Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994 cause for him to issue the warrants.
e warrants. They further
Facts:
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a
discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement
implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and
Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them
as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and
slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a
search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios
of the RTC of Manila.
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant
issued separately raided the dwellings of police
officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the
perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and
ammunitions were found in the raid including Van
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder,
and usurpation of authority. Their case was referred
by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto
Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the
issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
contend that the judge did not personally determine
the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence
where the investigation was based from.
Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without
bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for
lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in
the custody of the court.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding in the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. As with other
earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement
that the accused be in the custody of the law.
Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court
to accused even if they are not in the custody of the
law.
1
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an
international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted
PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November
1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all
the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again
went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to
February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to
reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight.
On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
decision for him to remain grounded until such time
that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a
repeated refusal to report for weight check would be
dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of
weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a
Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated
were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by
PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
“and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him
“which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
(5) years,” his services were considered terminated
“effective immediately.”
2
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL
are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only
invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result
of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to
no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep
the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates
against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That
he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992
clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight
given the proper attitude, determination, and self-
discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he
issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight
which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician,
per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when
placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service.
His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness
basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing
3
or controlling his actions. This element runs through all
just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found
in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the
bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it
is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it
has committed itself to safely transport its passengers.
In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of
PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
the employee as an act of social justice or based on
equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
4
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and
other consolidated petitions), November
3, 2008
VELASCO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2)
students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years
and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x
x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 unconstitutional?
5

III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658
and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It
alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the
validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election
is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f)
thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
6
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of
public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-
testing policy for employees—and students for that matter—
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and
informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for
the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and
the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to
a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For
one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under
a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee
in a private establishment is under the law deemed
7
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a
drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may
be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what,
in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug
test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the
mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test
and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH)
to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
“need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result
of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees,
the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness
for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1
day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons
to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
8
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815
Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
Respondent
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the
petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was
bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject
firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not
been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso
was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in
the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the
room as the raiding team went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of
the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The
firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry
Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a
9
revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing
the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a
letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearm and ammunition has merit and valid
HELD/DECISION:
1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and
seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested
lawfully may be searched so that the officer may
remove any weapons that the accused may be
used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare
of the officers and to make sure that the arrest
will happen. This is also to find evidence that
otherwise can be destroyed by the accused.
Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or any weapons either on the person or
within the area of his immediate control. Based
on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner
did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed
outside the room where the gun was found;
therefore the room where the gun was found
could not be “in his immediate control.”
Incidental searches without a warrant states that
officers are permitted to seize any weapon that
they can inadvertently found during the arrest
under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the
firearm was not found accidentally but was
actually searched and therefore not incidental.
Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of
Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is
inadmissible to court and cannot be used against
him.
Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine Blooming
Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human
Rights, Human Right is superior to property rights,
Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional
right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free
expression, rights of free assembly and rights of petition
FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered
that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a
valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before
10
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality
of Pasig at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be
participated in by the workers in the first, second and
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2
meetings in the morning and afternoon where PBMEO
confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to
report for work the following morning shall be dismissed
for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO
answered that there is no violation since they gave prior
notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for
strike against the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for
reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD:
YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and
reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement
of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well
as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
11
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs
as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,
the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his
dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution,
denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against
the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the
day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to
a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the
desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy
of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right
to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a
denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee
is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to
effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
12
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic well-
being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would
be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest
between an employer and its laborer, the latter
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the
financial resources with which to pay for competent
legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason
to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations
rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an
accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require."
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA
849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for
the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to
be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers
of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would
impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; there was also the requirement that the
guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
13
There was also a provision that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They
claimed this to be violative of due process for being
vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners
also invoked the lack of due process on this for being
arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the
hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic
cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the
ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.”
However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case
was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts,
the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city
government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.
14
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is
ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of
liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement
the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
15
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."
MORFE V MUTUC
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND
ASSOCIATES DECEMBER 29, 2011 SALN
Declaratory relief (Appeal)
Date of Promulgation: January 31, 1968
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive
Secretary) et al.
Facts:
 The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
 Every public officer within 30 days after its
approval or after his assumption of office
“and within the month of January of every
year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare
and file with the head of the office to which
he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year”.
 Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the
periodical submission “within the month of
January of every other year thereafter” of their
sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise
of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban
against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.
 Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
 Acceptance of public position = voluntary
assumption of obligation
 Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable
measure of insuring the interest of general
welfare in honest and clean public service
and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
police power.
 CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
and is thus offensive to the due process clause
Issue/s:
16
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public
officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2.
Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the
right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable
search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
Ruling: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
1. Presumption of validity
 Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was
a reasonable requirement for employment so a
public officer can make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did
not present evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity.
 “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate
Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided
by the Due Process Clause
 “inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice
Malcolm)
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern
men and things within the limits of its
domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment
of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can
invoke the protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied
upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process
to strike down what he considers as an
infringement of his liberty.
 Under the Constitution, the challenged provision
is allowable as long as due process is observed.
 The standard for due process is
REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions
and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
public service with its ever-present temptation to
heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon
17
 assuming office…There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
1. Right to privacy
 Right to be let alone
 “It cannot be said that the challenged
statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the
rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute
goes very far in precluding assent to an objection
of such character. This is not to say that a public
officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize
that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
including the statement of the amounts of
personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year, there is no unconstitutional
intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.”
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
 The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion.
1. Right against self-incrimination
 We are not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
 Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid.
SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
J. Corona
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following
day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil
depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only
scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop
their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting
July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
18
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement
Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027
has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the
MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it
can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be
the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required
to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to
compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which
a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the
laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not
show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and
thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of
an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for
this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to
the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU
were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS.
ATIENZA CASE DIGEST
19
 (Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of
Manila City to issue — and enforce — an Ordinance reclassifying
certain areas within the city. The reclassification adversely affected
the oil companies, which are now forced to relocate their oil
terminals in Pandacan. This is a digest ofSocial Justice Society vs.
Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008. Other procedural issues
are not discussed.)
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals― of
the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is
here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies. They agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.― The
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In
the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which
period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 7 March 2007
Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to “enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city,― including
Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron
Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the “oil companies―) and
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to
intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the
interest of justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the oil
companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were
granted because they presented novel issues and arguments.
DOE’s intervention was also allowed considering the
transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared
unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second
is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
20
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier
law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the
first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable
conflict between the two ordinances. However, there was no
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no
conflict since both ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to
the same subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the
area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to
repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both
can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute
an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a
certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area)
whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against
respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of the
executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not
interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or executive
departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of its
powers, there is an exception – to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of
mandamus is the power to compel “the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
trust or station.―
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President of the
Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s power of
supervision over local government units. This suggested process,
however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its
constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party need
not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an
ordinance. Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus
before the SC is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not
be unreasonable. There is no showing that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional.
21
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the
plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex(the welfare
of the people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature,
such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to
local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the
power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.―
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having
properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there
is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted
“for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare― of the residents of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect
the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is
vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government
may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used
to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.
22
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a
zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is
situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection
of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the
businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents
of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to
be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which
amounts to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and
oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits
them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. However,
the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its
power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it
established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and
oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the
depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in income
and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument
has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on
or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which
involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only
when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a
noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In
the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the
use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their
use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has
discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals
despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings
and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code,
Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another
class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
23
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks
to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not
a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion
occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is
a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which
provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals
removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all
businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992)
and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes
enacted by Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where
the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws
shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were
clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of
the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no
room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely
gave DOE general powers to “establish and administer programs
for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution,
utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources― and “to encourage certain practices in the [oil]
industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve
efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products.― These powers can be exercised without
emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the
LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved
in favor of the City of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the
Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress
to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Constitution. There is no showing how the laws relied upon by the
oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to
enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify
the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is
that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot
exercise the power of control over them. The President and his or
her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the
activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City
of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail
as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution
and the law.
24
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA
7924 and EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are
required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall
endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O.
72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through
this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority
to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which
made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to
comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is
admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very
specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area
in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack.
It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the
“Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.― CLUPs are the
ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration
in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by the
HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and
policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and
HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present
any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was
not observed.
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property.
They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to
relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a
few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who
have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the
terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and
preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the
intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke a
crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan
Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision,
specially one with far-reaching consequences, should always be
within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive
and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies
with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil
companies have no choice but to obey the law.
25
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to
property
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet
(10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded
that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH
Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of
the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the
ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made
by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the
removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental
right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-
based or content-neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to
property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are
considered religious speech.
26

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to
the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be
abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence
to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC
27
does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions
are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
“based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In
contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule
as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There
is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by
the Constitution.
28
 Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
protection of the laws. create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.”
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad Lemon test
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
A regulation is constitutional when:
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property 1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
without due process of law.
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of 1-UTAK V. COMELEC
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech. vs.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government PONENTE: Reyes
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of
the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals campaign materials on PUV and public terminals, captive-audience
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their doctrine
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

29
DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and
fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to
vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a
particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for
a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right
to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to
convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy
presumption of invalidity.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the
campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public
places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include
any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the
like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause
for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the
owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these
Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards
the application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner
then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of
the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their
vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which
denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
30
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the
people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the
freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and
convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting
an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and
transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the
public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for
an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right
to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to
operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is
an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech
clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right
to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional
power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated
power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the
right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
31
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional
grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during
an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or
permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other
public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers
of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se
of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit
to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation
utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used
for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of
political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to
do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport
terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot,
as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can
be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a
listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise
of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only
when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree
of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience”
may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign
materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
same unbearably intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting
of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals,
cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which
prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum,
pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses,
“although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a
part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other
commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising
32
from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion
on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs
owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of
the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements
would be placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility
vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of
advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark
contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on
the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to
refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that
what were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the
instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals
remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their
political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign
materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run
afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection
clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and
applies equally to the members of the purported class. However,
the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is
not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the
purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and
transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in
that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from
the government either a franchise or a permit to
operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition
imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport
terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the
franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership
of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by
the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other
properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion
by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there
is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the
distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for
use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set
them apart from private vehicles and other
properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would
be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many
people. However, election campaign materials posted on private
33
vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is
no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in
the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional
power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the
objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause,
but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no
substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise
one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom
of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or
reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic
way of life.
Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board | Barrera, J
FACTS
 Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan
Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and
Basilio King were charged before the Deportation Board
with having purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary
licensing from the Central Bank and having clandestinely
remitted the same to Hong Kong.
 After the filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of
arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending
investigation.
 They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a
surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for P10,000.00.
 Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the
charges on the ground, among others, that such charges are
not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not
jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to dismiss was
denied.
 Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for habeas corpus
and/or prohibition.
 TIRAL COURT: Upheld the validity of the delegation by the
President to the Deportation Board the power to conduct
investigations for the purpose of determining whether the
stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State.
o The court also sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release pending
investigation on the theory that the power to arrest
and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien
is essential to and complement the power to deport
aliens.
34
ISSUES/HELD
[1] WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such
power is validly delegated to the Deportation Board. –YES.
[2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order
the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT only when there is already an
ORDER OF DEPORTATION.
[2]
RATIO
[1]
 Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of
Immigration the power to effect the arrest and expulsion of
an alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be
delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of
the Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring
such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation
proceedings for the President.
 Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in 2 ways:
o By order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and
o By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
 And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not
enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of profiteering, hoarding
or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central
Bank regulations, which is tantamount to economic
sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions
of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940.
 Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in
deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their
appearance.
o However, the same did not authorize the arrest of
the alien pending investigation.
 It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu
proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special
Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest
of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention
during the investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release in such amount and under such
conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the
Board.
 However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
upon whose authority the President's power to deport is
predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power
to arrest.
 Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his
person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the Constitution:
35
 “...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce...”
 Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement
— "to be determined by the judge" — to any public officer
who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.
 Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to
carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only
when there is already an order of deportation.
o However, during the investigation, it is not
indispensable that the alien be arrested.
o It is enough that a bond be required to insure the
appearance of the alien during the investigation, as
was authorized in EO69.
DISPOSITIVE
 Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing
of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond
and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of
said aliens, is declared illegal.
 The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation
Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant
to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840;
G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the
following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman
72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was
found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the
“after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has
been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
sometime now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They
were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3
month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence,
another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3
petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4
March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens
for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
36
Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for
violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of
Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988
but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4
April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable
cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures
by CIDagents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to
petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code,
it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect
the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The
arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined
after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the
offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest;
therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12
of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest.
2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view.
In view of the foregoing, the searchdone was incidental to the
arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning
its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing
presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not
be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of
Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be
arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against
them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure.
Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should
be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired.
37
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done
under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure
against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of
the people.
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971.
On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed,
specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed
a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November
1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc
denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he
had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with
his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary
as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim
to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
38
Board of Commissioners V. De La Rosa
197 SCRA 863 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Conflict of Laws –
Foreign Laws; How Proven – Proof of Foreign Laws – Processual
Presumption
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino
citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor
arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was
eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all
decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases
where entry was allowed among which was that of William
Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in
accordance with Philippine law.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the
evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known
as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it
is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is
declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the
citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.
G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST
MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN ORGANIZATION,
INC., respondents.
Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Mariano
Abaya for petitioner.
Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction,
with preliminary injunction, against an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction bond in the
amount of P3,000.00, let a writ of preliminary preventive and/or
mandatory injunction issue, restraining the respondents, their
agents or representatives, from further searching the premises and
properties and from taking custody of the various documents and
papers of the petitioner corporation, whether in its main office or in
any of its branches; and ordering the respondent Central Bank
and/or its co-respondents to return to the petitioner within five (5)
days from service on respondents of the writ of preventive and/or
mandatory injunction, all the books, documents, and papers so far
seized from the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid search
warrant.1äwphï1.ñët
Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the requisite bond, we
issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ of preliminary injunction
39
restraining and prohibiting respondents herein from enforcing the
order above quoted.
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual Savings and Loan
Organization, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Organization —
is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961,
is "to encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its
members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans,"
to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of
"members,"1 namely: (a) founder members — who originally joined
the organization and have signed the pre-incorporation papers —
with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating
members — with "no right to vote or be voted for" — to which
category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members,
so made by the board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion"
thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in
the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization — without
any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary members.
On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Bank of
the Philippines — hereinafter referred to as the Bank — rendered
an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of similar
nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the
Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to
be published in the newspapers the following:
ANNOUNCEMENT
To correct any wrong impression which recent newspaper reports
on "savings and loan associations" may have created in the minds of
the public and other interested parties, as well as to answer
numerous inquiries from the public, the Central Bank of the
Philippines wishes to announce that all "savings and loan
associations" now in operation and other organizations using
different corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in
nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE
IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING
ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act,
Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds
obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the
sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without
authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations
are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and persons
dealing with such institutions do so at their risk.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the
coordination of "the investigation and gathering of evidence on the
activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating
contrary to law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member of
the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the Municipal Court
of Manila a verified application for a search warrant against the
Organization, alleging that "after close observation and personal
investigation, the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" — in
which the offices of the Organization were housed — "are being
used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in
banking activities, "by receiving deposits of money for deposit,
disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of
a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan association . .
. without having first complied with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 337" and that the articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a
40
list attached to said application, as Annex A thereof.3 are kept in (8) Credit Report
said premises, and "being used or intended to be used in the
(9) Solicitor's Report
commission of a felony, to wit: violation of Sections 2 and 6 of
Republic Act No. 337."4 Said articles, papers or effects are described (10) Promissory Note
in the aforementioned Annex A, as follows:
(11) I n d o r s e m e n t
I. BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRY
(12) Co-makers' Statements
(1) General Journal
(13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts
(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book
(14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts
(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book
(15) Trial Balance
(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement Book
(16) Minutes Book — Board of Directors
II. BOOKS OF FINAL ENTRY
IV. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(1) General Ledger
(1) Income and Expenses Statements
(2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers
(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers
V. OTHERS
III. OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS
(1) Articles of Incorporation
(1) Application for Membership
(2) By-Laws
(2) Signature Card
(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.
(3) Deposit Slip
(4) And other documents and articles which are being used or
(4) Passbook Slip intended to be used in unauthorized banking activities and
operations contrary to law.
(5) Withdrawal Slip
Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman
(6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report
Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal court, issued the warrant
(7) Application for Loan Credit Statement above referred to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid

41
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the
foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to
believe" upon examination, under oath, of a detective of the Manila
Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank — that
the Organization has under its control, in the address given, the
aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense
adverted to above or intended to be used as means for the
commission of said off offense.
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization commenced Civil
Case No. 50409 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an original
action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police
Department, and the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search
warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal
court had acted "with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction
and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant is
a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the
word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the
unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no
relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no
court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case
against a corporation . . ."
The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending hearing of the case
on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex
parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the
alternative, if the acts complained of have been partially performed,
that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be forthwith
issued ex parte, ordering the preservation of the status quo of the
parties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the
documents and papers so far seized under, the search warrant in
question. After due hearing, on the petition for said injunction,
respondent, Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila to which said Case
No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on July 2, 1962, the order
complained of.
Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved for a
reconsideration thereof, which was denied on August 7, 1962.
Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the
present action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging
that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and
in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question.
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the Bank,
in causing the aforementioned search to be made and the articles
above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that the
Organization was illegally engaged in banking — by receiving money
for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise, or transacting
the business of a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and
loan association, — without first complying with the provisions of
R.A. No. 337, and that the order complained of assumes that the
Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act.6 Yet
respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to
be unreasonable, through the following process of reasoning: the
deposition given in support of the application for a search warrant
states that the deponent personally knows that the premises of the
Organization, at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,7 were being used
unlawfully for banking and purposes. Respondent judge deduce,
from this premise, that the deponent " knows specific banking
transactions of the petitioner with specific persons," and, then
concluded that said deponent ". . . could have, if he really knew of
actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to search and seize
only books" or records:
42
covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the
petitioner with specific persons who are the supposed victims of
said illegal banking transactions according to his knowledge. To
authorize and seize all the records listed in Annex A to said
application for search warrant, without reference to specific alleged
victims of the purported illegal banking transactions, would be to
harass the petitioner, and its officers with a roving commission or
fishing expedition for evidence which could be discovered by normal
intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of books and
records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No 337 . . ."
The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the civil liberty
involved is, certainly, in line with the function of courts, as ramparts
of justice and liberty and deserves the greatest encouragement and
warmest commendation. It lives up to the highest traditions of the
Philippine Bench, which underlies the people's faith in and
adherence to the Rule of Law and the democratic principle in this
part of the World.
At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not
purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature of things, a
condition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding each
case, in much the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of
the conditions obtaining in given situations.
Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order
complained of whether respondent Judge opined that the above
mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that the
Organization was engaged in the transactions mentioned in his
deposition — deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however, a
mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on
the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion
that said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
Upon the other hand, the failure of the witness to mention
particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he had no
personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the
Organization, for the witness might be acquainted with specific
transactions, even if the names of the individuals concerned were
unknown to him.
Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an
illegal banking transaction, of the kind contemplated in the
contested action of the officers of the Bank, must always connote
the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to denote a party
whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is
not necessarily justified. The law requiring compliance with certain
requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously
seeks to protect the public against actual, as well as potential,
injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of
warrants to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise.
The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be
justified if the acts imputed to the Organization consisted
of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of
business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be
necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated
transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the
records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not the situation
confronting us. The records suggest clearly that the transactions
objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the
business of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof,
43
according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the
form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them.
It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of
Incorporation and the By-laws — as their "savings." and that the
depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a
cursory examination of said documents will readily show that
anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member."
In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public"
for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the
Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is
placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and
"participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be
voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to
those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine
from time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the
"participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation
is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic
Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the
requirements of said Act, before the transactions in question could
be undertaken.
It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not
seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank
is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated
upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the
Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in
Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was
probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6
of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that,
accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64
Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not been
proven to be unreasonable.
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2, 1962, and
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in compliance
therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on August 14, 1962, accordingly,
made permanent, with costs against respondent First Mutual
Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It is so ordered.
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42
search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to
search persons and premises of several personal properties
due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were
conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the
corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null
and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a
petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from
being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against
44
the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects
found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the
legality of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the
residences but not those done in the corporation's premises.
The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation
since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each
in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein.
Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which
cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object
belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents,
papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case
Digest
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and
ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually
convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample
of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found
dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre
filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional
right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his
package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner
Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant
to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that
Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the
NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes
into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
45

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision issued
on June 9, 1980 which affirmed the decision of the California
Supreme Court in a case that arose out of a free speech dispute
between the Pruneyard Shopping Center in Campbell, California,
and several local high school students (who wished to solicit
signatures for a petition against United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3379).[1]
Case[
In American constitutional law, this case is famous for its role in
establishing two important rules:
 under the California Constitution, individuals may peacefully
exercise their right to free speech in parts of private shopping
centers regularly held open to the public, subject to
reasonable regulations adopted by the shopping centers
 under the U.S. Constitution, states can provide their citizens
with broader rights in their constitutions than under the
federal Constitution, so long as those rights do not infringe on
any federal constitutional rights
This holding was possible because California's constitution
contains an affirmative right of free speech which has been
liberally construed by the Supreme Court of California, while the
federal constitution's First Amendment contains only
a negative command to Congress to not abridge the freedom of
speech. This distinction was significant because the U.S.
Supreme Court had already held that under the federal First
Amendment, there was no implied right of free speech within a
private shopping center.[2] The Pruneyard case, therefore, raised
the question of whether an implied right of free speech could
arise under a state constitution without conflicting with the federal
Constitution. In answering yes to that question, the Court rejected
the shopping center's argument that California's broader free
speech right amounted to a "taking" of the shopping center under
federal constitutional law.
A typical "Please Do Not Contribute" sign at a California shopping
center.
Footnote two of the decision quotes the relevant portions of
the California Constitution, which states in Article 1, § 2
“
Every person may freely speak, write and publish
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press. ”
and Article 1, § 3
“ ”
[P]eople have the right to . . . petition government
for redress of grievances.
The vote to uphold the California decision was unanimous,
although four justices disagreed with part of the reasoning in
Justice William Rehnquist's opinion for the majority.
Justices Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, and Lewis Powell filed
separate concurring opinions. Justice Harry Blackmun filed a brief
"statement" indicating that he was joining in all of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion except for one sentence.
Because of the Pruneyard case, people who visit shopping
centers in California may regularly encounter people seeking
money or attention for various causes, including charitable
solicitations, qualifying petitions for amendments to the state
constitution, voter registration drives, and sometimes a beggar. In
turn, many shopping centers have posted signs to explain that
they do not endorse the views of people exercising their right to
46
free speech, and that if patrons do not give them money, the
speakers will go away.
Subsequent developments[edit]
Although 39 other states have free speech clauses in their
constitutions that look like California's – indeed, California
borrowed its clause from a similar one in the New York
Constitution – at least 13 of those states have declined to follow
California in extending the right of free speech into private
shopping centers.[3] In refusing to follow Pruneyard, the state
supreme courts of New York and Wisconsin both attacked it as
an unprincipled and whimsical decision.[4] In 2003, the European
Court of Human Rights also considered and refused to
follow Pruneyard, in a United Kingdom case.[5] Only New
Jersey, Colorado, and Massachusetts have followed California,
albeit with some reservations. In a 2000 decision, Puerto Rico (a
U.S. territory) also adopted Pruneyard's right of free speech,
although the case was complicated by the presence of a branch
office of a government agency (Puerto Rico Telephone, since
privatized) in the shopping center (the Mayagüez Mall).[6] Some
commentators have suggested the Pruneyard rule could be
applied to speech on the Internet, including speech activities
in virtual worlds, like Linden Labs' Second Life, although the
courts have not addressed this theory.[7]
In the decades since Pruneyard was decided, the Supreme Court
of California has become much more conservative, especially
after three liberal justices (including Chief Justice Rose Bird) were
removed by the electorate in 1986 for their opposition to
the death penalty.[8]
In the 2001 Golden Gateway decision, a 4–3 majority of the Court
significantly narrowed Pruneyard by holding for a variety of
reasons that California's free speech right does not apply to
private apartment complexes – yet they also refused to
overrule Pruneyard.[9] Thus, California's right of free speech in
private shopping centers still survives.
The shopping center industry strongly "detests"
the Pruneyard decision since it has resulted in numerous test
cases by protesters in California and elsewhere trying to find the
boundaries of the Pruneyard rule.[10] Shopping centers have
regularly imposed restrictions on unwanted solicitors and
appealed the resulting legal cases in the hope of convincing the
California judiciary that Pruneyard should be overturned, or at
least limited.[10] Since Golden Gateway, decisions by the
intermediate Courts of Appeal have generally limited the scope of
the Pruneyard rule to the facts of the original case. For example,
starting in 1997, the parking lots of many Costco warehouse
club stores in California became sites of conflict involving a large
number of political activist groups who had gradually become
aware of their rights under Pruneyard. In 1998, Costco's
management imposed several restrictions, including a complete
ban on soliciting at stand-alone stores, a rule that no group or
person could use Costco premises for free speech more than 5
days out of any 30, and the complete exclusion of solicitors on
the 34 busiest days of the year.
In 2002, these restrictions were upheld as reasonable by the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, and the
Supreme Court of California denied review.[11] Costco's stand-
alone stores lacked the social congregation attributes of the multi-
tenant shopping center at issue in Pruneyard. As for the
restrictions on the stores in shopping centers, they were held to
be reasonable because Costco had developed a strong factual
record at trial which proved that hordes of unwanted solicitors had
significantly interfered with its business operations – they had
damaged its reputation, obstructed access to its stores, and
traumatized Costco employees.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of California confronted
the Pruneyard decision once more, in the context of a complex
labor dispute involving San Diego's Fashion Valley Mall and
the San Diego Union-Tribune. On December 24, 2007, a 4-3
majority of a sharply divided court once again refused to
overrule Pruneyard, and instead, ruled that under the California
Constitution, a union's right of free speech in a shopping center
47
includes the right to hand out leaflets urging patrons
to boycott one of the shopping center's tenants.[12]Justice Ming
Chin, in his dissent joined by Justices Marvin Baxter and Carol
Corrigan, expressed his sympathy with several of the most
common critiques of the Pruneyard decision:
"Pruneyard was wrong when decided. In the nearly three decades
that have since elapsed, jurisdictions throughout the nation have
overwhelmingly rejected it. We should no longer ignore this tide of
history. The time has come for us to forthrightly
overrule Pruneyard and rejoin the rest of the nation in this
important area of the law. Private property should be treated as
private property, not as a public free speech zone."[13]
In the aftermath of the Fashion Valley case, the California Courts
of Appeal briefly began to apply Pruneyard more broadly. In
2010, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, in an
opinion authored by then-Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye (now Chief
Justice of California), held that it is unconstitutional
under Pruneyard for shopping mall giant Westfield Group to
promulgate rules discriminating in favor of commercial speech in
its malls and against noncommercial speech.[14] The plaintiff had
been detained by Westfield security after attempting to discuss
the principles of his Christian faith with strangers at the Westfield
Galleria at Roseville.
In 2011, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District
disagreed with the Fourth Appellate District's analysis of blackout
days in the Costco case, and held that it was unreasonable
for Westside Pavilion to prohibit animal rights protesters from
protesting on certain blackout days and to require them to protest
out of aural and visual range of the targeted tenant (an alleged
retailer for puppy mills).[15]
On December 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of California
reaffirmed Pruneyard but narrowed its applicability to the facts of
the original case.[16] The entire court concurred in Associate
Justice Joyce Kennard's holding that Pruneyard applies only to
"common areas" of shopping centers that are designed and
furnished to encourage shoppers to linger, congregate, relax, or
converse at leisure, but does not apply to any other open portions
of shopping centers merely intended to facilitate the efficient
movement of shoppers in and out of tenants, including concrete
aprons and sidewalks which shoppers simply walk across as they
move between parking lots and big-box stores. In other words,
the court effectively immunized most (but not all) strip malls and
shopping centers from Pruneyard, except for those with areas
analogous to public gathering areas such as plazas, atriums,
or food courts. Miriam Vogel, a former Court of Appeal justice
who argued for the shopping center tenant
(Kroger subsidiary Ralphs), characterized the decision "a great
victory for retailers as far as putting another nail in
the Pruneyard coffin."[17] However, the decision was not a
complete loss for free speech advocates, as the court separately
upheld the right of a union to protest on the employer's premises
under the state Moscone Act by a 6-1 majority (the majority,
though, was badly split as to why).
Serrano vs. NLRC / ISETANN - GR No. 117040 Case
Digest
FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the
head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure,
Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the
services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in
his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that
private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that
private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting
48
employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC
reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation
pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the
private respondent to replace its current security section a valid
ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is
not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an
independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated
employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided
by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid
backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just
cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid
backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground
for considering dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes
mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should
not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to
hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without
legal effect.
BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. 149454 &
149507, May 28, 2004
Facts: CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI,
with CASA’s President as one of its authorized signatories. It
discovered that 9 of its checks had been encashed by a certain
Sonny D. Santos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and was
used by a certain Yabut, CASA’s external auditor. He voluntarily
admitted that he forged the signature and encashed the checks.
RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with Damages against BPI
ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. CA
took account of CASA’s contributory negligence and apportioned
the loss between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to reimburse
both.
BPI contends that the monthly statements it issues to its clients
contain a notice worded as follows: “If no error is reported in 10
days, account will be correct” and as such, it should be considered a
waiver.
Issue:Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to
report the error in the bank statement
Held: Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA
failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning
the mistake after the lapse of the ten-day period.
This notice is a simple confirmation or "circularization" -- in
accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors to affirm
theaccuracy of items recorded by the banks. Its purpose is to obtain
from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of
49
theiraccount balances with their respective banks. Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2
008
Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private
the activesubject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive
corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws, both engaged in
one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement. On the one hand, BPI
the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
could not have been an active subject, because it could not have
agriculturalchemicals. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI)
demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA, on the other
1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of
hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had
fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate capital was
no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to
raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the
respond.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from
Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their
1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily
own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established
stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI
as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even
a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil
make a juris et de jure presumption that whenever one has, by
filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the
one’s ownact or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was
to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief,
unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition
one cannot -- in any litigation arising from such act or omission -- be
that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil
permitted to falsify that supposed truth.
has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465
because itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the
In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation
case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It
that misled BPI. The former’s omission, if any, may only be deemed
asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences
because"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the
of periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance
farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.
founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. A person
who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be
estopped by it. "Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or
doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not barred from questioning BPI’s ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
error even after the lapse of the period given in the notice. constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.

What is the power of taxation?

50
RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine
of standing is a mereprocedural technicality which may be
waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation
power of the state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used
as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy
was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantialpurposes, then
the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power and the power of
taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct
andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the
State to enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power
of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose.
The main purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior
or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful
subjects" and"lawful means" tests are used to determine
the validity of a law enacted under the police power. Thepower of
taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
Ponente: NACHURA, J.:
FACTS
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and
Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come
before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of
Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks
to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the
consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to
refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took
effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from
the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. On
May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying that the
proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge
be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF)
managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed
areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order provisionally
approving the computed amount as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the
Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the
51
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution
Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On
August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking
the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003,
ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for
its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of
funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric
Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all
other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective
electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which
sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18
of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such,
the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed
provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving
to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where
the funds collected should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.
Respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC,
and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends:
1) Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public
purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the
country's electric power industry.
2) It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely
exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and
implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
3) Universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the
benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and
that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a
tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability
to pay.
4) Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the
State and it complies with the requirements of due process.
PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount
pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund
52
components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165.Otherwise,
PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which
imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.
ISSUE
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
HELD
1st ISSUE
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers
rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. In
exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the
State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.
Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for
which the Universal Charge is imposed. From the aforementioned
purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not
a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power.
Public welfare is surely promoted.
2nd ISSUE
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This
is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind
of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is
allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety
of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in
their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required
for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
53
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms
and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one
(1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-
users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to
the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is
complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
reviewing the same.
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably,
petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the
EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which
would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and
Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed
rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no

undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in

the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is

54