DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,
appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him
of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record.

HELD:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party
relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The
Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority
and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

FACTS:
The BOC issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of the rice shipped by M/V Criston, operated by Glucer
Shipping, on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from the Philippine
Coast Guard. A notice of the scheduled hearing of the seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it
failed to appear at the hearing. After a typhoon had passed through Albay, M/V Criston failed to return to
the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found. The BOC then received information that M/V Criston was
found in Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze. The District Collector rendered a Decision
ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo. In the
meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze filed a
Motion for Intervention claiming that M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by
Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi,
Albay.
Manila District Collector issued an Order quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against
M/V Neptune Breeze for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V
Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein
for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. By review of the BOC, the prior order was reversed. CTA
ordered forfeiture of the vessel. MR was denied for failure to present issues that had not been previously
threshed out in its earlier Decision. CTA en Banc affirmed CTA division.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

RULING: YES
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be
disturbed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The court cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not
the same as M/V Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign
registration of M/V Neptune Breeze proves only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not
render impossible the conclusions consistently reached by the courts, that M/V Neptune Breeze was the
very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.

In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.

Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings, it had ample opportunity to present its side of
the controversy in before the Manila District Collector. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the
latter proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District
Collector was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which
El Greco submitted to this Court.

Sahali vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134169 February 2, 2000

Facts: During the 2010 elections, Sahali and Matba were two of the four candidates who ran for the
position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and Usman ran for the position of Vice-
Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the
duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively.

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results
in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts that functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed
their answer with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct a
technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks
appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and
Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion
for Reconsideration.
The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the said motion for
reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the
COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when the COMELEC granted the motion for
technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said
motion?

Held: No. The Supreme Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the issuance of
the COMELEC First Divisions Order.

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a party
therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party
concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of
a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC's directive to do so.

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in
their manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, their objections to the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively
discussed by the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having filed a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC First Divisions Order, their claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard.

On the question of Jurisdiction, the power of the Supreme Court to review election cases falling within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution
in this wise: We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a
final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order
of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since
they only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the
said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is to await the decision of the
COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved
thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused
for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The
CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan
filed the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines v. Noel Enojas, et al., G.R. No. 204894, 10 March 2014
.entry-header
Remedial Law; Evidence; Electronic Evidence; Admissibility; Text Messages – As to the admissibility of the
text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved
by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
7
NOV
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error
of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
15
AUG
.date
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial
court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently
denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity.

--

ATIENZA V BOARD
OF MEDICINE
10
MAR
G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III
of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent
kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and
non-visualizing.
3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of
Editha’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request
forms where interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of
proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha’s formal offer of exhibits, alleging
that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not
properly identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay,
and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the
BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the
ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine
its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the
evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence
Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not
strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although
trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency,
or admissibility, we have held that, “it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can
easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.”

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As
pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved
thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with
Editha’s medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of
the examination. The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s
exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time”
of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be established through a
belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are
liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of
the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at
the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits
offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no
longer had the originals of the exhibits “because [it] transferred from the previous
building, x x x to the new building” and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.

Case Digest: ROLEX SUPLICO, Petitioner, vs NATIONAL

ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by
NEDA SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, and the NEDA-INV
Case Digest:

On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents’ reply, reiterating

their position that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy – one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice.

Contrary to petitioners’ contentions that these declarations made

by officials belonging to the executive branch on the Philippine
Government’s decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project
are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court has no alternative
but to take judicial notice of this official act of the President
of the Philippines.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take

judicial notice, without introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms
of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions.

It is further provided in the above-quoted rule that the court

shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts without
introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of
cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed
ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2, 2007 with
the Chinese President in China as an official act of the
executive department, the Court must take judicial notice
of such official act without need of evidence.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the

very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally
opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is
no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to
have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise

its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case
or controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication
thereon would be of no practical use or value as
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.
Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of
legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which requires
a judicial finding of facts.

DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO, J

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly, sometime in May
1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses.
Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true.
The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification stating that per records in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said certification the police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of appellant.
Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the
appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the
implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the
appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant
gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
(Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live
ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any.
This prompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.

For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the
search including the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in which the search was
carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials
arrived only after the police already had finished the search. However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals and ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of
P. D. No. 1866.

Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a
poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house.
This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.

True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are.

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

VERGARA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 128720, Quisumbing, J

FACTS:
An information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City charging S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y Abrera, PC and
Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band. Allegedly, conspiring and confederating with John Doe, they stole from Catherine F. Manalo the payroll
money amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued
at P17,000 belonging to Manalo.

Athough all the suspects were brought into police custody, petitioner’s co-accused managed to extricate themselves from police control and remain at
large. Only petitioner was left to face the charges wherein he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private
complainant who testified in court while Vergara claimed an alibi and denied his participation in the offense. Claiming innocence, he presented evidence
showing that he was at Pacita Complex at San Pedro, Laguna at the time of the commission of the offense and that being a member of the narcotic
operatives he was engaged in a surveillance of a suspected drug pusher at that particular time. This statement was corroborated by no less than the
team leader Captain, who was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was physically present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex,
San Pedro Laguna at the alleged commission of the offense.

The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and disregarded petitioner’s alibi. It convicted Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in the
information, , but of robbery as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s alibi is bereft of merit.

HELD:

For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. He must further
demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. It is essential
that credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable
alibi. Petitioner failed to meet this test. While petitioner could have been working as intelligence agent in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 –21, 1990,
contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime.

In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused
must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed

In the light of private complainant’s positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the latter’s defense of bare denial and alibi
must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative testimony. Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of
positive identification of the accused. Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by a credible witness who has no
motive to testify falsely.

ROMUALDEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 161602, Abad J.

FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act 1379, the Republic of the Philippines filed an action for forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired property with the
Sandiganbayan against Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity
Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc.

The filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings. 2 They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed
under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing
of the case. The Republic, in its Comment pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in
OMB-0-91-0820 and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
for the filing of the forfeiture case. Sandiganbayan denied the Romualdezes motion, hence they filed petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to
annul the Sandiganbayan’s rulings and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until another preliminary investigation is conducted in
their case on the ground that e Office of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since its authority to investigate ill-
gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before that dateSince the Romualdezes
acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case as early as 1970, then the Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the investigation that it
did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the absence of a prior valid preliminary investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.

In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their absence. The spouses Alfredo
and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that investigation took place. They were thus denied their right to be heard in that investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Romualdezes are entitled to a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:

The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes’ claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to take
part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the
time it was conducted The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the Romualdezes.

Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA revolution of February 1986 and so
could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced upon them
by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things shall have stabilized.13 The Court will take judicial notice of
the fact that the people’s ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation in the
Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served on them at their last known address in
1991, which they do not deny having received.
STATE PROSECUTORS vs. MURO, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876,Per Curiam

FACTS:

Judge Manuel T. Muro filed a motion for reconsideration against a a per Curiam decision in 1994 that ordered for his dismissal from service and
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. The said decision was brought about by his motu proprio dismissal of eleven criminal
cases against Mrs. Imelda Marcos for violation of Central Bank foreign exchange restrictions. Such dismissal constitutes gross ignorance of the law
because it was prompted by mere newspapers reports of the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions which were “hearsay evidence” and without
waiting for the defense to file a motion to quash nor at least affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter.

In pressing for the dismissal of the complaint against him, he maintains that his dismissal of the criminal charges against Mrs. Marcos in the
aforedescribed manner was not motivated by bad faith or by any corrupt and insidious intent. And to further belie his imputed "gross ignorance of the
law", respondent stresses that "he graduated from the law school,
magna cum laude, the valedictorian of his class and placed 6th in the Bar examination"

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal of the cases constitutes gross ignorance of the law absent bad faith and ill motive on his part.

HELD:

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor
does such professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process of law.

Respondent, in acting the way he did, committed a legal error which usually is remediable by appeal or by any other modes sanctioned by the Rules of
Court and "does not raise a question of improper judicial conduct subject to judicial discipline". But egregious legal error, legal error motivated by bad
faith, or a continuing pattern of legal error do amount to misconduct subject to discipline, ranging from admonishment to removal from office. And legal
error is egregious and serious enough to amount to misconduct when judges deny individuals their basic or fundamental rights, such as when
defendants were not advised of their constitutional right to counsel, coerced to plead guilty, sentenced to jail when only a fine is provided by law,
sentenced to jail for a period longer than the maximum sentence allowed by law, or particularly similar to this case when defendants were denied a full
and fair hearing— a constitutional right equally afforded to the prosecution but unceremoniously ignored by respondent.

The gravity of his actuation cannot be shrugged off casually. Respondent has followed a course of judicial conduct which is in utter disregard of the law,
established rules of practice and basic notions of fair play, and his impressive scholastic record as student of law all the more punctuates his blunder
rather than temper it.

NOGALES VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 191080, Mendoza J.

FACTS:

Special Investigator Garry Meñez (SI Meñez) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him
and his fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) located at
Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the
items/articles/objects enumerated in his application which were allegedly used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website. The
application was granted and the corresponding Search Warrant was issued. Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the
search warrant filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties which was denied by RTC.

Meanwhile,the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against
petitioners be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence and the same was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Motion to Release Seized Properties manifesting that the complaint against them was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of
the seized properties. The Motion to Release Seized Properties is partially granted such that only the monitor sets were released but the CPUs and the
softwares were retained under the custody of the NBI. On appeal to CA, it ordered that the CPUs and softwares which were ordered to be retained by
the NBI shall be released in favor of the petitioners herein with the condition that the hard disk be removed from the CPUs and be destroyed. If the
softwares are determined to be unlicensed or pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by law.
On appeal before Supreme Court, petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of pornographic printouts presented by
the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 07H-13530. Since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu,
opium, counterfeit money, or pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course of business, the
destruction of which would violate not only procedural, but substantive due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the destruction of the hard disks and softwares is tantamount to denial of petitioners’ right to due process.

HELD:
The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer units contained obscene materials or
pornographic files. Had it been otherwise, then, petitioners’ argument would have been meritorious as there could be no basis for destroying the hard
disks of petitioners’ computer units.
The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files.
Significantly, Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit as it directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject law.
To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. ALEJANDRO, G.R. No. 176350, Brion J.

FACTS:
Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and
was sentenced to life imprisonment. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the Exhibits whereby they agreed on the
admissibility of the request for laboratory examination of the submitted specimen and on the findings of the forensic chemist.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling that appellant cannot be allowed to question, on appeal, the identity and
integrity of the plastic sachet of shabu seized from the appellant by members of the entrapment team after stipulating its admissibility during the pre-trial.
The CA added that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who handed the plastic sachet of shabu to the poseur-
buyer. The CA further held that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence of
improper motive on their part

On appeal, the he appellant claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the integrity of the seized item had been compromised due to the failure of the apprehending police to mark it

ISSUE: Whether or not integrity of seized item is compromised by the failure of the apprehending officer to mark it.

HELD:
The Court resolved to ACQUIT the appellant, for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 are:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed,
as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and proof of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To remove any doubt or uncertainty
on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, the evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same illicit
drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
In the present case, the records do not show that the apprehending team marked the seized items with th he police did not only fail to mark the
specimen immediately upon seizure; it likewise failed to identify the police officer to whose custody the confiscated item was given at the police station.
Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that the item seized from the appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and, later on,
presented in courteir initials immediately upon confiscation.

In like manner, the stipulation during the pre-trial regarding the non-presentation of the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Gural, merely covers the handling of
the specimen at the forensic laboratory and the result of the examination, but not the manner the specimen was handled before it came to the
possession of the forensic chemist and after it left his possession.

However, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and
invalid; the seizure may still be held to be valid, provided that
(a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly preserved.

These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the police
to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized item

PEOPLE VS. ALIVIO, G.R. No. 177771, Brion J.

FACTS:
During a buy-bust operation by the Pasig City Police, Arielito Alivio and Ernesto de la Vega were apprehended after having seized one plastic sachet of
shabu on the person of Dela Vega and drug paraphernalia at Alivio’s residence which were correspondingly marked. During the trial, the appellants
anchored their defense on denial and frame-up. Alivio additionally asserted that he could not have sold shabu to PO2 Laro since he knew him to be a
policeman. Alivio claimed that he was a former driver of Atty. Nelson Fajardo whom he used to accompany to the police station where PO2 Laro was
assigned.
The RTC convicted the appellants of all charges laid. The RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the buy-bust operation and the lack of improper
motive on the part of the police officers. The RTC rejected the proferred denial and frame-up as defenses as they are inherently easy to concoct, and
found that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crimes charged and the identity of the appellants as perpetrators. His decision
was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identities of the subject shabu were not sufficiently proven since the seized items were not marked at the time the appellants
were apprehended.

HELD:
In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia presented in court as the ones actually seized from the accused, the
prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the
saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link
(not perfect link) in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items.

In this case, although the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, we find that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the buy-bust team under the chain of custody rule.
Under the circumstances, the prosecution’s evidence clearly established an unbroken link in the chain of custody, thus removing any doubt or suspicion
that the shabu and drug paraphernalia had been altered, substituted or otherwise tampered with. The unbroken link in the chain of custody also
precluded the possibility that a person, not in the chain, ever gained possession of the seized evidence.

VALLENO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 192050, Perez J.

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Naga City found petitioner Nelson Valleno y Lucito guilty of violation of Section 11 of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (Illegal
Possession of Shabu) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine. During the enforcement of the search warrant in
the reseidence of Valleno, he was found in possession of 9 nine transparent plastic sheets containing shabu.

During trial, petitioner Valleno interposed denial and claimed that upon showing the search warrant , the policemen asked him to come out of the house
and thereafter the police officer emerged and told him that they had found a tawas-like substance and he was asked to sign an inventory receipt which
he did not understood.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, before the Supreme Court, Valleno raised the following arguments: 1)
there was failure to present the alleged photographs of the seized substance in court; 2) there were no representatives from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of the inventory of the seized items; 3) there was a major contradiction from among prosecution
witnesses on who actually brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory; and 4) the manner of conducting the physical inventory of the alleged
drugs taken from petitioner’s house appeared to be irregular as the seized items were allowed to be handled by persons not authorized to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to submit the required physical inventory would render the seized item inadmissible.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the absence of
a member of media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In the instant case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not broken. Clearly, the recovery and handling of the seized illegal drugs were
more than satisfactorily established in this case.

LUCAS VS. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, NACHURA, J.

FACTS:
Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City. In this petition, Jesse Lucas claimed that Jesus Lucas was his father. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. Respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment and averred among others
that that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He
argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still
unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and opined that the petitioner must first establish the four procedural aspects as laid down in the case of
Herrerea vs. Alba before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group
test and DNA test results. However, upon motion for reconsideration of petitioner, the trial court set aside its previous order and dismissed respondents
arguments. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of respondent and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether or not DNA testing can only be ordered upon establishment of prima facie case of filiation.

HELD: The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at the initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as
yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court.

Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example,
consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

HERRERA VS. ALBA, G.R. No. 148220, CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner Rosendo Herrera. Likewise, he also filed a Motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate proceedings. However, petitioner
denied that he is the biological father of respondent and he also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother. He also opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

The trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and asserted that "under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen…, unconstitutional.” However, said motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and ruled that the proposed DNA testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion.

ISSUE: Whether or not DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

HELD:

The laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that
sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity. Thus, parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to
deny progress.

However, the court ruled that despite the relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as
evidence. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the
DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.55 This refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is
without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.

RP VS. MARCOS, G. R. No. 171701, SERENO, J

FACTS:

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). Pursuant to their mandate, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for
Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos;
and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

Thereafter, petitioner Republic of the Philippines presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on
the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had not provided any
reason for its failure to present the originals. After RP’s presentation of the evidence, the respondents filed Demurrer to Evidence.The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution, which granted all the Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that there was a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III
had connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that respondents were compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render
an accounting and to return the ill-gotten wealth. Said motion was later denied by the Sandiganbayan and it pointed out its reservation in its Resolution, wherein it said that it
would still assess and weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. On appeal, the Republic assailed the resolutions issued by Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents Marcos siblings collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
HELD:
It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in
and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is
constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that
could prove petitioner’s allegations.Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which
mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any
compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them. Thus, absent any
convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth

However, since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos,the Court ruled that iit is imperative that the estate be duly
represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The
deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Because of this, the
Court take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In sum, the Court ruled that the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and,
therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or
acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.