SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

CASES

RULE 73
SETTLEMENT OF DECEASED PERSONS

Garcia Fule vs Court of Appeals Nov 29, 1976 (residence defined ; venue of probate ; appointment
of special administrator)

Relevant Facts

 Virgina Fule (petitioner) filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as special administratrix for the estate of Amado Garcia.
 A series of petitions followed the suit, but in essence this petition was opposed by respondent
Preciosa B. Garcia on the grounds of improper venue and her claim as having preference over
the petitioner for appointment of special administrator being the surviving spouse.
 CFI Laguna appointed petitioner as the administratrix and ordered the latter for the inventory of the
estate. Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision of CFI Laguna stating it had no jurisdiction and
appointing respondent Preciosa as special administratrix.
 Even before a motion for recon was submitted by the petitioner for the appeal, respondent already
filed with CFI Quezon City for letters of administration and for appointment as special administratrix.
After this court came to know of the pending appeal of the CA order, this was suspended.
 Issue : a) Whether or not the CFI Laguna was the proper venue for the case
b) Whether or not petitioner is the proper special administratrix for the estate

Relevant Rulings

On Jurisdiction and Venue; Residence Defined

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section
2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the
state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration. anroblesirtual law library

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter
of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and

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Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of
the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner
in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the
power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting
to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method,
of convenience to the parties. anrobles virtual law library

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or
the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon
this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." chanrobles virtual law library

But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate
of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of
his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles
covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's
last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to

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waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected
to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had
reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia
did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as
surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

On Preference of Appointment of Special Administrator

Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue
of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed
when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties
cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator
or not lies in the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to
make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the
order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator.
After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration
of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. chanrobles virtual law
library

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation
whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any
successional rights. On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing court
does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to
the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter
Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the
office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be
the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

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Borja vs Tan November 18, 1955 (the appointment of a co-administrator is appealable because he
performs the function of a regular administrator; non appeal applies to the appointment of a
special administrator who serves on a temporary basis)

Relevant Facts

 On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated on April 2,
1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof.
 On March 26 of that year Francisco de Borja qualified as executor and administrator.
 Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the lower court appointed
Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-administrator. He qualified as co-administrator on August 29,
1951.
 Subsequently, the court revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed
administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja QeY7R.
 Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja as
co-administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the
corresponding record on appeal.
 By order of December 27, 1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and
refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de Borja as
co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable.

Relevant Rulings

An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand, according to Rule 105,
section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a
co-administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake
those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal. We cannot share
this view. The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1,
a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause,
and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions
causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section
8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim
against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to
the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is
appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and
special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from
said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and
duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner
Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only
in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now
practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the
appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a
sole regular or general administrator.

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Ongsingco etc vs Tan and Borja (the probate court cannot make final determination on
ownership; no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgements of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction)

Relevant Facts

 Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja who was
declared incompetent by CFI Rizal. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Jose Tangco whose
estate is being settled. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco and was appointed
administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
 Petitioner claims that Francisco is the owner of two parcels of land in Nueva Ecija, acquired by
inheritance, and has already commenced threshing out palay crop for the benefit of her ward.
 Jose de Borja, on the other hand as administrator of the estate, filed a motion in the estate
proceeding praying that the petitioner be restrained from threshing the palay on the lands until the
ownership is determined.
 Petitioner then filed with CFI Nueva Ecija for determination of ownership and to restrain Jose de
Borja from interfering with the harvesting and threshing of the crop. The court granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for. Subsequently, Jose de Borja filed an urgent petition to dismiss the action for
lack of jurisdiction and to dissolve the preliminary injunction. This was denied.
 Issue : 1) Whether or not the respondent court (CFI Rizal) has the jurisdiction to determine dispute on
ownership in the estate proceeding and 2) whether or not the respondent court can nullify the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by CFI Nueva Ecija.

Relevant Ruling

On jurisdiction of probate court to determine ownership

It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that, “the
question of ownership of property is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in
probate proceedings and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the state. …….When
questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be
determined in the court of administrative proceedings.

The dispute between petitioner and respondent administrator involving, as it does, the ownership of two
parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and theis question having been squarely raised in an
action pending in the Court of First Instance of said province, which was instituted by the petitioner
against respondent administrator precisely because of the dispute, it is the sense of this Tribunal that
respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the said question in its capacity as probate
court.

On jurisdiction of probate court to issue a restraining order on writ of preliminary injunction issued by
another court adjudicating on ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate

As regards the question whether the order of respondent court restraining petitioner from threshing the
palay crop standing on the lands has been properly issued on the face of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the CFI Nueva Ecija, the answer is not difficult to find : the court should not have issued the
order for “It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
power to grant the relief sought by injunction,

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Cayetano vs Leonidas May 30, 1984 (the probate court, as a general rule, is limited to the
determination of extrinsic validity ; the capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent ; jurisdiction for probate of a will of a foreigner deceased not residing in the Phils
is the place where properties are located)

Relevant Facts
 On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos
and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as
the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself
the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
 Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix, claiming that the testatrix
was an American citizen at the time of her death and that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31,
1977 and that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.
 In the meantime, petitioner Cayetano filed an opposition to the reprobate on the ground of forgery and
the nullity of the intrinsic provisions of the will. The petitioner later filed a motion to withdraw the
opposition
 The lower court issued a decision allowing the admitting the will and appointing Nenita Campos
Paguia as the administratrix.
 Subsequently, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition praying that the order allowing the will upon
withdrawal of the petitioner be set aside on the ground that such was secured through fraud. Hearing
was set but petitioner failed to appear. Several postponements were set until a hearing date was set
on May 29,1980. Campos died and petitioner Cayetano substituted.

Relevant Rulings

Duty of the court to try on validity of the will ; capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue…..

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established
that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

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 It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Jurisdiction of the reprobate court

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of
her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a
"usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction

Jao vs Court of Appeals May 29, 2002 (the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be
settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death)

Relevant Facts
 Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of Sps Ignacio and Andrea, who died instestate.
 On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the
RTC of Quezon City alleging that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the
estate and receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting.
 Rodolfo moved for the dismissal on the ground of improper venue. He argued that the deceased did
not reside in Quezon City but were actual residents of Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted various
documents to prove such.
 On the other hand, Perico countered that their parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon
city at the time of their deaths. In fact, such was contained in their death certificates as the
information was supplied by Rodolfo himself. Rodolfo filed a rejoinder stating that the information he
gave were made in good faith and through honest mistake.
 On April 6, 1994, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss of Rodolfo who filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
 The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?

Relevant Rulings
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the
situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or
domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must
be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.While it
appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.

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The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio,
passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He
was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City
residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio
died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence
because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.

Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon
City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death
certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his
deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

Eusebio vs Eusebio December 28, 1956 (venue is the residence at the time of death ; requisites of
residence or change of domicile)

Relevant Facts
 Eugenio Eusebio filed with CFI Rizal a petition for appointment as administrator of the estate of his
deceased father, Andres.
 Respondents objected to said petition stating that the case be dismissed on improper venue as the
deceased was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.
 Issue : Whether or not CFI Rizal is the proper venue

Relevant Rulings
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties.
Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at
No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at
889-A España Extention, in said City While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.

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Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted
marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2)
days later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at
the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said
house at España Extention.

It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled
that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained". Under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been
one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had
been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he
intended to stay in that place permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have manifested his
wish to live indefinitely in said city……xxx

Jimenez vs CA April 17, 1990 (the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action)

Relevant Facts
 Leonardo Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with whom he had 4 children and during such
marriage acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.
 After the death of Consolacion, Leonardo married Genoveva Caolboy and had 7 children (the
petitioners in this case). Leonardo died on Aug 11, 1951 while Genoveva died on Nov 21, 1978.
 Thereafter, Virginia (2nd marriage) filed a petition praying for appointment as administratix. Included in
thepetition were the 4 children of Leonardo by the first marriage.
 Subsequently, private respondents Leonardo Jr (1st marriage) filed for an exclusion of his father’s
name and his siblings on the ground that they have already received their inheritance consisting of
the 5 parcels of land.
 Virginia was appointed administrator and included in the inventory the 5 parcels of land. Leonardo Jr
moved for its inclusion as it has already been adjudicated.
 Consequently, the trial court ordered the exclusion of the land in question from the inventory. Motion
for recon by petitioners were denied thus causing the filing with the CA a petition for certiorari. This
was also dismissed by the CA because it found that their mother admitted that the land was already
adjudicated and in addition CA ruled that the prescription has set in as it has been more than 10 yrs
that the adjudication as effected. This decision became final and executory.
 Two years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint to recover possession of the 5 parcels of
land. Respondents filed for dismissal on the ground that the action was barred by prior judgment (res
judicata).
 The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners'
present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the
negative, is the present action for reconveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?

9
Relevant Rulings

We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Benedicto vs Javellana February 21, 1908

On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge to
the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee, or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and
decided within the same special proceedings not in a separate action and the same judge having
jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as
when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the
interested parties, as may be seen in part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, from section 551 forward.

By the foregoing it has been shown that the judgment appealed from is not in accordance with the law,
therefore it is our opinion that the same should be reversed, and that the request of the representative of
Maximino Jalandoni, now sustained by Eduarda Benedicto, the administratrix of his estate, should be
dismissed without any special ruling as to costs.

Roberts vs Leonidas April 27, 1984 (probate of a will is mandatory ; it is anomalous that the estate
of person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding)

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs.
Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated
with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to
the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.

10
Gaas vs Fortich December 28, 1929

Relevant Facts
 January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and testament in which, subject to
certain devises, he bequeathed all of his property to Pilar Fortich his then wife. Later, upon his death,
this will was admitted to probate as his last will and testament. Pending the administration of his
estate, Isidra Gaas filed a petition claiming that she was married to the deceased in 1908 and had 3
children by him.
 Respondent answered statin ghtat the petitioners had no right to succeed and that the action to
acknowledge the children has prescribed.
 Trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared that the were natural children of the deceased
and entitled to the estate.
 Issue : Whether or not the trial court erred in recognizing the natural children of the deceased.

Relevant Rulings

In the instant case, the record is conclusive that the father acknowledged Federico Arquiza as his child,
and it is also conclusive that at the time of his birth or conception, his parents were single. Even so, the
appellant contends that there is no evidence that they could have been then married "without
dispensation." Neither is there any evidence that they could not have been married "without
despensation," Conceding that to be true, there is no evidence tending to show that they could not have
been married "without dispensation," and in the ordinary course of business, a single man and woman of
legal age have the legal right to marry "without dispensation," and the denial of a marriage "without
dispensation" is an exception to the general rule.

The finding of the lower court that Federico Arquiza was a natural son of Francisco Arquiza is well
sustained by the evidence.

------------------------------------------

As to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court cites and relies upon the case of Larena and Larena vs.
Rubio (43 Phil., 1017), and says:

This is not an action to compel the recognition of Federico Arquiza under the provisions of the Civil
Code. Such an action is barred. This is a proceeding to obtain a declaration of the rights of the
petitioners as the legitimate children of Federico Arquiza to inherit in representation of their father
from their grandfather. It was not necessary for Federico Arquiza to bring an action for recognition
because he had acquired the status of a recognized natural child under Law 11 of Toro by the tacit
recognition of his father. His vested rights were transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no
need to bring an action against Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their
father, Federico Arquiza, as the natural son of Francisco Arquiza.

If Federico Arquiza were still living, he could intervene in these proceedings for the distribution of the
estate of his natural father, without the necessity of a proceeding to compel his recognition, as is
required by the Civil Code; and Francisco Arquiza having left no legitimate descendants, or
ascendants, Federico Arquiza, if he had survived his father, would have been entitled to one-third of
the latter's estate.

Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

If the testator leaves no legitimate ascendants or descendants, the acknowledged natural children
shall be entitled to a third of the estate.

11
And article 843 provides:

The rights granted natural children by the preceding articles are transmitted on their death to their
legitimate descendants.

The facts found by the trial court and sustained by the evidence bring the appellees within those
provisions.

The well written opinion of the lower court in all things and respects is affirmed, with costs.

Calma vs Tanedo November 28, 1938 (indebtedness against a property in an estate must be
brought in the same proceeding, not in a separate action)

Relevant Facts

 The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the
complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable
against the conjugal property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent
per annum.
 On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter,
Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties subsequently confirmed by the CFI of Tarlac.
 While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza
Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of
P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this
sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit,
the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
 Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks
that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the complaint be annulled and
that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.

Relevant Rulings

The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act No.
3176 reading:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the
testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of
this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties,
being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding
debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities
established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except
as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.

---------------------------------------

12
We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with
his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted
in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by
law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in
execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs .

Reyes vs Mosqueda July 23, 1990 (probate court may exclude properties from the estate when it is
provisional in nature)

Relevant Facts
 Dr. Pascual died intestate on November 18, 1972 and was survived by his sister and the children of
her late sisters. Subsequently, the heirs filed for administration of his estate and Atty Macapagal was
appointed as special administrator.
 Ursula Pascual (sister) filed a motion to exclude some properties form the inventory and to deliver
titles to her alleging that these were donations mortis cause to her.
 Trial court granted motion and ordered exclusion from the inventory of the properties.
 In the meantime, Ofelia D. Parungao claims that a property excluded was donated to her. During the
registration of the donation, Paruangao was able to have TCT No. 129092 issued in her name for the
land in question.
 Ursula, on the other hand, had sold the property in 1976 over to Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and
Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyeses
 The Reyeses then filed for a declaration of nullliity of TCT 129092 and reconveyance of such.
 RTC then nullified the title of Parungao and ordered title back to the name of Dr. Pascual. Ca affirmed
the decision upon appeal.
 The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold:
(1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction of the probate
court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1,
1976, and
(2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his
capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No.
L- 45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 7324142) question
the appellate court's finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio
Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.

Relevant Rulings

Jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude properties

The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga in S.P. Proc. No.
73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio
D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action." The provisional
character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within
the jurisdiction of the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495
[1984]) which we cited in the case of Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V :

13
 It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so

Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties.

On Donation Inter Vivos

It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which
makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44
Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or
"mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the
provisions stated in such deed.

These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:

Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition
made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution
of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is
inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.'

Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION
MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his
sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered
by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was
immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of
properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation
confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee
immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.

14
RULE 74
SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

Alcala vs Pabalan August 12, 1911 (effect of extrajudicial settlement)

Relevant Facts

 Juan Banatin died on April 23, 1987 leaving a widow (Damasa Alcala) and 17 nieces and nephews.
All, except a certain Tranquilina Banatain, entered into a voluntary agreement for the division of all
property except the house. They further agreed that the one-half of the usufruct of said house beong
to the widow during her lifetime and the other half among the 17 heirs. Francisco Salgado, one of the
nephews should administer the said house and deliver ½ to Damasa and ½ to the heris.
 Damasa later on sued Francisco for having failed to pay her share. Judgment was rendered against
him and an execution on ½ of the undivided property was sold to one Macario Decena. The same
property was repurchased by the heirs of Francisco, using the money of the four of the heirs
(respondents in this case).
 Subsequently, the 13 nieces and nephews through public document recognized the right of
respondents as owners of the ½ of the undivided property. In addition, on November, 1908 the 16
heirs designated Modesta Pabalan as administrator in lieu of Francisco Salgado already deceased.
 On June 11, 1910, Damasa Alcala filed a petition with CFI La Laguna for appointment as
administratrix of the property.

Relevant Rulings

The heirs of Juan Banatin were at perfect liberty to divide the estate among themselves, assuming
the responsibility of any debts which might exist. There is no proof that any debts existed. After the
actual division of the estate among themselves they became the absolute owners of their
respective allotments and were tenants in common of that portion of the property which remained
pro indiviso. After the mutual agreement among themselves for the division of the estate, either actually
distributing their respective shares or leaving the same undivided, the property in question was no
longer the property of the estate of Juan Banatin, but the undivided property of the heirs. They
were tenant in common of that portion of the property which remained undivided. As such tenants in
common the majority of them had a right to agree upon the appointment of an administrator of their
property. (Art. 398, Civil Code.) The property belonged to them. They had a right to administer it.

The lower court in appointing the plaintiff and appellee as administratrix of the property in question,
evidently did so upon the theory that the said property was still the property of the estate of Juan Banatin.
In this theory the lower court was mistaken. There was nothing left of the estate of Juan Banatin to be
administered. The heirs by mutual agreement had divided the property among themselves. There
was no occasion and no reason for the appointment of an administrator by the probate court, and,
therefore, the judgment of the lower court appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix of the estate
of Juan Banatin for the purpose of administering the property mentioned in paragraph 4 of the
petition, is hereby revoked.

15
Divina vs Court of Appeals March 30, 1993 (nature and effect of extrajudicial settlement)

Relevant Facts

 Upon the death of Eleuterio Munoz, his wife Juanita invited the decedent’s siblings (Trinidad, Maximo
and Concepcion) to an extrajudicial settlement of her husband’s estate. The spouses had no children.
 In the settlement, parties agreed that ¾ of the estate would go the surviving spouse while the ¼ shall
be divided equally among the decedent’s siblings in the amount of 55,788 which is to be paid by
Juanita with 6 months.
 Subsequently, Concepcion, the petitioner, signed a statement of partition stating the amount due her,
deductions and advances. Thereafter Juanita signed a certification that a residential house in Makati
was part of the inheritance received by her from the estate.
 In September 1986, Juanita filed a petition for reconveyance of the said house. The trial court granted
such petition and the order became final and executor.
 In February 1988, almost 8 yrs after the settlement, petitioners filed for revocation and annulment of
the extrajudicial settlement on the ground of fraud.
 The trial court upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement but stated that petitioner was not paid
the balance of her share. Upon appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and
found that the petitioner was fully paid of her share.

Relevant Rulings

The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that the legitime of
the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided all requisites are met,
the same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.

Extra-judicial partition, being a speedy and less expensive method of distribution of the estate, is
specifically provided for in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, that in the absence of a will and
where the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition.

In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the parties, of course, are
duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in the document. A party cannot, in law
and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and
repudiate what does not suit him.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED. The ruling of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Vda de Reyes vs Cpurt of Appeals July 26, 1991 (partition may be oral; death of a decedent results
in heirs automatically becoming co-owners of the properties left)

Relevant Facts

 Gavino Reyes died in 1921. He owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less,
located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite, sought title for such but such was not issued
only in 1941. His son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
 In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs and each resultant lot
was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. Two lots, were allotted to Rafael Reyes,
Sr., one of Gavino's children.
 When the title for the whole lot was issued, it was kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo
Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.

16
 On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters,
more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola. According to the vendee, this parcel
corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14, one of the two lots allotted to Rafael. The deed of sale, however, did
not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and
started paying the land taxes therein.
 In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted,
the new title is OCT RO-255. In October 1967, the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate based on the aforestated subdivision plan. The lot that was
intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein).
 Subsequently petitioners herein as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March
1983 respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for
indemnification, accounting and damages. In their answer, private respondents deny the material
averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought
the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr.
 The decision of the RTC on October 1, 1986 stated that the petitioners were the lawful owners and
ordered the return of the title to the plaintiffs on the ground that there is no evidence of the partition in
1936 based on the subdivision plan and there is no identity between the land sold then to the
description of the land in the title.
 Upon appeal, RTC decision was reversed. CA ruled that the partition, although oral was valid.

Relevant Rulings

Oral extrajudicial partition is valid

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,
although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in
writing to be valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such
rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which
it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition.
Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is
not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by
some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right
of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance.

Upon death of decedent, heir automatically becomes co-owner of properties

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some
reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in
1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the decedent
would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his
share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually
allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:

17
 Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.

In Ramirez vs. Bautista, this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share
in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely
personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded
to him upon the partition of the property.

Action for Reconveyance has prescribed

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest,
Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot
to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership
and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in
their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery
of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners
of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual
physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they
decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in
the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden
on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr

Asuncion vs de la Cruz November 23, 1955

Relevant Facts

 Benedicta de la Cruz died allegedly leaving 5 parcels of land with original certificates of title in the
name of the deceased.
 Subsequently, oppositor filed a petition praying that 3 of the lots be ceded to the oppositor because
such did not belong to the deceased but to the oppositor’s father.
 After hearing the opposition, the court found that two of the lots in question were mortgaged to one
Santiago Nicolas and one to Juan Cojuanco.
 The court rendered its decision declaring the children of the decedent her heirs and assigning to all of
them equal shares.
 Issue : Whether or not the trial court judge had no power to declare that the questioned properties are
those of the deceased.

Relevant Rulings

A study of the order, however, shows that it did not make a definite finding or conclusion to that
effect as against the oppositor-appellant. The court only went to say that there was a presumption
that said properties were still owned by the deceased at the time of her death and are free from all
incumbrances; but it makes the reservation in favor of the oppositor's claim of the right to a separate
action if the claims proprietary rights over said properties. The court states thus in its order:

If Celestino de la Cruz claims some proprietary rights over these properties, he can pursue his
remedy in a separate and ordinary action which he should bring against the proper parties.
---------------------------------------------

18
The purpose of a summary settlement is to proceed summary with the "allowance of a will, if any there
be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion
and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find
to be due; and such persons . . . shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. . . .." (Section 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) As
held in the cases of Intestate of the late Januaria Gonzales, Abarro vs. De Guia, 72 Phil., 245 and
Intestate of Jimenez, Jimenez vs. Jimenez, 67 Phil., 263, in a summary distribution the estate of the
deceased is valued; his debts, if any, are paid; his will, if any, is allowed; the heirs and legatees are
declared, and distribution is made, . . ... In distribution proceedings, the court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate by the heirs and distributees
and also claimed by third parties.In the same manner that the court in an administration proceeding
determines only in a prima facie manner if a property alleged to belong to the state really belongs to the
decedent,so also the court in a summary settlement proceeding only determines prima facie the
ownership and possession of the properties; but such determination does not prevent the heirs or
third parties from claiming title adverse to the decedent's, which title or claims must be decided in a
separate suit. In consonance with these principles the orders appealed from found prima facie that the
lots sought to be distributed among the heirs of the decedent belong to and were in the possession of the
said decedent at the time of her death. The orders do not deprive the oppositor-appellant of his right
to claim said properties as his own and to institute a separate action to assert his title thereto as
against the decedent or her heirs. The claim of the appellant that the trial court had no power to enter
the decree of distribution is, therefore, without merit.

Solivio vs Court of Appeals February 12, 1990 (a co-equal trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
an action for partition and recovery while the probate proceedings for the settlement of said
estate are still pending)

Relevant Facts

 This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the
private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
 Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife, but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
 On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including
a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of
all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
 During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
 Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came.. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of
the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she
stated that prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation.
 Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, for her

19
 appointment as special administratrix but later, filed an amended petition praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. The
petition contained the fact that the estate would be used to fund the foundation. After due publication,
trial court declared her as sole heir.
 Four months later, Concordia opposed the court’s order on the ground that she too was an heir of the
deceased. The case was for partition, recovery of possession and damges. The trial court issued an
order in favor of Concordia, requiring Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate.
Celedonia filed a motion for reconsideration stating that said properties were already in the
possession of the Salustia Solivio Vda de Javellana Foundation.

 Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court in toto. Hence this petition.

Relevant Rulings

On the jurisdiction of RTC Branch 26 to adjudicate an action for partition and recovery of her share

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery
of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings for the settlement of
said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the
submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the
estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties.

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings….xxxx

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC,
Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to
have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased,
was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to
elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the
court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court.

20
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL

De Aranz vs Galing May 28, 1988 (notice is a jurisdictional requirement)

Relevant Facts
 On March 3, 1986, respondent filed with RTC Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last
will and testament of Montserrat R-Infante Y G-Pola. After publication, hearing was set but no
oppositor appeared. The hearing was reset and on this day witnesses were presented. Respondent
was appointed as executor.
 On May 14, 1986, petitioners filed a motion of opposition alleging that no notices were sent to them
as required by Sec 4, Rule 76. Motion was denied. Upon appeal, CA dismissed the petition.
 Issue : Whether or noto notice is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

Relevant Rulings

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a
will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that
the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition
for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the
testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to
petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere
publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, said:

... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case
were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by
the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be
likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not
measure or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all
interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision

21
Suntay vs Suntay July 31, 1954

Relevant Facts
 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, China on May 14, 1934.
 He left real and personal properties in the Phils and a house in china.
 First mariange : Manuela T. Cruz (died) with 9 children
 Second marriange : Maria Natividad Lim Billian (surviving spouse) with 1 child
 Intestate proceedings were instituted in CFI Bulacan; Federico Suntay (from 1 st family) was appointed
administrator
 On October 15, 1934, the surviving widow filed a petition in CFI Bulacan for the probate of a last will
and testament alleged to be executed and signed in the Phils. This was subsequently denied
because of the loss of the will after the filing of the petition and the insufficiency of evidence to
establish its loss.
 Upon appeal, order was given upholding the existence of the will and remanded the case to CFI
Bulacan for further proceedings.
 The proceedings were subsequently dismissed inspite that a commission from the probate court was
issued for deposition of Go Toh an attesting witness to the will.
 In the meantime, the Pacific war supervened.
 After liberation, Silvino Suntay (child by 2 nd marriage) filed a petition for intestate proceedings praying
for the probate of the will executed n the Phils on Nov 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China on
January 4, 1931 which petitioner found.

Relevant Rulings

Proof of a lost will

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A)
and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of
Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be
"clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent
witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible
witnesses.

Requirements of Re-probate
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in
Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the
fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be
deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade
matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for
the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the
municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the
municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in
probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a
will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or
both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to
reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested
parties residing in the Philippines). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy,
China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for
lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such
interested parties.

22
Castro vs Gallegos March 9, 1908

It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain, among them
in those of October 28, 1864, and January 29, 1885, that "wills executed with the formalities of law are
presumed valid."

It is also a legal doctrine established among others by the decision of the 31st of December, 1883, that
"the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law."

And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions in that of the 13th of February, 1889,
"that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when
the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time
of executing the will, was of sound mind."

Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have
been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law.

It is a legal doctrine established by repeated decisions in cassation, among others those of April 26, 1861,
October 28, 1867, and March 17 and December 17, 1873, that nothing can be done upon the ground of
nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity;
and the plaintiffs have limited themselves to asking that they be declared the owners of the property of
the late Marcelina Cuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity
of the will whereby Marcelina transmitted said property to others.

In the event that the will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate
succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the
declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or
contracts by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons.

Basa vs Mercado July 26, 1935 (3 week publication and newpaper of general circulation defined)

Relevant Facts
 The judge of CFI Pampanga allowed and probated the will of deceased Ines Basa, declared
respondent the only heir and closed the administration proceedings.
 Petitioners filed a motion to reopen the proceedings alleging that court lacked jurisdiction for failure to
comply with the requirements as to publication of the notice of hearing as required by Sec 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

Relevant Rulings

3 weeks successive publication, defined

It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three publications was on December 18, 1919,
and the hearing on the administrators's final account was set for December 19 of that year, only fifteen
days after the date of the first publication.

In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure
does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the
date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be
made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing.

23
Newspaper of general circulation, defined

The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial
court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of
general circulation in the Province of Pampanga."

Furthermore no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or
published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious
denomination. The fact that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a few more
subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a larger circulation in that province
is unimportant. The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of
Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to
constitute a newspaper of general circulation.

24
RULE 80
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

Pijuan vs Vda de Gurrea November 29, 1966

Relevant Facts
 Manuela Ruiz (Mrs Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain until he abandoned her and
their son Teodoro in 1945
 He came to the Phils and lived martially with Rizalina Perez with whom he had 2 children.
 Manuela came to the Phils in 1960 but Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her. She then stayed with her
son Teodoro in Bacolod.
 On July 29, 1960, Manuela instituted a case for support and annulment of the donations of some
conjugal property to the common law wife, Rizalina. The court issued an order for monthly alimony
pendent liteof P2,000 subsequently reduced by the CA to P1,000.
 Carlos died on March 7, 1962 leaving a will naming Marcelo Pijuan as his executor and disinherited
Manuela and their son, Teodoro. Pijuan was appointed special administrator. Oppositions were filed
by Manuela.
 On July 16, 1962, Manuela filed for the continuance of her monthly support of P1,000 pending final
determination of the case. This was denied. She was also denied for appointment as administratrix
when such motion was filed.
 Hence, this petition.

Relevant Rulings

Support pendente lite must be continued

xxx……..we are bound by law to assume that the estate of the deceased consists of property
belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea,
aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one of the
compulsory heirs, if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the provision
therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth P205,397.64,
according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is clear to us that the continuation of
the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820, is fairly justified.

The appointment of Marcelo Pijuan was proper; the court not obliged to appoint surviving spouse as
special administrator

In the language of this provision, (Sec 6, Rule 78) said preference exists "if no executor is named in the
will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea
has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as
yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is
not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has,
also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as
special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference
accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to
the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and
that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
appealable.

25
RULE 81
BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Sison vs Teodoro March 29, 1957

Relevant Facts
 On December 20, 1948, CFI Manila appointed Carlos Moran Sison as administrator, without
compensation, of the estate of Margarita David, after the filing of a bond for P5,000
 On January 19, 1955, he filed and accounting of his administration claiming the amount of P380.70
and P76.14 for premium of the administrator’s bond for various periods covered.
 Oppositor filed objection to the approval of such expenses claiming these should not be charged to
the estate.
 Subsequently, this was disallowed by the court.
 Issue : Whether or not a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as
an expense the premiums paid on his bond.

Relevant Rulings

It is true that the Sulit case may be differentiated from the present in the sense that, in the former the
administrator accepted the trust with the emolument that the law allows, whereas in the latter the
administrator accepted the same without compensation, but this difference is of no moment, for there is
nothing in the decision that may justify the conclusion that the allowance or disallowance of
premiums paid on the bond of the administrator is made dependent on the receipt of
compensation. On the contrary, a different conclusion may be inferred considering the ratio decidendi on
which the ruling is predicated. Thus, it was there stated that the position of an executor or
administrator is one of trust: that it is proper for the law to safeguard the estates of deceased
persons by requiring the administrator to give a suitable bond, and that the ability to give this
bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. It is also intimated therein that "If an individual
does not desire to assume the position of executor or administrator, he may refuse to do so," and it is far-
fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an administrator is an necessary expense in the care,
management and settlement of the estate within the meaning of the law, because these expenses
are incurred "after the executor or administrator has met the requirement of the law and has
entered upon the performance of his duties." Of course, a person may accept the position of executor
or administrator with all the incident appertaining thereto having in mind the compensation which the law
allows for the purpose, but he may waive this compensation in the same manner as he may refuse to
serve without it. Appellant having waived compensation, he cannot now be heard to complain of
the expenses incident to his qualification.

The orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, without costs.

The Phil Trust Co vs Luzon Surety Co. May 30, 1961

Relevant Facts

 On February 14, 1946, the Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as
Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt (Civil Case No. 71872) upon a bond
of P1,000.00. Thereafter he submitted and the Court approved his bond in the required amount, with
appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety.
 For reasons that do not fully appear of record, on May 1, 1948 the Court dismissed Picard, as
administrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in his place. After qualifying for the position, the
latter, on July 19, 1948, submitted an inventory-report showing that the only asset of the Intestate
Estate of Burt that had come into its possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of
the checking account of said deceased with the Philippine National Bank.

26
 In view thereof, on July 26, 1948 the Court issued an order ordering Picard to deliver the amount of
P7,063.58 representing the balance left of the bank deposit after deducting approved expenses.
Picard subsequently submitted an itemized expense report including payments to Feliciano Burt, the
adoptive son of the deceased.
 The court found Picard guilty of disbursing funds of the estate without authority in the amount of
P8,000. Thus it issued an order to respondent, Luzon Surety, to show cause why administrator’s
bond should not be confiscated.
 Respondent claims that the court cannot confiscate the administrator’s bond without prejudice or
injury to creditors, legatees or heirs and that it cannot ex proprio motu prosecute the bond.
 The trial court ordered the confiscation of the bond, The surety’s motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Hence this petition.

Relevant Rulings

Jurisdiction of the court to forfeit the administrator’s bond

Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture
of an administrator's bond, is clearly without merit. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other
jurisdictions, in ours probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring
but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution
or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the
administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is
that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same probate proceeding.

Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully
execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise
it shall remain in full force and effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate
without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound upon the terms of their
bond.

Basis for confiscation of bond

Appellant also contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of its bond
because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or other interested person has been proved. This is
also without merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by Antonio Gardiner
and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00 and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probate
court but the same have remained unpaid because of lack of funds.

When surety ceases ; surety not entitled to notice

From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond — which
makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal — he is bound and concluded, in the
absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was
not a party to the proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135, the sureties on
the administrator's bond were held liable thereon although they were not parties to the proceeding against
the administrator, nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for
the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the
settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted
as a party to such accounting." The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to
notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or
administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost.

27
DACLAG VS MACAHILIG (reconveyance is a proper remedy for land subject of extrajudicial
partition)

In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. Under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the
property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor
must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. Maxima's execution of the
Deed of Sale selling Parcel One, part of which is respondents' one half northern portion, was not valid
and did not transfer ownership of the land to petitioners, as Maxima had no title or interest to transfer. It
is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod non habet.
Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
than what the seller can transfer legally.

In Naval v. Court of Appeals, we held:

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the
certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.

x x x notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person's name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.

We find that reconveyance of the subject land to respondents is proper. The essence of an action
for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought is the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.

An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Records
show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, the instant complaint
for reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive
period.

Petitioners claim that they were innocent buyers in good faith and for value; that there was no evidence
showing that they were in bad faith when they purchased the subject land; that Article 526 of the Civil
Code provides that he is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; and that good faith is always presumed, and upon
him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.

Notably, petitioners bought the property when it was still an unregistered land. The defense of having
purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the
buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.

28
WT CONSTRUCTION VS CANETE(probate court can enforce obligations under a deed of sale)

As correctly held by the CA, there was no discretion given to the sheriff as to the amount to be paid or
executed on under the writ of execution. While the writ of execution did say ". . . the sum of
P4,259,400.00, . . . minus the expenses incurred by WT Construction in ejecting the occupants of the
land," this simply means that petitioner was being given a chance by the court to reduce the
aforementioned amount upon proof of said deductible expenses, after which an alias writ would be
issued. In the absence of such proof, the sheriff would have to execute for the full amount. And as noted
by the CA, petitioner failed to prove such expenses within the period given by the probate/estate court.
The issue is, therefore, moot.

As to petitioner’s argument that the probate/estate court cannot adjudicate the rights and obligations of
the parties under the deed of sale, the CA rightly found that this was a new issue not raised in the
probate/estate court. Furthermore, the deed of sale in question is the sale of the property of the estate to
pay for taxes, a matter definitely within the power of the probate/estate court to order.

It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce obligations under such a deed of sale. Otherwise,
they would not be able to secure the proceeds to pay for the taxes and this would defeat the purpose of
the proceedings to settle the estate. Stated otherwise, the power to enforce obligations under the deed of
sale of a property ordered sold to pay debts of the estate is but a necessary incident of the power of a
probate/estate court to order and effect such sale in the first place.

ARRIOLA VS ARRIOLA (family home duly constituted cannot be partitioned within a period of 10
years as provided for in Art 159, Family Code)

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.
Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments
on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of
The Family Code, particularly:

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home
from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial
processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these
concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.

29
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
Code, viz:

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to
the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot
transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it
by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights
granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

CO VS ROSARIO (revocation of special administrator is discretionary upon the court)

We affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The
exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no
longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto. The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control
and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.

In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as special co-
administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent
and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the
writ of certiorari.

30
REYES VS ENRIQUEZ (in the case for the annulment of documents executed on land as subject
matter, one has to be recognized as an heir to be admitted as a real party of interest; the
recognition of an heir, though, is an issue in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary action
for conveyance)

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action
in court. A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one
which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or
omission which had violated the legal right of the former. The purpose of the rule is to protect persons
against undue and unnecessary litigation. It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of having
before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to
recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint
for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or
documents related thereto,this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper
in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a
special proceeding."

LEE VS TAMBAGO (formalities in the execution of a will are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded; a notary public is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements)

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. A will may either be notarial or
holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone,
the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.

31
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated
from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or
court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory
actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after
his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

----------------------------------------

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. A notary public, especially a lawyer, is bound to
strictly observe these elementary requirements.

TAN VS GEDORIO (the appointment of a special administrator is not appealable; remedy to

question appointment is certiorari under Rule 65)

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to
the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of
the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari,
however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

32
HILADO VS COURT OF APPEALS (right to intervene for contingent claims based on TORT is not
recognizable; however parties are entitled to notices. If such contingent claim is based on
contract, express or implied, it is allowable)

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x” While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily
comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within
the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2,
Rule 72 further provides that “in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule
19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition
of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before
us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners
have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of
the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to
the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle “any interested persons” or “any persons
interested in the estate” to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings.
Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely:

(1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of “any person interested” to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;”
(2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and “to any other persons believed to have interest in the
estate;”
(3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a “person interested in the estate” to petition for the allowance of a
will;
(4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased “to complain
to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;”
(5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance
of the Administrator’s account “to persons interested;”
(6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice “to the persons interested” before it
may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate;
and
(7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows “any person interested in the estate” to petition for an order for the
distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.

33
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it appears
that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection
with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall
within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s
death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they
were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are
granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate.

RODRIGUEZ VS RODRIGUEZ (a will has no force or validity unless probated; issue on ownership
cannot be collaterally attacked; in summary proceedings like ejectment, adjudication on
ownership is provisional and is done only to determine the right of possession)

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or
building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The sole issue to be resolved
is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession
de facto. Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of property, the question of title is not involved and should be raised by
the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper court.

However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section 16 of
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC 16. Resolving defense of ownership. – When the defendant raises the defense of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Thus, all that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property
so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. But
this adjudication is only provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.

34
SHEKER VS SHEKER (money claim is an incidental matter, it is not an initiatory pleading and
does not require the attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping; nonpayment of docket
fees is not a ground for dismissal of money claim as court has already acquired jurisdiction upon
filing of the petition for allowance; failure to explain why personal service of notice is not made is
a ground for dismissal as the court should have taken judicial notice in the interest of justice)

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money
claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In
Arquiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is
not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a
cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

----------------------------------------

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer
to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate
docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.
After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.
Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

-----------------------------------------------

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable
to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the failure of
petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered
as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to
dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit
of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.

35
BENATIRO VS CUYOS (action to nullify a void judgment does not prescribe; due process in a
judicial partition requires that all witnesses be present)

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character and will not so easily and readily lend
itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict
conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.

Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order
of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence
recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral
in character. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it
should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due
process.

----------------------------------

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not
take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In
this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the
compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.

36
HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO VS HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO (determination of
whether or not the legitime of heirs is impaires is an issue in a special proceeding not in an
ordinary civil case like reconveyance)

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of
Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate
court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of
impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate.

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

MONTANER VS SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT (the jurisdiction of a court is determined based on the
substantive averments in the pleading and not in the defenses set forth in the answer; a court has
the authority to hear and receive evidence whether it has jurisdiction)

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character
of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. The designation given by parties to their own pleadings
does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on “a
falsa descriptio or defective caption,” courts are “guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings.”

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a
“Complaint” for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. xxxxx

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction
over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not
depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant or result in having “a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. Indeed, the “defense of lack of
jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be
deprived of its jurisdiction.”

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, the Shari’a District
Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence
to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was
not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

37
ADOPTION
Lahom vs Sibulo July 14 2003 (a controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing
at the time the petition is filed. Thus after the RA 8552 was in force, rescission of adoption can no
longer be availed of by the adopter if filed such the law took effect)

Facts/Issue
 Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was given.
 However, In 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the adoption on the grounds that
adoptee refulse to change his surname. Furthermore, the adoptee has remained indifferent to the
respondent, now a widow, and would only come to see her once a year. She alleges that the
respondent’s only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of
herein petitioner and her late husband.
 Prior to the institution of the rescission case, RA 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
 Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the
proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article
192 of the Family Code.
 The trial court dismissed the case due to prescription. Hence this petition.
 Issue : Whether or not rescission of adoption can be filed at a time after the promulgation of RA 8552
prohibiting rescission by adopter based on the grounds allowed under the previous statute and
against an adoption before RA 8552

Relevant Ruling
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02
February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an
adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them……..xxxxx…… The Court concluded that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action….xxxx…… the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right
of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke
the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is
a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute It is a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.

38
Republic vs Hernandez February 9 1996 (a change in the first name of the adoptee cannot be
instituted in the same proceedings as the adoption; such requires a filing of a separate petition
under Rule 103)

Facts/Issue
 Sps Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition to adopt the minor
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran,
 In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with
religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since
May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence.
 The petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption.
In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
 The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents granting both petition for adoption and for
change of name.
 The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows. (1)
whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or
given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.

Relevant Ruling

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted,
is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used
until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil
register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial
order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever
possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the
application is made should normally make its decree recording such change.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein.
If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province
where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person

39
desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to
such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the
date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial
or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name
that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a
copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its
own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance
as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

De la Cruz vs de la Cruz September 29 1964 (a petition for rescission is an entirely different

proceeding from adoption and is not a continuation of such; thus, it may be filed in a different
court from where the adoption was granted)

Facts/Issue
 Seven years after the grant of adoption on Aug 16, 1954, Sps. de la Cruz filed for the revocation of
the adoption of Manuel J. Aquino on the grounds of adoptee’s open display of defiance, animosity,
revulsion and disobedience and abandonment of petitioner’s home to live with his natural mother.
 The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction as they
allege that the petition for revocation must be filed with the court that granted the adoption.
 The lower court granted the petition stating that it had no power to interfere with the judgment of
another court of coordinate jurisdiction.
 Issue : Whether or not a petition for rescission of adoption should be filed in the court where the
adoption decree was granted.

Relevant Ruling

The provisions of the Civil Code on revocation of adoption do not specify the court where the proceedings
should be filed. The Rules of Court designate the venue of proceeding for adoption, which is the place
where the petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with respect to the venue of proceeding for
rescission and revocation of adoption (Rule 100). It is clear that the two proceedings are separate and
distinct from each other. In the first what is determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of
parent and child between two persons not so related by nature. For that purpose the court inquires into
the qualifications and disqualifications of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person to be
adopted; the probable value and character of his estate; the other proceeding either the adopting parent
or the adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously established, and the inquiry refers to the truth
of the grounds upon which the revocation is sought.

Once the proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has become final
the proceeding is terminated and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is
neither a continuation of nor an incident in the proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one,
dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of adoption. The venue of this new case,
applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the residence of the petitioner. In the
present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having moved there from their former residence in
Ilocos Sur.

40
Dias vs IAC June 17 1987

Facts/Issue

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue
here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could
inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who
is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Relevant Ruling

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

41
TRUSTEE

Lorenzo vs Posadas Jr June 18 1937

Heirs of Emilio Candelaria vs Romero September 30 1960

Facts/Issue
 Emilio and his broth Lucas bought each a lot in the Solokan Subdivision on installment. Lucas paid
the first two installments, however, due to his sickness, he sold his interest to Emilio who reimbursed
him for amounts paid. Emilio continued to pay for the remaining installments but such payments were
made in the name of Lucas with the understanding that the necessary documents of transfer will be
made later. The certificate of title was subsequently named under Lucas and his wife Luisa Romero.
Lucas remained in possession of the lot and had been collecting the rent from such as a financial aid
to him by Emilio.
 This petition is filed by the heirs of Emilio for reconvenyance of the subject property. This was
dismissed on the ground that the heirs had no cause of action and that the action has already
prescribed.
 Issue : Whether an express or implied trust has been created and whether or not the action has
prescribed.

Relevant Ruling

The trust alleged to have been created, in our opinion, is an implied trust. As held, in effect, by this
Court in the case of Martinez vs. Graño (42 Phil., 35), where property is taken by a person under an
agreement to hold it for, or convey it to another or the grantor, a resulting or implied trust arises in
favor of the person for whose benefit the property was intended. …….xxxxxx……….. The trust which
results under such circumstances does not arise from contract or agreement of the parties, but from
the facts and circumstances, that is to say, it results because of equity and arises by implication or
operation of law.

Constructive or implied trusts may, of course, be barred by lapse of time. The rule in such trusts is
that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is
a concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust. Continuous recognition of a resulting trust,
however, precludes any defense of laches in a suit to declare and enforce the trust. The beneficiary
of a resulting trust may, therefore, without prejudice to his right to enforce the trust, prefer the trust to
persist and demand no conveyance from the trustee. It being alleged in the complaint that Lucas held the
title to the lot in question merely in trust for Emilio and that this fact was acknowledged not only by him
but also by his heirs, herein defendants — which allegation is hypothetically admitted — we are not
prepared to rule that plaintiff's action is already barred by lapse of time. On the contrary, we think
the interest of justice would be better served if she and her alleged co-heirs were to be given an
opportunity to be heard and allowed to present proof in support of their claim.

42
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro vs de la Pena November 21 1913

Facts/Issue

 In 1898, Father de la Pena, as trustee held P6,641 for the construction of a leper hospital as
representative of the petitioner. He also had P19,000 of his personal funds. During the war, Father de
la Pena was arrested, detained and the entire amount was confiscated in favor of the United States.
The petitioner now claims the amount from the respondent’s estate.
 Issue : Whether or not respondent is obliged to return the funds placed under his trust

Relevant Ruling

Although the Civil Code states that "a person obliged to give something is also bound to preserve it
with the diligence pertaining to a good father of a family" (art. 1094), it also provides, following the
principle of the Roman law, major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest, that "no one
shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which having been foreseen were
inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the
obligation so declares." (Art. 1105.)

By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal funds De la Peña did not
thereby assume an obligation different from that under which he would have lain if such deposit
had not been made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the money at all hazards. If the
had been forcibly taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the combatants
during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions of the Civil Code he would have been exempt
from responsibility. The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in his personal account does not add
to his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a debtor who must respond at all hazards.

xxxxx…... There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it as he did and there was no law
which changed his responsibility be reason of the deposit. While it may be true that one who is under
obligation to do or give a thing is in duty bound, when he sees events approaching the results of which
will be dangerous to his trust, to take all reasonable means and measures to escape or, if unavoidable, to
temper the effects of those events, we do not feel constrained to hold that, in choosing between two
means equally legal, he is culpably negligent in selecting one whereas he would not have been if he had
selected the other.

The court, therefore, finds and declares that the money which is the subject matter of this action
was deposited by Father De la Peña in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of Iloilo; that
said money was forcibly taken from the bank by the armed forces of the United States during the war of
the insurrection; and that said Father De la Peña was not responsible for its loss.

43
HABEAS CORPUS
Martin vs Guerrero October 22 1999 (writ of habeas corpus issued by an RTC is executed only
within its respective judicial districts)

Facts/Issue

 On December 27, 1995, a Petition for Habeas Corpus dated December 26, 1995 was filed before the
RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 as Civil Case No. TC-1552 by Petitioner Maria Victoria S. Ordiales
against petitioner for the custody of their begotten minor child born out of wedlock during their union.
 Respondent judge issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The petitioner opposed as complainant alleges
that the court had no jurisdiction he was a resident of Parañaque City, while the RTC was in Tagaytay
City.
 Issue : What is the scope of a writ issued by an RTC judge?

Relevant Ruling

Sec. 21 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 provides that "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction (1) in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . a Regional
Trial Court, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the foregoing clear provisions of BP 129 and the Rules of Court, regional trial courts have
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs can be enforced within their respective
judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them are limited to and operative only within such areas.
Clearly then, respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus against herein
complainant, who was a resident of Parañaque, an area outside his judicial jurisdiction

Calvan vs CA October 3, 2000(nature of the writ of habeas corpus)

Facts/Issue
 On 02 August 1999, at about 11:30 a.m., in a shootout at a sitio in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, Reynolan
T. Sales, incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, fatally shot former Mayor Rafael Benemerito. After the
incident, Sales surrendered his handgun, placed himself under the custody of the police.
 The next day a criminal complaint for murder was filed against Mayor Sales at the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court. Judge Calvan, the Presiding Judge forthwith conducted a "preliminary examination" of the
witnesses and issued the assailed order and warrant of arrest against the accused "with NO BAIL."
 Mayor Sales was transferred to the Provincial Jail
 On Aug 5, Judge Calvan, after conducting a "preliminary examination in accordance with Section 6(b)
of Rule 112 of the 1989 Rules in Criminal Procedure," issued a two-page resolution forwarding the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor "for appropriate action."
 On 10 August 1999, Sales was notified by the Provincial Prosecutor to submit his counter-affidavit
and defense evidence.
 Contending that his right to due process was violated by the manner by which Judge Calvan suddenly
terminated and concluded the preliminary investigation, without even allowing him to submit counter
affidavit and present his witnesses,

44
 Mayor Sales filed a Petition For Habeas Corpus and Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He
questioned his detention on the thesis that the Order and Warrant of Arrest were improvidently and
illegally issued by Judge Calvan, the latter being a relative of complainant Thelma Benemerito within
the third civil degree of affinity and, therefore, disqualified from conducting the preliminary
investigation.
 After hearing, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of Mayor Sales,
subject to the outcome of the proper preliminary investigation.
 Issue : a) Whether or not the grant for petition should be granted
b) Whether or not the judge should have inhibited himself

Relevant Ruling

On Propriety of Issuance of the Writ due to the Independence of the Judge

Rule 137, Section 1 provides:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
The proscription against the judge from proceeding with the case is predicated on the principle that no
judge should preside in a case in which he may not be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. In Geotina vs. Gonzales, this Court has said that where the disqualifying fact is indubitable
and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification, the Rules forthwith strips the judge of
any authority to proceed.
The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its
jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person
has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and
authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that
so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention. Keeping in mind the limitation that in habeas
corpus the concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or holding the
petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process,
an inquiry into the validity of the proceedings or process can be crucial in safeguarding the constitutional
right of a potential accused against an obvious and clear misjudgment. The intrinsic right of the State
to prosecute and detain perceived transgressors of the law must be balanced with its duty to
protect the innate value of individual liberty.
Quite evidently, the circumspection and objectivity required of the judge could not be assured in the
case at bar. Stringent standard should be applied in order to avoid hasty and improvident issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of an accused. The deprivation of liberty, regardless of its duration, is too invaluable
a price even just to stake for any wrongful prosecution and unwarranted detention.

45
On Propriety of the Issuance of the Writ due to Violation of Due Process

In this regard, the Court of Appeals has observed that -

xxxxxxx

"Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to issuance of the
arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching
questions and answers. (Roberts, Jr. vs. CA, supra; Sec. 6 (b), Rule 112.) The statements of
witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript
of the stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer.
"Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary investigation. He claimed to have examined
only the witnesses for the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records
to the Provincial Prosecutor without giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits and supporting documents. (Sec. 3 (b), Rule 112.)
Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ, which furnishes an extraordinary remedy and may not thus
be invoked under normal circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals has so aptly explained, the illegal
order and warrant of arrest issued by petitioner Judge subsists and private respondent is offered
no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in the ordinary course of law. The writ of habeas corpus,
although not designed to interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the
attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. Such a special circumstance is here
present considering that respondent cannot resort to the remedy of a motion to quash, the case no longer
being with petitioner judge, and neither could he ask for a reinvestigation because the preliminary
investigation for purposes of filing the information has already been taken over by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The latter, upon the other hand, does not have the authority to lift the warrant of arrest issued
by the disqualified judge. Meantime, respondent is being held and detained under an illegal order and
warrant of arrest which has no legal standing.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This denial is final.

City Warden of Manila City Jail vs Estrella et al August 31, 2001 (habeas corpus lies for an action
to release a prisoner based on good conduct time allowances; mere certification of such time
allowances is not enough)

Facts/Issue
 In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law
students visited various jails in Metro Manila.
 In the City Jail of Manila, they found thirty-four (34) prisoners, herein respondents, whom they
believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service
of their respective sentences based on Art 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
 On October 15, 1999, respondents, represented by the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid, filed in
this Court a petition for habeas corpus on such grounds
 The court dismissed the case stating that the prisoners may be dismissed on the certification of the
City Warden as to good conduct time allowance
 Issue: Whether a court may rely on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time
allowances in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus.

46
Relevant Ruling

On period to file habeas corpus

Under B.P. Blg. 129, §39, the period of appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours
from the notice of the judgment appealed from. Petitioner thus had until November 24, 1999 to appeal.
However, on November 23, 1999, prior to the expiration of the period to appeal, the Solicitor General
asked for an extension of fifteen (15) days from November 24, 1999, or until December 9, 1999, within
which to file the present petition. The Court having granted the motion, the instant petition was timely filed
on December 2, 1999.

Prisoners could not be released on the mere certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time
allowance; petition for habeas corpus is proper

Needless to say, the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the
authority granted by Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of Prisons, but that is altogether a
different kettle of fish from the question posed in this case. Here, the question is whether a court may rely
on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the release of
prisoners by writ of habeas corpus. We hold that it cannot, in view of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code
vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances solely in the Director of Prisons.

In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to order the re-arrest of all of respondents. This can be done
without placing them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the
invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances in their favor.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order is SET ASIDE and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial judge
for further proceedings, taking into account the certification of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections as
to the good conduct time allowances to which respondents may be entitled, by either granting the writ of
habeas corpus with respect to some of the respondents or ordering the re-arrest of others, as the facts
may warrant.

Talabon vs Iloilo Provincial Warden June 30 1947 (habeas corpus will not lie for the release of the
prisoner because of mere errors, irregularities, and defects in the sentence i.e. as in when there is
a defect in the form of judgment such as verbal judgment )

Facts/Issue

This is petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and with this Court on the
ground, that the "petitioner was charged of (with) murder and was confined in the concentration camp in
the provincial jail of Iloilo since 1942 up to the present time, and under the pretext of a fantastic trial he
was continually imprisoned and restrained of his liberty without having promulgated the corresponding
authority of any decision against him;" and "the petitioner is deprived of his absolute right of appeal and
denied of prompt and speedy justice," because "he cannot prosecute any appeal to a higher tribunal of
justice;" for the reason that the judgment which convicted the defendant to be imprisoned for not less than
12 years and 1 day to not more than 20 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, was rendered verbally
by the trial judge, without the court's findings of facts.

47
The sole question involved in this appeal, therefore, is whether or not the court that convicted the
petitioner had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner and of the offense, and to impose the
particular penalty above stated; for as above stated, it is "well-settled that where the court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the prosecution, and the punishment imposed by the court is of the character
prescribed by law for the offense, habeas corpus will not lie for the release of the prisoner because of
mere errors, irregularities, and defects in the sentence

Relevant Ruling

After considering the facts and law of the case, it is obvious that the lower court did not err in
denying the petitioner's petition, because the lower court had jurisdiction over the petitioner, the
offense with which the latter was charged and of which he was convicted, and to impose upon him the
penalty above stated. And for that reason, the petitioner does not question the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The principal ground alleged in the petition is, that the petitioner is illegally detained for the reason
that the judgment rendered by said court is not in writing and does not contain findings of facts as the
basis of conviction, in violation of the provision of section 2, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court which was
enacted in conformity with the provision of section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, and provides the
following:

SEC. 2. Form of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctively a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the defendant and upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction the judgment or sentence shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the defendant, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there is any; (b) the participation of the
defendant in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after
the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the defendant; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused
by the wrongful act to be recovered from the defendant by the offended party, if there is any.

The fact that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was made verbally without
prejudice to put it subsequently in writing, and that no written decision with findings of facts has
been rendered up to the filing of the petition, did not make that judgment absolutely void, because
failure on the part of the court to comply with the above quoted provisions of the Rules of Court and the
Constitution did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction acquired over the offense and the petitioner. In
many cases in which the trial court had failed to comply with the provision of section 133 of the old Code
of Civil Procedure requiring that a decision in civil cases must be in writing and contain findings of facts,
this Court did not dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court a quo had thereby lost its jurisdiction,
but remanded the case to the lower court for compliance with said requirement. To hold otherwise would
be to rule that a court that has jurisdiction will preserve it if it does not commit any error or applies
correctly the law, and it will lose its jurisdiction if it does not act in accordance with the law, which is
obviously untenable.

The provision of section 12, Article VIII, of the Constitution that "no decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"
which had been incorporated substantially in section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers only to the
form of the judgment. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court rendering it. The substance of the
judgment is defined in section 1, of said Rule 116, which says that it is "the adjudication by the court that
the defendant is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the penalty provided
for by law on the defendant who pleads or is found guilty thereof."

48
Gomez vs Director of Prisons October 2 1946 (petition for habeas corpus does not lie in a case
where appeal is filed and the records of such are lost or destroyed)

The petition does not make out of case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under process
issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits
the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner's release.

The prisoner's remedy, for the time being at least, lies in having the record of his case reconstituted.
Steps in this direction have already been started; the record is in process of reconstitution before a
commissioner. If the proceeding has been suspended, it was on motion of the prisoners's attorney for the
extension of time.

The delay which the prisoner's case suffers has been due to circumstances beyond the control of the
officials in charge of the prosecution. This delay we have to consider as reasonable and is not a good
ground for the granting of the petition.

We agree with the Solicitor General that at best the petition is premature. The petitioner should have
waited for the result of the efforts being exerted to reconstitute the record. Should reconstitution or new
trial turn out to be impracticable, then that will be the time when appropriate action may taken to do justice
within the law to the prisoner.

Ho Nina et al vs The Insular Collector of Customes October 28, 1914 (A final judgment in a habeas
corpus proceeding is just as binding upon the parties as a final judgment in any other
proceeding.)

It is difficult to understand upon what theory the attorneys for the petitioners, after a final
judgment had been rendered against their clients, can justify the presentation of the same
questions again in a new action, without even alleging or indicating the existence of new
questions or facts which had arisen subsequently. A final judgment in a habeas corpus
proceeding is just as binding upon the parties as a final judgment in any other proceeding. The
parties have no more right to relitigate the same questions in a habeas corpus proceeding than they have
in an ordinary action. A final judgment in such actions concludes further proceedings just as effectually as
it does in other proceedings.

A judgment which has been rendered in proceedings regularly conducted, when the same is
not tainted with fraud, can not be disregarded or set aside, except and until, in some legal
proceeding brought for the purpose, it has been nullified. In the present case no intimation is made in
the record or no suggestion presented that the final judgment was illegal for any reason. No hint is made
even that it should be set aside or annulled. Its existence and finality are admitted by the petitioners. Their
only reason for commencing the present action is that they may have another judgment upon the same
facts, with the evident hope that the next may be different and more favorable to them.

The questions presented in the present petition have been once settled by the courts. That
judgment is final. No new facts have been presented. No new questions have arisen. No reason is
alleged nor suggested why the court should reopen the case already closed, and closed by the consent of
the parties.

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