G.R. No.
L-63915 April 24, 1985 implementation and administrative
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S.
PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed
on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
269, 271-273, 275-283,
orders. 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-
Specifically, the publication of the 315, 325, 327, 343, 346,
following presidential issuances is 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
sought: 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-
397, 405, 438-440, 444-
a] Presidential Decrees 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 713, 726, 837-839, 878-
360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 879, 881, 882, 939-940,
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 964,997,1149-
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 1178,1180-1278.
521, 528, 551, 566, 573,
574, 594, 599, 644, 658, c] General Orders Nos.:
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 64 & 65.
935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, d] Proclamation Nos.:
1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819- 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1826, 1829-1840, 1842- 1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1847. 1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
b] Letter of Instructions 1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-
199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
211-213, 215-224, 226- 1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
228, 231-239, 241-245, 1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
248, 251, 253-261, 263- 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
 1836, 1839-1840, 1843- outright on the ground that petitioners that judgment be
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, have no legal personality or standing to rendered commanding
1853-1858, 1860, 1866, bring the instant petition. The view is the defendant,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, submitted that in the absence of any immediately or at some
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, showing that petitioners are personally other specified time, to
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965- and directly affected or prejudiced by the do the act required to be
1966, 1968-1984, 1986- alleged non-publication of the done to Protect the rights
2028, 2030-2044, 2046- presidential issuances in question 2 said of the petitioner, and to
2145, 2147-2161, 2163- petitioners are without the requisite legal pay the damages
2244. personality to institute this mandamus sustained by the
proceeding, they are not being petitioner by reason of
e] Executive Orders Nos.: "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of the wrongful acts of the
411, 413, 414, 427, 429- Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defendant.
454, 457- 471, 474-492, which we quote:
494-507, 509-510, 522, Upon the other hand, petitioners
524-528, 531-532, 536, SEC. 3. Petition for maintain that since the subject of the
538, 543-544, 549, 551- Mandamus.—When any petition concerns a public right and its
553, 560, 563, 567-568, tribunal, corporation, object is to compel the performance of a
570, 574, 593, 594, 598- board or person public duty, they need not show any
604, 609, 611- 647, 649- unlawfully neglects the specific interest for their petition to be
677, 679-703, 705-707, performance of an act given due course.
712-786, 788-852, 854- which the law specifically
857. enjoins as a duty The issue posed is not one of first
resulting from an office, impression. As early as the 1910 case
f] Letters of trust, or station, or of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Implementation Nos.: 7, unlawfully excludes Court held that while the general rule is
8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, another from the use a rd that "a writ of mandamus would be
39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, enjoyment of a right or granted to a private individual only in
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, office to which such other those cases where he has some private
123. is entitled, and there is no or particular interest to be subserved, or
other plain, speedy and some particular right to be protected,
g] Administrative Orders adequate remedy in the independent of that which he holds with
Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, ordinary course of law, the public at large," and "it is for the
360- 378, 380-433, 436- the person aggrieved public officers exclusively to apply for the
439. thereby may file a verified writ when public rights are to be
petition in the proper subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79
court alleging the facts M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the
The respondents, through the Solicitor
with certainty and praying question is one of public right and the
General, would have this case dismissed
object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies,
3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized
the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to
compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental. Speaking for this
Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the
opinion that the weight of
authority supports the
proposition that the
relator is a proper party
to proceedings of this
character when a public
right is sought to be
enforced. If the general
rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a
general rule to a
particular case without
keeping in mind the
reason for the rule,
because, if under the
particular circumstances
the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to
error'
No reason exists in the
case at bar for applying
the general rule insisted
upon by counsel for the
respondent. The
circumstances which
surround this case are
different from those in the
United States, inasmuch
as if the relator is not a
proper party to these
proceedings no other
person could be, as we
have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer
of the Government to
appear and represent the
people in cases of this
character.
The reasons given by the Court in
recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
conceive of any other person to initiate
the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take
effect after fifteen days
following the completion
of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is
in accord with this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication-but not when
the law itself provides for the date when
it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is
logically correct only insofar as it equates
the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at
hand, the conclusion is easily reached
that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be
published in the Official
Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and
administrative orders and
proclamations, except
such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions
or abstracts of decisions
of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals
as may be deemed by
said courts of sufficient
importance to be so
published; [4] such
documents or classes of
documents as may be
required so to be
published by law; and [5]
such documents or
classes of documents as
the President of the
Philippines shall
determine from time to
time to have general
applicability and legal
effect, or which he may
authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted
provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the
establishment of the Philippine Republic
has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the
people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication,
the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de
leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of
Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There
shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance
and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included
or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative
and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication
of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating
decrees, orders and
letters of instructions
which all form part of the
law of the land, the
requirement of due
process and the Rule of
Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the
official government
repository promulgate
and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that 118 U.S. 425, 442;
the people may know Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co.
where to obtain their v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
official and specific 566. It is quite clear,
contents. however, that such broad
statements as to the
The Court therefore declares that effect of a determination
presidential issuances of general of unconstitutionality
application, which have not been must be taken with
published, shall have no force and effect. qualifications. The actual
Some members of the Court, quite existence of a statute,
apprehensive about the possible prior to such a
unsettling effect this decision might have determination, is an
on acts done in reliance of the validity of operative fact and may
those presidential decrees which were have consequences
published only during the pendency of which cannot justly be
this petition, have put the question as to ignored. The past cannot
whether the Court's declaration of always be erased by a
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been new judicial declaration.
enforced or implemented prior to their The effect of the
publication. The answer is all too subsequent ruling as to
familiar. In similar situations in the past invalidity may have to be
this Court had taken the pragmatic and considered in various
realistic course set forth in Chicot County aspects-with respect to
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: particular conduct,
private and official.
The courts below have Questions of rights
proceeded on the theory claimed to have become
that the Act of Congress, vested, of status, of prior
having been found to be determinations deemed
unconstitutional, was not to have finality and acted
a law; that it was upon accordingly, of
inoperative, conferring no public policy in the light of
rights and imposing no the nature both of the
duties, and hence statute and of its previous
affording no basis for the application, demand
challenged decree. examination. These
Norton v. Shelby County, questions are among the
 most difficult of those
which have engaged the
attention of courts, state
and federal and it is
manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle,
this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
right had accrued in his favor before said
law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the
implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court
by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of
the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters
nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of [penal] regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy,
refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or
in some other publication, even though
some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders
respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and
effect.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC.,
ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the
petitioners in demanding the disclosure
of a number of presidential decrees
which they claimed had not been
published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication
was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985,
the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general
application, and unless so
published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again,
this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public
nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between
laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the
petitioners suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not;
that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must
be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then
Solicitor General, he claimed first that
the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be
dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in
the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently
not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came
next the February Revolution and the
Court required the new Solicitor General
to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to
be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and that, however, the
decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of
the Civil Code providing as follows:
 ART. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after
such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and
of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant
motion, we have come to the conclusion
and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every
case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is
the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the
disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication
(or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be
so not because of a failure to comply
with but simply because they did not
know of its existence, Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive
presumption that every person knows
the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important
to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to,
among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws
and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like
a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is
a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question
in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and t to the
public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes,
including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution.
administrative rules and regulations must
a also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city
must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if
they are meant not merely to interpret
but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of
the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule
but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention
of the number of the presidential decree,
the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a
mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose
was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is
true that only four justices were
categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as
long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need
for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of
this Court to arrive at a clear consensus
on this matter and to lay down a binding
decision supported by the necessary
vote.
There is much to be said of the view that
the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic
releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to
the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of
publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we
know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor
General has not pointed to such a law,
and we have no information that it exists.
If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon
to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical.
That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no
choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication
of laws must be made in the Official
Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the
legislature.
We also hold that the publication must
be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is
that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could
be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor
General that the instant motion is a
request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves
no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the
unpublished decrees are over. This is
once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public
scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from
them.
Although they have delegated the power
of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to
ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and
their right of suffrage. This they cannot
do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the
clear light of the sun instead of skulking
in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements
and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that
all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published
in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified
by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,
Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion
penned by my distinguished colleague,
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like
to add a few observations. Even as a
Member of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa, I took a strong stand against
the insidious manner by which the
previous dispensation had promulgated
and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of
instructions, etc. Never has the law-
making power which traditionally belongs
to the legislature been used and abused
to satisfy the whims and caprices of a
one-man legislative mill as it happened
in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it
was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although
covering two different subject matters. In
point is the case of two presidential
decrees bearing number 1686 issued on
March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine
citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then
President's nephew and the other
imposing a tax on every motor vehicle
equipped with airconditioner. This was
further exacerbated by the issuance of
PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980
granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court
on the need for publication before any
law may be made effective seeks
prevent abuses on the part of the
lawmakers and, at the same time,
ensures to the people their constitutional
right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the
court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish
to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is
saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for
its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted
as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Such statute, in other words, should not
be regarded as purporting literally to
come into effect immediately upon its
approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such
statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due
process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to
and unknowable by those subjected to
the statute, has been throughout history
a common tool of tyrannical
governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a
negation of the fundamental principle of
legality in the relations between a
government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the
requirement of publication of a statute in
the Official Gazette, as distinguished
from any other medium such as a
newspaper of general circulation, is
embodied in a statutory norm and is not
a constitutional command. The statutory
norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil
Code and is supported and reinforced by
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638
and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of
the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be
changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code
could, without creating a constitutional
problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country. Until such an amendatory
statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the
Civil Code must be obeyed and
publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.