Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining
with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands
it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would
be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives
nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment
the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to
every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn
officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these
reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to
cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of
scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to
the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a
far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to
all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the
first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to
aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything,
to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired
in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his
great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of
a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader
in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope
than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to
individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of
severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had,
by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very
least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant
was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take
the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge
Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit
for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents
or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks
(Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of
maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively. [9]
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-
Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that
on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and
requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and
0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-
Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15,
1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that
he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to
Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as
shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially
considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and
Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent. [13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any
truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their
commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had
allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already
been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given
them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with
them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in
any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly
private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He
maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay
rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:
In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Rizal respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and
then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business
venture.
Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E.
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by
them in their business venture.
The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before
this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two
separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that
correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two
checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and
46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241 and
0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have been
issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What
building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor,
according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of your
client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As
between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more
credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving
the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his
version of the transaction with complainants.
Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously
and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors.
Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.
Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan
of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears
to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who
had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent
does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between the parties.
In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to pay interest.
That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used
for a business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent
does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of
complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt
for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the
money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really
cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public
prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the criminal
cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of
complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his
actions.[15]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. [16] It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.[17] A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
[or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. [19] Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private
lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree
of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they
had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the
P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that they
had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a
careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to
Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan
had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, [24] he was not able to
return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by
petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their
blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all
and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already
been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material
gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the
temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have
them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them.
As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months [26] because of the
Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He
committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of
the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is
equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Lawyers must be
ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. [33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing
deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention
of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it
appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious
inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the
SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein
respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and
thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office
of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy
be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
321
[October 2, 1933]
FELIX MELEGRITO, complainant, vs. EUSEBIO C. BARBA, respondent.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; MALPRACTICE; SUSPENSION FROM PRACTICE OF LAW.—The
respondent attorney is guilty of malpractice. He collected several thousand pesos from the
complainants for the purpose of taking their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States, but he
never removed said cases to that court or attempted to do so, because the decision of this court had
already become final and unappealable, and he was guilty of deceit in concealing that fact from the
complainants while collecting fees from them for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Eusebio C. Barba in his own behalf.
Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
514
514 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Melegrito vs. Barba
VlCKERS, J.:
These charges of malpractice filed by Felix Melegrito on behalf of himself and 230 other persons against
Attorney Eusebio C. Barba were referred in due course to the Solicitor-General for investigation and
report. As the complainants were residents of the Province of Tarlac, the Solicitor-General entrusted the
investigation to the fiscal of that province. At the instance of the respondent the investigation, after being
transferred several times, was set for April 4, 1933, but the respondent did not appear on that date. The
complainants, accompanied by an attorney, appeared and presented their evidence, consisting of the
testimony of Felix Melegrito and various exhibits. The provincial fiscal found the respondent attorney
guilty of serious malpractice committed by def rauding the complainants of P8,226, and recommended
that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and ordered to return said amount to the
complainants. The Solicitor-General in submitting his report to this court said:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence, oral as well as documentary, presented by the complainant
in the case, the undersigned has found that the conclusions of the provincial fiscal are supported by the
evidence of record, and, accordingly, concurs in his recommendation."
It appears from an examination of the record that Francisco Gonzales, the owner of the greater part of the
"Hacienda Esperanza", transferred certain portions of it to his daughters Ramona, Guadalupe, Cristina,
and Aurea Gonzales, and that in 1914 his daughters filed separate applications in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija for the registration of their respective portions of the hacienda. The registration
was opposed by Felix Melegrito and more than 230 other persons. In due course the opposition was
overruled and the registration of the lands in the name of the applicants was ordered. The cases were
appealed to this court, which remanded them to the lower court for a new trial and for amendment of the
plans.
515
VOL. 58, OCTOBER 2, 1933 515
Melegrito vs. Barba
The four cases were then consolidated with cadastral case No. 22 of the Province of Nueva Ecija, which
had been instituted in the meantime. After additional evidence had been presented, the lower court again
decided in favor of the applicants. From that decision four groups of opponents appealed to this court, which
affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1929 (G. R. Nos. 2887579). 1
In February, 1930, the complainants engaged the respondent attorney to appeal their cases to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and agreed to pay him P6,500. The respondent sailed for the United States in
October, 1930, and returned in March, 1931. While in the United States he went to Washington and secured
a letter of introduction from the Vice-President of the United States to the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands in the hope of being appointed a member of the Governor-General's staff. It does not
appear that the respondent made any attempt, either in Manila or in Washington, to take the cases of the
complainants to the Supreme Court of the United States, because, as the respondent states, the decision
of this court had become final and unappealable, and the records had been returned to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. The only thing which the respondent did, after examining the record, before leaving
for the United States, was to go to Tarlac and have the complainants sign affidavits respecting their claims
to the land, f or which he collected P2.50 from each of the complainants; seven months after his return from
the United States, when the complainants had already demanded the return of the money which they had
paid him, the respondent petitioned the Governor-General to order a survey of the boundary line between
Nueva Ecija and Tarlac Provinces. The object of this petition, the respondent asserts, was to show that the
lands claimed by Felix Melegrito et al. were not situated in Nueva Ecija Province, but in Tarlac. The
complainants inf ormed the Governor-General that they were not
_______________
1 Gonzalez vs. Domingo, not reported.
516
516 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Melegrito vs. Barba
interested in having the boundary line between the two provinces surveyed, but in recovering the money
which they had paid the respondent.
Felix Melegrito testified at the investigation that he and the other complainants had paid the respondent or
his agents a total sum of P8,226. Four thousand two hundred and twenty-eight pesos (P4,228) of this
amount is supported by receipts signed by the respondent or his authorized agents. The respondent denies
having received the sum of P8,226 or any such sum, but in his answer of December 29, 1932 he admitted
that he had received P2,185.
The respondent alleges that after examining the records of the land registration cases, which had already
been returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, he told the complainants that the decision of
this court had already become final and could not be appealed, and that the amount involved in the different
cases was not sufficient to entitle the claimants to a review in the Supreme Court of the United States, and
that in case of an appeal it would be necessary for the appellants to file a supersedeas bond, which they
said they were unable to do. Although the decision of this court appears to have been final and
unappealable when the complainants consulted the respondent, we are satisfied that he never so informed
them, but on the contrary led them to believe that the cases could be taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and that to prosecute the appeal to the best advantage it was necessary for him to go to
Washington. The respondent now maintains that he went to the United States for the purpose of revisiting
his alma-mater in Kansas and securing the capital necessary for the development of a gold mine, and that
he went to the United States at his own expense, but the receipts, Exhibits B, B-1 to B-6, show that the
respondent collected at least P3,530 before he sailed for the United States; that in September, 1930, the
respondent wrote a letter to Felix Melegrito, Exhibit F, inquiring whether the voyage was to be made or not,
and urging Melegrito to advance P1,000 for the account of the respondent's compadre
517
VOL. 58, OCTOBER 2, 1933 517
Melegrito vs. Barba
in order to make up the agreed amount. The respondent said that he wished to reach Washington by
Christmas. After the respondent had sailed his wife and his agent; Benito Diaz, collected further sums from
the complainants. Felix Melegrito went to the boat with the respondent when he sailed for the United States;
and respondent's wife and his agent in their letters to the complainants refer to respondent's voyage and
his arrival in Washington.
The respondent attorney is guilty of malpractice. He collected several thousand pesos from the
complainants for the purpose of taking their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States, but he never
removed said cases to that court or attempted to do so, because the decision of this court had already
become final and unappealable, and he was guilty of deceit in concealing that f act f rom the complainants
while collecting fees from them for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office. It appears from the testimony of Felix Melegrito that in April, 1931, he made a demand on the
respondent for the return of the money which the complainants had paid him, and the respondent promised
to repay the sum of P1,500 at once and the remainder at the rate of P50 a month, but that the respondent
has never repaid any sum to the complainants.
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
years from this date and until he shall have repaid to the complainants the sum of P4,228, payment thereof
to be evidenced by receipts in due f orm, which shall be attached to the record of this case.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for two years.
Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to the filing of the complaint.
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua Yap Ans legal
counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a
building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents family, and
another property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City
(Melencio property), also owned by respondents family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their
house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondents mother Felicisima
Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she
obtained.
As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua
and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation in consideration for which the
Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.
Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their business partner, herein co-
complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40.
A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] conveying the Melencio property for
P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M.
Melencio, in favor of complainants.
As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted
respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax.
As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 [if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M.
Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA properties,
Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on
account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18, 1986,
acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title over the Melencio property.
Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one
Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] dated February 20, 1986 before the
Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging respondents mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia
and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and
violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a
lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that
contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his
exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the
true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax.
Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was
antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He
proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein
complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1,
1986[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00.
A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners
copy of which was entrusted to complainants.
Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office an Affidavit of Desistance
dated September 5, 1986[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of
mere misunderstanding and difference with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no
sufficient evidence against them.
Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told them that he would
borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs.
Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave
complainants a written undertaking[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] dated May 2, 1990 reading:
Received the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383 issued by the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City
registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina, widow, consisting of about 854 square meters more or less
located at calle Melencio, Cabanatuan City from Mrs. Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia.
I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of the above-mentioned property in favor of Ana
Chua and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof
so that the above-mentioned property and title maybe transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina
Hsia. (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991.
Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do
so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public.
The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed on August 24, 1992 a Complaint [if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] against respondent and his two siblings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property.
As of the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint in 1998, the civil case against the
Mesina siblings was still pending.
This Court, by Resolution of July 13, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] directed respondent to file Comment on
the complaint within ten days.
By Resolution of December 2, 1998,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] this Court, noting that the copy of the Resolution
of July 13, 1998 requiring respondent to comment on the complaint sent to him at his office address at S.
M. Mesina Law Office, 30 Jupiter St., Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air Subd., Makati City was returned unserved
with the notation Moved, considered the Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by substituted
service pursuant to Rule 13, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent was accordingly
deemed to have waived the filing of the required comment.
By the same Resolution of December 2, 1998, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days.
The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing on September 14, 2001,[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
copy of which was sent to respondent at his office address via registered mail, covered by Registry
Receipt No. 2605 of the Meralco Post Office.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] On the scheduled date of hearing,
complainants personally appeared with their counsel. Respondent failed to show up.
Given the length of time that the case remained pending from its filing, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, by Order of October 12, 2001,[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] directed complainants to just file their
position paper with affidavits and supporting documents in lieu of actual presentation of witnesses and to
serve a copy thereof to respondent at his last known address.
In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April 1, 2002 their position paper,[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif] annexed to which were photocopies of: 1) a May 5, 1993 Certification [if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] issued by the Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that it issued the demand
drafts to the payees enumerated below, which were debited from the account of Mr. Chua Yap An under
Savings Account No. 760:
D/D No. Payee Amount Date of Issue
EN BANC
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Adm. Case No. 2474
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Present:
Complainant,
[IF !SUPPORTEMPTYPARAS] [ENDIF]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
*AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] CORONA,
*CARPIO MORALES,
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, and
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif] **CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Respondent.
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
DECISION
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
PER CURIAM:
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City
a petition[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] for declaration of
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P. In the
Decision[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint [if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] for
disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and his family
and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her.
The great disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and
respondent gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her
scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a married
man with three (3) children;
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her
travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for complainant. To break
down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that
there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
SO ORDERED.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, [if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral
character is always an indispensable requirement.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage
with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the
other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong
Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the
time of respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin,
Elizabeths classmate and family friend.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with
a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] Measured against this definition, respondents act is
manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent
young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then
resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by
respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such, there can be no other fate that
awaits respondent than to be disbarred.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman
and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession, warranting respondents disbarment.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] respondent married complainant while his first wife was
still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated
marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
(5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and
spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this,
respondent was disbarred.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and
resumed cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming
carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting
disbarment.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It
was respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made
possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal
affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night,
he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by securing a plane
ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without
complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is
legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he
cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the
sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa
when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have
done was to walk away.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student
of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. [if
!supportFootnotes][32][endif] Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the
country has to take before he is allowed to practice.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty
of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The
bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his
oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this
Decision.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
SO ORDERED.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice