Lorenzo Tañada vs Juan Tuvera (1986)

146 SCRA 446 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Publication – Presidential Proclamations etc – What
“unless otherwise provided” means in Article 2 of the Civil Code

With the Supreme Court’s decision that ordered Tuvera to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed.

HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same
as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme
Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall
immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains
to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.

136 SCRA 27 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Publication of Laws – Presidential Proclamations

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, Lorenzo Tañada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera (then executive
secretary to President Ferdinand) Marcos to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive
Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs) issued by the then president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of affectivity does not
preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in
the present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to
give the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia
legis non excusat”. Publication is indispensable.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16
of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.

Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process
clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.
Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the formalities of
the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be entitled to a hearing
before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process
is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006

The Effectivity Clause Is Defective

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In
Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this Court laid down the rule:

… the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….55

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or
a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the
courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.