Dying Declaration- Exception to the hearsay rule.
Accused: Francisco Santos @ Pran and Villamor Asuncion
People vs De Joya: (Robbery with Homicide)
Accused: Pioquinto De Joya
Victim: Eulalia Diamse (Dying Declaration when asked by grandson Alvin who
asked her "Apo, Apo, what happened?". . . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after
which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and
passed away.
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself.
To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything
that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his
statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say
as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness
has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement
as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes.But it is immaterial how much of the
whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or
by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a
very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the
statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of
what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if
admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say
might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.
That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
(Acquitted)
People vs Santos: (Murder)
Victim: David Ambre (Dying Declaration: Lolita asked her husband who had shot
him and the latter answered, It was Pare Pran.[5] She heard Davids words because,
like Lolita, she had also placed her head near David who was still alive at the time.)
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[27] As an
exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1)
the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending
death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; and (4)
the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry.[28]
It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the
decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid
eventuation of death -- is at hand.[29] This may be proven by the statement of the
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents
wounds, or other relevant circumstances.
We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to
speak the truth.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as
such when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3)
the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances
(Convicted)
People vs Rada & Sacdalan: (Multiple Murder)
Accused: RADA AND SACDALAN (CAFGUS)
VICTIM: Simeon Castillo, Isidro Castillo and Leonora Castillo (Leonora with
repeated dying declaration while she was being brought to the hospital that it was
the two accused that shot them)
Variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same side in respect to minor,
collateral, or incidental matters do not usually impair the weight of their united
testimony to the prominent facts. The witnesses testifying to the same event do not
have to be consistent in every detail as differences in recollection or viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable (People vs. Fabros, 214 SCRA 694 [1992]). Indeed, if
rights were to be lost merely because witnesses, while agreeing on the essential fact,
fail to testify harmoniously on all the particulars, a very large proportion of cases
involving wrongs would find no redress in law.
All that accused-appellants could offer by way of defense are alibi and
denial. These defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of credible
prosecution witnesses (People vs. Villanueva, 242 SCRA 47 [1995]; People vs.
Layno, 264 SCRA 558 [1996]) as well as where there is an ante mortem statement of
the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res
gestae (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]). Especially must this be so, in view
of defense witnesses Sgt. Verde and Kagawad Tolentino's claim that the place where
they allegedly were at the time of the incident is only about two kilometers from the
crime scene (tsn, Feb. 18, 1992, p. 42; Feb. 19, 1992, pp. 16-17). Essential to a
valid defense of alibi is the physical impossibility of the accused to be present at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof (People vs. Daquipil, 240
SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]). Accused-appellants
failed to demonstrate any of these elements in the case at bench.
Both Accused CONVICTED.
PEOPLE VS CERILLA (Murder)
Accused: Joemarie Cerilla @ PATO
Victim: Alexander Parreo (Dying Declaration to his daughters and to his wife as
well as to the police that it was PATO who shot him. Died the following day)
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring
to the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and
which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow
immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the
absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person
after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating
the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death. As
an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante
mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and
false accusation. It
is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased,
to show the cause of death of the deceased, and
the circumstances under which the assault
was made upon him.
The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity,
because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand,
and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime;
allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the
declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a
situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by an oath administered in court.
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,
thus: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but
also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection
with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarants injury or the cause of
death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the
reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the
absence of cause for the act are admissible.[40] Second, at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders
the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be
presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant
has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending.[41] Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where
the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the
proffered declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made by a
child too young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or
incapable of understanding his own statements by reason of partial
unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence.[42] Thus, in the absence of evidence
showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he
survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been
competent.[43] Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. [44] Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had
caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of
Alexanders ante mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
First, Alexanders declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot
him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries[49] he suffered underscore
the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his demise occurred
the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have
been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in
a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
Accused: CONVICTED
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
PEOPLE VS BERNAL (Kidnapping)
Accused: Theodore Bernal
Victim Openda Jr:
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified
that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which
they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she
(was) a married woman.[9] Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason for
Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of
the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.[10] Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless
he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded
to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.[11]
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites,
to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true.
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Tandog vs Macapagal
The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land
since time immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried,
who died in 1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased,
except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand nieces and grand
nephews (herein petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they
found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses
Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square
meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato
Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent which led to the issuance to him
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT). Because of these incidents, petitioners filed
with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title.
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners
allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their
property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same. They
planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the corresponding
realty taxes. She does not knowpetitioners who are all strangers in the place.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to
evidence. In an Order dated March 20, 1995, the trial court granted their motion
and dismissed the complaint.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created
by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This
rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis for the
asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse
possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a cloud on
their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been
proved.The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their
possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in
evidence by petitioners.We have consistently ruled that documents which may have
been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in
evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value.[4]
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[5] Petitioners
failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that
 Casimiro Policarpio existed and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that
pedigree may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of
the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related
to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant
or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or
prior to the controversy. Records show that petitioners failed to establish by
evidence any or all the above requisites.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004] (Petition to
disqualify FPJ because of his Citizenship)
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of
candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a
candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the
latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place
of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior
his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides –
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ,
i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in
one house, and as one family –
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
GRAVADOR VS MAMIGO (Forced Retirement)
Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on
the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11,
1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro
Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which these two
affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on December 11,
1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of
Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses,
NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and
we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore,we were also
invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO
GRAVADOR."
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground
that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service
on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement
benefits. SC deemed it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the
merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among
other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree,1 and that payment of
benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the
date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should
this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the
respondents claim.
The import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was
then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Madeante litem motam by a deceased
relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by
evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a
deceased relative. Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother,
Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963
with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than
Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is
admittedly older than he.
PEOPLE VS. ALEGADO (2 counts of rape)
Accused : Alfredo Alegado
Offended Party: Christina Deang (below 12 years old)
Firstly, the accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the
time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty, hence, it was
error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.
We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended
party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that
the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the
hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we stated that:
... [D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the
principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth (See
Sec. 33, Rule 130 Revised Rules of Court now Sec. 39, Rule 130 under the new
Rules). Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the
case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof
than from its admission.
(In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said provision
contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in
respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or
tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the
controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of
birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's
grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of
seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to
the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was
born on September 5, 1976
It is long-settled, that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although
hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his
birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he is told
by his parents– he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents
and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition
(Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742) ... (Rollo, p. 93-94)
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute
the prosecution's claim that the victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old
at the time of the rape incidents under consideration, we affirm the trial court's
finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of age.
ACCUSED CONVICTED OF Statutory Rape
COMMON REPUTATION
Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the
controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or
respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
JISON VS CA (Petition for Recognition as an Illegitimate child filed by Monina
Jison against Francisco Jison)
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end
of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter,
Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and
since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate
child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that
FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a
Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her,
MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. FRANCISCO alleged that he could not
have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know
of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
Several witnesses were presented by MONINA consisting of former and present
employees of FRANCISCO and testified that MONINAs filiation was common
knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
CA erred in GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT
THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER
UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates
issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and
Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their
due execution and authenticity are not in issue,[40] as MONINA witnessed the
authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the
contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the
declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents
in question.[41] As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section
40, however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion
containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence,
under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof
did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the
preceding phrase [e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of
this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in effect,
a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. [42] These have
been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family, [43] or those
which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition.[44] Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a
familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on
tombstones,[45] monuments or coffin plates.[46]
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section
41 regarding common reputation,[47] it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like
manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony
to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter.
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the
success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of evidence. SC RULED IN FAVOR OF MONINA
PART OF RES GESTAE
Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE VS ROBERTO NER (MURDER)
VICTIM: JOSE DE LEON
The case hinges on whether or not appellant has been sufficiently identified as the
killer or one of the killers of Jose de Leon. In this connection, the main witnesses for
the prosecution were Estanislao de Leon, Leonardo Bolea, Rodolfo Rosales, and
Artemio Tiong.
The defense insists that the testimony of Patrolman Tiong concerning his
conversation with Angelina Viray should be disregarded as hearsay, for Angelina did
not take the witness stand. Said conversation took place in Boy's apartment, on
May 17, 1964, between 10:09 and 10:30 p.m., or immediately after the occurrence,
and referred to the circumstances surrounding the same. At that time, Angelina had
not, as yet, fully recovered from the effects of the assassination of her common-law
husband, practically, if not actually, before her own eyes. In fact, she was not only
crying; she had, also, been repeatedly saying, almost hysterically, that Boy had been
shot by "Pirate". Tiong's testimony about the statements then made by her, before
she could deliberated on the events that had transpired a few minutes before, was
properly admitted under Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
which:
... Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as a part of the RES GESTAE. ...
Indeed, it has been held:
... that declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the
act or occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if
they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to
be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were
made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or
deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of
the act or transaction itself.2
It is true that, in saying that Boy had been shot by Pirate, Angelina did not
explain to Patrolman Tiong whether or not she had seen the latter in the act of
firing, although she said so in an affidavit made by her in the City Fiscal's office.
Her story to Patrolman Tiong indicated, however, that she had seen appellant and
Boy talking in the living room of his apartment, shortly before the shooting, and
that, accordingly, she had personal knowledge of appellant's presence at the scene
of the occurrence.
The fact that Angelina's statement to Tiong was part of her narration,
prompted by his questions about the details of the occurrence, does not detract
from the spontaneity of her statement. All that is required for the admissibility of a
given statement as part of theres gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a
startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration 3 before he had
time to think and make up a story 4 , or to concoct or contrive a falsehood 5 , or to
fabricate an account 6 , and without any undue influence in obtaining it 7 , aside
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. 8
Accused Convicted.
PEOPLE VS SANCHEZ (ARSON)
Accused Danilo Sanchez and Juanito Zamora
Arson of the house of SPS. Nepescua. Trial then proceeded against him with the
prosecution presenting as its witnesses Demetrio Matabang, Pedro Parayno, Julieta
Nepuscua and Cesar Nepuscua. The lone eyewitness, Mr. Elpidio Nepuscua, could
no longer be presented because he died on 13 December 1982. 3 He, however,
signed a statement on 24 November 1982 before an investigator of the Integrated
National Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan wherein he implicated the accused as the
person who burned the house.
Accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the following errors:
1. . . . in not considering the statement of Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua as
hearsay evidence.
2. . . . in convicting the accused-appellant by considering the
information made by Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua to his wife Julieta
Nepuscua and his son Cesar Nepuscua as part of the res gestae.
According to Julieta, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982, her
husband arrived at the house of Filomena and related to her that "on that evening of
November 22, 1982, there were four (4) persons who went near our house and they
were carrying with them rice stalks or hay and then one of them called out, saying
"Tatay, tatay, bangon kayo ta ansakit so eges nen nanay, iyacar tayo ed hospital",
which means, "Father, father wake up because my mother is suffering from stomach
(sic) ache and we will rush her to the hospital." He further told her that on that
same evening, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house carrying with
him one (1) bundle of rice hay which he then set on fire thus causing the burning of
their house.
In his sworn statement, Elpidio narrated the burning incident. He categorically
admitted therein that he reported the incident to the Calasiao Police Station, but he
did not mention the names of the culprits for fear that he and his family would be
placed in danger once the culprits discovered that they had been identified as
suspects.
There can, therefore, be no question that the only eyewitness to the burning of the
house was Elpidio Nepuscua. Unfortunately, he died even before the Information
was prepared and filed. Thus, he could no longer testify during trial.
A careful scrutiny of the records discloses that the prosecution relied solely on the
sworn statement of Elpidio Nepuscua wherein he named the accused, Juanito
Zamora, and two others whom he failed to identify, as the parties who set his house
on fire, and the testimony of his wife Julieta Nepuscua to the effect that on 21
November 1982, she, her children and three (3) grandchildren were evacuated by
Elpidio to the house of her sister-in-law, Filomena Nepuscua, because herein
accused and Juanito Zamora were angry with Elpidio because the latter reported
them for having cut on 20 November 1982 the bamboo trees that were mortgaged to
them (Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, Juanito's mother. Julieta also declared that at
4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982 — four (4) hours after the burning
of the
house — Elpidio told her that in the evening of 22 November 1982, four (4) persons
carrying rice stalks went near their house; one of them uttered "father, father wake
up because my mother is suffering from stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to
the hospital"; thereafter, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house
carrying a bundle of rice stalks and set the same on fire. The court admitted in
evidence Elpidio's sworn statement and considered Elpidio's declaration to Julieta
as part of res gestae.
The so-called statement uttered by Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife Julieta at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982, or four (4) hours after the
burning, implicating accused, should not have been admitted as part of the res
gestae.
Section 42 of Rule 130 provides:
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of theres
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae.
Res gestae means the "things done". 27 It "refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." 28 A
spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation made
immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting
the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of
such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be
produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their
control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere
response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external
shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief
period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,'
the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the
facts just observed by him." 29 In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking
through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself. 30 Or, stated
differently, ". . . the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning
through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of
the language is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation or
fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a good deal of
reason, as a guarantee of its truth." 31
There are, therefore, three (3) requisites for the admission of evidence as
constituting part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the
occurrence of the startling event and the making of the declaration. What is
important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made "so
nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to
exclude the idea of design or deliberation . . ." 40
In the light of the foregoing principle on res gestae and the settled jurisprudence
thereon, We find the questioned statement of Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife to be
lacking in spontaneity and to have been given after he had the luxury of time
to concoct a story or fabricate an account. If indeed he was at his house at the
time the accused and the latter's alleged companions came, and the burning took
place at midnight, considering that the house of Filomena where his wife and
children were sleeping was only 150 meters away, and there being no evidence at all
that he was prevented through threats and intimidation by the accused and his
companions or that he was struck by fear which immobilized him from immediately
leaving the scene of the fire, no plausible reason may be summoned to justify or
explain his nearly four-hour delay in reporting the incident to his wife and other
members of his family. He could easily negotiate that distance in less than five (5)
minutes. Doubtless, the burning of their house was no ordinary event; such a
dastardly occurrence caused an irreparable loss of property and rendered them
homeless. The shock and excitement it naturally produced was more than
enough to propel his feet to bring him to his family as soon as possible. It
behooved Elpidio to relay the tragic event to those dear to him without any
delay; thus, his conduct cannot be reconciled with human experience,
ordinary habits of men and common sense. It could, however, be easily reconciled
if he were, in fact, with his family in the house of Filomena during the fire. If he
evacuated his family to the house of Filomena on 21 November 1982 because he
was afraid of the accused and Juanito Zamora, there was no reason at all for him to
risk his life and limb by staying alone in their house. That he was not in the house
at the time of the burning seems to be supported by the conduct of the members of
his family. As testified to by Julieta and her son Cesar, they just looked out the
window of Filomena's house while their own house was burning. They never
mentioned that they expressed fears as to Elpidio's fate, if in fact the latter was left
in the house. All that Julieta could do was to prevent Cesar from returning to their
burning house for fear that the persons who set it on fire would harm him. Cesar
then left for Manila at 3:00 o'clock early the next morning, 23 November 1982,
barely three (3) hours after the fire. He did not proceed to their house to find out
what had happened to his father. By that time, worry over Elpidio's fate did not
seize or overcome both Julieta and Cesar. If indeed Elpidio was in their house before
the fire and he left the scene only four (4) hours later, the conduct of his wife and
son seemed too unnatural.
Another badge of untrustworthiness attributable to the alleged statement given by
Elpidio to his wife is his deliberate suppression of the names of the "suspects" when
he reported the incident to the police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan in the
morning of 23 November 1982. The reasons given therefor are palpably untenable.
In the first place, there is no evidence that the accused and his companions had a
reputation for being violent; if they were known for their violence and Elpidio was so
afraid of revealing their names, then he would have kept their identitiesin
pectoris. This he failed to do during the investigation at the P.C. Headquarters the
following day despite the absence of any assurance of protection.
After everything is said and done, it is clear to Us that serious doubts surround the
questioned statement of Elpidio to his wife, especially when viewed in the light of the
probability of concoction — he had every reason to get even with the accused and
Juanito Zamora.
Accused then deserves an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE (MURDER)
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the
case at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attended by
treachery, because the Information charged him with murder qualified only by
evident premeditation. This legal lapse of the prosecution -- for that matter, any
prosecution lapse -- should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the
accused may be held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the crime
necessarily included therein), and every doubt must be resolved in his favor.Thus,
we hold him guilty only of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the victim
waived their claim through an affidavit of desistance, no award for civil indemnity
should be included in this Decision finding the accused guilty of the homicide.
Victim suffered two gunshot wounds at the back
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City,
testified that as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him
from his residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed
him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which
was near his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim
already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot
by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not
know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim
said that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the
victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing
the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark
with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of
the City Mayor. (Exh. C)
Defense: Alibi
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
 The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when considered
as part of the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided
specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the
admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is
spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling
occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.[27] These
requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case where the statement, subject
of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and, more
important, the victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration
and as part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has the
advantage of ensuring the statements appreciation by courts, particularly where the
absence of one or more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in
issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured
PEOPLE VS RESTITUTO MANHUYOD (RAPE)
Private Complainant: Daughter of Accused Rellane and his wife Yolanda
Manhuyod
However repulsive and condemnable the act of a father raping his daughter, yet, the
Constitution mandates that an accused is entitled to the presumption of
innocence. Thus, after a scrutiny of the record and the evidence in this case, we find
ourselves unable to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Acquittal then is
compelled by law since the presumption of innocence was not overcome, the
conviction having been based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension of the
rule on statements forming part of the res gestae.
Subject Exhibits: B, the sworn statement of Yolanda given before Atty. Tomarong
and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; C, the sworn
statement of Relanne given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995;
Court issued Warrant for indirect contempt of Yolanda and Rellane for non-
appearance. They were not presented. the prosecution rested its case solely on the
basis of the testimonies of NBI agent Atty. Tomarong, NBI agent Atty. Icao, Jr. and
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Refe, together with the documents they identified or
testified on.
The trial court held that Exhibits B and C were convincing as they mentioned
details which could not have been concocted, as such, they constitute[d] part of
the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule
the NBI agents and medico-legal officer had no personal knowledge as to what
actually and truthfully happened; hence, their testimony as to what Relanne and
Yolanda narrated were likewise inadmissible hearsay. Accused further contended
that what was established during trial was that Relanne and Yolanda were no longer
interested in pursuing the criminal complaint against him; hence the case should
have been dismissed for their lack of interest to prosecute the same.
It is a basic rule in evidence set forth in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise,
such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. [42] Obviously
then, the NBI agents testimonies touching upon what was told them by Relanne and
Yolanda concerning the events relating to the alleged commission of rape in
question was hearsay. As a matter of fact, insofar as Yolanda was concerned, since
she was not an eyewitness to the commission of the rape, but obtained knowledge
thereof only from Relanne, the testimony of Atty. Tomarong with respect to what
Yolanda told him, even constituted double hearsay.
It is settled that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm
the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from a judicial
proceeding for being inadmissible hearsay. The rationale for this is respect for the
accuseds constitutional right of confrontation, or to meet the witnesses against him
face-to-face.[43] To safeguard this right, Section 1 of Rule 132, of the Rules of Court
thus provides that the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing must
be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. [44] At bottom, admitting
Exhibits A, B, and C only as part of the testimonies of the NBI agents could validly
be done, but in light of the foregoing discussion, these exhibits should have been
excluded insofar as their contents related to the truth of the matter concerning the
commission of the rape in question.
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of
the res gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event
witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to
think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to
fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances.
In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.[47]
It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following
factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence
as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the
declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening
events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the
nature and circumstances of the statement itself.[48] As to the first factor, the
following proves instructive:
T]he rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made
before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive anything
contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law altogether distrusts is
not afterspeech but afterthought.
[T]here are no limits of time within which the res gestae can be arbitrarily
confined. These limits vary in fact with each particular case. The acts or
declarations are not required to be contemporaneous with the primary fact,
but they must be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and
the main fact particularly inseparable, or be generated by an excited feeling
which extends, without break or let-down, from the moment of the event
they illustrate. In other words, if the acts or declarations sprang out of the
principal transaction, tend to explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous,
and were made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of deliberate
design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and are
admissible.[49]
Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit statements as part of the res
gestae and factors to test the spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesitate to
rule that the sworn statement of Relanne (Exhibit C) fails to qualify as part of the
res gestae for these reasons: (1) it was executed only on 8 June 1995 or, thirty-six
(36) days after the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than sufficient
time to concoct or contrive a falsehood; (2) it was made after she had resolved to file
a case for rape against her father, a decision which required much deliberation and
would cause her obvious pain as the filing would expose her to public humiliation
and shame, bring dishonor to her family and visit upon her father the penalty of
death; (3) she gave the statement after three critical intervening events had
occurred, viz., her pregnancy, filing the complaint sheet and her being referred to
the NBI medico-legal officer for examination; and (4) it was made far from the place
where the principal event -- the alleged rape -- was committed, i.e., the latter took
place in the De la Paz, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, while the statement was made in
Dipolog City, at the sub-office of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte will
show that Tampilisan and Dipolog City do not even adjoin each other.
Turning to the sworn statement of Yolanda (Exhibit B), with more reason
should this not qualify as forming part of the res gestae. Yolanda did not witness
the principal event and all she knew of it was told to her by Relanne. Even if the
issue of admissibility is confined to what Relanne had told Yolanda, the same
conclusion would be reached for it clearly appears in Exhibit A that Relanne had not
spontaneously told Yolanda of the alleged rape. In fact, the latter had to confront
the former only after the accused confessed to Yolanda that he had molested
Relanne. Moreover, the confrontation took place on 3 June 1995, or a month after
the alleged rape.
Ineluctably then, the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits B and C as part of
the res gestae.
PEOPLE VS OSCAR MANSUETO (MURDER)
Victim: Jacinto Pepito
Jacinto Pepito (hereafter JACINTO) lived at his mothers house in Liloan, Cebu
with his son Jeovani and 17-year-old daughter Cleofe (hereafter CLEOFE). At
around 8:25 p.m. on 26 October 1991, CLEOFE roused JACINTO from his sleep and
informed him that a man outside the house was calling for him. JACINTO got up
and went down the house. Downstairs, JACINTO saw the man who was standing
outside the gate of the house. Are you Jacinto? the man asked. Yes, I am Jacinto,
JACINTO replied. Without warning, the man drew a gun and fired one shot at
JACINTO.
The man tried to shoot JACINTO a second time but the gun would not
fire. Summoning whatever strength was left in him, JACINTO reached out for his
assailant. The man, however, hurriedly ran across the street to where a motorcycle
was waiting. He boarded the motorcycle; he and the driver sped away. At that point,
JACINTOs body lay on the ground lifeless.
The gunman was never brought to court to answer for his dastardly act. He
remained at-large. The driver of the getaway motorcycle was identified at the
investigation conducted by the police to be the accused-appellant, Oscar Mansueto
as conspirator for the crime of Murder.
The States principal witness, CLEOFE, testified on the circumstances leading to
the death of her father as already narrated.[5] When asked whether she had a good
look (at) the man who was driving the motorcycle, CLEOFE said that she is familiar
with his face because (she) often see(s) him. She further explained that she had a
good view of said driver for about five seconds as he and the gunman sped away.
Besides, the place where the driver waited for the gunman was illuminated by the
light coming from a nearby vulcanizing shop owned by one Arnold Hernandez. She
then identified the driver of the motorcycle as OSCAR, whom she claimed was the
paramour of her mother, Moisesa Pepito.
 Accused challenges CA in ruling and giving credence to the statements of
witness CLEOFE immediately after the shooting incident as part of the res gestae.
The trial court believed CLEOFE and found her to be a credible witness when
she testified that OSCAR was the driver of the getaway motorcycle. In its decision,
the trial court stated that:
On the other hand, the identification by witness, Cleofe Pepito of the accused as
the motorcycle driver, who was waiting in the wings to facilitate the escape of the
gunman was never destroyed by the defense. In fact, in answer to the question of
private prosecutor whether witness Cleofe Pepito had a good look at the man who
was driving the motorcycle, her answer was a definite yes, and when she was asked
as to why she was definite, her answer was that she was familiar with his face
because she had often seen him. Later on, as records show, this witness was able to
explain her familiarity and it was the result of having been instructed by her mother
to collect accounts supposedly due her mother from the accused.
In his Appellants Brief, OSCAR additionally attempts to impeach the credibility
of CLEOFE on the grounds of bias and her failure to mention OSCAR as the driver
of the getaway motorcycle when she reported the shooting incident to the Liloan
Police immediately after it occurred should form part of the res gestae. OSCAR
contends that the omission, as part of theres gestae, should have been afforded
evidentiary weight.
OSCAR, however, misunderstands the admissibility in evidence of statements
as part of the res gestae which is considered in Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as an exception to the rule on hearsay evidence. Res Gestae refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.[34] The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not
testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant
complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Since CLEOFE herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application
of the rule on res gestae. Besides, subject matters not mentioned or are outside the
statements or explanations given by the declarant, in this case CLEOFE, obviously
do not form part of the res gestae.
Accused Convicted.
 JUANITO TALIDANO VS FALCON MARITIME (Illegal Dismissal Case)
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax
messages to support the validity of his dismissal from employment. He maintains
that the first fax message containing the information that the vessel encroached on
a different route was a mere personal observation of the ship master and should
have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages cannot be
considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein
is just a report. He also contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been
recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify his
unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal
from employment stemmed from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his
superiors resented.
Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of
the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous
exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the
res gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act.41 We find that the
fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of
route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author
of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as
double hearsay.
Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner is
clearly insufficient as these messages were addressed only to itself. No notice was
ever given to petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing
neglect of duty. Neither was he informed of his dismissal from employment.
Petitioner was never given an opportunity to present his side. The failure to comply
with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent’s liability on top of dismissing
petitioner without a valid cause.

To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.42

Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly caused the ship to deviate

from its course—is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In
addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the
first kind.

Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility
are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act
must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act;
and (4) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.43

Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
AZMAR VS CITIBANK
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented his credit
card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was
not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency
(Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again
dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank.
To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a
computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of
one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
“DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for
lack of merit. It held that as between the computer print-out presented by petitioner
and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent, the latter had
more weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly established by
respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la Peña ruled
that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular
course of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not able to
testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena. The
same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and
credit card facilities which readily print out bank account status, therefore the
print-out can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioner’s
credit card.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an electronic
document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by
anyone who saw the document executed or written; Petitioner, however, failed to
prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
i. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” is an electronic
document?
ii. Whether or not the “On Line Authorization Report” constitutes
electronic evidence?
Held:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agency, to
prove that his credit card was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out
appears the words “DECL OVERLIMIT”.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on 4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
authentication of the computer print-out would still be found wanting.
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.47
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
“other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on
judge.” The Court is not convinced. Petitioner’s testimony that the person from
the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature
Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter
purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words
asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said
"Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It
print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his
is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-
May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. “G” does not show on its face that it was issued by
out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a
Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure
certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only
the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed to show the specific business
handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan
above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did petitioner establish in
Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its business address was not reflected in the
what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the
print-out.
entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-
out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.

Related:

Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to
entries in the course of business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:

Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;

2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
G.R. No. 155550 January 31, 2008
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
STEVEN P. CHIONG, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 503082 which affirmed in
toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision3 holding petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc.
(Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the
authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven
Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port.
Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary
of US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one
year.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL
Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean’s agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiong’s arrival
thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California,
United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane
ticket for San Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10)
days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from Samar and
brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.
On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport4 (MIA), at about 6:30
a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare’s
Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong’s seaman service record book for clearance.
Thereafter, Chiong’s passport was duly stamped, after complying with government
requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest
check-in counter. When it was Chiong’s turn, the Northwest personnel5 informed him that his
name did not appear in the computer’s list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was
then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest’s counters from
whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the
"man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without the said amount,
and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwest’s Check-in
Counter and presented his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him
to simply wait and that he was being a pest.
Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so he
could obtain a boarding pass from the "man in barong." Calvo, who already saw that
something was amiss, insisted that Chiong’s plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he
could check-in smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding
pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San
Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989
(California, U.S.A. time).
It appears that Chiong’s name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in
Northwest’s Air Passenger Manifest.6
In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiong’s counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount
equivalent to Chiong’s salary under the latter’s Crew Agreement7 with TransOcean;
(2) P15,000.00 for Chiong’s expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to
Manila; (3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees.8
Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract
of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss9 the complaint citing the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied the
same.10
In its Answer,11 Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage
with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records,
Chiong was a "no-show" passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989.
In the RTC’s Pre-trial Order12 based on the parties’ respective Pre-trial Briefs,13 the triable
issues were limited to the following:
(a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether
[Chiong] "no-showed" for said flight.
(b) If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with
plaintiff, what damages are awardable to plaintiff and how much.
In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal
complaint for False Testimony14 against Chiong based on the latter’s testimony that he did
not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service
record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the
same year. Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14,
1990, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila,
Branch 54, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722.
In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied by
the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.15 Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the proceedings
before the trial court. However, both the Petition for Certiorari and Motion for Suspension of
the proceedings were denied by the CA and RTC, respectively.16
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong,
and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the
evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately
prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an
American passenger by the name of W. Costine.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered, ordering the defendant liable to plaintiff in damages by reason of
the latter’s inability to take defendant’s NW Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, for the
following amounts:
1) U.S.$8,447.0017 or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of this
judgment with legal interests until fully paid, representing compensatory
damages due to plaintiff’s loss of income for one (1) year as a direct result of
defendant’s breach of contract of carriage;
2) P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiff’s actual incurred
damages as a consequence of his failure to avail of defendant’s Flight No. 24
on April 1, 1989;
3) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages suffered
and sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendant’s breach of contract of
carriage;
4) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or punitive
damages due to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the latter’s breach of
contract of carriage with malice and fraud; and
5) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorney’s fees, plus costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. Identical to the RTC’s findings, those
of the CA were as follows: on April 1, 1989, Chiong was at the MIA three hours before the
10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwest’s claim that
Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong
was not allowed to check-in and was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest check-in
counter to accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwest’s defense that Chiong had left
the country after April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwest’s
failure to raise this defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a waiver
thereof. The CA declared that, in any event, Northwest failed to present any evidence to prove
that Chiong had worked under the original crew agreement.
Hence, this recourse.
Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that: (1)
Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong who was present at the MIA on April
1, 1989 to board Northwest’s Flight No. 24; (2) As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to
Chiong for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit; and (3) Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name
Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records.
The petition must fail.
We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest
breached the contract of carriage with Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to compensatory,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Northwest contends that Chiong, as a "no-show" passenger on April 1, 1989, already
defaulted in his obligation to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract of
carriage;18 and thus, Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation to
transport Chiong. In sum, Northwest insists that Chiong’s testimony is a complete
fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by the following: (1) Chiong’s seaman service record
book reflects that he left the Philippines after April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to
board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged therefrom upon his personal request; (2) the
Information filed against Chiong for False Testimony; and (3) the Flight Manifest and the
Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was a "no-show" passenger.
We are not convinced.
The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof
required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiong’s evidence consisted
of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiong’s passport and seaman
service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio
Gomez,19 and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all
identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiong’s passport.
We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that
factual findings of the lower courts deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on
appeal.20 Indeed, Chiong’s Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with
the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was
present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As
testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman
has passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied
with government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimare’s liaison officer
tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiong’s testimony on the latter’s
presence at the MIA and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further
testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was able to
board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare’s liaison officer, to confirm with
their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and
commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is docked.21 Thus, she had
observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board Northwest Flight No. 24, and was
actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.
It is of no moment that Chiong’s witnesses – who all corroborated his testimony on his
presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently
bumped-off – are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the
outcome of this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,22 thus:
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness’ relationship to the victim does
not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle
is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this
case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness’ relationship with a party does not ipso
facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of
evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the
same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is
only preponderance of evidence.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact
that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without
delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed
ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding
Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.
In stark contrast is Northwest’s bare-faced claim that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, and
was scheduled to leave the country only on April 17, 1989. As previously discussed, the
records belie this assertion. It is also noteworthy that Northwest did not present any evidence
to support its belated defense that Chiong departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989 to
work as Third Engineer on board M/V Elbia under the original crew agreement.
It is true that Chiong’s passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the
country on April 17, 1989 and come back on October 5 of the same year. However, this
evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989, more
particularly, Chiong’s presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest
despite a confirmed ticket. Although initially, the burden of proof was with Chiong to prove
that there was a breach of contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted to Northwest
when Chiong adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged. At that point,
Northwest had the burden of going forward23 to controvert Chiong’s prima facie case. As the
party asserting that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, Northwest then had the burden of
evidence to establish its claim. Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in its
Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a witness their check-in agent on that contentious
date.24 This omission was detrimental to Northwest’s case considering its claim that Chiong
did not check-in at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a "no-
show" passenger and totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously, showed a
horizontal line drawn across Chiong’s name, and the name W. Costine written above it. The
reason for the insertion, or for Chiong’s allegedly being a "no-show" passenger, is not even
recorded on the remarks column of the Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column.
Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG
stamp on his passport and seaman service record book, prevails over Northwest’s evidence,
particularly the Flight Manifest. Thus, we are perplexed why, despite the evidence presented
by Chiong, and the RTC’s specific order to Northwest’s counsel to present the person(s) who
prepared the Flight Manifest and Passenger Name Record for a proper identification of, and to
testify on, those documents, Northwest still insisted on presenting Gonofredo Mendoza and
Amelia Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to testify thereon.25
In its desperate attempt to evade liability for the breach, Northwest claims that Chiong
worked at M/V Elbia when he left the Philippines on April 17, 1989. The argument was not
only belatedly raised, as we have repeatedly stated, but is off-tangent.
On this point, we uphold the RTC’s and CA’s ruling that the failure of Northwest to raise the
foregoing defense in its Motion to Dismiss or Answer constituted a waiver thereof. Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.— Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 8. Omnibus Motion.— Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date. Even if
Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that Chiong was
a "no-show" on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact that Chiong
had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter without
delay, then reached and was at the Northwest check-in counters on time for the scheduled
flight.
Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger on two (2) separate
occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989 because he was actually scheduled to depart for the
US on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and seaman record book. Had
this new matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would prevent or bar recovery by
Chiong. Unfortunately, Northwest was unsuccessful in proving not only the "no-show" claim,
but that Chiong, likewise, worked under the original crew agreement.
Northwest likewise insists – now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony
against Chiong – that a falsified part of Chiong’s testimony would indicate the falsity of his
entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"26 doctrine. Following
Northwest’s flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating
testimonies of Chiong’s witnesses are also false.
The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of
law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the
witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points.
The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary
to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show that Chiong’s
testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest
never even attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG
counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for
purposes of his departure on that day.
As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of
Chiong’s guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on
the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:27
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated
parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated
parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts
established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one
question may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to other question.
The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive
rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. The
testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others:
xxxx
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:
It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless— first, in
point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a
kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others, it is
absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it
merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do
or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in
practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of
its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many
counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly
unimportant in themselves.
From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest breached its
contract of carriage with Chiong.
Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport, is
primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The
law governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As
the aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its
non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual
damages.
We reiterate that Northwest failed to prove its claim that Chiong worked on M/V Elbia from
April 17 to October 5, 1989 under the original crew agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the
lower court’s finding on Chiong’s entitlement to actual and compensatory damages.
We, likewise, uphold the findings of both courts on Northwest’s liability for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in
breaches of contract, is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.28 It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.29 It means
breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud.30 Bad faith is in essence a question of intention.31
In the case at bench, the courts carefully examined the evidence as to the conduct and
outward acts of Northwest indicative of its inward motive. It is borne out by the records that
Chiong was given the run-around at the Northwest check-in counter, instructed to deal with
a "man in barong" to obtain a boarding pass, and eventually barred from boarding Northwest
Flight No. 24 to accommodate an American, W. Costine, whose name was merely inserted in
the Flight Manifest, and did not even personally check-in at the counter.32
Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of exemplary damages is also correct given the
evidence that Northwest acted in an oppressive manner towards Chiong.33
As for the award of attorney’s fees, while we recognize that it is sound policy not to set a
premium on the right to litigate,34 we sustain the lower courts’ award thereof.
Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to
protect his interest,35 or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim.36 In the case at bench,
Northwest deliberately breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and then repeatedly
refused to satisfy Chiong’s valid, just and demandable claim. This unjustified refusal
constrained Chiong to not only lose income under the crew agreement, but to further incur
expenses and exert effort for almost two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and
vindicate his right. Therefore, this Court deems it just and equitable to grant
Chiong P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The award is reasonable in view of the time it has
taken for this case to be resolved.37
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3" need not detain us long.
Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay
evidence. We quote with favor the CA’s holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised Rules
of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is
necessary that: (a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries
were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e) the
entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be
mere hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the
employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who
supervised them while they were making the entries testify that the account was
prepared under his supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the
ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was the
supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the
entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More
importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee who made
the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the
circumstances that would show the employee’s inability to testify.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The ruling of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF
DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-
appellees.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
MAKALINTAL., J.:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners' second amended
complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that
in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner
of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a
tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged
owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the
part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and
that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision
of their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared
by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are as follows:
1. Police Department report: —
Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while
Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck, plate No. T-5292
into the underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station located at the
corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino
lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of
the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed.
Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the
truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the
flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It
burned the truck and the following accessorias and residences.
2. The Fire Department report: —
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the
installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office
 a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it
appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack
which according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes
and matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales
regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the fire department had
told him on the same subject.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence
inadmissible. This ruling is now assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said reports
were admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of respondents; secondly, that
with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective
Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but
respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the opportunity to do
so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130.
The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing of September
17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the reports in question, when offered as evidence, were
objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the ground that they were hearsay and that
they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution only
Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were admitted without objection; the admission of the others,
including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not
examined and he did not testify as to the facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by
Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one of those who investigated "the location of
the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the report
with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he need be cross-examined; and the
contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby become competent
evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still have been objectionable as far
as information gathered by him from third persons was concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without further
testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which
provides that "entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the
material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not
within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to some
facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina,
referred to as an employee at the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver
of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground
tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit
V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official
information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty
to give such statements for record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated
therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in the
instant case on the grounds that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to
he nothing definite," and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate
cases, "in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine." The question
deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually been applied in this
jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-G.R. No.
3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was penned by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and other companions
were loading grass between the municipalities of Bay and Calauan, in the province of
Laguna, with clear weather and without any wind blowing, an electric transmission
wire, installed and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development
Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the
head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received
the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the wire and was knocked unconscious to the
ground. The electric charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and
serious multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some parts and
causing intense pain and wounds that were not completely healed when the case was
tried on June 18, 1947, over one year after the mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
any specific act of negligence, but the appellate court overruled the defense under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to place
appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant, that in
case of noncontractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
 plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the
defendant, it is also a recognized principal that "where the thing which caused injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having
such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed.
680.) This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for
itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned that
the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the
sole control of defendant company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do
not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subjected to
unusual strain and stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and
supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to
injure passersby, unless some one was negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722;
159 Eng. Reprint 299, the leading case that established that rule). Consequently, in
the absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not present), the fact that
the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence in its
installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock,
"if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding
on the Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a reason for not applying the particular
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in
the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not
considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man. A case
strikingly similar to the one before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al., 171
So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon which in the year
1934 was leased to the Shell Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On
October 8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while gasoline was being transferred
from the tank wagon, also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the
underground tank of the station, a fire started with resulting damages to the building
owned by Jones. Alleging that the damages to his building amounted to $516.95,
Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for the recovery of that amount. The
judge of the district court, after hearing the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to a recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed this judgment, on the ground the testimony
failed to show with reasonable certainty any negligence on the part of the Shell
Petroleum Corporation or any of its agents or employees. Plaintiff applied to this
Court for a Writ of Review which was granted, and the case is now before us for
decision.1äwphï1.ñët
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence — one relating to the
cause of the fire and the other relating to the spreading of the gasoline about the
filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's building by the fire, no
witnesses were placed on the stand by the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of the fire, we find it
established by the record that the filling station and the tank truck were under the
control of the defendant and operated by its agents or employees. We further find
from the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the
underground tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the
tank truck and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of and being
operated by the agents or employees of the defendant, extended to the hose and tank
truck, and was communicated from the burning hose, tank truck, and escaping
gasoline to the building owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendant's
failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause,
plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which
the doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely approved and adopted
by the courts of last resort. Some of the cases in this jurisdiction in which the
doctrine has been applied are the following, viz.: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann.
1153, 25 So. 977; Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64
L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115 La. 63, 38 So.
892; Bents v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees.
A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila Police Department (Exh. X-
1 Africa) the following appears:
Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex Gasoline Station
complained of occupies a lot approximately 10 m x 10 m at the southwest corner of
Rizal Avenue and Antipolo. The location is within a very busy business district near
 the Obrero Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly populated neighborhood
where a great number of people mill around t
until
gasoline
tever be theWactjvities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and
this constitute a secondary hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the
entire neighborhood to conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its operator the concrete walls
south and west adjoining the neighborhood are only 2-1/2 meters high at most and
cannot avoid the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases of fire which caused not only material
damages but desperation and also panic in the neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline service station is
also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs
numbering ten or more, adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this
already small but crowded gasoline station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer in the performance of his
duties on the basis of his own personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be
considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and
objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question,
strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on
their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy
the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is no more eloquent
demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator.
Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance, was
transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He
said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no people, but while the loading was
going on, there were people who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is
about a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank
was almost filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back
turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete
wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized
iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat.
Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also
with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended
complaint that "the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or
permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently
threw a lighted match in the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission
may be taken against Boquiren — it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the present case, states the rule
which we find acceptable here. "It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or
agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a
danger involved ... we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the
effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm
to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of
a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts,
vol. 2, p. 1184, #439). Stated in another way, "The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected
cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting
injury." (MacAfee, et al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants.
This issue depends on whether Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by the
Court of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in the light of the facts not
controverted, is one of law and hence may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1)
Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire Caltex
owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over
Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to
the station had the name of CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the
station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees. (Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-
Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied that he directed
one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truck into the tank and alleged that the
"alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ, the driver being an employee of the
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on
amended his answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not
acting as agent of Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants' second
amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of action since under the
allegations thereof he was merely acting as agent of Caltex, such that he could not have
incurred personal liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an admission
of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims
that the business conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated by
Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the
nature of their relationship at the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at
that time. Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for
purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year
period it was intended to operate. This so-called license agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was
executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the
date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and
gives rise to the conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any
responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex "shall not be liable
for any injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it being understood
and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee, representative or agent of
LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an
independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He could sell only
Caltex Products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval,
in other words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee
without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from January 1,
1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior
written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren
ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in the
judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex
but not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex
over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his position to the company
and the latter could remove him or terminate his services at will; that the service
station belonged to the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only
the products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator belonged to
the company and were just loaned to the operator and the company took charge of
their repair and maintenance; that an employee of the company supervised the
operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company's gasoline and service
station; that the price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the company
and not by the operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated that
he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the operator was an
agent of the company and not an independent contractor should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely
upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties, should thereby a
controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the
contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed
upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict with
the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over the
latter. (Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens' Insurance Company of
Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of creating the apparent
relationship of employer and independent contractor, and of avoiding liability for the
negligence of the employees about the station; but the company was not satisfied to
allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it immediately assumed
control, and proceeded to direct the method by which the work contracted for should
be performed. By reserving the right to terminate the contract at will, it retained the
means of compelling submission to its orders. Having elected to assume control and
to direct the means and methods by which the work has to be performed, it must be
held liable for the negligence of those performing service under its direction. We think
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. (Gulf Refining Company
v. Rogers, 57 S.W. 2d, 183).
Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged to Boquiren. But no
cash invoices were presented to show that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex.
Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.
As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of P9,005.80, after deducting the
amount of P2,000.00 collected by them on the insurance of the house. The deduction is now
challenged as erroneous on the ground that Article 2207 of the New Civil Code, which
provides for the subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, was not yet in effect
when the loss took place. However, regardless of the silence of the law on this point at that
time, the amount that should be recovered be measured by the damages actually suffered,
otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would be violated. With respect to the
claim of the heirs of Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower court on the basis of the
assessed value of the property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00, disregarding the testimony of
one of the Ong children that said property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the court
erred, since it is of common knowledge that the assessment for taxation purposes is not an
accurate gauge of fair market value, and in this case should not prevail over positive evidence
of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled to P10,000.00.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable
solidarily to appellants, and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and
P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the complaint, and costs.
[G.R. No. 105958. November 20, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO LEDESMA ALIAS "JUAN
LEDESMA." Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AS LONG AS WITNESSES
CONCUR ON MATERIAL POINTS, SLIGHT DEVIATIONS IN THE RECOLLECTION OF
DETAILS WILL NOT DETRACT FROM THE ESSENTIAL VERACITY OF THEIR ASSERTIONS.
— Appellant likewise refers to certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which, according to him, cast serious doubt on their truthfulness and notes the
alleged disparities regarding the shape of the moon that fateful night, the time interval
between the two shots, and the distance between him and the Patricios before the shooting
started. But such inconsistencies are to be expected of witnesses testifying on the same
incident as different persons may have diverse perceptions or recollections of a particular
event. It is well-settled that as long as the witnesses concur on material points slight
deviations in their recollection of details will not detract from the essential veracity of their
assertions. The inconsistencies and contradictions, if any there be, do not necessarily impair
credibility; they in fact enhance it as they erase any suspicion of a perjured or rehearsed
testimony.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; WORTHLESS IN THE FACE OF
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES. — Appellant would impress us
that during the entire evening of 7 August 1984 he was in his house at Barangay Cawayan,
Carles, Iloilo, with his family and neighbors, and never left the place at all until the following
day. However, he failed to convince us that it was impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the killing. The house of the victim at Barangay Dayhagan, Pilar,
Capiz, is only one and a half (1-½) kilometers from the adjoining Barangay Cawayan, Carles,
Iloilo, where appellant resides. Strangely, only his wife attested to his alibi which, it has been
held, is generally unavailing if it is corroborated merely by immediate relatives and not by
disinterested persons. In fact he could have easily presented witnesses from among
disinterested parties. Anyway, alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses. But, did not appellant admit on cross-examination that his son was
buried on 5 August 1984 or two (2) days before the killing took place? Verily, this should
destroy whatever is left of his pretension that on the night of the incident he was at home
with his family and friends attending the wake for his son. All told, we find that the
prosecution has convincingly proved its case against appellant and established beyond
reasonable doubt his culpability relative to the death of Loreto Patricio Jr.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; REQUISITES; NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in
finding that treachery attended the killing. For treachery to be present, two (2) conditions
must concur: (a) employment of means of execution that would give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself much less retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted. In the present case, there is no question that when the
Patricios heard their dogs barking at the direction of the carabao corral they sensed danger.
Thus they brought along their bolos when they went down their house and walked towards
the corral. There they saw appellant Romeo Ledesma, Fernando Bernal and an unidentified
man pulling their carabao, each carrying a pugakhang. Seeing the intruders armed must
have forewarned the Patricios that their lives were in grave peril. In other words, they were
afforded a chance, albeit fleeting, to retreat or defend themselves. Hence, it cannot be said
with utmost certainty that appellant and his companions deliberately chose treacherous
means to insure the attainment of their objective without risk to themselves. As we view it,
the killing of Loreto Jr. was made on the spur of the moment and only when the accused lost
their composure after having been caught in the act of stealing a carabao. Consequently, as
the killing was not attended by any of the aggravating circumstances qualifying it to
murder, Accused-appellant should only be liable for homicide.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT WHERE
VICTIM WAS NOT AFFORDED A FAIR CHANCE TO EFFECTIVELY DEFEND HIMSELF. — For
treachery to be appreciated, it is necessary (1) that, at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. It has to be conceded that, as
to the first requirement, the established facts of the case show that the victim was
defenseless at the time he was killed. It matters not that the victim had a bolo tucked to his
waist. Nowhere in the record does it appear that the victim was actually able to make use of
said bolo during or immediately preceding the attack on him by Accused-Appellant. The
attack was sudden and unprovoked. The victim was totally unsuspecting of the grave peril to
his person. He, his father and brother, had simply gone down the house to verify as to why
the dogs were barking. That they were shot at when so doing only goes to show that the
accused had intended to shoot whoever comes to thwart their act of robbery. The accused
immediately opened fire at the victim and the victim’s companions, hitting the victim fatally.
Under these circumstances, it can be validly concluded that the victim and his companions
were not afforded a fair chance to effectively defend themselves. The suddenness of the
attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the victim and his companions in
such a position that they could not have defended themselves from the aggression, taking
into consideration the superiority of weapons of the malefactors and the suddenness of the
attack upon the victim who could not have put up a defense even if he wanted to.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT OF PARTICULAR MEANS METHOD OR FORM OF ATTACK TO
INSURE WITH IMPUNITY THE SUCCESS OF THE UNLAWFUL OBJECTIVE COULD BE
DEDUCED FROM THE ACTS OF THE ASSAILANTS PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME. — The existence of the second requirement, that is, whether the accused-appellant
consciously adopted the particular means employed in killing the victim, is evident from the
fact that accused-appellant and his cohorts conveniently provided themselves with home-
made guns and took advantage of nighttime in waylaying the persons who might be minded
to stop them from stealing the carabao of the victim. It could be fairly deduced from the
attendant circumstances that, even prior thereto, the accused-appellant and his companions
were grimly determined to insure with impunity the success of their unlawful objective, the
very reason why they armed themselves with guns and purposely sought the night to pursue
their evil deeds.
3. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; COMMITTED WHERE THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM
WAS PERPETRATED TO OR ON THE OCCASION OF ROBBERY. — In point of fact, it being
obvious that there was conspiracy among the malefactors to commit robbery and the killing
of the victim was perpetrated pursuant to or on the occasion of robbery, the crime committed
was robbery with homicide.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Loreto Patricio Jr. was shot dead in the evening of 7 August 1984 at Barangay Dayhagan,
Pilar, Capiz. For this death Romeo Ledesma alias Juan Ledesma, his brother-in-law Fernando
Bernal and a John Doe were charged with murder. However, as may be explained
immediately hereunder, only accused Ledesma was tried and thereafter sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of P50,000.00. 1
Romeo Ledesma pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Fernando Bernal who was bonded did
not appear. The third accused remained a John Doe as he was never identified. Fernando
died pending trial. 2
As culled from the evidence, on 7 August 1984, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while
Loreto Patricio Sr. and his family were resting from a day’s work and listening to the radio
their dogs suddenly barked. Responding to the perturbing noise, outside, Loreto Patricio Jr.
went down the house followed by his father Loreto Patricio Sr. and brother Edilberto Patricio,
whose house was just ten (10) meters away. They proceeded to the torel 3 each with a
sandoko 4 tucked to his waist. On their way they saw Fernando Bernal and Romeo Ledesma,
whom they had known for nineteen (19) years, prowling in the premises. A little farther they
noticed a man pulling their carabao by the rope. Romeo Ledesma and Fernando Bernal were
each armed with a pugakhang. 5 As the Patricios drew near, Fernando Bernal fired. No one
was hit. After some three (3) seconds Romeo Ledesma also fired, this time hitting Loreto Jr.
which caused the latter to stagger and fall. All three (3) accused then fled leaving the carabao
behind. Loreto Sr. and Edilberto pursued them but failed. 6
Loreto Patricio Jr. died in the emergency room of the Capiz Emmanuel Hospital. His cadaver
was autopsied by Dr. Florentino Bermejo who reported the cause of death as severe
hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds. 7
The killing was reported the following day by the Patricios to the municipal authorities.
Fernando Bernal was arrested on 14 August 1984 and Romeo Ledesma on 5 December 1984.
Romeo Ledesma invokes alibi for his defense. He claims that in the evening of 7 August 1984
he was at home at Barangay Cawayan, Carles, Iloilo, about one and one half (1-1/2)
kilometers from the house of Loreto Patricio Sr. at Barangay, Pilar, Capiz; he was with his
wife Merlinda and their four (4) children together with two (2) neighbors attending the wake of
his son who drowned on 4 August 1984; there were other people outside his house although
he did not know them then. He insists that he never left this house that night until the
following day. 8
Accused-appellant contends in this appeal that the court a quo erred: (a) in giving weight to
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Loreto Patricio Sr. and his son Edilberto; (b) in
convicting him of murder despite the fact that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; and, (c) in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused-appellant argues that the testimonies of Loreto Patricio Sr. and Edilberto are highly
doubtful, especially as regards their alleged positive identification of him as the killer,
considering that despite the third-quarter moon visibility was obstructed by growing trees.
As did the trial court, we find the argument flawed. While there may have been trees around
the crime scene the defense failed to establish that the area near the torel was so dark as to
preclude the identification of the accused. It has been clearly established that appellant and
his cohorts were caught by the Patricios in the act of stealing their carabao. If they had not
been recognized, purportedly because they were able to hide, there would have been no need
for them to fire at the Patricios. But appellant and Bernal fired two (2) shots in rapid
succession, and second hitting Loreto Patricio Jr. which caused his death. The act of firing at
the Patricios simply confirmed that they were indeed recognized.
In attempt to discredit the Patricios, appellant claims that he was not included among the
suspects in the police blotter but his son Romeo Ledesma Jr. 9 However, entries in the police
blotter are not evidence of the truth of what are stated therein but merely of the fact that
such entries were made. Besides, the police blotter speaks of "suspects" in the slaying of
Loreto Patricio Jr. which can in no way prevail over the positive identification of appellant as
the one who fired the fatal shot. Testimony given in open court is commonly more lengthy
and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter. 10
Appellant likewise refers to certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which, according to him, cast serious doubt on their truthfulness and notes the
alleged disparities regarding the shape of the moon that fateful night, the time interval
between the two shots, and the distance between him and the Patricios before the shooting
started. But such inconsistencies are to be expected of witnesses testifying on the same
incident as different persons may have diverse perceptions or recollections of a particular
event. It is well-settled that as long as the witnesses concur on material points slight
deviations in their recollection of details will not defract from the essential veracity of their
assertions. The inconsistencies and contradictions, if any there be, do not necessarily impair
credibility; they in fact enhance it as they erase any suspicion of a perjured or rehearsed
testimony. 11
Appellant would impress us that during the entire evening of 7 August 1984 he was in his
house at Barangay Cawayan, Carles, Iloilo, with his family and neighbors, and never left the
place at all until the following day. However, he failed to convince us that it was impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the killing. 12 The house of the victim at
Barangay Dayhagan, Pilar, Capiz, is only one and a half (1-1/2) kilometers from the adjoining
Barangay Cawayan, Carles, Iloilo, where appellant resides. Strangely, only his wife attested to
his alibi which, it has been held, is generally unavailing if it is corroborated merely by
immediate relatives and not by disinterested persons.
In fact he could have easily presented witnesses from among disinterested parties. Anyway,
alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. 13
But, did not appellant admit on cross-examination that his son was buried on 5 August 1984
or two (2) days before the killing took place? 14 verily, this should destroy whatever is left of
his pretension that on the night of the incident he was at home with family and friends
attending the wake for his son. All told, we find that the prosecution has convincingly proved
its case against appellant and established beyond reasonable doubt his culpability relative to
the death of Loreto Patricio Jr.
Nonetheless, we agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding that treachery
attended the killing. For treachery to be present, two (2) conditions must concur: (a)
employment of means of execution that would give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself much less retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted. 15 In the present case, there is no question that when the Patricios
heard their dogs barking at the direction of the carabao corral they sensed danger. Thus they
brought along their bolos when they went down their house and walked towards the corral.
There they saw appellant Romeo Ledesma, Fernando Bernal and an unidentified man pulling
their carabao, each carrying a pugakhang. Seeing the intruders armed must have forewarned
the Patricios that their lives were in grave peril. In other words, they were afforded a chance,
albeit fleeting, to retreat or defend themselves. Hence, it cannot be said with utmost certainty
that appellant and his companions deliberately chose treacherous means to insure the
attainment of their objective without risk to themselves. As we view it, the killing of Loreto Jr.
was made on the spur of the moment and only when the accused lost their composure after
having been caught in the act of stealing a carabao. Consequently, as the killing was not
attended by any of the aggravating circumstances qualifying it to murder, Accused-appellant
should only be liable for homicide. 16
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the
range of which is fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4)months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, Accused-appellant Romeo Ledesma alias Juan Ledesma is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, instead of murder, and is accordingly sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor, medium, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
Cost against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107735. February 1, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL y
ORTIZ, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder in an Information alleging that
on 26 November 1989, armed with a bladed weapon, in conspiracy with Ramon Doe, with
treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, he assaulted and stabbed to death Jaime
A. Tonog.[1]
The trial court convicted the accused as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment
and to pay the heirs of Jaime Tonog the sum of P30,000, plus costs.[2]
The accused is now before us on appeal.
The evidence shows that at around seven oclock in the evening of 26 November 1989,
within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued
between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with Ramon
Doe on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the
protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were
back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and
simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran
towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought
to Mary JohnstonHospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, autopsied the
cadaver of the victim and reported that it sustained two (2) penetrating stab wounds each
caused by a single-bladed instrument. He opined that both wounds were fatal.[3]
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog even
attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking but when he chanced
upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon fought
back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway; when
Tonog met a certain Mando he boxed the latter who however fought back despite his
(accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he
warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon
struck Tonog on the belly; when Mando saw what happened he (Mando) pulled out his knife
and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and Mando then fled towards the highway.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out the
latters companions to bring him to the hospital; that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales
only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the hospital; that Brenda
even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to testify; that his refusal
coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales some money earned him the ire of the latter and
that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.
Accused-appellant claims in this appeal that the trial court erred: (a) in giving credence
to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo, and for
discrediting his; (b) in finding that the killing was attended with evident premeditation; (c) in
ruling that he committed treachery and, (d) in convicting him of murder.[4]
We sustain the conviction of the accused for murder. It is settled that findings of fact of
the trial court are accorded greatest respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of
discretion,[5] and none is perceivable in the case at bench; hence we affirm the factual
findings of the trial court.
The accused contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are incredible
and conflicting. We however find otherwise. Gonzales and Ochobillo, as observed by the trial
court, testified in a direct and candid manner. No evil motive is attributed to them as to
testify falsely against the accused. That Gonzales harbored a grudge against the accused
because he owed her some money, and even enticed her customers into patronizing
another carinderia, can hardly be believed. We are not convinced that Brenda Gonzales would
testify against accused-appellant for a crime so grave simply because he owed her a measly
sum of P300.00. That he enticed the customers of Gonzales into patronizing
another carinderia is belied by the fact that on the night of the incident he was, as he
claimed, eating at the carinderia of Gonzales. If there be any testimony that should be
considered incredible and illogical it must be that of the accused. His assertion that Mando
stabbed the victim should not receive any evidentiary value when weighed against the positive
assertion of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was the assailant of Jaime Tonog.
Quite interestingly, the accused did not offer any information regarding the person and
circumstances of Mando. Up to this date Mando remains a myth. Not a single witness was
presented by the defense to prove who Mando was, nor even a hint of his personal
circumstances. During the entire proceedings in the court below Mando was never mentioned
by the prosecution witnesses. Nobody ever implicated him except the accused. In fact, there
should have been no difficulty procuring witnesses to testify on the part of the accused as the
incident was viewed openly by a multitude of bystanders. His failure to present any witness
pointing to Mando as the perpetrator of the crime convinces us that Mando in fact existed
only as a figment of the mind.
The accused also asserts that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene only after the victim
was brought to the hospital and that she even inquired from him about what happened.
Again we are not persuaded. The statement contradicts the earlier version of the accused
that Gonzales was prejudiced against him as he owed her some money. For, granting that
Gonzales had a grudge against him it was not likely that she would inquire from him about
the incident as there were other persons then present who could shed light on the startling
occurrence.
Equally dubious is the avowal of the accused that Gonzales arrived at the crime scene
only after the victim was rushed to the hospital considering that the incident took place just
in front of her store. Besides, this claim was easily demolished by Gonzales detailed account
of the fight.
The fact that the witnesses did not immediately report the incident to the police does not
necessarily discredit them. After all, reports were made albeit by different persons. The
accused banks on the apparent inconsistency as to why Gonzales failed to give immediately
her account of the killing to the authorities. But the discrepancy is so minor that it cannot
undermine her credibility nor detract from the truth that she personally witnessed the
incident and positively identified the accused.
The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet[6] prepared by Pat. Steve
Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as the principal
suspect.Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the
police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony
during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police
blotter.[7] Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the
defense during the proceedings in the court below.Hence any reliance by the accused on the
document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.[8]
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only
after interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba
on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.[9] But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a)
The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.[10]
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule,
hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and
personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired
from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order
to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must have personal
knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the
record.[11] In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements.
The accused enumerates discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Thus, according to him, it was testified that the victim was stabbed by the accused
at the back but failed to point out its precise location. The stabbing admittedly occurred at
around seven oclock in the evening but the Advance Information Sheet reported 6:30
p.m. One witness testified that the fistfight was only between the victim and Ramon Doe,
while another reported that it involved the victim, Ramon Doe and the accused. Further, it
was not accurately determined whether Ramon and the accused returned to the scene of the
crime within five (5) minutes or after the lapse thereof.
As previously stated, the discrepancies do not militate against the fact firmly established
by the prosecution that Tonog was stabbed at the back by the accused and by Ramon Doe in
the abdomen. Any discordance noted is so minor and insignificant that no further
consideration is essential. The most honest witnesses make mistakes sometimes, but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their credibility. The testimony of a witness must
be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein.[12]
The presence of the accused in the vicinity even after the commission of the crime does
not in any way extricate him from his dilemma. Certainly, it is no proof of his innocence.
The court a quo properly considered the aggravating circumstance of treachery in
convicting the accused of murder. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[13] Alevosia or treachery presumes an attack
that is deliberate and unexpected. There is no treachery when the victim is placed on guard,
as when a heated argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was standing
face to face with his assailants, and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen.[14]
It is true that in the case at bench the attack was preceded by a fistfight. It was however
established that they were already pacified by onlookers when the accused and Ramon
returned. Lulled into complacency the victim simply stayed where he was before the fistfight
when after a brief moment the accused together with Ramon returned with bladed
weapons.Both approached the victim and circled him surreptitiously. The attack was sudden
and simultaneous that the victim was never given a chance to defend himself. As we have
held in People v. Balisteros,[15] where a victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected
attack from behind and had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be considered
as treacherous. The evidence proved that the victim was caught unaware by the sudden
assault. No weapon was found, nor even intimated to be, in his possession.
Conversely the court a quo should have disregarded evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation requires a showing that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[16] Evidence for the prosecution showed that after
the fight was broken up the accused and Ramon Doe proceeded towards the highway. They
returned only after a lapse of approximately five (5) minutes. From the foregoing we cannot
conclude that the accused had sufficient time within which to meditate on the consequences
of his acts. Meditation necessitates that it be evident and proven. Be that as it may, treachery
as a qualifying circumstance having attended the killing, the conviction of the accused for
murder still holds.
WHEREFORE,. the decision of the court a quo in Crim. Case No. 90-81744
dated 25 July 1991 convicting accused-appellant RICARDO SAN GABRIEL Y ORTIZ of
murder is AFFIRMED. The penalty of life imprisonment however is MODIFIED to reclusion
perpetua,[17] while the award of P30,000.00 as indemnity is INCREASED to P50,000.00
conformably with existing jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.