JOURNAL/ OF

10.1177/0743558405275172
Schachter CONTEXT
ADOLESCENT
AND IDENTITY
RESEARCH
FORMA
/ May
TION
2005

Context and Identity Formation:

A Theoretical Analysis and a Case Study
Elli P. Schachter
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
This article examines the possible implications of reintegrating the concept of context
into identity theory. Through the analysis of a case study of one individual attempting to
form an identity within the larger juxtaposed sociocultural contexts of premodernity,
modernity, and postmodernity, the article demonstrates how diversity of sociocultural
context is reflected not only in identity content but also in identity structure, suggesting
multiple diverse identity structures and developmental trajectories. Erikson’s concept of
identity configuration is reintroduced as a concept that can deal with the diversity and
dynamics of the identity of the individual-in-context. The article claims that identity
development should be redefined as the configuration of identity elements in a goal-
oriented structure negotiated and co-constructed within context.

Keywords: context and identity development; ego identity status paradigm; modern and
postmodern identity structure; identity configurations

Much has been written in the past 15 years (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996;
Côté & Levine, 1988, 2002; Phinney & Goossens, 1996) on the importance
of reintegrating the concept of context into identity theory in general and into
the Eriksonian approach to identity (Erikson, 1963, 1968) as this approach
was interpreted by Marcia (1980) in particular (Marcia, Waterman,
Matteson, Archer & Orlofsky, 1993). The prototypical description of identity
development that appears in the neo-Eriksonian (Schwartz, 2001) literature
portraying a self-contained individual (Sampson, 1985, 1988) developing his
or her identity in vivo, free of contextual constraints and resources, has
increasingly been criticized both as erroneous in and of itself and as a

This article was written while the author was a postdoctoral fellow at the Mandel Leadership Institute, Jerusa-
lem, Israel. The author would like to thank Yisrael Rich and Zvi Bekerman for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions. An earlier version of this article was presented at the biennial meeting of the Society of Research on
Adolescence, Baltimore, March 11, 2004. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Elli
Schachter, School of Education, Bar Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel; e-mail: elli_s@inter.net.il.

Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 20 No. 3, May 2005 375-395

DOI: 10.1177/0743558405275172
© 2005 Sage Publications

375

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376 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

misrepresentation of Erikson’s theory (Côté & Levine, 1988; van Hoof,

1999; Yoder, 2000; however, see Waterman, 1988, 1999 for responses to
these critiques). A growing sense of discontent with psychological
approaches to identity that are seen as excessively individualistic and
atomistic has brought researchers to suggest that the current paradigmatic
modes of thinking about identity must be reassessed (Rattansi & Phoenix,
1997). Côté (1996) wrote that constructing a contextual approach to identity
formation is the biggest challenge now facing identity researchers, a chal-
lenge which many are now attempting to find ways to address (Adams &
Marshall, 1996; Bosma & Kunnen, 2001). In this article, I wish to demon-
strate that a serious attempt to integrate context into identity theory may have
substantial implications regarding Marcia’s paradigm.
The aforementioned trend calling for the reintegration of the concept of
context into identity theory should be understood as part of a larger move-
ment to incorporate context into the much wider discourse of general psy-
chology and, in particular, into the discourse of developmental psychology
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Lerner, 2002). This call to add context to the study of
developmental psychology has not merely been to classify different develop-
mental phenomena according to the different immediate surroundings in
which they take place (i.e., family context, school context, etc.), but rather
this reflects a basic stance that different contexts constrain, enhance, interact
with, and even constitute basic developmental processes and,
complimentarily, that individuals create, choose, maintain, change, and con-
stitute their contexts of development. Thus, it is posited that human develop-
ment cannot be understood without incorporating the appreciation of such
contexts and their complexity.
Bronfenbrenner (1979) attempted to address this issue by creating a mul-
tifaceted model that describes the complexities of the context of develop-
ment. He wished to challenge the then prevailing concept of context as a uni-
tary monolithic entity to promote more sophisticated research into the
relation between context and development. He conceived of context as subdi-
vided into a nested arrangement of interacting concentric structures, each
contained within the next, ranging from a microsystem setting, where face-
to-face immediate interactions occur, to a macrosystem, which refers to regu-
larities and consistencies that exist at the cultural level. Following this line of
thought, culture has been theorized to be related to psychological develop-
ment by way of its superordinating role in providing a measure of organiza-
tion and regularity to the immediate context of development (Super &
Harkness, 2002; however, see Gjerde, 2004, and Hermans, 2001, who caution
against reifying the notion of culture).

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 377

The relation of psychological development to context is a theme dealt with

extensively also by cultural psychologists of development (Cole, 1996;
Rogoff, 2003; Shweder et al., 1998). Sociocultural theorizing holds that the
individual and his or her cultural context are not easily separated into two dif-
ferent entities interacting and influencing each other. But rather, they are mu-
tually constitutive and thus highly interdependent. In Shweder’s (1990)
words,

No sociocultural environment exists or has identity independent of the way hu-

man beings seize meanings and resources from it, while every human being has
her or his subjectivity and mental life altered through the process of seizing
meanings and resources from some sociocultural environment and using them.
(p. 2)

A radical implication of this viewpoint is the claim that adding culture and
context to the discourse of development is potentially transformative
(Sampson, 1993) to the discipline of developmental psychology, as this
brings about a change in the basic unit of analysis regarding human develop-
ment and may even bring about a change in our concepts of both what it
means to be human and what culture really is (Hermans, 2001). Such theoriz-
ing suggests that the subject of psychological study—the individual—is it-
self a socially constructed invention, based on a rather precarious, if not arbi-
trary, Cartesian split between a subject (individual) that resides within a
single physical body and an object (context) that resides without. The sug-
gested alternative offered has been to call for a softening of this dichotomy
and a greater appreciation of how subjectivity and culture “make each other
up” (Shweder et al., 1998, p. 871).
A far-reaching potential implication of integrating culture and context
into the discourse of developmental psychology is the claim of cultural psy-
chologists, such as Shweder (1990; Shweder et al., 1998), regarding diver-
sity. Shweder claims that a culturally informed discipline of psychology
changes the discipline because a previously universal psychology transforms
into multiple, diverse psychologies. In Shweder’s view, because psychologi-
cal features of the individual are inextractible from the cultural context that
shapes them (and vice versa) and because there are multiple diverse cultures,
there may be multiple diverse developmental psychologies. This means that
cultures might differ not only regarding specific cultural content (i.e., beliefs,
values, symbols, languages), but also regarding psychological structures and
processes (see Shweder, 1990, pp. 4-5) that were previously portrayed as uni-
versal. Studies regarding length of adolescence and the psychological char-
acteristics of the transition to adulthood in Western-developed societies

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378 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

exemplify this, demonstrating that these are embedded in specific historical

and economic circumstances (Arnett, 2000, 2004; Côté, 2000). Therefore, as
Larson writes (2002), “Gone is the concept of a singular ‘natural’ adoles-
cence” (p. 2). Instead, we have diverse adolescences. Rogoff (2003) ties the
concept of diversity to the concept of cultural goals and demonstrates how
diverse cultural goals of development and diverse cultural conceptions of
maturity are geared to promote the development of different psychological
characteristics.
Returning now to identity, we may now ask in what way classic neo-
Eriksonian identity theory could be transformed by integrating context or
culture in its discourse. The mere claim that an individual’s culture influ-
ences the specific content of her identity—her values, attitudes, symbols,
commitments, and so forth—is obvious and has always been acknowledged
within classical identity theory. Individuals from different cultures indeed
hold different beliefs and are committed to different cultural practices. The
more thought-provoking claim is to say that the cultural context of develop-
ment influences not only the content of identity, but also its structural proper-
ties and its developmental course. By referring to structural properties of
identity, I point to a wide range of theoretical concepts that can and have been
appraised regardless of specific cultural content, concepts such as identity’s
cohesiveness, its coherence, its stability, the sharpness of the self-other
boundary, and so forth. By referring to identity’s developmental course, I
point to the quality and sequence of changes in the above structural elements
throughout time. According to the ego identity status paradigm’s interpreta-
tion of Erikson, the content of identity may differ across cultural contexts;
however, the theoretical applicability of structural concepts, such as same-
ness and continuity, identity commitment, identity achievement, and so forth,
is deemed universal, as is the preferred developmental course from identity
diffusion to identity achievement. The alternative notion that I would like to
examine following cultural psychology’s argument is that identity’s basic
structure and its developmental course are contingent on the ongoing interac-
tion between the individual and his or her social context and thus may vary
across different cultural or other such macrosystemic contexts. If we accept
this possibility that diverse cultural contexts interact with the individual to
produce diverse psychologies, influencing psychological structures as well
as content, then integrating the concept of cultural context into identity the-
ory might have us consider whether we can expect to find diverse possible
mature structures of identity (Côté, 1996) that develop along diverse
pathways (cf., van Hoof, 1999; Waterman 1993, 1999).
In this article, I wish to demonstrate the viability of the above possibility
with the help of a case study of one individual whose life story reveals a

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 379

restructuring of identity as a result of his interaction with and adaptation to

diverse and changing sociocultural contexts reflecting premodern, modern,
and postmodern influences. I chose this single case from a larger sample of
narratives (to be described later on) because the restructuring of identity
within this one life story enables me to portray at least two different possible
ways identity can be structured, hence demonstrating structural diversity and
variations in the course of development. I wish to show that the integration of
context into identity discourse may lead to a reformulation of basic aspects of
classic identity theory.

MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY, AND IDENTITY

Much of the literature on context and identity structure has taken a

macrosystemic perspective and has examined modernity and postmodernity
as different macro-sociocultural contexts in which identity development
occurs. The controversy revolving around the concepts of modern versus
postmodern identity (Côté, 1996; Gergen, 1991; McAdams, 1997;
Schachter, 2002, 2004) is wider though and refers to modernity and
postmodernity not only as macro-sociocultural contextual systems in which
identity development occurs, but also as worldviews that inform the con-
struction of identity theories themselves. Although I recognize that present-
ing modernity and postmodernity as a stark dichotomy is itself problematic, I
make this distinction for analytic purposes and following the previous
literature.
Commonly, in contrasting modern and postmodern conceptions of iden-
tity, Erikson’s theory as interpreted by Marcia (1980) has been cast in the role
of the modern conception of identity (McAdams, 1988, 1997). Erikson’s the-
ory has been considered modernist in its portrayal of the following structural
elements of identity: First, within the classic exposition of Erikson’s view-
point, identity is described as an invigorating sense of sameness and continu-
ity regardless of specific content. Second, this sense is described as unfolding
epigenetically, from within and according to an innate timetable. Third, the
preferred course of development described is one in which incompatible
childhood identifications lead to a period of crises or exploration of alterna-
tives, which ideally then leads to a choice, which in turn allows identity clo-
sure, and thus to an adulthood of stable commitment. And lastly, the theory
strongly emphasizes personal choice and separation as precursors of a
mature personal autonomous identity. Basically, this is a description of one
universally desirable developmental trend toward an identity structure
characterized by self-consistency, stability, and autonomy.

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380 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

Conversely, the discourse regarding postmodern identity is quite differ-

ent. In the literature, identity is portrayed vis-à-vis postmodernism in two
distinct ways: First, postmodernity is referred to as the current sociological
context in which identity develops, and, second, postmodernism is referred
to as a theory of knowledge used to examine and deconstruct scientific theo-
ries that discuss identity. A brief discussion of the two ways of discussing
postmodern identity follows (for a more extensive description and resources,
see Schachter, 2005).
Regarding postmodernity as context, there are those who claim that
postmodernity is a qualitatively new sociological era that functions as a new
macrosocial context in which adolescent identity development takes place
(cf., Côté & Levine, 2002; Côté & Schwartz, 2002). This new context of
development has been characterized as both one which is continuously
undergoing rapid change and one in which many individuals mature in juxta-
posed multiple cultural contexts. Both of these attributes make a committed
and stable identity more problematic. The postmodern context has also been
described as being permeated with both an atmosphere of moral relativity
and a basic skepticism toward the prospect of human historical progress
(McAdams, 1988). Postmodern sociological and economic conditions (i.e.,
globalization) have been described as contributing to a prolonged adoles-
cence (Arnett, 2002; Côté, 2000). Communal identity has weakened
(Cushman, 1990), resulting in intensified individualization, and the
increased use of technology in communication as a medium for representing
reality has been associated with a diminished confidence in reality
(Baudrillard, 1994). Some writers claim that such a context threatens the via-
bility of a stable and integrated identity and thus potentially leads to a
fragmentation of identity and a multiplicity of selves.
A second way that postmodernism relates to identity is related to trends
reflecting postmodern philosophical thought (Lyotard, 1984; Rorty, 1979).
Certain theorists that ascribe to these trends are critical of scientific psycho-
logical theories that, in their view, reflect an unfounded belief in grand uni-
versal metanarratives. They are wary of theories that endorse the supremacy
of rationality, the belief that there is an objective reality that is knowable and
empirically accessible, and the concept of historical progress through the
accumulation of scientific knowledge. Some even add that such psychologi-
cal theories, in effect, take part in creating the reality that they are supposedly
describing. Therefore, they are critical toward classical identity theory,
because positing a universal identity theory creates an unnecessary norma-
tive standard of how one should go about self-understanding, and because
through the discursive use of supposedly value-neutral terms, such as identity
achievement, sameness and continuity, identity exploration, and so forth,

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 381

identity theory is bolstering Western’s culture’s creation of a certain kind of

individual and a certain kind of society, sometimes with considerable moral
implications (Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997).
Gergen (1991) and Lifton (1993) are two theorists whose writings regard-
ing identity have been associated with postmodernism. Lifton (1993), relat-
ing to classic identity theory, wrote the following:

I have come to see that the older version of personal identity, at least insofar as
it suggests inner stability and sameness, was derived from a version of tradi-
tional culture in which relationships to symbols and institutions are still rela-
tively intact—hardly the case in the last years of the twentieth century. (pp. 4-5)

Instead of stability and sameness, Lifton (1993) suggests a “Protean self-

process,” the continuous psychic recreation of the self. Gergen (1968) sug-
gested a revision of the construct of self toward a theory of multiple selves.
Gergen (1991) later suggested that psychological theory itself constricts the
possible range of self-expression:

The postmodern sensibility questions the concept of “true” or “basic” self, and
the concomitant need for personal coherence or consistency. Why, the
postmodern asks, must one be bound by any traditional marker of identity—
profession, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and so on? (p. 178).

So if we are discussing the structural issue of how disparate identity ele-

ments are “put together”, then supposedly Erikson (1963, 1968), the mod-
ernist, is claiming that the ego attempts either to choose from among them or
integrate them so as to create a structure characterized by sameness and con-
tinuity. Whereas, the postmodernists are claiming that they are not integrated
at all or perhaps should not be, as this is unnecessarily constrictive. Rather,
multiple changing identities are accepted and celebrated, as this contributes
to a more adaptive and flexible personality.

A THIRD ALTERNATIVE: IDENTITY CONFIGURATIONS

I would like to suggest a third alternative regarding identity structure that

might mitigate the modern-postmodern dichotomy. I base myself on existing
concepts that appear in Erikson’s (1963, 1968) writings that were not given
prominence in Marcia’s (1980) formulation and attempt to apply these con-
cepts to the postmodern case (see also Côté, 1996). I believe Erikson’s theory
itself contains theoretical concepts that can be creatively used to deal with
historical conditions that have changed since Erikson published his works.

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382 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

One of these concepts is identity configuration. Erikson (1968) wrote the

following:

Identity formation . . . arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimi-
lation of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configura-
tion. . . . The final identity . . . includes all significant identifications, but it also
alters them in order to make a unique and reasonably coherent whole of
them. . . . It is a configuration gradually integrating constitutional givens, idio-
syncratic libidinal needs, favored capacities, significant identifications, effec-
tive defenses, successful sublimations and consistent roles. (pp. 159-163)

The word configuration implies a relationship created between many

identity elements. Erikson (1968) elsewhere refers to “workable combina-
tions of identification fragments” (p. 53). Erikson uses the term configura-
tion in an attempt to bridge the inherent difficulty involved in constructing a
theory that aspires to an identity that is an integrative coherent whole; al-
though, at the same time, the theory recognizes that this wholeness also re-
quires including all significant and thus possibly contradicting identifica-
tions. The route that he charted toward integrative identity entails the gradual
alteration, assimilation, and integration of certain identifications and the re-
jection of others; however, identity must still include all significant identifi-
cations. Erikson’s usage of the terms workable combinations and reasonably
coherent suggests that Erikson the psychoanalyst understood that identity
formation entails compromise between these two conflicting objectives (in
ways comparable to Freud’s, 1923/1961, compromise structural model). And,
thus, sameness and continuity is not the exclusive structural criterion guiding
identity formation, for if it was, identity would easily become uniform.
Erikson’s choice of the terms configuration or combination implies, rather,
that multiple identity elements remain within one identity, because identity
requires a compromise between a measure of needed self-consistency and
other structural needs and goals. Erikson mentioned other examples of ele-
ments constraining the formation of identity. He wrote that the identity con-
figuration has to “simultaneously meet the requirements of the organism’s
maturational stage, the ego’s style of synthesis, and the demands of the culture”
(p. 53-54). Thus, identity structure has to meet multiple requirements, and if
indeed the formation of identity must take into account multiple structural
objectives and goals, then the resulting compromise structure may theoreti-
cally take many different forms, depending on the relative importance given
to each of these needs and goals. Thus, the structure of identity formed is
guided by goals. Note also that the quote reveals that Erikson required that
the configuration also meet the demands of the culture. Add this to the previous
point and together this means that the configuration is a joint co-constructed

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 383

creation of an individual and his or her cultural context(s) formed so as to

serve potentially diverse objectives of both personal and cultural origin.
In his theorizing, Erikson (1963, 1968) related to premodern and modern
contexts that are basically stable and homogeneous and, thus, enable identi-
ties that are both reasonably self-consistent and inclusive of all significant
identifications. He therefore suggested that the identity configuration created
remains relatively stable once formed. However, as described above, the
postmodern multifaceted and changing context disrupts such a harmonious
identity. If an individual must choose between the goal of a self-consistent
identity and the goal of an identity including all significant identifications,
and the context does not enable both goals, would Erikson situate one goal as
superior to the other? I do not know, of course. I suggest, though, that a choice
between conflicting goals is basically not an empirical question. I suggest
that rather than a priori positing that achieving sameness and continuity in
identity content is the only possible or desirable mature identity structure, as
the modernist approach suggests, and rather than preferring lack of structure
as the sign of maturity, as some postmodernist approaches seem to be sug-
gesting, the concept of configuration suggests that structure may take diverse
forms. The same identity elements may be creatively put together in different
workable ways in order to best meet the individual’s and/or the culture’s
needs and valued goals. The concept of configuration, therefore, resonates
with current theoretical trends in cultural psychology and allows us to broaden
identity theory’s ability to deal with diversity of structure in interaction with
cultural context.

GIL’S STORY

Gil’s story demonstrates one individual’s interaction with his cultural

context(s) and the shift in his attempt to configure identity elements during
the period of emerging adulthood, from a modern-like attempt to a
postmodern-like attempt. This case study is presented to illustrate the utility
of the concept of identity configuration in understanding individuals’ identi-
ties and the way these are created, transformed, and maintained in interaction
with context. Gil’s narrative was collected in the framework of a study on
identity formation in which I interviewed Israeli Jewish Modern Orthodox
emerging adults and collected their life stories, with a special focus on
themes regarding religion and sexuality in their lives (Schachter, 2002,
2004). Jewish Modern Orthodox adolescents were chosen for this study as
they are, as a group, exposed to multiple cultural contexts, thus presumably
susceptible to identity conflict. Historically, in the beginning of the modern

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384 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

age and enlightenment, Judaism, in certain similar ways to Christianity, had

to deal with the challenges of modernity (Berger, 1979). Some Jewish groups
embraced modernity and either abandoned or reformed much premodern tra-
ditional observance; some rejected modernity and formed an ultraorthodoxy;
whereas a third group, Modern Orthodoxy, crystallizing in the late 19th cen-
tury, attempted to somehow integrate certain aspects of modernity while
remaining faithful to the traditional Jewish code of law. Sociologically, Jew-
ish Modern Orthodox youth, at the turn of the 21st century, mature within
educational, family, and leisure settings that expose them to premodern,
modern, and postmodern cultural contexts, and to various combinations of
the three (Bar-Lev & Krausz, 1989; Heilman & Cohen, 1989; Kaniel, 2000).
The focus on sexuality and religion was chosen as a means to raise identity
issues pertaining to opposing worldviews. The relevance of this study is,
however, not restricted to religious youth but can extend to all youth maturing
in multiple conflicting contexts. It is especially relevant to those that
experience conflict surrounding issues of bicultural identity (Benet-
Martinez & Haritatos, in press; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997).
The period of emerging adulthood is particularly fitting for this study as it
has been shown that this developmental time period highlights identity issues
for youth in Western-developed societies (Arnett, 2004). In the case of Mod-
ern Orthodox youth, this is even more so as this is the time period in which the
juxtaposition of multiple contexts becomes most salient because of the tran-
sition from relatively segregated religious schools to more heterogeneous
university settings.
Gil, at the time of the interview, was 24 years old. The interview began in a
similar fashion to all other interviews in the study. Gil was asked to tell his life
story in chronological order in extensive, vivid detail, and he was told that the
interviewer was especially interested in events meaningful to him. Gil was
further requested to interweave any story related to either his religious devel-
opment or sexual development and then to discuss any relation he saw
between the two. The interviewer’s responses from then on were limited to
nondirective requests to clarify unclear or laconic remarks or to elicit expla-
nations for decisions when these were not given. In the larger study, I charted
respondents’identifications as they were revealed (positively and negatively)
in the narratives and analyzed the implicit configuration that the interviewees
attempted to create between these identifications.
Gil’s biography is typical of religious youth of his group. He grew up in a
relatively homogeneous religious neighborhood. He went to religious K-12
schools that integrate both religious and secular studies. After graduating, he
temporarily deferred his compulsory army service to study in a yeshiva, a
religious seminary. After the army, he began studying physics in a large

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 385

Israeli university and is now planning to continue on to graduate school in

brain sciences. This short biography demonstrates that Gil’s socialization
took place in differing contexts in which he was exposed to different and,
sometimes, contradicting worldviews.
Gil’s interview ran on for slightly under 2 hours. Because of space con-
straints, I provide only very short quotes from his story that illuminate the
specific way that he configurates the relationship between his identifications.
Gil’s basic identifications, as presented in the beginning of the narrative,
are complex. He describes his father negatively as having a nonintellectual,
rigid, nonexploratory, nonquestioning religious attitude. Gil says, “He con-
tinued with what his parents did. He doesn’t like to sit and learn new
things. . . . I always thought he wasn’t complete.” On the other hand, he men-
tions that he is similar to his father in their both being technically adept: “[My
father] works with his hands. . . . [And] curiosity about how things work is
central to my life, getting to the bottom of things, taking them apart, and
sometimes I can’t put them together again.”
During high school, Gil describes himself, on one hand, as being critical
toward the ultra-Orthodox rabbis who taught religious subject matter; but on
the other hand, he was also critical regarding the lax religious observance of
many of his schoolmates. Gil found the ideal combination of traditional reli-
giosity and what he considered a modern outlook in a Modern Orthodox
youth group. He describes the youth group as “my anchor” and as the “center
of my life.” Gil spent most of his waking hours at the youth group center, and
toward the end of high school, he himself became a dedicated counselor.
According to Marcia’s (1980) categorization, Gil can be described at this
point as a classic foreclosure. Distancing himself from a father with whom he
had difficulty identifying, he latched on to the youth group with great convic-
tion because it seemed to offer him an ideal solution to his potentially con-
flicting identifications; the youth group blended traditional and progressive
ideologies, and he found this blend powerful and exciting, fitting his serious,
intellectual, and dynamic nature.
Thus, all is supposedly well, and 18-year-old Gil who was fascinated with
science defined a life project: to combine science and religion. “I felt that just
like I educated my scouts, I can educate everyone. Here we have physics, here
Judaism, let’s combine them and we have more power.”
And so Gil deferred his army service and went to study in a yeshiva to
delve into the intellectual—the rational exploration of the scientific and the
religious. His intellectual explorations lead him through biblical textual criti-
cism and contemporary and medieval views of the natural world and finally
to ask the psychophysical question (i.e., “Where is the soul situated within
the brain?”). However, this exploration led to crises:

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386 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

At some point after reading physics on the one hand and Rabbinical literature
on the other, I found that. . . . Nothing fit. This Jewish stuff is hanging in mid
air—it’s got nothing to stand on and has nothing to do with physics. . . . And that
really stirred me up and got to me emotionally, because on one hand my whole
life is Judaism and religion and on the other hand I don’t believe in it, it can’t be
true, it’s based on mistaken facts. . . . My whole life was geared towards making
everyone become religious and idealistic and I had nothing in life for my-
self. . . . If I leave it, I’ll have nothing left. I got really depressed.
I decided I didn’t want children or a family because I wouldn’t know what
to hand over to them, because I wasn’t “closed” about myself. . . . I didn’t want
to bring anyone into the world to be in my same uncertain state.

Gil’s project was modern, both regarding identity content and structure.
He wanted to combine, integrate, synthesize, and find common and funda-
mental principles through the use of empirical, rational, and positivistic sci-
ence. Through such a combination, he also wished to find a common thread
with which to bond his identifications. However, his attempts to find closure
and sameness and continuity through natural science discourse failed. Simi-
lar to his early description of himself as someone who takes things apart and
finds it difficult to put the pieces together, his philosophical deconstruction
geared toward creating an overarching synthesis led him to identity crises
and depression.
Gil then decided to leave the yeshiva and commence his army service.
However, during his army service, Gil resisted the implicit demand to choose
and continued to hold on to his religious identity and practical religious
observance. He explained this as resulting from his wish to postpone his deci-
sions until after a more extensive study period in the university. “But I knew
that I didn’t know enough to destroy it all.”
Up to this point, we have a characterization of identity that fits nicely into
Marcia’s (1980) identity status paradigm. Gil is in moratorium; he has
described a period of identity exploration, a crisis, a time set apart for further
exploration, and a hoped-for identity resolution.
Three years later, Gil enrolls in university and decides to study physics
and brain sciences to “get to the crux of the problem.” However, now his stud-
ies bring him to the conclusion that the science-religion question is, at least
for the time being, unsolvable and that the physical truth and the aesthetic and
moral may never, or even cannot, be integrated.

I studied physics, and I saw what it is. It’s playing with mathematics and trying
to claim that this is similar to the real world. But nobody knows nothing. You
can’t derive behavioral norms from physics. . . . But people do live, in a sort of
“bubble,” which is divorced from physical reality . . . It could be that there is no
soul, and the body is just a physical machine. Yet it’s not that important anyway

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 387

because we [i.e., humanity] built civilization, painting, poetry which has

nothing to with physics.
So there is also room for a religious reality, which can even be aesthetic and
good, even though this has nothing to do with truth.

Gil’s studies, rather than bringing him closer to a synthesis, reconciliation,

or resolution of conflicting points of view, bring home a realization that there
is a split between the natural sciences and the moral, the social, the spiritual,
and the artistic. His intellectual search paradoxically brings him to the hum-
bling realization that “nobody knows nothing” and might never will. Rather
than accepting this split as final—not to say celebrate it—Gil mourns it and
halfheartedly hopes that someday science will come up with a better solu-
tion: “I haven’t decided anything yet [though], I’m still waiting for my Ph.D.
in brain sciences [laughs]. But seriously now, they won’t decipher the brain’s
secrets before I die. . . . This is delaying my whole life.”

And so Gil now concludes that the experience of “nothing to stand on,”
which he had previously hoped would be temporary, is becoming a perma-
nent reality for him. As there is no imminently arriving solution predicated
on rationality and science, how does one go on? Gil continues, “So now I
have backed down from living ideals. You can’t live in such middle ground
your whole life. I can’t stop life till they reach decisions, so I’m working at
smoothing both sides now.”
As Gil sees no hope in integration and rather than choosing one or the
other (i.e., identity achievement) or extending the moratorium period, Gil
portrays himself as withdrawing to what might, at first glance, be considered
identity diffusion. Gil said that he is “backing down” from a “life of ideals” to
a “smoothing of both sides.” When I asked him how he sees his life continue,
Gil said,

It depends on whom I marry. I stopped putting any religious restrictions. I’d

even be willing to date a non-religious girl or even a non-Jewish girl. But what
is crucial is that she be open to change. This might sound unusual but what I
want is that she change as I change . . . [and] that we reach any decisions
together.

Here, Gil is stating that he is willing to consider a partner with a suppos-

edly radically different hierarchy of values and identities. What is important
to him is her ability and willingness to go through constant change and make
decisions together.
Gil’s “smoothing” is not a diffused confusion. It is a way that he believes
he can get on with his life by making tentative commitments in an indefinite

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388 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

and changing world without rejecting his religious tradition lacking suffi-
cient basis, nor giving up on what science affords. It is a strategic approach to
creating structure in an indefinite and ultimately unknowable world.

GIL’S IDENTITY CONFIGURATIONS

Gil lives in a complex amalgam of premodern, modern, and postmodern

contexts. The yeshiva is a premodern institution of learning, the university a
modern institution, although many of the ideas he has encountered at the uni-
versity regarding science are postmodern. His shift between these contexts is
both self-directed and socially constructed. The move from high school to the
yeshiva was a personal choice, as was his decision to study at the university.
However, the existence of these institutions and the content of his studies
therein are examples of socially constituted influences.
Within the narrative, Gil describes a shift from a modern attempt to make
sense of his complex identifications beginning in adolescence to a
postmodern attempt during emerging adulthood. In Gil’s modern attempt,
the goal of identity formation was to achieve a sense of personal sameness
and continuity that would empower him as a persuasive social agent. Science
was the supposed final arbitrator of truth and rational exploration was the
preferred way of achieving identity. The developmental trend that he under-
stood as occurring was that his exploration, although perhaps leading to a cri-
sis, would eventually be resolved through integration or rational choice,
which would lead to long-term stability and commitment. Thus, the configu-
ration would be one in which multiple identifications are either synthesized
or selected from, until a coherent, stable, consistent structure emerges.
However, Gil’s view that both the modern and the traditional outlooks
have failed him has led him to conclude that it makes more sense to configurate
a loose structure of identity that is tentative and open to change, yet not
destructive to past identifications, and that additionally enables a construc-
tive engagement of the world. Within this configuration, the identifications
of science and religion are what he calls “bubbles”; they are separate confed-
erate perspectives, and both are not ultimate and all-inclusive vehicles of
truth. This structure allows for flexible change; truth is local and provisory,
commitment is tentative, and choices are ongoing rather than definitive.
Relationships are based on mutual willingness for change, and identity is
thus not bounded but rather relational and perhaps dialogical or interdepen-
dent (Hermans, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Last, this identity struc-
ture reflects an experiential stance to the world rather than an ideological one.

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 389

It might be claimed that Gil’s postmodern stance is temporary and the

result of the fact that the psychosocial moratorium of Western middle-class
youth has extended well into the third decade of life. Perhaps Gil is just going
through a normative exploratory stage that will culminate in identity achieve-
ment as he reaches adulthood? Maybe he will work it out later on? Perhaps he
will. However, we have only the present existing text before us in which Gil
knowingly rejects the whole identity achievement project as irrelevant to his
situation and attempts to forge and follow a qualitatively different develop-
mental pathway.

DISCUSSION

In this final section, I wish to discuss what I believe are the major implica-
tions of integrating context into identity theory. Gil’s narrative serves to high-
light many of these points. At the outset, though, it is important to state that
whether Gil is right or wrong in his philosophy, his theology, or his identity
choices is beside the point. The identity content per se is not the focus of my
discussion. More important, I stress that I am definitely not attempting to
endorse Gil’s postmodern attempt to deal with identity issues as psychologi-
cally or morally superior to the modern way; I am not claiming that his choice
of a postmodern identity configuration will lead him to a healthier adulthood;
and I am convinced that Gil’s choice entails certain psychological costs.
Rather, the crux of my argument lies elsewhere. It focuses on the fact that Gil
interacted with the cultural contexts he encountered and that within this inter-
action, he attempted to configurate his identifications in a way that would be
workable and acceptable within such contexts, although allowing him to
achieve certain goals. This was done in a more or less intentional and reflec-
tive manner. Figuratively, we may say that Gil’s process of identity formation
consisted of his choice of an identity structure and not only his choice of con-
tent. At first, he chose a consistent identity. Gil’s search for a consistent iden-
tity made sense to him within the premodern and modern contexts that sup-
port such an identity configuration. His depression, his identity crises at the
yeshiva, and his willingness to continue strict religious observance during his
3-year army service all made sense within a psychological framework that
views identity as potentially and necessarily progressing toward consistency
through either integration or choice. However, in fully encountering the
postmodern context, the consistent identity structure ceased to make sense
and required him to reevaluate and restructure his identity elements to meet
new goals. The integration of identifications or the selection from among

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390 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

them, so as to create a consistent identity, were no longer seen as the two pos-
sible solutions to his predicament of conflicting identifications, nor was inte-
gration even seen as necessary. Rather, Gil now chose a loose identity struc-
ture. Within this new context, a fluid, smooth, changing identity, which
selectively and contextually deals with issues as they come up, seemed more
reasonable to Gil and allowed him to continue his studies and “get on with
life.” The important theoretical point is not that one choice is inherently better
than the other, but that the cultural contexts that Gil encountered had implicit
and conflicting demands regarding not only identity content but also identity
structure. These diverse contexts interacted with Gil and formed diverse
identity structures.
Based on the theoretical analysis and the case study illustration, I wish to
highlight three important points: First, the classical distinction made in clas-
sical identity theory between universal structure and local content is at best
highly questionable. Structure is also context dependent. Second, I wish to
challenge both a modern identity theory that claims for the universality of a
desirable developmental trend toward sameness and continuity, on one hand,
and the postmodern notion that structural considerations regarding identity
are a nonuseful category, on the other hand. A loose identity structure is not
nonexistent; it is merely different, with an inner logic of its own and with a
possible different developmental trajectory. Third, I wish to emphasize the
point that identity structure is co-constructed by the individual-in-context
and that conceptualizing identity as a property of the individual is problem-
atic. Identity research should, therefore, focus not only on the individual but
also on those elements and agents that comprise his or her context. I wish to
clarify that I am not claiming that context predetermines an individual’s iden-
tity structure. Gil’s developmental trajectory was not inevitable. Gil might
have possibly configured his same identifications in other ways: He might
have adopted a religious or atheistic fundamentalist identity and attempted to
suppress either his intellectual curiosity or religious identification, respec-
tively; or he might have continued to search for a higher order philosophical
integration of his identifications; or he might have turned his dissonance into
a source of excitement and enjoyment (Schachter, 2004). A contextual iden-
tity theory should not be construed as a deterministic claim that context com-
pletely determines identity structure and that all youth maturing in
postmodern contexts will form a postmodern-like identity configuration.
Rather, it is a claim that there is an ongoing interaction and negotiation
between agent and context and that certain identity forms may be more preva-
lent in certain contexts as they may make more sense in such a setting. As put
by Côté (1996), “reactions to the identity stage could . . . be viewed in terms
of how cultural contexts, in conjunction with individuals’ inner workings of

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 Schachter / CONTEXT AND IDENTITY FORMATION 391

identity formation, produce various reactions, some of which may become

modal or predominant in a culture” (p. 143).

IDENTITY FORMATION: A REDEFINITION

Following the above analysis, I propose a redefinition of the psychosocial

developmental process of identity formation, which I believe is compatible
with both major Eriksonian themes and current conceptualizations adapted
from cultural psychology. I am not claiming that the components of my
redefinition are novel or original; rather, I believe it is important to restate and
organize these components in a way that contrasts them with the prevailing
ego identity status model as it is widely recognized.
First, instead of defining identity as a personal task, the creation of iden-
tity is better described as a joint co-construction (Valsiner, Branco & Dantas,
1997) of the individual and contextual sociocultural forces. Second, rather
than conceiving of the singular goal of identity formation as an individual’s
sense of sameness and continuity and commitment, identity formation is better
described as the ongoing attempt to create a reasonably workable identity
configuration. By workable, I mean the configuration is a tentatively plausi-
ble construction of prior identifications, allowing for the pursuit of valued
goals, negotiated intrapsychically and interpersonally. As the case study dem-
onstrates, an individual’s manifold identifications can conceivably be config-
ured in diverse possible ways to achieve different goals. Goals, then, serve to
guide the construction of identity structure. For example, self-consistency
might be the goal guiding the construction of one person’s configuration,
causing an identification to be rejected; conversely, striving for maximum
inclusiveness of all identifications, even inconsistent ones, might be the goal
guiding another’s configuration, causing the same identification to be
included. An individual in one cultural context might attempt to create an
identity configuration that optimizes individuation and autonomy, whereas
another in another cultural context might create a configuration that promotes
interdependence.
Finally, as identity configurations are goal oriented—the goals negotiated
between personal and social values and constraints within different cultural
contexts that may be differentially complex and dynamic—such configura-
tions are necessarily diverse and cannot be simplistically placed along a sin-
gle hierarchal continuum. They can only be evaluated relative to the contexts
in which they evolved and the goals they are intended to serve (Schachter, in
press). Psychologists often posit the criterion of psychological health as the
ultimate yardstick and thus create a single hierarchy. However, identities are

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392 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT RESEARCH / May 2005

often constructed with other goals and values in mind, such as truth, spiritual-
ity, purity, social change, meaningfulness, security, vitality, autonomy, divin-
ity, or community (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Why must
identity theory put forward one universal, externally imposed norm?
This has implications for both research and intervention. Researchers and
practitioners might broaden their focus to see how diverse identity structures
could be judged according to their possible function in serving diverse goals
of value to the individual and his or her social milieu. Intervention can then no
longer be seen as a value-free enterprise, simply helping the individual
develop psychologically according to a universally accepted trajectory.
Rather, intervention then becomes a complex project, involving a high
degree of critical reflectivity. The first step is to make the values guiding such
theory, research, and intervention more transparent.

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Elli P. Schachter teaches at the School of Education, Bar Ilan University, Israel. He holds
a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was a post-
doctoral fellow at the Mandel Institute for Leadership. His research interests include
identity development, especially religious and cultural identity development vis-à-vis
postmodernity; parents and schools as active and reflective agents of identity formation;
and the personal meaning of religiosity as this is manifest in life stories.

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