When Successional Rights Transmitted

Parulan vs. Garcia

Balus vs. Balus

Law Governing Intrinsic Validity

Miciano vs Brimo (1924)

G.R. No. 22595 | 1927-11-01

Subjects:

Wills and Succession; Institution of Legatees; Laws Governing Real Properties

(Article 16, Civil Code), Processual Presumption

Facts:

Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish national, died and left a will which provided that:

“…. Although a Turkish national….having resided for a considerable length of time in

the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws
in force in the Philippine Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request."

A partition for the estate of the deceased Brimo was filed in court. However, Andre
Brimo (brother of deceased) opposed the partition on the ground that the partition,
if made in conformity to the provisions of Joseph Brimo's will, is not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality.

Held:

Processual Presumption

1. The oppositor (Andre Brimo) did not prove that said testamentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.

2. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator
Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which,
not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. Hence,
the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

Institution of Legatee (Laws Governing Real Properties)

3. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

4. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

5. However, the subject condition is void, being contrary to law, because it

expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 (now
Article 16) of the Civil Code, the national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions

6. Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be

considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. (Art 792, Civil Code)

7. The condition in Joseph Brimo’s will, being contrary to law, is considered

unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to oppositor Andre Brimo.

8. The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
Nevertheless, All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are
contrary to the testator's national laws

Bellis vs Bellis (1967)

G.R. No. L-23678 | 1967-06-06

Subjects:

Renvoi Doctrine, Wills and Succession, Laws Governing Real Property (Art 16),
Statutory Construction (Specific over General)

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis, a Texas citizen, had five legitimate children by his first wife, three
legitimate children by his second wife. He also had three illegitimate children.

On August 5, l952, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he

directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following manner: (a)
USD240,000.00 to his first wife (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, in
equal shares.

On July 8, 1958, Amos Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will
was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on September l5, 1958. Under the
supervision of the court, the executor of the will paid all the bequests therein.

However, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

The lower court overruled their opposition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.

Held:

Renvoi Doctrine
1. The doctrine of renvoi was not invoked by the parties. Even if it was, the doctrine
is not applicable in this case.

2. The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of

one country, and a domicile of another.

3. In the present case, the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law.

4. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines.

5. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours. (Doctrine of processual presumption)
Wills and Succession ; Law Governing Real Properties (Art 16)

6. Article 16, paragraph 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed.

7. It was alleged that the decedent executed two wills - one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate - arguing that he intended Philippine law
to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 - now Article 16 - of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.

8. Amos Bellis, was a citizen of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Statutory Construction (Specific over General)
9. It is contended that Article 17, paragraph three of the Civil Code prevails as the
exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of
Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

10. It is therefore evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of
legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national Law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Testate Estate of Bohanan

Aznar vs. Garcia

Law Governing Formalities of Wills

In Re Will of Riosa Nov. 07, 1918
39 PHIL 32 Malcolm, J.

The will was executed prior to the enactment of Act. No. 2645 and the death occurred
after the enactment. The will was executed in accordance with the law in force at the
time it was executed. The Court ruled that it was valid. The validity of the execution of
a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that
statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. The Court adopted Justice
Sharswood’s opinion that while it is true that everyone is presumed to know the law,
the maxim in fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal right to
presume that no new law would affect his past act, and rest satisfied in security on that
presumption.
FACTS: Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of
January, 1908. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force,
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not executed in accordance with
Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, in force on and after July 1, 1916.
The will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not
signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page,
nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect
after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator
having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
ISSUE: Whether in the Philippines the law existing on the date of the execution of a
will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
RULING: It is the law existing at the death of the testator that controls.
The Court adopted the second rule established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa
is valid.
The validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes
subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect.
The opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell) is regarded to be
the best considered.
“Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator
makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at
the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition
to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that everyone is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is
inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new
law

Vda. De Enriquez vs. Miguel Abadia (1954)

G.R. No. L-7188 | 1954-08-09

Subject: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made

Facts:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,

executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"). He
died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value.
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the will, filed a petition for its probate in the
CFI of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.

One of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that the testator signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each
of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the
same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at
the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling
that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the
last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each
other.

The trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will, and that
although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing
and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry
out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court admitted to probate
Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.

The oppositors are appealing from that decision. Because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court.

Held:

The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made.

1. The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides
that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated
and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed.

2. However, at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that
Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the
time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which
were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios
of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

3. Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to
its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law in force at the time of the testator's
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act. (see: In re Will of Riosa)

4. There is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be
resorted to in order to carry out said intention. However, we should not forget that
from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees
and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process
clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new
legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By
parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights
in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not
validate void wills.

Testamentary Capacity

Bugnao vs. Ubag
14 SCRA 163 September 18, 1909 Carson, J.

Domingo Ubag died leaving a will which designated his wife as his sole heir. The
brothers and sisters of the former opposed its probate contending that because of the
serious illness of the deceased, at the time of the execution of the will, he was not of
sound mind and therefore the will shall not be held as valid. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court declaring the validity of the will and ruled that
mere weakness of the mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak of feeble minded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him
to know what he is about and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be
unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has not been
understood that a testator must possess these qualities in the highest degree.
Facts: Domingo Ubag and Catalina Bugnao are spouses and are publicly known as
members of the Aglipay Church. Because of their being members of the Aglipayan
Church, Domingo and his brothers and sisters became bitter enemies to the point
that they did not even visit Domingo when he was seriously ill and is about to die.
When Domingo Ubag died, he apparently left a will which named his widow Catalina
Bugnao as his sole heir. Upon the filing of the petition for probate of the will, the
appellants opposed the same contending that it did not comply with the
requirements provided for by the Civil Code of Procedure and that at the time of the
execution of the will, Domingo Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was
physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
Issue: Whether or not the deceased Domingo Ubag was mentally and physically
incapable of making a will at the time of its execution thereby invalidating the said
will.
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court which
approved the probate of the will and held it as valid. The contention of the
appellants that the deceased was of unsound mind as of the time of the execution of
the will because he was already seriously ill is of no moment. It does not in any way
affect his capacity or fitness to make a will. Mere weakness of the mind, or partial
imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will, a weak of feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he
has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about
and how or to whom he is disposing of his property.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should
be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has
not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities in the highest
degree. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its
violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange
the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational
faculties common to man. Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind.
Lastly, the Supreme Court defined what testamentary capacity means. It is the
capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend
the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects
of his bounty.

BAGTAS vs. PAGUIO March 14, 1912
22 Phil. 227 TRENT, J.

Contending that the deceased Pioquinto was mentally incapacitated at the time he
executed his Will, due to paralysis, the defendants opposed the petition for the probate
of the Will of Pioquinto filed by petitioner. The CFI however rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner and ordered the admission to probate the Last Will and testament
of Pioquinto. When the case was elevated to the SC the court explained that the rule of
law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they
have failed to do. Furthermore the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of
mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a
valid will.
FACTS: Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro, husband of petitioner Juliana Bagtas, died on
September 28, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of
his will.
Records show that the testator Pioquinto, for some fourteen or fifteen years prior to
the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body which
resulted to the impairment of his hearing as well as the lost of his power of speech.
He however retained the use of his right hand and was still able to write fairly well.
Through medium of signs, he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will four testamentary witnesses were present
namely Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor
Marco, and another witness namely Florentino Ramos. Anacleto and Señor Marco
having already died, only the other three witnesses were able to testify as to the
manner in which the will was executed. According to them, the testator Pioquinto
wrote out on pieces of paper notes the items relating to the disposition of his
properties. These notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco who transcribed
them and put them in form. Thereafter, Señor Marco read the will and asked the late
Pioquinto if the same was his testamentary disposition. Pioquinto assented by
making an affirmative movement of his head. Señor Marco then gave the document
to Pioquinto who signed the same after looking over it in the presence of the four
prescribing witnesses who in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
After Pioquinto died, petitioner Juliana Bagtas who was the executrix of Pioquinto’s
last will and testament, propounded the will. The defendants however, who are
the son and grandchildren of Pioquinto by former marriage, opposed the same.
The CFI made an order admitting to probate the last and will testament of the late
Pioquinto. It ruled that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully
complied with. Hence, the present appeal of the defendants.
The defendants alleged that the testator was mentally incapacitated at the time of
the execution of the will. To prove their allegation, the defendants presented Pedro
Paguio who, though agreed that Pioquinto was mentally incapacitated at the time he
executed the will, unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the late
Pioquinto. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and
advanced age of Pioquinto and the fact that he was unable to speak.
The defendants likewise presented two physicians namely Doctor Basa and Doctor
Viado to prove their claim. While Doctor Basa testified that he had attended
Pioquinto some four or five years prior to his death. He affirmed that Pioquinto
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He however did
not say that Pioquinto was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the
will, nor did he say that Pioquinto was mentally incapable, at the time of the
execution, to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder
had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to
him on one occasion when he visited him.
Dr. Viado, the other physician, had never seen Pioquinto. In his testimony, he said
that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition of a person who was
suffering from a disease such as that of Pioquinto.
Florentino Ramos, a witness for the plaintiff, on the other hand testified that he had
frequently transacted matters of business for Pioquinto and had written letters and
made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and
after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated
that Pioquinto was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of
this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the
testator.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator Pioquinto was mentally incapacitated at the time
of the execution of the will.
RULING: NO, he was not. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the two
physicians did not in any way strengthen the contention of the appellants. Their
testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years
prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and
mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of the two physicians attempted to
state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will
in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very
serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as it had
been in the earlier years of his life. However, the SC held that it cannot include from
this that the testator Pioquinto was wanting in the necessary mental capacity to
dispose of his property by will.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary
capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous citations there given from the
decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the case at bar and
have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the
mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to
prove the lack of testamentary capacity.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of
competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This
we think they have failed to do. Furthermore the courts have repeatedly held that
mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a
person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall
continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in
order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be
the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any
other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless
mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner.
In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of
the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of
mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of
executing a valid will.
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section
365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the
testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he
was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In
a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to know and
understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his
will.
Finally, the SC held that the striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the
testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in
his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we
think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the
time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in
any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the
will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a
rational person.

NEYRA vs. NEYRA March 25, 1946 76 Phil 333
DE JOYA, J.

Petitioner and the deceased Encarnacion are sisters who inherited certain properties
from their father Severo. Due however to said properties, the two had serious
misunderstandings which prompted the two to file complaints against each other.
When Encarnacion became seriously ill, she decided to reconcile with her sister
Trinidad and executed a new Will wherein she bequeathed all of her properties in
favor of Trinidad. Consequently, the case pending between the two was likewise
dismissed due to a compromise agreement between the two. Contending that
Encarnacion was of unsound mind when she executed the said Will as well as the
compromise agreement, the petitioners appealed the decision of the CA dismissing the
pending case between Trinidad and Encarnacion. The SC however ruled that the fact
that some of the witnesses talked to Encarnacion after she had executed the
documents showed that she indeed possessed the testamentary and mental capacity
needed at the time of the Will.
FACTS: One Severo Neyra died on May 6, 1938 intestate. He left certain properties
and two children by his first marriage named Encarnacion and Trinidad. He likewise
had other children by his second marriage. Meanwhile, after the death of Severo,
Encarnacion and Trinidad had serious misunderstandings in connection with the
properties left by their deceased father.
Thereafter, Encarnacion, who had remained single and who had no longer any
ascendants executed a Will disposing her properties in favor of the “Congregacion
de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria” and her other relatives making no provision
whatsoever in favor of her sister Trinidad. However, when the said will was brought
to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, said religious organization
declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion.
When Encarnacion had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison’s disease, she
asked that a mass be celebrated in her house. Father Garcia who solemnized the
mass advised Encarnacion to reconcile with her sister Trinidad. Encarnacion
accepted said advice and reconciled with Trinidad. After the two settled their
differences, Encarnacion gave one Atty. Panis instructions to prepare two
documents, one embodying their compromise agreement wherein they agreed to
dismiss the pending
appeal with the CA filed by Trinidad against Encarnacion regarding the recovery of
1⁄2 of the property left by their deceased father; and the other the new Will and
testament of Encarnacion naming Trinidad and Eustaquio as her beneficiaries. After
the two documents were read to Encarnacion she placed her thumb mark at the foot
of each one of the two documents. Unexpectedly, Encarnacion died on November 4,
1942, day after the Will was executed.
When Encarnacion died the CA dismissed the appeal by virtue of the compromise
agreement. The other relatives of Encarnacion however, filed a petition asking for
the reconsideration of said decision of the CA dismissing the appealing contending
that the alleged compromise agreement could not have been understood by
Encarnacion as she was already then at the threshold of death. And that if it had
been signed by Encarnacion, her thumb mark appearing on said document have
been affixed thereto against her will.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half-sister of Encarnacion, Presentacion Blanco and
Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra
was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping
on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they
were in the caida.
ISSUE: Whether or not Encarnacion possessed the testamentary and mental
capacity at the time of the execution of the Will.
RULING: YES. In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators,
more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts.
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will,
the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although
lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale
of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a
perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross- examination, frankly admitted that,
in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942,
Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus
showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired,
partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily
receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from
tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the
moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion
Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental
capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3,
1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time
Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in
the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been
fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was
lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the
time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other
sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this
case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix
on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs.
Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
Moreover, Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as
they are children of legatees named in the first will, dated September 14, 1939, but
eliminated from the will, dated November 3, 1942.
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect that
there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the
thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the
agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and
that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead,
in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is absolutely devoid of any
semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense
of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they
have testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy
of belief. And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal
aphorism — falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs.Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728,
735.)
To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the two
documents, dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously placed great
emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently on the common
belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Terrible indeed are the feuds of
relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They had forgotten
that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of
the Christian faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute.
They had also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than that
embalmed in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two
sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the
former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must
have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And believing perhaps
that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness, and that she had
always been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently what was her
due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want to go to
her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore,
most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her
generosity, under her last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by
executing said agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her
earthly labors.
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally
signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of
credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and possessed
the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the time; the petition for the
reconsideration filed of the CA decision is herebydenied; and that said decision of
the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed.

BALTAZAR vs. LAXA April 11, 2012
G.R. No. 174489
Del Castillo, J:

Petitioners in the case at bar opposed the petition of respondent for the probate of the
Will of Paciencia contending that the testator Paciencia was of unsound mind when
she executed the Will where she bequeathed all her properties to respondent and his
wife and children, due to the fact that Paciencia was forgetful. The trial court agreed
with the petitioners and held that at the time Paciencia executed the Will, she no
longer possessed sufficient reason to have testamentary capacity. On appeal, the CA
however held that the state of being forgetful does not make a person mentally
unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will. The SC agreed with the CA
and held that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to
being of unsound mind. Moreover, it held that, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on
the oppositor. Failing to present any substantial evidence that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.
FACTS: Paciencia Regala a 78 year old spinster made a last will and testament
wherein she bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo and his wife and
their children. The Will was executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin where the
same was read to Paciencia twice.
Respondent Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Pampanga and it was she who raised and
cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the will, Paciencia
left for the United States. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia, respondent Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor. There being no opposition to the petition, the
RTC issued an order allowing respondent Lorenzo to present evidence. Thereafter,
petitioner Antonio filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition contending that the
properties subject of Paciencia’s will belong to one Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan,
such being the case, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. The
petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in favor of
Lorenzo on the ground that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed an amended opposition asking that the probate of
Paciencia’s Will be denied by the RTC on the grounds that the Will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to
execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the signature of
Paciencia on the Will was forged, and that assuming the signature to be genuine, it
was obtained through fraud or trickery.
The RTC issued an order denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be
appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while
the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been
established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued.
Respondent Lorenzo testified that Paciencia was spinster without children and
without brothers and sisters. At the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer
from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. He
further testified that the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given
to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino. He further stated that he was
already residing in the USA when the will was executed, such being the case he
could not have used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon
Paciencia to execute the Will.
Petitioner Antonio on the other hand stated that Paciencia was his aunt. He
identified the Will and testified that he had seen the document before because
Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house. Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him the same were still unsigned. He further alleged that
Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands
and that it was he who explained to her that the same was a Will which would
transfer her properties to respondent Lorenzo and his family. According to him,
Paciencia, upon hearing this, left the doucments to petitioner Antonio and advised
him to throw the same away. Petitioner Antonio kept the unsigned documents and
eventually turned them over to Faustino.
Petitioner Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. She
claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia. She
testified that Paciencia was referred to as forgetful because she would sometimes
leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition of respondent Lorenzo for the
probate of the Will of Paciencia. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of
petitioner Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no
longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and granted the probate of
the Will of Paciencia. According to it, the state of being forgetful does not make a
person mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will.
Moreover, the petitioners were not able to overcome the presumption that every
person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to
prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners now filed the instant
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the Notarial Will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
RULING: YES. Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic
validity of a Will in probate proceedings.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law.The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the
Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence
of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state
of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
As to the allegation of the petitioners that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the Will, the Supreme Court held that the burden to prove
that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on
the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC in the case at bar agreed with the position of
the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent
to being of unsound mind.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness,
there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other
hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness
of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily
executed the Will.The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the
testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent. More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time
of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.
Moreover, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane
one month or less before the making of the Will. Thus, applying the rule provided
under Art. 800 of the New Civil Code, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of
unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same,
thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, the SC is convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the
testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties
from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as devisee.

Formalities of Wills

ACOP vs. PIRASO January 16, 1929 52 Phil. 660 ROMUALDEZ, J.

The petition for the probate of last Will and testament of the deceased Piraso was
denied by the CFI on the ground that Piraso having been able to speak Ilocano, though
imperfectly, the Will should have been written in said dialect for it was the dialect of
the locality where Piraso resided. On appeal, the SC however ruled that in denying the
petition for the probate of the Will, that part of the decision of the CFI was
unnecessary. The SC explained that the Will of Piraso was written in English which
language Piraso was unacquainted of. Under the rules, in order for a Will to be valid
the same must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator. Such being
the case the fact that the Will was written in a language unknown to the testator
makes the same void.
FACTS: The petition for the probate of the purported last Will and testament of the
deceased Piraso having been denied by the CFI of Benguet, the petitioner filed the
instant appeal alleging that the lower court erred in holding that in order for the last
will in question to be valid, the same should have been drawn up in the Ilocano
dialect.
In ruling as such, the CFI held that the deceased Piraso, although imperfectly, knew
how to speak the Ilocano dialect. The court is of the opinion that since Piraso could
make himself understood in that dialect, the Will should have been written in that
dialect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Will of Piraso should have been written in Ilocano
dialect.
RULING: NO. Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “No will,
except as provided in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a
resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went
into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect
the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc. In
the instant case, the document purported to be the Will of Piraso was written in
English, which language the deceased was unacquainted. Such being the case,
whether or not it be technically held that said will, in order to be valid, must be
written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a
cultivated language and used as a means of communication in writing, and whether
or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
written in said dialect. The fact is the instrument purported to be the Will of Piraso
was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know, and this is
sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the
law, and inevitably prevents its probate.
Finally, the SC held that nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by
this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is
presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof
to the contrary, can favor petitioner for even if he invoked in support of the probate
of the questioned document, not only is it proven that English is not the language of
the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where document was drawn,
but that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language
than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the
English language in which the document is written. So that even if such a
presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.

Jaboneta vs Gustilo
Avera vs. Garcia
Icasiano vs. Icasiano
Cagro vs Cagro
Nera vs. Rimandi

Caneda vs. Court of Appeals (1993)

G.R. No. 103554 | 1993-05-28

Subject: Kinds of will; Notarial Will (Attested will), requisites; Attestation clause
need not be written in a language or dialect known to the testator nor the attesting
witnesses; Attestation clause, requirements; Witnesses should
both attestand subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one
another; Attestation clause fails to specifically state that the attesting witnesses
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other; Substantial compliance rule cannot apply; The substantial compliance rule
under Art 809 must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself; Formalities of Wills (Liberal view vs. Strict View);

Facts:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a

last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses: Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said
testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public,
Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will.
It was declared in the will, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way
of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola,
Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni Cabrera and Marcosa
Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.

Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition in
court seeking the probate of his last will and testament. However, the testator
passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.

In 1981, Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, was appointed as
special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was
P24,000.

Thereafter, petitioners (Teodoro Caneda et al.), claiming to be nephews and nieces

of the testator, instituted a petition for intestate proceedings. After consolidating
their petition with the earlier filed probate proceeding, petitioners objected to the
allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its
execution, the testator was already in a poor state of health such that he could not
have possibly executed the same.

The probate court ordered the allowance of the will on the strength of the positive
testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos (notary public) and Cipriano Labuca (one of the
attesting witnesses to the will) who testified that the testator executed the will in
their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that Mateo Caballero
was in good health during the execution of his will.

Petitioners challenged the allowance of the will in the Court of Appeals, and asserted
that the will is null and void given that its attestation clause is fatally defective since
it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court and held that the attestation clause
in the last will of Mateo Caballero, even if not completely or ideally perfect in
accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 of the Civil Code, the phrase as formulated
is in substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.

Hence, the present appeal. What appears in the attestation clause which the
oppositors claim to be defective is:

"We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses
appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the
Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO, has published unto
us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each
page numbered correlatively in letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will
and Testament and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said
testator and in the presence of each and all of us."

The issue is whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and
testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805,
in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.

Held:

Kinds of will

1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is

permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate after his death.

2. Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of wills which a testator may execute.
The first kind is the ordinary or attested will, the execution of which is governed
by Articles 804 to 809 of the Code.

3. The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one
that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. This
kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses.

4. A common requirement in both ordinary and holographic wills is that they

should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect known to
the testator.

Notarial Will (Attested will), requisites

5. Article 805 requires that:

"Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them."

6. In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the attesting witnesses, hence it is likewise known as a notarial will.

7. Where the testator is deaf or a deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must
personally read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons
who will read the will and communicate its contents to him in a practicable manner.
On the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him twice; once,
by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the notary public before
whom it is acknowledged.

Attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect known to the

testator nor the attesting witnesses

8. In the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be
written in a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of
the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the attestation
clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last
paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause
shall be interpreted to said witnesses.

Attestation clause, requirements

9. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby

the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them
and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or
record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the
witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
formalities required by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of
preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a
particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or
other casualty, such facts may still be proved.

10. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of
which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:

(a) the number of pages used upon which the will is written;
(b) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
(c) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and
all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
11. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on
which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages;
whereas the subscription of the signatures of the testator and the attesting
witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus
indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and
attested to by the witnesses.

Witnesses should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of one another

12. Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest and subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of one another. "Attestation" and
"subscription" differ in meaning.

13. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to
see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact.

14. Subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for
the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the
testator.

15. As [attestation] involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of

ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed
signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially
expressed in the attestation.

16. Attestation is that act of the senses, while subscription is the act of the hand.
The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was
published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal
publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same
paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.

Attestation clause fails to specifically state that the attesting witnesses signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other

17. The last will and testament of Mateo Caballero is comprised of three sheets all of
which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof
bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses.
The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in
the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator.
The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in the English
language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses
thereto.

18. A careful reading of the attestation clause reveals that while it recites that the
testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not
expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.

19. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the
testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the
words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in
the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first
blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must however, be
interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses
since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every
page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin." What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Substantial compliance rule cannot apply

20. Art 809 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the
language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.

21. The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or

imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is
here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that
the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as
merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would
warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule.

22. While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end
thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it
certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed
their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since,
the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed,
but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to
be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or
occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the
imprimatur of effectivity.

The substantial compliance rule under Art 809 must be limited to

disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself

23. The substantial compliance rule must be limited to disregarding those defects
that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, i.e. whether all the pages
are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are
facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in
the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.

24. Under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with respect to the
form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or
imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was
really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however,
the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited
to merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde,
whether oral or written.

25. The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally
omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, thedefect is not
only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation
clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case.

26. The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on
by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be
cured or supplied by the text of the will or by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will
itself. In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been
performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied only by extrinsic evidence
thereof. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses
alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental
witnesses, thus he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and
would accordingly be doing by indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

Formalities of Wills (Liberal view vs. Strict View)

27. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a divergence
of views as to which manner of interpretation should be followed in resolving issues
centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in the execution of wills.

28. One view advanced the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first
laid down in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, where it was held that the object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in
such a way as to attain these primordial ends. Nonetheless, it was also emphasized
that one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, hence when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative
of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

29. The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the
formalities that should be observed in the execution of wills are mandatory in
nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent cases of In
the Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin, etc.

30. The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the
undeniable inclination towards a liberal construction, recommended the
codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be in accord
with the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the interpretation of wills.
Said rule thus became what is now Article 809 of the Civil Code.

31. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of
the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Cruz vs. Villasor

Lopez vs. Lopez

Holographic Will
Labrador vs. Court of Appeals April 5, 1990
G.R No. 83843-44
Paras, J.

Melecio Labrador died leaving a holographic will of the property located in Iba
Zambales. Sagrado filed probate of the will but such was opposed by Jesus and
Gaudencio on the ground that the property was already sold to them and that
the holographic will is invalid due to the fact that it was not dated. The SC ruled
that the holographic will is dated. The law does not specify a particular location
where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the
date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March
1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not
an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that
what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration
that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed
reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate
property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate.

FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving a parcel of land located at
Iba Zambales to his heirs namely Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio,
Juliana, Hilaria, and Jovita all surnamed Labrador and a holographic will. On July 28,
1975, Sagrado, Enrica, and Cristobal Labrador filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged holographic will. Subsequently, Jesus and Gaudencio Labrador filed an
opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law since Melecio sold the property to Jesus and
Gaudencio on Sept 30, 1971. Sagrado thereafter, filed an action for the annulment of
the sale alleging that Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise the lot from
their father and that the Deed of Absolute sale is fictitious. Trial court allowed the
probate of holographic will but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents alleged that holographic will should not be valid for it was
undated and that the date in the holographic will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of the deceased Melecio
Labrador is dated as provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code?
RULING: Yes, it was dated under the contemplation of Article 810 of the NCC. The
will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with
Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of
the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the
month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of
mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other
than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. The
intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from
the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the
will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly
knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the
declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be
followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate
property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate

Ajero vs. Court of Appeals 263 SCRA 488
September 15, 1994 Puno, J.
The private respondent opposed the probate of the holographic will of the deceased on
the ground that it does not comply with the requirements set forth under Articles 813 and
814. Therefore, it is his submission that the will cannot be probated. A reading of Article
813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova,
“ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will. This
separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements
of Article 810- and not those found in Articles 813 and 814-are essential to the probate of
the holographic will.
Facts: The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. In the will the decedent named as devisees the
following petitioners: Clemente, Meriam, Leah, Lilia, Edgar, Fe, Lisa and Dr. Jose Ajero
and their children. The petitioners then instituted a special proceeding for the allowance
of the decedent’s holographic will. The private respondent opposed the petition on the
grounds that: neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by the
decedent.
The trial court, however, admitted the will to probate reasoning that no reason at all for
the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by
law nor lack of testamentary capacity.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. The Court of Appeals found that,
“the holographic will fails to meet the requirement for its validity.” It held that it did not
comply with the requirements provided for in Article 813 and 814 of the Civil Code
regarding erasures, alterations and cancellation. Hence, the current petition.
Issue: Whether or not the will was executed in compliance with the requirement
necessary for its validity.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and ruled that the will complies with the requisite formalities for its validity. For
purposes of probating holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Artcile 810.
Therefore, failure to observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova,
“ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing
and dating of dispositions appear in provisions separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will. This separation and
distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810-
and not those found in Articles 813 and 814- are essential to the probate of the
holographic will.

KALAW vs. RELOVA 132 SCRA 237 September 28, 1984 Melencio-Herrera, J.
As a rule, only the alterations, insertions, erasures or cancellations are declared void
when the same are not authenticated by the testatrix. However, such rule applies only if
the Will contains several numbers of dispositions. In the case at bar, the holographic Will
of the deceased Natividad contains only one substantial provision. The Will as first
written named petitioner Rosa as her sole heir, however, the testatrix changed the same
by naming private respondent Gregorio as her sole heir. The alteration made by the
testatrix was not authenticated by her as required under Art. 814 of the NCC, hence, said
alteration was declared void. Consequently, the SC ruled that the entire Will is void for
the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after the only provision therein was
declared void. Furthermore, the SC held that even though the alteration was declared
void, the Will, as first written should not likewise be given effect for it would result to
disregarding the seeming change of mind of the testatrix.
FACTS: Private Respondent Gregorio Kalaw filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of her deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw executed on December 24,
1968. Private Respondent claims that he is the sole heir of Natividad.
Petitioner Rosa Kalaw on the other hand, opposed the probate of the Holographic Will
contending that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections and insertions
without the proper authentication of the testatrix as required by Art. 814 of the New Civil
Code.
It should be noted that the Holographic Will, as first written, named petitioner Rosa,
sister of the deceased Natividad, as her sole heir.
After trial, the respondent judge rendered a decision denying the probate of Natividad’s
Holographic Will on the ground that the alterations and/or insertions in the said Will were
not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix as required under Art. 814 of the
NCC.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that since the alterations were declared void by the trial court, the
holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could
be the sole heir thereunder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will, as first written, should be given effect and
probated after the alterations made by the testatrix were declared void.
RULING: NO. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the
Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason
that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will
as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

Perez vs. Tolete June 02, 1994 232 SCRA 722 Quiason, J.
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife Dr. Evelyn, who became American citizens,
established medical practice in New York. They had 3 children.
Dr. Jose executed a will, bequeathing to his wife all the remainder of his properties
at time of his death, wherever situated. That in the event that he would survive his
wife, his property would pass on to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. His wife will be the executrix and Dr. Rafael the substitute
executor. Art. 8 of his will says:
“If my wife and I shall die under such circumstances
that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall
be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”
His wife also made a will with the same provisions. Dr. Cunanan and his entire
family died when they were trapped by fire in their home.
Dr. Rafael, as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. The two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.
Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, and petitioner, filed with the RTC a
petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in
New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel,
Bulacan.
RTC issued letters of Special Administration to Salud upon her posting of a bond.
Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan after petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver
to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit,
and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of
P12,412.52.
RTC disallowed the reprobate of the two wills, recalled the appointment of
petitioner, and required the petitioner to submit an inventory of property received
by her as special administratrix. It ruled that that petitioner failed to prove the law
of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court cannot know
whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York.
On motion for reconsideration, RTC denied the motion of petitioner for the
suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country
within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the spouses.
Upon reassignment of the case to another judge, the probate was denied. Petitioner
filed motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and
termination of the probate cases in New York and reconsideration of the decision on
the strength of the order granting her a period of 15 days. It was granted. Cunanans
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision, alleging lack of notice to
their counsel.
Natividad, the counsel of petitioner who was her mother, substituted her since she
was ailing in New Jersey and incapacitated to act as special administratrix.
RTC denied the Cunanan heirs’ motion for reconsideration, stating that petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and
proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances
and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills
in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish
the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills.
Natividad filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law.
She was granted 45 days to do so. However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce
the additional evidence, respondent Judge that he found no compelling reason to
disturb former ruling (denial of Cunanan heirs’ reconsideration but that documents
did not establish law of New York) but allowed petitioner to "file anew the
appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator."
Respondent Judge then denied the subsequent motion of Natividad to submit
further evidence on New York laws. He held that to allow the probate of two wills in
a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of
probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New
York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt
with in separate proceedings.”
Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration on the grounds that "the
probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband
and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition."
ISSUE: Whether or not the separate wills of the spouses need not be probated in
separate proceedings
RULING: YES. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with the following provision:
“Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.”
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York
laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will
in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of them.
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on
allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted
to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 which advise that the rules shall be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the
delay in the administration of justice.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Art. 818). In this case, the
Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the
same provisions and pertain to properties which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. The Court will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

Revocation

Testate Estate of Adriano Maloto vs. Court of Appeals (1988)

G.R. No. 76464 | 1988-02-29

Subject: Revocation of will by testator; Act of testator in destroying (burning or

tearing) a will does not per se constitute revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator; Animus revocandi must
be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will; Evidence insufficient to prove that Adriana's will had been
revoked; The doctrine of res adjudicata does not apply

Facts:

In 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, Aldina
Maloto-Casiano and Constancio Maloto (petitioners) and Panfilo Maloto and Felino
Maloto (private respondents). Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a
last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case was in progress, the four heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement agreement providing for the division of
Adriana's estate into four equal parts among the parties. In 1964, the trial court
approved the extrajudicial settlement agreement.

Three years later, in 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's
counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, while going through the cabinet of the latter,
discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBULUT-AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3, 1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana.
The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the court. Under the will,
Panfilo and Felino (private respondents) are still named as heirs, however, Aldina
and Constancio (petitioners) are bequeathed a much bigger and more valuable
shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the extrajudicial
settlement agreement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties,
among them the co-petitioners: Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.

Hence, petitioners applied withe the trial court for the annulment of the previous
intestate proceedings and for the allowance of the will. When the trial court denied
their motion, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for
certiorari and mandamus but the SC dismissed the petition ruling that the more
appropriate remedy is a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question.

Hence, petitioners filed a petition for the probate of the will in the CFI. The same
was opposed by the private respondents. The trial court found the will to have
already been revoked by the testatrix, Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the trial court's findings.

The CA, while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the papers
allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon
instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, nevertheless found that the will
had been revoked. The CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the
destruction of the will had been sufficiently proven based on the fact that (a) the
document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, (b) the testatrix went to
the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's
possession, and (c) Adriana seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a
new will drawn up.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA's decision but was denied. Hence, this
petition. There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the
due execution of the will. The issue is whether or not the will was revoked by
Adriana.

Held:

Revocation of will by testator

1. Article 830 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person,
without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and
the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution,
and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are
established according to the Rules of Court.

Act of testator in destroying (burning or tearing) a will does not per se

constitute revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator

2. The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator.

3. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself.
It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the
presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document
destroyed must be the will itself.

Animus revocandi must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,

tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will

4. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded,
for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice.

5. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
the willcarried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under
his express direction.

Evidence insufficient to prove that Adriana's will had been revoked

6. In the present case, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid,

Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of
Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her
presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were
the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was
located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.

7. Nowhere in the records does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de
Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the
document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the
papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her
so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document
was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is
double hearsay.

The doctrine of res adjudicata does not apply

8. The private respondents contend that the present action for probate instituted by
the petitioners is already barred by res adjudicata. They claim that this bar was
brought about by the petitioners' failure to appeal timely from the order of the trial
court in the intestate proceeding denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the
case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the
last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto.

9. The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy.

For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur:

(a) the presence of a final former judgment;

(b) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
(c) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there is, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do not find here the presence of all the
enumerated requisites.

10. For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the
probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in the
intestate proceeding, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the
estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to
be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the
decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is
understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without
jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will. An action for probate is
founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution
and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of
estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no
will. Thus, there is likewise no identity between the cause of action in intestate
proceeding and that in an action for probate.

Estate of Molo vs. Molo (1951)

G.R. No. L-2538 | 1951-09-21

Subject: Imputations of fraud and bad faith committed in the earlier probate
proceedings (1939 Will); Revocatory clause in a subsequent will, which has been
disallowed, does not have the effect of annulling the previous will; No direct
evidence that testator voluntarily or deliberately destroyed the first will (1918);
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation; One witness is sufficient to prove due
execution of the will

Facts:

Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, (1918
Will) and another executed on June 20, 1939, (1939 Willl). The latter will contains a
clause which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918.

On January 24, 1941, Mariano Molo died without leaving any forced heir either in
the descending or ascending line. He was survived by his wife, Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo (petitioner ) and by his nieces and nephew, Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi,
deceased brother of the testator.

Juana filed in the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking the probate of the 1939 Will. There
being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the
oppositors, the probate order was set aside, and after hearing, the court rendered
decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the 1939 Will, the widow Juana filed another petition
for the probate of the 1918 Will in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed
an opposition. The court issued an order admitting the will to probate.

The oppositors filed the present petition contesting the allowance of the will on the
same grounds invoked in the lower court, to wit: (1) that (Juana) is estopped from
seeking the probate of the 1918 Will ; (2) that said will has not been executed in the
manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

Held:

Imputations of fraud and bad faith committed in the earlier probate

proceedings (1939 Will)

1. There is no evidence which may justify the insinuation that petitioner had
deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of the deceased to
enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere conjecture drawn
from the testimony of Canuto Perez that he went out of the room to answer an
urgent call of nature when Artemio Reyes was signing the will and the failure of
petitioner later to impeach the character of said witness in spite of the opportunity
given her by the court to do so. Apart from this insufficiency of evidence, the record
discloses that this failure has been explained by petitioner when she informed the
court that she was unable to impeach the character of her witness Canuto Perez
because of her inability to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this
explanation stands uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not,
it is not now for us to determine. It is an incident that comes within the province of
the former case. The failure of petitioner to present the testimony of Artemio Reyes
at the rehearing has also been explained, and it appears that petitioner has failed
because his whereabouts could not be found. Whether this is true or not is not also
for this Court to determine. It is likewise within the province and function of the
court in the former case.

2. If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would
make the testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because it is
a "disposicion captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through
consultation with a lawyer, there was no need for her to go through the ordeal of
filing the petition for the probate of the will. She could accomplish her desire by
merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading
to the probate of the will executed in 1918. But her conscience was clear and she
instituted the necessary proceedings for the probate of the 1939 will.

3. Petitioner cannot be considered guilty of estoppel which would prevent her from
seeking the probate of the 1918 will simply because her effort to obtain the
allowance of the 1939 will has failed considering that in both the 1918 and 1939
wills she was instituted by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged
with bad faith for having done so because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of
her husband.

Revocatory clause in a subsequent will, which has been disallowed, does not
have the effect of annulling the previous will

4. The oppositors contend that, notwithstanding the disallowance of 1939 will, the
revocatory clause contained in the 1939 will is still valid and still has the effect of
nullifying the prior will of 1918.

5. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been

disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions
[as] to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void." (see Samson vs. Naval)

6. Oppositors claim that the prevailing trend in the American jurisdiction, where
our rules on wills have been based, is that "an express revocation is immediately
effective upon the execution of the subsequent will, and does not require that it first
undergo the formality of a probate proceeding". However, the court found, upon its
own study of American caselaw, that the view held in Samson vs Naval is still
considered good law. The Supreme Court cites in particular the following passage:

"It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not being
executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where the testator has
not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is procured through undue
influence, or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does
not revoke the first will or affect it in any manner." (Mort vs. Baker University)

7. It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure) provides
that a will may be revoked "by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills." But it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be
regarded as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills" simply because
it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing within the
meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said writing is
admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation.

No direct evidence that testator voluntarily or deliberately destroyed the first

will (1918)

8. Oppositors contend that 1918 will cannot still be given effect because of the
presumption that it was deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors
contend that the testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of
the revocatory clause contained in said will, himself deliberately destroyed the
original of the 1918 will, and that for this reason the 1918 will submitted by
petitioner for probate is only a duplicate of said original.

9. There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the 1939 will. The only evidence is that when the first will was
executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he executed
his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate and petitioner
was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy of
the 1918 among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.

10. If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that
he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical
step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may
likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate
copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long
lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of the
will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator
deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary
dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of
circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or
deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be left to
mere inference or conjecture.

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

11. Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed
by the testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could
there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the
testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had
expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the
destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's
belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the
latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then the earlier will can still be
admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".

12. The doctrine known as dependent relative revocation is usually applied

where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to
revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a
substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect
for some reason. The rule is established that where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the
testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and
dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new
will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and
the original will remains in full force.

13. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the
revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition,
and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at
some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will.
14. We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to
produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior
will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will
of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on
which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different
occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no
mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

One witness is sufficient to prove due execution of the will

15. The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses. The
first two witnesses died before the commencement of the present proceedings. So
the only instrumental witness available was Angel Cuenca and under our law and
precedents, his testimony is sufficient to prove the due execution of the will.
However, petitioner presented not only the testimony of Cuenca but placed on the
witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public who prepared and notarized the will
upon the express desire and instruction of the testator. The testimony of these
witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the manner required by law.

Probate

Tolentino vs. Francisco G.R. No. L-35993 December 19, 1932 STREET, J.:
Facts: Gregorio Tolentino was sixty-six years of age been married to Benita
Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no children, Tolentino
contemplated leaving his property mainly to these kin of his wife, of the surname
Francisco; and for several years prior to his death, he had kept a will indicating this
desire. However, in October, 1930, strained relations, resulting from grave
disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he
determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few
individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be given
to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.
Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney informed him
that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him, thereby
the will was executed. However, on the morning of October 21 he again appeared in
Repide's office and returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections.
Among the changes thus made was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico,
and Repide as attesting witnesses, these names being substituted by the names of
Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Syyap had been the
draftsman of the former will of Tolentino, and in this same will the name of Syyap
appeared as one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being Vicente Legarda and
Vergel de Dios. When, therefore, Syyap learned that a new will was being drawn up
without his intervention, he showed profound disappointment, saying to Tolentino
that he considered it a gross offense that he, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios should be
eliminated as witnesses to the new will. Pursuant to these instructions Repide made
the desired changes in the will executed. It was subscribed and attested in the place
of Legarda with Syyap and De dios. Thereafter, Tolentino was murdered and died.
Adelaida Tolentino filed with the CFI Manila to procure probate of the will of
Gregorio Tolentino. CFI denied probate because the two attesting witness repudiate
its participation in the execution of the will Thus Syyap,
testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to Syyap's house on
the afternoon of October 21 - a time, be it remembered, when the will had not yet
left the hands of the draftsman - and upon learning that Syyap could not be present
at the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested
Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did.
Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that he signed the
will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Intramuros
Issue: Whether or not the will shall be admitted for probate
Ruling: YES. The SC is unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two
witnesses on this point, the same being an evident fabrication designed for the
purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative proof showing that
the will was properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of
the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by
Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La
Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when the will was executed
and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In the second place,
each of the seven signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to
have been made by using the same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing
the will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de
Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios
had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places. In the third
place, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of contradictory
statements made by them on different occasions prior to their appearance as
witnesses in this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio
Tolentino, and while the police authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio
Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning his relations with
the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately
made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the
circumstances already stated, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for
doubt in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy
between themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to defeat the will of
Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that said will was in all respects
properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no error in
admitting the will to probate.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting
witnesses, if available but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united
support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate
notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite
with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will
rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil., 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied
from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by
law. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will was properly executed
and the order admitting to it probate was entirely

Mercado vs. Santos September 22, 1938 66 PHIL 215
Laurel, J.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife, Ines Basa in
1931. Without any opposition, and upon testimony of one of the attesting witnesses,
the court admitted the will to probate.
Almost 3 years later, the five intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings
but it was denied. It was filed for the second time and now with notice to the
adverse party, but was again denied.
About 16 months after the probate of the will, Rosario Basa de Leon filed against
petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will probated. Petitioner Mercado was
arrested, and put up a bond of P4,000. Complaint was dismissed upon Rosario’s
instance. This happened again twice—upon the third time that Mercado was
arrested, the case was dismissed, as the will had already been probated and no
evidence was presented that Mercado forged the signature of the testatrix.
The provincial fiscal, however, moved for reinvestigation and again, Mercado was
arrested. Reinvestigation dragged for almost a year until the CFI ordered that it be
tried on merits. Mercado moved for the dismissal, claiming that the order that
probate the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution. It was denied.
He filed with CA for petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
trial court from further proceedings. CA denied it, with 3 justices dissenting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of the will of his deceased wife is bar to his
criminal prosecution for alleged forgery of the said will
RULING: YES. The criminal proceedings were quashed. Section 306 of Civil
Procedure states: The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special
proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States,
or of any State or Territory
of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
as follows:
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular
person,the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition or relation of the personProvided, That the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of
the death of the testator or intestate.
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due
execution of a probate will: No will shall pass either the real or personal estate,
unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate
shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually
considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the
will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that
the will is genuine and not a forgery.
The law on wills of PH, particularly Sec. 625, was taken from statutes of Vermont.
Said the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society vs. Eells: "The
probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice,
is conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world.”
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of
notice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive
notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is
binding upon everybody, even against the State. Through the publication of the
petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such
persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after
said proceeding is binding against the whole world.
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be conclusive.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it
will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong.
Although American and English cases show conflict of authorities, the Court chose
the rule most consistent with the statutory law, having in view the needed stability
of property rights and public interest in general.
A duly probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without disturbing in a way
the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a will should be
regarded as genuine for one purpose and spurious for another.

In view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Nuguid v. Nuguid June 23, 1966
17 SCRA 449 Sanchez, J.

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters. She left a holographic will containing only one testamentary disposition by
virtue of which she left all her properties to a sister, Remedios Nuguid, omitting her
parents (compulsory heirs, direct line). When the will was presented for probate by
Remedios, the parents of the testator (respondents) registered their opposition and
subsequently moved to dismiss the petition. The probate court granted the motion
holding that the will is a complete nullity and will perforce create total intestacy. A
motion to reconsider having been denied, Remedios appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not in a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court can
rule on the intrinsic validity of such wil? (under Article 838)
(2) Whether or not the will is a complete nullity pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code?
RULING: (1) Yes, but this is only the exception to the general rule. Right at the
outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of
a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the
court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy therein. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on
appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
Reflecting on the possible consequences, the Court believed that if the case were to
be remanded for probate
of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted.
And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on
the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head- on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.
(2) Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them:
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir —
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping
the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts
to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms,
Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.
Note on the difference of Disinheritance and Preterition: Petitioner's mainstay
is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition".
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not
explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is
clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we
repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.

Caniza vs. CA February 24, 1997 268 SCRA 641 Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS: Carmen Caniza, 94-year-old spinster, retired pharmacist and former
professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the
Philippines, was declared incompetent by RTC QC in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by Amparo Evangelista, her niece, who was appointed legal guardian of
her person and estate.
Carmen was the owner of house and lot at QC. Evangelista filed suit in MeTC to eject
Spouses Estrada from the property. It identified Carmen as plaintiff, suing through
her legal guardian, Evangelista.
The complaint alleged that out of kindness, Carmen allowed the spouses and family
to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free. Now, however, Carmen needed the
house on account of her failing health so that funds could be raised to cover her
expenses for maintenance and medical treatment. Through Evangelista, Carmen
asked them verbally and in writing to vacate but they refused.
The spouses answered that they have been living in the house since 1960s. Because
of the faithful service they gave that Carmen considered them as family and that she
executed a holographic will by which she bequeathed to the Estradas the house and
lot.
MeTC granted the complaint. RTC reversed it, ruling that the action should be
resolved by accion publiciana. CA affirmed the RTC and held that the proper remedy
was accion publiciana, not an accion interdictal, since the spouses have not been in
the premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, but as adopted family of
Carmen as evidenced by the holographic will. While the will cannot be the basis of
claim to the property until passed into probate, it is indicative of the intent of
Carmen that Carmen’s supervening incompetency did not vest her guardian the
authority to drive defendants out.
Carmen died and her heirs, Evangelista, and Ramon Nevado, substituted for her.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not an ejectment action is the proper remedy
(2) Whether
Evangelista had authority to bring action
(3) Whether Evangelista may continue to
represent Carmen after the latter’s death
RULING: (1) YES. Unlawful detainer is the proper remedy. Estradas contend that
since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any
contract, express or implied" — they having been"allowed to live temporarily for
free, out of Cañiza's kindness" — in no sense could there be an "expiration or
termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no
claim that they had deprived Cañiza of the possession of her propert by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. The act of
liberality is accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the
house to Cañiza upon her demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
One whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land or property the moment he is required to leave. Nor is it of any consequence
that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the
Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after
demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof,
that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being
possible unless and until the will is duly probated.
They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the
house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by
which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still
has to take place; in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of
possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court" (ART. 838).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by
his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was
sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.

(2) YES. Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of
both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of
Guardianshipclearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of
the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be
situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her
properties."
It became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical
and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in
preference to relatives and friends.It also became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it
being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his
property during her incompetency That right to manage the ward's estate carries
with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains
it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
In bringing the action, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to the
“comfortable and sustainable maintenance of the ward.”
(3) YES. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of the guardian or the ward, the
rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two surviving heirs,
the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. An ejectment case survives the
death of a party. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

Preterition
Pecson vs. Coronel 45 Phil 216 October 11, 1923 Romualdez, J.
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Doroteo Coronel the document submitted as Exhibit A. This document
named the niece, Lorenzo Pecson, of the deceased Dorotheo Pecson as the sole heir
of her estate. This was opposed by the blood relatives of the deceased contending
that the document submitted could not have been the last will and testament of the
deceased as it excludes her blood relatives from inheriting from her estate.
The opponents contend that it was not nor could it be, the will of the testatrix,
because it is not natural nor usual that she could completely exclude her blood
relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative
by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion, inasmuch as
until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with the
aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her
lands. In addition appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are
very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one’s estate is an
exceptional case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will must be denied probate because of the fact that the
blood relatives of the deceased was excluded from inheriting in her estate.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the will, though it excludes the deceased’s
blood relatives from inheriting in her estate, must still be probated.
It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889.
Moreover, it is also provided in the Civil Code that: “Any person who has no forced
heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person
qualified to acquire it.”
Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the Code embodying it has been
in force in the Philippines for more than a quarter of a century, and for this reason, it
is not tenable to say that the exercise of the liberty thereby granted is necessarily
exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants of this country whose
customs must have been taken into consideration by the legislator in adopting this
legal precept, are averse to such liberty.
Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the
most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se. “In the absence of any
statutory restriction, every person possesses dominion over his property, and may
bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim
upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and
the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence, the will is
not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing
can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust
as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as already shown, the
unreasonableness or injustice of a will may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity.

ACAIN vs. IAC 155 SCRA 100 October 27, 1987 Paras, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the RTC a petition for the probate of
the Will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his
favor on the premise that Nemesio died leaving a Will in which petitioner and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. It was stipulated in the Will that upon
Nemesio’s death all his properties shall be given to his brother Segundo Acain
(father of petitioner) and that in case Segundo predeceases him all his properties be
given to his children.
Due to the fact that Segundo predeceased Nemesio, the children of the former now
claims to be heirs of the latter.
After the petition was set for hearing, the oppositors, private respondents herein
moved for the dismissal of the case. Private respondents contend that they have
been preterited from the Will. They alleged the Virginia being a legally adopted
daughter of the deceased and Rosa being Nemesio’s widow they are considered as
compulsory heirs of the deceased entitling them to a share in the estate of the
deceased.
The trial court rendered a decision denying the motion to dismiss of private
respondents. On appeal. The IAC granted private respondents’ petition and ordered
the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the Will. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.
HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not
in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the
other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow
were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid
and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway
for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises
having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already
stated above, be respected.

Neri v. Akutin May 21, 1943 74 Phil. 185 Moran, J.

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents,
with omission/preterition of the children by his first marriage, the herein
petitioners. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator
with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the
inheritance, particularly (1) a land he had abandoned was occupied by the
respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land
(thus, not part of the estate), and (2) a another land which was still claimed to be the
property not only of the (petitioners) children of first marriage but also those of the
second marriage (respondents) which is the same as saying that it could not have
been advanced by the testator to the children by the first marriage, for otherwise,
the children by the second marriage would not lay a claim on it. (Deduced from
Clause 8 of the Will wherein the testator made the statement that the children by his
first marriage had already received their shares in his property)
This Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy.
A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground (1)
that there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received
their shares in the property left by the testator, and (2)
that, even assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the
annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made
to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not annulment of institution of heirs is the effect of preterition,
as in this case, and not just reduction of bequest made to the respondents?
RULING: Yes. The following example will make the question clearer: The testator
has two legitimate sons, A and B, and in his will he leaves all his property to A, with
total preterition of B. Upon these facts, shall we annul entirely the institution of heir
in favor of A and declare a total intestacy, or shall we merely refuse the bequest left
A, giving him two-thirds, that is one third of free disposal and one-third of
betterments, plus one-half of the other third as strict legitime, and awarding B only
the remaining one- half of the strict legitime? If we do the first, we apply article 814
(now Article 854); if the second, we apply articles 851 or 817 (now Article 918 or
907). But article 851 (now Article 918) applies only in cases of unfounded
disinheritance, and all are agreed that the present case is not one of disinheritance
but of preterition. Article 817 (now Article 907) is merely a general rule
inapplicable to specific cases provided by law, such as that of preterition or
disinheritance.
Manresa says that in case of preterition (now Article 854), the nullity of the
institution of heirs is total, whereas in case of disinheritance (Article 851, now
Article 918), the nullity is partial, that is, in so far as the institution affects the
legitime of the disinherited heirs. He further makes it clear that in cases of
preterition, the property bequeathed by universal title to the instituted heirs should
not merely be reduced according to Article 817 (now Article 907), but instead,
intestate succession should be opened in connection therewith under Article 814
(now Article 854). Sanchez Roman is of the same opinion
Of course, the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not
always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the whole will. Neither Manresa nor
Sanchez Roman nor this Court has ever said so. If, aside from the institution of heirs,
there are in the will provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons
some specific properties in the form of legacies, such testamentary provisions shall
be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not
inofficious or excessive, according to article 814 (now Article 854). In the instant
case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property of
the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of the second
marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the institution of heirs will be
necessarily the opening of a total intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that article 814 (now Article 854) refers to two different things
which are the two different objects of its two different provisions. One of these
objects cannot be made to merge in the other without mutilating the whole article
with all its multifarious connections with a great number of provisions spread
throughout the Civil Code on the matter of succession. It should be borne in mind,
further, that although article 814 (now Article 854) contains who different
provisions, its special purpose is to establish a specific rule concerning a specific
testamentary provision, namely, the institution of heirs in a case of preterition. Its
other provision regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not inofficious
is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions (Articles 815
and 817, now Articles 906 and 907) and signifies merely that it also applies in cases
of preterition. As regards testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is
that all "testamentary disposition which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs
shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficous or excessive"
(Article 817, now Article 907). But this general rule does not apply to the specific
instance of a testamentary disposition containing an institution of heirs in a case of
preterition, which is made the main and specific subject of article 814 (Article 854).
In such instance, according to article 814 (Article 854), the testamentary disposition
containing the institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its
entirety and all the forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit in
accordance with the law of intestate succession.

Viano Non vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 137287
February 15, 2000
VITUG, J.:
Facts: During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street,
La Loma, Quezon City. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado
died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children —
Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose
Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987.
Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents — his wife Alicia
Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog
property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between
petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked
that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the
growing children. Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over
the subject property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late
Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado
Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca
Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the
property inherited from Virginia Viado. Petitioners, in their action for partition,
attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo
Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the
deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her
brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of
extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia
Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should
warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed
instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years
later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo
Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died
Issue: Whether or not the property shall be equally divided
Ruling: NO. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the
evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large,
self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery
and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of
donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how
and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown
proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in
ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of
petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on
the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of
the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca
Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed
document. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the
date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a
ministerial act5 and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all
third persons, Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and
binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of
extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of
preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify
a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the
Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and
fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the
value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the
proper valuation of the isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due
petitioner De

Fideicommissary Substitution

Perez vs. Garchitorena February 13, 1930
54 PHIL 431 Romualdez, J.

FACTS: P21,428.58 is on deposit in Carmen Perez’s name with La Urbana in Manila
as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, the deceased.
Carmen Perez was her heiress.
Mariano Garchitorena had judgment against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of
Carmen, in amount of P7,872.23. The sheriff levied an attachment on said amount
deposited with La Urbana.
Carmen secured a preliminary injunction, alleging that the deposit with the
fideicommissary heirs of Ana
Maria.
Garchitorena contended that Carmen was the
universal heir, that the will ordered simple substitution, not fideicommissary
substitution, and prayed for dissolution of the injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is fideicommissary substitution and not simple
substitution
RULING: YES. As consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to
Carmen as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death
of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara. Thus, it cannot be subject to the execution of
the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
These are the relevant clauses in the will:
IX. Being single and without any forced
heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married
to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I
institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the
payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of this will,
and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and
approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary
estate, that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own.
X. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve
to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such
wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so
far as it is legally possible.
XI. Should Carmen Garchitorena die after me while her children are still in their
minority, I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana,
and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon
Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack
of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of
administering my estate, because I recognizethat his character is not adapted to
management and administration.
The Court ruled that it cannot be a simple substitution. Only the death of the
instituted heiress before the testatrix would give rise to a simple substitution. The
substitution provided is where the heiress dies after the testatrix.
The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs. Taking all
those clauses together, such means that Carmen is the sole heiress instated in the
first instance.
The disposition in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is
not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible
with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted does not receive
the inheritance).
There are three requisites to fideicommissary substitution, according to
Manresa:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An
obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the
whole or a part of the estate. 3. A second heir.
Clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of
the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an
indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say
whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the
testatrix. But from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions, the
testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the
transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such
wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in
so far as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid
the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for
transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that
fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the
second degree."
Another indication of fideicommissary substitution is the provision that the whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children. The heiress is required to
preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to
the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites.
Clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a
provision is made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. Said clause
anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and
after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.
Fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of
the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary
consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which
the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.

Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals 334 SCRA 522
June 29, 2000
Purisima, J.

Facts: AlejaBelleza executed a Last Will and Testament which she devised certain
properties to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. The provisions of the will imposed upon Rabadilla
the obligation to deliver to Maria Belleza 75 picus of sugar derived from the said
property. Failure to comply with this obligation would warrant the turn over of the
property bequeathed to the near descendants of the testatrix.
On the basis of this provisions, the private respondent Belleza filed a complaint
against the petitioner for the performance of the obligation burdened upon him. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
ruled that the provisions contemplates a modal institution thereby, the private
respondent has a cause of action.
The petitioner contends that the provisions of the will contemplates only simple
substitution. Hence, the current petition.
Issue: Whether or not the provision of the will obligating the instituted heir
partakes of a nature of a substitution.
Ruling: The provision disputed is neither a simple substitution nor a fideicomissary
substitution.
In simple substitution, the second heir takes the inheritance of the original heir in
case of renunciation, incapacity and predecease. It is necessary therefore that what
must happen is that the second heir would replace the original heir upon the
instances enumerated. In the case at bar, what is provided is that there would be a
transfer of property to the near descendants of the testatrix if the heir instituted
(Rabadilla) would not fulfill his obligations.
In fideicommissary substitution, two of its essential elements are lacking in the case
at bar. First, an essential element of a fideicommissary substitution is that there
must be a provision that states that the first heir must preserve and transfer the
inheritance to the second heir. The will in dispute even allows the alienation of the
property devised which is contrary to the essence of a fideicommissary substitution.
Second, the fideicommissary substitution must be limited to not more than one
degree from the first heir instituted. In the case at bar, the near descendants of the
testatrix is not even related to Rabadilla.

Conditional Institution
Morente vs. dela Santa

Compulsory Heirs/Legitimes

Rosales v. Rosales January 31, 1987 148 SCRA 69

FACTS:On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebesadministratrix of
the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June
16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate:
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4,
1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the
deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in- law together with
her son, Macikequerox Rosales.Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The
trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:Whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law?
RULING:No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.
Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of
intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law. There is no provision in the Civil Code
which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir
of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Regarding the contention of petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code, the Court ruled that
the aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.

Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso March 08, 2001
354 SCRA 112
Pardo, J.

FACTS: Aida is the only daughter of Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, both
deceased.
Regina and Zenaida are daughters of Gregorio with his common law wife Julia
Mendoza, with whom he had 7 children.
Gregorio owned 2 parcels of residential land in Bocaue, Bulacan. When he was
confined in 1990, he told Aida that the titles of his property were with Regina and
Zenaida. After Gregorio died, Aida inquired with her half- sisters about the titles.
They told her that. Gregorio executed a “Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan” wherein for
P25,000 he sold the lands to them.
Aida filed for the annulment of the sale, alleging that the signature of her father was
a forgery.
ISSUE: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to
his illegitimate children?
RULING: NO. First: Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same
was a simulation and hence, null and void.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida and
Regina did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property,
until in 1991, time of the testimony.
As proof of income, Zenaida testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen,
working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW items in
1983 and prior thereto. She alleged that she paid her father the amount of
P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank
to pay for the property since she had personal savings other than those deposited.
Regina was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day.
She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source
of income.
The Court found it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in
cash for the land. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that
would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Second: The sale violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction
affected Aida’s legitime. The sale was
executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio’s way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to
prevent her from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before
his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles
to the property.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land
involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive
Aida of her share in her father’s estate. By law (Art. 888) she is entitled to half of the
estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
His compulsory heir cannot be deprived of her share in the estate save by
disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Tumbokan vs. Magtanum

Reserva Troncal

Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and De Ocampo 41 Phil 915
October 27,
1920
Johnson, J.
Facts: The petitioner Segunda Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana
Nieva. She was conceived and born to an unknown father when Juliana was
unmarried. Juliana reared and took care of Segunda, she exhibited the petitioner
publicly as her natural daughter and that she was baptized as Juliana’s natural
daughter.
Juliana then married Francisco De Ocampo from which they begot a child named
Alfeo De Ocampo. Juliana, however, died intestate. And because of this, her son Alfeo
De Ocampo inherited ab intestate from her the parcels of land he owns.
Subsequently, Alfeo De Ocampo died intestate and without issue. Hence, his father
Francisco De Ocampo, being the only compulsory heir of Alfeo, inherited from his
son the parcel of land that he has inherited from Juliana.
Francisco De Ocampo married again. He married Manuela Alcala. They then begot a
child named Jose De Ocampo. Francisco De Ocampo died. Claiming that they are the
heirs of Francisco De Ocampo, Manuela and Jose took possession of the parcels of
land Francisco inherited from Alfeo.
On the other hand, Segunda, alleging that she is the acknowledge natural child of
Juliana, claimed that she is entitled to inherit from Francisco. Hence, she filed an
action against Manuela and Jose for the recovery of the parcels of land. She posits
that the principle of reserva truncal applies even to illegitimate children like her.
The RTC dismissed the petition ruling that the principle of reserve troncal under
Article 891 only applies to
legitimate descendants.
Issue:
descendants
and not to
illegitimate
1. Whether or not the Segunda, under the foregoing facts, can be considered as
an acknowledged natural child of Juliana. 

2. If she is, whether or not as an illegitimate child within the third degree, she is
entitled to the benefit of reserva troncal under Article 891. 

Ruling:
1.
2.
Under the foregoing facts, Segunda is an acknowledged natural child. She was duly
baptized as the natural child of Juliana, she was publicly declared as her child and
Juliana reared and took care of her.
An illegitimate child, like Segunda, cannot benefit from the principle of reserve
troncal under Article 891 of the Civil Code. Legal luminaries and scholars of Civil
Law, including Manresa, who have devoted almost their entire lives in studying the
intricacies of civil law are one in the opinion that the benefit of reserva troncal only
applies to legitimate childrend. It could not have been the intendment of the
Legislature to extend the benefit to illegitimate children. Although the legislature
used the generic words, “ascendants”, “descendants”, and “relatives” without
specification whether such are legitimate or illegitimate, still the article would only
apply only to legitimate children. This is because, under the system of legitimes, the
general rule is legitimacy and natural relationship is only an exception. In addition,
if the legislature had intended that reserva troncal would also apply to illegitimate
children, then it could have so expressly provided.
The phrase “who are within the third degree and belong to the same line from which
the properties came” admits of blood relationship. To admit otherwise would mean
to allow the properties to be transferred to relatives by affinity- which is, in fact,
what the law seeks to prevent.
The object of the law is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family in a way
that the properties of the legitimate family would not pass on the illegitimate family
and vice versa. It could not be otherwise. The law denies the legitimate parent to
succeed from an illegitimate child. From this, it can be deduced that the law
prohibits the illegitimate child from inheriting from the legitimate parents. This
means that the law seeks to put a barrier between the two families. The properties
of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.
This being the intendment of the law, the principle of reserva troncal under Article
891 only applies to legitimate children.
FLORENTINO vs. FLORENTINO 40 Phil. 480
November 15, 1919
Torres, J.
FACTS: The spouses Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Antonia Faz de Leon dutring
their marriage begot 9 children namely Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacio (herein
petitioner), Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro and Magdalena all surnamed Florentino y
de leon. Thereafter, when Antonia died, Apolonio married the second time Severina
Faz de leon with whom he had two children namely Mercedes (herein respondent)
and Apolonio III. When Apolonio II the second died, he was survived by his second
wife Severina and his above mentioned 10 children, his eleventh son, Apolonio III
having died months after his death.
Prior to Apolonio's death, he executed a will instituting as his universal heirs his
aforementioned ten children, Apolonio III, and his widow Severina. In the partition
of the said testator's estate, Apolonio III was given a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of
silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other
objects mentioned in the complaint.
Apolonio III having died in 1891, his mother Severina succeeded to all his property.
Thereafter, when Severina died, she left a will wherein she instituted as her
universal heiress her only living daughter respondent Mercedes. As such heir,
Mercedes took possession of all the property of her deceased mother including
those inherited by the latter from her deceased son, Apolonio III.
Contending that the property inherited by Severina from Apolonio III having the
character of reversable property, petitioner then filed with the CFI a complaint
against respondent Mercedes and her husband praying that the subject property be
declared as reservable property. They likewise pray that the respondents be
ordered to deliver their share in the reversible property.
Respondents on the other hand contend that when Mercedes inherited the property
left at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her deceased
brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby
complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line
might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided. She
further alleged that the hope or expectation on the part of the petitioners to acquire
the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because
there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and dismissed the complaint.
In ruling as such, the trial court held that when Mercedes inheirted the subject
property the fundamental object of Art. 811 has already been complied with, thus
there is no more need for Mercedes to revert back to herein petitioners the
ownership over the said properties. The trial court further ruled that if the
properties will revert back to herein petitioners the legitime of Mercedes will be
impaired. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are of the nature of reservable
properties; and if so, Whether or not Severina who inherited said property from her
son Apolonio III, had the obligation to preserve and reserve the same for the
relatives within the third degree of her deceased son.
2. Whether or not the
legitime of respondent Mercedes will be impaired if the reservable rights of
petitioners will be permitted.
HELD:
1. YES and YES. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property, while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is
nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He
is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil
Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said
property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted into
the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate
successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called
reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such
property came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it
subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives
of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These
reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)
who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third
degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case, there are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable
property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned
Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first marriage — Encarnacion,
Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented
by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by
a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos
son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-
brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his
three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in
their own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are
indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-
time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
The SC ruled that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina
Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, being in the nature of reservable
property, the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third
degree, are thereby entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property and that the
defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof.
2. NO. Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of
the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does
not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It
becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own
property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress.
But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property
received from her son Apolonio III, or
rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half
brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void,
inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios,
one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83484
February 12, 1990

Facts: This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author
of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr.
was born.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in
Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother,
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property
was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child,
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and
her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the
name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia
and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his
mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up
the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with
Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties
came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia
agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.

Celedonia was appointed as the administratix of the estate and later on the court
adjudicated her as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javallana Jr. and proceeded
to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On September 3, 1984, the
said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva.

Issue: Whether or not the property of the deceased was subject to reserve troncal.

Ruling: The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only
relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision
of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to
the line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant
(propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother,
Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he
did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia
Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who
inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews
or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.

However, It is true that by the agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor
of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and therefore, Concordia is obligated to honor her
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

The petition for review was granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late
Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with
the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of
the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana
Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be
trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same
for the purposes set forth in its charter.

Sumaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 68843-44
September 2, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2)
sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a
parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died
on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one- seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10)
parcels of registered from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on
November 3, 1950. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue,
and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole
surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned. Upon the death of the
propositus, Raul Balantakbo, thereservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was
clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr. and
from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. On December 21, 1959. Consuelo
Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold both property to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The same
properties were subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc. Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred
and assigned its rights over the properties in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first
named Balantakbos, filed an action to recover the properties which they claimed
were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor. Trial Court rendered a joint decision
in favor of the Balantakbos ordering the petitioners to surrender the property to the
plaintiffs. This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the
decision of the court a quo in toto. Petitioners contended that they were innocent
purchasers for value and thus the sale was valid. According to petitioners, before
they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called reservista),
Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their
family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated
on the certificate of title coveting the properties.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were innocent purchaser for value and thus
making the sale valid despite the fact that the properties sold were
reserved for the plaintiffs
2. Whether or not there is a need to need to register the reservable character of the
property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against
innocent third persons
3. Whether or not the Cause of Action of the Defendants already prescribed

Ruling

1. NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appelas. Upon the
death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of
Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from
his father Jose, Sr. and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, The court a
quo further ruled that said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a
recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. It
was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show
that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact
remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating
the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the
whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise,
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda.
de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a
descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant,
was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to
annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be
attributed to Consuelo. Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had
actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before they bought
the same from Consuelo. Such nature of the property was evident in the deed of sale
executed by the parties. Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and
private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners
knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul
Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo
Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
2. YES. In Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, this Court ruled that the reservable character of
a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled
therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable
character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the
reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant
who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another
descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also. The
jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right
reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule
is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D.
1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned . . ." The properties
involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the
registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third
persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.
3. NO. The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action
of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees
did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13,
1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3,
1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is
reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property
during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the
reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple,
and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom
they are relatives within the third degree The reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the
reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if
not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the
old Code of Civil Procedure or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New Civil
Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein
private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of
the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.

De Papa vs. Camacho 144 SCRA 281 September 24, 1986 Narvasa, J.

Facts: Romana Tioco, Balbino Tioco, Francisca Tioco De Papa, Manuel Tioco and
Nicholas Tioco are brothers and sisters. Romana Tioco, during her lifetime, donated
four parcels of land in favor of her niece named Toribia Tioco (daughter of Balbion
Tioco). Torabia Tioco died intestate and was survived by her husband Eustacio
Dizon and two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.

Subsequently, Balboa Tioco died intestate. Since he was predeceased by her

daughter, Toribia Tioco, he was only survived by his wife and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino and Trinidad. The legitime pertaining to Toribia Tioco
devolved upon her legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad (this included 3
parcels of land). He was also survived by his brothers and sister (herein plaintiffs)
Manuel, Francisca and Nicholas.

Faustino Dizon, the son of Toribia, died intestate and without issue leaving his 1⁄2
pro indiviso share on a total of 7 parcels of land to his father Eusebio Dizon. Eusebio
Dizon received the property subject to reserve troncal.

Trinidad Dizon then died intestate leaving her property to her daughter herein
defendant Dalisay Tongko. Then, Eustacio Dizon died intestate and he was only
survived by his only legitimate descendant, Dalisay Tongko. Because of

this, Dalisay Tongko owns 1⁄2 pro indiviso share of the 7 parcels of land disputed in
this case.

Upon advise of her counsel, Dalisay claims that she also entitled to the other 1⁄2 pro
indiviso share on the 7 parcels of land by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed on
the said share and she also posits that the rules of intestate succession shall govern
the case at bar.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs claiming that they are also third degree relatives of
the deceased Faustino Dizon alleges that they are entitled to 3/8’s of the parcels of
land in question.

Issue:

3. Whether or not all relatives within the third degree in the same line may succeed
by virtue of reserva troncal, without qualification, upon the death of the
reservista. 


4. Whether or not the rules of intestate succession will apply in cases of reserva
troncal. 


Ruling:

1. The relatives of the reservista within the third degree in the same line where the
property came from does not inherit without qualification. This is because, in cases
of reserva troncal, the rules on intestate succession also apply- the proximity rule
(the nearest relative excludes the remote ones), the right of representation and the
rule on double share for collateral blood relatives also applies (under this rule, it
states that collateral whole blood relatives shall receive double the share of
collateral half blood relatives).

In the case at bar, although the plaintiffs are relatives of the deceased Faustino
within the third degree and within the same line, they cannot inherit by virtue of
reserva troncal. Since the rules of intestate succession applies upon the operation of
reserva troncal, the rule on proximity of degree applies. This means that the nearest
relative excludes the remote ones. The plaintiffs are the uncle and aunts of the
deceased while, the defendant is the legitimate descendant (grandniece of the
deceased Faustino). Applying the rule on proximity, when the deceased is survived
by nephews and nieces, such nephews and nieces excludes all other collateral
relatives (aunts, uncles, first cousins..). It is therefore clear, applying the provisions
of the Civil Code under Articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009, that a decedent’s uncle
or aunt cannot succeed ab intestato so as there are willing and qualified nephews
and nieces to succeed.

2. When the operation of reserva troncal is necessary, the rules on intestate

succession apply. This is because the concept of reserva troncal being merely an
exceptional case, its application shall be limited to what it strictly needed to
accomplish.

The purpose of reserva troncal is to return the reserved property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the original property came, and avoid it
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendants. This means
therefore that the concept of reserva troncal is merely for the determination of the
specific class or group of relatives the reserved property is to be returned and
nothing more. But within that specific class or group, the determination of their
rights as to the reserved property shall be determined by the intestate succession.

Note: In addition, in cases of reserva troncal, the reservatorios does not inherit from
the reservista. They inherit directly from the descendant propesitus subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista.

Mendoza vs. Policarpio

Disinheritance
Pecson vs. Mediavillo
Ching vs. Rodriguez

Intestate Succession
Dorotheo vs. Court of Appeals (1999)
G.R. No. 108581 | 1999-12-08

Subject: A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world; Probate proceedings deals with the extrinsic validity and due execution of
the will; A will declared extrinsically valid may still be found intrinsically void,
hence, not given effect

Facts:

Nilda Dorotheo Quintana , Vincent Dorotheo and Jose Dorotheo (private

respondents) were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.

Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo, who claims
to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said
probate order.

In 1983, private respondents filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void."
The trial court granted the motion and issued the Order (January 30, 1986)
declaring that “Lourdes Legaspi, not being the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo,
the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo are intrinsically
void” and that the private respondents are the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated
and distributed according to the laws on intestacy”

Petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled
to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each other. The MR was denied.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed. The
dismissal became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued by the lower
court to implement the final and executory Order (January 30, 1986). However,
petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Angas setting aside the final
and executory Order (January 30, 1986) on the ground that the order was merely
"interlocutory", hence not final in character. Private respondents appealed to the CA
which nullified the the November 29, 1990 Order. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted
the present petition for review.

The issue is whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate, but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory, may still
be given effect.

Held:

A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole

world

1. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened

no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that
has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by
the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy
of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on
probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

2. If no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the
same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became
final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised
anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the
will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.

3. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some
point of time fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to
litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do
so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence,
which circumstances do not concur herein.
Probate proceedings deals with the extrinsic validity and due execution of the
will

4. Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the

will sought to be probated, particularly on these aspects:

(a) whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(b) compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
(c) the testamentary capacity of the testator;
(d) the due execution of the last will and testament

5. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether:

(a) the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution,
(b) that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud,
menace or undue influence and
(c) that the will is genuine and not a forgery,
(d) that he was of the proper testamentary age and
(e) that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will

A will declared extrinsically valid may still be found intrinsically void, hence,
not given effect

6. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.

7. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be
disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before
the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail
of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver.

8. Petitioner Lourdes Dorotheo was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of
the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable
order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986
wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who
are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same
constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. Forum shopping also occurs when
the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear
from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be
distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.

9. It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be
testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided
by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur
donare.

10. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will
had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically
void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it
is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity - that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In
this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as
correctly held by the trial court.

Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA

Sayson vs. Court of Appeals (1992)
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 | 1992-01-23

Subject:

The Decree of Adoption should have been Seasonably Appealed Before it Became
Final; An Error in an Adoption Decree is not Jurisdictional; Doribel’s Legitimacy
should be Affirmed (Birth Certificate is a Formidable Piece of Evidence); Doribel’s
Legitimacy Cannot be Questioned Collaterally; Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are the
Exclusive Heirs of Teodoro and Isabel; Provisions of the Law Governing the Right of
Representation; Doribel Can Exercise the Right of Representation; Delia and
Edmundo Cannot Exercise the Right of Representation

Facts:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died 1952, and Rafaela in 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died in 1972. His wife died nine years later in 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed
Sayson, who claimed to be their children.

In 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson in the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants.

Thereafter, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for the accounting
and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children. They asserted the defense that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the private respondents. The judges in the two
cases found that Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel by virtue of a decree of adoption and that Doribel was their legitimate
daughter. Hence, they were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation and they were the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel, excluding
the petitioners from the sharing of the estate.

The appellate court modified the ruling of the lower court by disqualifying the
adopted children, Delia and Edmundo from inheriting from the estate of Eleno and
Rafaela. In all other aspects, the assailed decision was affirmed.

Held:

The Decree of Adoption should have been Seasonably Appealed Before it

Became Final

1. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground
that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the
same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the
couple.
2. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final
and executory. Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of
Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo.

An Error in an Adoption Decree is not Jurisdictional

3. An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the
fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure.

4. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment

of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to
enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional
validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
necessarily in accordance with the truth. (Santos vs. Aranzanso)

Doribel’s Legitimacy should be Affirmed (Birth Certificate is a Formidable

Piece of Evidence

5. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the

prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172
of the Family Code.

6. It is true that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and
may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case

7. The evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of

strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. (Legaspi vs. Court of
Appeals)

Doribel’s Legitimacy Cannot be Questioned Collaterally

8. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and

accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

9. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally.

Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are the Exclusive Heirs of Teodoro and Isabel

10. The Supreme Court held that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,

11. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages. (Article 979, Civil Code)

12. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child. (id)

Provisions of the Law Governing the Right of Representation

13. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the

representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited. (Article 970, Civil Code)

14. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the
one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Article 971, Civil Code)

15. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation. (Article 981, Civil Code)

Doribel Can Exercise the Right of Representation

16. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.

Delia and Edmundo Cannot Exercise the Right of Representation

17. A different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these
rights do not include the right of representation.

18. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

Bagunu vs. Piedad

Diaz vs. IAC
DelaPuerta vs. CA
Pascual vs. Bautista
Manuel vs. Ferrer
Vertad vs. CA
Cacho vs. Udan
Sarita vs. Candia
Abellana de Bacayo vs. Borromeo
Bicomong vs. Almanza
City of Manila vs. Archbishop
Torres vs. Lopez
NEPOMUCENO vs. CA 139 SCRA 206 October 9, 1985 Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: The deceased Martin Jugo left a Will and testament disposing of his
properties. Under the Will, the testator devised to his forced heirs, namely his wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno. It appears that since 1952
the deceased had been separated from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife.
Being appointed as the sole executor of the Will petitioner then filed a petition for
the probate of the last Will and testament of the deceased Martin Jugo with the CFI.
Herein private respondents, Rufina and her children filed an opposition to said
petition alleging that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to be cohabiting with petitioner, the Will's admission to probate
will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
On appeal, the CA declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of
petitioner is null and void. Thus, the properties so devised were ordered by the CA
to be passed intestacy to private respondents in equal shares. Hence this petition.
The petitioner contends that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor
cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other
proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities
required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and
Testament itself expressly admits on its face the relationship between the testator
and the petitioner merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v.
Felix Nuguid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly
drawn,
it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor
of herein petitioner.
HELD: NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring
the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A
will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null
and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring
it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which
are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

Pastor vs. CA
Sanchez vs. CA
Nazareno vs. CA
Mendoza vs. CA
Aznar Brothers Realty Co. vs. CA March 07, 2000
327 SCRA 359
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: A lot in Lapu-Lapu City was acquired by Aznar from the heirs of Crisanta
Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy the property by mere tolerance.
Later, Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corp.
for a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. Demands by Aznar
for respondents to leave failed and thus, a case for unlawful detainer was filed with
MTCC.
Respondents alleged that they are the successors of the 8 children of late Crisanta.
They had been residing and occupying the property in concept of an owner since the
time of their parents and grandparents. They claimed that the extrajudicial partition
of real estate with deed of absolute sale is void for being simulated and they knew of
such fraud only in 1991 when Aznar entered the land. They filed with the RTC
complaint seeking to declare the document null and void.
MTCC ordered the respondents to vacate. It delved into issue of ownership to
resolve issue of possession. Aznar acquired ownership by such document executed
by heirs of Crisanta.
As to allegations that the two signatories were not heirs of the registered owners;
that some signatories were already dead at the time of execution; that many heirs
were not parties to the extrajudicial partition, MTCC held that such were in form of
negative pregnant, having the effect of admitting that the vendors were heirs and
had legal right to sell the land. Though some heirs did not sign, the document is
annullable, not void.
RTC granted during pendency of appeal the writ of execution because the failure of
the respondents to file a supersedeas bond. Sheriff padlocked the houses, but
respondents still re-entered. Aznar then filed for writ of demolition. RTC affirmed
MTCC’s ruling and granted the writ of demolition.
CA reversed RTC, declaring the respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of
the land. There was no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession of the . It
held that since not all heirs participated in the partition, the instrument is void and
could not be registered. Aznar is also estopped to assert ownership since in the
reconstitution proceedings of the title, it admitted in the pleading that property
were never conveyed by decreed owners. Also, from 1988 to 1993 (filing of case), it
never registered the extrajudicial partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer should be granted
RULING: YES. In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de
facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided without resolving
the issue of ownership, the court may receive evidence upon the
question of title to the property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession.
Respondents have set up the defense of ownership and questioned
the title of AZNAR to the lot.
Respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta participated in the
extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made
parties were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant
rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with
preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be
proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but
the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share
which belongs to him." No evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records.
As to the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105
provides: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person." The participation of non-heirs does
not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to
them.
Respondents also allege that some of the persons who were made parties to the
deed were already dead, while others were still minors. Moreover, the names of
some parties thereto were misspelled, and others who knew how to read and write
their names were made to appear to have affixed only their thumbmark in the
questioned document. Likewise, the signatures of those who were made parties
were forged.
The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or death
certificates were presented to support such. What respondents adduced as evidence
was merely a family tree, which was at most self-serving.
It was only when the case was on appeal with the RTC that they presented a
photocopy of the certificate of death of Francisco Aying, son of Crisanta Maloloy-on,
who reportedly died on 7 March 1963. This certificate was allegedly issued on 17
January 1992 by the Parish Priest of Virgen de Regla Parish, Lapu-Lapu City. The fact
remains, however, that this photocopy was not certified to be a true copy.
It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a
notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It
is admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity and is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face.
It must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the
same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof; hence, the
presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands.
Anent the non-annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale in
the reconstituted title, the same does not render the deed legally defective. It must
be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give
the conveyance legal effect as between the parties and the vendors heirs. As
between the parties to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and
effective.
The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers
to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the
deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their
obligations thereunder. Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent
transferees of the subject lot is involved. Thus, the conveyance executed in favor of
AZNAR by private respondents and their predecessors is valid and binding upon
them, and is equally binding and effective against their heirs.
The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer
or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting rights over
registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title
of the properties." This principle has no bearing on the present case.
It appears on the face of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale that
the same was registered... The registration was under Act No. 3344 on unregistered
lands allegedly because at the time, no title was existing in the files of the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, as it was allegedly lost during the last world war.
The Court did not agree with the CA and the that Aznar is in estoppel to assert
ownership over the subject property because of its own allegation in the petition for
reconstitution:
That certificates of title were issued thereto but were lost during the
last world war. That the same were not conveyed much less offered as a collateral for
any debt contracted or delivered for the security of payment of any obligation in favor
of any person or lending institution.
The words "the same" in the second sentence of the afore-quoted paragraph clearly
refers to the certificates of title. This means that the certificates of title, not
necessarily the subject lot, were not conveyed or offered as a collateral but were lost
during the last world war. Indeed, it would be very absurd and self-defeating
construction if we were to interpret the above-quoted allegation as CA did, for how
could petitioner, who is claiming ownership over the subject property, logically
allege that the property was not sold to it?
It bears repeating that petitioners claim of possession over the subject lot is
anchored on its claim of ownership on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale. Our ruling on the issue of the validity of the questioned deed is
solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession and is to be regarded merely
as provisional, without prejudice, however, to the final determination of the issue in
the other case for the annulment or cancellation of the Extrajudicial Partition with
Deed of Absolute Sale.

RALLA VS. UNTALAN

L-63253-54
APRIL 27 1989
Facts: Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his will in the
RTC of Albay. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (herein petitioner
substituted by heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.

At the same time, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother,
Paz. With this case, the brothers agreed to amicably compromise via project
partition, whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their
deceased mother was divided between them.

In the course of the proceeding for the probate of Rosendo, Pablo filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in
the allowance of the will of his late father for its probate would no longer be
beneficial to him. This motion was denied, it was also denied at the CA. In its
decision the CA said, indeed the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings
were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for
inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo comprising 149 parcels of land
from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the
exclusion and prejudiced of hi s brother who was being deprived of his successional
rights. Consequently, the court declared Pedro and Pablo the only heirs of Rosendo
who should share equally upon the division of the latter’s estate and thereupon
converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

After eleven years, one Joaquin Chancoco brother in law of Pablo filed a petition for
the probate of the same will of Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him
P5000. The petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of Pablo
was appointed special administrator, over and above the objections of the heirs of
Pedro. In taking possession, Teoderico also took possession of the 63 parcels of land
subject of the partition earlier.

Judge Untalan orderd that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo and thereafter proceed as
probate proceedings. After 2 years, Judge Untalan reconsidered his order and held
that the project partition is respected and upheld.

Petitioners filed an MR but was denied hence the instant case.

Issue: Whether the partition should be regarded or respected in view with the
probate proccedings of the estate of Rosendo

Ruling: Verily, the rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after
the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus this rule invoked, is
inapplicable in the instant case where there are two separate cases each involving
the estate of two different person comprising dissimilar properties.
The project partition is valid and binding upon the brothers as well as upon their
heirs especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their
respective shares. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them
and embodied in the document of partition.

Thus the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of
the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo.

Petition dismissed.

Balanay vs. Martinez

Plan vs. IAC