Omaoeng, Connie Joy A.

LLB I

1. Rule-based reasoning

a. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered against
accused Efren Leynes finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Sec. 94 of R.A. 8550 and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, up to twelve (12) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Eighty thousand, pesos (Php80,000.00), to suffer all the
accessory penalties and to pay the cost of the suit.

Paragraph number 8
G.R. No. 224804, September 21, 2016

EFREN R. LEYNES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

b. The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing
Authority requesting that the land they were occupying be declared as an
ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza,
General Manager, National Housing Authority, for appropriate action.9 The
request was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as
per 2nd Indorsement dated July 1, 1986.10 Clearly, the request to have the
land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an
ULRZ.

Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land

Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones.11
Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since
the land involved is not an ULRZ.
Paragraph number 14
G.R. No. 136996 December 14, 2001

EDILBERTO ALCANTARA, FLORENCIO VILLARMIA, POLICARPIO

OBREGON, + RICARDO ROBLE, ESCOLASTICA ONDONG, ESTEBAN
RALLOS, HENRY SESBINO, SERGIO SESBINO, MANUEL CENTENO, +
 RENATO CRUZ, MARCELINO CENEZA, BUENAVENTURA ONDONG,
and BENJAMIN HALASAN, petitioners,
vs.
CORNELIO B. RETA, JR., respondent.

2. Reasoning by analogy

a. Analogy

a.1.)
The Court finds the appeal meritorious.

Generally, on appeal, the findings of fact of an administrative agency like

the NLRC are accorded not only respect but also finality if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Such rule, however, is by no means
absolute. As held in San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa,62 "when the findings
of fact of the labor arbiter and the NLRC are not supported by substantial
evidence or their judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the
appellate court may make an independent evaluation of the facts of the
case." The Court finds the said exceptions extant in this case.

Paragraph number 101

G.R. No. 167286 February 5, 2014

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA AND/OR BRIAN McCAULEY,

Petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) AND
MEMBERS REPRESENTED BY RAQUEL DAVID CHING, PRESIDENT,
EVANGELINE SANTOS, JOSELYN RUCIO AND METHELYN FILLER,
Respondents.

a.2.) The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina,
Sr. v. Ombudsman, which likewise involved identical administrative
complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod
against a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein
that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to administrative cases.Thus, even if complainants filed in
the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against
private respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping
because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.

Paragraph number 27
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 23, 2010

b. Counter analogy

b.1.) In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions
to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.

Paragraph number 79
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA
CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.

b.2.) There is a need, however, to clarify what the Court of Appeals said is a
conditional contract of sale. Apparently, the appellate court considered as a
"condition" the stipulation of the parties that the full consideration, based on a
survey of the lot, would be due and payable within five (5) years from the
execution of a formal deed of sale. It is evident from the stipulations in the
receipt that the vendor Juan San Andres sold the residential lot in question to
respondent and undertook to transfer the ownership thereof to respondent
without any qualification, reservation or condition. In Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court
of Appeals, 17 we held:
 In Dignos v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 375), we have said that, although
denominated a "Deed of Conditional Sale," a sale is still absolute where the
contract is devoid of any proviso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally
rescind is stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid. Ownership will then
be transferred to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery (e.g., by the
execution of a public document) of the property sold. Where the condition is
imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of the condition
would prevent such perfection. If the condition is imposed on the obligation of
a party which is not fulfilled, the other party may either waive the condition or
refuse to proceed with the sale. (Art. 1545, Civil Code).

Paragraph number 46 and 47

G.R. No. 135634 May 31, 2000

HEIRS OF JUAN SAN ANDRES (VICTOR S. ZIGA) and SALVACION S. TRIA,

petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

3. Reasoning by common sense

a. Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed respondent's liability for the accident and for Sumayang's
death. Pestaño was negligent when he tried to overtake the victim's
motorcycle at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver operating a
public transport vehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid
accidents, knowing that it was perilous to overtake at a junction, where
adjoining roads had brought about merging and diverging traffic.

Paragraph number 16
G.R. No. 139875 December 4, 2000

GREGORIO PESTAÑO and METRO CEBU AUTOBUS CORPORATION,

petitioners,
vs.
Spouses TEOTIMO SUMAYANG and PAZ C. SUMAYANG, respondents.

b. The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s

complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his
charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the
Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport
is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.
 Paragraph number 15
G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING,
Respondents.

4. Reasoning by policy

a. The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of
any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Paragraph number 33
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

b. In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this
wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article
6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting
parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an
instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person
solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage
must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.

Paragraph number 35 and 36

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the
Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong,"
respondents.

5. Reasoning by Narrative
a. The Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the Secretary of Justice that
the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, contrary to
the finding of State Prosecutor Velasco, that it was a kidnapping for ransom.

The Court of Appeals gave credence to the accused’s documentary

evidence which supported their claim that the incident was a botched buy-
bust operation. The Court of Appeals specifically noted the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Cesar Landayan (Landayan), who was driving a taxi at the time
of the incident and was apprehended together with petitioners. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay categorically stated that he and petitioners were
released from accused’s custody at about 12:50 in the afternoon of the
same day, 11 September 2001. Thus, Cesar’s statement refuted the
complaint of petitioners that they were freed only in the morning of 12
September 2001 after a pay-off of ₱700,000 in casino chips and two
vehicles. The Court of Appeals stressed that Landayan’s Sinumpaang
Salaysay was given on 14 September 2001, prior to petitioners’ complaint
for kidnapping for ransom which was filed on 18 September 2001 before the
Western Police District. Having been executed prior to the filing of the
complaint for kidnapping for ransom by petitioners, Cesar’s Sinumpaaang
Salaysay could not be discredited as a cover-up evidence.

Paragraph number 15 and 16

G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and

SARAH LANGCO y ANGLI, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN,
P/INSP. ALLANJING ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS,
PO2 PEDRO SANTOS GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2
ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA, JR., Respondents.

b. The Court's Ruling

Petitioners contend that Pestaño was not under any obligation to slow down
when he overtook the motorcycle, because the deceased had given way to
him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the road was
clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestaño accelerated his speed
to pass the motorcycle. Having given way to the bus, the motorcycle driver
should have slowed down until he had been overtaken.

They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road
nearest to the junction as found by the trial and the appellate courts, but was
on the inner lane. This explains why the damage on the bus were all on the
right side - the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator
grill were bent and dented. Hence, they insist that it was the victim
who was negligent.

Paragraph number 27 and 28

G.R. No. 139875 December 4, 2000

GREGORIO PESTAÑO and METRO CEBU AUTOBUS CORPORATION,

petitioners,
vs.
Spouses TEOTIMO SUMAYANG and PAZ C. SUMAYANG, respondents.