Journal o f Shi‘a Islamic Studies Spring 2012 ‫ ־‬Vol. V · N o .

Al‫־‬Attas Revisited on the Islamic

Understanding o f Education
K h o s r o w B a g h e r i N o a p a r a s t

Department o f Psychology & Education, University o f Tehran, Tehran, Iran

kh bagheri @ut.ac. i r

ABSTRACT: Al‫־‬Attas has been an im portant figure in the

Islamisation o f knowledge project. One o f his original
contributions has been to offer an Islamic account o f education in
terms o f a d a b and t a d i b . He holds that the words commonly used
to describe the Islamic understanding o f education, ta rb iya h and
ru b u biyya h , are unable to do the job. This paper argues that not only
is t a d i b not better than ta rb iya h / ru bu biyyah for denoting the
Islamic understanding o f education but that it can only be
subsumed under ru bubiyyah. This is because t a ’d ib , at best, refers to
only the ethical and social aspects o f education without all aspects
o f education.

KEYWORDS: Al-Attas, Syed M uham mad Naquib; education;

knowledge, ad a b \ t a ’dib \ rububiyyah.

Introduction
Syed M u h am m ad N aquib al‫־‬Attas has made a significant co n trib utio n
to Islamic th o ug h t in general and Islamic education in particular. He
delivered the keynote address, titled the C oncept o f Islamic Education,
at the First W orld Conference on M uslim Education held in Mecca in
M arch 1977. At the time al-Attas was the Director o f the International
Institute o f Islamic T ho ug h t and Civilization (ISTAC) and a m ember
o f the International Advisory Board o f the M uslim Education
Foun d atio n (MEF). Al-Attas’ con trib u tio n to education needs to be
seen in the broader context o f the project for the Islamisation o f
knowledge. There have been two strands for this project; one with an
ethical o rientation and the other with an epistemological orientation.
The first strand is defended, am ong others, by R ahm an (1982) and

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A shraf (Husain & A shraf 1979). The second strand is supported by Al-
Faruqi (1982) and Al‫־‬Attas (1979) himself. According to the ethical
approach, Islamising knowledge is n o t concerned so m uch with
providing a new kind o f knowledge b ut with taking an ethical
relationship to knowledge based on Islamic ethical values. However, in
terms o f the epistemological approach, the Islamisation o f knowledge is
first and forem ost an epistemological endeavour by means o f which we
should change the epistemological sphere o f current Western secular
and hum anistic knowledge.
Al-Attas is regarded as an im p o rtan t figure (if n ot the most
im p o rtan t figure) in the Islamisation o f knowledge project (Wan M o hd
1998; H aneef 2005; Niyozov & M em on 2011). In this context al‫־‬Attas
(1979, 1980/19963) has suggested an original view o f the concept o f
education which has been recognised as im p o rtan t by Halstead (2000)
and Milligan (2008) am ong others. Al-Attas5 suggestion is that ‘tadib'
(providing discipline), from the ro ot word ‘adab' (discipline), captures
what is m eant by ‘education’ in the Islamic tradition in that it refers to
b o th knowledge and action. He holds that the m ore familiar concept o f
‘tarbiyah', and the related word ‘rububiyyah', can n ot indicate the full
m eaning o f education in the Islamic context despite their widespread
use. According to al‫־‬Attas, the roo t o f tarbiyah and rububiyyah is raba
(to grow) and it refers only to physical developm ent and n o t to
intellectual development. In addition, he holds that raba lacks the
conn otatio n s o f knowledge, intelligence, and virtue even tho ug h these
concepts are essential for giving an adequate Islamic account o f
education.
In what follows, I will first deal with the positive aspect o f al-Attas5
argum ent for his view o f Islamic education. I intend to show the
shortcom ings o f his suggestion regarding adab and ta ’dib. Then, I will
concentrate on the negative part o f al-Attas5 view on Islamic education
where he denies the capacity o f the words rabb and rububiyyah to refer
to educational concepts as they are u n derstood nowadays. This essay
argues that the concepts o f rabb and rububiyyah, un derstood properly,
can in fact provide an adequate u nderstanding o f Islamic education. I
will be particularly concerned to argue for this position using the
Q iir’an and Shi‘a traditions.

Is Ta’dib a Good Candidate?

By giving an analysis o f the Islamic concept o f adab , al-Attas

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(1980/1996a) suggests that the derivative word ta’dib could adequately

refer to the vast concept o f Islamic education. This is particularly
because, according to him, unlike rububiyyah, ta ’dib refers to knowledge
and action. In this section a brief account o f his analysis and argument
will be given and subsequently examined.
Al‫־‬Attas defines Islamic education and, on the basis o f his
definition, tries to show why adab is crucial in this conception.
According to him, Islamic education is n o t about simply producing
good citizens b u t rather Islamic education involves the p ro d u c tio n o f
an all-round good person and a society com posed o f such persons:
The end o f education in Islam is to produce a good man, and
n o t - as in the case o f Western civilization - to produce a
good citizen. By ‘good’ in the concept o f good m an is m eant
precisely the m an o f adab in the sense here explained as
encompassing the spiritual and material life o f man. (al‫־‬Attas
1980/1996a: 45)
Defining education as p ro ducing a ‘good ’ person, al‫־‬Attas connects
education to adab as this word draws our attention to a particular
‘discipline o f body, m ind, and soul’. In particular, al-Attas means that
adab requires a background o f knowledge or recognition and
acknowledgement or c o m m itm e n t to action:
Adab is the discipline o f body, m ind and soul; the discipline
that assures the recognition and acknowledgement o f one’s
proper place in relation to one’s physical, intellectual and
spiritual capacities and potentials; the recognition and
acknowledgement o f the reality that knowledge and being are
ordered hierarchically according to their various levels
(maratib) and degrees (darajat). (al-Attas 198071996a: 42)
Even tho ug h al-Attas relates the concept o f adab to a n u m ber o f
other Islamic concepts, such as wisdom (hikmah) and justice, he takes
two explicit dim ensions o f adab as ‘recognition’ (knowledge) and
‘acknowledgement’. Thus, he holds that one cannot have a proper grasp
o f adab w ith o ut taking into account ‘knowledge’ and ‘c o m m itm e n t to
action’. Then, he is led to define these concepts and gives this
definition:
Recognition means discovering the proper place in relation
to what is recognized; and acknowledgement means
co nco m itant action ( ‘amai) resulting from discovering the

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proper place in relation to what is recognized. (al-Attas

1980/1996a: 43)

In any case, al‫־‬Attas takes the two elements o f ‘recognition’ and

‘acknowledgement’ in adab to pave the ground for giving an adequate
definition o f Islamic education. Then, he considers a derivative word o f
adab , namely tadib\ ‘Education is in fact ta d ib ..S 0 1 adab as here
defined already involves b oth ilm and amaV (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a: 45). In
this definition, 4ilm refers to knowledge or recognition and ‘amai to
acknowledgement. Finally, al-Attas gives this definition o f education:
Recognition and acknowledgement, progressively instilled
into man, o f the proper places o f things in the order o f
creation, such that it leads to the recognition and acknow-
ledgement o f the p roper place o f G od in the order o f being
and existence. (al-Attas 198071996a: 46)
In sup p ort o f his view, al-Attas states that the Prophet o f Islam has
used the word ta ’dib in referring to his education provided by God.
In yet another, more well know n Hadith , n o t only is the
conceptual connection between the two concepts established
in an even m ore direct way, b u t it is expressed in such a
m anner as to im ply identity between adab and ilm. The Hadith
I refer to is one in which the Prophet, u p o n w hom be Peace,
said: ‘My Lord educated me, and so made my education most
excellent’ [addabani rabbi f a ’ahsanu ta ’dibi]. The word I have
translated as ‘educated’ is addaba, which according to Ibn
M anzur, is synonym ous with allama , and which al‫־‬Zajjaj
attributed to G o d ’s m ann er o f teaching His Prophet. (al-Attas
1980/1996a: 47)

Al-Attas takes the hadith he quotes as im p o rta n t because he thinks

that n o t only does it show that there is a conceptual connection
between adab and him3b u t also that there is an ‘identity’ between them.
Having considered al-Attas’ account o f Islamic education in terms o f
adab and ta ’dib , I will next challenge his view. First, the challenges to
his account o f adab will be introduced and then his remarks on Islamic
education in terms o f ta 3dib will be examined.

Challenges to the Basic Conception o f Adab

As far as adab is concerned, al-Attas takes it to have the essential

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element o f knowledge as m entioned above. His in ten tio n is to give an

extensive scope to knowledge in his definition o f adab in order to show
that this concept is able to provide us with a definition for education in
which knowledge is essential. I will argue in what follows firstly that his
conception o f knowledge cannot be as extensive as he intends it to be
and secondly that knowledge is n o t necessarily presupposed in adab.
Al‫־‬Attas defines knowledge as follows:
[w]ith reference to the soul as its interpreter, knowledge is the
arrival (wusul) o f the soul at the meaning o f a thing or an
object o f knowledge. (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a: 37-38)
This definition has a n um b er o f characteristics. Firstly, it is limited
to ‘acquired’ knowledge and does n o t include ‘knowledge by presence’
which is said by some Islamic philosophers to be the m ain type o f
knowledge in Islamic th o ug h t (Haeri Yazdi 1982). In knowledge by
presence, the known is present by its existence in the knower whereas in
acquired knowledge the known is know n n o t immediately b u t by means
o f its meaning. By placing meaning at the centre o f knowledge, al‫־‬Attas
places education in the realm o f acquired knowledge.
Secondly, the definition o f knowledge given by al‫־‬Attas is, in fact,
limited to theological or mystical knowledge in which everything is
taken to be a ‘sign’ o f God. This is why al-Attas considers ‘m eaning’ and
‘interp retation ’ as essential in knowledge. Thus, according to al-Attas,
knowledge refers to som ething like a worldview and does n o t include
other sorts o f knowledge, such as what is obtained in empirical science,
even though al-Attas intends for his definition to include empirical
sciences as well:

...so is the Book o f the world o f nature to be interpreted by

scientific m ethods em ulating those o f tafsir and ta’wil,
treating the things o f the empirical world as ‘w ords’, as signs
and symbols operating in a network o f conceptual relations
that altogether describe an organic unity reflecting the Noble
Q iir’an itself. In this way also the Noble Q u r ’an is the final
authority that confirms the tru th in our rational and
empirical investigations. (al-Attas 198071996a: 39)
As this passage indicates, al-Attas thinks that the interpretive and
hermeneutical m ethods should be used in scientific investigations as
they are used in u nd erstanding the Q iir’an. However, this is neither
desirable n o r possible. It is n o t desirable because it will reduce all other

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sorts o f knowledge to theology - while this may be the m ost noble o f

disciplines, it covers only one type o f knowledge. In a com parison, al-
Attas likens the things in the world to the words o f language; just as
words w ith ou t reference to things are em pty o f meaning, the things
themselves w ith o ut referring to G o d ’s attributes will be em pty o f
meaning:
For as it really is, a thing or an object o f knowledge is other
than what it is, and that ‘o th er’ is what it means. So just as the
study o f words as words leads to deviation from the real tru th
underlying them, in the same way the preoccupation in
p hilosophy with things as things leads to the erroneous,
ordinary level o f experience belief in the existence o f their
alleged essences outside the m ind, whereas in reality the so
called essences are only mentally posited. (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a:
38)
However, the com parison between things and words in order to
conclude that un d erstanding things‫־‬as‫־‬things cannot be considered as
knowledge is misleading. W hen, for instance, scientists analyse water in
terms o f its one atom o f oxygen and two atoms o f hydrogen and state
that ‘water is com posed o f oxygen and hydrogen’, they have uttered a
sensible p ro po sitio n and have acquired a piece o f knowledge about the
world. Now, when a scholar o f theology looks at the same thing and
states that ‘water being com posed o f one atom o f oxygen and two atoms
o f hydrogen is a sign o f G o d ’s power’, he or she has also uttered a
m eaningful statement. O ne cann ot say that only the second statement is
knowledge and the first one is a false statement. Even from the Islamic
p o in t o f view, it is n o t the case that only seeing things as signs o f God
should be considered as knowledge. N o t only is empirical knowledge
(seeing things as things rather than as signs) called ‘knowledge’ in
Islamic texts, b u t also ‘knowledge’ is attributed to non-M uslim s in these
texts. The famous saying o f the Prophet o f Islam: ‘Seek knowledge even
if it is in C h in a ’ (Majlisi 1982: vol. 1,180) confirms this view.
O n the other hand, it is n o t possible to subsume empirical sciences
u nder the hermeneutical knowledge. W hat particularly makes this
p urpose impossible is to hold, as al-Attas does, that the Q u r ’an is ‘the
final authority’ for confirm ing the tru th o f empirical investigations.
The Q p r ’an obviously does n o t do the job as no b o d y can decide about
the tru th o f scientific investigations by appealing to verses o f the
Q u r ’an. This is because, on the one hand, the Q u r ’an is silent ab o ut lots

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o f empirical questions and, on the other hand, where we encounter

apparent conflicts between the Q u r ’an and scientific findings, the
relevant verses are so ambiguous that one cannot determ ine a conflict.
A well-known example is the conflict between the theory o f evolution
and the creation o f hu m ans as stated in the Q iir’an. This apparent
conflict cannot be decided u p o n by simply rejecting the theory o f
evolution on the basis o f o ur initial un derstanding o f the relevant
verses. This is because these verses are ambiguous as far as the exact
phases o f creation are concerned. Thus, as some interpreters o f the
Q iir’an have suggested, the theory o f evolution is n o t incom patible
with the Q iir’anic view on the creation o f hum ans (Meshkini 1977).
It follows from what has been said so far that knowledge in al‫־‬Attas’
view refers to merely a theological knowledge w itho u t being inclusive o f
other features o f knowledge such as empirical knowledge. This result
has im plications for the second element o f adab which al‫־‬Attas
distinguished, namely acknowledgement. The reason is that m any
branches o f empirical knowledge have no direct behavioural
im plications which can be acted out. Al-Attas’ insistence, therefore, that
the Islamic concept o f education m ust involve action does n o t make
sense for branches o f knowledge which do n o t resemble theology.
In order to give a m ore comprehensive account o f knowledge in
Islam, rather than limiting knowledge to theological knowledge, we can
hold that any correct understanding o f reality at any level is knowledge.
The correct u nderstanding is n o t accounted for merely in terms o f
interpretive and hermeneutical understanding. Em phasizing this kind
o f understanding, al‫־‬Attas negates ‘correspondence’ to reality as the
criterion o f truth. Thus, according to him, some scientific propositions
about hum ans, such as the propositions resulting from genetic
engineering, are false even though they are confirm ed by empirical
evidence because they are in the service o f a system which is based on a
false interpretation o f h u m an nature (al‫־‬Attas 1996b: 85). In another
case, he refers to the current Western sciences, such as anthropology,
sociology, linguistics, psychology, and education, as epistemological
weapons that are used in the Islamic countries for de‫־‬Islamization o f
M uslims (al‫־‬Attas 1996c: 120).
However, correspondence to reality should n o t be abandoned as the
criterion o f truth; what is in fact needed is to take into account
different levels o f reality and use the criterion suited to each level o f
reality. Then, if at the highest level there is a symbolic reality which uses
signs, then correspondence to this reality is to have a concept o f it as a

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sign rather than as a thing and this is what al‫־‬Attas is mainly interested
in and as it is clear the correspondence theory o f tru th can be applied
here. However, this application is n o t limited to the highest level o f
reality as we can use it at the lower levels o f reality as well. Then, when
we refer to a thing as a thing, a different level o f reality is concerned
and a relevant correspondence to this reality can be considered as the
criterion o f truth. Accordingly, it is n o t the case that only the highest
level o f right understan ding o f reality can be called knowledge. The
theological and mystical un d erstanding o f reality can be p u t at the
highest level o f ranking o f knowledge b u t this does n o t im ply that
empirical sciences cannot be considered as knowledge.
The second part o f my argum ent aims at al-Attas’ view on knowledge
as a necessary element o f adab. C ontrary to what al-Attas claims, adab
does n o t necessarily indicate knowledge involvement let alone identity
with knowledge. Neglecting this claim o f identity, at the very least, al-
Attas talks about adab in a way that one m ust conclude that knowledge
is an inextricable part o f the word adab. This is because, according to al-
Attas, while tarbiyah indicates physical developm ent and includes
h u m a n and n o n-hu m an beings, the word adab is specific to hum ans
because this word implies knowledge (al-Attas, 198071996a: 50). This
indicates that adab is limited to hum ans because it involves
‘recognition’ and ‘acknowledgement’. However, this view o f adab does
n o t appear to be supported by the Islamic scriptural sources such that
one cannot consider recognition and acknowledgment as necessary
conditions o f adab. C o n trary to what al-Attas states, there is no
difference between adab and tarbiyah as far as their inclusiveness o f
other kinds o f beings are concerned. Just as we can find examples o f
adab being used in relation to animals so too we can find tarbiyah being
used in this way. Thus, to give but one example, it is m entioned in the
H a d ith that ‘All idle sport is vain unless in disciplining [ta9dib\ horses’
(Razi 1994: no. 182). Furtherm ore, when ta’dib is used in the case o f
training horses it is clear that knowledge is n o t involved.
This section concludes that the knowledge which al-Attas considers
to be an essential element in the meaning o f adab is in fact only
theological knowledge. Moreover, there is no necessary link between
adab and knowledge anyway.

Challenges to the Understanding q/T a’dib

I tu rn now to the second part o f al-Attas’ position on Islamic

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education, namely his definition o f Islamic education in terms o f ta ’dib

which is based on his analysis on adab. By way o f reminder, according
to al‫־‬Attas Islamic education is,
Recognition and acknowledgement, progressively instilled
into man, o f the proper places o f things in the order o f
creation, such that it leads to the recognition and acknow-
ledgement o f the proper place o f God in the order o f being
and existence. (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a: 46)
In this definition, there is an indication o f the goal, content, and
m ethod o f education. There are also three im plicit points in this
definition. The first p o in t refers to the way o f obtaining knowledge
which is supposed to be by way o f a m ovem ent from the effect to the
cause, what m ight be called an inductive m ethod. This is because,
according to this definition, one first recognises and acknowledges the
proper places o f things and as a consequent recognises the proper place
o f God. The second and third points refer to the m ethod o f education
which relate to the roles o f teacher and student. The role o f teacher is
supposed to be the active role o f ‘instilling in to ’ and that o f the student
is the passive role o f ‘receiving’ the instilling process. In what follows
some challenges will be made to al-Attas’ definition o f Islamic
education in terms o f ta ’dib.

The Basic Concept of Education

Let us start this section by recalling al-Attas’ interpretation o f the
P rophet’s saying that ‘My Lord [rabbi] educated me [<addabani], and so
made my education m ost excellent.’ A c o m m o n feature o f expression in
the Islamic tradition is that when a nam e o f God is used it is used for
its fit with the m atter being expressed. So, for instance, if a person
requests for G o d ’s forgiveness, he or she m entions the relevant name o f
God, i.e. the Forgiver (ghaffar). W hen the Q iir’an says ‘He will give you
two po rtio n s o f His mercy, and make for you a light with which you
will walk, and forgive y o u . . . ’ the verse ends with ‘...a n d Allah is
Forgiving, M erciful’ (57:28). It follows that if ta’dib indicates know-
ledge, as al‫־‬Attas would have us believe, then it follows that the m eaning
o f rabb should include knowledge provision. But we will see that al-
Attas denies such a co n n o tatio n o f rabb and related terms such as
rububiyyah in which case we would also have to deny any co n n otatio n
o f knowledge for ta ’dib . W ith his appeal to the saying o f the Prophet, al-

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Attas in fact underm ines his view on the Islamic conception o f

education. As we will come to see, provision and increase o f knowledge
is o f relevance to rabb which is why we read the P rophet’s prayer in
Q u r ’an 20:114: ‘My Lord [rabbi]\ Increase my knowledge’.
Secondly, there are also some points which need to be raised in
relation to al‫־‬Attas’ suggestion that the word ta ’dib is an adequate
candidate for showing the dim ensions o f education. O n e p o in t is that
the word ta ’dib and even the derivatives o f its root, aduba, are n o t used
in the Q iir’an at all. If, as al‫־‬Attas insists, adab is the word that can
exemplify the Islamic view on education, then why has this word, along
with its derivatives, n o t been used in the Q iir’an even though education
is clearly an im p o rtan t theme?
Even if we accept that ta’dib can be considered as a word for
indicating knowledge and teaching, it is doub tfu l to claim that the
ta’dib can be inclusive o f what nowadays is m eant by teaching in the
field o f education. Take, for instance, teaching physics and chemistry
which are im p o rtan t parts o f m o dern education, does it really make
sense that a teacher after teaching these subject-matters says to his or her
students that he or she has provided them with adabi It is clearly an
awkward way o f speaking. This can show that even when ta’dib refers to
knowledge, it refers to a particular kind o f knowledge, such as ethical
knowledge, rather than a comprehensive concept o f knowledge so that
the word can include all the subject-matters being taught in educational
institutions.
Now, if we want to capture the scope o f m eaning in ta’dib by
appealing to Islamic texts, we need to provide a comprehensive analysis
o f this word inform ed by prim ary Islamic sources. The following cases
in the Islamic texts are im p o rtan t for such an analysis o f the word adab
and ta ’dib :
1. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘Kumayl! God disciplined the
Prophet [addabahu] and he disciplined me [addabni\ and I
discipline [u’addibu] the faithful people.’ (Majlisi, 1982:
vol. 17, 4)
2. Ja‘far ibn M u h am m ad (A) says: ‘God disciplined [addaba\
His p ro ph et and well disciplined him [adabahu] and then
when He completed his discipline [adabahu], He said: you
have a great character.’ (Majlisi 1982: vol. 17, 4)
3. The Prophet (S) said: ‘I disciplined you [addabtukum]

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according to the p ro p h ets’ disciplines [adab\.’ (Majlisi

1982: vol. 22, 87)
4. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘Discipline (al-adab) is the best
character (.sajiyyah).’ (Razi 1994, no. 215)
5. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘The provider o f purifying
m orality is goodness o f discipline (<adab).’ (Amidi
1989/2011: no. 5520)
6. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘...a n d knowledge {Him) is a
valuable heritage and the disciplines [adäb\ are ever-
changing beauties.’ (Razi 1994: no .4)
7. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘The right o f child on h is/her
father is to give a good nam e to the child and give a good
discipline [adab\ to h im /h e r and to teach h im /h e r
[yu‘allimahu\ the Q u r ’an.’ (Razi 1994: no. 391)
8. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘Have associations with
knowledgeable people (al^ulam a ), this increases your
knowledge ( ‘ilmuka ) and makes your discipline (adabuka)
good and purifies (tazku ) your soul.’ (Amidi, 1989/2011:
no. 4786)
9. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘W hoever considers h im /h e rself
as the leader o f people should start teaching [talim\
h im /h e rself before teaching [ta‘lim\ others and his/her
disciplining [tadib] should be in practice before his/h er
disciplining [tadib\ in words. O ne who is h is/h er own
teacher \m ucallim\ and discipliner \muaddibuha\ is more
valuable than one who is the teacher \m u(allim\ and
discipliner o f others [mu’addibuhumY (Razi 1994: no. 70)
10. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: Ό faithful! Indeed this
knowledge (Him) and discipline (adab) is the price o f your
soul, so try hard to learn them (ta(alumahuma). So what
increases your knowledge (Him) and discipline (adab), it
increases your price and im portance.’ (Majlisi, 1982; vol. 1,
180)
11. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A) says: ‘The child is in fron t o f his
discipliner \m uaddibahu\. . .he is my son Hasan, ask him
to give you his view.’ (al‫־‬Tabarsi 1987: vol. 9, 269)

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12. ‘Ali ibn Husayn (A) says: ‘My God! D o n ’t discipline me [la
tu ’addibni] by your pu n ish m en t.’ (Majlisi 1982: vol. 98, 39)
13. The Prophet M u h am m ad (S) says: ‘A m an should n o t sleep
with another m an and neither a w om an with a woman.
Whoever does this, discipline [adab] is necessary for
h im /h e r and this is the p un ish m en t.’ (Majlisi 1982: vol. 10,
110)
14. The Prophet M u h am m ad (S) says: ‘All idle sport is vain
unless in disciplining [ta*dib\ horses.’ (Majlisi, 1982: vol.
64, 216)
15. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A): ‘Calam ity is discipline (<adab) for
the oppressor and a test for the faithful and a p ro m o tio n
for the prophets.’ (Majlisi, 1982: vol. 81, 108)
16. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (A): ‘Providing a better position for
good people is done by respecting them b u t for bad people
it is done by disciplining (tadib ) them .’ (Majlisi, 1982: vol.
78, 82)
The above traditions show the scope o f the m eaning o f ta'dib in the
Islamic sources. T radition (1) shows that ta’dib has an im p o rtan t place
in Islamic education such that God, the Prophet (S), and ‘Ali ibn Abi
Talib (A) were all com m itted to it. However, this tradition merely refers
to the im portance o f ta ’dib w itho u t explaining its scope. It is traditions
(2) and (3) which relate to the scope o f ta ’dib because they show that
ta ’dib is related only to m oral education. Traditions (4) and (5) show
that knowledge and adab are different and that this difference naturally
leads to a further difference between teaching and ta’dib. In traditions
(6), (7), and (8) we can also see this distinction. Similarly, there is a
difference in the missions o f the prophets between teaching (ta lim ) the
Book and purifying (tazkiyah ) the people. In tradition (9) there is an
ambiguity such that teaching and ta ’dib could be considered to be
synonyms. If we do n o t consider them as synonyms then trad ition (9)
indicates that people, as their own teachers, provide themselves with
im p o rtan t knowledge and, as their own discipliners, provide themselves
with moral manners. If, however, the two words are indeed synonyms,
then ta’dib un d erstood as teaching oneself will have a limited m eaning
as to teaching m oral behaviour. In other words, one can say that where
teaching and ta’dib are used as synonyms, they will mean teaching
m orality rather than a general meaning including teaching subject-

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matters such as sciences. T radition (10) can also be un d erstood by what

is said about (9). In tradition (11) the attribute o f discipliner has been
used for the teacher. However, one cannot conclude that the discipliner
means teacher in the general meaning o f the word. As m entioned, when
ta’dib and teaching are used synonymously, teaching will have a
m eaning limited to m oral matters.
Traditions (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16) show that ta’dib , namely
providing the desired manner, can be done by using the m ethods which
are suited to training animals, including punishm ent. In fact, in these
cases ta’dib does n o t mean p u n ish m en t per se b u t is used in the original
m eaning o f providing a proper behaviour even by means o f physical
p unishm ent. C ontrary to what al‫־‬Attas (198071996a) has claimed, ta ’dib
is n o t specific to hu m ans but is also used in relation to animals where
one wants to subject an anim al’s behaviour to some rules. Ta’dib means
providing a rule-governed behaviour either by following the rules
consciously, as is the case in hum ans, or by im posing the rules by force
on animals who lack consciousness o f rules or hu m an s who have no
choice b u t to follow rules.
In summary, the above analysis shows that adab and ta ’dib do n o t
necessarily indicate the involvement o f knowledge, n o r are they
inclusive o f education in a general sense. In the case o f hum ans, these
words refer at best merely to m oral education w ithout including other
sorts o f education such as teaching sciences.

The Content of Education

Following from the above criticisms o f al-Attas’ view on knowledge, the
content o f education can n ot be limited to theological knowledge; rather
empirical knowledge being related to things as things should also be
considered as a part o f the content o f education. As for the way o f
obtaining knowledge, which is also related to content, there is no
reason for us to lim it ourselves to the induction. Rather than being
concerned only with inference from the effect to the cause we can also
infer from the cause to the effect (see Tusi 1947/1326: 366). According to
the deductive m ethod, knowing God is the first step and knowing other
entities at any level o f the universe is due to it. An indication o f this
m ethod can be seen in the supplication Ja’far ibn M u h am m ad (A)
taught to his disciple, Zurarah:
My Lord! Make yourself know n to me since i f you do no t

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make yourself known to me, I do n o t know your Prophet. My

Lord! Make your Prophet know n to me since if you do n o t
make your Prophet know n to me, I do n o t know your Imam.
My Lord! Make your Im am know n to me since if you do n o t
make your Im am known to me I go astray from my religion.
(al-Kulayni 2009: 135)
This passage shows that knowledge o f God is the first step by which
other steps are made possible. O ne m ight object that if al‫־‬Attas has
presupposed the inductive m ethod this is due to the fact that education
begins from child h oo d and the process from childhood to ad u lth oo d is
suited to the inductive m ethod. However, this reply is unpersuasive
since the conditions al‫־‬Attas has considered for education, namely
recognition and acknowledgement, are n o t suited to the childhood.

The Method of Education

A further p o in t raised in al-Attas’ definition o f education refers to the
m eth o d o f education or the roles o f teacher and student in relation to
each other. His definition tells o f a tension:
In this definition [of knowledge] we affirm that the soul is
n o t merely a passive recipient like the tabula rasa, bu t is also
an active one in the sense o f setting itself in readiness to
receive what it wants to receive, and so to consciously strive
for the arrival at meaning. (al‫־‬Attas 2005: 22)
Despite adm ission that the soul is n o t a passive recipient o f knowledge,
the phrase ‘instilling in to ’ implies the passivity o f the student. Halstead
(2004), having considered al-Attas’ definition, also holds that al-Attas’
concept o f Islamic education indicates that a learner is passive (for a
criticism o f Halstead’s view see Bagheri Noaparast & Khosravi 2006).
The active role o f the student needs to be seriously taken into account
because there are cases in the Islamic texts which have im p o rtan t
im plications in this regard. For instance, the Q iir’an criticises
C hristians and Jews for taking their scholars as their lords instead o f
God: ‘They have taken their doctors o f law and their m onks for lords
besides A lla h ...’ (9: 31). In relation to this verse Im am Ja‘far al‫־‬Sadiq
says:
I swear to God, they [Christians and Jews] did n o t pray to
them [the scholars], n o r did they fast for them b u t they [the

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scholars] made legitimate what were illegitimate for them and

made illegitimate what were legitimate for them and they
obeyed them. (al‫־‬Kulayni 2009: 69)
The p o in t is that students need to examine the validity o f what their
teachers and scholars give to them instead o f merely obeying them;
otherwise, they may in fact end up w orshipping their teachers instead o f
God.
A nother case in the Q u r ’an that suggests an active role for students
is a verse which refers to highly educated people:
That is their description in the Torah and their description in
the Evangel; like a seed that puts forth its sprout, then
strengthens it, so it becomes stout and stands firmly on its
ste m (Qiir’an 48: 29)
In this verse, a dynam ic developm ent from the inside is regarded as a
model for the process o f education.
Given that the Q iir’an presumes an active role for students an
Islamic view o f education m ust take this in to account and m ust be
expressed in terms o f a development from the inside o f students and
n o t in terms o f ‘instilling in to ’. Or, if we also want to take the teacher’s
role into account in order to give a m ore comprehensive picture o f
education, then we can talk about an ‘interaction’ between the teacher
and the student rather than a unilateral action from either the teacher
or the student.

The Capacity o/^Rububiyyah3in Defining Islamic Education

Al‫־‬Attas’ attem pt to provide a detailed account o f the Islamic concept o f
education and, thereby, to provide an alternative to a secular conception
o f education is appreciated. In addition, his epistemological orientation
in this endeavour is also intelligible, in principle, since one would expect
to find an Islamic stance on the matter o f knowledge. However, what al-
Attas puts forward is no t fruitful. His epistemology is a theological-
coherence view that looks for the truth o f any part o f knowledge in terms
o f its coherence with the Qiir’an. His appeal to adab is successful only in
relation to theological knowledge and his suggestion that knowledge is a
necessary element o f adab can be challenged. Furthermore, neither adab
n or ta’dib refer to education in a general sense. W ith regard to humans,
these words refer at best to moral education only.

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Given the criticisms o f al-Attas’ theory o f Islamic education made in

this study it is appropriate to reconsider whether it would be better to
approach the concept o f Islamic education in terms o f rububiyyah. First
we assess the reasons al-Attas’ has given for disregarding rububiyyah,
then we suggest some m ore reasons why this is a mistake.

Why Rububiyyah is Defensible

Al‫־‬Attas objects to any attem pt to define Islamic education in terms o f
the word which is norm ally used in the Islamic world, namely, tarbiyah.
In referring to the root o f this word, he m entions raba and rabba and
considers them as indicating a limited kind o f education which refers
only to physical development. O n this basis al‫־‬Attas concludes that
tarbiyah cannot be considered as the proper Islamic concept for what is
nowadays called education. This is because, according to al-Attas,
tarbiyah is built from the Q y r ’anic application o f the words raba and
rabba and n one o f these words help in regard to the basic elements o f
knowledge, intelligence, and virtue which are the constitutive elements
o f real education (al-Attas 1980/ 1996a: 50).
A nu m ber o f points need to be made clear here. First o f all, puttin g
the words raba and rabba on a level in referring to tarbiyah is
unconvincing. To explain this, we need to consider that there are three
kinds o f derivation in Arabic. These are called small, great, and greater
derivations. For small derivations the order o f ro o t letters is the same in
the words that are derived from a root such as da-ra-ba and its derivative
yadribun. For great derivations the order o f the letters change such as
qassata and its derivative saqata. Finally, for greater derivations some
letters tu rn to other letters as with the root ra-ba-ba which can become
ra-ba-wa. Having these types o f derivation in m ind, it is said that
tarbiyah is derived from rabb in accordance with the greater m odel o f
derivation. Al‫־‬Mustafavi (1360/1971: vol. 4) m entions that the roots o f
ra-ba-wa, ra-ba-a, and ra-a-ba are all derived from ra-ba-ba and that it is
therefore possible that an overlap has occurred in their meanings. It
follows that al‫־‬Attas could have mistakenly considered the roo t o f ra-ba-
ba to im ply physical growth which is actually an im plication o f the
root ra-ba-wa. Accordingly, the two words o f raba and rabba can no t be
considered as having the same meaning. While al-Attas is correct to
m aintain that the words raba and tarbiyah carry the con no tatio ns o f
physical developm ent and physical upbringing, he is wrong to equate
raba and rabba. In fact the m ain co n n o tatio n o f rabba and rabb is

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ownership. Thus, the owner o f a property is its rabb. There is also a

peripheral m eaning for these words which is due to changes an owner
makes to his property. Al-Attas (198071996a: 49) admits the c o n n o tatio n
o f ownership b u t n o t the peripheral meaning and, therefore, considers
raba and rabba to have the same meaning. Thus, one cannot even claim
that rabba refers mainly to physical developm ent and upbringing let
alone that it refers only to physical developm ent and upbringing.
Being derived from rabba, raba implies physical development and
upbringing but does carry the im plication o f a peripheral m eaning o f
rabba. As for rabba itself, it refers mainly to ownership which can be
accom panied by carelessness or by carefulness. But there is another
p o in t to be made. Limiting the scope o f rabb to physical matters and
excluding it from intellectual matters is against Q iir’anic usage. Al‫־‬Attas
claims that the first co n n o tatio n o f rabb is tarbiyah in the sense that
som ething is bro ug h t to a perfect state throu g h a series o f
improvements. But bringing som ething to the perfect state through a
series o f im provem ents does n o t require knowledge, rather it can be
down to an existential state distinct from knowledge, such as mercy.
The Q u r ’an itself gives evidence to the separation between mercy and
knowledge, saying, O u r Lord! T h o u embracest all things in mercy and
knowledge’ (40:7). Mercy involves giving existence to creation. Thus,
when we say that tarbiyah means bringing som ething to the perfect state
in terms o f degrees, we understand that the perfection refers more to
the physical and material state than the intellectual and rational state.
M aking the intellectual and rational state perfect requires the
establishment o f knowledge by means o f repetition and as we showed
knowledge is n ot an essential part o f tarbiyah. (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a: 51)
C o ntrary to what al-Attas says, the first co n n o tatio n o f rabb is n o t
tarbiyah rather the latter is a peripheral co n n o tatio n o f rabb. In
addition, excluding knowledge from the scope o f rabb is n o t acceptable
in the Q u r ’anic usage. Ironically, al-Attas in citing Q u r ’an 40:7 for
making a distinction between knowledge and mercy and in excluding
knowledge from the scope o f the concept rabb, does n o t p o in t ou t that
b oth knowledge and mercy are m entioned in relation to rabb. W hen it
is said that rabb has b o th mercy and knowledge for and in relation to
everything in the world, it clearly shows that knowledge is one
dim ension o f rabb and rububiyyah and we are n o t justified in lim iting
rabb to mercy.
Further into his presentation al-Attas o f course admits that a
knowledge-related element can be recognised in the meaning o f rabb b ut

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he m aintains that this element is related to the possession o f knowledge

by God rather than the transference o f knowledge which is essential in
education (al‫־‬Attas 198071996a: 51). The evidence for this, according to
al‫־‬Attas, is that the word rabbani (which is used in the Q iir’an) refers to
the Jewish learned; that is to say to the persons who possess knowledge.
Again, al‫־‬Attas concludes that the Islamic concept o f education cannot
be sought in rububiyyah because the transference o f knowledge is n o t
presupposed in this word.
However, al-Attas’ conclusion is n o t persuasive for a nu m b er o f
reasons. Firstly, if a knowledgeable person is called rabbani this is in the
first place because he has acquired knowledge in relation to rabb and
with regard to God in a way that he can be attributed to rabb and called
rabbani. That is to say, ‘relation’ to rabb is vital in calling a person
rabbani rather than ‘possession’ o f knowledge per se.
Secondly, rabbani does n o t indicate merely the possession o f
knowledge b u t it also implies the transference o f knowledge. That is to
say, rabbani is used in Islamic texts to refer to the teacher as a person
who transfers knowledge. Having this in m ind, we can understand the
proper m eaning o f verses o f the Q u r ’an such as ‘...Be worshippers o f
the Lord because o f your teaching the Book and your reading (it
yourselves)’ (2:79). This verse says that a teacher who transfers
knowledge to others should be rabbani (worshipper o f the Lord); that is
to say, his or her relation to rabb should be made clear.
Thirdly, n o t only is it the case that rabbani is used to refer to the
teacher who transfers knowledge bu t also there is another Q u r ’anic
word, ribbi, which is derived from the same word o f rabb and refers to
the student: ‘A nd how m any a prop h et has fought with w hom were
m any worshippers o f the Lord’ (Qiir’an 2:146). In this verse, worshipper
o f the Lord refers to ribbi. In fact, ribbi has the same m eaning as
rabbani: a person who has a relation to rabb. The only difference is that
rabbani, because o f the additional letter ‘n ’ indicates a stronger relation
to rabb (Isfahani 1392/1972). This difference is reasonable because the
teacher, having a position o f responsiblity, should have a stronger
relation to God com pared to the student. In this way, we have got the
very interesting m atch o f the two words ‘rabbani-ribbi derived from
rabb paralleling the familiar two educational words o f ‘teacher-student’.
This educational m atch can also be seen in the trad itio n o f Im am ‘Ali:
‘People are o f three kinds: a knowledgeable rabbani, and a learner on the
road to salvation, and useless people’ (Razi 1994: no. 147). As is clear,
rabbani is in the teacher’s position at one pole and the learner is at the

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other pole which was called ‘ribbi in the language o f the Q u r ’an. This
shows that rabb has been a very good candidate in Islamic texts to
inspire educational concepts as far as knowledge is concerned.

The Alternative View on Islamic Education

So, it can be said that knowledge is involved in the concept o f rabb.
C ontrary to the epistemological position o f al‫־‬Attas, however, we
should have in m in d that knowledge has n o t merely a hermeneutical
feature as explained in the previous section. The criterion o f knowledge
is correspondence to reality at any level. Then, one can deal with, for
instance, physical and biological realities and acquire knowledge o f the
relevant ‘things’ with regard to the correspondence criterion bu t still at
a higher level consider those ‘things’ as ‘signs’ o f God and since the
reality o f the ‘sign’ is n o th in g b u t an indicator o f ‘the signified’, then
correspondence to this reality provides us with theological knowledge.
Theological knowledge is then n o t inclusive o f other features o f
knowledge even though in terms o f its value is at the highest level o f all
sorts o f knowledge. To be a rabbani does n o t require us to have merely a
theological knowledge but in having other features o f knowledge too
you can be a rabbani in terms o f your inten tion in acquiring knowledge
as well as in using it. W hen you purify your in ten tio n in learning
physics, you learn it just for the sake o f God b ut you are doing physics
nonetheless. Referring to this role o f intention, the sixth Im am Ja‘far al-
Sadiq states:
O ne who learns for the sake o f Allah and acts for the sake o f
Allah and teaches for the sake o f Allah, they will be called in
the heavens as great people and it will be said about them:
‘They learn for the sake o f Allah and act for the sake o f Allah
and teach for the sake o f Allah.’ (Hakimi et.al 1979: vol. 1, 85)
Thus, one dim ension o f becoming rabbani concerns knowledge. Being
related to the content o f education, knowledge needs to be taken into
account with regard to its vast scope m entioned above. However,
knowledge being cognitive is just one part o f content in education.
Having other dim ensions o f the h u m an in m ind, we should consider
other parts for the content o f education related to body (physical
education), em otions (art and aesthetic education), and action (moral
and social education, practical skills).
Yet there is another im p o rtan t dim ension in becoming rabbani

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which refers to choice. This dim ension relates to m ethod in education.

O ne cannot become rabbani unless by choosing God as his or her final
goal. This dim ension is emphasised in the Q iir’an: ‘Surely this is a
reminder, then let him, who will, take the way to his Lord’ (73:19). In
this verse, the final goal is rabb (Lord) and one can get towards the goal
if only he or she ‘take[s] the way’ towards Him . This p o in t shows that
the nature o f education in Islam is taken to be an outward
developmental m ovem ent from the inside o f the person rather than
being an inward m ovem ent from the outside. It is w orth m entio n ing
the Q iir’an ’s view on the process o f development in educated people
again: ‘That is their description in the Torah and their description in
the Evangel; like as seed that puts forth its sprout, then strengthens it,
so it becomes stout and stands firmly on its s te m ...’ (48: 29). There is
no d o u b t that we should give som ething to students during education
but, understood in this way, the process o f education is a pro fou n dly
‘give and take’ process rather than merely (or mainly) a giving and
transferring process. This has im plications for m eth o d in education.
Accordingly, Islamic education requires that m ethods o f education be
interactional as explained in the previous section.
C onsidering such an im p o rtan t place for choice in Islamic
education, u nderstood as becoming rabbani, indicates that the early
period o f education cannot be properly called education since children
are n o t capable for choosing. Then, this period should be called a
prelim inary period or pre-education.
Thus, having what is explained above in m ind, we can define Islamic
education in this way: education is an interactive process between the
teacher who has a strong relation to God ( rabbani) and the student in
which students know God as the Lord {rabb) and choose H im as their
own Lord and try to build a relation to God (and become ribbi) by
acquiring a healthy and stable body, knowledge, elegant emotions, and
responsible and capable action. Let us explain this definition in more
detail.

The Alternative Concept of Education

W ith regard to rububiyyah, education in Islam is about a person
becoming ribbi. This has im plications for the meaning o f education as
well as the co ntent and m ethod o f education. In terms o f meaning, this
concept has a wide range so that it can cover other Islamic concepts
that have an educational relevance. Concepts such as tarbiyah, ta lim ,

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ta ’dib , and tazkiyah are subordinated to rububiyyah or becoming ribbi:

tarbiyah refers to bodily growth (cf. Q u r ’an 26: 18-19); ta'lim is related to
knowledge; ta’dib , having bodily and m oral conn otation , relates to
body as well as em otion and action; and finally tazkiyah being a moral
concept is related to em otion and action. This is to say that all these
subordinated concepts are limited in scope so that no one o f them can
capture the whole meaning o f Islamic education. O n the other hand,
rububiyyah and the derived concept o f ribbi provide us with an
overwhelming concept that covers all the areas o f h u m an development
and the subordinated concepts. This coverage o f all areas o f h u m an
development can be in terms o f content a n d /o r orientation. Some o f
the developments are in terms o f co ntent as well as orientation, whereas
others are merely in terms o f orientation rather than content. For
instance, knowledge can be a theological knowledge in which bo th
content and orientation is divine. However, when it comes to other
sorts o f knowledge, such as physical knowledge, the orientation can be
divine rather than the content because the latter is, for instance, about
the quantities o f some material which has no immediate divine
relevance while the former deals with the purposes o f using the
knowledge and this is what can have clearly divine orientation.
As for content, the concept o f rububiyyah or becoming ribbi refers to
a process in which bodily state, knowledge, em otion, choice, and action
are involved. W ith regard to the co n ten t/o rien ta tio n distinction, the
content o f Islamic education need n o t be at any level explicitly divine,
rather it can deal with different sorts o f knowledge in terms o f content
and when it comes to orientation o f using knowledge, the divine aspect
comes to the fore. Thus, there is no need to consider a dividing line
between Islamic knowledge, on the one hand, and secular knowledge,
on the other, as if they are two enemies. There could be m any
com m onalities between Islamic and secular education in terms o f
content even though there can be differences with regard to orientation.
In terms o f m ethod, Islamic education offers a bi-lateral relationship
between the teacher and the pupil. This is because becoming ribbi is not,
and cannot, be unilateral since one should choose God as his or her
Lord. Thus, it is stated in the Q u r ’an: ‘Surely this is a reminder, then let
him, who will, take the way to his Lord’ (73:19). Also, God has assured
his Prophet that he cannot provide any change in a person who does
n ot want to listen to him: ‘For surely you can no t make the dead to hear
and you cannot make the deaf to hear the call, when they tu rn back and
flee. N o r can you lead away the blind out o f their error. You cannot

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make to hear any b u t those who believe in O u r com m u nication s so

they shall s u b m it/ (Qiir’an 30:52-53)

Conclusion
O u r analysis o f al-Attas’ view indicates that he tries to expand the scope
o f adab to include conn o tation s o f knowledge and action and to
thereby conclude that ta’dib is an adequate concept for referring to
Islamic education. This essay has shown that knowledge is n o t a
necessary element o f adab as it is used in the Islamic texts and where
adab refers to knowledge, it refers mainly to a moral knowledge.
Consequently, ta’dib has at best the c o n n o tatio n o f m oral education
and can no t encompass the full meaning o f teaching and education.
The negative part o f al-Attas’ argum ent against the words rabb and
rububiyyah is unpersuasive. Distinguishing between raba and rabb, I take
the latter rather than the former to be capable o f referring to Islamic
concept o f education. Accordingly, education in Islam, as far as the
student is concerned, refers to an inner developm ent towards God and,
as far as the teacher-student relation is concerned, is an interaction
aro un d rububiyyah in which the teacher should be or become rabbani
and the student should try to become ribbi in body, cognition,
em otion, and action, n o t merely cognition and action as al‫־‬Attas has
expressed. So, n o t only is ta’dib n o t better than rububiyyah in showing
the dim ensions o f education, b u t ta’dib in fact only shows an aspect o f
rububiyyah/

Table o f Key Transliterated Terms

Term Appearing in Text Arabic Term W ith Diacritics
Adab 0 ‫ג‬Î A dab
‘Ilm p_U cIlm
Raba '—ìJ Rabä
Rabb 40 Rabb
Rabba 40 Rabba
Rabbani R abbani

R ib b i R ibbi
R u b u b iyyah R u b ü b ïy ah

Ta’dib 0 _‫ גג‬1—3 T a ’dib

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Tazkiyah Tazkiyah
P4-LTa’lim *—‫ג‬ Tac11m
Tarbiyah Tarbiyah

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Tehran: University o f Tehran Press, 23-64.

----------- (1996b). ‘Islam and P hilosophy o f Science’, in A n Introduction to Islamic

Worldview, trans. Ahmad Aram, Tehran: University o f Tehran Press, 67-94

-----------(1996c). Islam and Secularism, trans. Ahmad Aram, Tehran: University o f Tehran
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