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AND
LIBERALISM
WORLDPOLITICS
MICHAEL W. DOYLE
JohnsHopkins University
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political and economic freedom) were that ruling makes no difference.He also
shown to have considerablyless conflict presumesthat no one is preparedto take
at or above the level of economic sanc- those measures(suchas stirringup foreign
tions than "nonfree" states. The free quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling
states, the partlyfree states (includingthe coalition) that enhance one's political
democratic socialist countries such as power, despite deterimental effects on
Sweden), and the nonfree states ac- mass welfare. Third, like domestic
countedfor 24%, 26%, and 61%, respec- politics, world politics are homogenized.
tively, of the international violence Materially monistic and democratically
duringthe period examined. capitalist, all states evolve toward free
These effects are impressive but not trade and liberty together. Countriesdif-
conclusive for the Schumpeterianthesis. ferently constituted seem to disappear
The data are limited, in this test, to the from Schumpeter'sanalysis. "Civilized"
period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for ex- nations govern "culturally backward"
ample, the Russo-AfghanWar, the Viet- regions. These assumptions are not shared
namese invasion of Cambodia, China's by Machiavelli'stheory of liberalism.
invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania'sin-
vasion of Ugandabut justmissesthe U.S.,
quasi-covert intervention in Angola Liberal Imperialism
(1975) and our not so covert war against
Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it Machiavelli argues, not only that
excludes the cold war period, with its republicsare not pacifistic, but that they
numerous interventions, and the long are the best form of state for imperial
history of colonial wars (the Boer War, expansion. Establishinga republicfit for
the Spanish-AmericanWar, the Mexican imperialexpansionis, moreover, the best
Intervention, etc.) that marked the way to guaranteethe survival of a state.
history of liberal, including democratic Machiavelli's republic is a classical
capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan, mixed republic. It is not a democracy-
1984; Weede, 1984). which he thought would quickly degen-
The discrepancybetween the warlike erateinto a tyranny-but is characterized
history of liberalstates and Schumpeter's by social equality, popular liberty, and
pacifisticexpectationshighlightsthreeex- politicalparticipation(Machiavelli,1950,
treme assumptions. First, his "material- bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung,
istic monism" leaves little room for 1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock,
noneconomic objectives, whether es- 1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner,1981, chap. 3).
poused by states or individuals. Neither The consulsserveas "kings,"the senateas
glory, nor prestige, nor ideological an aristocracymanagingthe state, and the
justification,nor the purepower of ruling people in the assembly as the source of
shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals strength.
leave little room for positive-sum gains, Liberty results from "disunion"-the
such as the comparative advantages of competition and necessity for com-
trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is promise required by the division of
true for his states. The political life of powers among senate, consuls, and
individualsseems to have been homogen- tribunes (the last representingthe com-
ized at the same time as the individuals mon people). Libertyalso resultsfrom the
were "rationalized,individualized, and popularveto. The powerful few threaten
democratized."Citizens-capitalists and the rest with tyranny, Machiavellisays,
workers, rural and urban-seek material becausethey seek to dominate.The mass
welfare. Schumpeterseems to presume demandsnot to be dominated, and their
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1986 Liberalismand World Politics
veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case, we want more for ourselves
state (Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. and our states than just materialwelfare
122). However, since the people and the (materialistic monism). Because other
rulershave differentsocial characters,the states with similar aims thereby threaten
people need to be "managed"by the few us, we prepare ourselves for expansion.
to avoid having their recklessnessover- Becauseour fellow citizens threatenus if
turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy
the ability of the state to expand their ambitionor to releasetheirpolitical
(Machiavelli,1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. energies through imperialexpansion, we
249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls expand.
plan expansion, consult oracles, and There is considerable historical
employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism.
that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and
Strength,and then imperialexpansion, Thucydides'Athens both were imperial
results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense
increasedpopulationand property,which (Thucydides,1954, bk. 6). The historical
grow when the citizens know their lives recordof numerousU.S. interventionsin
and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwarperiodsupportsMachiavelli's
seizure. Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4;
and provide soldierswho fight for public Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current
glory and the commongood becausethese record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is,
are, in fact, theirown (Machiavelli,1950, calls some of his insightsinto question.To
bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac-
the honor of having your state expand, tually controls (and thus unbalances)the
Machiavelliadvises, you should organize mixed republic, its diffidence may out-
it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite ("senatorial")aggressiveness.
Rome, rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that (1) liberal
republiclike Spartaor Venice. Expansion pacifismhas at least taken over with the
thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist
"Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy, as Schumpeterpredicted it
for expansion. If a stable aristocratic would or that (2) the mixed record of
republicis forced by foreign conflict "to liberalism-pacifism and imperialism-
extend her territory, in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are
shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeteriandemocracieswhile others
herselfquicklybroughtto ruin";if, on the are Machiavellian republics. Before we
other hand, domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion, however, we
"thecontinuedtranquilitywould enervate must considera third apparentregularity
her, or provoke internal dimensions, of modernworld politics.
which together, or either of them
separately, will apt to prove her ruin"
(Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. LiberalInternationalism
129). Machiavellithereforebelieves it is
necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalismcarrieswith it two
Rome, rather than that of Sparta or legacies. They do not affect liberalstates
Venice, as our model. separately,accordingto whetherthey are
Hence, this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic, but simul-
perialism. We are lovers of glory, taneously.
Machiavelliannounces. We seek to rule The firstof theselegaciesis the pacifica-
or, at least, to avoid being oppressed.In tion of foreign relations among liberal
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Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epi- we now come to the essential question regarding
stemology, a conditionfor ethicalaction, the prospect of perpetual peace. What does
and, most importantly,an explanationof nature do in relation to the end which man's own
reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does
how the "mechanicalprocess of nature nature help to promote his moral purpose? And
visibly exhibitsthe purposiveplan of pro- how does nature guarantee that what man ought
ducingconcordamong men, even against to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not
their will and indeed by means of their do) will in fact be done through nature's compul-
very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. sion, without prejudice to the free agency of
man? . . . This does not mean that nature im-
44-45). Understandinghistoryrequiresan poses on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be
epistemologicalfoundation,for without a imposed by practical reason. On the contrary,
teleology, such as the promise of per- nature does it herself, whether we are willing or
petual peace, the complexity of history not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt.
(PP, p. 112)
would overwhelm human understanding
(Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetualpeace, The guaranteethus rests,Kantargues,not
however, is not merely a heuristicdevice on the probablebehaviorof moralangels,
with which to interpret history. It is but on that of "devils, so long as they
guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First possess understanding"(PP, p. 112). In
Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the explainingthe sourcesof each of the three
Guaranteeof PerpetualPeace"),to result definitivearticles of the perpetualpeace,
from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, Kant then tells us how we (as free and in-
failing that, from a hiddenplan.8Peaceis telligent devils) could be motivated by
an ethical duty because it is only under fear, force, and calculatedadvantage to
conditionsof peace that all men can treat undertakea course of action whose out-
each other as ends, ratherthan means to come we could reasonably anticipateto
an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, be perpetualpeace. Yet while it is possible
chap. 3). In orderfor this duty to be prac- to conceive of the Kantianroad to peace
tical, Kantneeds, of course, to show that in these terms, Kant himself recognizes
peace is in fact possible. The widespread and argues that social evolution also
sentiment of approbation that he saw makes the conditions of moral behavior
arousedby the early successof the French less onerous and hence more likely (CF,
revolutionariesshowed him that we can pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In
indeed be moved by ethical sentiments tracing the effects of both political and
with a cosmopolitanreach(Kant,CF, pp. moral development,he builds an account
181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This of why liberal states do maintain peace
does not mean, however, that perpetual among themselvesand of how it will (by
peace is certain("prophesiable"). Eventhe implication, has) come about that the
scientificallyregularcourse of the planets pacific union will expand. He also ex-
could be changed by a wayward comet plains how these republicswould engage
striking them out of orbit. Human in wars with nonrepublicsand therefore
freedomrequiresthat we allow for much sufferthe "sadexperience"of wars that an
greaterreversalsin the course of history. ethical policy might have avoided.
We must, in fact, anticipatethe possibility The first source of the three definitive
of backsliding and destructive wars- articles derives from a political evolu-
though thesewill serve to educatenations tion-from a constitutionallaw. Nature
to the importanceof peace (Kant,UH, pp. (providence)has seen to it that humanbe-
47-48). ings can live in all the regionswhere they
In the end, however, our guaranteeof have been drivento settleby wars. (Kant,
perpetualpeace does not rest on ethical who once taught geography, reports on
conduct. As Kant emphasizes, the Lapps,the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)
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Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics,"since none appears to
fit Kant's commitment to liberal individualism (Holmes, 1979).
aThere are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; the
United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout.
bSelected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all states
categorized as "free"by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounced
capitalist orientation.
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Changkufeng(1938) Bangladesh(1971)
Nomohan(1939) Philippine-MNLF(1972-)
World War II (1939-1945) Yom Kippur (1973)
Russo-Finnish(1939-1940) Turco-Cypriot(1974)
Franco-Thai(1940-1941) (1974-)
Ethiopian-Eritrean
Indonesian(1945-1946) Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-)
Indochinese (1945-1954) Timor (1975-)
Madagascan (1947-1948) Saharan (1975-)
First Kashmir (1947-1949) Ogaden (1976-)
Palestine (1948-1949) Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978-1979)
Hyderabad(1948) Sino-Vietnamese(1979)
Korean (1950-1953) Russo-Afghan (1979-)
Algerian (1954-1962) Iran-Iraqi (1980-)
Note: This tableis takenfromMelvinSmallandJ. David Singer(1982,pp. 79-80). Thisis a partiallist of inter-
nationalwars foughtbetween1816and 1980. In AppendicesA and B, Smalland Singeridentifya total of 575
wars duringthis period, but approximately159 of them appearto be largelydomestic,or civil wars.
This list excludescovert interventions,some of which have been directedby liberalregimesagainstother
liberalregimes-for example,the UnitedStates'effortto destabilizethe ChileanelectionandAllende'sgovern-
ment. Nonetheless,it is significantthat such interventionsare not pursuedpubliclyas acknowledgedpolicy.
The covert destabilizationcampaignagainst Chile is recountedby the Senate Select Committeeto Study
GovernmentalOperationswith Respectto IntelligenceActivities(1975, CovertAction in Chile, 1963-73).
Followingthe argumentof this article,this list also excludescivil wars. Civil wars differfrominternational
wars, not in the ferocityof combat, but in the issues that engenderthem. Two nations that could abide one
anotheras independentneighborsseparatedby a bordermightwell be the fiercestof enemiesif forcedto live
togetherin one state, jointlydecidinghow to raiseand spendtaxes, chooseleaders,and legislatefundamental
questionsof value. Notwithstandingthesedifferences,no civil wars that I recallupset the argumentof liberal
pacification.
Notes
I would like to thank Marshall Cohen, Amy Gut- foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democ-
mann, Ferdinand Hermens, Bonnie Honig, Paschalis racies to maintain peace among themselves, and he
Kitromilides, Klaus Knorr, Diana Meyers, Kenneth made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-
Oye, Jerome Schneewind, and Richard Ullman for Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies
their helpful suggestions. One version of this paper of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand
was presented at the American Section of the Inter- Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implica-
national Society for Social and Legal Philosophy, tions of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp.
Notre Dame, Indiana, November 2-4, 1984, and will 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this
appear in Realism and Morality, edited by Kenneth phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J.
Kipnis and Diana Meyers. Another version was pre- Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarian-
sented on March 19, 1986, to the Avoiding Nuclear ism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the
War Project, Center for Science and International postwar period that drew on an unpublished study
Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Govern- (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Under-
ment, Harvard University. This essay draws on standing Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the
research assisted by a MacArthur Fellowship in term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discus-
International Security awarded by the Social Science sion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I
Research Council. survey the period from 1790 to the present and find
1. He notes that testing this proposition is likely no war among liberal states.
to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical 3. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the
analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward significance of the distribution of alliance partners in
the military, the spirit and manner by which bour- World War I. He found that the possibility that the
geois societies wage war, and the readiness with actual distribution of alliance partners could have
which they submit to military rule during a pro- occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972,
longed war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schum- p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an
peter, 1950, p. 129). equal possibility that any two nations could have
2. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to gone to war with each other, and this is a strong
have been the first to point out (in contemporary assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion
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1986 Liberalismand World Politics
of the issue of statisticalsignificanceas it appliesto empirically merely a "pious hope" (MM, pp.
his libertarianthesis. 164-75)-though even here he finds that the pacific
4. Thereare seriousstudiesshowingthatMarxist union is not "impracticable" (MM, p. 171). In the
regimes have higher military spending per capita Universal History (UH), Kant writes as if the brute
than non-Marxistregimes (Payne, n.d.), but this force of physical nature drives men toward in-
should not be interpretedas a sign of the inherent evitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 ff.) argues that
aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian from a post-critical (post-Critique of Judgment)
governmentsor of the inherentand global peaceful- perspective, Perpetual Peace reconciles the two
ness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in par- views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature
ticular, representa minority in the currentinter- (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a
nationalsystem;they arestrategicallyencircled,and prior of the a posterior'-a critical perspective that
due to theirlack of domesticlegitimacy,they might then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic pat-
be said to "suffer"the twin burden of needing terns in history. Law and the "political technology"
defensesagainstboth externaland internalenemies. of republican constitutionalism are separate from
Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) ethical development, but both interdependently lead
militarydictatorships,due to theirdomesticfragili- to perpetual peace-the first through force, fear, and
ty, have little incentiveto engagein foreignmilitary self-interest; the second through progressive
adventures.Accordingto WalterClemens(1982,pp. enlightenment-and both together lead to perpetual
117-18), the United States intervenedin the Third peace through the widening of the circumstances in
World more than twice as often duringthe period which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and
1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. smaller burdens.
Relatedly,Posen and VanEvera(1980,p. 105; 1983, 9. For a comparative discussion of the political
pp. 86-89) found that the UnitedStatesdevotedone foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp.
quarterand the Soviet Union one tenth of their 232-38).
defensebudgetsto forcesdesignedfor ThirdWorld
interventions(whererespondingto perceivedthreats
would presumablyhave a less thanpurelydefensive References
character).
5. All citations from Kant are from Kant's Andreski, Stanislav. 1980. On the Peaceful Dis-
Political Writings(Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet position of Military Dictatorships. Journal of
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28:197-204.
PP PerpetualPeace (1795) Aron, Raymond. 1966. Peace and War: A Theory of
UH The Idea for a UniversalHistorywith a International Relations. Richard Howard and
CosmopolitanPurpose(1784) Annette Baker Fox, trans. Garden City, NY:
CF The Contestof Faculties(1798) Doubleday.
MM The Metaphysicsof Morals(1797) Aron, Raymond. 1974. The Imperial Republic.
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