in$ that reason and freedom are ntcessary conditions for morality More

specifically, he claimed that the Categorical Imperative is justified precisely

because reason and freedom form its foundation-and ethical action cannot
consistently undrrnline its own foundation, From a reasonably skeptical
point of view, however, one could say that Kant failed to prove that the Cat-
egorical Imperative is truly obligatory> since he failed to show that reason
and freedom have dbsol~temoral value. For even if reason and freedom are
"necessary" for morality to be pcsssibie, this contention does not prove that
they dhne have inherent moral value and, hence, that they must nlwdys be
respected.
But instead of thinking of Kant's Categorical Imperative as being justified
by an unconvincing proof, one can conceive of it as inherent1y self-justify fng
o r foundational. That is, one can think of the Categorical Imperative as a
kind of moral assumption-as long as one values reason and freedom highly
enough. In &is case, one must be sufficiently persuaded &at ehc cxyacities ro
reason and act freely are uniquely "good-in-themselves" and, therefore, that
compromising them in any way would be morally inconsiscent, The Cate-
gorical Imperative itself would tben be understood as a first principlc-a
perfectly reasonable move for those who think of reason and free will as
having such a high moral value. The self-evident way to proceed would re-
w i r e one ro consislently justify and condemn aceions for all r a t i o n 4 free
beings, regardless of differences in culture and personal taste. O r to put it
crudely, one has come to assume the truth of the "golden rule" that whatever
is juseihcd for one person is justified for another, all ather things being equal.
So Kant's ethics wiH be most attractive to tlrose who take f-reedom to be
the central morat value; and its categorical dernands might even be convinc-
ing to those who take f-reedom to be the only genuine moral value. But now
consider a second example: Bentham and Mill's Principle of Utility. Accord-
ing to this principle, the only thirrg &at has inherent morat worth is happi-
ness, so actions are considered moral only in proportion to the happiness,
benefit, or utility they produce. Happiness therefore constirutes the only
"proof" this utilitarian ethic can appeal to, since "ultimate ends are not
ammable to direct proof,"Gmcd more acc.crrafely3then, the Principle of
Utility can be thought of as a self-justifying first principle for those who are
persuaded that happiness alone is desirable in itself.' In that case, happiness
would be rhe sole end of human action and, &erefore, the only tbing &at has
intrinsic moral worth. The moral necessity of bringing about the greatest
amount of happiness (general happiness) is taken to follow, even if this can
be brought about only at the expense of one%sown hagpiness.
At this point, I hope it is clear that there can be--and often is--a conflict
between Kantian and utilitarian principles. Indeed, different assumptions
about what has intrinsic moral worth can take us down very dift'crent moral