1

[G.R. No. 137571. September 21, 2000]

TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration; and the BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Facts

After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a Taiwanese citizen,[3] arrived in this country.
10 days after he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID). Thereafter, BID Board of Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered
passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary deportation.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal.
After respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim, the trial court issued a Decision granting his Petition
and ordering his release from custody.

Respondents then filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated case.
Petitioner filed an Opposition, claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for
filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although respondents alleged that
they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on
February 11, 1999, as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by the Sheriffs Return.

RTC rejected petitioners contention and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal.

Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law,

Issue:

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:[8]

(a)What is the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal in habeas corpus cases?

Ruling:

Main issue: Reglementary Period for Appealing Habeas Corpus Cases

Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents filed it only five days after they had
received the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. He argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal
is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing
with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of such
judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom.

The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was omitted from and thereby repealed by the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule of statutory construction
is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed
repealed and discarded.[10] The omission shows the intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this
case,[11] to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or code.[12]

Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
 2

In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167570

JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner, - versus -

LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171946

HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION; ATTY. FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as Intelligence
Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
 3

- versus -

JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution[8] dated February 26, 2007.

Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis
alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is Chinese. Luis argued that Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up
his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a
Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment
case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to
the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born FilipinoJimmy added that he had even voted in
the 1952 and 1955 elections.[13] He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging
that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father
was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.

With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is FChinese, he maintained that it may be attributed
to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when
making the said entry.

In a resolution, the Associate Commissioner dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate
Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation.

On March 8, 2001,[18] the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of
Philippine citizenship was made out of time.

On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940.

Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC
of Pasig City, challenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners (Board) to continue with the deportation
proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision[ ordering the apprehension of respondent JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T.
GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen.

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed a supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs which was denied.

The Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a
petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship.
 4

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship should
proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has
jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The
appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.

The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines;
hence, could not be made a ground to ones claim of Philippine citizenship and found that Carlos failed to elect
Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.

The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated
that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation proceeding in
order to determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, the appellate court found that due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board,
contrary to the claim of Jimmy.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration and was denied.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal the Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant
of Deportation to carry out the Decision. This resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of
Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus[36] before the RTC of Pasig
City assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on
recognizance.

The trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to
obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for
reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied.

Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship is settled
with finality by the court.
Issue:
whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

Ruling:
They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for
habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmys
apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board that ordered Jimmys
deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision
before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision was rendered. Said
decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously
granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the
power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of
deportation had already been issued by the Board.Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis.
Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no longer
proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy.] Nonetheless, they
claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer being detained.

On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate,
speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this
case is his cherished liberty. He maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire
 5

into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. As in his petition in G.R.
No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his
father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove his citizenship.

Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.

We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available
only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available for the correction
of the error.
The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and
adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be
wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of
arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had
been charged before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental
agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien
is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board,
the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there
is no law authorizing it.

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation,
coupled by this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to
touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
SO ORDERED.
 6

G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for injunctive relief
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision

The Facts
Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus
which demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to
produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the
custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can
be served with summons and other court processes.

The next day RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to court but despite
diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of
the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan
residence while the Petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC Quezon
City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss andRTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the
guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-Caloocan.4

Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted
by the trial court. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office of
the Assistant City Prosecutor which the Sheriff served petitioner the Order as well as the Alias Writ during the
preliminary investigation of the kidnapping case.

Petitioner prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming, among others,
that she was not personally served with summons and jurisdiction over her and Criselda’s person was not acquired by
the RTC Caloocan.
 7

RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz,9 where
the Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding
and action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said
writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein.

Moreover, personal service does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s given address,
for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy of the court
process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a copy of the
writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person. Ma. Hazelina Tujan-
Militante is hereby directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez Cada before this Court.

Issue: whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent and,
assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda.
Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was served
a copy thereof.

The Court’s Ruling

9

We find for respondent.

In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As provided:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.

However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns
to duty.

The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.The writ
issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and,
if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a
Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may
be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision.

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where
enforcement thereof is sought.

On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states:

Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial
regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong,
and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las
Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
 8

In view of the afore-quoted provision, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be
enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City
and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.

Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service
of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat
comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.22