Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 169079 February 12, 2007

FRANCISCO RAYOS, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayos’s complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.

Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, "Francisco Rayos v.
NAPOCOR," filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint
alleged, among other things, that the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) recklessly,
imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam at
midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27 October 1978, during the
occurrence of typhoon "Kading" causing the release of a great volume of stored water, the
resultant swelling and flooding of Angat River, and the consequent loss of lives of some of
petitioner’s relatives and destruction of his family’s properties, for which he sought damages. Of
the 10 members of petitioner’s family who perished, only four bodies were recovered and only
petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos, survived.

On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed 2 on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam, Norzagaray, were
governmental functions. Said dismissal was questioned directly to this Court which set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint. 3

On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of sufficient
and credible evidence. 4

The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision
and awarded damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:

xxxx
2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final
and executory, the following:

A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);

B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and

C. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

xxxx

In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiffs-appellants, attorney’s fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total
amount awarded. 5

The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. 6 The
Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on 4 August 1993.

Thus, a Writ of Execution 7 was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion filed by
respondent. As a consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5 January 1994, in
the amount of P1,060,800.00 payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the check was turned over to
respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner demanded the turn over of the check from
respondent, but the latter refused.

On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion 8 to direct respondent to deliver to
him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount of P1,060,800.00 from respondent,
claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the same as he was already dismissed by
petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993. 9 Respondent, on the other hand, justifies his
retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.

On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to the
Sheriff of the court who will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution was
subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order, respondent refused to surrender the check.

However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount of P502,838.79 with Farmers
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner which was
eventually received by the latter.

Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to return the
rest of the award in the amount of P557,961.21.

In his comment, 10 respondent alleged that he handled petitioner’s case, in Civil Case No. SM-
951, for 15 years, from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November 1993, he
received a letter from petitioner dismissing him as counsel. Simultaneous thereto, respondent
received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G. Bruno asking him to comment on
the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of petitioner addressed to NAPOCOR,
requesting that the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the
Supreme Court be paid to him.

Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorney’s fees on a contingent
basis and that the said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October 1991, duly signed by
both of them. By virtue of the contract, petitioner and respondent supposedly agreed on a 40%-
60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent was entitled to receive 60% of the
award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of the award as attorney’s fees and 20% of the
award as litigation expenses.

Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and refused to
settle his obligation, he deposited the amount of P424,320.00 in a bank in petitioner’s name
under Account No. 381 (representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the total award) on 10 May
1994 11 ; and the amount of P63,648.00 in petitioner’s name under Account No. 389
(representing petitioner’s share of 40% of the P159,120.00 awarded as attorney’s fees by the
Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994. 12 Petitioner already received the amount of P502,838.79 in
accordance with the RTC Order dated 7 April 1994.

Respondent contended that the petitioner’s complaint was without basis and was meant only to
harass and put him to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.

In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995, 13 the Court referred the case to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at the IBP
Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.

On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted her

Report and Recommendation, 14 recommending the dismissal of the case.

Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case lacks merit,
the same is hereby DISMISSED. 15

We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.

The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the amount
awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his attorney’s fees.
Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute trust
funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. 16 Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides as follows:

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR check
representing the amount awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he received on
behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he breached the trust reposed on him. It is only after an
Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the check to petitioner that the respondent
partially delivered the amount of P502,838.79 to the former, but still retaining for himself the
amount of P557,961.21 as payment for his attorney’s fees. The claim of the respondent that
petitioner failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an excuse for respondent’s failure to deliver the
amount to the petitioner. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money
for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. 17 The failure of an
attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well
as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, a lawyer’s unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in
this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. 18

It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the
following rights;

Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases supplied.)

But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client,
as above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received;
his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 19 Thus, what respondent should have
properly done in the case at bar was to provide the petitioner with an accounting before
deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the award collected
to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent represented petitioner from the time of filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951 before what is now the RTC and of the appeal of the same
case to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified to hold on the
entire amount of award collected by him until his fees had been paid and received by him.

The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust
and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his
relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to
render an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his client and when he
refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorney’s
fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest
above that of his client.

We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. 20
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are
simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 21

A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a trustee of his client’s cause of
action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the
fundamental function of administering justice in society. 22 It follows that a lawyer’s
compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not
just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with
the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to
which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits
himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees. 23

There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent claimed
that he charged petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent (40%) as
attorney’s fees and twenty percent (20%) as litigation expenses. The agreement provides:

UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:

Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa
Pinagbarilan, Baliwag, Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa mga
sumusunod:

Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.) na
ngayon ay nakabinbin sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking abogado, Atty.
Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:

1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya ng
sumusunod: 40% ang para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez; 20% ay
ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.

2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso ay wala akong sagutin sa aking abogado.

Sa katunayan ng lahat, ako ay lumagda sa kasunduang ito dito sa Norzagaray, Bulacan ngayong
ika-6 ng Oktubre 1991.

(SGD)PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ (SGD)FRANCISCO RAYOS

Abogado May Usapin 24

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction 25 and is generally recognized as valid
and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. 26 The amount of contingent fee agreed
upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services
only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee
in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. 27 Contracts of this
nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to
pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent
fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is
the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have
their rights vindicated." 28

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order
that clients may be protected from unjust charges. 29 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." Likewise,
Rule 138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.)

The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts. 30
When the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is unreasonable, or
found to have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression of facts on the part
of the attorney, public policy demands that said contract be disregarded to protect the client from
unreasonable exaction. 31

There is, therefore, now a corollary issue of whether the stipulated attorney’s fees are
unreasonable and unconscionable under the circumstances of the case as to warrant a reduction
thereof.

Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client.
This means to say that the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained
would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal
fraud had been perpetrated on him. 32
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee
contract, will not, however, preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a
reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s services.

Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. A stipulation on a lawyer’s
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of
fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount
unreasonable or unconscionable. 33 In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed
on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may
ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. 34 In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a

claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2)
labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the
value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it
being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be
taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 36

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors
which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

In the case at bar, respondent retained the amount of P557,961.21 out of the P1,060,800.00
award for damages paid by NAPOCOR to petitioner. Under the said scheme, respondent actually
collected fifty-three percent (53%) or more than half of the total amount due the petitioner;
indeed, he appropriated for himself more than the amount which he had already turned over to
and actually received by his client.

As adverted to above, we note that petitioner was unschooled and frustrated and hopeless with
the tragic loss of his loved ones caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan, on
26-27 October 1978 because of the negligent release by NAPOCOR of the water through the
spillways of the Angat Dam. Petitioner also had to face the loss and destruction of his family’s
properties. Under such circumstances and given his understandable desire to recover the
damages for the loss of his loved ones and properties, petitioner would easily succumb and
readily agree to the demands of respondent lawyer regarding his attorney’s fees.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this
case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in
conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of
the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers should not be permitted
to get a lion’s share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless. Contracts for legal services
between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of
the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to guard a client, 37 especially
an aged and necessitous client, 38 against such a contract.

A survey of existing jurisprudence regarding attorney’s fees would reveal the following: in the
case of Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 the rate of
attorney’s fees allowed was 25%; in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals, 40
the rate allowed was 20%; in Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 41 25%; in Santiago v. Dimayuga,
42
20%; in Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 43 15%; in Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 44
15%; and in Social Security Commission v. Almeda, 45 15%.

In the present case, respondent Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable
decision for his client, the petitioner. At first, respondent failed to obtain a favorable judgment in
the RTC as the case was dismissed. But on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the RTC Decision
was reversed and petitioner was awarded the amount of P1,060,800.00 as damages and
P159,120.00 as attorney’s fees. Said award was sustained by the Supreme Court. We also take
note respondent’s efforts in litigating petitioner’s case for a long period of 15 years. Lastly, the
respondent took risk in representing petitioner on a contingent fee basis.

In consideration of the foregoing, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner would be a
fair compensation for respondent’s legal services.
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, renders him unworthy to the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or
suspension. 46

The court should also exercise a sound discretion in determining whether a lawyer should be
disbarred or merely suspended. It should bear in mind that admission to the Bar is obtained only
after years of labor and study and the office acquired often becomes the source of great honor
and emolument to its possessor. To most members of the legal profession, it is a means of
support for themselves and their families. To deprive one of such an office is often to decree
poverty to the lawyer and destitution to his family. 47 Disbarment, therefore, should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired. 48

In the case of Schulz v. Atty. Flores, 49 a lawyer was suspended for six months for not returning
his client’s money despite demands, for unjustifiably refusing to return his client’s papers, and
for collecting excessive and unreasonable fees. Also in the case of Tanhueco v. Atty. De Dumo,
50
a lawyer was suspended for a period of six months for failure to return the money received by
him on behalf of his client and for collecting excessive and unconscionable fees.

Guided by our rulings in the abovestated cases, suspension of respondent for six months is
justified in the case at bar.1awphi1.net

WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:

1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath and of serious professional misconduct
and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely;

2. Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%)
of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951; and

3. Respondent is to return the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Thousand One Hundred Nine
Pesos and Twenty-One Centavos (P290,109.21), 52 which he retained in excess of what we
herein declared as fair and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus legal interest from date of finality of
this judgment until full payment thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as member of the Bar
and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the IBP, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

On Leave
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 9-24.
2
Records, Vol. III, p. 66.
3
Id. at 89.
4
Id. at 125.
5
Id. at 198-201.
6
Promulgated 21 May 1993.
7
Records, Vol. III, pp. 224-226.
8
Id. at 243-245.
9
Id. at 239.
10
Records, Vol. I, pp. 45-49.
11
Records, Vol. III, p. 233.
12
Id. at 234.
13
Records, Vol. I, p. 75.
14
Rollo, pp. 28-34.
15
Id. at 27.
16
Aya v. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11 (1932).
17
Cabigao v. Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20, 23 (1932).
18
Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490, 494 (2003); Reyes v. Maglaya, 313 Phil. 1,
7 (1995).
19
Tanhueco v. De Dumo, A.C. No. 1437, 25 April 1989, 172 SCRA 760, 767.
20
Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics.
21
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 86100-03, 23
January 1990, 181 SCRA 367, 377, citing Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691,
8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 173-174.
22
Pineda v. Atty. De Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, 23 August 2006.
23
Sumaoang v. Judge, RTC, Br. XXXI, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 78173, 26
October 1992, 215 SCRA 136, 143.
24
Records, Vol. I, p. 53.
25
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90983, 27
September 1991, 202 SCRA 16, 24.
26
Corpus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40424, 30 June 1980, 98 SCRA 424, 441.
27
Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 884, 893 (1995).
28
Director of Lands v. Ababa, G.R. No. L-26096, 27 February 1979, 88 SCRA 513, 524.
29
Licudan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91958, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA 293, 300;
Director of Lands v. Ababa, id. at 525.
30
Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. v. International Corporate Bank, G.R. Nos. 77042-43,
28 February 1990, 182 SCRA 862, 868.
31
Felices v. Madrilejos, 51 Phil. 24, 33 (1927); Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422, 424
(1933).
32
Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at 894.
33
Rule 138, Section 24, Revised Rules of Court; Francisco v. Matias, 119 Phil. 351, 358
(1964); Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, 123 Phil. 256, 271 (1966).
34
Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at 894.
35
Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 652, 668 (1997).
36
Taganas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118746, 7 September
1995, 248 SCRA 133, 137.
37
Tanhueco v. De Dumo, supra note 19 at 772.
38
Article 24, Civil Code of the Philippines.
39
131 Phil. 374, 386 (1968).
40
Supra note 25 at 25.
41
G.R. No. L-27033, 31 October 1969, 30 SCRA 187, 193.
42
113 Phil. 902, 905 (1961).
43
122 Phil. 648, 651 (1965).
44
202 Phil. 172, 173 (1982).
45
G.R. No. L-75428, 14 December 1988, 168 SCRA 474, 481.
46
Po Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 1, 13.
47
Pineda, Ernesto, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1994 Edition), p. 280.
48
Lim v. Montano, A.C. No. 5653, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 192, 202.
49
462 Phil. 601 (2003).
50
Supra note 19.
51
P1060,800.00 as damages and P159,120.00 (15% of P1,060,800.00) as attorney’s fees
or a total of P1,219,920.00.
52
35% of P1,219,920.00 is P426,972.00. Since respondent retained P557,961.21 and
P159,120.00 and 35% of P1,219,920.00 is P 426,972.00, respondent will return the
difference of P290,109.21 to petitioner. The amount of P557,961.21 and P159,120.00
retained by respondent is actually 59% of the amount due to petitioner in Civil Case No.
951.