NOBLEJAS V.
TEEHANKEE and remove the administrative officials who are presidential appointees and which the
1968|Reyes
Remedy Requested: Petition for Writ of prohibition w/ preliminary injunction
FACTS:
Antonio Noblejas is the Commissioner of Land Registration, created by RA
1151 which entitles him to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of CFI.
March 1968, Secretary of Justice sent him a letter requiring him to explain why
no disciplinary action should be filed for “approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly
in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.”
 Noblejas answered that since he has the same rank and privleges as a
Judge of CFI, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as a Judge and thus the papers relative to his case should be
submitted to the SC according to S67 Judiciary Act (RA 206) and Revised
Rules of Court
The Executive Secretary sent him a letter that by authority of the President a prima
facie case existed for gross negligence and he was thus suspended.
Noblejas reiterated his contentions to the court, claimed lack of jurisdiction and abuse
of discretion and prayed for restraining writs.
 Respondents answered that while he has the same rank, the Land
Registration Commissioner does not exercise judicial functions nor can he
be considered as a CFI Judge within the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of
Court; the function of investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary
w/ non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties as it would violate the separation of powers.
ISSUE: W/N Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the SC
due to RA 1151 and Appropriaton Laws giving him the rank of a CFI Judge
HELD:
1. S67 of the Judiciary Act for the investigation and suspension of judges say that "No
District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the
Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . .
." Thus there is nothing that says that the Commissioner of Land Registration is
a district judge or a Judiciary member at all.
2. It is impossible for him to be implied to have the right to be investigated only
by the SC since a variety of executive officials would have this right as well. The
Legislative also offered it to (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of
Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number
(Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City
Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
(R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). This theory must fall because it gives the SC the duty to
investigate and discipline all these plainly executive officials by mere implication
from the Legislative grant and remove them from the President’s power to discipline
Constitution expressly placed under the President’s supervision and control (Const.
Art. VII, S10).
 It would also mean that the SolGen, another appointee of the President,
could not be removed by the latter since the Appropriation Act gives the
SolGen the rank of a CA judge.
CASE: Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature.
Moreover, the Judges of the Court of Agrarian relations and Tax Appeals, the organic
statues of the bodies provide they are to be removed from office for the same causes
and in the same manner provided by law of CFI judges or appellate rank judges.
Thus, if the Legislature wanted a position to have the same rules as another position,
it would expressly say so.
3. Moreover, it would be unconstitutional the Judiciary can suspend or remove
him, an executive official, since it would violate the separation of powers. In
Richardson v. Scudder, it said that the Executive or Legislature have no power to
charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental
to the fulfillment of judicial duties. Federal Radio Comm. v. Gen. Electric Co. say that
the Judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or
administrative.
CASE: SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power
or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the SC to arbitrate disputes
between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co.
4. Finally, Noblejas claims he has judicial functions under RA 1151 where if the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with the proper step to be taken or where a party does
not agree with the Register regarding any matter, he is in charge of deciding.
CASE: It is doubtful if a consulta by the Register is a judicial function, as RA 1151
also said that his decision will be binding only upon all Registers, and not upon
other parties. Thus, this limitation identifies his resolutions with those of any
other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone.
That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not
administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.
 Even assuming it is a judicial, or more properly a quasi judicidal function,
analysis of the powers of the Land Registration Commissioner show that the
resolution of consultas are a minimal portion of his administrative or
executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.
In statutory construction, statutes should be given, whenever possible, a
meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution.
DENIED.