a  more  balanced  perspective,  but  these  views  seem  small  in  number  

compared  to  the  vast  array  of  conceptual  models  this  study  has  examined.  Githens-­‐  

Mazer  argues  that  radicalism  needs  to  be  contrasted  with  apathetic  tendencies  as  

opposed  to  activism  (Githens-­‐Mazer,  2010).  This  view  is  useful  but  also  contains  

some  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  the  ‘Muslim  mindset’.  In  many  respects  it  

echoes  the  same  criticisms  it  is  appearing  to  try  and  counter,  namely  that  concepts  

of  radicalization  are  too  broad  and  based  on  basic  typologies  that  are  in  reality,  far  

more  complex  and  nuanced  that  any  one  concept  can  capture.    

By  contrasting  radicalism  with  apathy,  is  this  view  not  running  the  risk  of  suggesting  

that  ‘apathetic’  Muslims  can  also  become  vulnerable  to  extremism  through  the  

channel  of  the  more  ‘accepted’  mode  of  activism?    If  Islamic  activism  is  not  seen  as  a  

risk,  then  non-­‐violent  Islamist  groups  are  the  false  and  wrong  target  of  the  

‘integration’  based  CT  agenda  based  on  the  fact  that  they  regard  non-­‐violent  means  

of  social  change  as  acceptable  compared  to  violent  ones.  Apathy  is  not  a  state  of  

mind  when  compared  to  ‘Islamism’  in  this  view  as  the  former  only  requires  certain  

push  and  pull  factors  to  trigger  its  next  stages  (grievance,  motivation  and  action).  

Apathy  is  not  an  ideology,  whereas  the  constant  drive  to  sub-­‐divide  Islam  into  

‘schisms’  and  ‘ism’s’  suggests  that  either  the  true  threat  from  AQ  ideology  is  still  not  

understood  or  that  terminology  is  confusing  the  CT  efforts  unintentionally.  

  39  
  

There  can  be  little  argument  that  AQ  ideology  possesses  the  means  to  work  within  

broad  and  basic  community  structures  of  Muslim  Diasporas  as  it  uses  key  theological  

lexicons  to  ‘gain  entry’.  CT  efforts  seek  to  counter  this  ‘home  advantage’  by  framing  

risk  and  vulnerability  to  extremism  /  terrorism  from  within  the  same  ‘sample’  but  

from  an  external  position  of  influence  and  by  using  terminology  that  ultimately  

weakens  its  already  ‘outsider’  label.  Without  the  lexical  clarity  of  theology,  doctrinal  

congruence,  cultural  synergy  and  ‘trust’,  CT  language  inadvertently  appears  to  be  

fostering  greater  vulnerability  to  extremism  as  opposed  to  countering  it.  It  was  

mentioned  earlier  in  this  study  that  there  are  several  variations  to  what  AQ  ideology  

manifests  ‘its  self’  as  currently.  This  point  can  be  applied  to  different  velocities  of  

radicalization  processes  and  different  motivations  for  their  respective  journeys  given  

the  relationship  between  online  or  self-­‐radicalization  and  established  conceptual  

frameworks  (Ashour,  2009).      

Although  a  useful  differentiation,  Kuhle  and  Lindekilde’s  assertion  that  ‘true’  

radicalization  needs  to  be  distinguished  from  ‘expression  of  youthful  frustration,  

revolt  and  solidarity  with  populations  in  the  Muslim  world’  also  clouds  somewhat  

the  current  UK  context  of  a  values-­‐based  preventative  CT  policy  (Kuhle  and  

Lindekilde,  2010;  Birt,  2009  and  Thomas,  2010).  It  can  be  argued  that  a  values-­‐based  

approach  must  also  accept  the  relative  nature  of  what  ‘values’  mean  and  once  

concepts  such  a  radicalization  are  added  that  also  have  certain  relative  meanings  a  

desire  for  absolute  conceptual  clarity  and  security  is  difficult  to  attain  (Mandel,  

2009).    

  40  
As  Mandel  et  al  point  out,  the  term  radical  is  different  to  the  term  terrorist’,  that  

‘radical  is  generally  defined  by  reference  to  the  extremist’  and  that  most  definitions  

view  the  ‘radical’  as  some  form  of  threat  (Mandel  et  al,  2009).  This  element  of  

assigning  attributions  to  defining  radicalization  is  further  exacerbated  by  thinking,  

that  regards  it  as  not  necessary  leading  to  violence  because  ‘simply  put,  

radicalization  cannot  be  a  sufficient  cause  of  terrorism  because  most  radicals  are  not  

terrorists’  (Mandel  et  al,  2009;  Global  Futures  Forum,  2009).    

Martha  Crenshaw  brilliantly  captures  this  increasing  uncertainty  by  outlining  how  

the  term  has  changed  over  time  from  one  that  stressed  what  is  intrinsically  

‘fundamental’  to  one  that  outlines  what  is  ‘extreme’  (Crenshaw  in  Reich,  2000).  

There  is  also  the  issue  of  the  need  for  continued  evaluative  understanding  of  the  

concept  and  that  by  framing  radicalization  in  value-­‐laden  subjectivism,  can  such  

efforts  and  concepts  firmly  identify  the  motivations  behind  terrorism?  (Mandel  et  al,  

2009).  Perhaps  most  crucial  from  a  conceptual  viewpoint  is  that  currently,  

radicalization  discourse  in  unable  to  still  explain  ‘how  that  process  unfolds  or  why  it  

begins’  (Mandel  et  al,  2009).  In  fact  Mandel  et  al  argue  that  from  a  cognitive  

platform  there  still  needs  to  separation  between  what  the  structure  of  extremist  

thinking  looks  like  and  its  contents  when  seeking  to  express  radicalization  processes  

(Mandel  et  al,  2009).    

Research  conducted  by  Hillyard  on  the  effects  of  UK  CT  policy  to  tackle  the  

Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army  based  threat  during  the  previous  decades  indicates  

that  despite  serious  ‘perceived  grievances’,  the  vast  majority  of  the  Irish  community  

  41  
in  the  UK  and  Ireland  ‘managed’  these  grievances  without  becoming  radicalised  or  

‘extreme’.  The  human  capacity  for  pain  threshold  levels  are  enormously  different  

and  therefore  how  grievances  affect  each  person  cannot  be  housed  in  one  causal  

factor,  regardless  of  the  definition  of  radicalization  or  terrorism  for  that  matter.    

The  history  of  terrorism  suggests  that  AQ  represents  a  ‘bigger’  threat  but  not  

necessarily  a  new  one,  when  motives  and  means  are  considered  in  light  of  existing  

knowledge.      

Mandel  et  al  maintain  that  the  connotative  meaning  of  the  term  ultimately  needs  to  

be  understood  as  an  increase  of  extremism  and  not  as  is  it  appears  currently,  as  

explaining  its  process.  Thus,  even  from  a  ‘structuralist  semiotic’  perspective,  the  

term  is  currently  explaining  some  form  of  incremental  cognitive  rise  in  extremism  

and  not  necessarily  how  this  occurs.  Radicalization  concepts  are  denoting  a  process,  

whereas  the  connotation  of  the  term  is  based  on  rising  extremist  tendencies,  

manifest  in  some  cases  through  violence.  As  Zaidi  points  out,  this  has  real  

implications  for  the  terms  real  world  usage  as  ‘radicalization  gets  clarified  only  by  its  

association  with  extremism  within  the  context  that  one  is  looking  for.  Nobody  

consents  to  be  labeled  an  extremist,  no  matter  how  radical  their  worldview,  and  

thus  the  term  lacks  contextualization  by  ownership’  (Zaidi,  2011).    

This  is  potentially  why  Sedgwick’s  point  referred  to  earlier  about  the  three  lenses  

through  which  the  term  is  used  renders  its  operational  efficacy  slightly  limited  when  

issues  of  religiosity  and  conservatism  in  religious  practice  are  introduced.  In  this  

context,  religious  zeal  or  militant  narratives  become  classically  associated  with  what  

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Zaidi  calls,  some  form  of  ‘retrogressive  barbarism’  and  an  overall  lack  or  absence  of  a  

‘civilized’  or  ‘modern’  worldview  (Zaidi,  2011).  However,  with  such  a  framework,  

there  is  a  danger  that  the  term  can  be  seen  to  be  reinforcing  equally  regressive  

orientalist  or  colonial  binaries  to  matters  that  require  more  nuanced  leverage  to  be  

effective  (Zaidi,  2011).  Radicalization  discourse  thus  may  resonate  meaning  within  

the  CT  context,  but  may  well  fail  to  do  so  inside  the  ‘real  world’  dialectic  of  terrorism  

it  is  seeking  to  understand.  

If  an  increase  in  religiousness  (not  extremism)  is  viewed  internally  as  a  beneficial  

process,  yet  seen  externally  as  an  outcome  of  radicalization,  then  it  is  argued  that  

the  typology  does  not  posses  an  adequate  frame  of  reference  to  explain  what  

moderate  religiousness  should  look  like  except  for  one  that  houses  it  inside  the  

already  skewed  view  of  acceptance  of  ‘western  values’  etc.  But  if,  the  recipient  

adheres  to  a  non-­‐violent  form  of  religious  understanding  that  is  against  democratic  

principles  and  integration,  then  how  can  current  radicalization  discourse  frame  its  

stance  without  labeling  the  individual  an  extremist?  The  recent  events  in  Egypt’s  

where  a  democratically  elected  ‘Islamist’  government  was  overthrown  muddy  this  

debate  a  great  deal.  As  explained  above,  if  the  radical  is  seen  as  threat  and  the  term  

is  used  in  conjunction  with  extremism,  then  a  non-­‐violent  religiously  conservative  

person  according  to  current  policy  understanding  is  still  a  potential  risk.      

Much  earlier  in  this  study  it  was  pointed  out  that  a  simple  lexicon  of  language  is  

often  used  to  ‘trigger’  radicalization  processes.  The  issues  of  identity  and  belonging  

permeate  AQ  influenced  literature  and  narrative.  But  as  King  and  Taylor  explain,  

  43  
ultimately  it  is  between  the  ‘person  and  the  situation’  as  to  the  potential  outcomes  

of  any  such  process  in  this  context  of  identity  crisis  (King  and  Taylor,  2011).  Can  this  

point  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  religiously  observant  person  is  as  or  less  likely  to  be  

radicalized  as  someone  newly  introduced  to  religious  praxis  through  being  

radicalized?  If  it  does  mean  this,  then  once  more,  the  discourse  is  not  fully  capturing  

the  essence  of  the  difference  between  increased  religiosity  and  radicalization,  let  

alone  differentiating  between  these  nuances.  On  this  point  alone  there  are  profound  

implications  for  CT  and  particularly  for  the  UK  Prevent  strategy.  

Such  a  convergence  in  confusion  and  context  are  also  applicable  to  many  of  the  

models  of  radicalization  presented  in  the  literature  review  of  this  study.  Mellen  for  

example  identifies  two  very  similar  models  of  radicalization  (Silber  and  Bhatt  /NYPD  

&  Precht).  Silber  and  Bhatt  she  argues  place  Salafism  within  the  ‘necessary’  

components  section  of  the  radicalization  stages  before  violent  jihad  is  accepted  

whereas  Precht  is  more  ambivalent  on  this  issue  and  cites  Islam  is  the  means  to  an  

end.  For  two  very  similar  models  to  arrive  at  the  same  outcomes  from  radicalization  

processes  but  have  such  diverse  explanations  of  the  prevalent  factors  is  testament  

to  the  on  going  conceptual  confusion  within  CT  understanding  (Mellen,  2012).    

This  is  even  more  apparent  in  Precht’s  stance  that  people  seeking  a  more  

pronounced    ‘Muslim  identity’  are  by  default  attracted  to  ‘radical  Islam’  and  

therefore  become  radicalized  as  a  result  (Precht,  2009).  This  claim  is  perhaps  best  

understood  by  the  fact  the  Precht’s  study  was  conducted  using  information  in  the  

public  domain  and  not  from  primary  empirically  based  research  sources.    

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This  point  as  mentioned  before,  remains  the  Achilles  heel  of  much  terrorism  studies  

research,  namely  access  to  high  quality  primary  sources  for  empirical  analysis  means  

(Mellen,  2012).  Mellen  claims  that  ‘Precht  fails  to  study  which  combinations  incite  

radicalization  most  effective,  or  whether  some  are  necessary  of  sufficient;  further  

research  in  this  area  is  warranted’  (Mellen,  2012).  

Jenkins  argues  that  it  is  the  ‘action  centric’  allure  of  extremist  ideology  that  is  more  

relevant  to  some  people  than  finding  what  he  calls  ‘finding  a  spiritual  connection  to  

Islam’  (Jenkins,  2010).  This  view  does  seem  to  distance  the  religious  observer  from  

the  potential  terrorist  as  it  navigates  a  path  that  can  be  correlated  along  predisposed  

and  situational  factors  paradigm  without  too  much  emphasis  on  what  radicalization  

means  to  it.  The  majority  of  concepts  do  tally  the  interpretation  of  faith  as  a  key  

component  of  any  process,  but  in  essence  the  question  of  what  specific  

interpretation  of  faith  and  why  it  may  still  affect  people  differently  is  still  hugely  

under  researched  at  present  (Mellen,  2012).  The  lack  of  first  hand  access  to  

empirical  data  and  subjects  who  have  been  ‘radicalized’  is  a  criticism  that  has  been  

levied  at  even  the  most  innovative  exposes  of  AQ  ideology  such  as  the  work  of  Marc  

Sageman,  who’s  findings  have  been  questioned  for  this  very  reason  (Gartenstein-­‐

Ross  and  Grossman,  2009).  

When  this  state  of  affairs  is  amplified  with  the  emerging  threat  from  online  

radicalization,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  radicalization  process  can  be  stretched  into  

years  on  one  hand  and  shrunk  into  hours  or  days  on  the  other,  if  the  recipient  is  

subject  to  an  AAA  online  video  on  the  merits  of  jihad  against  the  unbelievers.  To  this  

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extent,  the  shape  and  structure  or  capability  of  AQ  post-­‐  OBL  is  of  little  importance  

when  the  discourse  being  used  to  uncover  is  fraught  with  conceptual  amnesia.  

Schmid  identifies  a  huge  upsurge  in  terrorism  research  post-­‐9/11,  but  the  question  

must  be  asked:  how  much  of  this  research  is  still  relying  on  pre-­‐9/11  terrorism  

studies  paradigms  to  explain  even  the  Web  based  threat  from  a  globalist  terrorist  

network  that  even  on  scale  and  structure  issues,  is  vastly  different  from  a  millenarian  

cult  or  gang?    

Current  discourse  cannot  it  seems  clarify  the  importance  of  traditional  one-­‐to-­‐one  

recruitment  as  compared  to  virtual  recruitment  and  how  both  formal  and  informal  

means  of  indoctrination  create  greater  or  less  vulnerability  to  violence.  The  fact  that  

much  of  the  discourse  is  still  using  the  term  Salafi  or  Salafism  suggests  that  not  only  

is  radicalization  a  problematic  concept  but  the  terminology  associated  with  it  is  also.  

Githens-­‐Mazer  for  example  uses  the  term  Violent  Takfiri  Jihadists,  NYPD  use  the  

term  Salafism  and  Spencer,  Precht  and  others  use  the  term  Islam.    This  feature  is  

concerning  and  one  of  the  key  findings  of  this  study  on  the  term  radicalization.      

Deradicalization  Concepts:  

Somewhat  unsurprisingly,  the  confusion  surrounding  radicalization  and  its  usage  

renders  a  detailed  discussion  on  deradicalization  slightly  problematic.  However,  

there  are  a  number  of  key  points  this  research  study  has  identified  which  require  

critical  questioning  if  not  critical  analysis.  From  the  available  sources,  it  is  clear  that  

deradicalization  is  essentially  viewed  as  a  process  of  renouncing  violent  means,  

  46  
accepting  the  broad  norms  and  values  of  mainstream  society  and  in  the  Western  

context,  accepting  that  social  or  political  change  is  only  achieved  through  the  

tenants  of  democracy  (Heath-­‐Kelly,  2011;  Stevens,  2011;  Thomas,  2010).  The  

problem  this  study  has  identified  is  that  radicalization  is  such  a  contested  concept  

that  apart  from  disengagement  concepts,  deradicalization  is  still  a  ‘work  in  progress’.  

The  basis  for  disengagement  from  terrorism  is  markedly  different  from  

deradicalization  because  the  former  only  implies  the  renouncement  of  violence  at  a  

certain  point  in  time,  whereas  the  latter  is  apparently  a  process  of  re-­‐integration  into  

the  very  milieu  that  many  argue  houses  the  drivers  to  radicalization  in  the  first  place  

(Lambert,  2008).    

As  data  from  any  deradicalization  specific  initiatives  is  not  in  the  public  domain,  then  

it  is  impossible  to  determine  if  one,  the  concept  has  brevity  and  two,  if  

disengagement  and  deradicalization  are  just  as  susceptible  to  pre-­‐disposed  and  

situational  factors  as  radicalization  appears  to  be.  In  other  words,  if  someone  is  using  

the  Islamic  concept  of  ‘Hudna’  (ceasefire)  to  mask  future  involvement  in  violent  

action  and  this  person  has  been  introduced  to  core  AQ  narrative,  then  on  what  basis  

can  it  be  suggested  they  have  stopped  certain  extremist  behavior  on  the  basis  of  

disengagement  or  have  been  deradicalized?  This  is  admittedly  a  rather  brusque  

statement,  but  it  is  meant  to  demonstrate  that  without  contextual  and  conceptual  

clarity,  these  terms  have  only  lexical  meanings  based  on  current  research  in  the  UK  

Prevent  context  in  particular.  

  47  
It  also  hopefully  demonstrates  that  by  seeing  deradicalization  as  the  process  of  re-­‐

adopting  previously  ‘rejected’  values,  the  likelihood  of  these  values  being  

commensurate  with  the  expectation  of  liberal  Western  democracies  is  a  somewhat  

difficult  model  to  pursue  at  this  stage  of  CT  understanding.  When  the  current  

‘unknown’  shape  and  framework  of  AQ  in  the  West  post-­‐OBL  is  added  to  this,  such  a  

pursuit  is  all  the  more  shrouded  in  ‘known  unknowns’.  The  following  statement  

locates  these  points  in  a  different  way,  but  does  serve  the  same  warning  intrinsically  

by  stating  that  ‘as  long  as  there  are  those  who  seek  answers,  a  true  identity  and  

perhaps  a  sense  of  adventure,  there  will  be  a  market  for  jihadi  radicalization  in  the  

West’  (Abu-­‐Nasr  and  Keath,  2009).  

There  appears  to  be  some  understanding  within  CT  discourse  of  the  relatively  simple  

dichotomy  of  identity,  belonging  and  culture  being  key  aspects  of  both  R+DR  based  

issues.  However,  this  study  has  found  that  much  of  this  is  centered  around  a  view  of  

these  issues  being  affected  by  heritage  and  cultural  forces  on  one  hand  and  a  

pressure  to  integrate  into  Western  values  on  the  other  (Mulligan,  2009).  It  can  be  

argued  that  the  kinetic  force  model  and  WOT  under  the  foreign  policy  umbrella  of  CT  

policy  also  create  the  drivers  for  creation  of  a  certain  type  of  ‘identity’  and  negative  

outcomes  for  preventative  CT  work.  This  creates  an  equation  of;  force  to  stop  

terrorists  threats  and  prevention  to  stop  them  emerging.  But,  when  the  effects  of  

kinetic  force  are  multiplied  by  predisposed  and  situational  factors  (as  in  R+DR  

concepts),  then  force  can  be  seen  as  the  only  ‘prevention’  in  the  eye  of  those  being  

targeted.    

  48  
Force  becomes  the  potential  ally  of  the  recruiter  /  radicalizer  in  shaping  the  

‘seeker’s’  view  not  only  of  existing  extremist  narrative  but  a  new  narrative  that  uses  

CT  efforts  as  a  component  tool  for  radicalization  (Heath-­‐Kelly,  2011).    

In  terms  of  how  this  affects  conceptual  understanding  of  deradicalization  concepts  is  

a  further  piece  of  enquiry  needed  within  the  CT  sphere,  but  also  it  needs  to  be  

acknowledged  that  disengagement  from  terrorism  does  occur  (Horgan,  2008).    

However,  the  two  are  not  the  same  and  neither  has  been  cross  referenced  against  

self-­‐disengagement  or  self-­‐deradicalization  processes  to  arrive  at  a  point  in  CT  

studies  where  it  adequately  captures  the  relative  contribution  of  self-­‐realization  in  

comparison  to  preventative  initiatives  (McDonald,  2011,  Spalek,  2009).    

These  points  are  central  to  an  understanding  of  a  values-­‐based  CT  policy  and  its  

effectiveness  to  counter  the  argument  that  these  ‘values’  include  military  force  and  

collateral  damage  and  therefore  are  part  of  the  problem  and  not  the  solution  so  to  

speak.  In  this  context  the  simple  AQ  mantra  of  ‘kill  them  as  they  kill  you’,  ‘Eye  for  an  

Eye…tooth  for  a  tooth’  would  seemingly  negate  the  allure  of  prevention  and  

deradicalization  efforts  (Woolwich  incident).    

Although  the  mantra  is  indeed  based  on  authentic  Quranic  sources,  terrorist  groups  

influenced  by  AQ  ignore  the  contextual,  historical  and  theological  relevance  of  such  

narrative.  The  majority  of  the  world’s  Muslims  have  some  basis  for  understanding  

they’re  faith  through  some  of  form  of  consensus-­‐based  paradigm  and  therefore  

locate  such  edicts  in  their  ‘appropriate’  order  of  real  world  events  (Malik,  2003).    

  49  
  

However,  as  Said  famously  pointed  out,  it  has  to  be  in  the  minimum  sense  of  the  

term,  at  least  acknowledged  that  much  of  Western  academic  and  thus  its  CT  

discourse  element  is  framed  in  the  essential  orientalist  view  of  the  ‘other’  (Said,  

1978).  If  not,  then  the  state  bias  that  seems  to  pervade  much  of  the  research  is  

conveniently  ignoring  key  push  and  pull  factors  (Foreign  Policy  and  the  WOT)  to  

isolate  non-­‐state  terrorist  actors  from  state  based  terrorism  in  order  to  legitimize  

the  foundation  of  post-­‐modern  liberal  democracies  that  are  increasingly  relying  on  

neo-­‐conservative  idioms  to  pursue  integration  on  one  hand  and  CT  on  the  other.        

There  are  very  few  other  meta-­‐narrative  other  than  orientalism  based  contexts  to  

understand  certain  comments  that  seem  to  imply  that  ‘sympathy’  with  jihadist  

causes  correlates  to  some  form  of  risk  or  threat.  This  chasm  of  divergent  opinion  

within  the  CT  discourse  is  perfectly  illustrated  by  that  fact  that  Jenkins  views  the  

majority  of  Western  Muslims  as  being  hostile  to  jihadist  ideology,  whereas  

Gartenstein-­‐Ross  argues  that  sympathy  with  the  ‘cause’  should  essentially  be  seen  as  

an  impending  risk  to  security  (Jenkins,  2010;  Gartenstein-­‐Ross,  2009).  Using  the  

principal  of  equifinality  to  this  issue  means  that  the  broader  question  of  how  to  

manage  the  homegrown  threat  in  the  UK  context  is  one  based  on  either  greater  

security  meaning  greater  peace  or  peace  meaning  greater  security.  By  adopting  a  CT  

policy  that  includes  law  enforcement  and  prevention  measures  means  in  essence  

that  the  candle  is  burning  at  both  ends.  Peace  and  security  also  appear  to  be  relative  

terms  in  an  agenda  seeking  absolute  confirmation  of  its  known  enemies  and  those  

still  emerging.      

  50  
  

Against  this  backdrop  of  competing  lenses  in  which  CT  is  viewed  and  a  lack  of  robust  

conceptual  clarity  on  R+DR  matters,  it  can  only  be  suggested  that  CT  efforts  in  the  

AQ  context  are  still  relatively  embryonic  and  will  need  more  time  and  more  

importantly  more  data  to  dispel  both  the  negativity  that  surrounds  them  and  

contextual  amnesia  that  pervades  much  of  its  discourse  at  present.  Mellen  argues  

that  neither  Jenkins  nor  Gartenstein-­‐  Ross’s  views  are  mutually  able  to  present  the  

‘accurate’  picture  both  have  sought  to  frame  differently  (Mellen,  2012).  What  is  

clear  is  that  the  nature  of  religiosity  in  modern  society  is  underdeveloped  within  this  

discourse  and  therefore,  rather  than  paint  a  picture  of  quasi-­‐orientalist  CT  

understanding  permeating  the  discourse,  it  is  more  effective  to  study  in  detail  the  

role  that  religion  plays  in  a  number  of  Western  societies.    

UK  Prevent  Strategy:  Implications  

Thankfully,  this  also  appears  to  be  the  view  of  those  writers  who  have  made  bold  

claims  about  the  link  between  sympathy  and  terrorism/  risk  and  threat.  What  does  

all  this  mean  for  the  UK’s  Prevent  strategy?  Thomas  suggests  that  ‘Preventing  violent  

extremism  (PVE),  the  government’s  “hearts  and  minds”  response  to  the  threat  of  

domestic  Islamist  terrorism  within  the  wider  CONTEST  strategy,  has  been  exposed  as  

both  failed  and  friendless  by  growing  political  and  academic  scrutiny’.    

(Thomas,  2010).  

  51  
Thomas  is  referring  to  the  previous  Prevent  strategy  that  under  the  previous  

administration  was  based  on  two  very  different  auspices.  The  first  of  these  was  a  

cohesion-­‐based  approach  championed  originally  by  Cantle’s  study  of  the  causes  of  

the  Oldham  riots  in  2001.  These  disturbances  prompted  the  Blair  government  to  

adopt  an  integration-­‐based  model  that  sought  win  the  ‘battle  of  hearts  and  minds’.  

This  policy  was  aimed  at  addressing  the  concern  that  diaspora  communities  had  

been  removed  from  the  values  of  mainstream  British  society.  Against  the  backdrop  

of  this  approach  was  an  effort  to  reverse  the  perceived  polarity  created  by  decades  

of  multi-­‐culturalism  (Thomas,  2010).  The  London  bombings  of  July  7th  2005  

prompted  a  need  to  create  a  more  security  centric  policy  that  sought  to  address  the  

claim  that  ‘some  young  Muslims  are  dangerously  alienated  from  British  values,  and  

from  the  respect  for  diversity  and  free  speech  that  necessarily  underpins  Britain’s  

democratic,  multicultural  society’  (Prins  and  Salisbury,  2008).  

   

Thomas  identifies  four  key  criticisms  of  Prevent  since  it  was  publically  introduced  in  

late  2006.  These  are  ‘that  PVE  (Prevent)  has  had  an  unhelpful  and  broad  

monocultural  focus  on  Muslims;  that  it  has  been  a  vehicle  for  a  significant  growth  in  

state  of  surveillance  of  Muslim  communities;  that  PVE  in  the  way  it  has  been  

designed  and  implemented  is  contradictory  to  other  key  governmental  priorities  

such  as  community  cohesion’  and  that  the  problematic  design  of  PVE  has  left  

progress  hobbled  by  intra-­‐governmental  tensions  at  both  national  and  local  levels’.  

(Thomas,  2010).  

  52  
Against  this  backdrop  of  criticism  that  has  two  over-­‐arching  themes  (mono-­‐

culturalism  /  intelligence  and  contradiction  /  internal  tensions),  how  has  Prevent  

evolved  and  accounted  for  R+DR  issues  to  remain  as  part  of  its  central  focus?  

The  original  strategy  was  built  around  five  core  objectives:  

• To  challenge  the  ideology  behind  violent  extremism  and  support  the  places  

where  they  operate  

• Disrupt  those  who  promote  violent  extremism  and  support  the  places  where  

they  operate  

• Support  individuals  who  are  vulnerable  to  recruitment,  or  have  already  been  

recruited  by  violent  extremists  

• Increase  the  resilience  of  communities  to  violent  extremism  

• To  address  the  grievances  which  ideologues  are  exploiting  

(Home  Office  Prevent  Strategy,  2009)  

The  elements  where  R+DR  fitted  into  the  original  strategy  tightly  would  be  objective  

three  and  this  objective  went  on  to  become  the  domain  of  the  ‘Channel’  program.  

More  of  what  Channel  looks  like  will  feature  in  this  analysis  after  a  look  at  the  

revised  Prevent  strategy  and  some  of  its  foundations.  The  incoming  coalition  

government  set  about  revising  Prevent  and  made  some  key  distinctions  between  

what  had  transpired  before  and  where  the  future  direction  of  this  strategy  should  be  

focused.    

  53  
  

The  new  Prevent  objectives  are:  

1. Challenging  the  ideology  that  supports  terrorism  and  those  who  promote  it  

2. Protecting  vulnerable  people  

3. Supporting  sectors  and  institutions  where  there  are  risks  of  radicalisation  

(Home  Office  Prevent  Strategy,  2011)  

By  examining  the  publically  available  material  on  the  Channel  program,  it  is  possible  

to  formulate  some  key  considerations  that  the  previous  and  current  strategy  should  

have  and  may  need  to  take  in  to  account  if  the  new  objectives  of  Prevent  are  to  be  

effective.  A  closer  look  at  the  foundations  /  assumptions  behind  objective  two  of  the  

new  strategy  reveal  many  issues  already  highlighted  as  those  that  blight  current  

discourse  on  R+DR.  Objective  two  state  that  ‘Radicalization  is  usually  a  process  not  

an  event.  During  this  process  it  is  possible  to  intervene  to  prevent  vulnerable  people  

being  drawn  into  terrorist-­‐related  activity.  There  are  some  analogies  between  this  

work  and  other  forms  of  crime  prevention’  (Home  Office  Prevent  Strategy,  2011).  

By  ‘other  forms  of  crime  prevention’  is  taken  to  assume  this  means  work  done  within  

Youth  Offending  Teams  (YOT’s)  under  what  was  known  as  Youth  Inclusion  Panels  

(YIP’s)  or  child  and  adult  safeguarding  boards  run  usually  via  social  services  based  

systems.  

  54  
  The  reason  for  this  assumption  lies  in  the  statement  that  ‘Prevent  will  build  on  

Channel,  the  existing  multi-­‐agency  programme  to  identify  and  provide  support  to  

people  at  risk  of  radicalization.  Channel  has  had  some  success’  (Home  Office  Prevent  

Strategy,  2011).  This  ‘success’  is  not  currently  open  to  external  academic  evaluation  

or  assessment.  However,  of  perhaps  even  greater  significance  to  this  study  is  that  

‘Organisations  commissioned  to  provide  support  to  vulnerable  people  are  in  a  

position  of  great  influence.  They  must  be  credible  and  able  to  reach  and  talk  to  

people  at  risk.  But  we  will  not  fund  or  work  with  extremist  groups  for  this  (or  any  

other)  purpose’  (Home  Office  Prevent  Strategy,  2011).  

This  stance  appears  to  be  suggesting  that  those  tasked  with  influencing  vulnerable  

people  need  to  have  the  element  of  ‘credibility’  in  order  to  reach  their  ‘clients’.  

Stating  that  extremists  will  not  be  tasked  with  this  duty  or  others  for  that  matter  

offers  this  study  the  chance  to  assess  the  potential  assumptions  behind  this  

approach.    

Firstly,  that  the  nature  of  radicalization  into  an  AQ  influenced  mindset  must  not  

house  key  distorted  theological  narratives,  for  if  it  does,  then  how  would  a  

mainstream  agency  or  other  provider  seek  to  refute  or  counter  these  narratives  

unless  they  came  from  a  position  of  cultural,  ethnic,  religious  or  social  authority?  

Other  than  this,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  what  ‘credibility’  possibly  means  in  this  

context.  Secondly,  that  by  using  the  term  ‘extremist’,  there  is  an  undeniable  link  to  

the  term  ‘moderate’  and  from  the  strategy  document,  it  suggests  that  the  moderate  

is  one  who  accepts  the  values  of  democracy  and  ‘broad’  liberal  values  of  freedom  

  55  
and  liberty.  This  echoes  the  same  values-­‐based  CT  approach  that  was  criticized  in  the  

previous  strategy  as  being  contradictory  to  community  cohesion  based  models  as  it  

has  Muslim-­‐centric  focus  in  the  main  (Thomas,  2010;  Stevens;  Heath-­‐Kelly,  2012).    

Thirdly,  if  AQ  influenced  ideology  is  accepted  at  the  nemesis  of  such  values,  how  can  

radicalization  be  tackled  via  deradicalization  understanding  if  it  is  not  based  on  the  

adoption  of  these  ‘Western  values’?  Such  a  barometer  for  success  ignores  the  issues  

of  theological  brevity  in  the  thought  process  of  such  individuals,  who  would  have  in  

the  least,  ‘rejected’  these  very  same  values  in  favour  of  AQ  influenced  narrative.    

In  essence,  the  notion  of  credibility  mentioned  by  the  Prevent  strategy  implies  that  it  

comes  from  accepting  mainstream  values  and  not  extremists  ones.  But  it  seems  to  

muddy  the  waters  of  understanding  when  issues  of  religious  conservatism  and  non-­‐

violent  groups  are  added  to  the  mix.  Religious  conservatism  by  definition  must  have  

an  element  of  strict  adherence  to  certain  theological  values  for  it  to  exist.  If  these  

values  are  different  to  mainstream  liberal  values,  then  such  adherents  are  simply  a  

few  steps  away  from  radicalization  based  on  current  understanding.    Conservative  

literalism  then  becomes  the  ‘enabling  environment’  for  terrorism  or  at  least  

extremism.    

This  typology  lends  itself  well  to  Gartenstein-­‐Ross’s  view  and  Silber  and  Bhatt’s  view  

that  essentially,  the  problem  and  threat  from  AQ  is  the  same  problem  and  threat  

from  Islam.  This  also  creates  the  same  binary-­‐colonialist  accusation  made  earlier  in  

the  study  all  over  again.  It  also  serves  to  reinforce  some  form  of  absolutism  to  

  56  
meanings  such  as  ‘values’,  ‘extreme’,  ‘radicalized’  and  ‘deradicalized’  that  other  

researchers  have  pointed  out  are  more  relative  terms  in  reality  (Borum,  2011).      

The  values-­‐based  approach  has  long  been  seen  negatively  buy  its  main  recipients  

simply  because  it  opens  its  auspices  up  to  the  label  of  what  Birt  calls  ‘social  

engineering’  (Birt,  2009).  This  is  all  the  more  relevant  when  consideration  is  given  to  

the  fact  that  traditionally,  secular  democracies  do  not  tend  to  intervene  in  matters  

of  faith  (Heath-­‐Kelly,  2012).  Channel  and  its  Prevent  objectives  seem  to  be  trying  to  

work  in  the  pre-­‐criminal  space  of  ‘thoughts  and  ideas’  and  ‘grievances’.  However  

such  a  policy  is  not  clear  conceptually  if  these  thoughts  and  narratives  are  

unacceptable  from  a  values-­‐based  context  or  counter-­‐terrorism  context  or  legal  

context.  By  then  applying  R+DR  processes  to  this  issue  seemingly  creates  more  

problems  than  solutions.    Birt  sees  a  clear  distinction  between  the  values-­‐based  

approach  and  means-­‐based  approach.  This  view  is  echoed  by  Lambert,  Githens-­‐

Mazer  and  Health-­‐Kelly  respectively.  This  analysis  has  found  that  the  ‘values’  do  

seem  to  be  the  ‘means’  (Birt,  2009;  Githens-­‐Mazer  and  Lambert,  2010).      

Stevens  encapsulates  this  multi-­‐faceted  tension  very  well  by  stating  that  ‘First  is  the  

assumption  of  the  primacy  of  doctrinal  beliefs.  This  is  the  assumption  that  

individuals  join  radical  and  extremist  groups  because  of  the  religious  ideas  

themselves;  second,  that  the  state  intervention  in  this  arena  of  ideas  is  an  effective  

method  for  rendering  more  moderate  (peaceable)  alternatives  attractive;  and  third,  

that  state  intervention  in  religious  disputes  is  an  appropriate  method  for  securing  

social  stability’  (Stevens,  2011).  

  57  
  

Conclusion:  

Hillyard’s  research  on  the  Irish  communities  CT  experience  detailed  a  complex  

emotional  web  of  labeling,  mistrust,  and  profiling  and  excessive  law  enforcement  

according  to  its  victims.  Although  many  within  the  CT  world  regard  contemporary  CT  

efforts  as  having  moved  on  considerably  from  the  IRA  based  risk  and  threat,  this  

study  has  found  that  much  of  the  discourse  on  R+DR  in  particular  has  been  shaped  

by  certain  previously  held  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  the  current  threat.  The  

role  of  ‘intelligence  led  preventative  policing’  appears  to  be  the  main  barrier  to  this  

assumption  being  dispelled.  This  threat  is  from  AQ  influenced  ideology,  but  is  has  

become  clear  during  this  research  that  post-­‐OBL  and  AAA  and  with  the  rise  of  what  

Mellen  calls  ‘Web  2.0’  radicalization,  that  current  understanding  of  R+DR  concepts  

have  been  divided  across  two  main  plateaus  (Mellen,  2012).    

The  first  of  these  locates  radicalization  as  a  set  of  stages/  step  or  processes,  which  

cause  someone  to  lean  toward  eventual  violent  action.  The  second  version  sees  

radicalization  as  a  component  part  of  the  process  that  takes  someone  towards  

violent  action,  but  not  necessarily  the  cause  of  violence.  Somewhere  in  between  

these  two  frameworks  rest  key  questions  for  the  research  community  and  policy  

world  about  how  these  concepts  are  developed  to  take  into  account  to  the  issues  

outlined  below.    

This  research  has  not  found  any  study  that  has  explained  in  detail  the  nuances  of  

doctrinal  difference  within  Islam  and  its  effect  on  potential  R+DR  processes.    

  58  
If  Salafism  is  part  of  the  problem  as  the  NYPD  espouses,  then  Saudi  deradicalization  

programs  are  solving  the  ‘problem’  with  the  ‘problem’,  as  it  is  common  knowledge  

that  Saudi  Islam  is  based  on  Wahabbism/  Salafism.  The  ‘problem’  according  to  Silber  

and  Bhatt  is  also  the  ‘solution’,  but  it  is  unclear  as  to  which  variant  of  Salafism  is  

which  in  this  regard.  These  types  of  program  may  also  be  ‘lost  in  translation’  and  

actually  be  modeled  on  Horgan’s  typology  of  disengagement  and  if  so,  attempts  at  

conceptualizing  deradicalization  need  to  be  switched  to  understanding  

disengagement.  Are  Saudi  extremists  being  ‘compelled’  to  disengage  through  

psychological  and  social  re-­‐alignment,  only  to  accept  this  process  because  they  have  

been  taught  through  prior  indoctrination  that  this  period  of  the  global  jihad  is  a  

recovery  phase,  where  the  ‘ceasefire’  ruling  comes  into  play?  This  is  a  key  question  

and  a  worrying  one.  

The  current  post-­‐OBL  and  AAA  AQ  world  of  recruitment  renders  R+DR  concepts  

weak  in  the  face  of  cases  that  suggest  radicalization  can  occur  in  a  matter  of  weeks,  

days  and  in  relative  isolation  (Roshana  Chowdury  and  Abdul  Muttallib  cases).  If  

radicalization  is  a  process  then  such  processes  are  also  ‘phases’,  and  if  so  phases  

pass  and  evolve.  Youthful  revolt  and  frustration  can  be  such  phases.  R+DR  concepts  

can  seemingly  reinforce  traditional  colonial  binaries  due  to  lack  of  conceptual  clarity.  

The  role  of  media  and  academia  worlds  in  either  reinforcing  or  negating  

Islamaphobia  or  colonial  binaries  and  also  in  not  allowing  UK  CT  policy  to  be  given  its  

due  time  to  make  a  positive  impact  must  be  assessed.  How  academia  improves  R+DR  

concepts  if  governments  do  not  release  data  for  better  quality  empirical  study  

remains  a  key  cause  for  concern  also.  

  59  
  

These  contentious  issues  form  the  basis  for  what  this  study  has  found  in  terms  of  

outcomes.  This  is  unfortunate  on  one  hand  but  useful  on  the  other  as  it  highlights  

what  the  main  aim  of  this  study  originally  was:  to  assess  if  R+DR  concepts  are  

effective  in  the  fight  against  AQ  in  the  UK  context?  What  has  been  discovered  is  that  

these  concepts  are  currently  either  too  broad  to  have  any  real  traction  in  CT  or  too  

driven  by  the  different  lenses  of  integration,  security  and  foreign  policy  to  be  

contextually  relevant  to  something  as  new  as  the  Prevent  strategy.  Of  the  two  

concepts,  radicalization  has  warranted  the  most  academic  and  policy  attention  but  is  

still  conceptually  underdeveloped  and  deradicalization  remains  even  further  behind,  

until  data  is  accessible  and  fully  analyzed  in  this  regard.    

Silke  points  out  that  ‘wars  are  won  when  one  side  breaks  the  will  of  the  other  to  

fight  on’  (Silke,  2011)  and  on  the  same  page  reminds  the  CT  community  of  the  

visionary  words  of  historian  David  Fromkin  who  said  that  ‘terrorism  wins  only  if  you  

respond  to  it  in  way  the  terrorists  want  you  to;  which  means  that  its  fate  is  in  your  

hand  and  not  theirs’  (Fromkin  in  Silke,  2011).  

This  study  has  found  that  at  present,  concepts  of  R+DR  do  not  favour  either  party  in  

the  ‘war  on  terror’.  The  position  of  R+DR  concepts  appears  to  be  one  of  them  trying  

to  acutely  make  risk  based  knowledge  more  amenable  to  a  policy  and  state  centric  

agenda  that  is  happy  to  use  kinetic  force  as  well  as  ‘manage’  terrorist  threats  pre-­‐

emptively  (Heath-­‐Kelly,  2012).  

  60  
  In  final  analysis  if  ‘Al  Qaeda’s  global  pretentions  bulge  with  paradox.  It  is  a  network  

social  order,  without  a  society.  It  is  atomized  without  individualism.  And  the  

narrative  of  returning  to  an  ideal  form  of  a  seventh-­‐century  Islamic  caliphate  finds  

resonance  in  Western  cosmopolitan  cities  like  London,  Sydney,  and  Paris’  (Ungerer,  

2012)  then  too  some  greater  or  lesser  extent  the  discourses  on  R+DR  and  CT  policy  

house  a  similar  paradox.    

The  concepts  of  R+DR  need  much  greater  robust  study  for  them  to  become  a  tool  of  

true  purpose,  effectiveness  and  security.  9/11  changed  the  world,  but  CT  discourse  

needs  to  first  acknowledge  this  change  in  terms  of  how  its  concepts  seek  to  explain  

it.  Is  this  threat  ‘new’  terrorism  or  just  ‘new’  language  to  explain  an  old  foe  operating  

on  a  bigger  scale?  If  terrorism  can  be  crudely  seen  as  a  form  of  communication,  then  

CT  needs  to  communicate  itself  better.  AQ  ideology  is  without  little  doubt  operating  

on  ‘medieval  specifications’,  but  is  doing  so  with  ‘modern  tech’.  The  CT  world  needs  

to  filter  its  scope  of  rationale  to  first,  have  definitional  primacy  as  its  base  and  

secondly,  base  this  primacy  on  an  acceptance  that  the  WOT  and  its  associated  policy  

impacts  may  well  contribute  one  of  most  significant  ‘push’  factors  in  the  rise  of  

radicalization  in  the  global  space.  Only  then  will  it  possibly  move  on  from  the  claim  

that  it  currently  uses  ‘medieval  tech’  to  understand  a  ‘modern  specification’  of  

terrorism.    

   

 
 
 
 
 

  61  
  
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