DIGESTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UA&P LAW 2018

Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
GR No. 196425, 24 July 2012

LEGAL DOCTRINE:

 The abolition of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA)
is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing „delegated legislative authority to
reorganize‰ his own office pursuant to E.O. 292; Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual
freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to
take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move
of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.

FACTS:

 On April 2001, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit
its report and recommendations to the President.
 On November 2010, Pres. Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued EO 13, abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
 On April 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against Petitioner Prospero Pichay, Jr. Chairman of the Board of Trustees
of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as other incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of P445,377 pesos of shares of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.
 Thereafter, petitioner received an Order signed by Exec. Sec. Paquito Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his
co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge
of grave misconduct is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
 Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course
of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following
grounds:
o EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the Legislature to create a public office,
appropriate funds for such and for delegating quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies.
o EO 13 is unconstitutional for encroaching upon the powers of the Ombudsman
o EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause and the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

Whether EO 13 (abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA) is unconstitutional.

RATIO:

The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
 NO, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative
authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
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Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or
a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office
of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger
of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
 Furthermore, the abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office
as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required
no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment
of a third division- the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the
additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

 A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued
in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy
and efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President
Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. Indeed, the economic effects of the reorganization is
shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC’s operation in
the 2010 annual budget, no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required
after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA

There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.

 While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for
the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President’s own office budget without committing
any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature’s power to appropriate funds
when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
 Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to “investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government” and to “submit its report and
recommendations to the President.” Hence, the IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body
to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

 The President’s authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator
cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department
to ensure the enforcement of the laws.

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
 The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency.

 Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate both elective
and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies.

EO 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws.
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 The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that
aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.

 Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from
the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is
lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove and/or
discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public
officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-
level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed
decision.

 Also, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA
took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain one’s side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied.

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