1
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
GLORIA Z. GARBO, petitioner, vs. CA,
JUDGE ENRIQUE T. JOCSON of the RTC
of Bacolod City, Branch 47, and ANTONIO
B. GRADIOLA in his capacity as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
MAGDALENA B. GARBO, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS: On March 22, 1989, the RTC appointed
petitioner Gloria Z. Garbo administratrix of the intestate
estate of Manuel G. Garbo.
3 months later, or on June 21, 1989, the intestate
estate of Manuel G. Garbos wife, Magdalena B. Garbo,
filed a petition for the allowance of Manuel G. Garbos
Last Will and Testament which devised and
bequeathed all of Manuels properties and assets
exclusively to his wife Magdalena.
The administratrix, Gloria Z. Garbo filed her opposition
thereto.
On Aug 16, 1990, the court issued an Order allowing
the Will to be probated and appointed private
respondent Antonio B. Gradiola, as administrator of the
estate of Manuel G. Garbo.
The letters of administration previously issued to
petitioner was accordingly recalled.
On Aug 31, 1990, petitioner filed her notice of appeal
and, subsequently, her record on appeal.
Contending that pertinent pleadings were not included
in the record on appeal, private respondent objected to
its admission.
The probate court issued an Order dated Oct 15, 1990,
requiring petitioner to submit an amended or corrected
record on appeal x x x within 10 days from receipt.
Petitioner filed her compliance not by filing the
amended record on appeal but by attaching the omitted
pages to be annexed or inserted to the original record
on appeal which private respondent stressed in his
opposition to compliance dated Dec 11, 1990,
to be improper as it failed to follow what was required
by the Oct 15, 1990 Order.
On Feb 5, 1991, private respondent moved for the
dismissal of petitioners appeal.
3 days after or on Feb 8, 1991, the probate court
through an Order gave petitioner 5 days within which
to comment on the motion to dismiss appeal.
However, neither the required comment nor the
amended record on appeal was filed, thus the probate
court dismissed the appeal in its Order dated Feb 15,
1991.
Meanwhile, on Sept 6, 1990, the probate court directed
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of
private respondent.
Protesting that the issuance of letters of administration
is unjustified in view of her pending notice of appeal
and the alleged non-finality of the Aug 16, 1990 Order,
petitioner, on Sept 27, 1990, filed her motion for
reconsideration.
The probate court in its Order dated January 29, 1991
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before respondent CA to set aside the probate courts
Order dated Feb 15, 1991 dismissing her appeal, and
Order dated Sept 6, 1990, directing the issuance of
letters of administration.
CA: dismissed the petition, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration but
without success.
ISSUE: whether or not the probate court and
respondent Court of Appeals properly dismissed
petitioners appeal.
Petitioner argues that she has substantially complied
with the probate courts order to submit an amended
record on appeal and that she is entitled to the liberal
application of the rules.
She cites Grearte v. The London Assurance as
authority to bolster her contention.
RULING: the petitioners contention devoid of merit.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress,
was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants
to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberality in the interpretation and application of the
rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
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The instant case is no exception to this rule. FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Juanito and
Agustina Obedencio, a Civil Case for Specific
Petitioner offers no cogent reason and none appears Performance at the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan
on record to justify her failure to file her amended or de Oro. They prayed that the SSS be ordered:
redrafted record on appeal as directed by the probate (1) to cancel the mortgage on the properties of
court twice despite the vehement objection of the the spouses;
private respondent. Petitioners failure, if not an (2) to release the documents covering the said
obstinate refusal to comply with the probate courts properties; and
orders is fatal. (3) to pay the spouses moral damages in the
sum of P80,000; litigation expenses in the
In correcting a record on appeal, Rule 41, Section 7 of sum of P5,000; and attorneys fees in the
sum of P20,000.
the Rules of Court requires the appellant, within the
time limited in the order, x x x, [to] redraft the record by
The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim
including therein, in their proper chronological
alleging that the private respondents had an unpaid
sequence, such additional matters as the court may
obligation in the amount of P48,188.72 as of Sept 1,
have directed him to incorporate, and shall thereupon
1994.
submit the redrafted record for approval, upon notice to
the appellee, in like manner as the original draft.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on Feb 16, 1995.
Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant branch
The submission of the redrafted record on appeal as
manager of the SSS in Cagayan de Oro City and
well as its approval are essential to perfect an appeal
allegedly the only lawyer of the said branch, entered
in special proceedings, as in this case.
his appearance as counsel for the petitioner.
Petitioner simply failed to comply with the requirements
He manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief
of the rule, hence the Order of Aug 16, 1990,
through registered mail.
consequently lapsed into finality.
The hearing was, however, cancelled because the
It is a settled rule that once an order or decision
respondent judge was indisposed.
acquires finality it may not be altered or modified save
in some exceptional circumstances none of which,
The hearing of the case was reset on April 18, 1995.
however, is present in this case. Moreover, Rule 41,
This time, Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of an
Section 13 of the Rules of Court is quite explicit:
official mission to Zamboanga City from April 7 to May
Sec. 13. Effect of failure to file notice, bond,
or record on appeal. - Where the notice of 8, 1995 involving SSS cases.
appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is
On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the
not filed within the period of time herein
respondent spouses, respondent judge issued an
provided, the appeal shall be dismissed.
Order dated April 18, 1995 declaring petitioner in
default and allowed private respondents to present
The dismissal of petitioners appeal was, therefore,
their evidence ex-parte.
beyond cavil.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
As a last ditch effort to extricate and excuse herself
praying for the lifting of the order of default. The motion
from her failure to file the amended record on appeal
was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated May 22,
petitioner draws some parallelism between this case
1995.
and Grearte v. The London Assurance wherein,
petitioner emphasized, the Court liberally construed
On August 16, 1995, the petitioner appealed the Order
Rule 41, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.
The case of Grearte is not in point. While there appears
to be some similarity of facts between the instant case
CA: In its Decision of Feb 29, 2000 - dismissed the
and Grearte we nonetheless note that in the latter case
petition.
respondents therein filed the required amended record
on appeal. In the instant case, however, petitioner
SC RULING:
never bothered to do so. Reliance on Grearte is thus
We deny the petition.
misplaced.
There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner vs. HON. judge to declare a party-defendant as in default for
NAZAR U. CHAVES, RTC, BR. 18, MISAMIS failure to appear at a pre-trial conference.
ORIENTAL, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY and SPS.
JUANITO & AGUSTINA OBEDENCIO, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
3
The declaration of default for non-appearance at a pre-
trial conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court, thus:
- A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference
may be non-suited or considered as in default.
To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec.
3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that the
defendant must file a motion under oath to set aside
the order of default; that he must show that his failure
to appear at the pre-trial was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect and accompany the
motion with affidavit of merit.
A motion to lift order of default should be under oath,
verified and accompanied with an affidavit of merit.
Aside from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, the motion to lift the order of default
must further show that the defendant has a meritorious
defense or that something would be gained by having
the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the
motion is not accompanied by affidavits of merits, it
may properly be denied.
A perusal of petitioners motion to lift order of default
shows that it is neither under oath nor accompanied by
an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing.
There was also no showing, save in the instant petition,
that it has meritorious defense or that something would
be gained by having the order of default set aside.
Thus, the trial Court correctly denied petitioners
motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SC MR:
On March 16, 2000, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, petitioner through the OSG now assails the
Decision and Resolution of the appellate court, alleging
that,
THE CA, BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally
construed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court in order to protect the
substantive rights of the parties.
B. Petitioner has the right to have its day in court
in order to present its meritorious defense
against the unfounded and baseless claim of
respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
The core issue particular to this case is whether the
default order of the lower court should be lifted, so that
substantial justice would prevail over technical rules.
PETITIONER CONTENDS:
Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now Section 6
and Section 2, Rule 20 (now Section 4, Rule 18 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and invoking our
pronouncements in Rinconada Telephone Company,
Inc. v. Buenviaje, Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and Alonso v. Villamor, the
petitioner asserts that although respondent judge has
the discretion to declare a defendant in default for
failure to appear during pre-trial conference, the strict,
rigid and arbitrary application thereof denied the
petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present its
meritorious defense, refute the evidence of the private
respondents, present his own, and exercise his right to
due process. The petitioner contends that the rules
should be liberally construed in order to protect the
substantive rights of the parties.
Citing further Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete and Lucero v.
Dacayo, petitioner suggests that its Motion for
Reconsideration was in substance legally adequate,
whether or not it was verified with an affidavit of merit
since the form of the motion by which the default was
sought to be lifted is secondary and the requirements
of Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court need not be
strictly complied with, unlike in cases of default for
failure to answer. In sum, petitioner begs for the liberal
construction of the rules.
Petitioner further avers that contrary to the
unsubstantiated claim of private respondents, their
obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of Sept 1, 1994,
remains outstanding. This is evidenced by the
statement of account prepared by the SSS Real Estate
Loans Department. Consequently, petitioner
concludes, private respondents had yet no legal right
to demand from petitioner the release of the mortgage
over their property.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CONTENDS:
Private respondents, in turn, insist that petitioner
violated Section 2, Rule 20, (now Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 18) of the Revised Rules of Court and Sections 4
and 5, Rule 15 as amended on July 1, 1997.
RULING:
Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to
comply not only with one rule. Other than failing to
appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not deny that its
Motion for Reconsideration to lift the order of default
lacked verification, notice of hearing and affidavit of
merit. If not accompanied by affidavits of merit, the trial
court has no authority to consider the same.
A motion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed and
the trial court has no authority to consider the same

where it was not under oath and unaccompanied by an
affidavit of merit.
In effect, the petitioner failed to set aside the order of
default and must suffer the consequences thereof.
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules they are to be followed, except only
when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Here,
the petitioner has not shown any persuasive reason
why he should be exempt from abiding by the rules.
Accordingly, the order declaring the petitioner in default
and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default
are juridically unassailable.
We must stress, however, that a judgment of default
against the petitioner who failed to appear during pre-
trial or, for that matter, any defendant who failed to file
an answer, does not imply a waiver of all of their rights,
except their right to be heard and to present evidence
to support their allegations. Otherwise, it would be
meaningless to request presentation of evidence every
time the other party is declared in default. If it were so,
a decision would then automatically be rendered in
favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly to the
tenor of his prayer. The law also gives the defaulting
parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs,
despite the default of defendants, are still required to
substantiate their allegations in the complaint.
In the instant case, private respondents claim that they
had fully paid their obligation with the SSS. They allege
that they already paid P63,000, an amount that
exceeded their supposed accountability of P56,427. In
their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-211 for Specific
Performance filed before the RTC, they ask that
petitioner be ordered to cancel the mortgage on their
properties, to release the documents covering the said
properties and to pay them damages, litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
We note, though, that petitioner had earlier filed an
answer stating that the private respondent spouses
had an unpaid obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as
of September 1, 1994. Likewise, before the petitioner
was declared in default its counsel, Atty. Filoteo, had
manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief by
registered mail.
We also note that when the respondent judge issued
the default order, it allowed private respondents to
present their evidence ex parte. With the pre-trial brief
and answer of petitioner, the trial court could then
proceed to evaluate the evidence like receipts, if any,
of the private respondents against the allegations of the
petitioner, to determine the private respondents
outstanding obligation, a crucial factual question in this
4
case. The petitioners averment that the private
respondents outstanding balance is P48,188.72 as of
September 1, 1994 should be weighed against the
private respondents own evidence that they had fully
paid their obligation to petitioner.
In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case through a preponderance of
evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of that of his opponent. The private
respondents cannot railroad the release of the
mortgage through a default order. The determination of
the accurate outstanding balance of the private
respondents should first be resolved before the release
of the subject mortgage can be demanded. In this case,
when the evidence during trial proves unsatisfactory
and inconclusive as to the full payment of private
respondents obligation to SSS, then the mortgage
should not yet be cancelled prematurely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated February 29, 2000, and the
Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals,
are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
FELINO QUIAMBAO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD,
Represented by its CHAIRMAN FEDERICO S.
COMANDANTE and MEMBERS, ATTYS. ROBERTO
T. AGAGON and ADELAIDA T. AGUILOS of the
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, RAUL S.
IMPERIAL, Police Chief, Philippine National Police
and ESPIE S / L CATOLICO, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On Dec 22, 1990, at around 8pm, Espie Catolico
(Catolico) was walking along Capulong Street in
Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of her
housemaid Gynalin Garais who left the house the day
before.
After having asked her neighbors and bystanders to no
avail, an old woman told her that a certain policeman
was looking for her as her housemaid was in his
custody. She went to the area as directed by the old
woman but there she was allegedly accosted by
petitioner, PO3 Felino Quiambao, a member of the
PNP, Western Police District Command, and 5 other
persons.
Quiambao and his companions forcibly took Catolicos
handbag and carried away its contents consisting of
precious assorted merchandise, jewelry and other
personal items worth approximately P9,000.00.
Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his
owner-type jeep and brought her to the dimly lit portion
of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slapped her on
5
the face several times and warned her not to look
anymore for her housemaid.
In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement
on 24 June 1991 with the PNP Inspectorate Division,
accusing petitioner and 6 others, with robbery-holdup
and mauling committed on Dec 22,1990. The complaint
was corroborated by Grace Commendador who
witnessed the actual incident and confirmed the
statement of Catolico.
On Aug 22, 1991, Catolico filed another administrative
complaint with the Office of the Hearing Officer at
NAPOLCOM, Western Police District, Manila, charging
petitioner with grave misconduct for the same incident
which occurred on Dec 22, 1990.
An investigation was conducted on this administrative
charge by the Office of the Hearing Officer of
NAPOLCOM.
On 30 March 1993, the case was forwarded to the City
of Manilas Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) for
adjudication.
The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an
investigation on the charges filed.
On 31 Oct 1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing
Officer (SDHO) recommended the dismissal of
petitioner. This recommendation was approved by
Raul S. Imperial (Acting PNP Chief).
Petitioner appealed the Oct 31, 1992 resolution to the
National Appellate Board (NAB) of the NAPOLCOM.
On Oct 25 1993, the Third Division of the NAB,
rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner
from police service. The motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated Dec
27, 1993.
But it was only on Sept 23, 1996 when petitioner
received a certified xerox copy of the Resolution of the
NAB denying his petition for reconsideration.
On Oct 7, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with
the CA. On 10 Jan 1997, the appellate court dismissed
the petition for review for lack of merit.
CA: The appellate court ruled that the petition did not
state all the specific material dates showing that it was
filed within the reglementary period provided by law as
it failed to state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated Dec 27, 1993,
denying his motion for reconsideration of NABs
decision dated Oct 25, 1993.
It found out that NABs decision dated 25 October 1993
was received by petitioner on 22 November 1993, and
on Dec 2, 1993, he filed his motion for reconsideration.
The said motion, however, was denied on Dec 27,
1993, but according to the appellate court, petitioner
did not disclose the date when he received such denial.
The fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals started to run from
such date.
Further, the appellate court ruled that the issue of
which administrative disciplinary authority had
jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only
for the first time before it. He did not raise it before the
SDHO nor before the NAB.
More importantly, it found that the PNP Inspectorate
Division had original, exclusive and summary
jurisdiction over the instant case, and that NAB did not
commit any reversible error in deciding the appealed
case without a priori pronouncement as to which
among the disciplinary authorities under RA No. 6975
had jurisdiction over the case.
It also added that NABs not having all the records
requested by petitioner after it had rendered its
decision did not necessarily mean that it did not have
such documents at the time it rendered its decision.
Petitioner’s claim was further belied by the fact that
Catolico was able to obtain certified true copies of the
relevant documents which the PNP Chief transmitted
to the NAPOLCOM.
Additionally, the appellate court found that a perusal of
the annexes to the comment of Catolico would readily
show that NAB resolved petitioners case based on
substantial evidence appearing on the record before it.
It observed that petitioners claim that his case was
decided on the basis of an incomplete record was
merely an afterthought. Said defense was not raised by
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of NABs
decision dated 25 October 1993. Likewise, petitioner
was not denied due process as he was afforded
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit his
evidence before the SDHO and to appeal to NAB the
decision of the Acting PNP Chief dismissing him from
the police service, the Court of Appeals ruled.
On Jan 27,1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration followed by
the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on Feb 17,
1997. On the same day, the appellate court issued a
Resolution denying petitioners motion for extension of
time.
On 5 March 1997, it issued a resolution stating that the
Motion for Reconsideration was merely NOTED, the
Resolution dated 10 January 1997 being already final.
Hence, the instant judicial recourse.
ISSUE:

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred and
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition is
not meritorious.
He specifically assigns the following as errors which
need to be rectified, to wit:
(1) that the appellate court ruled that petition did
not state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27
December 1993 to determine if it was filed
within the reglementary period;
(2) that the appellate court sustained the findings
of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB without
first resolving and/or giving a reason why it
was the Acting PNP Chief and neither the
NAPOLCOM Hearing Officer nor the PLEB
that had the power to hear and decide the
case;
(3) that the appellate court sustained, through
misapprehension of facts and/or contrary to
evidence, the decision of NAB which was not
based on the complete records of the case;
(4) that the appellate court ruled that the petition
was not meritorious and sustained the
findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB
although such findings were arrived at without
a hearing and absent substantial evidence;
(5) that the appellate courts denial of the motion
for reconsideration was based on purely
technical considerations; and
(6) that the appellate court had been passive to
Catolicos surreptitious introduction into the
records of the case evidentiary documents of
which petitioner was not furnished and to the
latters prejudice.
The petition is not imbued with merit.
Readily glaring upon examination of the petition filed by
petitioner is its title Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The title would immediately lead us to conclude that the
petition is primarily anchored on Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under this mode of appeal, only questions of law may
be entertained by this Court and factual issues raised
are beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues
raised by petitioner in the petition are fundamentally
factual in nature which are inappropriate for resolution
via the mode of review he availed of.
However, a perusal of issues in the petition would
indicate that the petition is actually anchored on Rule
65 as the issues principally sought to assail the
resolution rendered by the appellate court on the
6
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, even assuming that the petition was
brought under Rule 65, the petition would still not lie as
the implausibility of the grounds on which the petition
rests are convincingly manifest and the grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
the core of this mode of review is strikingly wanting.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
an excess, or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, questions of
fact are not generally permitted, the inquiry being
limited essentially to whether or not the respondent
tribunal had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
These grounds under Rule 65 are not attendant in the
instant case. Even if we take this case as so
exceptional as to permit a factual review, the petition at
bar fails to persuade us to rule in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in holding that the petition was not
meritorious since the petition filed with the appellate
court did not state the date when petitioner received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December
1993 to determine if the petition was indeed filed within
the reglementary period. There is reason basis for such
contention.
The petition with the appellate court by petitioner
substantially complied with Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95. The pertinent portion of the circular
reads,
SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and
issues involved and the grounds relied pon for the review;
(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies
of such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in Revised
Circular No. 28-91. The petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period
fixed herein.
7
The records reveal that the petition filed with the Court
of Appeals by petitioner provides the following, 18
On December 27, 1993, respondent National Appellate
Board rendered its Resolution denying the motion in this
manner:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit on this instant petition, the
same is hereby denied.
A certified xerox copy thereof, duly RECEIVED BY
PETITIONER ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1996 is hereto
attached as ANNEX M.
A reading of the foregoing allegation, however,
disclosed the fact that on 27 December 1993, NAB
rendered a resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous as
it is unnatural that the purported resolution was
received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, we
are inclined to sustain petitioners assertion for the
same is supported by the certified xerox copy of the
resolution and the evidence is bereft of any showing
that will warrant a contrary conclusion. Thus, the
aforecited allegation substantially complied with the
requirements under Section 6. The appellate court
believed that petitioner had already been served with a
copy of the resolution prior to 23 September 1996.[37]
Such a conclusion, however, is bereft of any
evidentiary basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It is
noteworthy that the date when petitioner received
NABs resolution denying his motion for reconsideration
is material in determining when the fifteen (15)-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals starts to run.
The failure to specifically state in the petition on
material dates such as the date when the resolution or
order denying a motion for reconsideration was
received is a ground for dismissal in accordance with
Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule 43.
But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for the
aforecited paragraph 18 of the petition filed with the
appellate court reflected the date when petitioner
actually received the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration, which is 23 September 1996.
Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and
applied so as not to frustrate substantial justice that this
Court seeks to achieve.
Now, on substantial issues rather than on mere
technicality.
The pivotal questions posed in this petition are whether
the Acting Chief of the PNP had authority to conduct
summary dismissal proceedings over members of the
PNP and whether the summary dismissal of petitioner
was sufficiently established by the evidence on record.
RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which took effect on Jan 1,
1991, defines the structural components, powers and
functions of the PNP as the citizens guardian of peace
and order and enforcer of the law.
The statute likewise delineates the procedural
framework in pursuing administrative complaints
against erring members of the police organization. Sec
41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a
complaint against an erring member of the
PNP may be filed, thus;
Section 41. (a) Citizens Complaints. Any complaint by an
individual person against any member of the PNP shall be
brought before the following:
(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is
punishable by withholding of privileges,
restriction to specified limits, suspension or
forfeiture of salary, or any combination
thereof, for a period not exceeding 15 days;
(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the
offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits,
suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any
combination thereof, for a period of not less
than 16 days but not exceeding 30 days;
(3) Peoples Law Enforcement Board, as
created under Section 43 hereof, where the
offense is punishable by withholding of
privileges, restriction to specified limits,
suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any
combination thereof, for a period exceeding
30 days; or by dismissal. . . .
It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP
member which would warrant dismissal from service is
within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section
41 should be read in conjunction with Section 42 of the
same statute which reads, thus:
Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and
Regional Directors. - The Chief of the PNP and regional
directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may
immediately remove or dismiss any respondent PNP
member in any of the following cases:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of
guilt is strong;
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges;
and
(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer.
Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are
vested with the power to summarily dismiss erring PNP
members if any of the causes for summary dismissal
enumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power
to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of
PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and
regional directors. This shared power is likewise
evident in Section 45.

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary
action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by
the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional
appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy
of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the
National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, That the regional or
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide
the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice
of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional
appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall
render the decision final and executory without prejudice,
however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the
Secretary. (Emphasis ours)
Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining
authorities under R.A. No. 6975, the latter shall acquire
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although
other disciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction
over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section 41 explicitly
declares this point.
(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction A complaint or a charge filed
against a PNP member shall be heard and decided
exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired
original jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the
existence of concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense;
Provided, That offenses which carry higher penalties
referred to a disciplinary authority shall be referred to the
appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense.
(Emphasis ours)
Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional
directors have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases filed against members of the PNP
which may warrant dismissal from service.
This Court in Summary Dismissal Board and the
Regional Appellate Board, PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City
v. Torcita recognized the authority of both the
Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate
Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, to act on 12
administrative complaints filed against C/Insp. Lazaro
Torcita, even though the controversy occurred in 1994,
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. The Court further
declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary
dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and regional
directors, among others in cases, where the
respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police
officer.
Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the rules
and regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal
proceedings against erring PNP members and defines
conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section
3(c), Rule II, as follows:
Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers to any
behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank,
done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or
otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously
compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in
such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of
8
moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any
PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman,
seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and
exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member
of the organization.[42]
The same Memorandum Circular also defines the
phrase serious charge as a ground for summary
dismissal of PNP members. This includes charges for
commission of heinous crimes and those committed by
organized/syndicated crime groups wherein PNP
members are involved, gunrunning, illegal logging,
robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave trade,
illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drug
trafficking, falsification of land title and other
government forms, large scale swindling, film piracy,
counterfeiting, and bank frauds. Clearly, the robbery-
holdup and mauling incident which occurred on 22
December 1990 fall under the summary dismissal
power of PNP Chief and regional directors.
In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct
against petitioner was first filed by Catolico before the
PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991. However,
another case was filed by Catolico with the Office of the
Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD, on 22 August
1991. The charges filed with the PNP Inspectorate
Division were investigated, and on 31 October 1992,
the SDHO recommended the dismissal of petitioner
which was approved by the Acting PNP Chief.
Petitioner appealed the case to the NAB which affirmed
the decision of the Acting PNP Chief. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Thus, in accordance
with paragraph (c) of Section 41, the PNP Inspectorate
Division had acquired exclusive original jurisdiction
over the complaint of Catolico to the exclusion of other
investigating body. It is as if the second complaint filed
by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer,
NAPOLCOM, WPD, had not been filed.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Acting
PNP Chief and the NAB were bereft of jurisdiction to
rule on the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the
earliest opportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction before the PNP Inspectorate Division nor
with the NAB but only before the appellate court.[43]
Despite the existence of a jurisprudential rule [44] that
jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, an equitable exceptional rule has also
been laid down by this Court bars a party from raising
jurisdictional question on ground of laches or
estoppel.[45] Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may
be estopped from raising such questions if he has
actively taken part in the very proceedings which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction
in the event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him.[46]
Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in
affirming the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the
NAB, which was arrived at without hearing and
substantial evidence. We are not persuaded.
Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges
9
together with copies of affidavits and other attachments
supporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer,
together with supporting documents. It is true that
consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the
hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the
hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take
the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-
examination is confined only to material and relevant
matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained.
Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was
approved by the Acting PNP Chief whose decision was
affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB was also
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The unanimity in their
conclusions cannot just be disregarded and their
factual determinations are conclusive upon this Court
for the records show that petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to defend his side, as he filed
position papers to substantiate his defense and
arguments and even filed motions for reconsideration
to set aside adverse decisions rendered against him.
This opportunity to defend himself was more than
sufficient to comply with due process requirements in
administrative proceedings.
Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of the government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special and technical
training and knowledge of such agency.
Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the
evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their
adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the
authority to take judicial notice of facts within their
special competence.
The instant case filed by Catolico is an administrative
case for grave misconduct against petitioner for the
alleged robbery-holdup and mauling incident that took
place on 22 December 1990. In resolving
administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is not
indispensable to dispense justice to the parties. The
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings.
Submission of position papers may be sufficient for as
long as the parties thereto are given the opportunity to
be heard. In administrative proceedings, the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. This constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an action or a ruling. It does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion is required. Thus, findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and
even finality by the Supreme Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise
on the specific matters under their consideration.
Thus, factual determinations made by the SDHO and
the NAB as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this
Court, they being triers of facts. The congruence in
their conclusion forecloses any possibility of reversible
error or misappreciation of facts. Such being the case,
we cannot but affirm their common conclusion as
petitioner failed to advance substantial and convincing
evidence and arguments that will merit the reversal of
prior decisions on the case.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 10 January 1997
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
BARCENAS, et al. vs Sps. TOMAS, G.R. No.
150321, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses Tomas filed a case for recovery
of ownership and possession of real property with
damages against the heirs of Veronica Tolentino. The
Complaint stated that after the death of Benedicto
Guerzon, Veronica’s husband, the latter sold a 1-ha
portion of her undivided share in a 14.6-ha property in
Nueva Ecija. Respondents took possession of the
property immediately after the sale.
In 1989, the Spouses however migrated to the United
States leaving the lot in possession of Victoriano
Tomas. On April 13, 1989, the heirs of Veronica
executed an Extrajudicial Partition of the entire Nueva
Ecija property. Thus, a new title was issued in the name
of Maximo Guerzon, one of the heirs.
The respondent Spouses presented a Deed of Sale
evidencing the sale of the 1-ha lot and also showed
through an Affidavit that Veronica’s children
subsequently confirmed the sale. The Petitioner heirs
however denied knowledge of the two documents.
The MTC of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija held that the
Respondent Spouses had the better right of
possession over the property. The RTC-Branch 33 of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija affirmed this ruling.
In the Court of Appeals, the court dismissed the
Petition for Review on several grounds, including the
fact that the pleadings filed with the lower court had not
been appended to the Petition in contrary to Section
2(d) of Rule 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the lower courts
committed a grave and serious error in giving
evidentiary weight to the purported Deed of Sale
and Affidavit as proof of the alleged sale even if
said documentary exhibits have not been properly
identified by a competent witness.
HELD: NO
The argument that this Court should reverse the factual
findings because certain facts or circumstances of
import have allegedly been overlooked or
misinterpreted by the lower courts is unavailing. That
kind of review is done only with regard to factual
findings of the CA -- and there are none here -- not of
the RTC or the MTC.
To satisfy the incessant call of petitioners for a factual
review, the Court -- despite the foregoing invocations -
- nonetheless looked over the records. It found no
adequate basis for their claims.
First, the evidence did not show that petitioners had
presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof that
the notarized Deed of Sale was false. Without that sort
of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its execution, as well as the
statements and the authenticity of the signatures
thereon, stand.
Second, no evidence was presented to establish the
fact that the Affidavit confirming the sale had been
forged. Forgery cannot be presumed. Whoever alleges
it must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
Daikoku Electronics Phils v. Alberto Raza
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: In January 1999, Daikoku hired respondent
Alberto J. Raza as company driver, eventually
assigning him to serve as personal driver to its
president, Mamuro Ono (Ono). By arrangement,
Alberto, at the end of each working day, parks the car
at an assigned slot outside of Ono’s place of residence
at Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City.
On July 21, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m., Alberto, after
being let off by Ono, took the company vehicle to his
own place also in Makati City. This incident did not go
unnoticed, as Ono asked Alberto the following morning
where he parked the car the night before. In response,
Alberto said that he parked the car in the usual
condominium parking area but at the wrong slot.
On July 24, 2003, Alberto received a show-cause
notice why he should not be disciplined for dishonesty.
A day after, Alberto submitted his written explanation
of the incident, owning up to the lie he told Ono and
apologizing and expressing his regret for his mistake.
10
Following an investigation, the investigation committee
recommended that Alberto be suspended for 12 days
without pay for the infraction of parking the company
vehicle at his residence and for deliberately lying about
it.
The committee considered Albertos voluntary
admission of guilt and apology as mitigating
circumstances.
Daikokus general affairs manager, however, was
unmoved and ordered Alberto dismissed from the
service effective August 14, 2003. Dishonesty and
other work related performance offenses appeared in
the corresponding notice of termination as grounds for
the dismissal action.
Alberto sought reconsideration but to no avail,
prompting him to file a case for illegal dismissal.
LA: On Jan 15, 2005, the labor arbiter, on the finding
that Albertos dismissal was predicated, among others,
on offenses he was neither apprised of nor charged
with, rendered judgment for Alberto, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the complainants
dismissal unlawful, respondents are
hereby directed to reinstate complainant to
his former position without loss of seniority
rights and other benefits
SO ORDERED.
The labor arbiter also determined that the ultimate
penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the
offense actually committed and charged.
From the labor arbiters ruling, Daikoku appealed to the
NLRC
On July 11, 2005, pending resolution of Daikokus
appeal, Alberto filed before the NLRC a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt and to Compel Them to Pay
Complainant for the company’s alleged refusal to
reinstate him. In his accompanying affidavit, Alberto
alleged, among other things, that he reported back to
work on June 24, 2005. But instead of being given back
his old job or an equivalent position, he was asked to
attend an orientation seminar and undergo medical
examination, at his expense. To compound matters,
the company deferred payment of his backwages and
some other benefits. These impositions, according to
Alberto, impelled him to stop reporting for work.
NLRC: dismissed Daikokus appeal for failure to perfect
it in the manner and formalities prescribed by law.
Acting on Daikokus MR, however, the NLRC issued a
11
Resolution dated May 31, 2006, reinstating Daikokus
appeal, setting aside the arbiters Jan 15, 2005
appealed decision, and denying Alberto’s motion to cite
the company for contempt.
The assailed Decision dated January 15,
2005 of the Labor Arbiter is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby
entered declaring that complainant was
validly dismissed from his employment.
Nevertheless, for failure to reinstate
complainant Alberto J. Raza pursuant to
the Labor Arbiters Decision, respondent
DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. is
hereby ordered to pay him his wages from
11 March 2005 up to the promulgation of
this Resolution.
Alberto sought reconsideration of the above ruling.
Daikoku also moved for reconsideration on the
backwages aspect of the NLRC resolution. On July 31,
2006, the NLRC issued a resolution explicitly denying
only Albertos motion.
Obviously on the belief that the NLRCs July 31, 2006
resolution also constituted a denial of its own motion
for reconsideration, Daikoku went to the CA via a
petition for certiorari, to assail the NLRC Resolutions
dated May 31, 2006 and July 31, 2006.
The same NLRC resolutions were also assailed in
Alberto’s similar petition to the appellate court. Both
petitions, while involving the same parties and
practically the same subject and issues, were not
consolidated in the CA.
Meanwhile, on Oct 30, 2006, Alberto filed before the
CA a Motion for Summary Dismissal and to Cite
Petitioner in Direct Contempt, alleging that the assailed
NLRC resolutions of May 31 and July 31, 2006 have
become final as against Daikoku which filed out of time
a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
CA: On September 26, 2007, rendered the assailed
decision dismissing Daikokus appeal as well as
denying Alberto’s contempt motion.
The CA anchored its denial of Daikokus petition on the
interplay of the following stated grounds or premises:
(1) prematurity of the petition for certiorari, the NLRC
not having yet resolved Daikokus motion for
reconsideration of the NLRCs May 31, 2006 resolution;
(2) even if the matter of prematurity is to be
disregarded, the NLRC May 31, 2006 resolution has
become final and executory as to Daikoku as its motion
for reconsideration was filed out of time; and (3) there
is no compelling reason for the relaxation of procedural
rules.
ISSUES:
the question of timeliness of Daikokus motion for
reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution.
RULING:
Motion for Reconsideration Belatedly Filed
As the records show, Daikoku admitted receiving a
copy of the May 31, 2006 NLRC resolution on June 16,
2006. It only filed its motion for reconsideration on July
3, 2006, or 17 days after the receipt of the May 31,
2006 resolution. Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC 2005
Rules of Procedure pertinently provides:
SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION. Motions for
reconsideration of any decision, resolution
or order of the Commission shall not be
entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors; provided that the
motion is x x x filed within 10 calendar
days from receipt of decision,
resolution or order, with proof of service
that a copy of the same has been
furnished, within the reglementary period,
the adverse party; and provided further,
that only one such motion from the same
party shall be entertained.
Applying the above provision to the case at
bench, Daikoku had 10 days from June 16,
2006 when it received the May 31, 2006
NLRC resolution, or until June 26, 2006, to
be precise, within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. As it were, Daikoku filed
its motion for reconsideration of the May
31, 2006 NLRC resolution on the 17th day
from its receipt of the said resolution. The
motion for reconsideration was doubtless
filed out of time, as the CA determined.
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural rules cannot
be made without any valid reasons proffered for or
underpinning it. To merit liberality, petitioner must show
reasonable cause justifying its non-compliance with the
rules and must convince the Court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration
of substantive justice. Daikoku urges a less rigid
application of procedural rules to give way for the
resolution of the case on its merits.
The desired leniency cannot be accorded absent valid
and compelling reasons for such a procedural lapse.
The appellate court saw no compelling need meriting
the relaxation of the rules. Neither does the Court.
We must stress that the bare invocation of the interest
of substantial justice line is not some magic wand that
will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone

dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights.
Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized
by harping on the policy of liberal construction.
Daikokus substantial rights, if any, may still be amply
addressed in the appellate proceedings Alberto
instituted and pending before the CA.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated
September 26, 2007 and Resolution dated Feb 7, 2008
in CA are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
WAIVER OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. L-10100 August 15, 1916
GALO ABRENICA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA,
ARAULLO, J.:
This case was brought by the plaintiff to compel the
defendant to return to him the two parcels of land
described in the complaint which he alleges were sold
by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on
Feb 21, 1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of
7 years.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to
deliver said property to him when, upon the expiration
of the period mentioned, he tried to redeem the same
and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum.
The first of the defendants, Manuel Gonda (who had
already sold said parcels to the other defendant
Marcelino de Gracia, for which reason the latter was
also made a party defendant) alleged that about 19
years ago he was the sole possessor and owner of said
parcels, and in the course of the trial endeavored to
prove that they had been sold to him by the plaintiff and
his mother.
ISSUE: whether said two parcels of land were sold
under right of repurchase by the plaintiff to the
defendant for the period of seven years, for the sum of
P75, or whether they were conveyed to the defendant
in absolute sale by the plaintiff's parents.
The justice of the peace - reached the conclusion that
the proofs introduced by the plaintiff were entitled to the
greater credit and, on the grounds that the plaintiff had
not yet lost his right to recover the lands from the
defendant Gonda and that the sale made by this
defendant to the other defendant De Gracia, supposing
it to be genuine, could have no legal effect as Gonda
was not the true owner of the land,
12
entered judgment in behalf of the plaintiff and against
the two defendants whereby he ordered each and both
of them to return and deliver to the plaintiff the parcels
of land claimed by him, after payment to Gonda of the
sum of P75 that had been deposited with the clerk of
the court, and assessed the costs against the
defendants in equal shares.
The court made no finding in regard to the damages
demanded by the plaintiff as there was no evidence to
show that any had been caused. The defendants
moved for a new trial. Their motion having been
overruled, they excepted to the ruling and, by proper
bill of exceptions, appealed to the Supreme Court.
In this instance the appellants allege in the first place
that the trial judge erred in holding that he had
jurisdiction to try the case, and in trying the same in
spite of the fact that the Act which authorizes justices
of the peace to try by assignment cases filed with the
Court of First Instance is unconstitutional.
Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the
defendant did in fact challenge the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace of the provincial capital to try the
case at bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041 of the
Philippine Legislature is unconstitutional. In deciding
this question, said justice of the peace held that he did
have jurisdiction and immediately proceeded to enter
judgment in the manner aforestated.
This Supreme Court has held on various occasions,
among them in the decision rendered on December 24,
1914, in the case of Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29 Phil.
Rep., 116) that said Act No. 2041 is valid and does not
conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902; that a justice of the peace, acting under
the designation under the law just referred to, acts not
as a justice of the peace or holds a justice's court, but
acts as a judge of the zone of first instance and holds,
in effect, a Court of First Instance; and finally, that for
this reason the objection that this case falls within that
of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the
one cited by the appellants in their brief to show that
the error aforementioned was incurred), is not well
taken. This assignment of error cannot, therefore, be
sustained.
The second error assigned by the appellants to the
judgment of the trial court consists, as they maintain, in
that the court founded its judgment on inadmissible and
illegal evidence which was rejected by the same court
during the course of the trial.
In effect, the plaintiff ought to have proven that on
February 21, 1906, he sold, under right of repurchase
for the period of seven years, the two parcels of land
mentioned in the complaint, or, what amounts to the
same thing, that a contract of sale with right of
repurchase (or one of pledge or mortgage, as it was
improperly called in the complaint and so termed by the
plaintiff) was entered into between this latter and the
defendant, on the date aforementioned, in respect to
13
said parcels of land.
The plaintiff, testifying at the trial in regard to the
existence of the contract, stated that it was a verbal one
between himself and said defendant. Assuredly such a
contract could not be proven a trial, except by means
of some written instrument in accordance with the
provisions of subsections 1 and 5, section 335, of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff, however, having
been placed on the stand as a witness by his on
attorney, testified at length and answered all the
questions asked him with respect to the said contract,
the details of the same, the persons who witnessed it,
the place where it was made, and various other
circumstances connected with its execution. These
questions and answers cover six pages of the record,
and yet the defendants' counsel raised no objection to
the examination, aside from challenging one of the
questions as leading and another of them as irrelevant.
It seems that only when the examination was
terminated did counsel for defendants move to strike
out all of the testimony given and statements made by
plaintiff in regard to the contract, on the ground that the
period for the fulfillment of the contract exceeded one
year and that it could not be proven except by means
of a written instrument. The court sustained this motion,
to which an exception was entered by the plaintiff.
Defendants' counsel moved that the case be dismissed
on the ground that, as the aforementioned testimony
was stricken out, there was no proof of the contract.
This motion being denied by the court, counsel
excepted to the ruling and on cross-examination put
several question to the plaintiff relative to the plaintiff's
ownership in said parcels of land and the manner in
which he acquired it. Among these questions some
were asked which bore upon the answers given by the
plaintiff on direct examination regarding the existence
of the contract by which, according to the plaintiff, the
defendant Gonda came to hold said parcels. These
questions on cross-examination and their respective
answers are as follows:
CARINGAL: (To the plaintiff). Prior to the day on which the
defendant Manuel Gonda went to see you or to visit you in the
house of Domingo Tamayo, you had not spoken to him with
regard to the pledge of some land of yours, had you? —
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you then take advantage of that circumstance of
his having gone to visit you? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You knew then that he was married, did you not? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you not think of necessary to speak to Manuel
Gonda's wife about the mortgage? —
A. No, sir, because I considered him as an uncle of mine.
xxx xxx xxx
CARINGAL: So that you knew, did you, that it was Manuel
Gonda who paid the land tax? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who paid the land tax before the lands were pledged?
—
A. I could not declare them before they were pledged. I
have not yet paid the land tax, because I have not been able
to declare those lands.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Tell us where Manuel Gonda was living on the date
when, as you said, the pledge was made. —
A. In the barrio of Moson.
Q. Of Taal or Bauan? —
A. Bauan.
Q. What is the distance between the then domicile or
residence of Manuel Gonda and the house of Domingo
Tamayo in which you were living? —
A. I think it is the same as between Bauan and Taal.
Q. And notwithstanding that distance, Manuel Gonda went
purposely to take the money to you? —
A. He took the money to the house of Domingo Tamayo.
Q. Was there no written contract of that mortgage? —
A. No, sir.
That is all.
Continuing to present evidence, the plaintiff put three
witnesses on the stand and they were examined.
One of them, Juan Carandang, testified in regard to the
plaintiff's ownership and possession of the lands. The
court sustained a motion by defendants' counsel to
strike out one of the statements made by this witness
in which he stated that he knew by hearsay that said
lands had been "pledged".
Another of these witnesses, Domingo Tamayo,
testified that he was present at the time the plaintiff
asked the defendant for the P75 mentioned in the
complaint, and when the agreement was made with
regard thereto between the two men in connection with
the so-called pledge of the lands in question. He also
testified that he received that sum from the defendant,
at the plaintiff's suggestion.
And, finally, the third witness, Pedro Mendoza, also the
plaintiff's, testified that he was present when the money
was tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and
heard the latter tell the witness Domingo Tamayo to
receive it. He stated that Tamayo did in fact take the
money.
In the course of the examination of these witnesses,
the defendants' counsel moved that their testimony be
stricken out. The court sustained one of these motions,
while as to the rest of them be said that counsel's
motion would be taken under consideration; later, when
one of these witnesses, replying to a question by the
court, stated that the contract was not executed in
writing, the court said that the motion was sustained,
but, notwithstanding this ruling, and immediately after
it had been made, the defendants' counsel put the
following question to this witness on cross-
examination:
Q. Do you remember positively that it was on a Sunday
the first time, and on a Tuesday or a Wednesday the second
time, that Manuel Gonda went to your house and delivered the
money? —
A. Yes, sir.
The court finally granted the motion of counsel for defendants
for strike out the testimony given by this witness. Counsel for
plaintiff excepted to this ruling.
Now then, it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of
evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper

time, and that if not so made it will be understood to
have been waived. The proper time to make a protest
or objection is when, from the question addressed to
the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissiblity of the
evidence is, or may be, inferred.
A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence
from the record is useless and ineffective if made
without timely protest, objection, or opposition on the
part of the party against whom it was presented.
Objection to the introduction of evidence should be
made before the question is answered. When no such
objection is made, a motion to strike out the answer
ordinarily comes too late. (De Dios Chua Soco vs.
Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658).
In the case of Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko (15 Phil.
Rep., 387) in which one of the points discussed was
the inadmissibility of parol evidence to prove contracts
involving real property, in accordance with the
provisions of section 335 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, no objection having been made to such
evidence, this court said:
A failure to except to the evidence because it does not
conform with the statute, is a waiver of the provisions
of the law.
An objection to a question put to a witness must be
made at the time question is asked. (Kreigh vs.
Sherman, 105 Ill., 49; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed., 932.)
Objections to evidence and the reason therefor must
be stated in apt time." (Kidder vs. McIlhenny, 81 N. C.,
123; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed., 933.)
It is held in general that by failing to object to the proof
of an oral contract a party waives the benefit of the
statute and cannot afterward claim it. (20 Cyc., 320,
where several decisions on the subject are cited.)
Many rulings have been made in regard to this matter
by the courts of the United States, and among them we
cite a few found in volume 46 of the American Digest,
page 933:
Where plaintiff without objection proved by parol
evidence that certain land belonged to him, defendant
cannot afterwards object that the deed should have
been produced. (Clay vs. Boyer, 10 Ill. [5 Gilman], 506.)
After a question has been repeatedly asked and
answered without objection, it is too late to object to its
repetition on the ground that the answer is in itself
inadmissible. (McKee vs. Nelson, 4 Cow., 355; 15 Am.
Dec., 384.)
An objection to the admission of evidence on the
ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has
been given, is too late. (In re Morgan, 104 N. Y., 74; 9
N. E., 861.)
14
Plaintiff having testified to conversation between
defendant's son and himself until the direct
examination extended through about 12 folios,
defendant could not sit by and then objet to the
"foregoing testimony." (Boehme vs. Michael, 5 N. Y. St.
Rep., 492.)
The first witness to testify at the trial was the plaintiff
himself. From the first question put to him, it clearly
appeared, as may be seen in folios 5, 6, and 7 of the
stenographic notes, that the contract of pledge or
mortgage of the lands, as the plaintiff himself
improperly calls it, or the sale of said lands with right of
repurchase, between him and the defendant Gonda,
was a verbal one and for the period of seven years,
made in the course of a conversation between the
plaintiff and said defendant in the house of Domingo
Tamayo. The defendants' counsel, however, did not
endeavor immediately to obtain from the witness a
statement as to whether that contract was set forth in
any instrument; he did not object to the witness'
continuing to testify in regard to the contract, nor did he
in any way object to the questions they continued to
ask the witness concerning the matter, though he did
object to one question as leading and to another one
as irrelevant, thus indicating that he had no other
objection to make to those questions. Only after
witness, the plaintiff, had finished answering all the
questions put to him on the subject of the contract, did
counsel for the defendants move that all of his
testimony and statements be stricken out. It is obvious
that the court should not have granted that motion; but
we must also bear in mind that the court did not grant
other similar and subsequent motions made during the
examination of the other witnesses; he merely said that
he would take them under advisement. The fact that
the defendants' counsel asked various cross-
questions, both of the plaintiff and of the other witness,
in connection with the answers given by them in their
direct examination, with respect to particulars
concerning the contract, implies a waiver on his part to
have the evidence stricken out.
It is true that, before cross-examining the plaintiff and
one of the witnesses, this same counsel requested the
permission of the court, and stipulated that his clients'
rights should not be prejudiced by the answers to those
witnesses in view of the motion presented to strike out
their testimony; buy this stipulation of the defendants'
counsel has no value or importance whatever,
because, if the answers of those witnesses were
stricken out, the cross-examination could have no
object whatsoever, and if the questions were put to the
witnesses and answered by them, they could only be
taken into account by connecting them with the
answers given by those witnesses on direct
examination.
As no timely objection or protest was made to the
admission of the testimony of the plaintiff with respect
to the contract; and as the motion to strike out said
evidence came to late;
15
and, furthermore, as the defendants themselves, by the
cross-questions put by their counsel for the witnesses
in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to
have it stricken out, that evidence, therefore, cannot be
considered either inadmissible or illegal, and court, far
from having erred in taking it into consideration and
basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding the fact
that it was ordered to be stricken out during the trial,
merely corrected the error he committed in ordering it
to be so stricken out and complied with the rules of
procedure hereinbefore cited.
The lower court was guided by the evidence in making
that finding, for it was proved that the plaintiff sold to
the defendant Gonda for the period of seven years,
with right of repurchase, the two aforementioned
parcels of land, on February 21, 1906, for the sum of
P75, Philippine currency. The testimony of the plaintiff
himself and of the witnesses Juan Carandang,
Domingo Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza, of which
mentioned is made in the judgment, proves those facts.
As against this testimony, the defendants presented
that of one of themselves, Manuel Gonda, who stated
that said two parcels of land were sold to him outright
by the plaintiff Galo Abrenica and his mother, Mamerta
Bonio, more than 19 years ago, for the sum of P75; but
this allegation was in no matter proven, for, having
stated that an instrument of sale was executed but that
it had been lost, he furnished absolutely no proof of the
existence of the instrument, nor of any such sale
having been made between himself and the plaintiff.
This defendant did, indeed, exhibit a copy of the
affidavit filed by him on May 26, 1906, in the
municipality of Taal, for the purpose of the assessment
of a piece of land which he says included the two
parcels in question; but the plaintiff has explained why
the tax declaration of said parcels was not made by
him, but by the defendant Gonda. It is easily
understood that the latter might have made this
declaration on May 26, 1906, that is, three months after
the land had been sold to him by the plaintiff under right
of repurchase, inasmuch as said defendant had been
the owner of said parcels since the month of February
of the same year and, by reason of said sale, was to be
their owner for seven years, so long as the plaintiff did
not make use of his right to redeem them. On the other
hand, the very fact that the defendant Gonda did not
declare these parcels of land before May 26, 1906, is
proof that he did not purchase them outright from the
plaintiff and the latter's mother 19 years ago.
As the plaintiff made use of his right to recover the
property within the period stipulated by the contract and
which did not exceed ten years, and as he deposited
with the clerk of the court the sum of P75, the price of
the purchase, in due time, the defendant is not entitled
to oppose the recovery, and the said parcels of land
must be delivered to the plaintiff, even though they be
in the possession of the other defendant, Marcelino de
Garcia, to whom they were sold by his codefendant
Gonda,
for the latter could not sell them to De Gracia except
under the condition that they could be repurchased by
the plaintiff within the said period of seven years.
Even still less right could the defendant De Gracia have
to retain possession of these lands, if the contract
executed between the plaintiff and Manuel Gonda had
been one of mortgage (as it was styled all along by the
plaintiff and the defendants at the trial and by the lower
court himself in the judgment appealed from) for, as the
defendant Gonda was not the owner of the lands, he
could not lawfully convey them to his codefendant.
There being no proof that any damages was caused to
the plaintiff by the defendants' refusal to return said
parcels of land to him, no finding should be made
against the defendants with respect thereto.
We therefore affirm the judgment appealed from, with
the costs of this instance against the appellants. So
ordered.
SCC Chemicals Corp. VS CA
353 SCRA 70 (2001)
Facts: On December 13, 1983 petitioner SCC
Chemical Corporation (SCC) obtained a loan through
its chairman private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice
president, Pablo Bermundo from State Investment
House Inc. (SIHI) in the amount of Php 129,824.48.
Private respondents executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay the obligation on maturity date. SCC
failed to pay the loan and despite demands, no
payment was made.
SIHI filed a case of sum of money against SCC with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against private
respondents. SCC contends that SIHI has no cause of
action because the promissory note was null, void and
no binding effect. During the pre-trial stage, no
settlement was reached however, stipulation of facts
was agreed upon, thus, the case proceeded to trial.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The
cross- examination of the said witness was postponed
despite being calendared many times. SCC or its
counsel failed to appear several times, thus, the RTC
declared SCC to have waived its right to cross-examine
the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
SCC elevated the case to CA and contended that SIHI
had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence,
that the latter had a case against it; and that the witness
presented to prove its claim was incompetent because
he had no personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC
also contended that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the documentary
exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence
by SIHI. The appellate court affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not judicial admission requires proof.
2. Whether the testimony of the witness is a hearsay
evidence and thus inadmissible.
RULING:
1. No. A judicial admission requires no proof.
Petitioner’s admission as to the execution of the
promissory notes by it through private
respondents Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial
sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness
of the signatures. The admission having been
made in stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the ROC.
2. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value. However, the rule does
admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object to hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be
found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It
is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified
to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to
cross-examine may be waived. The repeated
failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is
an implied waiver of such right.
NO VESTED RIGHT IN THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. L-1164 Sept 17, 1903
MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL.,Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
HENRY HOSKYN,Defendant-Appellant.
WILLARD, J.:
The only exception in this case was to the judgment,
and the only question before us in the bill of exceptions
is whether that judgment is supported by the findings
of fact stated in the decision.
It appears from the decision that Doña Petrona Inarda
bought the land in question in 1855 from Don Pablo
Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death,
in 1876, when Don Miguel Aldeguer, their grandfather,
was appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four
children, the present plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel
sold the land to one Martinez, who sold it to the
defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to
Martinez, Don Manuel stated that he acquired the
property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia twenty-
four years before. The court finds that this declaration
was the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had
any title to the land.
16
1. The appellant defendant below assigns as error that
the court found from parol evidence alone the
existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo
and Doña Petrona. It is true the court says that no
documentary evidence was received on this point, but
it is also stated that the existence of a written contract
was proved, as also its record in the registry of
property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by
the plaintiffs in 1892, its subsequent destruction with
other papers in the case, and the contents thereof.
After such preliminary proof had been made, parol
evidence of the contents of the document was properly
received (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 284). Such a
ruling does not infringe section 795, par. 6, of said
Code, which provides "that nothing in this act contained
shall be so construed as to divest or injuriously affect
any property right that has already become vested
under existing law," even if under article 1221 or other
provisions of the Civil Code, after the destruction of the
instrument, such parol evidence of its contents could
not have been given. The general rule is that there is
no vested right of property in rules of evidence.
2. The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel
to Martinez proves nothing against the plaintiffs, either
according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or
according to the new Code (secs. 277 et seq.), and the
claim of the appellant to the contrary can not be
sustained.
3. It is claimed by the appellant that he has acquired
title by prescription, but the defense of the statute of
limitations, to have been available to the defendant in
this case, should have been set up in his answer. This
was not done. The court, therefore, made no finding
thereon.
4. The appellant has moved for a new trial in this court
under section 497, par. 2, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. This evidence is to the effect that one
Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in
question and never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.
Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency to the
showing of due diligence by the defendant, and as to
the failure to procure the affidavits of the proffered
witnesses, the motion must be denied on the ground
that such evidence is not "of such a character as to
probably change the result." The court finds that the
mother of the plaintiffs bought the land from Don Pablo
Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would be
immaterial. Such evidence would merely strengthen
the decision of the court. It would not overthrow it.
But the appellant says that the plaintiffs in their
complaint alleged that the mother bought the property
of Don Bonifacio. What took place during the trial we
do not know, but it is certain that evidence was
introduced showing that the purchase was made from
Don Pablo, because the court has so found.
17
We must presume that this was done without objection
on the part of the defendant, for no exceptions relating
to the matter appear in the record. If such objections
had been made, the court had power to allow the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the
name of Bonifacio and inserting that of Pablo.
The motion for a new trial is denied and the judgment
of the court below affirmed, with costs of this instance
against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty
days, reckoned from the date of this decision, judgment
shall be rendered accordingly, and the case is returned
to the court below for compliance therewith.
JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA
MAGDANGAL
G.R. No. 136368
January 16, 2002
FACTS: On Jan 22, 1981, Jaime Tan, for a
consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of
absolute sale over the property, parcel of land, with an
area of 34,829 square meters, situated in Bunawan,
Davao City in his name, in favor of spouses Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous
with the execution of this deed, the same contracting
parties entered into another agreement whereunder
Tan given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or
extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the
Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint
alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated
their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention
was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped
'received,' the Magdangals were able to have Tan's title over
the lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT
No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan,
who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan,
Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint. On June
4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr. wherein the
judgment was rendered that the plaintiff is ordered to
pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality
of this decision.
The Magdangals appealed to this Court and in a
decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court,
thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the
appealed decision of the lower court.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered
in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision has, on
October 21, 1995, become final and executory.
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the
lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND
WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not
appeal from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding
'[T]hat the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals has
become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or
up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption
period commences.
In opposition to this motion, Tan, Jr. alleged,
among other things, that until an entry of judgment has been
issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished
the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this
case cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the
point, Tan, Jr., citing Cueto vs. Collantes, infra., would then
assert that the period of redemption on his part commenced
to run from receipt of entry of judgment.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution
dated March 27, 1996, which he filed directly with this court,
prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution of the civil case. In a related
move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION
AND MOTION therein advising the court a quo of his
intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact
that, on such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the
repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original
decision. By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the
Magdangals be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited
and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, to reinstate the title
of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON
FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION
of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION
of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by the respondent
judge denied the motions for lack of merit.
The respondent judge wrote in the same order:
'Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120
days period for plaintiff to pay the amount of
P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned
from the date of Entry of Judgment x x x which
was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff made a deposit
on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period
mandated by the decision of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a
reconsideration. However, the respondent judge denied the
motion for being proforma and fatally defective.
ISSUE: What rule should govern the finality of
judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the
petitioner.
RULING: From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the
case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is
Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections
10 and 11 provide:

"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. -
If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed
within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book
of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of
its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the
judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is
ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its
execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of
execution shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to
any appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending
appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals at a time that it is in
possession of the original record or the record on appeal, the
resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the
lower court from which the case originated, together with a
certified true copy of the judgment or final order to be
executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the
proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs.
Collantes as follows:
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of
the lower court that plaintiff can still exercise his right of
redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day
period fixed in the original decision and, therefore,
defendants should execute the deed of reconveyance
required in said decision. Appellants contend that, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on
July 8, 1953, the 90-day period for the exercise of the right
of redemption has long expired, it appearing that plaintiff
deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only
on October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days.
Appellee brands this computation as erroneous, or one not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of
court.
Appellee's contention should be sustained. The original
decision provides that appellee may exercise his right of
redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the
judgment has become final. It should be noted that appellee
had appealed from this decision. This decision was affirmed
by the court of appeals and final judgment was entered on
July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became final
on that date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification.
Once a decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals a party
may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the date of
entry of such decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of
judgment is made after it has become final, i.e., upon the
expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties
(Section 8, Rule 53, as modified by a resolution of the
18
Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice
Moran has said, 'such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved
party's right of filing a petition for certiorari under this
section,' which means that 'the Court of Appeals shall
remand the case to the lower court for the execution of its
judgment, only after the expiration of ten (10) days from the
date of such judgment, if no petition for certiorari is filed
within that period.' (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that
the date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is
suspended when a petition for review is filed to await the
final entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme
Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for
review within the reglementary period, which was dismissed
by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for
reconsideration the entry of final judgment was made on
August 7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day period within
which appellee may exercise his right of redemption should
be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee
having exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by
depositing the redemption money with the clerk of court, it
is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of
such right is well taken and is within the purview of the
decision of the lower court."
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, amended the rule on finality of judgment
by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or
final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied
for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same
case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct
the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice
F.D. Regalado as follows:
"1. The term 'final order' is used in two
senses depending on whether it is used on
the issue of appealability or on the issue of
binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an
order is "final" if it disposes of the action,
as distinguished from an interlocutory
order which leaves something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al.,
L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of
binding effect or whether it can be subject of
execution, an order is 'final' or executory
19
after the lapse of the reglementary period
to appeal and no appeal has been
perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374,
Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et
al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs.
CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party
can secure certified true copies of the judgment or
final order of the appellate court and the entry
thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin
with and to justify his motion for a writ of
execution, without waiting for its receipt of the
records from the appellate court. That motion must
be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing
when the circumstances so require, to enable him
to file any objection thereto or bring to the
attention of said court matters which may have
transpired during the pendency of the appeal and
which may have a bearing on the execution sought
to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new
provision, is due to the experience of the appellate
courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its
own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly
delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion
for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion
in the same case while the records are still with the
appellate court, or even after the same have been
remanded to the lower court, the appellate court
can direct the issuance of the writ of execution
since such act is merely in the enforcement of its
judgment and which it has the power to require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality
of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property within
the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the
appellate court's entry of judgment. The appellate court,
however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule
retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the
case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be
given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has
well-delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:
Procedural laws are adjective laws which
prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer
to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice. They include
rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to
criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by
which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective
and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive
law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a
new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial
statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing,
do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule
against giving statutes retroactive operation whose
effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to
disturb vested rights does not prevent the application
of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their
enactment where they neither create new nor take
away vested rights. A new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively applicable to all
actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to
pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions.
The rule does not apply where the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides
that pending actions are excepted from its
operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under
appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive
application of procedural laws in the event that to do so
would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may
procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions
if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process
or impair the independence of the courts."
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure should NOT be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in
great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and
this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions
of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period
of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the
retroactive application of this procedural rule with the
rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the
laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he
made the redemption. The subject lot may only be
34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, "it is the
only property left behind by their father, a private law
practitioner who was felled by an assassin's bullet."
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To
lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of
reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The
manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the
change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right
of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
The decision of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC of Davao City are
REINSTATED.

Simon V. Chua G.R.
Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to
Elvin
Chan a Landbank Check dated December
26, 1996 worth P336,000.00
Dec 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account
closed.
After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary
attachment - MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment
Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia because there is already a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the
MeTC
Chan appealed to the CA – reversed and set aside
the
decision of the MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis
pendentia because the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which
became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable
to this case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an
independent civil action
HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the
framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed
by
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her
only the remedy, which in many cases results in a
Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.
To
do so may leave the offended party unable to
recover
even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense
of
the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
However, there is no independent civil action to
recover
20
the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention
of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action
for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez
(different facts): issuance of a bouncing check may
result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of
the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes
are different and non-interchangeable
In prosecutions of estafa, the offended
party may opt
to reserve his right to file a separate civil
action, or may
institute an independent action based on
fraud
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation
or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil
liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22,
2012
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates
Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of
the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of
the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of respondent with
Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of
San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first
marriage was already declared void ab initio in 2003.
Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to
her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. The
prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of
respondent on the ground that both wedding were
governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage.
21
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of
respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against
her.
HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the
respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial
declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy
charges against her.
Scope and applicability
Rule 128, Section 2
Rule 143
G.R. No. L-64204 May 31, 1985
DEL ROSARIO & SONS LOGGING ENTERPRISES,
INC., petitioner,
vs. NLRC, PAULINO MABUTI, NAPOLEO BORATA,
SILVINO TUDIO and CALMAR SECURITY AGENCY,
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: Feb 1, 1978, petitioner Del Rosario & Sons
Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a "Contract of
Services" with private respondent Calinar Security
Agency (Security Agency, for short) whereby the latter
undertook to supply the former with security guards at
the rate of P300.00 per month for each guard.
On Oct 4, 1979, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and
Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security
Agency and petitioner, for underpayment of salary,
non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay.
Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for
the same causes of action.
In its Answer, petitioner contended that complainants
have no cause of action against it due to absence of
employer-employee relationship between them. The
Security Agency also denied liability alleging that due
to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the
Contract of Services, it could not possibly comply with
the payments required by labor laws.
LA: on Dec 21, 1979 - rendered a Decision dismissing
the complaint against petitioner for want of employer-
employee relationship but ordering the Security
Agency to pay complainants the amounts sought by
them totaling P2,923.17.
NLRC: The Security Agency appealed to the NLRC, -
modified the Decision of the LA by holding that
petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and
severally, with the Security Agency on the ground that
petitioner is an indirect employer pursuant to Articles
106 and 107 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Reconsideration sought by petitioner having been
denied, this certiorari petition was instituted contending
that the NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal
despite the fact that it was not under oath and the
required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly
and severally liable with the Security Agency; and in
refusing to give due course to its Motion for
Reconsideration.
The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency
were not fatal defects. The lack of verification could
have been easily corrected by requiring an oath. 1 The
appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed. 2 In
the case of Panes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 3 we
held:
Clearly, failure to pay the docketing fees does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal,
Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court
(Nawasa vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 16 SCRA 536, 539 [1966]), and
discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently,
never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice
(Cucio vs. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA 401 [1974]).
Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an
appeal and such power must be exercised with sound
discretion and with a great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances. 4
It may be that, as held in Acda vs. MOLE, 119 SCRA
306 [1982], payment of the appeal fee is "by no means
a mere technicality but is an essential requirement in
the perfection of an appeal." However, where as in this
case, the fee had been paid, unlike in the Acda case,
although payment was delayed, the broader interests
of justice and the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits demanded that the appeal
be given course as, in fact, it was so given by the
NLRC. Besides, it was within the inherent power of the
NLRC to have allowed the late payment of the appeal
fee.
Moreover, as provided for by Article 221 of the Labor
Code "in any proceeding before the Commission or any
of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing
in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it
is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters
shall use every and an reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all
in the interest of due process."
Petitioner's joint and several liability with the Security
Agency was correctly adjudged. When petitioner
entered into a Contract of Services with the Security
Agency and the latter hired complainants to work as

guards for the former, petitioner became an indirect
employer of respondents-complainants pursuant to the
unequivocal terms of Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor
Code, as amended:
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor .— ...
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to
pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this
Code, the employer shag be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees
to the extent of the work performed under the contract,
in the same manner and extent that he is liable to
employees directly employed by him.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. —The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to
any person, partnership, association or corporation
which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the
performance of any work, task, job or project.
The joint and several liability imposed on petitioner and
affirmed herein, however, is without prejudice to a
claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the
Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may
have to pay to complainants. The Security Agency may
not seek exculpation by claiming that petitioner's
payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is
charged with knowledge of labor laws and the
adequacy of the compensation that it demands for
contractual services is its principal concern and not any
other's.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner's right to seek
reimbursement from Calinar Security Agency for such
amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SASAN vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank
(Equitable-PCI Bank) and HI (Helpmate, Inc.) for illegal
dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed
that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank
with respect to the activities for which they were
employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
messengerial services to the bank for more than one
year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which
they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal
by HI was null and void because the latter had no
power to do so since they had become regular
employees of E-PCIBank.
22
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a
Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the
bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an
independent job contractor engaged in the business of
providing janitorial and related services to business
establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients.
On the basis of the parties’ position papers and
documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate
job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the
required substantial capital or investment to actually
perform the job, work, or service under its own account
and responsibility as required under the Labor Code.
HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real
employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held
liable to petitioners.
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez,
respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to
the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling
of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into
consideration the documentary evidence presented by
HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof,
declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered
engaged in "labor-only contracting."
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners
sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA
affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a
legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally
dismiss petitioners. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional
evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases.
RULING: The submission of additional evidence
before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules
of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed
to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the
interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this
directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider
evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted
by the parties for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not
prejudice the other party for the latter could submit
counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving
evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because
23
technical rules of procedure are not binding in
labor cases.
Case: ONG CHIA v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS (328
SCRA 749)
Date: March 27, 2000
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts: Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in
Amoy, China. He arrived in Manila when he was 9
years old, since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found his employment and eventually started
his own business, married a Filipino with whom he had
4 children.
On July 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA
473 a.k.a. the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. On Chia, after stating his qualification and
the lack of disqualifications, stated that his petition for
citizenship was not acted upon by the Special
Committee on Naturalization, OSG, since the same
was not reconstituted after the February 1986
revolution.
During the hearings, Ong Chia along with 3 witnesses
testified as to his qualification. Since the Prosecutor
was impressed and decided not to counteract the
testimonies, the trial court granted the petition and
admitted Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
However, the State, through the OSG, appealed (with
annexed documents) contending that Ong Chia: (1)
failed to state all the names by which he is or had been
known i.e. Loreto Chia Ong; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of CA 473 i.e.
J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo; (3) failed to conduct himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire
stay in the Philippines i.e. he cohabited with his wife 8
years prior to their marriage (annexed is the marriage
contract in 1977 and Joint Affidavit of Ong Chia and his
wife); (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation
and his previous incomes has been insufficient or
misdeclared as per the annexed income tax returns;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence i.e. marriage
contract for the alleged first marriage before a judge in
1953.
The CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the
present petition by Ong Chia contending that CA erred
in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to it’s appellant’s brief. Not
having been presented and formally offered as
evidence, they are mere scraps of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value contrary to Rule 132, sec. 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that the
court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
Issue: WON the Revised Rules on Evidence applies in
the case
Held: No.
Ratio: According to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court:
“These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.”
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by Ong Chia is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not
the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decision in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of
the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Ong Chia claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before
the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process. The Court is
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object
to their admissibility. Ong Chia cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the
objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and,
at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on
the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767,"
a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct
case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, Ong

Chia offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents -
namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, Ong Chia's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and
his wife, and Ong Chia's income tax returns - are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath.
They are thus reliable.
Since Ong Chia failed to make satisfactory showing of any
flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity
of these documents, it is the Court’s conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
The Court additionally discussed the effect of Ong Chia's
failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his
petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address
appears on his Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a
document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his
1989 petition for naturalization. He admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since
the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial
compliance with §7. This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be
achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part
in any community where he may have lived at one time or
another.
It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant.
Admissibility of evidence
( Rule 128, section3 and 4 )
a. Requisites
i. Relevant

BSB Group v Go
Action: Petition for review under rule 45
Facts:
- BSB Group, Inc., presided by its herein representative,
Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go
and Sally Go-Bangayan, Bangayans wife, who was
employed in the company as a cashier, and was
engaged, among others, to receive and account for the
payments made by the various customers of the
company.
- Bangayan filed a case a complaint for estafa and/or
qualified theft[5] against respondent alleging that
24
respondent deposited customer checks to her
personal account on her Security Bank account in
Divisoria Branch.
- Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.
- The prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective
managers or records custodians of Security Banks
Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank
(now Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in
Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch which was
granted by the Trial Court
- Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena
noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit
filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made
of the said bank account
o while respondent characterized the
Metrobank account as irrelevant to the case,
she, in nevertheless waived her objection to
the irrelevancy of the Security Bank account
mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit,
inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to
address the allegations with respect thereto.
- the prosecution was able to present in court the
testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. Marasigans testimony
sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB
Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks
issued to the company by its customers, endorse the
same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her
personal deposit account with Security Bank.
- But before the testimony could be completed,
respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] invoking,
in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of
confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405 in relation to the
testimony and as well as the related documents to the
testimony.
- The trial court denied the motion
- The respondent elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
- The CA reversed set aside the assailed orders of the
trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.
- Arguments:
o Petitioner
 testimony dealing with
respondents deposit account with
Security Bank had a direct relation
to the subject matter of the case
for qualified theft and, hence,
brings the case under one of the
25
exceptions to the coverage of
confidentiality under R.A. 1405.
o Respondent
 the money represented by the
Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case,
because nothing in the criminal
information suggested that the
money therein deposited was the
subject matter of the case.
 She advanced the notion that the
term cash money stated in the
Information was not synonymous
with the checks she was purported
to have stolen from petitioner and
deposited in her personal banking
account.
Issue: Whether the testimony of Marasigan and the
accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case
Decision: Evidence is inadmissible
Ratio:
- In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes
deprivation of personal property of one by another
with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the
offended party has already ensued from such act of
execution.
- The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates
that evidence presented must have a tendency to
prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another.
- petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a
connection between the evidence subject of the
instant review, and the allegation of theft in the
Information by claiming that respondent had
fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name.
But this line of argument works more prejudice than
favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other
crime probably estafa
- Proof tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks
and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal
account, becomes not only irrelevant but also
immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in
evidence.
G.R. No. L-28607 February 21, 1929
PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHOENIX INSURANCE
COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a
corporation, defendant-appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a mercantile
partnership, for the purpose of recovering from the
Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the
sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss
alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on Aug
21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was
covered by policy of insurance No. 600217, for the sum
of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the
plaintiff. For answer, the defendant, Pheonix Insurance
Co., admitted the insurance of the policy of insurance
but, by way of special defense, alleged, among other
things, that the fire in question had been set by the
plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff had
submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent
claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of
the policy. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect
to the obligation created by the policy which was the
subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with interest from
the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys
received from salvage sales, conducted by the
defendant, of remnants of the insured stock. From this
judgment the plaintiff appelaed.
So far as liability under the policy of insurance which is
the subject of this action is concerned, we are of the
opinion that the defendant has sufficiently established
two defenses, either of which would be fatal to the right
of recovery, namely, first, that the fire was set by the
procurance or connivance of the plaintiff for the
purpose of defrauding the insurer; and secondly, that
the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a
fraudulent claim supported by the false proof, in
violation of the terms of the policy. Of these defenses
the trial judge sustained the second but passed the first
without express finding. We consider it important,
however, briefly to exhibit the salient facts on both
points, not only because of the considerable sum of
money involved, but because the facts appearing in
evidence supply a typical illustration of the manner in
which frauds of this character against the insurance
companies may be constructed with some hope of
success, when insurance agents are accessible who,
under the incentive of writing large amounts of
insurance, can be induced to close their eyes to
obvious dangers.
On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and
Isidro Bejar registered two mercantile partnerships in
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for the purpose
of engaging in mercantile business. The articles of
copartnership of these two entities were the same
except in the firm names. It was apparently

contemplated, in so far as any legitimate function may
have been intended, that Prats & Co. should be an
importing firm, while Hanna, Bejar & Co. should
engage in retail businss. As eveents show, the
existence of the parallel entities, controlled by the same
individuals, supplied, undeniably, suitable engines for
accomplishing an exploit of the kind that was here
attempted. Of the three individuals mentioned Elias
Hanna and Isidro Bejar were Turkish subjects of
unsavory reputation in insurance circle of Manila, while
Francisco Prats was a Spanish subject who had had
some success as a merchant and, prior to his
connection with the two associates above mentioned,
apparently enjoyed a fair reputation. Another
individual, who figures in the case as an instrument of
the three partners, is one Domingo Romero, who at
that the time which we are here concerned, was an
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with a
salary of P150 per month. Ramon Prats, a son of
Francisco Prats, was united in marriage to a daughter
of Domingo Romero, with the result that social relations
between Francisco Prats and Domingo Romero were
close. Francisco Prats appear to have acted as
manager for both Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co.
On May 27, 1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co.,
purchased a one-story building at 95 Plaza Gardenia,
Manila; and soon thereafter he begun to assemble in
this place the stock of merchandise which was the
subject of insurance in this case. The building referred
to was purchasd outright for the sum of P1,600. It was
old and was scarcely more than a shed but had been
used in times past for human habitation. It was located
in a part of the city which was inconvenient of success
to traders and out of the ordinary channels of business
activity. After purchasing the building, Prats knocked
out the partitions, removed the floor, and laid along the
center. The main part of the structure was thus
converted into a single store, or bodega, though certain
adjuncts, consisting of kitchen and closets, remained
unchanged in the rear of the building. A sign was then
set up over the entrance bearing the firm name "Hanna,
Bejar & Co." In effecting the purchase of this building
Prats availed himself of the service of Domingo
Romero, who lived only two doors away at 97 Plaza
Gardenia.
By August 21, 1924, there had been assembled and
stored by Prats in the place above described a stock of
goods which, according to the documents exhibited by
him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on which he had
taken out insurance to the extent of P410,000. At
midnight of the day mentioned a fire occurred at 95
Plaza Gardenia, which destroyed the building and
ruined its contents, the amount realized from the
salvage of the stock being P11,731.93.
With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the
time of the fire, the following facts appear: In the month
of June preceeding the fire, nine policies aggregating
P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the name of
Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored at 95 Plaza
26
Gardenia. At the time these policies were taken out the
valuation of the goods then in said store could not have
been more than P68,753. On June 28, 1924, Prats
procured from the agent of the defendant in this case
policy of insurance No. 600217 in the amount of
P200,000 on merchandise stored in the same place.
The nine policies already procured had been taken out,
as we have seen, in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co.;
but when Prats applied to the agent of the defendant
for the P200,000 policy last above mentioned, the
agent told him that if Hanna or Bejar had any interest
in the stock to be insured the policy could not be issued
for the reason that, in such case, the defendant would
not be able to obtain reinsurance for any part of the
policy, owing to the bad reputation of Hanna and Bejar.
Accordingly, at the request of Prats & Co.; and Prats at
the same time assured the agent that Hanna and Bejar
were not partners in Prats & Co. With the writing of this
policy the amount of insurance on the merchandise at
95 Plaza Gardenia was increased to P360,000, while
the value of the stock at that time was not probably
much in excess of P158,000. On August 11, 1924, or
just ten days before the fire, Prats took out an
additional policy for P50,000 in the name of Prats & Co.
on the same stock. This made a total insurance of
P410,000 on the contents of the store at 95 Plaza
Gardenia. At the time, according to Prats himself, the
evaluation of the merchandise then in the place was
not in excess of P230,000. Furthermore, Prats, about
this time, caused the first nine policies which had been
taken out in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. to be
indorsed to Prats & Co., thereby making this firm the
sole insured firm with respect to this stock of
merchandise.
With respect to the origin of the stock thus assembled,
we find that part had been purchased in Europe by
Prats; and in connection with its importation from
abroad it is noteworthy that on June 18, 1924, Prats &
Co. procured a policy of marine insurance to be issued
by Meerkamp & Co., Ltd., as agents of the India
Insurance Co., Ltd., Upon twenty-two cases of silk, of
a supposed value of P43,400. at the time this policy
was procured Prats informed the insurer that the goods
were soon to arrive from France by the steamer Suwa
Maru. For this policy of insurance Prats paid out the
sum of P736.25. Nevertheless, it now appears that the
twenty-two cases of silk covered by this marine policy
were fictitious, as no such purchase of silk had been
made by Prats & Co. in France or elsewhere. This fact
was offered in evidence by the defendant, as tending
to reveal a scheme by which, if a dstructive fire should
occur, the plaintiff would be able to mislead the
defendant as to the quantity of goods stored in the
bodega. This item of proof, though circumstantial in its
nature, was undoubtedly competent and should have
been admitted by the trial court.
The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show
that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in
the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and
in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega
27
before the fire. In this connection it appears that forty-
five cases of old stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at
Legaspi, P. I., were shipped to Manila before the fire,
but instead of being taken directly to 95 Plaza
Gardenia, they were housed for a time in the back part
of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in which Prats &
Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. had their offices.
Moreover, a quantity of merchandise purchased from
place shortly before the fire, instead of directly to 95
Plaza Gardenia; and it is the theory of the defendant
that new merchandise purchased from Talambiras
Brothers was substituted for the old stock in boxes from
Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi, leaving the old goods
to be deposited in the bodega to swell the debris of the
fire.
There is evidence also, which was credited by the
court, to the effect that on various occasions before the
fire goods were removed from the bodega to the store
of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were received
without invoice. Some of these goods were
subsequently sent away by Abolafia for sale in the
provinces.
If overinsurance and the assemblage of goods at
inflated values in the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia,
together with the surreptitious abstraction of goods
therefrom by the insured, have suggested a possible
intention on the part of its manager to realize
improperly on its insurance policies, this inference is, in
our opinion, but beyond reach of reasonable doubt by
facts relative to the destruction of the place. In this
connection we note that about the time the bodega at
95 Plaza Gardenia had been purchased, Domingo
Romero assisted one Ramon Osete to rent No. 69
Calle Gardenia, which was close to the rear of the
building at 95 Plaza Gardenia. Osete appears to have
been the individual chose for the role of incendiary, and
he slept at the place mentioned until the night of the
fire. A night or two before the fire this Osete,
accompanied by one Antonio Prats, appears to have
brought two cans of petroleum to his lodging place at
69 Calle Gardenia. After these cans had been taken to
Osete's bathroom by his muchacho, the latter was sent
out on an errand; and while he was gone the petroleum
disappeared. After the fire had been started in the
plaintiff's bodega shortly after midnight on August 21,
1924, Osete conveyed this boy in his automobile to the
fire alarm box on Plaza Gardenia. Reaching this place,
Osete planted the boy there with instructions to stop
anyone who might attempt to turn in the alarm by telling
him that he (the boy) had already done so; and in fact,
after the fire had gained some headway, one Joaquin
Silos, who lived near the bodega, ran to the box to turn
on the alarm but was stopped in the act by a person
who stated that he had already given the alarm.
Nevertheless, when Fire Chief Vanderford reached the
scene of the fire a few minutes later, he found that the
box had not been disturbed and he himself turned on
the alarm. The boy stated that when he was on the way
with Osete to the alarm box, as just stated, an
explosion took place in the bodega and a dull sound
was emitted. Vanderford says that upon his arrival he
saw that the smoke issuing from the bodega black,
suggesting the combustion of some inflammable
material like petroleum. He also noted the odor of
petroleum, as did also some of the firemen who
reached the scene. It may be added that when the
debris of the fire was subsequently searched,
merchandise soaked with petroleum was found in the
ruins.
Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 Plaza
Gardenia, had before the fire taken his family
temporarily to the home of Prats in Pasay. But after the
fire was over the family moved back to 97 Plaza
Gardenia, although that place had been considerably
damaged by the flames.
Among those who suffered from the fire were the
members of the Artigas family, living at 93 Gardenia,
on the side opposite Romero's house. Another
neighbor who likewise suffered from the fire was one
Juan Atayde, occupant of 67 Calle Gardenia, at the
side of the house occupied by Osete. Soon after the
fire Domingo Romero quietly passed a 100-peso bill
into the hand of Maria Luisa Artigas, a daughter
belonging to the Artigas family. Romero likewise gave
the same amount to Juan Atayde. It is self-evident that
the gifts thus made by Romero to Luisa Artigas and
Juan Atayde had other motives than pure charity and
that the money probably came from some other source
than his own modest earnings. After the fire that a
special investigation was made by the police
department with the result that Deputy Chief Lorenzo
came to the conclusion that the fire had originated from
an intentional act. Reflection upon the proof before the
court engenders in us the same belief and conducts us
to the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was not alien
to the deed.
The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff
had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is
also, in our opinion, well founded. That conclusion
appears to have been based upon three items of proof,
and with respect to at least two of these, we think that
the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These
two facts are, first, that the plaintiff had submitted a
claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800
when th erule value of said jewelry was about P600;
and, secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover
from the insurance company the value of goods which
had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the
bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two facts are
consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff,
and each constituted a breach of the stipulations of the
policy against the use of fraudulent devices and false
proof with respect to the loss.
The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the
conclusion that the plaintiff had attempted to deceive
the defendant with respect to the extent of the loss was
at least competent in its general bearing on the good
faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true, not
alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the same
stipulations. The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff

presented to the adjuster certain cost sheets and cpies
of supposed invoices in which the prices and expenses
of importation of a quantity of goods were stated at
double the true amount. The adjuster soon discovered
the artificial nature of these documents, and, with his
consent, they were withdrawn by Prats and
subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated
that these documents had been fabricated in order that
they might be exhibited to intending purchasers of the
goods, thereby making it appear to them that the cost
of the mercahndise had been much greater than it in
fact was — a ruse which is supposed to have been
entirely innocent or at least not directed against the
insurer. But a question naturally arises as to the
purpose which these documents might have been
made to serve if the fire, as doubtless intended by its
designers, had been so destructive as to remove all
vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upoon the
whole we are forced to state the conclusion, not only
that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connived
therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof as
the trial judge found.
Before concluding this opinion we are constrained to
make a few observations with reference to the trial of
this case and the inordinate amountof time consumed
in the proceedings. We are told in the appellant's brief
that the trial of this case covered a period of almost two
years, in which fifty separate sessions were held,
without counting the numeruos hearings upon the
taking of the deposition of Francisco Prats, a partner in
the plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the
instance of the defendant. Taken all together, the time
thus consumed was out of all proportion to the
difficulties of the case. An examination of the
voluminous transcript reveals at least part of the reason
for this inordinate consumption of time; since we find
that far too much of the space in the transcript is taken
up with the record of petty skirmishes in court resulting
from objections over the admission of evidence.
In the course of long experience we have observed that
justice is most effectivly and expenditiously
administered in the courts where trivial objections to
the admission of proof are received with least favor.
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objection to its materiality or technical objection to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of
any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance,
in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant
or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on
the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court
may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of
the battle over which he presides a judge of first
instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection
is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
28
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of error without
returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this
court is always very loath to take. On the other hand,
the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even
if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to either
litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the
law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the
case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and
the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon
appeal, this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
In this connection it should be remembered that many
of the technical rules of evidence which are often
invoked in our courts were originally worked out in
England and the United States, where the jury system
prevails. These rules were adopted for the purpose of
keeping matter from juries which — it was supposed —
might unduly influence them in deciding on the facts.
They have little pertinence to a system of procedure,
like ours, in which the court is judge both of law and
facts, and in which accordingly it is necessary for the
court to know what the proof is before it rules upon the
propriety of receiving it.
Apart from these considerations is the circumstance
mentioned above that the time consumed in the trial on
such collateral points is generally many times greater
than would be consumed if the questionable testimony
should be admitted for what it is worth. What has been
said above finds special relevancy in this case in view
of the action of the trial court in refusing to consider the
proof referred to in the opinion showing that the
plaintiff, while engaged in assembling its stock,
procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious
importation of silk. We earnestly commend the
maintenance of liberal practice in the admission of
proof.
Our examination of the case leads to the conclusion
that the result reached by the trial court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it
is also ordered, with costs against the appellant.
PEOPLE VS. YATCO
Facts:
1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and
another whose identity is still unknown, were
charged with having conspired together in the
murder of one Jose Ramos.
2. During the progress of the trial, counsel for the
defendant Panganiban interposed a general
objection to any evidence on such confession
made by defendant consunji on the ground
that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent
as against the other accused Panganiban.
29

3. The lower court ordered the exclusion of the questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
objected evidence but on a different ground prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence
which is “the prosecution could not be may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or
permitted to introduce the confessions of the dismissal of the charges, from which the People
defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso can no longer appeal.
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between
them, without prior proof of such conspiracy
by a number of definite acts, conditions, and Issue #2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is applicable
circumstances”. in the case at bar?
4. OSG filed a petition for cetiorari before the SC
No. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its
for the review and annulment of the lower
exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
Court's order completely excluding any
123, providing that the act or declaration of a
evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso
existence may be given in evidence against the co-
Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. Manifestly, the rule
Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in
refers to statements made by one
excluding the prosecutions’s evidence (extra-
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
judicial confession by Consunji)?
enterprises("during its existence") and in
No. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had
of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged
been brought to an end.
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage
of the trial when the ruling was made.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to
confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact,
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence
the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape
against him.
recordings) had not yet even been identified, much less
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the
SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused
prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before
offense charged, may be given in evidence against
their confessions are formally offered in evidence.
him.
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also
applies to the confessions in question, it was premature
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence,
for the respondent Court to exclude them completely
even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
on the ground that there was no prior proof of
against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as
conspiracy.
to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other
Issue #3: WON the court has the power to disregard
evidence, the confession of Consunji was,
evidence? (Related to the topic Objections)
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's
own guilt and should be admitted.
The court does not have the said power.
Rule on admissibility
The exclusion of the proferred confessions was not
made on the basis of the objection interposed by
The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different
objections to its materiality or technical objections to
ground, which the Court issued motu proprio.
the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's
of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused
instance, in the early stages of the development of the
Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to
proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is
the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this
relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad
objection, put up its own objection to the confessions
faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence,
— that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy
the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony
between Consunji and Panganiban without prior
upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite
offered will be connected later. At any rate, in the final
acts, conditions, circumstances, etc. and completely
determination and consideration of the case, the trial
excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing,
Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from
the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere
the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground
evidence, should be excluded. There is greater reason
for objection is known and not reasonably made, the
to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where

objection is deemed waived and the Court has no
power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN:
BERNARDO S. SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN,
DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S. CHU;
HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ,
MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ
and EMMANUEL SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA
SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and
LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C.
COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA
C. ARIEGO, REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A.
LARIEGO, BELINDA M. COMORPOSA and
ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The admissibility of evidence should be
distinguished from its probative value. Just because a
piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean
that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001
Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22 June 2000
rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Su[r].
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the
case as follows:
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was
filed by [petitioners] against [respondents] before the
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the
lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275
located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an
area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his
30
heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the
land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in
relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the
late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem.
Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo
allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of
Marcos Saez.
Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and
transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this
case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people,
among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco
Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez
property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was
succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the
premises through petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the
respondents to vacate the premises but the latter
refused to vacate the same and claimed that they
[were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and
lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was
filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del
Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File
Action was issued by the said barangay and an action
for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against
respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material
allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in their own right
as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the
present time; that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary
or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional
Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld
their possession over the land in question when it ruled
that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors
and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the
Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on
appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x x x
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA
upheld the right of respondents as claimants and
possessors. The appellate court held that -- although
not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional
executive director of the Department of Environment
31
and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force
and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA
added that the Certification issued by the DENRs
community environment and natural resources (CENR)
officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right
to possess alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, because they have suffiently proven their
actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960.
The appellate court deemed as self-serving, and
therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria
Leano Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following
issues for the Courts consideration:
I of the disputed property is a matter that may be
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion
and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998
issued by the regional executive director?
II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion
and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling
giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which
only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a
certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter
raised for the first time on appeal?
III
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion
and err in holding that the land subject matter of this
case has been acquired by means of adverse
possession and prescription?
IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion,
and err in declaring that, neither is there error on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give
importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
[Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self
serving?
To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third
issues shall be discussed in reverse sequence.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the
April 2, 1998 Order issued by the regional director of
the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the
Order, which had upheld the claim of respondents, was
supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order
dated August 23, 1999, issued later by the DENR
regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the
effectivity of the earlier one.
Under the Public Land Act, the management and the
disposition of public land is under the primary control of
the director of lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau or LMB), subject to review by the
DENR secretary.
As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude
upon matters properly falling within the powers of the
LMB.
The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate
and dispose of public land does not, however, divest
regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions
instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their
respective possessions and occupations. The power to
determine who has actual physical possession or
occupation of public land and who has the better right
of possession over it remains with the courts. But once
the DENR has decided, particularly through the grant
of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate
of title, its decision on these points will normally prevail.
Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties
are entitled to a piece of public land remains pending
with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession
addressed to the courts.
Second Issue:
CENR Officers Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated
July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In
support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.
and argue that the Certification is a new matter being
raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving
the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade
or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. x x x
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered
originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they
are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested
for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the
same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which
is defined as a signature produced by mechanical
means but recognized as valid in banking, financial,
and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the
Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order
dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a
CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997, certified among

others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x
x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any
person x x x.
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims,
then the regional director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either
verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers
direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for
the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the MTC, the CENR Certification
had already been marked as evidence for respondents
as stated in the Pre-trial Order.
The Certification was not formally offered, however,
because respondents had not been able to file their
position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would
sanction the admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule
is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases
covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in
which no full-blown trial is held.
Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the
Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits.
They also claim that the failure of respondents to file
their position paper and counter-affidavits before the
MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused
with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to
be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are
admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies,
the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso
facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause
of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.
Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding
the defense of prescription proffered by respondents. It
is the formers contention that since the latters
possession of the land was merely being tolerated,
there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We
disagree.
32
For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners,
they have first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces
of evidence submitted by the former to support their
claim were a technical description and a vicinity map
drawn in accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR
Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had
not yet been allocated to any person when the survey
was conducted. The testimony of petitioners witnesses
alone cannot prevail over respondents continued and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a
considerable length of time.
Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a
rule, be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. V CIR
GR NO. 151857
PANGANIBAN, April 28, 2005
NATURE
Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court
FACTS
-Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of steel blanks. It filed an Amended
Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996
declaring a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax
credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of
P3,311,559.00. Petitioner also reported quarterly
payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in
the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
respectively.
-It filed an administrative claim on April 10, 1997 for the
refund of P3,159,687.00, which allegedly several of its
clients withheld taxes from their income payments to
petitioner and remitted to the BIR for the year 1995. It
was unable to use the excess tax paid for and in its
behalf by the withholding agents due to its income/loss
positions for the three quarters of 1996.
-BIR’s Answer: ‘1) Petitioner has no cause of action; ‘2)
Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set out in Section 5 of Revenue
Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94; ‘3) It is incumbent upon
[p]etitioner to prove by competent and sufficient
evidence that the tax refund or tax credit being sought
is allowed under the National Internal Revenue Code
and its implementing rules and regulations; and 4)
Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed strictly
against the taxpayer as they partake the nature of tax
exemption.
-Petitioner presented documentary and testimonial
evidence. BIR presented the revenue officer who
33
conducted the examination of petitioner’s claim and
found that petitioner liable for deficiency VAT
-CTA: DENIED REFUND: No other evidence
presented to prove that excess tax payments had been
made in 1995. Petitioner did not present its 1996
income tax return to disclose its total income tax
liability.
-CA: Affirmed
ISSUE
WON excess income taxes paid in 1995 that could not
be applied to taxes due in 1996 be refunded in 1997
HELD
YES
Ratio. A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the
taxable year following that in which the tax credit
arises. Hence, excess income taxes paid in 1995 that
have not been applied to or used in 1996 may still be
the subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided that the
claim for such refund is filed with the internal revenue
commissioner within two years after payment of said
taxes. As a caveat, the Court stresses that the
recognition of the entitlement to a tax refund does not
necessarily mean the automatic payment of the sum
claimed in the final adjustment return of the taxpayer.
The amount of the claim must still be proven in the
normal course.
Reasoning. In accordance with Sec69, NIRC, a
taxable corporation is entitled to a tax refund when the
sum of the quarterly income tax it paid during a taxable
year exceeds its total income tax due also for that year.
Consequently, the refundable amount that is shown on
its final adjustment return may be credited, at its option,
against its quarterly income tax liabilities for the next
taxable year.
-Reasons why Petitioner could still apply for refund
after 2 years:
1. A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the
taxable year following that in which the tax credit
arises: only limitation is Section 204(3) which provide
the 2 year after payment of tax limit. The “succeeding
taxable year” in Sec69 applies only to tax credit, not
to a tax refund.
2. To be able to claim a tax refund, a taxpayer only
needs to declare the income payments it received as
part of its gross income and to establish the fact of
withholding: In accordance with Sec5, RR12-94,
petitioner filed its amended 1995 income tax return in
1996. In addition, the resulting investigation by the BIR
on August 15, 1997, reveals that the income accounts
were “correctly declared based on the existing
supporting documents.” No need for petitioner to
show again the income payments it received in
1995 as part of its gross income in 1996.
3. “only legal issues may be raised”[10] in petitions for
review under Rule 45: The proper interpretation of the
provisions on tax refund is a question of law that “does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.” The truth
or falsity of the contents of or entries in the 1996 final
adjustment return, which has not been formally offered
in evidence and examined by respondent, involves,
however, a question of fact. This Court is not a trier of
facts. Neither is it a collection agency for the
government. Although we rule that petitioner is entitled
to a tax refund, the amount of that refund is a matter for
the CTA to determine judiciously based on the records
that include its own copy of petitioner’s 1996 final
adjustment return.
4. liberal construction of rules: both the CTA law and
jurisprudence mandate that the proceedings before the
tax court “shall not be governed strictly by technical
rules of evidence” : As a rule, CTA’s and CA’s findings
of fact are final, binding and conclusive on the parties
and upon SC; however, as an exception, such findings
may be reviewed or disturbed on appeal when they are
not supported by evidence. In the present case, the
1996 final adjustment return was attached as Annex A
to the Reply to Comment filed by petitioner with the CA.
The return shows a negative amount for its taxable
income that year. Therefore, it could not have applied
or used the excess tax credits of 1995 against its tax
liabilities in 1996.
5. the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of
the 1996 final adjustment return which had been
attached in CTA Case No. 5799: As a general rule,
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of records in other cases tried or pending in
the same court, even when those cases were heard or
are actually pending before the same judge. However,
this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to
such records is sufficiently made without objection from
the opposing parties. Prior to rendering its Decision on
January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well-aware of
the existence of another case pending before it,
involving the same subject matter, parties and causes
of action. Because of the close connection of that case
with the matter in controversy, the CTA could have
easily taken judicial notice of the contested document
attached in that other case. Furthermore, there was no
objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final
adjustment return in petitioner’s Reply to Comment
before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return,
a reference made with the knowledge of respondent,
the latter still failed to controvert petitioner’s claim. The
appellate court should have cast aside strict
technicalities and decided the case on the basis of
such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to
“take judicial notice of its records and of the facts [that]
the record establishes.”
…but Petitioner has to prove its claim first…
-Mere allegations by petitioner of the figures in its 1996
final adjustment return are not a sufficient proof of the
amount of its refund entitlement. They do not even

constitute evidence adverse to respondent, against
whom they are being presented. When petitioner
purportedly filed its administrative claim for a tax refund
on April 10, 1997, the deadline for filing the 1996 final
adjustment return was not yet over. Hence, it could not
have attached this return to its claim. petitioner failed
to offer such return as evidence during the trial phase
of this case. For its negligence, petitioner “cannot be
allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of the
[r]ules”
- It would not be proper to allow petitioner to simply
prevail and compel a refund in the amount it claims,
without affording the government a reasonable
opportunity to contest the former’s allegations.
Negligence consisting of the unexplained failure to
offer the exhibit should not be rewarded with
undeserved leniency. Petitioner still bears the burden
of proving the amount of its claim for tax refund. After
all, “[t]ax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions”
and are to be construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.
-Even in the absence of a final adjustment return or any
claim for a tax refund, CIR is authorized by law to
examine any book, paper, record or other data that
may be relevant or material to such inquiry. Failure to
make an assessment of petitioner’s proper tax liability
or to contest the return could be errors or omissions of
administrative officers that should never be allowed to
jeopardize the government’s financial position.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax
Appeals for the proper and immediate determination of
the amount to be refunded to petitioner on the basis of
the latter’s 1996 final adjustment return. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
TATING v. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27
FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the
subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale
was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973,
1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in
possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela
executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true
agreement between her and Nena was simply to
34
transfer title over the subject property in favor of the
latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray
her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena
did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she
wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the
subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on
July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a
letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that
when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and,
as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the
return of their rightful shares over the subject property
as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle
the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a
complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the
plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sworn Statement should have
been rejected outright by the lower courts.
RULING:
The Court finds that both the trial court and
the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available
to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the
RTC and the CA should not have given probative value
on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving
that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was
simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them. Considering
that the Court finds the subject contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not
fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust
relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is
DISMISSED.