Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BROWNELL v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, G.R. No. L-5731; June 22, 1954
The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the
President of the Philippines and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the
enactment of R.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 477.
It is evident, therefore, that the consent of the Philippine Government to the application
of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 to the Philippines after independence was given, not
only by the Executive Department of the Philippines Government, but also by the Congress,
which enacted the laws that would implement or carry out the benefits accruing from the
operation of the United States law. The respondent-appellant, however, contends that
the operation of the law after independence could not have actually taken, or may not
take place, because both Republic Act No. 8 and Republic Act No. 477 do not contain any
specific provision whereby the Philippine Property Act of 1946 or its provisions is made
applicable to the Philippines. It is also contended that in the absence of such express
provision in any of the laws passed by the Philippine Congress, said Philippine Property
Act of 1946 does not form part of our laws and is not binding upon the courts and
inhabitants of the country.
A foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin,
provided the latter, in which it is sought to be made operative, gives its consent thereto.
This consent may be either express or implied.
The consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not
need to be express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from
that of its authorized officers.
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension
of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of
the Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of
Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
The operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from
the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or
from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is
well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The
application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine
Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine
Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
Elements of a Treaty:
1.
It must be in writing.
2.
3.
It must involve two or more States.
4.
5.
It must be governed by international law.
6.
WON Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended
by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to
a foreign transient.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous,
this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be
used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY
with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs.
Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the
dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment.
BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA v. COURT OF APPEALS, 400 SCRA 156
First Issue: the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants since
plaintiffs are merely stockholders of the corporations which are the registered owners o
the vessels and the borrowers of petitioners.
In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three elements of a cause of action. It
alleges that: (1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an
accounting from defendants (herein petitioners), as trustees by reason of the fiduciary
relationship that was created between the parties involving the vessels in question; (2)
petitioners have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an accounting; and (3)
petitioners failed to do the same.
Failure to state a cause of action” refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading,
unlike “lack of cause of action” which refers to the insufficiency of factual basis for the
action.
Second Issue. Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum
non-conveniens?
No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning ‘the forum is inconvenient’,
emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping that
is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring
their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and
harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue.
Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.
In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that “xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one
to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.”Evidently, all these
requisites are present in the instant case. The PRINCIPLE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS
IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a
ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance;
and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a
matter of defense. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Third Issue: WON respondents guilty of forum shopping because of the pendency of
foreign action.
No. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present and where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Parenthetically, for
litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action there must be: (a) identity of
the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c)
the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
In case at bar, not all the requirements for litis pendentia are present. While there may
be identity of parties, notwithstanding the presence of other respondents, as well as the
reversal in positions of plaintiffs and defendants, still the other requirements necessary
for litis pendentia were not shown by petitioner. It merely mentioned that civil cases
were filed in Hongkong and England without however showing the identity of rights
asserted and the reliefs sought for as well as the presence of the elements of res judicata
should one of the cases be adjudged.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
INC, 241 SCRA 192
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys
the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly
performed its official duty.
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption
of its validity. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment
rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of
such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the
extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not
only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire
jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In
this case, it is the procedural law of Japanwhere the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP.
The service was regular applying the presumption of regularity. Even if it was not regular,
the law of Japan was not proved and so the doctrine of processual presumption
concerning the service of summons to foreign corporation: (1) resident agent (2)
government officials designated by law to that effect (3) to any officers or agent within
the Philippines.
As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice
of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the Japanese court must stand.
WON THE JAPANESE COURT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OF A FILIPINO CORPORATION
JAPAN BY SERVING A SUMMONS TRHOUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL. YES.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption
of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service
of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
The extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only
under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty. as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan
through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was
filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident
of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be
deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid
not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.
DOCTRINES INVOLVED:
ORIGIN OF FORUM SHOPPING: Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private
international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum
or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded
dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses,
the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum shopping "occurs when a
party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict." Hence,
according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of "forum
shopping" whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual
circumstances surrounding his suit, and litigants should be encouraged to
attempt to settle their differences without imposing undue expenses and
vexatious situations on the courts".
FORUM-SHOPPING; AS A CHOICE OF VENUE AND AS A CHOICE OF REMEDY;
CONSTRUED: In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation
encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was originally understood in conflicts of
laws, but also to a choice of remedies.
As to the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff
to commence personal actions "where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec, 2 [b]).
As to remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing
civil liabilities independently of the criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A
passenger of a public utility vehicle involved in a vehicular accident may sue on
culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa criminal — each remedy being
available independently of the others — although he cannot recover more than
once. In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the
litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This was the original concept of
the term forum shopping.
AS AN UNETHICAL PRACTICE; WHEN PRESENT: Eventually, however, instead of actually
making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the encouragement of
their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies
simultaneously. This practice had not only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudications
among different courts and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly
administration of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to
the action.
Thus, "forum shopping" had acquired a different concept — which is unethical
professional legal practice. And this necessitated or had given rise to the
formulation of rules and canons discouraging or altogether prohibiting the
practice.
What therefore originally started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic law
as a legitimate device for solving problems has been abused and mis-used to
assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection
with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending,
as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
IMPOSITION: In either case, forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground
to ask for summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or petitions, and for
imposition of the other sanctions, which are direct contempt of court, criminal
prosecution, and disciplinary action against the erring lawyer.
WON there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties.
YES.
WON the said contract was enforceable under the statute of frauds.
Statute of frauds will not apply by reason of the failure of petitioners to object to oral
testimony proving petitioner Bank's counter-offer of P5.5 million. Hence, petitioners — by
such utter failure to object — are deemed to have waived any defects of the contract
under the statute of frauds, pursuant to Article 1405 of the Civil Code. As private
respondent pointed out in his Memorandum, oral testimony on the reaffirmation of the
counter-offer of P5.5 million is a plenty — and the silence of petitioners all throughout
the presentation makes the evidence binding on them.
WON the bank conservator have the unilateral power to repudiate the authority of the
bank officers and/or to revoke the said contract
While admittedly, the Central Bank law gives vast and far-reaching powers to the
conservator of a bank, it must be pointed out that such powers must be related to the
"(preservation of) the assets of the bank, (the reorganization of) the management
thereof and (the restoration of) its viability." Such powers, enormous and extensive as
they are, cannot extend to the post-facto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise
they would infringe against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. If the
legislature itself cannot revoke an existing valid contract, how can it delegate such
non-existent powers to the conservator under Section 28-A of said law?
Obviously, therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power to revoke
contracts that are, under existing law, deemed to be defective — i.e., void, voidable,
unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the conservator merely takes the place of a bank's
board of directors. What the said board cannot do — such as repudiating a contract
validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority — the conservator cannot do
either. Ineluctably, his power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate valid
obligations of the Bank. His authority would be only to bring court actions to assail such
contracts — as he has already done so in the instant case. A contrary understanding of
the law would simply not be permitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To
rule otherwise would be to enable a failing bank to become solvent, at the expense of
third parties, by simply getting the conservator to unilaterally revoke all previous dealings
which had one way or another or come to be considered unfavorable to the Bank,
yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights nor vested interests of the third parties
who had dealt with the Bank.