Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
- versus -
BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),
GENERAL ALLIANCE
BINDING WOMEN FOR
REFORMS, INTEGRITY,
EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA),
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID
NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
(MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY
OF CAVITE WORKERS,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS),
ANAKBAYAN,
PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG
MAMAMALAKAYA
(PAMALAKAYA),
ALLIANCE OF
CONCERNED TEACHERS
(ACT), MIGRANTE,
HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY (HEAD),
AGHAM, TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., DR.
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
RENATO CONSTANTINO,
JR., SISTER MARY JOHN
MANANSAN OSB, DEAN
CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY.
JOSEFINA LICHAUCO,
COL. GERRY CUNANAN
(ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-
REYNA, DR. CAROLINA
PAGADUAN-ARAULLO,
RENATO REYES, DANILO
RAMOS, EMERENCIANA
DE LESUS, RITA BAUA,
REY CLARO CASAMBRE,
Petitioners,
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-
Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY
(NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE
OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP
CHIEF GEN. G.R. No. 178890
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------
x
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PEOPLES RIGHTS,
represented herein by Dr.
Edelina de la Paz, and
representing the following
organizations: HUSTISYA,
represented by Evangeline
Hernandez and also on her
own behalf;
DESAPARECIDOS,
represented by Mary Guy
Portajada and also on her own
behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA
EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA
DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA),
represented by Donato
Continente and also on his
own behalf, ECUMENICAL
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE
AND PEACE (EMJP),
represented by Bishop Elmer
M. Bolocon, UCCP, and
PROMOTION OF CHURCH
PEOPLES RESPONSE,
represented by Fr. Gilbert
Sabado, OCARM,
Petitioners,
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-
Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY
(NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE
OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP G.R. No. 179157
CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------ x
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA AND
THE MEMBERS OF THE G.R. No. 179461
ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL (ATC),
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------
x
BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN
TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST),
GABRIELA-ST,
KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SAMAHYANG
MAGSASAKA-TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN
(KASAMA-TK),
MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
(MCCCL), PEOPLES
MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-
ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-
ST), PAGKAKAISAT
UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA
(PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG
MGA MAMAMAYAN SA
TABING RILES (SMTR-ST),
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN
MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG
MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA
SA REPORMANG
AGRARYO KOMPRA,
BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG
MGA KATUTUBO SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG
KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN
(SUMAMAKA-TK),
STARTER, LOSOS RURAL
POOR ORGANIZATION
FOR PROGRESS &
EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN
NIO LAJARA, TEODORO
REYES, FRANCESCA B.
TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E.
BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T.
LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE
CLARO, SALLY P.
ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN,
Petitioners,
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-
Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMEN T
SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINCANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY
(NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE
OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP
CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers
(SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng
Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham,
represented by their respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and
taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino,
Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua
and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio
Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
clear:
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[11]
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct
and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons
and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with
military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the
[S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection betweenthe purported surveillance and the implementation
of RA 9372.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No.
178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and
NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of
RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and
specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is the
filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the
Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to
the Abu Sayyaf Group.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed
in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael
Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro
Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed
rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and
accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement were
petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP,
KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For
one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus
standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section
21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under
the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however,
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against
its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the
subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the
veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds
that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA
9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human
rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens
has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[30] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that
the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conductor activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity
the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take
the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by
law may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms
like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder
Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the
definition of the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically
postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify
a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the
case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be
made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain
penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute
may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal
statutes x x x may not be allowed.[64]
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to
a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will
impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be
nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal
statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts
as applied to the litigants.