Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG,

and its officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as
Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.

G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as

Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF
RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD.,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same:
whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the
Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the
Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this question and
consequently applied different periods for appealing.

The facts are as follows:

I.

Proceedings in the CB and the RTC

On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by
the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A
few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2

On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a
petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the
court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.

On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for
short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of
holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and
cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order
dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the
Union.5

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991,
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December
6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's
motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991.
The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for
Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of
Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.

In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of
Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision.
The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and
executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for
issuance of a writ of Execution.

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed
claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks
amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common
shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that
their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment
under the Foreign Investments Law.

In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator
to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors.7

The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he
moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He
received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October
14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2,
1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken
off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and
beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his
September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

II.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court
of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders
granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the
Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the
Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a
special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order
rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th
day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on
time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the
latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had
filed for hearing.

On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No.
29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation
proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed
on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which
his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly,
the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.

III.

Present Proceedings

The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.

In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:

1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the suit.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition

for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special

proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.

4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of

appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on time.

5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of
appeal filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking

Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple
appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders
whose right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the
creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.
 3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is
not in the nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.

4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and
proved.

5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made
with grave abuse of discretion.

The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.

First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition
for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is,
then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of
appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if
a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of
the decision or final order appealed from.

BP Blg. 129 provides:

§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or
decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the
period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the

entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered
consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court.

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. —

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the

cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order,
resolution or award appealed from.

(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule

109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30)
days, a record on appeal being required.

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary
action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
 The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court where there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same
subject matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for
interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several
claims among themselves. (Section I Rule 63).

An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62

which, like an ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with
or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rule relating to such civil
actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as

"an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every
other remedy including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact shall be by special proceeding."

To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special

proceeding, the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an
asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is not
intended to establish the fact of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the
bank had already been previously determined by the Central Bank in
accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that
needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the
assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.

It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases
categorized as a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court, nor among the special proceedings that may be appealed under
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.

We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
provide:

§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by

which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one

to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by
special proceeding.

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief
Justice Moran states:" 11
 Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from
special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another,
his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment
of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish
the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be

classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the
enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party.
It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission
nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that
its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of
payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble
petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject
matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its
assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the
assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment
provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of
deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common
purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of
the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are
both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of
the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of
creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for
liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting
the Liquidator, correctly noted:

A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of

cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding.
The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims.
Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court
in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are
required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the
declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without
basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing
 the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary
or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed
by the party aggrieved thereby.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in
detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were
earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property
is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in accordance with
the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.

Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or

disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the
operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple
appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its nature,
affects only the particular claims involved, and which may assume finality if
no appeal is made therefrom, ipso factocreates a situation where multiple
appeals are allowed.

A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the

Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims
against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is
individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a
particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims
unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and distinct from the
others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the
others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original
records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They
remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of
appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court.

Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings.

Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal
made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).

In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of
appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting
the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on
appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on
appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for
cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are
actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be
appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where
other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision
dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed
albeit for a different reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth
Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus.
As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a
record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order
granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he
filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent
judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for
extension to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court
merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of the institution,
and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as
representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court
or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's
liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the
payment of their claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with
the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court
is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under
the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside
the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard
may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may
interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether
or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its
limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad
faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the
insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank
"personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the
corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes."
This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court
which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file
the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the
Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October
22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March
27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign
pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for
Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ. concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus
Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an
order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due
him amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of
land belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of
said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as
prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a
written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the
money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be

dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules
requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,
and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with
this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are
only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the
Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put
into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions,
rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely
suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of
non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present
case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his
motion a certification against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other
initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the
estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's
will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money
claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors'
claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the
properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A
motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of
the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7(Emphasis
supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute
a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent
money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against
non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services
rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate
even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien
on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may
order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had
already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore,
non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for
dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de

Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite
action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical
practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus
leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an
opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or
filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service
was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever
practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or
filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an
explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case
or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its
discretion and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must
be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal
service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals
and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic]
would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service
was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so
worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of
substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi 1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.
Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written
explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has
been allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The
lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation
why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC
should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money
claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons
for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after
the debts and expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule
on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement
of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is
hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money
claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157644 November 17, 2010

SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-fact

MARILOU TOPACIO-NARCISO, Petitioners,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by petitioner spouses Ernesto and
Vicenta Topacio (petitioners), assailing the August 26, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389, as well as its March 17, 2003 Resolution3 denying
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision and Resolution affirmed in toto
the October 1, 1993 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, which
issued an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank (respondent).

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

The backgrounds facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

The petitioners obtained a loan amounting to ₱400,000.00 from the respondent. To secure
the loan, the petitioners executed on May 8, 1980, a real estate mortgage over Lot 1224-B-1
LRC Psd-15436, covered by TCT No. T-191117 (now 13554) of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, in favor of the respondent. The petitioners failed to pay the loan, prompting the
respondent to file a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, pursuant to Act No.
3135. To satisfy the obligation, the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, on November 8, 1982, sold
the mortgaged property at public auction, where the respondent emerged as the highest
bidder. Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in favor of the respondent and
registered with the Registry of Deeds.4

On May 26, 1983, the respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession5 over the mortgaged property before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela City (RTC). In an Order6 dated December 12, 1983, the RTC granted the petition,
conditioned on the posting of a ₱100,000.00 bond. Upon posting of the required bond, the
RTC issued, on February 16, 1984, a writ of possession, commanding the sheriff to place the
respondent in possession of the property.

The writ of possession was not implemented7 because, on February 27, 1984, the
petitioners, filed with the RTC, a petition to set aside the auction sale and the writ of
possession (with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction).8 In an Order dated February 28, 1984, the RTC issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondent and the Deputy Sheriff from implementing the writ of
possession it previously issued. 9 After hearing, the RTC, issued on March 13, 1984, a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondent and the Provincial Sheriff to desist from
implementing the writ of possession and to refrain from interfering with and disrupting the
possession of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.10

Sometime in April 1984, the respondent filed with the RTC its Motion to Admit Answer with
Opposition to the Petition to Set Aside Auction Sale and Writ of Possession with Motion to
Dissolve or Lift Preliminary Injunction (Answer) which was granted on April 26, 1984.11 On
May 21, 1984, the petitioners filed their Reply thereto, praying that the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued be maintained.12

More than two years after the filing of the Answer and the Reply, and after a series of
postponements at the instance of both parties, then Presiding Judge Teresita D. Capulong
issued an Order dated December 16, 1986, dismissing the respondent’s petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of "failure to prosecute."13 The Order reads in
full:

When this case was called for hearing, counsel for the oppositors [now petitioners], Atty.
Constancio R. Gallamos, was present. Atty. Francisco Rivera [counsel for the respondent]
was absent despite notice. Upon petition of the counsel for the oppositors, this case is
hereby ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute.

SO ORDERED.

No copy of the above Order was served on the respondent14 whose operations the Monetary
Board (Central Bank of the Philippines) shut down on January 25, 1985, for reasons not
relevant to the present case.15

Nearly six (6) years later (after the Court ordered the reorganization and resumption of the
respondent’s operations in G.R. No. 70054)16 or on August 19, 1992, the respondent filed a
Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986. In the same motion, the respondent
likewise moved for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. 17

In an Order18 dated September 18, 1992, the RTC made a clarification that the Order of
Dismissal of December 16, 1986 refers to the dismissal of the "main case for issuance of a
writ of possession." In that same Order, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of possession.

On May 18, 1993, the respondent moved for the reconsideration19 of the September 18,
1992 Order. In an Order20dated June 2, 1993, the RTC, this time presided by Judge Emilio L.
Leachon, Jr., reconsidered and set aside the Order of December 16, 1986 and granted the
respondent’s prayer for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the June 2, 1993 Order and prayed that the implementation of the alias
writ of possession be held in abeyance.

The RTC Ruling

On October 1, 1993, the RTC, now presided by Judge Jaime F. Bautista, issued the assailed
Order21 which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order for
the issuance of an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent. The assailed RTC
Order is summarized below.
First, the RTC ruled that the Order of Dismissal was granted on a "technicality" and that
"[t]he ground of failure to prosecute is manifestly unfounded."22 The RTC held that "the power
of the trial court to dismiss an action on the ground of non prosequitur is not unbounded. The
real test x x x is whether under the facts and circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in [failing] to proceed with reasonable promptitude."23 In the present
case, the RTC noted that the records show that the case dragged on for years because of
several postponements at the request of both parties, particularly petitioner Ernesto Topacio
who went abroad for a long time during the pendency of the case.24

Second, the RTC held that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be considered a
dismissal on the merits as it was founded not on a substantial ground but on a technical one;
it does not amount to a "declaration of the law [on] the respective rights and duties of the
parties, based upon the ultimate x x x facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and
upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objectives or contentions."25

Third, the RTC ruled that the revival by a motion for reconsideration (filed on May 18, 1993)
of the February 16, 1984 Order, granting the writ of possession, was seasonably filed by the
respondent, pursuant to the period allowed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Citing National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,26 the RTC held that "[i]n computing
the time [limit] for suing out an execution, x x x the general rule is that there should not be
included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite
time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise." The RTC noted that the running of the
five-year period under Section 6 of the Rules of Court had been interrupted by the erroneous
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; the February 16, 1984 Order never attained
finality and was overtaken by the issuance of the Order dated June 2, 1993, granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution.27

Finally, the RTC held that the respondent, as the winning bidder, "has an absolute right to a
writ of possession,"28considering that: (1) a writ of possession had been issued on February
16, 1984 and the corresponding bond had already been posted, although the writ was not
enforced because of the erroneous injunction issued by Judge Capulong; and (2) there was
no redemption by the petitioners.29

On October 20, 1993, the petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
(petition), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32389.30 Before the CA, the petitioners argued that
the RTC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it: (1) reinstated the
respondent’s case more than seven (7) years after the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order
became final and executory, and (2) issued an alias writ of execution upon a mere motion for
reconsideration and not by an independent action pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

The CA Ruling

On August 26, 2002, the CA denied the petitioners’ petition and affirmed in toto the June 2,
1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders of the RTC. The CA found that the December 16, 1986
Order of the RTC does not amount to a dismissal on the merits as it was based on purely
technical grounds. It noted that the records show that the respondent was not furnished a
copy of the Dismissal Order; hence, the case cannot be deemed to be final with respect to
the respondent. The CA also agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that the delay in the
resolution of the case cannot be solely attributed to the respondent and did not warrant its
outright dismissal.31

The CA held that an independent action for the revival of the writ of possession need not be
filed in order to enforce the writ of possession issued on December 12, 1983 since Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings,32 citing Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar.33

The Petition

In the present petition,34 the petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the October 1,
1993 Order of the RTC considering that:

1) the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order constitutes an adjudication on the merits
which has already attained finality, and

2) a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after
the lapse of more than five (5) years from the time of its issuance.

On the first assignment of error, the petitioners submit that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal
Order for failure to prosecute constitutes adjudication upon the merits, considering that the
RTC did not declare otherwise, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioners further contend that the Dismissal Order has become final and executory since
the respondent belatedly filed the Motion to Clarify the Order of December 16, 1986 on
August 19, 1992 or almost six years later. On these premises, the petitioners argue that res
judicata has set in and consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant the motion for
reconsideration and to issue an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent.35

On the second assignment of error, the petitioners contend that pursuant to Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, the writ of possession issued on February 16, 1984 may no longer
be enforced by a mere motion but by a separate action, considering that more than five
years had elapsed from its issuance. The petitioners also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court applies to the present case since a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is neither a special proceeding nor a land registration case.36

In their Memorandum, the petitioners additionally submit that they do not dispute that the CA
made a finding that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order was not properly served. They,
however, point out that the CA made no such finding with respect to the September 18, 1992
Order of the RTC. The petitioners contend that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed on May
18, 1993 or eight months later from the September 18, 1992 Order by the respondent, was
filed out of time. Thus, they conclude that any subsequent ruling of the RTC, including the
June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, is barred by res judicata.37

OUR RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

A. Preliminary Considerations

Our review of the records, particularly the CA decision, indicates that the CA did not
determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC decision before
it. Given that the petition before the CA was a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it appears that the CA instead incorrectly reviewed the case
on the basis of whether the RTC decision on the merits was correct.

To put the case in its proper perspective, the task before us is to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the RTC decision before it. Stated otherwise, did the CA correctly determine
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling on the case?

As discussed below, our review of the records and the CA decision shows that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of possession in favor of the
respondent.

B. Applicability of Res Judicata

Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a
"matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment."38 The principle bars a
subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The
rationale for the rule is that "public policy requires that controversies must be settled with
finality at a given point in time."39

The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior judgment"
under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is
"conclusiveness of judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata applies in the
concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment
or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of causes of action.40

The petitioners claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case
because all of the elements thereof are present. In response, the respondent argues that res
judicata did not set in as the first element is lacking.

We agree with the respondent.

The December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality as it was not properly served

The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of
service of judgments:41

SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. – x x x

Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. x x x

SEC. 5. Modes of service. – Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
other papers shall be made either personally or by mail.
SEC. 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a
copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person
having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has
no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the
evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and
discretion then residing therein.

SEC. 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy
in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office,
if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the
addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.

SEC. 8. Substituted service. – If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders

and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of
residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the
copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail.
The service is complete at the time of such delivery.

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. –Judgments, final orders or

resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned
by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions
against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing
party.

As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through
registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with
a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor
made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains
finality.42

In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez,43 the Court ruled that the
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, denying the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there is no
conclusive proof of service of the said resolution. In the words of the Court, "there was no
proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by the respondent’s
counsel."44 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired
jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a
reckoning date of the period provided by law for the filing of the petition, the Court could not
assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.

Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang,45 the Court held that the decision of the Regional
Trial Court did not become final and executory where, from the records, the respondent had
not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.46 The Court
also noted that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of
the said Order or that she indeed received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there
could be no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never
attained finality.

In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be
deemed to have become final and executory in view of the absence of a valid service,
whether personally or via registered mail, on the respondent’s counsel. We note in this
regard that the petitioners do not dispute the CA finding that the "records failed to show that
the private respondent was furnished with a copy of the said order of
dismissal[.]"47 Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never attained finality.

The petitioners now claim that the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by the respondent on
May 18, 1993 from the September 18, 1992 Order of the RTC, was filed out of time. The
petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that the subsequent rulings of the RTC,
including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, are barred by res judicata.

We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only for the first time on appeal,
particularly, in their Memorandum. In fact, the petitioners never raised this issue in the
proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for review.

As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change the theory on appeal.48 Points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done
had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.49 Thus, to permit the
petitioners in this case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the
respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.50

C. Applicability of the Rule on Execution

by Motion or by Independent Action

The petitioners finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February 16,
1984, may no longer be enforced by a mere motion, but by a separate action, considering
that more than five years had elapsed from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or

order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions

In rejecting a similar argument, the Court held in Paderes v. Court of Appeals51 that Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings. Citing Sta. Ana v. Menla,52 which extensively discussed the rationale behind
the rule, the Court held:

In a later case [Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 (1961)], the Court also ruled that the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five
years by motion, and after five years but within ten years by an action (Section 6, Rule
39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land
registration cases. x x x x
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment,
except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has
become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by
motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.

Subsequently, the Court, in Republic v. Nillas,53 affirmed the dictum in Sta. Ana and clarified
that "Rule 39 x x x applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary
proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other
specific law or legal modality," viz:

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or
extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by
some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary
civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration
proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the
purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or
fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is
required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land
registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.1avv phi 1

In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte
petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil
action54 governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed
separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The provision states:

Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of
this Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing
bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made
under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings
if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered
under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office
of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of
the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven
of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as
amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by
the Court, and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff of the province in which the
property is located. Based on the text of the law, we have also consistently ruled that the
duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of
course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond.55 In
fact, the issuance and the immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and
mandatory under the law.

Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil,56 we emphatically ruled that "once the writ of
possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without
delay." The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of
title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof;57 it must grant the
issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the
provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.

Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the moment of the issuance
of the writ of possession, leaves no room for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be applicable
only to civil actions. From another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be
executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. 58

D. Conclusion

In sum, based on these considerations, we find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an alias writ of possession in favor of the respondent.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The August 26, 2002 Decision and the
March 17, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He
was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil
Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil
Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners
Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs
therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule
78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by
respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the
decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an
order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband,
and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of
the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending
claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the
amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No.
95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report
pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion,
petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s
estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on
the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition
and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners
to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were
in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings
before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in
denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not
the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders
issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with
the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule
on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally
preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently
held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of
estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC,
and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if
it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it
would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC
since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn
our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or
intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1,
Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3)
Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest
therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the
notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such
notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil
actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice
to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section
1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of
Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims
for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in
the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide
us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order.
Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and
during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan
thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late
husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the
civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the
pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground
that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court
refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the
Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant
to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in
said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration
and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of
the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and
have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so
taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over
the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the
two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no
rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate
action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained.
Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against
the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action
against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs
desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary
civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should
be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-

intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings
of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various
specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment
could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs
from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality
under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we
assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator
of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They
would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status
of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under
Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed,
embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no
matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the
estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this
Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to
be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the
Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which
the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the
provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall
be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that
petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate
proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance
with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over
the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule
135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it
that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly
satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the
service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will
be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent,
while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved. 1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any
or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice.
The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10,
Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the
executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for
distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her
submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that
the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified
annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath
with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of
his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these
duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced
and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against
the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper
remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.
While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good
faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless,
as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the
Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as

persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices
and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of
Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
 The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-
3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence
of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of
his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after
the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s
death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court
of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of
Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO

QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA

GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
does not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed
to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50
years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution
of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack
of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1723 May 30, 1949

LUZ MARQUEZ DE SANDOVAL, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, Branch
III, respondent.

Potenciano A. Magtibay for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor MartinianoP. Vivo for
respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the petitioner against the respondent Judge
Hon. Vicente Santiago.

The herein petitioner instituted a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance of First
Instance of Quezon Province for then probate of the will and codicil executed by the
deceased Daniel Marquez in which she was designated as executrix. The will and codicil
were allowed and the petitioner was appointed on August 16, 1946, executrix in accordance
with the will but before the petitioner qualified as executrix the three heirs instituted in the will
all age made an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of he deceased on October 5,
1946 and entered into the possession of their respective share without the authority and
approval of the court. On August 22, 1947, that is one year after the probate of the will and
appointment of the petitioner as executrix the respondent judge required the petitioner to
quality as such and file a bind of P5,000. In response thereto the petitioner informed the
respondent judge that it was not necessary for her to qualify because the heirs had already
made an extrajudicial partition in accordance with the will as shown by the copy the copy of
said partition which she submitted to the court. In view of the answer of the petitioner the
respondent judge ordered the executrix to qualify as such within forty-eight hour and
declared the extrajudicial agreement of partition entered into by the heirs null and void, on
the ground that the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be
terminated judicially. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and denied by
the court hence, the filing of the present petition for certiorari.

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the respondent, Judge or Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province, wherein the deceased was residing at the time of his death, has acquired
exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of the deceased Daniel Marquez and over
the heirs and other person interested in the estate of the deceased from the moment the
application for the probate of the decedent's will was filed with the said court and the
publication required by law were made; and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not
divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of
dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves.

If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the deceased wassubmitted to the court and
approved by the respondent judge after verifying that it does not prejudicially affect the rights
of third parties, the testate proceedings pending in the court would have been legally thereby
terminated. An extrajudicial partition of the estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a
judicial partition after its approval by the court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of
the estate by the filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will; but as the
testate proceeding is terminated in such case without the necessary publication ofnotices to
creditors and other persons interested in the estate required ina required in a regular judicial
administration, the effect of such judicial partition would be the same as if it had been
effected extrajudicially without the intervention of the court under the provisions of
section1,of Rule 74, that is, subject to the claims against the distributees by persons
mentioned in sections 4 and 5, of the same rule. (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21 Phil., 211.)

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against the petitioner,
because the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in not giving the deed of
extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the deceased the effect of terminating the
testate proceedingover which the court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction since said partition
was not submitted to said court for approval. So ordered.

Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.