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G.R. No.

L-1138 December 17, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JOSE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.

Jose H. Tecson for appellant.


First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

Jose Fernando was found by the People's Court in a decision rendered October 17, 1946, guilty of the crime of
treason, as defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of the law, and to pay a fine of P15,000, and the costs.

The information filed against appellant is as follows:

That on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereinafter stated and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jose Fernando, not being a foreigner but a
citizen of the Philippines owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably adhere to their
enemy, the Empire of Japan, with which the United States and the Philippines were then at war, giving said
Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines aid and/or comfort in the following
manner, to wit:

1. That in or about the early part of 1942, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of
giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously to join and become an informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, a Japanese military police
organization.

2. That in or about the period comprised between 1942 and February 1945, in the City of Manila, the above-
named accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, as informer and/or spy of the Kempei-tai, report to the Kempei-
tai, a number of person as members of guerrillas, resulting in the arrest and apprehension, torture , and death
of a number of those persons; and still in the furtherance of his purpose of giving aid and/or comfort to the
enemy, the above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously join, lead and
accompany Japanese soldiers in their raids against guerrillas, resulting in the arrest, apprehension and
detention of a number of guerrillas.

3. That in or about May, 1943, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving aid
with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
arrest, maltreat and detain Ponciano Briones, for the purpose of finding the whereabouts of Lt. Col. Pacifico
Briones of the guerrillas.

4. That in or about August 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving
and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously
arrest, maltreat and detain Carlos Paz who was suspected of a being a guerrilla.

5. That in or about the early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of
giving aid and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously arrest or cause the arrest of Gregorio Hernandez; and still in pursuance of his purpose of giving
aid and/or comfort to the enemy, the above-named accused, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously investigate the said Gregorio Hernandez charging him with being a guerrilla and selling firearms to
the guerrillas, and threatening to take him to Fort Santiago, and tried to persuade him to become a spy for the
Japanese.

6. That in or about early part of 1944, in the City of Manila, the above-named accused, for the purpose of
giving and with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully, and
feloniously arrest or cause the arrest of Abraham Albines, and thereafter, the above-named accused
investigated the said Abraham Albines, charging him with having sold firearms to threatening to take him to
the Japanese officer in Fort Santiago.

7. That in or about May, 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and
with intent to give comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously lead, join,
accompany and assist a group of Japanese and Filipinos which tried to arrest Consolacion Tongol, and being
unable to accomplish that purpose, the above-named accused and his Japanese and Filipino companions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest Gabriel Tongol, a brother of Consolacion Tongol, and
detain him for two days and three nights in the Kempei-tai garrison.

8. That in or about May 1943, in Arayat, Pampanga, the above-named accused, for the purpose of giving and
with intent to give aid and/or comfort to the enemy, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously lead,
join, accompany and assist a group of Japanese soldiers and Filipinos for the purpose of obtaining the
surrender of guerrillas in barrio Candating, Arayat, Pampanga, and not being able to obtain any favorable
result, the above-named accused, together with his Japanese and Filipino companions, did then and there
unlawfully, willfully and feloniously attack the civilian population of Candating, Arayat, Pampaga, resulting in
unnecessary hardships to, and in the wounding of, many civilians.

The lower court found that during the period comprised between 1942 and 1945, appellant was an informer and a
member of the Kempei-tai, and, as such member, he had a group of ten renegade Filipinos whose mission was to
make arrest of guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to investigation and torture in order to ferret out whatever
information they possessed regarding the activities of the underground forces; he had Gregorio Hernandez and
Abraham Albines, father of Pacifico Briones, a ranking officer of the guerrilla forces, and subjected him to investigation
and torture in order to elicit from him information as to the whereabout of his son; and that he attempted to arrest
Consolacion Tongol, but failing in his purpose, because of the intervention of the guerrillas, he took into his custody
Consolacion's brother, Gabriel Tongol.

The fact that appellant has been an informer and a member of the Kempei-tai has been established, not only by the
evidence presented by the prosecution, but also by the testimony of the accused himself, who, however, claims (a)
that he was forced into the service by the enemy and (b) that his employment was a fact known and sanctioned by
chieftains of the guerrilla outfits which governed Manila in their spheres of activities. Both defenses were rejected by
the lower court.

At the hearing of this case on August 16, 1946, appellant made the admission that he is a Filipino citizen.

Eleven witnesses testified for the prosecution.

1. Odon Alimañgohan, 42, residing at 1535 Felix Huertas, Manila, testified that during the Japanese occupation he
came to know the appellant one night in a gambling house at the corner of Oroquieta and Quiricada streets. Appellant
was accompanied by three others. The people therein moved to run away, but the visitors told them not to be afraid
because they were only looking for a certain person. Appellant often visited Dodong, a friend of the witness, who saw
him twice carrying firearm. The witness knows that appellant was a member of the Kempei-tai. He asked the witness if
he wanted to work with the Kempei-tai. The witness did not join it, "because the Japanese refused to accept me."

2. Zoilo Rufino, 22, married, residing at 1255 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that he came to know appellant during the
Japanese occupation because their homes are near each other, witness' house located in Sales Street, and
appellant's in Comandante street. In 1944, the witness was arrested by Domingo Santiago, informer of the Japanese.
He was taken to the house of the appellant in Comandante street. There he saw five men, including appellant, and a
woman. He was detained there for about four days and was investigated and maltreated by Domingo Santiago, who
was asking for the whereabouts of his brother. Appellant was staying in the house at night time. On the first night, the
witness was placed under the house, but on the following days he was brought up. When he was arrested he was tied
but after two days he was untied. Appellant saw the witness being tied. A few hours after his arrival in the house, a
Japanese appeared who "told us that we are bad men; but when we refused to admit he told us that it is better for us
to die because in that case they will not be taking the trouble of covering our bodies with newspapers." Witness'
brother was also arrested. The witness was released by order of appellant who did not impose any condition. The
witness was released ahead of his brother. Domingo Santiago was asking the witness P20,000 for his release. The
witness told him that he cannot afford that amount because his earning is only enough for his needs. Appellant told
the witness that he can be released but his brother cannot because he was an ex-convict. After his release, the
witness looked for money and gave it to appellant after which his brother was released. He saw appellant in the place
carrying arms. Later on, the witness heard from neighbors that his brother, Laureano Rufino, was arrested by an
informer and a Japanese and killed.

3. Santiago Briones, 40, married, 441 Evangelista street, Manila, testified that he had his tailoring shop at 820 Ilaya
street, Tondo, and one day appellant, accompanied by one Adriano, came asking for the father of Pacifico Briones.
The witness purposely denied knowing where he was, because he knew that Pacifico Briones was a guerrilla leader in
the Central Luzon area. Appellant and companion showed that they bore firearms with them. Surprised, the witness
admitted that Ponciano, father of Pacifico Briones, was living in the house. They went inside the house and they saw
Ponciano, who is also an uncle of the witness. Appellant asked Ponciano for his son, but Ponciano answered that he
did not know where his son was. They took Ponciano away. It happened in 1943 but the witness cannot remember the
month.
4. Ponciano Briones, 66, married, unemployed, resident of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, testified that he had known appellant
who married in Cabiao. In 1943, he was arrested by appellant at Ilaya street in his house located on a lot to reach
which it was necessary to pass through the tailoring shop of Santiago Briones. Appellant was accompanied by
Ruperto Adriano. They were armed with pistols. Appellant was asking for Pacifico Briones. He wanted the witness to
find his son and to surrender him to them. Appellant and his companions were spies of the Japanese. His son Pacifico
was a guerrilla major in 1943. The witness was brought to a building called Meisic. The next morning he was brought
to the China Bank at Dasmariñas street. Appellant and companion were forcing him to look for his son and to
surrender him. There were many Japanese at the China Bank. He was investigated by appellant and his companion.
Appellant struck him on the ribs with the butt of a revolver. In the afternoon the witness was released on condition that
he was to report every morning to the Japanese Mijara at the China Bank building. He reported for about five days.
Afterwards he was brought to Arayat, Pampanga. He was brought by appellant together with the Japanese, because
they heard that his son was in the mountains of Arayat. He remained in the place for about a week. The Japanese told
him to write to his son and go around the town to secure information about his son. From Arayat he was brought to
Manila and then to Cabiao by appellant, Ruperto Adriano and Mijara. In Cabiao he remained for about eighty days. He
was brought to a Japanese captain named Kimura. Kimura asked him about his son and to look for him and surrender
him. He was required to work in the garrison, to cut grass and fetch water. After eight days he was brought to Manila.
He was not arrested anymore and returned home to the province. His son belonged to Ramsey's guerrilla unit. His son
is dead. He was shot at the China Grill when he was a lieutenant-colonel and when the Americans had already
arrived.

5. Gabriel Tungol, 49, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant since he took away witness'
sister. It was in April, 1943. It happened at Mangakakutud Arayat. One morning and a companion "came to our house"
armed with revolvers. They said that "they were taking away my sister," to surrender her "to the Japanese." His sister
Consolacion in the beginning joined the guerrillas. "They were not be able to take away my sister because she was
sick" and "on that night the guerrillas came and took away my sister and Maria, another sister." The following morning
appellant with another companion returned and took the witness to the Japanese garrison in Arayat. "The Japanese
took my statement and I was detained there for two days and two nights. They were asking me of the whereabouts of
my sister." He was maltreated by the Japanese and at the time appellant was present in the place. After taking his
statement and two days' and two nights' detention, the witness was released. In May, he was arrested again by the
appellant. He was again detained for two days and two nights in the Japanese garrison. After his release, he was
arrested for the third time by the Japanese, he did not see appellant anymore, and was again detained for one day
and one night. He did not see appellant. He escaped, "because the Japanese tried to kill me. I went to the mountains."

6. Fernando Tongol, 33, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that he knew appellant when he arrested his
brother Gabriel. Appellant and a companion "came to our house" and "told us they will surrender my sister
Consolacion in Manila and asked me to go with them. We tried our best to please them in our house. They told us to
prepare and after two hours they returned, but at that time my sister became sick because of that sickness of my
sister they were not able to take her away. After that they departed, and I also left. That night my sister was taken
away by the guerrillas. My brother was taken away the following day," by appellant and a companion. They were
armed with revolvers. They brought his brother to the Japanese garrison.

7. Engracio Manese, 27, married, farmer, resident of Arayat, testified that Gabriel Tongol is his brother-in-law. In May,
1943, he was living in barrio Mangakakutud, Arayat. In Manila, appellant took away by the guerrillas. Gabriel was
taken to the Japanese garrison. His wife Maria became afraid and hid in one of the houses, then joined Consolacion
who was with the guerrillas in the mountains.law phil.net

8. Juanita Rosales, 24, married, laundry woman, resident at 1729 M. Hizon, Manila, testified that she had known
appellant since the Japanese occupation, Gregorio Hernandez is her husband, who was arrested by appellant. The
arrest took place at 1729 M. Hizon street. It was nighttime. Her husband was brought to Comandante street, the place
where the office of Jose Hernandez was located. She went to the place the following morning. She saw there Jose
Fernando and his men in her house. She talked with Leoncio Fernando one of the accused men and with appellant.
She asked appellant why he arrested Gregorio Hernandez and appellant answered "because he was a guerrillero.
Jose Fernando told me then that if I do care to live with him he would release Gregorio Hernandez but if not, he will
bring Gregorio Hernandez to Fort Santiago. Then, we continued talking. After that, I talked also to Gregorio
Hernandez and I told him what Jose Fernando told me and my husband said to me, `Well, it is up to you, because if
that is the only way for my salvation, then you use your discretion.' Then, I told Jose Fernando 'I will live with you on
condition that you release Gregorio Hernandez' and he really released Gregorio Hernandez." Gregorio Hernandez
was brought to the House of Jose Fernando at Dapitan street. He was released in the afternoon following the day of
his release. From that time, the witness came to live at Comandante street with Jose Fernando. "I do not remember
for how many months I lived there. I lived with him as his wife in order to secure the release of Gregorio Hernandez. I
have seen the men he arrested. I cannot remember how many men were brought there, but I know that almost
everyday there were persons who were brought and maltreated there." Jose Fernando and his men were maltreating
them by using a piece of iron. The witness saw Japanese in the house. The Japanese were Mjara and Quijacho. They
used to go to the place once in a while. About two times a week. It was said that Mijara] was an interpreter and
Quijacho was the chief of the accused. Everytime they went to the place they used to talk with the accused, who was
given rice and money by the Japanese. The witness was brought to Zurbaran street and also to Canton Hotel. In
Zurbaran she lived with Jose Fernando under the house of Mijara. They left that street, "because according to them,
as they arrested many persons, they were afraid that the guerrilleros may go to that place." She stayed under the
house of Mijara "quite long." While there, she saw persons arrested by Jose Fernando. They were maltreated. There
were few brought to Zurbaran street but many at Canton Hotel, located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Azcarraga
streets. When she was living with Fernando at the Canton Hotel, almost everyday, she saw persons being arrested
and maltreated. "It is very seldom that a day had passed by without a person arrested ... There were many persons
living there also. According to them, those arrested persons were guerrilleros. They maltreated them and tied them up.
Then they were given to the Japanese." The Japanese just went there. There were three men under Jose Fernando.
Among the arrested persons the witness remembered one by the name of Berting. After leaving the Canton Hotel, she
went to Jaen, Nueva Ecija with Jose Fernando. "I deserted him without knowing or rather without his knowledge and I
went back to my house." Gregorio Hernandez is in Bulacan. When appellant arrested Gregorio Hernandez, he was
accompanied by Leoncio Fernando, Carlos Domingo and Johnny. The witness became acquainted with Jose
Fernando only at Comandante street before he arrested her husband. It was two weeks before. Since then, "he has
been making some propositions to me." She was then working at Comandante street, "because I had a small bar
there." The accused was visiting her there. Her husband was arrested because he was suspected as a guerrillero
although he was not.

9. Fidel Ferreras, 25, married, laborer, resident at 1226 Lealtad, Manila, testified that he has known Jose Fernando for
a long time, since they were in the Buencamino Hacienda. The witness was arrested by Vicente Reyes at Tutuban
station because of being a USAFFE and was delivered at Meisic station to Jose Fernando. He does not remember the
date. "Upon my arrival there, Jose Fernando and the Japanese called Simura, conferred with each other, and after
their conference, Jose Fernando began to punish me. "I was hanged" by the Japanese, "for more than one hour.
While I was suspended and tied in the wire with my face downward, the Japanese was hitting my legs and other parts
of my body and this Jose Fernando was talking with that Japanese." The witness showed a scar of about two inches
long and one-fourth inch wide located at the right clavicle, for a wound he suffered from the beatings. Jose Fernando
did not take part in the maltreatment. "He just asked the Japanese to maltreat me." The witness saw Ponciano
Briones, father of Pacifico, when they went to Cabanatuan because they were loaded together in the same train. They
were six in all, including Vicente Reyes, a Japanese, and Jose Fernando. They were brought to the house of Captain
Kimura. The witness was asked questions there. He remained in Cabanatuan for more than a month in the house of
Captain Kimura. "We were free to go anywhere in that house. From Cabanatuan we were brought to Arayat" by Jose
Fernando and the Japanese Kimura. The witness does not remember when he was released. "I was released from the
Japanese garrison in Arayat." When he was being investigated at Meisic by the Japanese, Jose Fernando acted as an
interpreter. Jose Fernando told the witness to confess if he was really an ex-USAFFE. Jose Fernando was armed with
a rifle but he wore no uniform.

10. Gregorio Hernandez, 29 , single, telephone operator, residing at 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he was arrested by
the accused in 1943. He had forgotten the month and date. It must be about October. He was arrested in his house at
M. Hizon street. "At night, when I was lying in my bed, at about 10 o'clock, I heard that somebody was knocking our
door, and when I went to see who was knocking the door, I saw three men. Only I know the names of the two but not
their surnames — Johnny and Frank, and the other one is Dominador Rodriguez. They forced me to go down from my
house. I was not even able to put my suit. I was in my sleeping outfit." "He was brought to the corner of Oroquieta and
San Lazaro. I found there the herein accused Jose Fernando. Frank, referring to Jose Fernando, faced the witness
and told him 'Here is your man'." His hands were tied by Frank upon order of Jose Fernando. He was there for about
thirty minutes. Abraham Albines and Carlos Francisco arrived arrested. "We were brought to Rizal Avenue and to
Comandante street," guarded by five persons including Jose Fernando. Fernando "took us to the house one by one
and asked about our activities as guerrilleros." Fernando was armed with a .45. The witness was asked about names
and activities of guerrilleros. He answered that he did not know anything about the guerrilla organization. He remained
in Comandante street the whole night. Fernando ordered his men to tie the hands of the witness who was brought to
Dapitan. There was no misunderstanding between the witness and Jose Fernando before 1943.

11. Abraham Albines, 28, singles, government employee, 1729 M. Hizon, testified that he came to know Jose
Fernando after his arrest in the early part of October, 1943. This witness was in gambling den at the corner of
Quiricada and Oroquieta streets when four men raided the place. They asked for Gregorio Hernandez, Carlos
Francisco and the witness. Gregorio Hernandez was not there, because he went out. Carlos Francisco and the
witness were taken and brought to the corner of Oroquieta and San Lazaro. Among the four persons who raided the
place was Jose Fernando. When they arrived at the place they saw Gregorio Hernandez already tied with three men.
Then they were taken to Comandante street, they were investigated by Jose Fernando. Fernando asked the witness
about his guerrilla activities and whether he wanted to join the Kempei-tai. The witness did not accept the offer. In
1944 the witness was occupied in helping in the laundry at Bambang street. The witness was not a guerrillero.
Appellant asked him questions but did not maltreat him. lawphil.net

Nine witnesses testified for the defense.

1. Arsenio S. Muñoz, 53, single, Captain, residing at 551 España, knew the accused since before the war. He was the
contractor of the River Control between Cabiao and Candaba during the war. He met him as a guerrilla lieutenant, and
they often met each other because the witness was also a guerrilla. They used to meet at Cabiao and Arayat. The
accused was second in command to Captain Basco in the early part of 1942. The witness does not know whether
appellant remained as a guerrillero until the liberation. In 1943, the witness met the accused in Manila at the Central
Hotel with other Filipinos and the witness "heard that he was working with the Japanese. Mr. Jose Fernando knew that
I passed to Briones organization and he knew also that I am a guerrilla member and also I knew that he was working
with the Japanese and he came to me and he induced me to surrender to the Japanese, but I did not approve his
proposition, and then I told him: `I think Joe, I cannot surrender.' Then he replied: `Well, it is up to you, if you want to
surrender or not. Then, one day, while I was taking my lunch in the Plaza Hotel, one Mr. Rufino Buenaventura
approached me and he told that I should go to Military Administration Office between 12 and 1 o'clock in the
afternoon, and I went there and I was brought before a Japanese interpreter as a guerrilla member and I admitted that
I was a guerrillero, and at about 3 o'clock that same afternoon, Mr. Jose Fernando and his companions arrived and
Mr. Fernando approached me and told me that I should not be afraid, because he was willing to help me, and at about
6 o'clock in the afternoon I was released. After my release, I was told that I should go to Nueva Ecija with one Leonor
but I told him: `I cannot go.' My regiment was the one who arrested Jose Fernnado and turned him over to the CIC."

2. Roberto Simbol, 32, married, ex-serviceman, residing at 1511 Ipil, Sta. Cruz, Manila, testified that in 1942 he was in
a guerrilla organization in Arayat with Jose Fernando, who was first lieutenant with the late Lt. Col. Pacifico Briones.
Fernando was appointed organizer of the Barrio Defense Corps. In January, 1943, there was a split between the Huks
and the USAFFE men and by that time Jose Fernando and Pacifico were captured by the Huks but were able to
escape. The witness came to Manila when he was sick of malaria and after his recovery in the San Lazaro was
captured by a Japanese of the Kempei-tai. Jose Fernando heard about his capture and worked for his release, and
once he was released he went back to his outfit "and since then I knew that Jose Fernando was a Japanese agent."

3. Estanislao, Ordoñez, 54, married, businessman, residing at 1482 Quezon Blvd., testified that he knew the accused
in Cabiao in 1935 or 1937. He met him in Manila. The accused told him that he was working with the Japanese, but he
was also working for certain Filipinos. According to him, he was working as an agent of Fort Santiago. He also told me
that he stayed there to keep the Filipinos who happened to be there. In 1945, when Texas men came to the house of
Jose Ramos, witness' friend, confiscate rice, they were given money to avoid the confiscation, the witness requested
the intervention of the accused, who was able to have the money returned to the owner. The Texas men were agents
of Fort Santiago. The incident happened in 1944.

4. Exequiel Lacanlale, 41, married, detained in Muntinglupa, testified that he knows Gabriel Tongol. In May 1944, the
witness was in Arayat with the Japanese as a prisoner. Mayor Ramirez of Arayat reported Gabriel Tongol to the
Japanese that he had gun and he was a member of the Huks. Gabriel Tongol was arrested by the Japanese and the
witness saw him maltreated. Tongol admitted that he had a gun. Later he told the witness that he had to admit
because he could no longer suffer the maltreatment. The Japanese compelled Gabrile Tongol to produce the gun and
as a guaranty his wife and children were taken as hostages. He was told that if he could not produce the gun his
house will also be burned. The accused had no connection whatsoever with the arrest of Gabriel Tongol. The witness
is in Muntinglupa, "because I was suspected being a Japanese spy." In 1943 he was staying in Macabebe, Pampanga
and in the middle of the same year he was in Arayat. He worked with the Japanese from 1943 to 1944, "because I
was captured by them on December 6, 1942." He was accompanying the Japanese in their raids, "there was no
alternative except to go with them." When Gabriel Tongol was captured by the Japanese the witness present.
Consolacion Tongol was not there, but his wife was present. There were about twenty Japanese in the group.

5. Joaquin S. Galang, 26, married, merchant, residing at 1463 Dapitan, testified that about the middle of 1944, the
accused was introduced to the witness as a good young man who was acting as agent of Fort Santiago and able to
serve friends, by Mr. Tecson, a former companion of the witness at Liceo de Manila. The accused was also introduced
as a guerrillero. The witness stated that in case something happen he would request the help of the accused, who
committed himself to give help and added that he was a grandson of Felipe Buencamino and that he was from
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. One morning in October or November, the accused went to the witness' house to ask him if he
was acquainted with Marcos Villa, who was a colonel under General Luna, stating that there was a warrant of arrest
from Fort Santiago against him because the Japanese said that guerrilleros went to his house, adding that he did not
want the old man be arrested, suggesting to the witness to see to it that the old man should go to the provinces. The
witness, being a friend of Marcos Villa, induced the latter to go to Isabela and even lent him P70 for transportation.
The witness also testified about the request of the accused to ave Alejo Galang who was about to be arrested that
night by the Japanese for helping guerrilleros.

6. Antolin S. Rosales, 34, single. miming engineer, residing at Visiones, Sampaloc, Manila, testified that in September,
1942, he met the accused in the house of Governor Robles. A week after the witness raided the Cabanatuan jail,
because there were guerrilleros imprisoned therein. The witness was the captain of guerrilla organization. The raid
was successful. In 1943, while the witness was a prisoner in Fort Santiago, a Japanese asked the accused if he
knows the witness. The accused answered that the witness was a good element. After a month, the witness was
released. One day, the witness met the accused in the Escolta, where the accused informed him that he was an agent
of the Japanese. During their long talk, the witness came to trust him and give him information about his guerrilla
organization and other underground work. But in July , 1944, the witness was arrested. In January, 1945, the witness
entered Manila, under Captain Maloles. In 1945, the witness is released on bail. He is one of those accused of the
crime of treason.

7. Mario M. Bundalian, 41, married, district engineer, Bureau of Public Works, San Fernando, Pampanga, testified that
he knew the accused in 1941 as one of the contractors of the government. He met him sometime in 1943 in Manila
and the accused reported about his guerrilla activities in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, being in the USAFFE unit, and they
discussed abut their work, but the conference did not last long. In 1943, the witness was a guerrilla officer assigned in
Manila.

8. Jose Fernando, 33, married, testified that at the outbreak of the war he was working in the Hacienda Buencamino at
Cabiao. He was a contractor in a government construction job. On December 10, 1941, he helped the Red Cross at
Cabanatuan. On June 2, 1942, he went to the Ramsey guerrilla unit. Since the beginning he was not satisfied with the
Japanese occupation, so "I conferred with my townmates to form a body to combat the Japanese administration. We
contributed money and we collected arms, and we organized a guerrilla unit." The witness was a first sergeant in June
and in the following month he became the first lieutenant of the Fort Squadron. "I was assigned to the area comprising
the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlac, up to April 5, 1943. There was a split in the ranks in our guerrilla
organization between USAFFEs and Hukbalahaps, and there were encounters between those two factions. My
Commander, Dominador Basco, and myself were captured by the Hukbalahaps that captured us was raided by the
Japanese, and I, together with Dominador Basco, were able to escape; and after escaping I reported to my former
squadron. On my return to my former squadron, I stayed there for two days with them and I, Col. Briones and my
commanding officer, Dominador Basco, agreed that we should place our respective families in a safer place, so I
brought my family here in Manila." He brought his family to Manila on the seventh or eight of the April, 1943. "While I
was looking for a place for my family I was apprehended by the Military Police together with Vicente Reyes and
Ruperto Adriano. These two persons were formerly attached to our squadron, but at that time they were already with
the MPs. I was tied, and I was brought to Fort Santiago. I was maltreated, investigated; they starved me there, and
they gave me the water cure treatment. After that they tied me; then they made me rest in a certain room and I was
approached by Vicente Reyes. Vicente Reyes asked me to tell them that I am really a Lieutenant Colonel in Central
Luzon, because, according to him, he reported that I am the Lieutenant Colonel, because he was under obligation to
point out the highest officer of the guerrillas in the Central Luzon area to the Military Police. I told him that it is against
my conscience, but he told me that there is no other remedy, because otherwise he and myself will die. After that, I
was called again by the MPs an d I was investigated and I saw Vicente Reyes had really presented evidence against
me and I saw the evidence were clear, and so I admitted that I am the highest ranking officer of the guerrillas in the
Central Luzon. The Japanese officer told me that if really my intention was to help my countrymen, then I should
accept a position with them in the pacification of my countrymen. At first they offered me the position of Japanese
informer. I refused this position, and what I suggested was employment in the office, in their management of the
peace campaign. The Japanese did not accept my offer to work in their office, and instead they made me the head of
ten Filipino agents in the Kempei-tai and they told me that if I would not accept this position, the Japanese would kill
me and will behead all the members of my family. I accepted the position that they gave me and after that I reported to
my squadron and other guerrilla men and I related to them what happened to me. The emissary whom I sent to
different guerrilla units to relate my plight, named Leonor Francisco, came back to me and he told me that those
people told him to tell me to continue also to help the guerrillas. I selected real guerrilla men, mostly ex-USAFFES and
other people entrusted the communication that I sent to those different guerrilla units." The witness had connections
with Squadron 29, USAFFE, that is Ramsey, at that time in Cabanatuan; with Lt. Teofilo Francisco stationed at
Meycauayan, Bulacan; with Roberto Simbol stationed at Bataan; with Col. Pacifico Briones stationed at Pinatubo
Mountains; he was sending communications to the unit under Dominador Basco. There were also several small units
of guerrillas with whom the accused had had connections, among those were the unit at Dapitan, under Col. Marking,
the unit at corner of Oroquieta and Zurbaran, under Wenceslao Lamsen, and that under Capt. Leon Pichay, in Manila.
"Upon my employment in the Japanese Military Police, the first step that I did was to select seven trusted genuine
guerrillas, and to these seven men entrusted the communications that I sent to the underground and to several
guerrilla units. Then, among the ten men given to me by the Japanese of whom I was the head, I dismissed seven of
them, and I retained in my office three ganaps. I cannot dismiss all of them, because this will arouse the suspicion of
the Japanese, so I have to retain three in my office. Whenever there was a raid proposed by the Japanese to be
made, the first step that I did was to warn the people there to transfer to another place, and after that, I report back to
our office and reported to the Japanese that there was no guerrilla in said place; however, if they are not satisfied with
the report and they wanted to raid the said place, they can do it because I am satisfied that they could not find any
person there, because I warned them beforehand. Take, for example, the unit under Commander Dominador Tombo.
At the beginning of the year 1943, Capt. Tombo and myself were already wanted by the Japanese in the province, so
we went here in Manila. This Capt. Tombo, everytime he came to Manila, the first thing that he did was to report to
me, telling me that they are here, and they came here with ten of fifteen men, and asked my advise or what advise I
can give him. Then I told them to go to a certain place, giving him the number of my telephone, so that in case of
danger they might call me and as a matter of fact, up to the middle of the year 1944, when Capt. Tombo returned to
the province, nothing happened to them, and even I gave them my revolver and ammunitions. Another case is about
the headquarters commanded by Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, in the City of Manila, corner Zurbaran and Oroquieta.
This headquarters was being closely watched by the Japanese Military Police. Inasmuch as one of my activities was
to protect the guerrillas, I contacted Capt. Lamsen and I told him that his headquarters was being watched by the
Japanese, and I told him that the best way to do, inasmuch as the building that he used as headquarters was
composed of two stories, was that I will occupy the second story, so that I can camouflage the activities of the
guerrillas, and in case the building will be raided, the Japanese will find out that I am using the first floor as my office.
So, when the Japanese came to raid the place, I was confident that they could not find any guerrilla men in said
building. When Capt. Lamsen approached me and asked me to do whatever I can, so that he will not be able to
manage guerrilla unit. I did what I could to prevent the Japanese from employing him, and I succeeded in this. Then,
another fact happened to Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, when one night in November, 1944, at about 8 o'clock, the
Military Police of the Airport Studio raided the place of Capt. Lamsen. I was the one who happened to be there, and
when the Japanese Military Police found me, they asked me why I was there, and I said that I was occupying the
place as temporary office; then the Japanese searched the place and found nothing, and they left."

The witness testified also that one Manuel Gallego was wanted by the Military Police. He warned him and so Manuel
Gallego was not arrested by the Japanese. Gallego was the representative from the Second District of Nueva Ecija.
The witness used to help civilians coming from the provinces and arriving at Tutuban so as to prevent their rice from
being confiscated by the Military Police. He also used to help peaceful guerrillas when they were being maltreated by
the Japanese. Jose Fernandez, a lieutenant in the Ramsey Unit at Meycauayan "was arrested by the Japanese but
my runner came immediately and reported to me that Jose Hernandez was arrested by the Japanese so I went at
once to a superior officer to tell him that the person arrested is one of my men who is helping me in my peace
campaign. I was able to convince the superior officer, and Jose Hernandez. The same is true with respect to Vicente
Nuñez, of Squadron 4, when he was arrested by Vicente Reyes and Buenaventura — I interceded in their behalf, and
through my intercession, they were released." "While I was under detention in the month of May, Ponciano Briones
was arrested by Vicente Reyes and one Ruperto Adriano, and I came to know this fact, because Vicente Reyes and
Ruperto Adriano told me that they had arrested Ponciano Briones. After he was investigated he was released." The
witness had nothing to do with the detention and maltreatment of Ponciano Briones. In December, 1944, Jose Nogoy,
nephew of Ponciano Briones, brought from Cabiao a machinery which was confiscated by agents of the Japanese
Military Administration. Ponciano Briones approached the accused requesting him to recover back the machinery or
its costs, which was P4,000. The witness was able to recover only P3,000 and for his failure to recover the remaining
P1,000, Ponciano Briones harbored resentment against him. Last September, 1944 I, together with my men, arrested
Gregorio Hernandez in his house because there was a complaint against him that he, together with other Texas men
extorted five thousand pesos from Pablo Pastaño and Estanislao Ordoñez. After arresting him, I brought him to my
office, and while I was investigating him he told me that he left the five thousand pesos to his companions. Then I
gave him some warning, and then I sent him home after taking the five thousand pesos from him. Since the month of
June, 1944, I met Juanita Rosales, in one of the houses of prostitution and Juanita Rosales was one of the inmates of
that house and I came to know her and came to have understanding with her: we agreed to live with each other. Her
name was not Juanita Rosales — she was Juanita Ibañez, according to her certificate. We lived each other for ten
months, since June, 1944. While we were in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, about the end of March, 1945, Juanita Rosales told
me that Gregorio Hernandez had been sweetheart before the war. Before April 27, 1945, I discovered that Juanita
Rosales returned back to her old business in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, and I scolded her and I told her to leave. She
returned here to Manila and I even gave her P20 for her transportation expenses. I met her at the headquarters of the
guerrillas at Meycauayan on April 27, 1945. Nothing happened to us. When she came to the headquarters of the
guerrillas at Meycauayan she reported to the guerrillas that I was an agent of the Japanese Military Police." The
accused had Abraham Albines arrested because he "was in company with Gregorio Hernandez in their thieveries."
Because Consolacion Tongol was sick, "she asked Lt. Leonor Francisco to fetch me. Upon my arrival at the house of
Consolacion Tongol I asked her why she sent for me. She told me that she was sick and she wants to be hospitalized
in the city. Then I told her to be prepared and I will conduct her to the hospital in the city. She told me that her money
and clothes were placed at different places, and the best time for her to start was on the following day. I took my lunch
in her house, and after lunch, she told me that she will get her clothes in the laundry; but after 30 minutes, a group of
Japanese, accompanied by the Municipal Mayor of the town came to raid the house, and I was one among those
arrested in the house. When I asked the Japanese why he was arresting me, told me that I was denounced as a bad
man. Then I showed to them my identification card, and the Japanese then found that I was a bad man. I was
conducted to the office of the Military Police in the town and there in the office I saw Consolacion Tongol. We slept in
the town of Arayat that night, and that night I learned that Consolacion Tongol was kidnapped by guerrillas, and on the
following morning I returned to Manila. Consolacion Tongol was the nurse of our guerrilla unit." The witness does not
know anything about Gabriel Tongol. The second time the accused went to Arayat was because he was sent for by
the barrio people of Candating and by the head of the guerrilla unit. They asked him to intercede with the Japanese
authorities who have committed many abuses against the population. "Upon my arrival I remonstrated with the
Japanese military authorities and I transmitted to them the plight of inhabitants of the barrio. On my arrival there in the
barrio of Candating, the town mayor gathered the people of the barrio, and about 300 people gathered there, and the
mayor separated those who were not guerrillas and he denounced the guerrillas to the Japanese. I interceded for
them and explained to the Japanese that those people were not guerrillas, they were simply farmers, and I explained
to the mayor that with that system there will be no peace in the town. I quarrelled with the mayor, because the mayor
was insisting that those men who were segregated were guerrillas, and as a result of which I quarrelled with him. to
save those people, I selected one person by the name of Mabini, and I gave him instructions as to what he should do,
that somebody should be sacrificed, that he should suffer, because that would be their only salvation. He followed my
instructions, and they were saved. I took hold of this person named Mabini, and I investigated him in the presence of
the Japanese, and I even slapped both of his face, and this man insisted that he is not a guerrilla, that he is a peaceful
farmer. Then the Japanese approached us, and they asked what the person was trying to explain, and I told the
Japanese that he was saying that he was not a guerrilla, that he was a peaceful farmer, but that we could not
understand each other. Then the Japanese explained to me. I exerted my efforts to convince the Japanese that I was
really investigating, and because of that they were saved." After his mission in Candating, he returned to Manila,
"Upon my return here in Manila, I closely watched the activities of the Japanese Military Police, and I stole the plan
and sketches of the places here in Manila and suburbs to be zonified by the Japanese; and one time I was able to
steal from the car of Colonel Takano, here in Escolta, the plans and sketches of the different places here in Manila
and suburbs that were to be zonified; and as a matter of fact, the loss of those maps created a furor here in the city
among the Japanese, and they have offered a reward of ten million pesos for the recovery of said sketches and maps.
They were not recovered, because I sent said maps and sketches to the guerrilla officer, Capt. Antolin Rosales; and
as a matter of fact what happened then was that even the detectives at the City Hall were arrested here in Manila, and
some of them were brought to my office and were investigated. Then I helped in the arrest and investigation of the
"texas" here in Sampaloc and Quiapo. When the American liberating forces arrived here in the city, February 3, 1945,
I went with Capt. Wenceslao Lamsen, and I indicated to him the places of danger that may endanger the lives of
Americans and guerrillas; and after that I proceeded to Jaen, Nueva Ecija."

After the witness joined the Japanese Kempei-tai and he was made the head of a group of ten men, he separated
seven among them, but he could name only one Johnny, one Tony, one Pedro and one Ruperto. He forgot their
surnames. In 1942, he left Nueva Ecija because of the fact that he sensed that he was being pursued and wanted by
guerrillas and the Japanese and by the peace officers of Cabanatuan or Cabiao. After he was made head of a group
of Filipino agents, the accused enjoyed absolute freedom and he could escape. The Japanese "had not trusted me, so
they were always suspicious of me. I had access to their offices, because at times they called us or investigated us."

9. Dominador Panis, 28, married, sportsman, residing at 772 Tayabas, Manila, testified that he has known Jose
Fernando before the war. Fernando knew pretty well that the witness was active in the resistance movement. They
dined together many times, and the accused told him several times of raiding certain places. In November, 1944, the
witness was arrested by the Japanese and brought to the Airport Studio where he was released. At the garrison, he
was tortured and several scars of his face show the effects of his torture. I saw the accused once inside the Airport
Studio.

After carefully weighing the above testimonies, we are convinced that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond
all reasonable doubt that appellant, being a Filipino citizen, had adhered to the cause of the Imperial Government of
Japan, by giving aid and comfort to their military forces stationed in the Philippines during the enemy occupation,
having served as informer and active member of the Kempei-tai, the Japanese military police organization, having
arrested Ponciano Briones, Gregorio Hernandez, Abraham Albines and Gabriel Tongol as guerrilla suspects or having
immediate connection with guerrilla suspects, in an attempt to suppress the underground resistance movement. I
proving the overt acts imputed to appellant, the two-witness rule provided by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
has been fully satisfied.

Appellants claim that he was forced into the service of the Kempei-tai by the enemy appears to be without merit. The
circumstances under which he alleges having been forced by the Japanese to serve them seem to belie his allegation.
It is incredible that, while appellant was undergoing detention and maltreatment for his alleged connection with the
resistance movement, the Japanese should, without much ceremony, upon appellant's show of willingness to abide by
their order to serve them, release him, provide him with firearms, and put under his charge a group of Filipino
informers in the service of
Kempei-tai. To place appellant in such a responsible position, full of opportunity and means either of helping the
Japanese or sabotaging their military efforts, appellant must beforehand have shown them strong evidence of
adherence and loyalty for the Japanese to trust him.

If appellant's claim of unwillingness was true and he was helping the underground resistance movement at heart, he
offered no explanation for his failure to take advantage of the freedom granted him during the long months of service
in the Kempei-tai by fleeing from the enemy to join the guerrilla forces or by sabotaging the military efforts of the
Japanese. His corroborated claim of having stolen zoning maps appears to be too flimsy to be believed, not only
because appellant has not shown any military usefulness in said theft, but also because the Japanese needed no
maps for their zonings which they practiced in a haphazard and indiscriminate way. That appellant, instead of fleeing
from, or sabotaging the efforts of, the enemy should have made arrests and investigations to actually help the
Japanese in their campaign for the suppression of guerrilla activities, makes wholly unacceptable his claim of having
entered the service of the Kempei-tai involuntarily.

Appellant's allegation that his employment in the Kempei-tai was known and approved by guerrilla leaders is a
gratuitous allegation without any reliable evidence to support it. Not a single guerrilla leader or guerrilla soldier was
called by appellant to support or corroborate him in his claim.

At any rate, even on the hypothesis that appellant's claim of his involuntarily induction into the Kempei-tai, and that
said induction was approved by the guerrilla chieftains, have been proved, they cannot exculpate him from criminal
responsibility for the arrests and investigation of guerrilla suspects and their relatives and for the punishments and
tortures inflicted by him on them, as conclusively proved by the evidence on record, as with said overt acts he helped
the military purposes of the enemy, with no other purpose than to show his adherence and support to the Japanese
cause in the last war.

Appellant never claimed that he made the arrests and investigations and inflicted the punishments and tortures
impelled by force or induced by insurmountable fear of the Japanese, which, if proved, would relieve him from criminal
responsibility, nor with the knowledge and approval of guerrilla leaders, which, even if accepted, would not exculpate
him of rather make said leaders answerable with appellant for the crime of treason.

The appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.

Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.


Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court sentencing the accused to life
imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.

The information charged:

That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not
a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the
Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then at
war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:

That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily
the Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the
United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted the Japanese Military
Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces
and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan,
Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April,
1945. Contrary to Law.

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of defendant's
having joined the Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese
soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not
been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the
enemy. But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other
Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili
military uniform; that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . .
that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;" and that
"the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the Americans."

Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of
the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant.
Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry
duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding
in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one
witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least
one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.

We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and
giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports
treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was created, which, according to the
evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with
the Empire of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence
in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the
Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two
witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the
act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of
increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country
or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with
him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very
nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on
his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced,
his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the
accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from
that of enlisting in the invader's army.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the
evidence in the present case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one
witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from American sources
on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts,
and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from American materials the following excerpts which
appear to carry the stamp of authority.

Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:

In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was
held to mean that there might be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act of the
same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same construction might apply in this
country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony,
by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting
them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both
state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the
rule in England.

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section 2038, p. 271:

Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two
witnesses to each part of the overt act.

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is
necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt
act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the
Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a
treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused
actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of the trial court. To the possible
objection that the reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that
the authors of the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason
difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of
evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or
jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the
culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the
truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or
from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of
another eyewitness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of
the rule of two witnesses but said that the founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went
ahead not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said,
attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be
guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of
the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the
celebrated Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision.
Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology warrant.
Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a
crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to
conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however,
that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a
manner, as to render proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was
adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by
whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for
treason were generally virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who
introduced that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should
operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.


First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a
plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor
introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence
to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to
death and to pay the fine of P20,000.

Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the
first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught
an American aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way,
the accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American
was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the
next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and the accused were
Japanese and other Filipinos.

These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the American was walking
as well as his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night when he and
Albano had a drink of tuba together.

This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only
on the whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)

The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by
murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has
regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but
also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of
the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
being a member of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts;
that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give
him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese companions to
Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and
from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;

2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and
Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of the body and
thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following
day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;

3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military
forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-
an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol
did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with a
rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken
about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;

7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers,
said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.

The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on
others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States
constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make treason.

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or
physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so,
when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the
subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery,
because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not
a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of
murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts
of treason that they can not be regarded separately under their general denomination.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating
circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method
of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the
Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the
accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were
abandoned.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint
"another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the
accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings
of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial,
27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear
expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to
aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel
assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The
statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the
interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his
best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former
counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the
bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case
and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There
being an aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court
will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with
costs of this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-2256 July 6, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LUIS NAVEA, defendant-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgement of the People's Court finding the appellant guilty of treason and sentencing him to
life imprisonment, with corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay a fine of P10,000, plus the costs, the appellant
being entitled, however, to the benefit of one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

The appellant was charged with six counts but was found guilty of three, 1, 2, and 4.

Under count No. 1, the appellant is alleged to have been a member of a party of Filipinos who captured in the latter
part of November, 1944, Lieutenant Leslie of the American Air Force who Bailed out from his plane between
Binangonan and Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The capturing party delivered the flier to the Japanese soldiers who liquidated
him. The skull of Lieutenant Leslie was found only after the liberation of Sta. Rosa. The witness for the prosecution
presented in support of this count were unanimous in testifying that the only part taken by the appellant was to pilot
the banca in which the capturing party of Lieutenant Leslie rode. The evidence for the defense tends to show the
appellant was compelled to pilot the banca by the Japanese soldiers. In our opinion, the appellant at least is entitled to
the benefit of a reasonable doubt, as he merely piloted the banca used by the rescuing party and did not even go with
the Japanese soldiers when the latter took over the American Flier. No active part is therefore attributable to the
appellant in the delivery or liquidation of Lieutenant Leslie.

Under count No. 2, it is alleged that on or about two o'clock in the morning of November 16, 1944, the appellant and
David Cose, both armed and clad in Japanese uniforms and army caps, went to the house of the spouses Wenceslao
Carpena and Maxima Bato in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival, they took hold of Reynaldo Carpena, son of
Wenceslao, and after he was tied, Reynaldo was brought down to the place where appellant's companions were
waiting with Captain Maykawa of the Japanese Army. Thereafter, the appellant And David Cose went up the house,
tied the hands of Wenceslao, and dragged him down. The appellant and his companions left, bringing with them
Wenceslao Carpena. Nothing was heard from Wenceslao since then, and it was known that he was killed only after
the liberation When his remains were discovered. Wenceslao Carpena, according to the evidence for the prosecution,
was apprehended for being a guerrilla suspect. This count is supported by the testimony of Maxima Bato and
Reynaldo Carpena, wife and Son respectively of Wenceslao Carpena.

Under count No. 4, it is alleged that on February 14, 1945, the appellant, together with Martin Laurel, Filemon
Alitaptap, Tiburcio Alitaptap and Higino Sigue, found Agustin Ramirez riding on a bicycle. Thereupon they arrested
him. After Agustin's hands had been tied, the group took him to a yard in front of the house of Buenaventura Dichoso
where he was forced to kneel down on the edge of a prepared grave and bayoneted to death by Tiburcio Alitaptap and
Martin Laurel. Agustin Ramirez was suspected of being a guerrilla. This count is supported by the testimony of
Buenaventura Dichoso and Canuto Velandres.

We are convinced that the appellant is guilty under counts No. 2 and 4. At least two witnesses testified in support
thereof. It is true that, as pointed out in the lengthy brief of appellant's counsel de oficio, there are some discrepancies
in the statements of the prosecution witness, but as they refer to minor details, said discrepancies rather lead to the
conclusion that the witnesses were not fabricated. In view of the lapse of time and different capacities for observation,
the witnesses cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity minor matters connected to the main overt
acts. The trial court saw and observed the witnesses during the trial, and we have found no good reason for overruling
said court when it gave weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and refused to believe the testimony of
the witnesses for the defense. At any rate, the witnesses for the prosecution have not been shown to have had any
motive for falsely testifying against the appellant.

The Solicitor General recommends that the appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of treason with murder. We
have already ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason it
"becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides."

Being conformity with the facts and the law, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.

C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.

REYES, J.:

We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court
upon the appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of crime
of treason with murder robbery and rape."

The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains the following counts:

1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of
Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become
a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully
well that the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend every aid and cooperation
with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored
Philippines Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he
did give aid and comfort to them did go out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of
guerrilla and other elements and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.

2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and the
City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to
the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join the
Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T. Yushida, performing
the function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military police
and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with treasonable intent to give as he
did give and comfort aid and comfort to them did in company with other member of the Japanese Military
Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla as they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot
civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile design of the enemy and to
weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.

3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his
capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a
guide of the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army did then
and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called mopping up
operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance against said
enemy and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.

4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November 1944 in the City of
Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give
aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a
construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese soldier against allied air raids and did help in
the acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation against the expected landing of
America forces.

5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did aid and comfort to the said enemy in company with Japanese Military
soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the
latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to
confess his guerrilla activities.

6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent
to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the
Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia
strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia
on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.

7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and within
the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and
its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy
in his capacity as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with
Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then and there willfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter taking said
Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa
about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in gathering up arms in
furtherance of their hostile design and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise
maltreat him in the course of said investigation.

8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of
Japan and its imperial Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police
Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese Military Police did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did investigate the latter as to the
whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer of the guerrilla and upon his
denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the
latter by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting
wounds on his head and finally striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.

9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese
Government and her armed forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military
Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police, did then and there apprehend and
arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez as to the
whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command
and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts herein accused did
slap kick and throw her to the ground hang her by the arms strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten
her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.

10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and its Imperial of Japan its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and
comfort said enemy in company with five Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military Police
otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his capacity Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan
Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike said Victoriano
Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan
Unadia to the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said person were guerrilla and as a result of which
said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since then.

11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as
chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in
furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy.

12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn
company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest one
Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla.

13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there,
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to
headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question and investigate said
Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong denied
knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing,
severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her
aforesaid husband, Pedro Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and
when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever
since.

14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy,
acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu
District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the latter as the whereabouts of
Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the accused did
hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several
wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla whereabouts.

15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the
Jurisdiction of this court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the
Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Marciano Alejandro, Carlos
Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said Jose Rada
on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.

16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla activities and
resistance to said enemy.

17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines,
particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as member of the
enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation conducted by
the Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to
Minglanilla for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy.

18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its
Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu
District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeant T.
Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest,
maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping
them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco:

2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch


P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring

on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of
this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an
informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas
and as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was captured.

20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat,
hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession of the
latter's connection with guerrillas.

21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of
the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldier and other agent of the
Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up
the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as
consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.

22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief
informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and "John Doe" her husband, on
suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita
Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did torture them
by hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.

23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial
Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military
Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for
his activities and resistance to the said enemy.

By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he now
pleads for modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred:

1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary surrender; (2)
the facts that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese
soldiers under trial by the military commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the
lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of the Japanese;

2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of the
assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;

3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;

4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and
robbery;

5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.


Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of
the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned
in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which
the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-
399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.

Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission that he
was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there
has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People vs.Conwi,2 40
Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)

The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not been
established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code.

There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would not be sentenced to
death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both the prosecution and the trial court,
the latter stating in its order denying appellant' motions for reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would
advance his opinion in connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on
the merit of the same."

There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of
treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the
information show that appellant in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being
unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting
them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and
maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino
girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty,
these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this
said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.

But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission
of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes,
wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be
regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs
17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is
beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.

For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in treason
characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying crimes should be taken in
to consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on
its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the
penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and
harm to which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries
that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just penalties to the
perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating
penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the
method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of
justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims.

The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed P20,00
Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating
against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in
its maximum. But since five member of this court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the
appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.

Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio.
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,


vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.


First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these
Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that
this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to
the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as
we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested
in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme
power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the
exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may
be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law
of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in
articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty
itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance,
the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in
the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons,
supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de
factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based,
either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an
enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty"
used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains
vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said
conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other
publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to
the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute
and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted
of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to
the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it
would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso
facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial
life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship,
because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not
receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate
power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in
abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason
that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not
applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as
treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well
as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which
are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as
crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and
that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable
as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as
against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial
life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure,
either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such
action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of
his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established
by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the
military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are
bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and
those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be
considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,
essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the
safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the
occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of
being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive
them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in
forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves
of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in
other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in
article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then
organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of
the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by
authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides
that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . .
and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in
so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but
subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to
our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them"
(section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the
United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional
Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691,
696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the
final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty,
in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by
that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed
against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been
committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth
of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's
petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion,
without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a
separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,


vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA,respondents.

Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.


Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin
Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint
against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpusfiled with this
Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed
against them an information with the proper courts justice.

This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a
quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation
and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the
complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if
there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the
information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.

The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of
the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the
opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed
a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.)

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force
of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a
person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours
after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice
empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person
arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204,
which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and
medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed
by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit
such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."

Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the
mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his
liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be
surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of
commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.

Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer
after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay,
and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court orjudge for
such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the
defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall
also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.

And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the
provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a
judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ
shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of
the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule
108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947,
43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation
proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by
the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the
purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First
Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of
arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation
proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence
of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the
municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in
connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may
conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.

Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is
not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make
or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who,
personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the
investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as
abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in
the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the
offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction
over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of
section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the
officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and
the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the
time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for
the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith,
unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest
without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the
person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the
defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the
testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that
prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the
proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the
purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as
the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary
information, must be taken into consideration.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any
process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient
ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally
detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or
any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such
case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities
and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds,
after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a
fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the
offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened
in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear
cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners
within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now
detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,


vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic
principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a
government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best
of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard
of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor
and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during
the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it
to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men,
others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion
found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney
for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to
a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to
include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all,
the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be
repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made
returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain
facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners
were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or
control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an
exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of
the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order
of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring
before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel
for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day
named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in
court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared,
repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition
copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto,
and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return
to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and
because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have
any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after
due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not
complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore
directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales,
and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of
first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate
some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the
respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final
decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and
policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919,
the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own
efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their
returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in
the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who,
on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of
the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos,
(reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision.
We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society,
and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights,
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-
General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine
Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and
punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States
have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes.
Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous
person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law,
order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to
force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change
his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.
Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor
and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of
the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines
have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same.
And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute
could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can
hold the same club over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will
we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng.
stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who
by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106
U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and
makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still
rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet
any such situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his
domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in
the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of
destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred
and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer
has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as
they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons
guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a
case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and
therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of
criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in
this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should
not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was
finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city
limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a
petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty,
even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's
jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown
that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their
plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate
court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a
denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says
counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this
is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles
of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were
prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived
his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality
in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the
true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as
it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ
of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The
membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and
Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J.,
with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished
American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the
opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as
will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the
opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition
which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been
expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations,
until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will
have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights
and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of
personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not
doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the
state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the
case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the
statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and
served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The
officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court
relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon
the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine
and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they
are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if
the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his
grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother
and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain
date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been
handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to
obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the
defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately
after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to
bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the
possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child,
that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he
does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been
made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that
what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was
done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it
was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q.
B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233;
The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have
before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his
return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that
they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the
negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive
and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to
produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production
of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the
two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926.
See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding
the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as
purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the
record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his
chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being
brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit
that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted;
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life
in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through
ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own
expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar
facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that
state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every
effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in
America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter;
and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have
shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal
police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges
and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance
with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally
closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular
individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of
the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao,
and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and
does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to
be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a
person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of
the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any
of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction
by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to
fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court,
his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women
to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty
for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as
much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a
contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since
respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first
order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and
embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating
his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is
P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban
is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of
one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al
Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may
serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.