Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Lawrence W. Barsalou
Emory University
10 November 2009
Abstract
Thirty years ago, grounded cognition had roots in philosophy, perception, cognitive
linguistics, psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuropsychology.
During the next twenty years, grounded cognition continued developing in these areas,
and also took new forms in robotics, cognitive ecology, cognitive neuroscience, and
developmental psychology. In the past ten years, research on grounded cognition has
grown rapidly, especially in cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, cognitive
psychology, social psychology, and developmental psychology. Currently, grounded
cognition appears to be achieving increased acceptance throughout cognitive science,
shifting from relatively minor status to increasing importance. Nevertheless, researchers
wonder whether grounded mechanisms lie at the heart of the cognitive system or are
peripheral to classic symbolic mechanisms. Although grounded cognition is currently
dominated by demonstration experiments in the absence of well-developed theories, the
area is likely to become increasingly theory-driven over the next thirty years. Another
likely development is the increased incorporation of grounding mechanisms into
cognitive architectures and into accounts of classic cognitive phenomena. As this
incorporation occurs, much functionality of these architectures and phenomena is likely
to remain, along with many original mechanisms. Future theories of grounded cognition
are likely to be heavily influenced by both cognitive neuroscience and social
neuroscience, and also by developmental science and robotics. Aspects from the three
major perspectives in cognitive science—classic symbolic architectures,
statistical/dynamical systems, and grounded cognition—will probably be integrated
increasingly in future theories, each capturing indispensable aspects of intelligence.
According to classic theories, the core amodal data structures that exist independently
knowledge representations in cognition are of the brain’s modal systems. Instead—
amodal data structures processed according to a positive definition of grounded
independently of the brain’s modal systems for cognition—the environment, situations, the
perception, action, and introspection.1 From body, and simulations in the brain’s modal
this perspective, the core representations in systems constitute the central representations
cognition differ from representations in modal in cognition. From this perspective, the
systems, function according to different cognitive system utilizes the environment and
principles, and reside in a modular semantic the body as external informational structures
system (Tulving, 1983). Grounded cognition that complement internal representations. In
is often defined negatively as the view that turn, internal representations have a situated
classic theories are incorrect: The core character, implemented via simulations in the
knowledge representations in cognition are not brain’s modal systems, making them well-
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suited for interfacing with external structures. Cognitive linguists, such as Talmy (1983),
The Past Thirty Years Langacker (1987), and Fauconnier (1985),
Grounded cognition has a venerable proposed cognitive grammars and mental
history over two millennia, existing long spaces grounded in experience as accounts of
before modern cognitive science. Pre- language and thought. In cognitive ecology,
scientific accounts of the human mind, from Hutchins (1995) documented the distributed
ancient philosophers (e.g., Epicurus, 341- nature of cognition across the environment,
270BC/1987), to British Empiricists (e.g., situations, and agents. In robotics, Brooks
Berkeley, 1710/1982; Hume, 1739/1978; (1991) and Kirsh (1991) advocated
Locke, 1690/1959), to twentieth century incorporating the environment and the body
philosophers (e.g., Price, 1953; Russell, 1919), into a new generation of robots. In cognitive
assumed that modal images represent neuroscience, Kosslyn (1994) and Jeannerod
knowledge, analogous to current views. Even (1995) demonstrated that mental imagery
nativists (e.g., Kant, 1787/1965; Reid, arises in the brain’s modal systems for
1785/1969) frequently discussed modal images perception and action, corroborating earlier
in knowledge (among other constructs). behavioral research on imagery. In
Around thirty years ago—peripheral to the developmental psychology, Thelen and L.
amodal approaches that emerged from the Smith (1994) demonstrated that the
Cognitive Revolution—grounded cognition environment, the body, and the motor system
took a variety of forms in cognitive science. In play central roles in the development of
philosophy, Searle (1980) proposed the intelligence. In cognitive psychology,
Chinese Room Problem as an example of how Barsalou (1993, 1999) proposed that
amodal representations in cognition are knowledge is grounded in a compositional
typically ungrounded. In cognitive linguistics, system of perceptual symbols.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) proposed The past ten years have witnessed an
conceptual metaphor theory, conjecturing that explosion of research on grounded cognition.
bodily experience grounds abstract concepts. Not only has the salience of this work
In ecological optics, Gibson (1979) proposed increased dramatically, it has increasingly been
that the environment plays important roles in viewed as challenging dominant theories. One
supporting the internal processes underlying of the most significant areas has been cognitive
perception. In cognitive psychology, Paivio neuroscience, where researchers such as Martin
(1971), Shepard and Cooper (1982), and (2001, 2007), Pulvermüller (1999, 2005), and
Kosslyn (1980) developed clever behavioral Thompson-Schill (2003) performed
paradigms to demonstrate that perceptual neuroimaging on tasks that engage memory,
representations implement mental imagery in knowledge, language, and thought. Of interest
higher cognition. In psycholinguistics, was the general finding that the brain’s modal
Bransford and Johnson (1973) and Clark and systems become active as people perform these
Marshall (1981) demonstrated that situations tasks, suggesting that higher cognition is
play central roles in establishing the semantics grounded in modal systems. In social
of sentences and texts, along with the neuroscience, researchers such as Rizzolatti
pragmatics of common ground. In cognitive and Craighero (2004) and Decety and Grèzes
neuropsychology, Warrington and Shallice (2006) found that as non-human primates and
(1984) demonstrated that lesions in the brain’s humans perceive social situations, they run
modal systems constitute one source of deficits simulations in their motor and affective
in category knowledge, suggesting that modal systems to comprehend social action, generate
systems play roles in representing knowledge. empathy, and engage in other social processes.
Although these lines of research captured In cognitive psychology, many researchers
significant interest in the cognitive science including Glenberg (1997), Zwaan (2004),
community, they had relatively little influence Gibbs (2006), Hegarty (2004), W. Prinz
on the dominant amodal theories of the time. (1997), Wilson (2002), Wilson and Knoblich
Over the next twenty years, grounded (2005), Rubin (2006), and Barsalou (2008a),
cognition continued evolving, but again found that sensory-motor variables affect
remained relatively peripheral. Philosophers diverse tasks associated with perception,
continued to stress the seriousness of the action, memory, knowledge, language, and
grounding problem (e.g., Harnad, 1990). thought, implicating the brain’s modal systems
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Author Notes
Address correspondence to Lawrence W. Barsalou, Department of
Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322
(barsalou@emory.edu,
http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/index.html).
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Footnotes
1
Introspection includes the internal perception
of motivational states, affective states, goals,
beliefs, cognitive operations, meta-cognition,
and so forth.