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MO YA LIM V. CA
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong,
and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13
March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed
to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog,
except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did
not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya
Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section
4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section
4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant
for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien
wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not
have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even
as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim,
a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
IN RE: CHING BAR MATTER
Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship
Requirement
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint
Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the
bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he
is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his
mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution,
a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner,
acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign
parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant
– a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served
as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying
that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching
should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon
reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years
after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution
was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when
he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after
reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed
due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years
had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year period.
The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally
3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be
extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t
be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his
life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for
citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never
thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar).
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship
 Page 2 of 8

is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority
which the court considered not within the reasonable time.
Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
CO V. HRET
THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS:

Facts:聽 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET
Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has
declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
resided in the Philippines
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on for voting purposes.
July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as
proof of his Philippine Citizenship: second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the

1. Certification 聽 issued by the PRC Board of candidates who vied for the position of representative in
Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant; the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The
district of Northern Samar.
oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship,
he was not allowed to take oath. The petitioners filed election protests against the private
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose
The Office of the Solicitor General 聽 was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
Philippine Bar. 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
In his report:
Northern Samar.
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese
citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the
age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to for the private respondent.
elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already
be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present ISSUE:
jurisprudence.

Issue: whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of

discretion. (EWAN KO KUNG TAMA TOH)
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within
"a reasonable time".
HELD:
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to On Jurisdiction
elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The
reasonable time means that the election should be made
within 3 years from 聽"upon reaching the age of majority", The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate

Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members.
(See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been
given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
His grandfather was naturalized as a Filipino, Ong married
a Filipina…. Blah blah…. He is only renting a house
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it
is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
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the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
Disclaimer: I just copy pasted this from the actual case in
toto, if you’re going to make a case digest from this, please
make the necessary adjustments.
CO V. HRET
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern
Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the
citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only
a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s
residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any
property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines;
and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. In the case at
bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial
of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by
the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan,
respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was
declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time
Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then
is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no
ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong.
Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino
mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the
earlier definition given to the word residence which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The
domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,

Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of
respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization;
Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province
of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League
of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083.
May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were
both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation
was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground
that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both
a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
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However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public
elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other
hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV
Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization
takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of
the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with
its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and

bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far
as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss
of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MERCADO VS MANZANO
Posted by kaye lee on 5:15 PM
G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999 [Dual Citizenship; Dual
Allegiance]
FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano
to hold elective office on the ground that he is both an
American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in
the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted
the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160,
that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any public position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for
disqualification to hold or run office in the local position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What
is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal 聽
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the
HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when
the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However,
he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized
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as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his
nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET
decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other
hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the
disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other
hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces
of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage
of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil

Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in
this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,
Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost
or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to
or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the
U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United
States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
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Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship
by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January
2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the

thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23
January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for
lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied
on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any
other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other
petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would
include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be
allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the
Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined
to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and
year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli,
res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli,
per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions
that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them
on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the
time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Page 7 of 8
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while
the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties
to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
The petitions were dismissed.
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TECSON V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy
on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939
and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable
is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father
of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on
September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
 Page 8 of 8

Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the

residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have
been benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that
Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr.
was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which
constitution considers as citizens of the Philippines those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando
Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.