RULE 102

Habeas Corpus

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.

Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
`Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and
at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and
verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:

(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;

(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are
unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the
person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;

(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;

(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without
impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal
authority, such fact shall appear.

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Not shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. — A court or judge authorized to grant the writ must,
when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith,
and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of
emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute any officer or person to serve
it.

Section 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. — In case of imprisonment or restraint by an
officer, the writ shall be directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained
of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case
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of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall
command him to take and have the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon the person by whom he is
restrained then and there to appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or
restraint.

Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. — The person to be produced should be designated in
the writ by his name, if known, but if his name is not known he may be otherwise described or identified.
The writ may be served in any province by the sheriff or other proper officer, or by a person deputed by the
court or judge. Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the original with the person to whom it is
directed and preserving a copy on which to make return or service. If that person cannot be found, or has not
the prisoner in his custody, then the service shall be made on any other person having or exercising such
custody.

Section 8. How writ executed and returned. — The officer to whom the writ is directed shall convey the
person so imprisoned or restrained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ, or in case of
his absence or disability, before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ, unless,
from sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such person cannot, without danger, be
bought before the court or judge; and the officer shall make due return of the writ, together with the day and
the cause of the caption and restraint of such person according to the command thereof.

Section 9. Defect of form. — No writ of habeas corpus can be disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently
appears therefrom in whose custody or under whose restraint the party imprisoned or restrained is held and
the court or judge before whom he is to be bought.

Section 10. Contents of return. — When the person to be produced is imprisoned or restrained by an officer,
the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the
prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and
unequivocably:

(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or under restraint;

(b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the authority and the true and
whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order execution, or other process, if
any, upon which the party is held;

(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and is not produced, particularly
the nature and gravity of the sickness or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot,
without danger, be bought before the court or judge;

(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, and has transferred such
custody or restraint to another, particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what
authority such transfer was made.

Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to. — The return or statement shall be signed by the person who
makes it; and shall also be sworn by him if the prisoner is not produced, and in all other cases unless the
return is made and signed by a sworn public officer in his official capacity.

Section 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments. — When the writ is returned before one judge, at a time
when the court is in session, he may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and
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determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned or adjourned must immediately proceed to
hear and examine the return, and such other matters as are properly submitted for consideration, unless for
good cause shown the hearing is adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order for the
safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the nature of the case requires. If the person
imprisoned or restrained is not produced because of his alleged sickness or infirmity, the court or judge must
be satisfied that it is so grave that such person cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear
and dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall disregard matters of form and
technicalities in respect to any warrant or order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit by
law.

Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that the prisoner is in custody
under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be
considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such
facts.

Section 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. — If it appears that the
prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with
an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned
or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to
imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall
forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of
the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the
offense is properly cognizable to abide its order of judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the
proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner
shall be recommitted to confinement.

Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the court or judge has examined into the cause
of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he
shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy
of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining
the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.

Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. — A clerk of a court who refuses
to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who
neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false
return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person
demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of
commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recorded in a proper
action, and may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt.

Section 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned. — A person who is set at liberty upon a writ
of habeas corpus shall not be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order or process of
a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense; and a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions
of this rule, recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned, for the same offense, or
pretended offense, any person so set at liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit to the party
aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, notwithstanding any colorable
pretense or variation in the warrant of commitment, and may also be punished by the court or judge granting
the writ as for contempt.

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Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another. — A person committed to prison,
or in custody of an officer, for any criminal matter, shall not be removed therefrom into the custody of
another unless by legal process, or the prisoner be delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail, or, by order
of the proper court or judge, be removed from one place to another within the Philippines for trial, or in case
of fire epidemic, insurrection, or other necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after such
commitment, makes signs, or counter-signs any order for such removal contrary to this section, shall forfeit
to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action.

Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. — The proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus shall be
recorded by the clerk of the court, and upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall
make such order as to costs as the case requires. The fees of officers and witnesses shall be included in the
costs taxed, but no officer or person shall have the right to demand payment in advance of any fees to which
he is entitled by virtue of the proceedings. When a person confined under color of proceedings in a criminal
case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the Philippines, and paid out of its
Treasury; when a person in custody by virtue or under color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, the
costs shall be taxed against him, or against the person who signed the application for the writ, or both, as the
court shall direct.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application
for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of
triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of
our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose
for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set
up in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable
reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill
repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16
and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor
for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the
coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for
a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board
the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The
governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the
women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these
women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not
essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others

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assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others
assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao,
the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application
for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of
the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the
same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set
forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of
their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal
appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties,
because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of
Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control,
and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an
exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a
member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court
awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to
be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of
counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf
the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who
had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret
service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated
the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city
of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits
showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao,
and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he
did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which
related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor
explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought
before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the
women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the
clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal
motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final
decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives
and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court

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sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On
January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to
the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents.
Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents,
through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to
Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already
returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located.
Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally
asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al
memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck
from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final
decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from
society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown
by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these
officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the
Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another
distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The
Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519
of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for
the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899
authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the
homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge
of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel
vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done
pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints
at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to
change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a

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principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require
a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the
United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such
arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality,
who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the
presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same
privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And
if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a
prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country,
then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned,
or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna
Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106
U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one
man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning
that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of
laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three:
(1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It
may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and
promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force
in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant
from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty
pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character
in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall
suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more
than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

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We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any
public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal
prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the
act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant
proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a
monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it
could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely
until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ,
whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the
Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of
their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of
police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women
from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of
the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women
to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in
their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its
zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had
standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or
should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid
unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance
of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court.
On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents
with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of
the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to
grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for,
says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed,
were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to
be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

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A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region,
deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed
in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold
his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over
this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong
that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain
a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of
liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless,
strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain
decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a
writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to
bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained
in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed
of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the
court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a
large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English
courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley
are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the
petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have
been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many
confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by
the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion
of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole

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 instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without
delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject
being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment
within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction.
It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the
observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is
directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set
the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint.
The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be
resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of
affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are
usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within
reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The
difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell
[1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50
Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of
English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the
application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at
chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that
the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court.
On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded
the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice
immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and
detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some
lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by
reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ,
the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence
of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the
Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to
shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done
at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ
it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo
[1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com.
Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

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A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the
defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause
of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves
in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before
the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody.
The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply
for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was
bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that
he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of
two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis
produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622,
Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p.
170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court
awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be
punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano
Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated
November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the
writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November
before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for
the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;
or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in
whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in
the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced
at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in
finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order.
Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be
fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the
Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take

12 | P a g e
the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do
much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court
would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did
not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court
forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and
the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while
a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to
conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced
somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further
in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax,
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to
produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its
authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined.
An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has
power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re
Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot
say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court
by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them
entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been
drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal,
Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the
city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the
record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position,
must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily
responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of
Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of
the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to

13 | P a g e
suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to
the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the
parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to
deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be
possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he
has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the
first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that
his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command
such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court.
Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme
Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila
to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted.
Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this
decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual
liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas
corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.

There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great
number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district
of Sampaloc, to change their residence.

We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of
prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred
and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that
the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the
mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which
constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the
city of Manila.

14 | P a g e
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order
of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to the distant district of
Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or
the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return to
their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to
Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they
may return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia
Street.

As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any
apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the city and his
subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who were free
at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the
said women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really detained, but because
on the first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one another,
and as a proof that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living
separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted
in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and to oblige them to
change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and
especially of the patrons who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and
shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous
people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants
thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without
repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.

If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be
taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to establish a house of
pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws
prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and
dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting correctly,
in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution
ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is
inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing
his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.

A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his
favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights, should the administrative
authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to
free from contagious the great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such
diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to
prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their
diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily
adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that
their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they
are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal
disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is still prejudicial to the
human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid,
and other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.

15 | P a g e
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her
sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman who is
usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously
dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own
knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident
that she can not join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to
the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights
enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised
within that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance
of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not
permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions adopted
by the administrative authorities.

It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been
worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which being a very drastic
remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the
inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the
authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure
the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life
they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of the city
who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the
step he had taken, availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of
protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years
a true center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering
the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of the
inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty
and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the
said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free
practice of their shameful profession.

In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities
similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people,
although it is true that in the execution of such measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter
in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate
object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a
certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope
that they adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.

In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to
take back and restore the said women who are at present found in Davao, and who desire to return to their
former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes
who should expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which
manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest
time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.

ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:

16 | P a g e
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings,
with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed, according to the same decision,
by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of
P100.

In the said decision, it is said:

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The
order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do
so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents, for
the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons
according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the
said women could not safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said
respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not
show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be present by those
interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented with
their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return.
That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the
municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at
the second hearing by the respondents."

The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made,
would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending
them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from
sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's
Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce
the women was made by the respondents."

When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion
was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order
referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before
the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was
impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this
second order, the same decision has the following to say:

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous
and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the
constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested

17 | P a g e
 case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.

I do not agree to this conclusion.

The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance
of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking the first step for compliance
with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent
a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the
decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said
order was not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven
of the said women having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December
and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who
was then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the court by
the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was
called to this particular by the undersigned.

The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January
13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this court, presented technically the seven (7)
women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women
whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates
succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81)
women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right,
as is shown in the affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine
(59) women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not
possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and
eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban
and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have been brought
to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-
nine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six
of whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said
attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these
numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we
have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their
inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not
desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first named, that is
Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders
issued by this court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as
before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74)
women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the
majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and
the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor
brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment,
with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially
complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not complied
with the mandate of this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied
with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority
decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said
respondent with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the

18 | P a g e
first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the
production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally
detained by virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26)
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of
the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the
question whether they should or not be granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to
the same nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the
said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and
lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas
corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said
proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.

Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court;
and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)

It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt,
unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)

It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to
obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of process by
deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had
obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)

While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for
the law and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing justice, since true
respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the
courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts
that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it.
Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the courts as ministers of the law is
wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual
respect as to compel obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the
administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)

The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest
times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or
his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for
contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some
degree so far as the legislative department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost
universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have of
vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or
not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has been
declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. .
. . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)

The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of
the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might have been caused by
noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might
have been suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought
to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them were

19 | P a g e
obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney
for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the delay
which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which
was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are
circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the
penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding
months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into
consideration the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of
the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the
first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly
constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and
aid to the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the
respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against
him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted
to the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he
may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the
provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution
and punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the
women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton
Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were
in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be
realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a government
of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and
to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.

20 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police
and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.

ISSUE:

WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD:

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished.

21 | P a g e
G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner for
the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 which dismissed his petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the Philippines v.
Glenn Caballes2for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to
Branch 169, presided by Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-
bailable offense, he was detained.

The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The
prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother.
The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the same.
In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered
his appearance as defense counsel.3

During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed to
terminate the same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-examination
of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date did not proceed. The
trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner continued with his cross-examination
of the private complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On
April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The prosecution declared that its next
witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the private complainant, but
stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the trial scheduled on
April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on
him. The petitioner conformed to the motion of the prosecution.

On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.4

The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioner’s counsel filed a Manifestation5 that his
presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he reserved his right
to cross-examine any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that date; on the
other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he would be available in May 2003 and
during the first half of June 2003.

22 | P a g e
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the prosecution ten (10)
days to file its opposition6 to the petitioner’s petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance of
a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.

On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion7 seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial
under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail.8

On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19, 2003
be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the prosecution filed its
comment/opposition10 to the petitioner’s petition for bail.

On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its
resolution and denying the petitioner’s motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court
issued its Order12 denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner
was strong.

During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the meantime,
he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive the subpoena issued to him by the
court. The prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to speedy
trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial to July 17, 2003.

On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez
requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.13

On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16, 2003
denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the petitioner
preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss14 the case on July
11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He made the following allegations:

1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one month
apart;

2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a
Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be "any Monday,
Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on May
14 and 21" – yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or
beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2 months away, but
which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;

3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause" as to how come he was not
able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid,
his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;

4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than
one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started; neither has there been any authorization from
the Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;

5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting continuance that
"the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial;"
23 | P a g e
 6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the Honorable Court
in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they
had not.15

Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court, because of
which the prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July 17, 2003. The
prosecution prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however,
granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.16

On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid being
misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial
administration of justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio,
who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of Judge Laurea’s Order dated July 24, 2003, which the latter denied,
on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to reconsider the same.19

During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutor’s motion to be
given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the
trial on September 18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order21 denying the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to
speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution
alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.

Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the petition for
bail, the trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing of his
motion to dismiss the case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on his
petition for bail.

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition."22 On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring the
petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In
compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his
petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant application of
certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas
corpus."

The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court
committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had
prejudged the case against him.

On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.23

According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be treated as
a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings
24 | P a g e
before the trial court and as a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive situation in the trial court.
The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could not exercise its
certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that
the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court
declared that the petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any intentional or
deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to
promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted that the
resetting of petitioner’s case may also be attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC involved.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the congestion of
the trial court’s calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court failed to secure
an extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should have given a
precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was proper because his continued detention had become illegal, following the prosecutor and the
trial court’s violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ of habeas
corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, the CA denied the
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reiterating the
grounds contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that the
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in rendering
its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s order denying his petition for bail, motion to
dismiss the case, and Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not
deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well as under the Speedy Trial Act.

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final and
executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a writ
if habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the affirmative,
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner’s recourse to this Court via a petition for certiorari
from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate. Section 39
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas
corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from. While the said
provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001,
thus:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

25 | P a g e
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled
rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the
special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.24 An appeal in this case would
still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this
Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.

It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other
proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of
error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.25

Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into
the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest
a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he
thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.27

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The
inquiry in a habeas corpusproceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the
assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.29 The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides
for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30 The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case,
it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law
and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject
to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed.31 It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities,
which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such
cases, the restraint is not illegal.32

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention
may be inquired into and his statements final.33 The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner
who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority.34 Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive
the petitioner of his liberty.35 The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled
thereto ex merito justicias.36

26 | P a g e
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does not
issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on
proper formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a
complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint.38 The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.39

Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a "petition
for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari" The petitioner assailed therein the
orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge Laurea’s order of
inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the
special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special
actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a
special civil action.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different
from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ
of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while
certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be considered
in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the
record. However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body
of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which
the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e.,
it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of
certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial
determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions
pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly complained of.40

The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition for habeas
corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to
the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and
was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.41 There is no question that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority
and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him
dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente
lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus by the appellate court.1a\^/phi1.net

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial thereof:

… The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial

27 | P a g e
court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first
applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.43

The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to file a
petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done so, his petition would have
been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial court, it failed to summarize the
testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid.45 The trial court
would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the testimonies of the private complainant
and her mother, including its findings and conclusions. However, the petitioner would still not be entitled to
be released from detention in the meantime.

It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13746 of the Rules of Court, the
voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons, the primary
consideration being that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.47 The petitioner should
have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of a petition for habeas corpus.

In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy lies in the
procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 8. Sanctions.— In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the
prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be
unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the
court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused,
a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00); and

(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying
the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this
section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction
authorized under these Rules.

If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in
granting the prosecution’s motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioner’s objections, the more
appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to

28 | P a g e
compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and termination of
the case.

It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the said
Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it cannot be
gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:

The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused to
speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends that the failure of the prosecution to present the
medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-appearance of the private
prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of this case.

The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has not
yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the light of the
unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the defense do not
touch on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.

After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable.l^vvphi1.net The alleged delay and
failure to present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution and/or the
Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the medico-legal officer to appear
inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed by
defense counsel that violated accused’ right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the prosecution. In
fact, the defense, contributed to the delay since the former defense counsel and even the present defense
counsel sought postponements of the hearings.

Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch 169)
proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause of the accused)
on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several jurisprudence to this
effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he has filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding Judge who denied the Petition for Bail
voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing, the
Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the parties to stipulate on the medical
findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense with his presentation. Defense counsel, however,
would not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.48

We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one is
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution and of his right to due process.49 However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to a
speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he filed
his petition for habeas corpus.

Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the occasion to state –

29 | P a g e
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere
speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but
deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but
it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the
accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to
a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the
light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the
Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if
the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of
anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed,
and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its
burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and
(b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different
weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily
against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical
advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the
prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.

30 | P a g e
In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to present only
two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private complainant by the
year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason for the delay because the records of the RTC are not
before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is there any showing that the
counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay. Aside from the petitioner’s claim that the private
prosecutor failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez during the trial dates
April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003
with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support his claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this
Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because
he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioner’s counsel gave priority to the execution sale and
asked for a resetting despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-heinous crime.
While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more than one month from April 30, 2003, the
petitioner’s counsel himself manifested that he was available for trial during the first half of June 2003.
There was a difference of only four (4) days from the trial date set by the court and the available dates
suggested by the petitioner’s counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set solely at the
convenience of the petitioner’s counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the
prosecutor must also be taken into account.1ªvvphi1.nét

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence during the trial
of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in contempt of
court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to
establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to
prejudice him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

31 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

1. RTC: Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor (Pio)
a. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.
2. The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
a. (The facts below are about the speedy trial issue. Just in case lang)
b. The petitioner’s original counsel commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to
complete the same.
c. Petitioner’s new counsel continued his cross-examination of Pio but still failed to terminate
the same.
d. The trial was set to terminate the cross-examination of Pio but once again failed due to the
illness of the private prosecutor. Trial was further reset to another date.
e. Thereafter, the prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Marquez, the
Medico-Legal Officer of PNP, who had conducted an examination of the private
complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. Trial was rescheduled.
f. The rescheduled trial did not proceed because petitioner’s counsel filed a manifestation
that he was required to be present in an execution sale. Rescheduled again.
g. Dr. Marquez failed to receive the subpoena. Rescheduled.
h. Subpoena was issued again against the doctor. Still, the doctor failed to receive.
Rescheduled.
i. The Judge issued an order to be replaced. Rescheduled.
3. Petitioner filed a petition for bail.
a. The trial court denied the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the
petitioner was strong.
4. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Order denying his petition for bail.
a. However, the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed
a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been
violated.
5. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
a. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial,
considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution
alone.
b. The motion for reconsideration was considered to be abandoned upon filing of motion to
dismiss by the petitioner.
6. CA: The petitioner filed a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition."
a. CA asked which remedy would petitioner avail between Habeas Corpus and Certiorari.
Petitioner chose Habeas Corpus.
b. The petitioner averred that (1) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) the trial court committed
grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail.
7. PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is DISMISSED. According to the appellate court:
a. It was not the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial court as
a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive situation in the trial court.
b. A writ of habeas corpus is NOT a writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari
jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and
that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and purpose.
8. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration – DENIED
9. Hence, this petition (certiorari - rule 65)
32 | P a g e
ISSUE#1: Whether the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a writ of habeas
corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;

HELD: No. Petitioner should have filed an appeal instead.

 The resort to a petition for certiorari is inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.
 Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration
thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
 The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of
appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari
cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of
the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two
remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate
remedy.
 Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already
final and executory.

ISSUE#2: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.

HELD: No. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no question that the trial
court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the
authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against
him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his
incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances
warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court

About Habeas Corpus:

 A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Laurea.
 Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into
the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure
freedom. When a prisoner petitioner for a writ of HC, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a
case in that court.

33 | P a g e
  Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on
the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.
 Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the
sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the
unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
 A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which
does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a
writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the
criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object
of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under
which a person is held.
 We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special
civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules. We also
agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Writ of Habeas Corpus Certiorari

The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional
the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial errors. It has no other use, except to bring before
court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said the court a record material to be considered in
processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of exercising jurisdiction.
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a writ of habeas A writ of certiorari reaches the record
corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach
the record.

34 | P a g e
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if one
is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution and of his right to due process. However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his right to a
speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he filed
his petition for habeas corpus.

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence during the trial
of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in contempt of
court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner failed to
establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to
prejudice him.

PETITION DENIED!

35 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995

DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL
INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of LAWRENCE A.
LARKINS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity,1 was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief from
illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them
from unlawful custody. It is then essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a
person is detained.3

Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. It is not available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the
said Rule which reads:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February 1995 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273,5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release Lawrence A.
Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative relief of certiorari.

The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the parties are
neither complicated nor disputed.

36 | P a g e
On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases
Nos. 101189-92 for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against
her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.6

Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and
Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994
and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. 7 Larkins was then
detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge
Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September
1993 and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless
otherwise detained for some other cause."

Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for
another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.

On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea.8 It contains a
certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his
right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ."
The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 94-11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.

On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bail9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no
carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated
nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the
country or hiding away from the law.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No.
94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release,10 principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous
opposition from the private complainant.11

In the order of 5 January 1995,12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:

After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the Court
finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant
him bail. The filing of this case against the accused, which is [a] very serious offense,
justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a hold departure order.

WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and as prayed
for by the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to
include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its hold order departure list until
further order from this Court.
37 | P a g e
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners
and Judge Felix S. Caballes.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution13 ordering the respondents therein to appear and
produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why
Larkins' liberty is being restrained.

On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at the
hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General
representing the People of the Philippines made no appearance.15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not
received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared
with her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer
for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. 16

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision, holding
that:

From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate release of
Larkins from his present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI
by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant
of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.

Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after the NBI
was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in connection with the BP
22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information had been filed or pending in any court.
It was only sometime between November 25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was
approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on
the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the
complaint for rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.

The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because
Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for
bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the
mere filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which
are the only two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge
Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not qualify as such. She asserts that the
petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan17 because that case did not rule that the writ
is no longer available after an information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is filed against the
person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has
jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce
Enrile,18 adverted to in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or
at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."

38 | P a g e
We find for the petitioners.

But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into the propriety of the
petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common-law spouse,
Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term
"some person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally
justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization
to make the application.20 She is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the
petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for
bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.

It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas
corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there
is an adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in
exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify
form over substance.21 It must be kept in mind that although the question most often considered in
both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the
former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the
latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."22

And now on the merits of the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of
Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application
for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila,23 this Court
held:

[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is
hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice. (emphasis supplied)

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in
the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows:
"Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in
the Philippines."

Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons,24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar claimed
to have been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint or information filed against
them, this Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the petition they

39 | P a g e
had already been charged with the crime of treason and confined by reason thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor-
Santiago25 reiterates Matsura.

In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become academic
because the information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had
already been filed and a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have originally
infected his detention had been cured.

In Umil vs. Ramos27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ
of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any
court. Thus:

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102,
Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from
imprisonment under lawful judgment.28 (emphasis supplied)

It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the
court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero,29 this Court stated:

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower
court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him. (emphasis supplied)

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import
and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of
bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case
of Carrington vs. Peterson,30 this Court declared:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a

warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction
of the court he must raise the question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or
pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

In United States vs. Grant,31 this Court held:

Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason that no probable
cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to
the same by appearing and giving bond.

40 | P a g e
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail,
Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for
Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere
afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his
person.

Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal
assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of
the word order under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . .
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."

The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile32 which
must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only two
recognized processeswhich justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment order and (2) warrant of
arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its application to
the first part of the first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted restriction
of the term process. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are but species of judicial process.

In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,33 this Court stated:

Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing
issued by authority of law; also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of courts of justice or judicial
officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a judicial
proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce
the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.

In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe,34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris' definition of the term "process," to
wit:

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and many
meanings. In its broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with "proceedings" or
procedure and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to
its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court
compels a compliance with its demands. (50 C.J. 441)

We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within the meaning
of Section 4 of Rule 102.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will
not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the
complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents
relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose
that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to

41 | P a g e
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and
(2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an
afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal
(now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the
complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that
the said complaint was actually filed in court.

Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits
nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit
to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should make no
shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of
accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia35 needs
to be repeated:

It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a person
deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected. The good name of
the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part, by such inefficiency or
inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken against its repetition. Otherwise, the
parties responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay themselves open to the accusation
that the greatest danger to constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal,
concededly well-meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule
of law.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court's
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised
after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order
would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain
the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail.38 It was thus incumbent
upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this
procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the
scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out
of the country.39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1 February
1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

42 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of February1, 1995 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273, a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release Lawrence A. Larkins
from their custody and declaring moot the alternative relief of certiorari.

On September 16 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins.

On November 20, 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the NBI a complaint-affidavit
accusing Larkins of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed against her on November 19, 1994, acting on
the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and Antonio M.
Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, and arrested the latter, who was
thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of
the NBI,Taft Avenue, Manila.

On Nov. 22, 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4, 000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina
forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on September 16, 1993 and
directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement unless otherwise
detained for some other cause but the Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins
because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held
for examination.

Larkins, through his counsel Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he alleged, that the evidence of
guilt against him for rape is not strong; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no
intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law. Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, filed in an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, but the said motion was denied
by the trial court. Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S.
Caballes. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution ordering the respondents therein to appear
and produce Larkins before the court on January 31, 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins'
liberty is being restrained. On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and
produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. The Office of the
Solicitor General representing the People of the Philippines made no appearance. On the other hand, the
petitioner, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the court order the
release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be deemed abandoned. After hearing the
arguments the Court of Appeal resolve to order the immediate release of Larkins from his present
confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the
basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/s:

-WON the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will still be granted due to Larkins’ illegal arrest and
confinement.

43 | P a g e
RULLING:

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will
not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the
complaint against him and by the issuance of the January 5, 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents
relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose
that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112 and
(2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities within 36 hours, the crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an afflictive
penalty. Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a city jail, Larkins was
brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party
was executed on November 23, 1994, it was not until December 2, 1994 that the said complaint was actually
filed in court.Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said
provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of their duty and in their
commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement
authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the constitutional
and statutory rights of accused persons.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court's
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised
after evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose. The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order
would be defective and voidable. In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. It was thus incumbent upon the
trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural
shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled
hearing on Decenber 5, 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the
country.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of February 1,
1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

44 | P a g e
 DIVISION

[ GR No. 197597, Apr 08, 2015 ]

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO v.

WARDEN +

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases,
the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

This is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision[2] reversing the Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.

From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were
allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.[4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited and prayed in the
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."[5] He returned to the Philippines on December 20,
2009.[6]

On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.[7]

Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the
November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.[8]

Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23,
2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.[9]

To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes
and other documents"[10]tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from
November 7 to December 19, 2009.[11]

The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S.
Malang.[12]

Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that
evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu
Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.[13]

The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City,
where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.[14]

On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
45 | P a g e
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.[15]

On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.[17] He maintained that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang.[18]

In the Resolution[19] dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City
(Taguig Hall of Justice).[20] The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file
a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00
a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.[21]

Proceedings before the trial court

On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the trial court.
The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel
during the hearing.[22]

Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.[23]

On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the September 29, 2010
hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering
Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.[24]

Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that
only the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas
corpus proceeding.[25]

The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the Return to
October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.[26]

The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on
behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus
should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition
for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."[27]

Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of
Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused.
Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the
Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention.[28]

The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under any resolution, information, or
amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not
charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of
Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.[30]

The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in
connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August
27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.[31] A

46 | P a g e
Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan Malang Salibo."[32]

Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"[33] from November 7,
2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification[34] from Saudi Arabian Airlines
confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.[35] A Flight Manifest issued by
the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.[36]

Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus
and ordered his immediate release from detention.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal[37] by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
Decision.[38] Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.

Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention
were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.[39] Even assuming that Salibo was not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"[40] According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.[41]

Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution[43] dated
July 6, 2011.

Proceedings before this court

On July 28, 2011,[44] petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent
Application for a Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,[45] after which petitioner Salibo filed a
Reply.[46]

Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he,
Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and,
therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.[47]

Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed a
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal
before this court.[48]

As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming
that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have
pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.[49]

The issues for our resolution are:

47 | P a g e
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's
proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

We grant the Petition.

Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of
its members,[50] the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law,[51] or the
Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.[52] The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.[53] A
hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.[54]

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.[55] Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed
to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power
and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]"[56]Therefore, the decision on the
petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court.[57]

In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,[58] "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court [o]n behalf of
Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."[59]This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.[60]

After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for
Habeas Corpus.[61]

Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for Habeas
Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"[62] Consequently, "this Court
should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] should be
regarded as operative."[63]

This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real."[64] It ruled that
when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves whether the
respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition
was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.[65] However, once the superior court makes
the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not
thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of
effect[.]"[66] The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the
superior court.

In Medina v. Gen. Yan,[67] Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention.[68]

48 | P a g e
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.[69]

Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of
Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.[70]

This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the
Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.[71] The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's
Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the
case[.]"[72] Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's Petition for
Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.[73]

In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the
merits.

Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the
decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,[75] respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court
of Appeals.

II

Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"[76] the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom."[77] The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary[78] and summary[79] in nature, consistent
with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."[80]

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."[81] The primary purpose of the writ "is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal."[82] "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."[83]

The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the
efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy[84] or when there is an
alleged violation of the liberty of abode.[85] In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the
implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.[86] Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious
and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
labyrinth of other processes.[87]

In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,[88] Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol
(Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares)
were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their respective
sentences of reclusion perpetua.[89]

49 | P a g e
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this court
promulgated People v. Hernandez[90] in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with murder does
not exist.[91]

Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine
must retroactively apply to them.[92]

This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a petition for
habeas corpus.[93] Citing Harris v. Nelson,[94] this court said:

[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected.[95]
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,[96] the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25,
Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and compelled
them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who
refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.[97]

An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans
being held in the reservation.[98] Since the application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of
Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board
of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.[99]

A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.[100] "[T]o exterminate
vice,"[101] Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex workers
previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women
were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.[102]

On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban,
however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.[103]

This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the Writ.[104] As to
the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had
deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile.[105] It said that the women,
"despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]"[106] The women had the right "to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality."[107]

The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is
the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty.
On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.

Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of
the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of
50 | P a g e
any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its
issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"[108] Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it,[109] the writ itself may not be
suspended.[110]

III

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.[111] The restraint then has become legal,[112] and the
remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.[113] Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,[114] elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then
Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest, 15
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he
was detained.[115]

Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no
longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned Mission
Order.[116]

Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his
arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty.
Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified
Commander.[117]

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.[118]

This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines
Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-
Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.[119] This court set the hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.[120]

In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2045-A.[121] The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass
actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front."[122]
51 | P a g e
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and
retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.[123]

Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and
General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[124] They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion
stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed
that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being moot and academic.[125]

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were
deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was void.[126]

This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic with the
filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:[127]

As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys'
incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had
served its purpose.[128] (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.[129] Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for their
alleged membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army.[130]

During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them were filed
before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas
corpus moot and academic, thus:[131]

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper
courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed.[132] (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus,
persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and
exhaust the usual remedies.[133] This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the
warrant of arrest.[134]

At any time before a plea is entered,[135] the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information
based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

52 | P a g e
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
(f)
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
(i)
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed
against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face
of the information."[136] If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
"hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information."[137] "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic
from the information are not to be considered."[138]

"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."[139] If the motion to
quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an
offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."[140] If
after amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash
the complaint or information.[141]

IV

However, Ilagan[142] and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any
warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He
was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City
in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang,
not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(a)
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on- personal
53 | P a g e
 knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
(c) where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may
be issued.

The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing"[143] case
of Ilagan.[144] Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest
papers against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion
in Ilagan,[145] Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary investigation deprived Atty.
Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law — a ground for the
grant of a petition for habeas corpus:[146]

The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within
the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this
is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not persons
"lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January
25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then
serve it at one's whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency
and necessity as declared by the President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5
which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in
flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen's
arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now
requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and
excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of factsindicating that the [arrestee] has committed
it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule).
Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process and
preliminary investigation.[147] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of
the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion
to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.

A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information
54 | P a g e
and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo
are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not
Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.

Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,[148] his identification card from the Office on
Muslim Affairs,[149] his Tax Identification Number card,[150] and clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation[151] all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of these
government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang."

Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009 when the
Maguindanao Massacre occurred.

A Certification[152] from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia
on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A Certification[153] from
Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian
Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on board Saudi Arabian
Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.

People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case pending in
our courts. The case involves 57 victims[154] and 197 accused, two (2) of which have become state
witnesses.[155] As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed
petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.[156] To require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial
would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his
favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.

In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence. However,
between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due process of law and
the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command"[157] to properly indict a
citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against
him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty.
His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
April 19, 2011 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

55 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he
presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi
Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him. He
questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining
that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge of
RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the C
A reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named
in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s proper remedy, according to the CA, should have
been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision before the CA.
Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Warden’s Return, the
RTC’s ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have been appealed directly before
the SC.

Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases,
the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested
by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a
court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of
authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in cases where a
person with amistaken identity is detained

No, the CA’s contention is not correct. Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan Malang Salibo” will not
cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for reinvestigation will not cure
the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.

56 | P a g e
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC ruling on the Return before the CA

Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before CA or any of its
members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person
allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed
to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and
authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is
a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.

57 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20478 March 14, 1923

In the matter of the petition of AMZI B. KELLY, for the issuance of habeas corpus for Ivon
Pumutkin, et al.,petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

The petitioner on behalf of Ivon Pumutkin et al.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:

Amzi B. Kelly, a member of the Philippine Bar, has made applications in this court for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus to set at liberty sixteen young Russians, members of the crew of a fleet of boats now
at anchor within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. The return of the Attorney-General states that
these Russian subjects are confined in Bilibid Prison, at the request of the Admiral of the Russian ships, and
pursuant to the orders of the Governor-General. The Attorney-General further states that the said persons do
not desire that any writ of habeas corpus be issued in their behalf, and accept and abide by the order of the
Governor-General pending such disposition as it is the wish of the Chief Executive to make in their
respective cases. This last statement is supported by an affidavit subscribed and sworn to by the sixteen
Russians before the Director of Prisons.

The writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by a person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
or by some person in his behalf. Where the application is made in the prisoner's behalf by a third person,
and where the prisoner repudiates the action taken, the writ will be denied. The writ of habeas corpus ought
not to issue if the restraint is voluntary because unnecessary.

Petition denied without costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and
Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals’ Decision and
Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael
Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
(PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").

Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of the Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded
Gen. Narciso Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense and National Security
Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.

Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered
and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex,
located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and
planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.

On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took
59 | P a g e
place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood
incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.

On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior
officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August
2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:

(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on
Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of
Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon,
after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of the decision.3

Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the
scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.

On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.

On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ
and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled
hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the
petition submitted for decision.

On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the
appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in
court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees
are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing
in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that
the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees’
60 | P a g e
liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees’ right to confer with their counsels is
reasonable under the circumstances.

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation
of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The
violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in
open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is
hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the
detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and
the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.

SO ORDERED.4

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION OF THE

SUPREME COURT;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF

THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF

THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS’ DETENTION.5

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Court’s 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Court’s Order had
already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.

Petitioners’ claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to
the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers’ detention. Had the Court ruled
for the detainees’ release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of
Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners’ cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his
detention.7 However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not
an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.

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For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination
of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should
issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into
the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address
the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.8 The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ
of error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal.11

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary.12

However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation
of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the
excess.13 Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of
constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.14

Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they
dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is
the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers
from seeing the detainees – their clients – any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees’ right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission.

Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees’ right to
privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and
Capt. Milo Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the
detainees’ right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees
from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and
plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the
detainees’ cells.

Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.16 However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public.17 RA 7438, which specifies
the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention
officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his
escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

62 | P a g e
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (₱4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over
any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client "at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night." However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b)
makes the express qualification that "notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer
has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.

The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a
detainee’s confinement must be "reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape."
Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the government’s objective of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to "undertake such
reasonable measures" or regulations.

Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees’ right to effective representation
when petitioners’ visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of
the detainees’ rights entitle them to be released from detention.

Petitioners’ contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees’ indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees’ release from detention.
The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees’ right to counsel. The purpose of the
regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all
detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial
confinement are permissible.

In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related
to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a
restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless.19 However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from
skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.20 The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing policies to
maintain institutional security.21

In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations
in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s
safety and prevent his escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the
detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of all detainees.

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While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-
to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees’
right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a
lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers
normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of
reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP
officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.

The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to
confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in
the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission,22 petitioners were given time to confer with
the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their
right to counsel.

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the
iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to
impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainee’s desire to live
comfortably.24 The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees’ desire to live
comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.25 It is when the restrictions are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the
restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in
relation to that purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security
measure.28 They must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it
serves.29

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the "essential
objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees’ presence at trial." While this interest
undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept
respondents’ argument that the Government’s interest in ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial is
the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a
person. "If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent
necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified
form of detention." The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the
facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require
administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the
detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and
order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are
reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not
have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise
extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence at trial, the
effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may
justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such
restrictions are intended as punishment.30

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An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or
"disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.31 Punishment also requires that the
harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.32

Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as
this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be
jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious,
violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction.34 Contact visits make it possible for the detainees
to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes.35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to
visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on contact visits was imposed
even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and
weapons.37 The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to
outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.38

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate
goal of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a
form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison
matters in deference to administrative expertise.40

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by
iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their
visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and
limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a
strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees’ physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This
measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and
weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within
the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention,
and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center
are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo
Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated
well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable
compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with
detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP
Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New People’s Army
("NPA") member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.

We now pass upon petitioners’ argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were
not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.

65 | P a g e
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail
of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert
coordinated escapes.41 Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening
and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of "civil deaths."42 Inmates were
deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison
authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications
between the inmate and his lawyer.43

Eventually, the inmates’ outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received
respect.44 The confidential correspondences could not be censored.45 The infringement of such privileged
communication was held to be a violation of the inmates’ First Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right
to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of
prison authorities in the administration of the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will
conspire in plots that threaten prison security.48

American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted
inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono49 recognized that pre-trial detainees,
unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial
detainees’ mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming
mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees
could not be inspected or read at all.

In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates.
However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:

The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to
inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under
challenge provided that ‘(a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected,’ and no exception was
made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that
they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow
issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison
authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal
detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.

xxx

x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before
opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely
appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating from an
attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also
certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner,
first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are
actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in
no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications,
since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that
contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’
opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in ‘appropriate

66 | P a g e
circumstances.’ Since a flexible test, besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting
any of the possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to
a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even
more, than the Constitution requires.51

In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of
privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections
of the Constitution, thus:

However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear
that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is
internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under
our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction.53

The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made
no distinction as to the detainees’ limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable
jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We
quote State v. Dunn:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close
and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy always yield to
what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our
society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."

The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been
blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security
risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many
cases be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose
a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical to
draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security."

American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’ non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged
mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.58 A pre-trial detainee
has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.59 However, incoming mail from lawyers of
inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but
could not read the contents without violating the inmates’ right to correspond with his lawyer.60 The
inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.61

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in the
present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening
of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.

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The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights62 is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners
have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators."63 The deferential review of such
regulations stems from the principle that:

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration.64

The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.65 The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but
visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to
the Articles of War.66

Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA.
Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in
detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations
adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.68

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 78545.

No pronouncement as to costs.

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SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

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 DIGEST

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered
and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex,
located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and
planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers
to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-
2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August
2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers
who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of
Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already
charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case
as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners
do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid

HELD: YES
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination
of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should
issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into
the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address
the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the

70 | P a g e
detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the
detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is
not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners
themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.
AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security
within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are
but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to
valid security concerns.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read by the
ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal
courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters
were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes
for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R. MORALES,

JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C. MONCUPA,

JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR,
respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio Quintos for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED.

2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they were riding together in a
motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under detention. Petitioner
Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa
filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged
with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal
Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be
terminated. The continued detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore
legal.

3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional
rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy
and public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were subjected to
maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the opportunity to present their defense before the
inquest fiscal and therefore asked this Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges against them.
Acting on such plea, this Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered the City Fiscal of
Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and at the same time appointed him "to act as
commissioner of this Court and receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court
72 | P a g e
of alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." On
September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his report on the reinvestigation affirming the existence
of a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on February 8, 1983 he
submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes taken at the reception of the evidence on the
charges of petitioners.

4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no rights to speak of.
However, the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional convention and duly
ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect and
defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this
Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2

6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may
be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned
and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in a strange and un familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers
hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods
and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the
detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they
were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms
them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at any hour of the day
or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the jail or any other place of custody. 3

Arrest.

9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the
commission of an offense.4

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10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 5

11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and limits them to a
"judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." It also lays down in unmistakable
terms the procedure required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue.

12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the President of the
Philippines. 6Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same
manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance must therefore comply with
the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a
judge.

13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.7

14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no justification for the
arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some
other offense.

15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the President dated
April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he
reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the results of the ensuing
tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment
Order, was approved by the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested
without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already under surveillance on
suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and
the documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were
actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore
clearly justified.

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Procedure after Arrest.

16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by a judge or
by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, the proper complaint or information against him
must be filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law, to wit:

FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS

AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)

WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to the judicial
authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are on
occasions inadequate to enable the government to file within the said periods the criminal
information against persons arrested for certain crimes against national security and public
order.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, and in the interest of
national security as well as public safety and order, do hereby decree and order as part of the
law of the land the following amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:

SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The penalties provided
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: six
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the
President may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize
by Executive Order longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or
for as long as the conspiracy to commit the crime against national security and
public order continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of persons
arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined in Title III,
Book 11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143,
144, 146 and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the gravity
of the offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to
national security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a
public calamity or other emergency situation preventing the early
investigation of the cases and the filing of the corresponding information
before the civil courts.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate
relatives.

75 | P a g e
 SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees, General Orders,
Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by the President of

the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the detention of persons arrested for any
of the abovementioned offenses against public order shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of General Orders No. 2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General Order
Nos. 60 and 62, dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977, respectively.

SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight."

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125,
Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ
of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court.10

Power of the Courts.

18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is the most
expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus may be suspended, but not the writ itself.

19. The Bill of Rights provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:

In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court 'had
'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence
of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and
thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of
Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...'
Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction
that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

21. We reiterate this doctrine.

22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate, in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from
the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution
has in fact been satisfied.

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23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts cannot
inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does
violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society.

The Right to Bail.

24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even more than their life.

25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of this presumption and
inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, our Constitution laid down the right to bail in these
words:

SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be
required. 11

26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045 of the
President of the Philippines, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby revoke
Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines) and
Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the
suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present
detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for
all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion
therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ... (Presidential Proclamation No.
2045).

27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat
the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is
anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.

28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of
the State.

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29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The
suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended
with respect to these offenses.

30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of
charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason,
the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.

The Charges of Torture.

31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and maltreated, the Court decided
to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear the charges and to receive the evidence. Not because We
are an investigating body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But because petitioners' charges are material and
relevant to the petitions before Us.

32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of the proceedings held before
him. We will not pass upon the merits of the torture charges. However, they should be filed before the body
which has jurisdiction over them as provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A and 1850.

33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged the executive and legislative
branches into one. Members of parliament are at the same time cabinet ministers. Under the system of
checks and balances ordained by the Constitution, the judiciary serves as the check and balance to the
merged executive and legislative branches. The judiciary is therefore called upon to express its thoughts on
areas outside the traditional and narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we
may explore the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our people.

34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, roofs over their heads,
health services for themselves and their families, education for their children, and other necessities that
make life worth living. They cannot be denied. They want it and they want it now. Timely indeed are the
thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.

35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve complete peace in our land; and
we cannot have complete peace unless we improve the administration of justice.

36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive their justice and I will tell you
how stable its government is." 12

37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four principal areas: the preservation of
peace and order which is the primary task of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Integrated Police, both under the Ministry of Defense; the investigation and prosecution of offenses and the
administration of our penal system which are under the Ministry of Justice; the application and
interpretation of laws and the trial and adjudication of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts;
and appearance as counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as counsel for the
Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange Commission, and others, which is the responsibility of
the Office of the Solicitor General. In everyone of these areas much can be done to achieve our ultimate
goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how humble, no matter how poor shall thirst for justice.

78 | P a g e
38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting the poor among us. Not
knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for the services of a lawyer, possessing no influence
whatsoever, they are invariably the victims of injustice. The affluent can take care of themselves. They are
better aware of their rights, they have influence, and they can engage the services of the best counsel. But
the poor can only pray to God and hope to find relief in the system of justice established by their
government.

39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the grievance procedure may be
made more readily available to the masses of our people. Only by knowing their needs can we give them
what they rightfully deserve.

40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land, lawlessness and disorder have
increased and continue to increase to undesirable proportions. It is wishful thinking to believe otherwise. An
efforts must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We cannot afford any delay. And we should begin by
bringing to the bar of justice the culprits in particular who burned and destroyed public property, and
attacked, kidnapped and killed public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the
government cannot protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the government cannot
guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it guarantee the safety and lives of private
individuals?

41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so that only meritorious cases
shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the unclogging of court dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by
complainants are just harassment suits and should never have been filed in court. In the process, it is
required that all fiscals be appointed in a permanent capacity. Their security of tenure is the foundation
stone of their independence. Our penal system should be further updated to make more effective the
rehabilitation of criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve sentence in order to
be reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.

42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and decision making process has
been modified and vastly improved to achieve better results. But it must be remembered that courts which
are not filled are as good as no courts at all. Therefore, more appointments to the existing vacancies should
be made.

43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and a good administration of
justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics infiltrates the administration of justice, injustice is
often the outcome. In some jurisdictions of the United States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district
attorneys (prosecutors) who are elected by the voters and who run for office as the candidates of a political
party. In the Philippines such a system would never work because in our culture we have values peculiarly
our own-value like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo", "bigayan", "bata ko", "amo
ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have derailed and may derail the administration of
justice. Political followers commit abuses in the belief that come what may their political bosses would
shield them from punishment. Can you imagine how criminal cases would be investigated and prosecuted if
fiscals (prosecutors) were chosen by election? How would our laws be enforced if policemen and members
of the Armed Forces were elected by the people? And yet the heads of the Ministries of Justice and Defense
and the Office of the Solicitor General are all active politicians.

44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we relieve them of the additional
burdens that being politicians entail. Our Constitution foresaw the need for heads of ministries who are not
active politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
ministries shall come from the Regional Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13

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45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfesance should be pursued
with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption are like termites gnawing away the foundation of government.
The harm done is sometimes not realized; or even if realized, under- estimated. In the process let us
remember to stress preventive measures to save public property from loss.

46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether Marxist, Maoist, Leninist,
aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals, and lawless elements, they all have but one aim-one
single purpose-one defined objective: to bring down by violence the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and to forcibly seize political power in order that they may replace our existing political, social,
economic, and legal order with an entirely new one based on communism.

47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established order. They were driven back by
the Armed Forces, mainly because of the support of our people. We must keep, strengthen and solidify the
sympathy, faith, loyalty, and trust in the government of our brothers in the rural areas. Guns and bullets
alone will not do it. We can accomplish this only by giving them better government. It is a condition sine
qua non to achieve success in the fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined men. However, there are those
who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear. Not a few have enriched themselves by abusing the powers
of their position. Some are involved in extortion, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There are others
who maintain gambling, drug rings, and prostitution dens. And still others have committed robbery, rape,
murder, and other offenses. The campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out with
missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the government.

49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in peace and freedom. We believe
in the family and its strong ties. We can never willingly accept communism and what it stands for.

50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the
lawless with all the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken
must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall be asked to account not only
for what we did, not only for what we did not do, but also for what visions we have today of our tomorrow.

52. What will be our answer?

53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED. With costs
against the petitioners.

54. SO ORDERED.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Guerrero, J., I concur in the dismissal of the petitions.

Plana, J., Escolin J., Vasquez, J., concurs in the result.

Relova, J., I concur and will also add my own views in a separate opinion.

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Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

concurring in the dismissed of the petitions, expressing conformity with the reiteration of the doctrine
announced in Lansang v. Garcia, and dissenting on the question of the right to bail which for him may be
invoked whenever allowable under the Constitution:

Let me make clear at the outset that I limit myself to a concurrence in the dismissal of the petitions,
expressing conformity with the reiteration of the doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia,1 and a dissent on the
question of the right to bail during a period of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
which for me may be invoked whenever allowable under the Constitution, a stand I took both as counsel
in Hernandez v. Montesa 2 and thereafter as a member of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 Buscayno v.
Enrile, 4 and Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile. 5 This is by no means to indicate lack of due recognition of the
intensity of conviction and lucidity of expression so evident in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Concepcion
Jr. It is merely to adhere to the norm of limiting myself to an appraisal of the constitutional rights invoked
insofar as they have a bearing on these petitions. 6 Hence this separate expression of my views.

1. The first paragraph of the decisions of this Court is worded as follows: "The petitions are without merit
and are hereby DISMISSED." 7 I am in full agreement. The authoritative doctrine followed by this Court in
accordance with well-settled jurisprudence is that the moment it can be shown that the persons detained are
being held in lawful custody by virtue of a judicial process, then an application of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus cannot succeed.8

2. There is equally to my mind no question about the validity as a legal proposition of paragraph 4 of the
opinion, which speaks of the Philippines being "a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional convention
and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect
and defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And
this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights." 9 This Court in normal times as well as under emergency
conditions has displayed fealty to human rights, as protected and safeguarded by the Constitution. It is a
matter of legitimate pride that even under the 1935 Charter, the Philippines has accorded full recognition not
only to the traditional civil and political rights but to social and economic rights. The autonomy of the
human personality and the assurance of his dignity are a matter of deep public concern. It is equally a matter
of legitimate pride that during the period of martial law, with fun recognition of the power of the
government to maintain peace and order and preserve its authority, the judiciary, was not recreant to such a
trust. 10 For the entire judiciary, not only this Court, stands as a guarantor of those rights. It does so when it
has to act in a proper case submitted to it. The political branches are equally, to my mind, guarantors of
human rights; the Batasan Pambansa in the enactment of laws and the President in their enforcement
whether through executive orders implementing them or the issuance of decrees having the force and effect
of law. In the sense, however, that decisions coming from this Court have not merely an inter-partes but
an erga omnes effect, binding not only the litigants but also others finding themselves similarly situated, it is
quite accurate to state that "this Court stands as a guarantor of those rights."

3. It is by virtue of the respect for constitutional rights that in the resolutions of this Court in both
applications for the writ, it was made clear that counsel of petitioners can visit them and confer with them in

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an atmosphere of confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures to be imposed by
respondents. 11 Again, it is by virtue of deference to the Constitution that in succeeding resolutions, their
allegations as to other instances of violation of their rights were referred for investigation to the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. 12

4. Paragraphs 5 to 19 of the opinion of the Court elaborate further on the matter. They are notable for the
concern shown for constitutional rights, with full recognition of the power of the state to deal effectively
with rebellion or subversion. I view the matter similarly. The same thought was given expression
in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 In the memorable language of Chief Justice Concepcion: "Manifestly, however, the
liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof,
but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the
Constitution and the context of the Rules of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy
that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law-such as rising publicly and
taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there
emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or
protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it.
Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it
may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse-
when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied-to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested
in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore,
without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to
epitomize." 14

5. In the opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr., paragraph 21 explicitly states: "We reiterate this doctrine." There
is thus a reaffirmance of the ruling in Lansang cited in paragraph 20 to the effect that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ raises a judicial rather than a political question. I am in complete agreement. That was
the point of my dissent in the recently decided case of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.

6. There is also on my part conformity with the view set forth in paragraph 22 that "in all petitions
for habeas corpusthe court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition." 15

7. I am in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 23 that there can be no indefinite detention
without charges being filed. It must be recognized, however, that in cases of invasion, rebellion and
insurrection, or imminent danger thereof, the power of preventive detention is recognized by the
Constitution, considering that when public safety requires, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended or martial law, as a last resort, declared. I had occasion to speak on the matter in my separate
opinion in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, where I stated that when the stage of punitive detention is reached,
there can be reliance on the writ of habeas corpus. 16

8. The next five paragraphs deal with the right to bail. Paragraph 24 correctly noted: "Next to life, man loves
his freedom." In the next paragraph reference is made of the presumption of innocence and then of the
constitutional right to bail, after which it was noted in paragraph 26 that under Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 lifting martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "continues to be suspended in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses," namely "the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith." Paragraph 27 reaches the heart of the matter, the main opinion laying

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down the principle that due to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remain suspended, "the natural
consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To
hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the
detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in
court." Paragraph 28 sets forth the ratio decidendi: "The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State." Then an analogy is made in the next paragraph in
this wise: "Just as an individual has a right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended
with respect to these offenses." With respect, I dissent. It is not necessary to repeat what I said right at the
beginning of this opinion why I am unable to agree to the proposition that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. Nor is there need to quote from my concurring and
dissenting opinions both in the Lansang and the Garcia-Padilla cases. Briefly put, my perception of the
matter traces itself to what was said in the landmark Milligan decision where the American Supreme Court
said that only one great right may be suspended "leaving all the rest forever inviolable." 17 This is not to
ignore the practical consideration set forth in the opinion of retired Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang
that militates against my approach. First he aptly summarized it in the words of Justice Tuason in Henandez,
"if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out." 18 After which
came this portion of the opinion of the then Chief Justice: "From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation-
of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the
detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view-particularly the theory that the detainees
should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination
and/or investigation-would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from firing formal charges as long as it
may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice
could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection." 19

9. That brings us to paragraph 33 of the main opinion. The characterization of a "merged executive and
legislative branches" does not suffer from the taint of in accuracy, if viewed from the practical standpoint.
Viewed as a matter of legal theory, I am not prepared to go that far. This Court, in a unanimous opinion,
expressly held: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does
not alter its essentially presidential character." 20 There is therefore no repudiation of the theory of
separation of powers. Through the exercise of vigorous presidential leadership, however, made manifest in
party caucuses, there is attained both unity of purpose and action. In that sense, it could be asserted with
truth that there is to all intents and purposes fusion of the executive and legislative branches. Hence the need
for the maintenance of the concept of an independent judiciary. So it was pointed out in Fortun v. Labang. 21

10. One last word. Doctrines have to be assessed in terms of its effect on the governmental process. The
rationale cannot be dissociated from the texture of the times. They cannot ignore the forces at work which
may either solidify or rent asunder the political community. A crisis situation has a compulsion all its own.
There may then be a conflict between the traditional formulations and the coercion of events. That may
render even more unavoidable the intrusion of the demands of the hour into the domain of law. Adherence
to what has been all along the accepted basic approach to human rights calls for fealty. There must be also,
however, recognition of a more fluid standard in the assessment of governmental action to protect the
security of the state. It is my submission, however, that only when there may be grave public danger should
reliance on the high estate accorded constitutional rights be stigmatized as being in the grip of the
suffocating orthodoxies of the law.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

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I concur in the sharply perceptive and heartfelt main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. especially in the reminders about rights of the accused, the cry of our people for material
necessities to give them a better life, and the proper administration of justice. However, I would like to add
some qualifying observations to a few points discussed by the ponente.

I agree, that the issuance of a presidential arrest and commitment order (PCO) must comply with the
requirements of the Constitution. However, until the issue is placed squarely before us in a more appropriate
case, I hesitate to concur in a categorical statement that a PCO may be equated with a warrant of arrest
issued by a judge under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution. An examination of Letters of Instructions
Nos. 1125-A and 1211 indicates that the PCO is issued by the President, not as "such other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law" under Section 3 of the Bill of Rights but as Commander-in-Chief
exercising exclusively executive powers under the Constitution to meet problems of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. Precisely, the letters of
instructions call for preliminary examination or investigation by a judge as the regular procedure. Only
when resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public order and safety and
when the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would
endanger said public order and safety may the military commander or the head of the law enforcement
agency apply to the President, through the Minister of National Defense, for a presidential commitment
order. The fact that the stated procedure in the issuance of a PCO is an exception to and differs from the
regular procedure before a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest shows that a PCO may not be
equated completely with a warrant of arrest.

In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, (9 SCRA 27), the issue was raised that the President, having been
given the power to deport undesirable aliens, may not be denied power which is essential to carry into effect
the deportation. This Court did not categorically rule that the President himself may order the arrest of an
alien for deportation purposes, but neither did it rule that he may not do so. The fact is the President has on
various occasions, such as those involving among others, Mr. Harry Stonehill and some associates and
perhaps and Yuyiteng brothers, ordered the arrest of aliens without having to secure a warrant of arrest from
a judge at a time when under the Constitution only a judge could issue such a warrant. The commander-in-
chief's power in a situation where the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended or martial law has been
proclaimed is certainly broader and less subject to constitutional restrictions than the power of deportation. I
may also add that the President does not personally examine the complainant and the witnesses the latter
may produce as the multifarious affairs of state prevent him from doing so. But as in the case of judges
relying on investigations conducted by the fiscal, the President may rely on his Minister of National Defense
or the recommending military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency to conduct what
would be the equivalent of the judicial examination for probable cause. Of course, the rules in Amarga v.
Abbas, (98 Phil. 739) which impose on the judge issuing the warrant of arrest the legal duty to first satisfy
himself that there is probable cause without relying completely or ministerially upon the findings of the
fiscal, should also apply and I believe are in fact applied to PCO's.

It also hesitate to give concurrence to an unqualified reiteration of the Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448)
doctrine on the Court's inquiring into the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law to determine their constitutional sufficiency. While
the Court has not been very receptive lately to the invocation of the political question doctrine by State
lawyers, I believe that the doctrine does apply in cases where a political department- either the President or
the Batasang Pambansa-exercises powers expressly granted in an exclusive manner by the Constitution and
which are of a clearly political nature not proper for judicial determination. If the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ is so patently arbitrary and as Justice Abad Santos says,
lacking in popular support, there will always be constitutional foundation for Supreme Court action to rule
against arbitrariness. However, as a general principle, whenever the President exercises his powers under

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the Constitution to meet the supreme dangers of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof when the public safety requires it, we should not assume a power, upon the mere filing of a petition,
to render a judicial interpretation of an exclusively constitutionally granted power of the President.
Paraphrasing Coleman v. Miller (307 US 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385), the question of the sufficiency of factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law would involve an
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions involving national security which can hardly be said to be
within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an
extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice, which after all is what we would be
asserting in most cases involving the exercise of this extraordinary presidential power.

Relova, J., I vote with Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur with paragraph 1 of the Decision, dismissing the petitions filed in these cases. The term petitioner
as used herein shall refer not only to Horacio R. Morales, Jr,, but will also include Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr.
insofar as legal statements may be applicable to the latter.

Petitioner was detained on April 21, 1982 by the Armed Forces of the Philippines under a Presidential
Commitment Order approved on April 23, 1982. On July 9, 1982, he filed the petition for habeas
corpus alleging that he was being illegally detained by respondents Minister of National Defense, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and, specifically, by Colonel Galileo Kintanar, Commanding
Officer of the 15th Military Intelligence Group. Petitioner's prayer was for the issuance of the Writ directing
respondents "to show the cause of his imprisonment or restraint, and after hearing, to order his release
forthwith." The Court issued the Writ on July 13,1982.

In a Supplemental Return to the Writ, respondents informed the Court that petitioner, on July 20, 1982, had
been charged with Rebellion in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and they
asked that the petition for habeas corpus be denied for the reason that "with the pendency of the case against
petitioner before the Court below for trial and before the City Fiscal for reinvestigation, there is all the more
reason to dismiss the petition.

Under the foregoing facts, it is my opinion that these cases have become moot. There is no longer any cause
of action against respondents who must be deemed to have lost custody of petitioner (In re Lasam vs. Enrile,
67 SCRA 43 [1975]). I do not agree with the view that petitioner is still not within the jurisdiction of the
Court below. If that were a correct proposition, the Court below would be without jurisdiction to try the
rebellion case. In criminal law, "the Court must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is,
jurisdiction of the offense, and must have jurisdiction of the person of the accused" (U.S.-U.S. v. Simon,
D.C. Pa., 248, cited in 22 C.J.S. 300). Even if there has been no warrant of arrest issued by the Court below,
the person of petitioner, who is now being tried, must be deemed as already within its jurisdiction
(Carrington vs. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 [1905]).

As petitioner is now within the jurisdiction of the Court below, the question in regards to the suspension of
the Writ ofhabeas corpus has become irrelevant. Considering that the Writ is never issuable to a Court
(Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172 [1951]), there should be no justification in these cases to assail whatever
has been said or resolved in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971). That particular matter could have
been raised, procedurally, if petitioner had not been charged with Rebellion before the Court below. Of
course, it would then be for this Court to give or not to give due course to the question. After all, habeas
corpus is a discretionary Writ (Engels vs. Amrine 155 Kan. 385, 125 P2d 379, cited in 39 Am. Jur. 2d, 269).
Or, that would be the occasion for the Court to express its present views in regards to Lansang-Garcia. The

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Constitution is a living institution, and its interpretation and construction lives with changing times and
circumstances.

On the other hand, in reference to whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail in the rebellion case, I believe
that the proper procedure should be for petitioners to apply for bail before the Court below, and after his
motion is granted or denied, the matter can thereafter be elevated to appellate consideration.

Once prosecuted in Court the position should not be taken that petitioner cannot be bailed, the right to bail
being a fundamental right except for those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
The Constitution limited the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to only one great right
leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable (Ex parte Milligan, 18 U.S. Law ed., 281, 297). The power of
the Courts to grant bail cannot be curtailed if the supremacy of the Judiciary within its own sphere is to be
preserved. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil. 139 [1936]; Fernandez Subido vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA
1054 [1961]).

The reason for the objection to bail poses the same risk should the Court acquit petitioner. The risk need not
be taken by continuing the detention under the Presidential Commitment Order, for a reasonable period, in
the exercise of executive discretion by way of precaution essential for the public safety. "Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process" (Moyer vs. Peabody, 53 Law, Ed., US
211-214, p.411).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Justices De Castro and Abad Santos in their opinion to abandon the Lansang doctrine and to adhere to
the doctrine in the Montenegro and Barcelon cases that determination by the Chief Executive of the
existence of invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent danger thereof and that public safety requires it,
for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus and for the proclamation of martial law, is a
political question and therefore beyond the sphere of judicial inquiry. In addition to the reasons advanced by
Justices De Castro and Abad Santos, it should be stressed that the prime responsibility for the preservation
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic as well as its security, rests on the commander- in-
chief and not on the Judiciary. It is a classical truism that there is no power under the sun that is not
susceptible of abuse. Any abuse or any arbitrary exercise by the President as commander-in-chief of his
constitutional power to proclaim martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can be
repudiated or overruled by the people in the exercise of their sovereign right of suffrage at the next election,
and, pending the holding of the next election, through their constitutional right of free expression to sway
public opinion against such abuse of power.

To repeat, only the Chief Executive is well-equipped with the intelligence services as commander-in-chief
to secure the desired information as to the existence of the requirements for the proclamation of martial law
or for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court is bereft of such aids.
This was clearly demonstrated at the executive session during one of the hearings in the Lansang case where
the lawyers for the petitioners were present. Counsel for the petitioners had no means of rebutting the
evidence and information gathered by the military organization presented in said Lansang case before this
Court, which had to rely on such evidence and information submitted by the Armed Forces. It was clearly an
exercise in futility.

II

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Corollary to the doctrine in the case of Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), which was re-affirmed in Gumaua
vs. Espino (96 SCRA 402, 412), that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must necessarily
include the suspension of the right to bail for crimes which are grounds for the suspension of the privilege.
This should be the ruling principle because, as well-stated by Mr. Justice De Castro, to release on bail
persons indicted for rebellion or insurrection would be to nullify the very purpose of the suspension of the
privilege, which is precisely to prevent them from continuing with the rebellion or insurrection or abetting
the same. The suspension of the privilege is precisely to restore tranquility and prevent the shedding of
blood by our own people, more than just insuring the safety of public and private properties.

Executive process is as valid as judicial process. In the epigramatic language of Mr. Justice Holmes:

... when it comes to a decision involving its (state) life, the ordinary rights of individuals
must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. (See Kelly vs. Sanders, 99
U.S. 441, 446, 25 L ed. 327, 328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual
clash of arms. And we think it is obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true to
temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. (Moyer vs, Peabody, 212 U.S. 77.85. 53 L
ed., 411, 417).

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result, i.e. in the dismissal of the petitions. This is as far as I can go because I cannot give my
assent to some of the statements made in the main opinion. My list is not exhaustive but among them are the
following:

1. I reject the doctrine laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 [1971] that this Court "has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [for the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in order to determine the constitutional
sufficiency thereof." (At p. 473.) In other words, this Court, on the urging of the petitioners, declared that it
has the power to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ. In so doing,
this Court did a complete turnabout from Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil, 87 [1905] and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952] which enunciated the doctrine that the President's determination in
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is final and conclusive upon the courts.

I submit that Barcelon and Montenegro laid down the correct doctrine. The Lansang doctrine is based on
naivete; it demonstrates a lack of contact with reality.

How can this Court determine the factual bases in order that it can ascertain whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truthful words of Montenegro, "with its very limited
machinery [it] cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago?" (At p. 887.) The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive
Branch which has the appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had
to be used in Lansang. This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the military.
Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this Court relied on the very branch of the government
whose act was in question to obtain the facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch supplied
information to support its position and this Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case of the
defendant judging the suit. After all is said and done, the attempt by this Court to determine whether or not
the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.

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There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the
seal of approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks
popular support because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not
arbitrary (because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect
participates in the decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its
prestige and credibility to an unpopular act.

Lansang was an empty victory for the petitioners. They won a battle but lost the war. It could be that this
Court also lost something in the process. It raised expectations which it could not fulfill.

2. I cannot accept the statement in paragraph 27 of the main opinion that "because the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus remains suspended 'with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith', the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of the said offenses is also suspended."

In the instant case, the petitioners were arrested without warrant on April 21, 1982. However, a Presidential
Commitment Order was issued against them on April 23, 1982 and on July 20, 1982 (after the petitions for
the writ of habeas corpus had been filed) the petitioners were charged with rebellion before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091.

Are they entitled to be released on bail if they so apply?

The ponente says that they have no right to bail because "To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose
of the suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus. Another reason given to deny bail is Letter of Instructions
No. 1211 issued on March 9, 1982, which stipulates that "4. When issued, the Presidential Commitment
Order shall constitute authority to arrest the subject person or persons and keep him or them under detention
until ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative.

I submit that the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right if they should apply for it.

The nature of LOI No. 1211 has been raised. Does it have the force of law or is it a mere directive to
officers named therein, namely: The Minister of National Defense; The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines; The Chief, Philippine Constabulary; The Chief, Criminal Investigation Service; The Director-
General, NISA; The Minister of Justice; The Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and The Solicitor
General. To me the nature of LOI No. 1211 is irrelevant for the right to bail is guaranteed by a higher law-
the Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees that "All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be
required. " (Art. IV, Sec. 18.) The penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal. Hence rebellion is a non-
capital offense and the petitioners should be granted bail by the court where their case is pending if they ask
for it.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that they are covered by a Presidential
Commitment Order are of no consequence. Since the respondents have elected to bring the case of the
petitioners to court, the court acquired complete jurisdiction over them. To say that the court cannot grant
them bail is to diminish the court's jurisdiction.

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The eloquent words of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason are completely relevant:

Under constitutional guarantee bail is a matter of right which no court or judge could
properly refuse in all cases beyond the exceptions specified in the Constitution. The meaning
of this fundamental provision is that a party accused of any and every bailable offense shall
have the inestimable privilege of giving security for his attendance at court and shall not be
imprisoned. (6 C.J. 893.)

The Constitution will be searched in vain for any provision that abridges this right. Any
argument in support of the contention that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus carries
with it the suspension of the right to bail is, and has to be, based on inference. I do not
believe that the curtailment of the right to bail is a normal, legal, or logical outcome of the
suspension of the writ. The error, I am inclined to believe, arises from a confusion of terms
and misapprehension of the principles underlying the suspension of the writ.

The purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a precautionary
measure, to detain without interference persons suspected of harboring designs harmful to
public safety. (Ex Parte Simmerman, 132 F. 2d, 442, 446.) The Constitution goes no further.
(Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 18 Law. Ed. 281, 297.) If this is the purpose, the suspension
can contemplate only cases which, without the suspension, are open to interference; such
cases are arrests and detentions by the executive department. Since the suspension of the writ
is designed to prevent the issuance of this extraordinary remedy, and since the writ issues
from the courts but never to the courts, it necessarily follows that arrests and detentions by
order of the courts are outside the purview of the constitutional scheme.

As stated, the theory of the prosecution stems from a misconception of the ends pursued by
the suspension of the writ. If it is to have any color of validity, this theory must assume that
the Constitution directs positive action to be taken, orders arrests and detentions to be made.
Unfortunately or fortunately, the Constitution does not do so. The intent of the Constitution
in authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is no other than to given the
authorities a free hand in dealing with persons bent on overthrowing the Government. The
effects of the suspension are negative, not positive; permissive, not mandatory nor even
directory. By the suspension, arrests and detentions beyond the period allowed under normal
circumstances are tolerated or legalized. The Constitution is not in the least concerned with
the disposition of persons accused of rebellion or insurrection, whether or how long they
should be kept in confinement, or whether they should be set at large. In the nature of the
governmental set-up under the Constitution, their immediate fate is left to the discretion,
within reasonable and legal limits, of the proper department.

With these distinctions in mind, the query is, on what department of Government is entrusted
the prerogative of deciding what is to be done with the prisoners charged with or suspected of
rebellion or insurrection? The answser, as I shall endeavor presently to explain, is either the
executive or the Court, depending on who has jurisdiction over them.

All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under executive
control. It is here where the Constitution tells the courts to keep their hands off-unless the
cause of the detention be for an offense other than rebellion or insurrection, which is another
matter.

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 By the same token, if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the
executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern.
Thereupon the corresponding court assumes its role and the judicial process takes its course
to the exclusion of the executive or the legislative departments. Henceforward, the accused is
entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and privileges essential to due process.
'The Constitution does not say that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common
law.' (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.) The Bill of Rights, including the right to bail and the
right to a fair trial, are unaffected by the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The
Constitution 'suspended one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable. (Ex
parte Milligan, ante, 297.) (Nava et al vs. Gatmaitan 90 Phil. 172, 202-205 [1951].)

It should be stated that Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Justices Cesar Bengzon, Alex Reyes and Fernando
Jugo shared the above opinion of Justice Tuason. Incumbent Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando expressed
the same opinion in Lansang.

It is also said that the view "if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive
steps out," will tend to induce the executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be
possible. (See opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, op. cit. on p. 494.) The answer has long
been given by this Court in Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1954) as follows:

This constitutional mandate [on the right to bail] refers to all persons not only to persons
against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the
rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that
any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he
is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong, Of course, only those
persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will
ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can
invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this- guarantee of the Bill of
Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and
evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those
already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just
reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even yet
conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more
favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense
(Constitution, Article III, Section 1[17], a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in
favor of one not yet so charged, although already arrested or detained." (At pp. 640-64 1.)

What I have said above about the right of an accused to bail in non-capital cases applies mutatis mutandis to
a person accused of a capital offense if the evidence of his guilt is not strong to be determined after a
hearing as provided in the Rules of Court: "Sec. 7. Capital offense-Burden of proof. -On the hearing of an
application for admission to bail made by any person in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. ..." (Rule 114.)

Addendum to concurring and dissenting opinion:

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Long after I had written my separate opinion in the above-entitled cases, the newspapers reported the arrest
of Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City on grounds of national security. It was said that the
arrest of Mayor Pimentel was effected pursuant to a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO).

It was also reported that Msgr. Patrick Cronin Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro City, requested President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to lift the PCO because Pimentel was innocent of any wrong-doing.

The issues dated April 20, 1983, of Bulletin Today, Daily Express and Times Journal all report that
President Marcos denied the request of Archbishop Cronin because he had no power to release Pimentel
who was arrested and charged before a Regional Trial Court in Cebu City on very strong evidence that he
provided arms, funds, and sanctuary to subversives.

President Marcos is reported to have told Msgr. Cronin

The disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is now within the
powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City, and not within the powers of the President.

It should be recalled the main opinion holds that the petitioners herein cannot be granted bail by the court
where they stand charged with the crime of rebellion because to hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and also because under LOI No. 1211, the release of
persons arrested pursuant to a PCO can be effected only by order of the President or his duly authorized
representative. And it should be noted that every PCO has the following operative last paragraph:

I, therefore, hereby order the arrest and detention of the abovenamed persons until the final
disposition/termination of their cases unless sooner ordered released by me or by my duly
authorized representative.

And yet in the case of Mayor Pimentel who was arrested by virtue of a PCO, the President no less said that
the power to release Pimentel "as any lawyer will inform you," is not his but of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City.

I am happy to be counted among the "any lawyer" mentioned by President Marcos for I believe, as I have
stated in my separate opinion, that the petitioners herein are entitled to bail after they were charged in court
with rebellion because "the court steps in and the executive steps out."

DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the dismissal of the petition. It is my considered opinion, as I have set forth in my ponencia in
the case for Habeas Corpus-Josefina Garcia, petitioner, G.R. No. 61388, hereafter referred to as the Parong
case, that when a person is arrested by virtue of a PCO or a PCO is issued after his arrest effected without
warrant or with one issued by court, his detention becomes one without right to bail, even after charges have
been filed against him in court. This is so because, under the circumstance that the rebellion is still
continuing, perhaps with greater intensity, a captured or arrested rebel, or one in conspiracy with the rebels
by acts in pursuance or in furtherance of the rebellion, is not arrested and detained with a view to his
immediate prosecution. It is more for the purpose of detaining him as a military measure to suppress the
rebellion. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has the effect of deferring trial for
certain specified crimes during the existence of the emergency, as I stated, citing legal writers and
publicists, 1 in the aforecited case of Parong, et al.

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The reason is that a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime the commission of which has not yet come to
an end as in the case of the existing rebellion. A person who kills another can and should immediately be
prosecuted, because the killing itself constitutes the termination of the commission of the crime, as is
generally true with the common statutory offenses. But a rebel, even when already captured or arrested and
placed under detention, by reason of conspiracy with the rebels and their co-conspirators who are free,
continues in a state of committing the crime of rebellion which is a continuing offense. If immediately
prosecuted and by virtue thereof, allowed to be released on bail, the crime of rebellion being bailable, the
detainee would certainly join his comrades in the field to the jeopardy of government efforts to suppress the
rebellion, which is the rationale for the President being constitutionally empowered to suspend the privilege
of habeas corpus in case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, even mere imminent danger thereof, when
public safety so requires. The President, however, may order the filing of charges in court and trial thereof
forthwith held, or even release on bail, as his best judgment will dictate to him. But this is for the President
alone to decide, without interference from the courts, he being in the exercise of his military power.

It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it would reiterate the doctrine of the
Lansang case, being of the view that the earlier doctrine in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro
vs. Castaneda which was superseded by the Lansang doctrine should be reverted to, as the more practical
and realistic ruling, and more in consonance with the grant by the Constitution to the President of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of the contingencies mentioned in the
Constitution. Such power could be easily rendered nugatory if interference by the Supreme Court were
allowed as when it is given the power of judicial review over the exercise of this particular presidential
power. The doctrine of "political question" comes in to make it improper for the power of judicial review to
be exercise by the said Court, which doctrine renders the exercise of the presidential power referred to non-
justiciable. Justiciability of the controversy is the basic requirement for the exercise of the power of judicial
review.

Moreover, the Lansang doctrine could easily be viewed as discriminatory against our incumbent President
whose proclamation suspending the privilege of habeas corpus was held subject to judicial review, where
similar proclamations of former Chiefs Executive, Governor General Wright and President Quirino, were
held binding and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons. If this is so, as it can be safely surmised
that the incumbent President cannot but feel discriminated against with the pronouncement of the Lansang
doctrine, rectification is called for. Needless to state, I am one with Justice Abad Santos in his vigorous
dissent against the reiteration of the Lansang doctrine as proposed in the majority opinion in the instant case.

In the Parong case (G.R. No. 61388), I stated, inter alia, the following:

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of
legislation to the President. Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the
principle that during such crises, the judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more
trusting of the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review, Arbitrariness,
as a ground for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to
contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion
for the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on
reviewing Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent
collision of two jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in

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 favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political question" in
reference to the power of judicial review."

Indeed, while the Supreme Court is said to be the Guardian of the Constitution, not all questions arising
therefrom may be brought to it for judicial review as to whether a constitutional violation has been
committed. The power of the President as the defender of the State has to be granted by the Constitution, for
how else could such power be granted except by the instrument which is the repository of the sovereign will
of the people. But certainly, the exercise of such power of defending the Nation is not to be subordinated to
that of the Supreme Court acting as Guardian of the Constitution, for of what use is it to preserve the
Constitution if We lose the Nation?

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The bench and bar and law scholars and students are in debt to the writer of the main opinion, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, Jr., for his thorough and perceptive restatement of the constitutional and basic human rights of
accused persons and detainees. The main opinion spotlights the grievances that persons detained or charged
for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes
invariably bring to this Court. They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any warrant
of arrest; of being kept in isolation and being denied of their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of
prolonged detention without any charges; of having been subjected to maltreatment and torture; and of their
counsel and families undergoing great difficulties in locating or having access to them.

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies all such charges and submits
affidavits of the arresting officers and detention custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane
treatment, further countering that such claims are merely calculated to arouse sympathy and as propaganda
against the Government and its institutions.

Upon the filing of the petition at bar on July 13, 1982, the Court, in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
Resolved "to allow counsel for petitioner to visit and confer with the detainee in an atmosphere of
confidentiality, consistent with reasonable security measures which respondents may impose." At the
hearing held on July 22, 1982, the Court granted petitioner's plea for reinvestigation of the charges and to
"appoint the (Quezon) City Fiscal to act as Commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of the charges
made by petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to counsel." The City Fiscal in due time submitted his report on the reinvestigation,
affirming the existence of a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioner. In February this year, he
submitted the voluminous transcript of the proceedings held before him and the evidence submitted to him
without comment or recommendation on petitioner's charges of alleged torture and violation of
constitutional rights. The "material and relevant" charges have not been taken up nor deliberated upon by
the Court, but apparently will no longer be resolved by the, Court, as was expected at the time, since the
main opinion directs now that "they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them." 1 On
my part, I believe that the Court should go over the transcript and make some authoritative pronouncements
on the charges at least of violation of petitioners' right to counsel.

I. The vital problem is to assure the enjoyment of such constitutional and basic human rights of the persons
arrested, detained or charged, be they mere dissenters, subversives or hardened criminals. As observed in
the main opinion, this is what distinguishes our country as a republican and democratic state from those
arrested in totalitarian states who have no rights to speak of. This Court stands as the guarantor of the
constitutional rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights are respected and
not treated as paper rights.

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These are the great rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the Constitution:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures and arbitrary arrest:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

The right to due process and equal protection of law:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

The right of free association:

Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.

Freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition:

Sec. 9. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

The great writ of liberty:

Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it.

The right to bail:

Sec. 8. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

Presumption of innocence and Rights of speedy and impartial trial and confrontation:

Sec. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
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 arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

The right to counsel and silence.

Sec. 20n No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The main opinion deals with the scope and extent of these rights and a number of passages bears emphasis
and reiteration, as follows:

The arresting officers, upon making the arrest, must inform the subject of the reason for the arrest and show
him the warrant of arrest, if any. They must inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. They must respect his right to communicate with his lawyer. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of his counsel. The right to counsel may be waived knowingly and
intelligently and for such reason the waiver should be recognized only if made with the assistance of
counsel. The detainee's right to confer with counsel at any hour of the day, alone and privately, should be
respected.

Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no

justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention
(under Article 124, Revised Penal Code) or unlawful arrest (under Article 269, Idem) or for
some other offense.2

Furthermore, we hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate,
in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment
the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts
cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the
Constitution and is contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society. 3

However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the
filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without
any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains
his right to freedom. 4

II. Respondents' return in these cases, in asserting that "the allegations that petitioners have been denied
their right to counsel are not true. They simply did not ask for one, " disregards the consistent injunction of
the Court and of the law that the detainees need not bear the burden of asking for counsel but should be
informed of their right to counsel. The return's assertion that "petitioners also waived the assistance of
counsel during the investigation of their cases" also falls short of the requirement that such waiver be made
with the assistance of counsel to assure the validity thereof.

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The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in maintaining in his dissenting opinion in Magtoto vs.
Manguera5 that the 1973 constitutional ban on uncounselled confessions should operate retrospectively to
June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 (amending Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code) was enacted
recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any custodial inquest, and not prospectively only as
to such confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, stressed anew that it is "the
obligation on the part of any detaining officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before
the very inception of custodial inquest." He enjoined us eloquently that "(I) hold no brief against custodial
interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained person is subjected, without the
assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and
not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases in the annals of adjudication where this Court has set at
naught and declared inadmissible confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is
a verity in the life of our nation that people without influence and without stature in society have, more often
than not, been subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many
police agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we must recognize it for
what it is, (and) I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the
rights and freedoms of the individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations which
call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any
proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human
being," and echoed Justice Douglas' aphorism that the rights of none are safe unless the rights of all are
protected.

In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 6 the Court did not rule on the therein detailed assertions of
maltreatment of the detainee, stating only that "redress for the alleged violation of Socorro's constitutional
rights may be secured through appropriate civil, criminal or administrative charges." 7 The case was
dismissed for having become moot with the detainee's release from detention upon her filing the
recommended P l,000.00-bail bond. But the Court decried that "all the effort, energy and manhours
expended by the parties and their counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided had the officers
of the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the inquiries of petitioner instead of giving her the
'run-round' by referring her from one office to another."

III. I join Mr. Justice Abad Santos' stand that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) constitutes authority to keep the subject person under detention "until ordered
released by the President or his duly authorized representative," the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant
bail which may not be removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to
the fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances. "

The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege would be defeated ignores the
overwhelming capability of the State and its military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance
and the courts' imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports to the
authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical areas.

In my dissenting opinion in Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 8 Ireiterated my adherence to the majority
holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan and Hernandez vs. Montesa 9 (although it failed
one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by then Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices
Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against
them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc., accused persons covered by the

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proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail. As
stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras. "(T)he right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid
the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be
provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be
tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is
not insisted upon for being patently untenable, "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the
suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong
and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving
the rest to remain forever inviolable." 10 It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing stand since 1951
that the other great constitutional rights remain forever inviolable since the Constitution limited the
suspension to only one great right (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no
amendment of the Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such suspension notwithstanding the
numerous constitutional amendments adopted after the 1973 Constitution.

The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the security of the State would be
jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a
justification for courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These
rights are immutable, inflexible, -yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency or the so-called
'judicial statesmanship.' The Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government
and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain
undiluted individual rights." 11

And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea echoed these days by men of
goodwill that respect for constitutional and human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the
fight against rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my opinion, one of the surest
means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the
Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not. Let the
rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into
Muntinglupa, without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed
essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime before the tribunal of justice. Give them the
assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion,
uphold any doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always cling
to the principles uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the
Constitution, 'the Courts will favor personal liberty.'" 12

IV. The most authoritative pronouncement in regard to the courts' judicial power to grant the constitutional
right to bail is of course none other than the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April
20, 1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been charged with rebellion before the

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regional trial court of Cebu City and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under
the jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO " In a telegram in reply to the appeal of Msgr. Patrick
Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and Misamis Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino
Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of the accused, as any
lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City and not within the
powers of the President."

The statement of the now Chief Justice in his separate opinion in Gumaua vs. Espino 13 referring to his
earlier concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2,14 is most relevant,
mutatis mutandis, thus: " 'Were it not for the above mandate of the Transitory Provisions [Article XVII,
section 3, par. (2), 1973 Constitution], the submission of petitioner as to a military commission being devoid
of jurisdiction over civilians elicits approval. The controlling principle, to my mind, is that supplied in the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku [327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946)], a
decision impressed with the greatest relevance inasmuch as it interpreted the specific section found in the
Hawaiian Organic Act, which was also a feature of the Philippine Autonomy Act, the source of the martial
law provision in the 1935 Constitution.' As was pointed out in the Duncan opinion penned by Justice Black:
'Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by
our founders to protect the liberties they valued. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. at page 19, 63 S. Ct. at
page 6, 87 L. Ed. 3. Our system of government clearly is the antithesis of total military rule and the founders
of this country are not likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the limits of a
Territory made part of this country and not recently taken from an enemy. They were opposed to
governments that placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws. Their
philosophy has been the people's throughout the history. For that reason we have maintained legislatures
chosen by citizens or their representatives and courts and juries to try those who violate legislative
enactments. We have always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal trials
and have guarded against them by provisions embodied in the constitution itself.' ... The phrase 'martial law'
as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the
maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the island against actual or threatened
rebellion or invasion, [it] was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military courts."

V. The courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, are therefore called upon to review all such cases and the
accused's right to bail, pending trial and conviction or acquittal, on a case by case basis. The courts with
their procedural safeguards are then called upon to apply the Constitution and the Law and to grant bail for
clearly bailable (non-capital) offenses and in capital offenses to determine whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong, in consonance with guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, as in the leading case of Montano
vs. Ocampo 15(involving Senator Montano who was charged with multiple murders and frustrated murders),
as follows:

Brushing aside the charge that the preliminary investigation of this case by the aforesaid
Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at midnight, a few hours after the
complaint was filed, we are of the opinion that, upon the evidence adduced in the application
for bail in the lower court, as such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the
answer thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral argument, there is not
such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute
right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair
and liberal appreciationrather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.

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 Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear
that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be
taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has
been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent
of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official and social
standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if not nil.

As editorially commented in one daily, 16 "(T)he danger, however, lies in the possibility that such means
(PCO's) may not always be employed judiciously. In issuing a PCO the President in most cases must rely on
field reports and recommendations filed by his subordinates, usually the military and the intelligence
community. No one can totally dismiss the possibility that the President may be fed with false information
in some instances. The consequences of such an error can only aggravate further the country's security
problems." When such cases occur and executive relief is not obtained, the courts provide the means of
securing redress from erroneous or wrongful arrests and detentions, and at the very least, as shown from
past experience, serve as the means for bringing the matter to the President's attention and securing the
needed relief.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

concurring in the dismissed of the petitions, expressing conformity with the reiteration of the doctrine
announced in Lansang v. Garcia, and dissenting on the question of the right to bail which for him may be
invoked whenever allowable under the Constitution:

Let me make clear at the outset that I limit myself to a concurrence in the dismissal of the petitions,
expressing conformity with the reiteration of the doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia,1 and a dissent on the
question of the right to bail during a period of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
which for me may be invoked whenever allowable under the Constitution, a stand I took both as counsel
in Hernandez v. Montesa 2 and thereafter as a member of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 Buscayno v.
Enrile, 4 and Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile. 5 This is by no means to indicate lack of due recognition of the
intensity of conviction and lucidity of expression so evident in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Concepcion
Jr. It is merely to adhere to the norm of limiting myself to an appraisal of the constitutional rights invoked
insofar as they have a bearing on these petitions. 6 Hence this separate expression of my views.

1. The first paragraph of the decisions of this Court is worded as follows: "The petitions are without merit
and are hereby DISMISSED." 7 I am in full agreement. The authoritative doctrine followed by this Court in
accordance with well-settled jurisprudence is that the moment it can be shown that the persons detained are
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being held in lawful custody by virtue of a judicial process, then an application of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus cannot succeed.8

2. There is equally to my mind no question about the validity as a legal proposition of paragraph 4 of the
opinion, which speaks of the Philippines being "a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional convention
and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect
and defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And
this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights." 9 This Court in normal times as well as under emergency
conditions has displayed fealty to human rights, as protected and safeguarded by the Constitution. It is a
matter of legitimate pride that even under the 1935 Charter, the Philippines has accorded full recognition not
only to the traditional civil and political rights but to social and economic rights. The autonomy of the
human personality and the assurance of his dignity are a matter of deep public concern. It is equally a matter
of legitimate pride that during the period of martial law, with fun recognition of the power of the
government to maintain peace and order and preserve its authority, the judiciary, was not recreant to such a
trust. 10 For the entire judiciary, not only this Court, stands as a guarantor of those rights. It does so when it
has to act in a proper case submitted to it. The political branches are equally, to my mind, guarantors of
human rights; the Batasan Pambansa in the enactment of laws and the President in their enforcement
whether through executive orders implementing them or the issuance of decrees having the force and effect
of law. In the sense, however, that decisions coming from this Court have not merely an inter-partes but
an erga omnes effect, binding not only the litigants but also others finding themselves similarly situated, it is
quite accurate to state that "this Court stands as a guarantor of those rights."

3. It is by virtue of the respect for constitutional rights that in the resolutions of this Court in both
applications for the writ, it was made clear that counsel of petitioners can visit them and confer with them in
an atmosphere of confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures to be imposed by
respondents. 11 Again, it is by virtue of deference to the Constitution that in succeeding resolutions, their
allegations as to other instances of violation of their rights were referred for investigation to the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. 12

4. Paragraphs 5 to 19 of the opinion of the Court elaborate further on the matter. They are notable for the
concern shown for constitutional rights, with full recognition of the power of the state to deal effectively
with rebellion or subversion. I view the matter similarly. The same thought was given expression
in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 In the memorable language of Chief Justice Concepcion: "Manifestly, however, the
liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof,
but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the
Constitution and the context of the Rules of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy
that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law-such as rising publicly and
taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there
emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or
protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it.
Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it
may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse-
when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied-to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested
in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore,
without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to
epitomize." 14

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5. In the opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr., paragraph 21 explicitly states: "We reiterate this doctrine." There
is thus a reaffirmance of the ruling in Lansang cited in paragraph 20 to the effect that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ raises a judicial rather than a political question. I am in complete agreement. That was
the point of my dissent in the recently decided case of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.

6. There is also on my part conformity with the view set forth in paragraph 22 that "in all petitions
for habeas corpusthe court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition." 15

7. I am in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 23 that there can be no indefinite detention
without charges being filed. It must be recognized, however, that in cases of invasion, rebellion and
insurrection, or imminent danger thereof, the power of preventive detention is recognized by the
Constitution, considering that when public safety requires, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended or martial law, as a last resort, declared. I had occasion to speak on the matter in my separate
opinion in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, where I stated that when the stage of punitive detention is reached,
there can be reliance on the writ of habeas corpus. 16

8. The next five paragraphs deal with the right to bail. Paragraph 24 correctly noted: "Next to life, man loves
his freedom." In the next paragraph reference is made of the presumption of innocence and then of the
constitutional right to bail, after which it was noted in paragraph 26 that under Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 lifting martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "continues to be suspended in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses," namely "the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith." Paragraph 27 reaches the heart of the matter, the main opinion laying
down the principle that due to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remain suspended, "the natural
consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To
hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the
detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in
court." Paragraph 28 sets forth the ratio decidendi: "The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State." Then an analogy is made in the next paragraph in
this wise: "Just as an individual has a right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended
with respect to these offenses." With respect, I dissent. It is not necessary to repeat what I said right at the
beginning of this opinion why I am unable to agree to the proposition that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. Nor is there need to quote from my concurring and
dissenting opinions both in the Lansang and the Garcia-Padilla cases. Briefly put, my perception of the
matter traces itself to what was said in the landmark Milligan decision where the American Supreme Court
said that only one great right may be suspended "leaving all the rest forever inviolable." 17 This is not to
ignore the practical consideration set forth in the opinion of retired Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang
that militates against my approach. First he aptly summarized it in the words of Justice Tuason in Henandez,
"if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out." 18 After which
came this portion of the opinion of the then Chief Justice: "From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation-
of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the
detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view-particularly the theory that the detainees
should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination

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and/or investigation-would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from firing formal charges as long as it
may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice
could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection." 19

9. That brings us to paragraph 33 of the main opinion. The characterization of a "merged executive and
legislative branches" does not suffer from the taint of in accuracy, if viewed from the practical standpoint.
Viewed as a matter of legal theory, I am not prepared to go that far. This Court, in a unanimous opinion,
expressly held: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does
not alter its essentially presidential character." 20 There is therefore no repudiation of the theory of
separation of powers. Through the exercise of vigorous presidential leadership, however, made manifest in
party caucuses, there is attained both unity of purpose and action. In that sense, it could be asserted with
truth that there is to all intents and purposes fusion of the executive and legislative branches. Hence the need
for the maintenance of the concept of an independent judiciary. So it was pointed out in Fortun v. Labang. 21

10. One last word. Doctrines have to be assessed in terms of its effect on the governmental process. The
rationale cannot be dissociated from the texture of the times. They cannot ignore the forces at work which
may either solidify or rent asunder the political community. A crisis situation has a compulsion all its own.
There may then be a conflict between the traditional formulations and the coercion of events. That may
render even more unavoidable the intrusion of the demands of the hour into the domain of law. Adherence
to what has been all along the accepted basic approach to human rights calls for fealty. There must be also,
however, recognition of a more fluid standard in the assessment of governmental action to protect the
security of the state. It is my submission, however, that only when there may be grave public danger should
reliance on the high estate accorded constitutional rights be stigmatized as being in the grip of the
suffocating orthodoxies of the law.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the sharply perceptive and heartfelt main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. especially in the reminders about rights of the accused, the cry of our people for material
necessities to give them a better life, and the proper administration of justice. However, I would like to add
some qualifying observations to a few points discussed by the ponente.

I agree, that the issuance of a presidential arrest and commitment order (PCO) must comply with the
requirements of the Constitution. However, until the issue is placed squarely before us in a more appropriate
case, I hesitate to concur in a categorical statement that a PCO may be equated with a warrant of arrest
issued by a judge under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution. An examination of Letters of Instructions
Nos. 1125-A and 1211 indicates that the PCO is issued by the President, not as "such other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law" under Section 3 of the Bill of Rights but as Commander-in-Chief
exercising exclusively executive powers under the Constitution to meet problems of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. Precisely, the letters of
instructions call for preliminary examination or investigation by a judge as the regular procedure. Only
when resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public order and safety and
when the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would
endanger said public order and safety may the military commander or the head of the law enforcement
agency apply to the President, through the Minister of National Defense, for a presidential commitment
order. The fact that the stated procedure in the issuance of a PCO is an exception to and differs from the
regular procedure before a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest shows that a PCO may not be
equated completely with a warrant of arrest.

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In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, (9 SCRA 27), the issue was raised that the President, having been
given the power to deport undesirable aliens, may not be denied power which is essential to carry into effect
the deportation. This Court did not categorically rule that the President himself may order the arrest of an
alien for deportation purposes, but neither did it rule that he may not do so. The fact is the President has on
various occasions, such as those involving among others, Mr. Harry Stonehill and some associates and
perhaps and Yuyiteng brothers, ordered the arrest of aliens without having to secure a warrant of arrest from
a judge at a time when under the Constitution only a judge could issue such a warrant. The commander-in-
chief's power in a situation where the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended or martial law has been
proclaimed is certainly broader and less subject to constitutional restrictions than the power of deportation. I
may also add that the President does not personally examine the complainant and the witnesses the latter
may produce as the multifarious affairs of state prevent him from doing so. But as in the case of judges
relying on investigations conducted by the fiscal, the President may rely on his Minister of National Defense
or the recommending military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency to conduct what
would be the equivalent of the judicial examination for probable cause. Of course, the rules in Amarga v.
Abbas, (98 Phil. 739) which impose on the judge issuing the warrant of arrest the legal duty to first satisfy
himself that there is probable cause without relying completely or ministerially upon the findings of the
fiscal, should also apply and I believe are in fact applied to PCO's.

It also hesitate to give concurrence to an unqualified reiteration of the Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448)
doctrine on the Court's inquiring into the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law to determine their constitutional sufficiency. While
the Court has not been very receptive lately to the invocation of the political question doctrine by State
lawyers, I believe that the doctrine does apply in cases where a political department- either the President or
the Batasang Pambansa-exercises powers expressly granted in an exclusive manner by the Constitution and
which are of a clearly political nature not proper for judicial determination. If the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ is so patently arbitrary and as Justice Abad Santos says,
lacking in popular support, there will always be constitutional foundation for Supreme Court action to rule
against arbitrariness. However, as a general principle, whenever the President exercises his powers under
the Constitution to meet the supreme dangers of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof when the public safety requires it, we should not assume a power, upon the mere filing of a petition,
to render a judicial interpretation of an exclusively constitutionally granted power of the President.
Paraphrasing Coleman v. Miller (307 US 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385), the question of the sufficiency of factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law would involve an
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions involving national security which can hardly be said to be
within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an
extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice, which after all is what we would be
asserting in most cases involving the exercise of this extraordinary presidential power.

Relova, J., I vote with Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur with paragraph 1 of the Decision, dismissing the petitions filed in these cases. The term petitioner
as used herein shall refer not only to Horacio R. Morales, Jr,, but will also include Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr.
insofar as legal statements may be applicable to the latter.

Petitioner was detained on April 21, 1982 by the Armed Forces of the Philippines under a Presidential
Commitment Order approved on April 23, 1982. On July 9, 1982, he filed the petition for habeas
corpus alleging that he was being illegally detained by respondents Minister of National Defense, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and, specifically, by Colonel Galileo Kintanar, Commanding

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Officer of the 15th Military Intelligence Group. Petitioner's prayer was for the issuance of the Writ directing
respondents "to show the cause of his imprisonment or restraint, and after hearing, to order his release
forthwith." The Court issued the Writ on July 13,1982.

In a Supplemental Return to the Writ, respondents informed the Court that petitioner, on July 20, 1982, had
been charged with Rebellion in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and they
asked that the petition for habeas corpus be denied for the reason that "with the pendency of the case against
petitioner before the Court below for trial and before the City Fiscal for reinvestigation, there is all the more
reason to dismiss the petition.

Under the foregoing facts, it is my opinion that these cases have become moot. There is no longer any cause
of action against respondents who must be deemed to have lost custody of petitioner (In re Lasam vs. Enrile,
67 SCRA 43 [1975]). I do not agree with the view that petitioner is still not within the jurisdiction of the
Court below. If that were a correct proposition, the Court below would be without jurisdiction to try the
rebellion case. In criminal law, "the Court must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is,
jurisdiction of the offense, and must have jurisdiction of the person of the accused" (U.S.-U.S. v. Simon,
D.C. Pa., 248, cited in 22 C.J.S. 300). Even if there has been no warrant of arrest issued by the Court below,
the person of petitioner, who is now being tried, must be deemed as already within its jurisdiction
(Carrington vs. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 [1905]).

As petitioner is now within the jurisdiction of the Court below, the question in regards to the suspension of
the Writ ofhabeas corpus has become irrelevant. Considering that the Writ is never issuable to a Court
(Nava v. Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172 [1951]), there should be no justification in these cases to assail whatever
has been said or resolved in Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971). That particular matter could have
been raised, procedurally, if petitioner had not been charged with Rebellion before the Court below. Of
course, it would then be for this Court to give or not to give due course to the question. After all, habeas
corpus is a discretionary Writ (Engels vs. Amrine 155 Kan. 385, 125 P2d 379, cited in 39 Am. Jur. 2d, 269).
Or, that would be the occasion for the Court to express its present views in regards to Lansang-Garcia. The
Constitution is a living institution, and its interpretation and construction lives with changing times and
circumstances.

On the other hand, in reference to whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail in the rebellion case, I believe
that the proper procedure should be for petitioners to apply for bail before the Court below, and after his
motion is granted or denied, the matter can thereafter be elevated to appellate consideration.

Once prosecuted in Court the position should not be taken that petitioner cannot be bailed, the right to bail
being a fundamental right except for those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.
The Constitution limited the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to only one great right
leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable (Ex parte Milligan, 18 U.S. Law ed., 281, 297). The power of
the Courts to grant bail cannot be curtailed if the supremacy of the Judiciary within its own sphere is to be
preserved. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil. 139 [1936]; Fernandez Subido vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA
1054 [1961]).

The reason for the objection to bail poses the same risk should the Court acquit petitioner. The risk need not
be taken by continuing the detention under the Presidential Commitment Order, for a reasonable period, in
the exercise of executive discretion by way of precaution essential for the public safety. "Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process" (Moyer vs. Peabody, 53 Law, Ed., US
211-214, p.411).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

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 I

I join Justices De Castro and Abad Santos in their opinion to abandon the Lansang doctrine and to adhere to
the doctrine in the Montenegro and Barcelon cases that determination by the Chief Executive of the
existence of invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent danger thereof and that public safety requires it,
for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus and for the proclamation of martial law, is a
political question and therefore beyond the sphere of judicial inquiry. In addition to the reasons advanced by
Justices De Castro and Abad Santos, it should be stressed that the prime responsibility for the preservation
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic as well as its security, rests on the commander- in-
chief and not on the Judiciary. It is a classical truism that there is no power under the sun that is not
susceptible of abuse. Any abuse or any arbitrary exercise by the President as commander-in-chief of his
constitutional power to proclaim martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can be
repudiated or overruled by the people in the exercise of their sovereign right of suffrage at the next election,
and, pending the holding of the next election, through their constitutional right of free expression to sway
public opinion against such abuse of power.

To repeat, only the Chief Executive is well-equipped with the intelligence services as commander-in-chief
to secure the desired information as to the existence of the requirements for the proclamation of martial law
or for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court is bereft of such aids.
This was clearly demonstrated at the executive session during one of the hearings in the Lansang case where
the lawyers for the petitioners were present. Counsel for the petitioners had no means of rebutting the
evidence and information gathered by the military organization presented in said Lansang case before this
Court, which had to rely on such evidence and information submitted by the Armed Forces. It was clearly an
exercise in futility.

II

Corollary to the doctrine in the case of Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), which was re-affirmed in Gumaua
vs. Espino (96 SCRA 402, 412), that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must necessarily
include the suspension of the right to bail for crimes which are grounds for the suspension of the privilege.
This should be the ruling principle because, as well-stated by Mr. Justice De Castro, to release on bail
persons indicted for rebellion or insurrection would be to nullify the very purpose of the suspension of the
privilege, which is precisely to prevent them from continuing with the rebellion or insurrection or abetting
the same. The suspension of the privilege is precisely to restore tranquility and prevent the shedding of
blood by our own people, more than just insuring the safety of public and private properties.

Executive process is as valid as judicial process. In the epigramatic language of Mr. Justice Holmes:

... when it comes to a decision involving its (state) life, the ordinary rights of individuals
must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. (See Kelly vs. Sanders, 99
U.S. 441, 446, 25 L ed. 327, 328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual
clash of arms. And we think it is obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true to
temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. (Moyer vs, Peabody, 212 U.S. 77.85. 53 L
ed., 411, 417).

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

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I concur in the result, i.e. in the dismissal of the petitions. This is as far as I can go because I cannot give my
assent to some of the statements made in the main opinion. My list is not exhaustive but among them are the
following:

1. I reject the doctrine laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 [1971] that this Court "has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [for the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in order to determine the constitutional
sufficiency thereof." (At p. 473.) In other words, this Court, on the urging of the petitioners, declared that it
has the power to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ. In so doing,
this Court did a complete turnabout from Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil, 87 [1905] and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952] which enunciated the doctrine that the President's determination in
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is final and conclusive upon the courts.

I submit that Barcelon and Montenegro laid down the correct doctrine. The Lansang doctrine is based on
naivete; it demonstrates a lack of contact with reality.

How can this Court determine the factual bases in order that it can ascertain whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truthful words of Montenegro, "with its very limited
machinery [it] cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago?" (At p. 887.) The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive
Branch which has the appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had
to be used in Lansang. This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the military.
Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this Court relied on the very branch of the government
whose act was in question to obtain the facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch supplied
information to support its position and this Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case of the
defendant judging the suit. After all is said and done, the attempt by this Court to determine whether or not
the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.

There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the
seal of approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks
popular support because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not
arbitrary (because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect
participates in the decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its
prestige and credibility to an unpopular act.

Lansang was an empty victory for the petitioners. They won a battle but lost the war. It could be that this
Court also lost something in the process. It raised expectations which it could not fulfill.

2. I cannot accept the statement in paragraph 27 of the main opinion that "because the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus remains suspended 'with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith', the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of the said offenses is also suspended."

In the instant case, the petitioners were arrested without warrant on April 21, 1982. However, a Presidential
Commitment Order was issued against them on April 23, 1982 and on July 20, 1982 (after the petitions for
the writ of habeas corpus had been filed) the petitioners were charged with rebellion before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091.

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Are they entitled to be released on bail if they so apply?

The ponente says that they have no right to bail because "To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose
of the suspension" of the writ of habeas corpus. Another reason given to deny bail is Letter of Instructions
No. 1211 issued on March 9, 1982, which stipulates that "4. When issued, the Presidential Commitment
Order shall constitute authority to arrest the subject person or persons and keep him or them under detention
until ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative.

I submit that the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right if they should apply for it.

The nature of LOI No. 1211 has been raised. Does it have the force of law or is it a mere directive to
officers named therein, namely: The Minister of National Defense; The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines; The Chief, Philippine Constabulary; The Chief, Criminal Investigation Service; The Director-
General, NISA; The Minister of Justice; The Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and The Solicitor
General. To me the nature of LOI No. 1211 is irrelevant for the right to bail is guaranteed by a higher law-
the Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees that "All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be
required. " (Art. IV, Sec. 18.) The penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal. Hence rebellion is a non-
capital offense and the petitioners should be granted bail by the court where their case is pending if they ask
for it.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that they are covered by a Presidential
Commitment Order are of no consequence. Since the respondents have elected to bring the case of the
petitioners to court, the court acquired complete jurisdiction over them. To say that the court cannot grant
them bail is to diminish the court's jurisdiction.

The eloquent words of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason are completely relevant:

Under constitutional guarantee bail is a matter of right which no court or judge could
properly refuse in all cases beyond the exceptions specified in the Constitution. The meaning
of this fundamental provision is that a party accused of any and every bailable offense shall
have the inestimable privilege of giving security for his attendance at court and shall not be
imprisoned. (6 C.J. 893.)

The Constitution will be searched in vain for any provision that abridges this right. Any
argument in support of the contention that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus carries
with it the suspension of the right to bail is, and has to be, based on inference. I do not
believe that the curtailment of the right to bail is a normal, legal, or logical outcome of the
suspension of the writ. The error, I am inclined to believe, arises from a confusion of terms
and misapprehension of the principles underlying the suspension of the writ.

The purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a precautionary
measure, to detain without interference persons suspected of harboring designs harmful to
public safety. (Ex Parte Simmerman, 132 F. 2d, 442, 446.) The Constitution goes no further.
(Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2, 18 Law. Ed. 281, 297.) If this is the purpose, the suspension
can contemplate only cases which, without the suspension, are open to interference; such
cases are arrests and detentions by the executive department. Since the suspension of the writ
is designed to prevent the issuance of this extraordinary remedy, and since the writ issues

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 from the courts but never to the courts, it necessarily follows that arrests and detentions by
order of the courts are outside the purview of the constitutional scheme.

As stated, the theory of the prosecution stems from a misconception of the ends pursued by
the suspension of the writ. If it is to have any color of validity, this theory must assume that
the Constitution directs positive action to be taken, orders arrests and detentions to be made.
Unfortunately or fortunately, the Constitution does not do so. The intent of the Constitution
in authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is no other than to given the
authorities a free hand in dealing with persons bent on overthrowing the Government. The
effects of the suspension are negative, not positive; permissive, not mandatory nor even
directory. By the suspension, arrests and detentions beyond the period allowed under normal
circumstances are tolerated or legalized. The Constitution is not in the least concerned with
the disposition of persons accused of rebellion or insurrection, whether or how long they
should be kept in confinement, or whether they should be set at large. In the nature of the
governmental set-up under the Constitution, their immediate fate is left to the discretion,
within reasonable and legal limits, of the proper department.

With these distinctions in mind, the query is, on what department of Government is entrusted
the prerogative of deciding what is to be done with the prisoners charged with or suspected of
rebellion or insurrection? The answser, as I shall endeavor presently to explain, is either the
executive or the Court, depending on who has jurisdiction over them.

All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under executive
control. It is here where the Constitution tells the courts to keep their hands off-unless the
cause of the detention be for an offense other than rebellion or insurrection, which is another
matter.

By the same token, if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the
executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern.
Thereupon the corresponding court assumes its role and the judicial process takes its course
to the exclusion of the executive or the legislative departments. Henceforward, the accused is
entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and privileges essential to due process.
'The Constitution does not say that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common
law.' (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.) The Bill of Rights, including the right to bail and the
right to a fair trial, are unaffected by the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The
Constitution 'suspended one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable. (Ex
parte Milligan, ante, 297.) (Nava et al vs. Gatmaitan 90 Phil. 172, 202-205 [1951].)

It should be stated that Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Justices Cesar Bengzon, Alex Reyes and Fernando
Jugo shared the above opinion of Justice Tuason. Incumbent Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando expressed
the same opinion in Lansang.

It is also said that the view "if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive
steps out," will tend to induce the executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be
possible. (See opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, op. cit. on p. 494.) The answer has long
been given by this Court in Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1954) as follows:

This constitutional mandate [on the right to bail] refers to all persons not only to persons
against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the
rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital

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 offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that
any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he
is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong, Of course, only those
persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will
ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can
invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this- guarantee of the Bill of
Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and
evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those
already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just
reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even yet
conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more
favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense
(Constitution, Article III, Section 1[17], a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in
favor of one not yet so charged, although already arrested or detained." (At pp. 640-64 1.)

What I have said above about the right of an accused to bail in non-capital cases applies mutatis mutandis to
a person accused of a capital offense if the evidence of his guilt is not strong to be determined after a
hearing as provided in the Rules of Court: "Sec. 7. Capital offense-Burden of proof. -On the hearing of an
application for admission to bail made by any person in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. ..." (Rule 114.)

Addendum to concurring and dissenting opinion:

Long after I had written my separate opinion in the above-entitled cases, the newspapers reported the arrest
of Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City on grounds of national security. It was said that the
arrest of Mayor Pimentel was effected pursuant to a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO).

It was also reported that Msgr. Patrick Cronin Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro City, requested President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to lift the PCO because Pimentel was innocent of any wrong-doing.

The issues dated April 20, 1983, of Bulletin Today, Daily Express and Times Journal all report that
President Marcos denied the request of Archbishop Cronin because he had no power to release Pimentel
who was arrested and charged before a Regional Trial Court in Cebu City on very strong evidence that he
provided arms, funds, and sanctuary to subversives.

President Marcos is reported to have told Msgr. Cronin

The disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is now within the
powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City, and not within the powers of the President.

It should be recalled the main opinion holds that the petitioners herein cannot be granted bail by the court
where they stand charged with the crime of rebellion because to hold otherwise would defeat the very
purpose of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and also because under LOI No. 1211, the release of
persons arrested pursuant to a PCO can be effected only by order of the President or his duly authorized
representative. And it should be noted that every PCO has the following operative last paragraph:

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 I, therefore, hereby order the arrest and detention of the abovenamed persons until the final
disposition/termination of their cases unless sooner ordered released by me or by my duly
authorized representative.

And yet in the case of Mayor Pimentel who was arrested by virtue of a PCO, the President no less said that
the power to release Pimentel "as any lawyer will inform you," is not his but of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City.

I am happy to be counted among the "any lawyer" mentioned by President Marcos for I believe, as I have
stated in my separate opinion, that the petitioners herein are entitled to bail after they were charged in court
with rebellion because "the court steps in and the executive steps out."

DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the dismissal of the petition. It is my considered opinion, as I have set forth in my ponencia in
the case for Habeas Corpus-Josefina Garcia, petitioner, G.R. No. 61388, hereafter referred to as the Parong
case, that when a person is arrested by virtue of a PCO or a PCO is issued after his arrest effected without
warrant or with one issued by court, his detention becomes one without right to bail, even after charges have
been filed against him in court. This is so because, under the circumstance that the rebellion is still
continuing, perhaps with greater intensity, a captured or arrested rebel, or one in conspiracy with the rebels
by acts in pursuance or in furtherance of the rebellion, is not arrested and detained with a view to his
immediate prosecution. It is more for the purpose of detaining him as a military measure to suppress the
rebellion. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has the effect of deferring trial for
certain specified crimes during the existence of the emergency, as I stated, citing legal writers and
publicists, 1 in the aforecited case of Parong, et al.

The reason is that a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime the commission of which has not yet come to
an end as in the case of the existing rebellion. A person who kills another can and should immediately be
prosecuted, because the killing itself constitutes the termination of the commission of the crime, as is
generally true with the common statutory offenses. But a rebel, even when already captured or arrested and
placed under detention, by reason of conspiracy with the rebels and their co-conspirators who are free,
continues in a state of committing the crime of rebellion which is a continuing offense. If immediately
prosecuted and by virtue thereof, allowed to be released on bail, the crime of rebellion being bailable, the
detainee would certainly join his comrades in the field to the jeopardy of government efforts to suppress the
rebellion, which is the rationale for the President being constitutionally empowered to suspend the privilege
of habeas corpus in case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, even mere imminent danger thereof, when
public safety so requires. The President, however, may order the filing of charges in court and trial thereof
forthwith held, or even release on bail, as his best judgment will dictate to him. But this is for the President
alone to decide, without interference from the courts, he being in the exercise of his military power.

It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it would reiterate the doctrine of the
Lansang case, being of the view that the earlier doctrine in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro
vs. Castaneda which was superseded by the Lansang doctrine should be reverted to, as the more practical
and realistic ruling, and more in consonance with the grant by the Constitution to the President of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of the contingencies mentioned in the
Constitution. Such power could be easily rendered nugatory if interference by the Supreme Court were
allowed as when it is given the power of judicial review over the exercise of this particular presidential
power. The doctrine of "political question" comes in to make it improper for the power of judicial review to
be exercise by the said Court, which doctrine renders the exercise of the presidential power referred to non-

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justiciable. Justiciability of the controversy is the basic requirement for the exercise of the power of judicial
review.

Moreover, the Lansang doctrine could easily be viewed as discriminatory against our incumbent President
whose proclamation suspending the privilege of habeas corpus was held subject to judicial review, where
similar proclamations of former Chiefs Executive, Governor General Wright and President Quirino, were
held binding and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons. If this is so, as it can be safely surmised
that the incumbent President cannot but feel discriminated against with the pronouncement of the Lansang
doctrine, rectification is called for. Needless to state, I am one with Justice Abad Santos in his vigorous
dissent against the reiteration of the Lansang doctrine as proposed in the majority opinion in the instant case.

In the Parong case (G.R. No. 61388), I stated, inter alia, the following:

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part of its power of
legislation to the President. Would it not be as proper and wholly acceptable to lay down the
principle that during such crises, the judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more
trusting •f the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond judicial review, Arbitrariness,
as a ground for judicial inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to
contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion
for the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on
reviewing Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent
collision of two jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in
favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political question" in
reference to the power of judicial review."

Indeed, while the Supreme Court is said to be the Guardian of the Constitution, not all questions arising
therefrom may be brought to it for judicial review as to whether a constitutional violation has been
committed. The power of the President as the defender of the State has to be granted by the Constitution, for
how else could such power be granted except by the instrument which is the repository of the sovereign will
of the people. But certainly, the exercise of such power of defending the Nation is not to be subordinated to
that of the Supreme Court acting as Guardian of the Constitution, for of what use is it to preserve the
Constitution if We lose the Nation?

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The bench and bar and law scholars and students are in debt to the writer of the main opinion, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, Jr., for his thorough and perceptive restatement of the constitutional and basic human rights of
accused persons and detainees. The main opinion spotlights the grievances that persons detained or charged
for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes
invariably bring to this Court. They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any warrant
of arrest; of being kept in isolation and being denied of their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of
prolonged detention without any charges; of having been subjected to maltreatment and torture; and of their
counsel and families undergoing great difficulties in locating or having access to them.

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies all such charges and submits
affidavits of the arresting officers and detention custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane

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treatment, further countering that such claims are merely calculated to arouse sympathy and as propaganda
against the Government and its institutions.

Upon the filing of the petition at bar on July 13, 1982, the Court, in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
Resolved "to allow counsel for petitioner to visit and confer with the detainee in an atmosphere of
confidentiality, consistent with reasonable security measures which respondents may impose." At the
hearing held on July 22, 1982, the Court granted petitioner's plea for reinvestigation of the charges and to
"appoint the (Quezon) City Fiscal to act as Commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of the charges
made by petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to counsel." The City Fiscal in due time submitted his report on the reinvestigation,
affirming the existence of a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioner. In February this year, he
submitted the voluminous transcript of the proceedings held before him and the evidence submitted to him
without comment or recommendation on petitioner's charges of alleged torture and violation of
constitutional rights. The "material and relevant" charges have not been taken up nor deliberated upon by
the Court, but apparently will no longer be resolved by the, Court, as was expected at the time, since the
main opinion directs now that "they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them." 1 On
my part, I believe that the Court should go over the transcript and make some authoritative pronouncements
on the charges at least of violation of petitioners' right to counsel.

I. The vital problem is to assure the enjoyment of such constitutional and basic human rights of the persons
arrested, detained or charged, be they mere dissenters, subversives or hardened criminals. As observed in
the main opinion, this is what distinguishes our country as a republican and democratic state from those
arrested in totalitarian states who have no rights to speak of. This Court stands as the guarantor of the
constitutional rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights are respected and
not treated as paper rights.

These are the great rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the Constitution:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures and arbitrary arrest:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

The right to due process and equal protection of law:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

The right of free association:

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 Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.

Freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition:

Sec. 9. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

The great writ of liberty:

Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it.

The right to bail:

Sec. 8. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

Presumption of innocence and Rights of speedy and impartial trial and confrontation:

Sec. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

The right to counsel and silence.

Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The main opinion deals with the scope and extent of these rights and a number of passages bears emphasis
and reiteration, as follows:

The arresting officers, upon making the arrest, must inform the subject of the reason for the arrest and show
him the warrant of arrest, if any. They must inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. They must respect his right to communicate with his lawyer. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of his counsel. The right to counsel may be waived knowingly and
intelligently and for such reason the waiver should be recognized only if made with the assistance of
counsel. The detainee's right to confer with counsel at any hour of the day, alone and privately, should be
respected.

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 Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no
justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention
(under Article 124, Revised Penal Code) or unlawful arrest (under Article 269, Idem) or for
some other offense.2

Furthermore, we hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional mandate,
in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment
the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the courts
cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of the
Constitution and is contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic society. 3

However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the
filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without
any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains
his right to freedom. 4

II. Respondents' return in these cases, in asserting that "the allegations that petitioners have been denied
their right to counsel are not true. They simply did not ask for one, " disregards the consistent injunction of
the Court and of the law that the detainees need not bear the burden of asking for counsel but should be
informed of their right to counsel. The return's assertion that "petitioners also waived the assistance of
counsel during the investigation of their cases" also falls short of the requirement that such waiver be made
with the assistance of counsel to assure the validity thereof.

The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in maintaining in his dissenting opinion in Magtoto vs.
Manguera5 that the 1973 constitutional ban on uncounselled confessions should operate retrospectively to
June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 (amending Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code) was enacted
recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any custodial inquest, and not prospectively only as
to such confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, stressed anew that it is "the
obligation on the part of any detaining officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before
the very inception of custodial inquest." He enjoined us eloquently that "(I) hold no brief against custodial
interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained person is subjected, without the
assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and
not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases in the annals of adjudication where this Court has set at
naught and declared inadmissible confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is
a verity in the life of our nation that people without influence and without stature in society have, more often
than not, been subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many
police agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we must recognize it for
what it is, (and) I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the
rights and freedoms of the individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations which
call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any
proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human
being," and echoed Justice Douglas' aphorism that the rights of none are safe unless the rights of all are
protected.

In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 6 the Court did not rule on the therein detailed assertions of
maltreatment of the detainee, stating only that "redress for the alleged violation of Socorro's constitutional

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rights may be secured through appropriate civil, criminal or administrative charges." 7 The case was
dismissed for having become moot with the detainee's release from detention upon her filing the
recommended P l,000.00-bail bond. But the Court decried that "all the effort, energy and manhours
expended by the parties and their counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided had the officers
of the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the inquiries of petitioner instead of giving her the
'run-round' by referring her from one office to another."

III. I join Mr. Justice Abad Santos' stand that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) constitutes authority to keep the subject person under detention "until ordered
released by the President or his duly authorized representative," the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant
bail which may not be removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to
the fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances. "

The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege would be defeated ignores the
overwhelming capability of the State and its military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance
and the courts' imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports to the
authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical areas.

In my dissenting opinion in Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 8 Ireiterated my adherence to the majority
holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan and Hernandez vs. Montesa 9 (although it failed
one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by then Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices
Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against
them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc., accused persons covered by the
proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail. As
stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras. "(T)he right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid
the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be
provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be
tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is
not insisted upon for being patently untenable, "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the
suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction
be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong
and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving
the rest to remain forever inviolable." 10 It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing stand since 1951
that the other great constitutional rights remain forever inviolable since the Constitution limited the
suspension to only one great right (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no
amendment of the Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such suspension notwithstanding the
numerous constitutional amendments adopted after the 1973 Constitution.

115 | P a g e
The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the security of the State would be
jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a
justification for courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These
rights are immutable, inflexible, -yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency or the so-called
'judicial statesmanship.' The Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government
and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain
undiluted individual rights." 11

And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea echoed these days by men of
goodwill that respect for constitutional and human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the
fight against rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my opinion, one of the surest
means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the
Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not. Let the
rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into
Muntinglupa, without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed
essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime before the tribunal of justice. Give them the
assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion,
uphold any doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always cling
to the principles uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the
Constitution, 'the Courts will favor personal liberty.'" 12

IV. The most authoritative pronouncement in regard to the courts' judicial power to grant the constitutional
right to bail is of course none other than the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April
20, 1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been charged with rebellion before the
regional trial court of Cebu City and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under
the jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO " In a telegram in reply to the appeal of Msgr. Patrick
Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and Misamis Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino
Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of the accused, as any
lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City and not within the
powers of the President."

The statement of the now Chief Justice in his separate opinion in Gumaua vs. Espino 13 referring to his
earlier concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2,14 is most relevant,
mutatis mutandis, thus: " 'Were it not for the above mandate of the Transitory Provisions [Article XVII,
section 3, par. (2), 1973 Constitution], the submission of petitioner as to a military commission being devoid
of jurisdiction over civilians elicits approval. The controlling principle, to my mind, is that supplied in the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku [327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946)], a
decision impressed with the greatest relevance inasmuch as it interpreted the specific section found in the
Hawaiian Organic Act, which was also a feature of the Philippine Autonomy Act, the source of the martial
law provision in the 1935 Constitution.' As was pointed out in the Duncan opinion penned by Justice Black:
'Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by
our founders to protect the liberties they valued. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S. at page 19, 63 S. Ct. at
page 6, 87 L. Ed. 3. Our system of government clearly is the antithesis of total military rule and the founders
of this country are not likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the limits of a
Territory made part of this country and not recently taken from an enemy. They were opposed to
governments that placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws. Their
philosophy has been the people's throughout the history. For that reason we have maintained legislatures
chosen by citizens or their representatives and courts and juries to try those who violate legislative

116 | P a g e
enactments. We have always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal trials
and have guarded against them by provisions embodied in the constitution itself.' ... The phrase 'martial law'
as employed in that Act, therefore, while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the
maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the island against actual or threatened
rebellion or invasion, [it] was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military courts."

V. The courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, are therefore called upon to review all such cases and the
accused's right to bail, pending trial and conviction or acquittal, on a case by case basis. The courts with
their procedural safeguards are then called upon to apply the Constitution and the Law and to grant bail for
clearly bailable (non-capital) offenses and in capital offenses to determine whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong, in consonance with guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, as in the leading case of Montano
vs. Ocampo 15(involving Senator Montano who was charged with multiple murders and frustrated murders),
as follows:

Brushing aside the charge that the preliminary investigation of this case by the aforesaid
Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at midnight, a few hours after the
complaint was filed, we are of the opinion that, upon the evidence adduced in the application
for bail in the lower court, as such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the
answer thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral argument, there is not
such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute
right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair
and liberal appreciationrather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.

Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear
that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital
punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be
taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has
been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent
of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official and social
standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if not nil.

As editorially commented in one daily, 16 "(T)he danger, however, lies in the possibility that such means
(PCO's) may not always be employed judiciously. In issuing a PCO the President in most cases must rely on
field reports and recommendations filed by his subordinates, usually the military and the intelligence
community. No one can totally dismiss the possibility that the President may be fed with false information
in some instances. The consequences of such an error can only aggravate further the country's security
problems." When such cases occur and executive relief is not obtained, the courts provide the means of
securing redress from erroneous or wrongful arrests and detentions, and at the very least, as shown from

117 | P a g e
past experience, serve as the means for bringing the matter to the President's attention and securing the
needed relief.

DIGEST

FACTS:
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC.
They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were
arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to
counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents
countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were
arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD:
Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus remains suspended “with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter
be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,” the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat
the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is
anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an
individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the
privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial
those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State’s very existence. For this measure
of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these
offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of
charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason,
the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in
this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they
ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court,
Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for
"Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro
City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD
VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and
NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void.
In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition
but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers
and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition
for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly
119 | P a g e
deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that
Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ
was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August
1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings;
besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian
Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and
Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28
August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons
were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral
parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in
relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued,
is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live
person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to
amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or
after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas
Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to
bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in
the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of
pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the
body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed
by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November
1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second
amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out
to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to
the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed
to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over
the nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the
custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment
thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
which reads as follows:

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 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:

xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case.
The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful
jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations
of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17
January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by
treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil
action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294
of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original
petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been
restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and
burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the
ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample
jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead
body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled
to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide
and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the
dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used
as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and
sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally
married to another woman. 11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of
law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of
both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
121 | P a g e
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating
that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead
body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision
without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover
custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants
are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one
for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new
Family Code) which states:

Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are
obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that
what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature
of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted
by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana
was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such
facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima
facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is
insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements
and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ
of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise
of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will
enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed
by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the
minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and
morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said
122 | P a g e
 respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and
law repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its
giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to
award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after
summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation
disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in
order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as
a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the
issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used
therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful
custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law
does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from
even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

123 | P a g e
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body
of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any
kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if
they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means
to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No
Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

124 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition for habeas corpus against Eugenio for
forcibly taking Vitaliana (respondents’ sister)from her residence in 1987 and confined by the former in his
palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The respondent-brothers, however, were not knowledgeable of
Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988 due to heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of habeas corpus.
Hence, Eugenio did not release the body of Vitaliana claiming that the writ of habeas corpus is invalid
because it was filed after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed that there was no existing
marital relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and therefore they have the custody over the body of the
latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was
merely a common law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it was held that Eugenio
was legally married to another woman.

Issue:

Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and sisters or her
common law spouse.

Ruling:

The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And even if it was recognized, the co-ownership
requires that the man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In this case,
Eugenio was legally married to another woman, which bars him from being legally capacitated to contract
marriages. Thye Civil Code of the Philippines defines “spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including
common law spouses. Hence, the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to her brothers and sisters.

125 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-43195 August 23, 1935

FELIPE GONZALES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FLORENTINO C. VIOLA and VALENTIN MANIQUIS, respondents-appellees.

Juan S. Rustia, for appellant.

Payawal, Osorio and Mendoza for appellees.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, denying the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by the appellant. The order of denial was entered by the court below after due
hearing, on the ground that the appellant was legally detained.

The facts which gave rise to this case are fully set forth in the order appealed from. In deciding this appeal,
it is sufficient to observe that the record shows that on January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., appellant was
placed under arrest by order of the appellees and detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel, Province of
Bulacan; that a few hours later a criminal complaint was filed by the appellee Maniquis against the appellant
in the justice of the peace court of the aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day, at about 8 p.m., he
was released on bail. When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court
below the appellant was already out on bail.

In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court of judge must first inquire whether the
petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains
is the court required to inquire into the cause of the detention, and if the alleged cause is found to be
unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. (Code of Civil Procedure, sections
525, 541; Wales vs. Whitney, 114 U.S., 564; 29 Law. ed., 277.)

The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a
mere moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very satisfactory definition to be found in
the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ
of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly be expected from the variety of
restraints for which it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal process may be so
relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or guardian, persons held
under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in a mad-house, as well as those under military control,
may all become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent and character
of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to the nature of the control which is asserted
over the party in whose behalf the writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral restraint is necessary to
make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it."
(Wales vs. Whitney, supra.)

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Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been justified in refusing the writ
solely on the ground that the appellant was not, within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground the order appealed from is
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Hull, Vickers, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

127 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 80591 August 5, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IN BEHALF OF DANIEL

NGAYA-AN, CARMENCITA NGAYA-AN, CLEMENTE WINGNGA and FELISA NGAYA-AN
TACALIG, petitioners,
vs.
CONRADO BALWEG, alias KA AMBO, SAGMAYAO APPAG, alias KA SULONG, and THE
CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (CPLA), respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Daniel Ngaya-an.
Petitioners Carmencita Ngaya-an, Clemente Wingnga and Felisa Ngaya-an Tacalig (Petitioners for brevity)
are the wife, brother and sister, respectively, of Daniel Ngaya-an. Named as respondents are Conrado
Balweg alias "Ka Ambo," the Head of Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA for short), Sagmayao
Appag alias "Ka Sulong" the Head of the CPLA Moro Company and the CPLA.

In their petition dated November 17, 1987, petitioners alleged, among others, that Daniel Ngaya-an is the
Chairman of the Cordillera Bodong Association; that sometime on October 5, 1987, at a checkpoint manned
by elements of the CPLA situated at Cagaluan Gate, past Kalinga-Apayao on direct order of Sagmayao
Appag alias "Ka Sulong", Daniel was forcibly taken and brought to their headquarters at Cagaluan Pasil,
Kalinga-Apayao; that Daniel has been detained and deprived of his liberty by respondents; that respondents
have no legal basis nor authority to detain him; that Daniel has not committed a crime nor charged with an
offense for which he can be legally detained; that petitioners together with their relatives and friends went
several times to the CPLA detachment at Cagaluan but respondents refused to release Daniel and reveal the
place where he is detained; that respondent Balweg in a radio interview admitted that the CPLA is
responsible for the disappearance of Daniel and even hinted that he will be or had been killed by the CPLA.
As a relief petitioners prayed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued directing respondents to produce the
body of Daniel and show cause for his detention. They also prayed that after hearing Daniel be restored of
his liberty and discharged from confinement.

On November 23, 1987, the Second Division of this Court resolved to issue a writ returnable to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. It also directed the Executive Judge to hear the
case and submit its report to this Court which retains full control over the petition. Likewise, the
respondents were required to respect Daniel's constitutional rights. (Rollo, p. 9).

Through registered speed air mail respondents Conrado Balweg and the CPLA were furnished a copy of the
resolution dated November 23,1987, at the Cordillera House, Presidential Mansion House, Wright Park,
Baguio City, the address of the respondents stated in the petition. In addition respondents were advised of
said resolution by telegrams sent by Second Division Clerk of Court Salvador de Guzman. The copy of the

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resolution sent to respondent Appag was returned unserved with the notation from the post office that the
addressee is unknown in Cagaluan, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao the address indicated in the petition.

On December 9, 1989, pursuant to this Court's resolution dated November 23, 1987, RTC Executive Judge
Stella Dadivas Farrales of Baguio City twice called the case for hearing, but there was no appearance by the
respondents.

On December 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to cite respondents for contempt. They pointed out
that respondents should be punished for their refusal to obey the November 23, 1987 resolution of this
Court. They also prayed that the RUC Commander of Region I be deputized to serve the writ of habeas
corpus on the respondents.

In this Court's resolution dated January 6, 1988 the respondents were required to comment on the motion for
contempt.1âwphi1 Copy of the resolution was sent by registered mail to the respondents at their respective
addresses as stated in the petition. Again the copy of the resolution sent to respondent Appag was returned
unserved with the notation that the addressee is unknown.

On April 11, 1988, this Court issued another resolution directing the PC Provincial Commander of Region I
at Dangwa to serve on the respondents the resolution of January 6, 1988. Copy of the resolution was again
sent by registered mail to respondents.

On May 19,1988, Col. Honorio Capulong of the AFP Northern Luzon Command, informed this Court that
the Office of Conrado Balweg at the Presidential Mansion House Complex refused to receive the resolution
of January 6, 1988 alleging that said refusal is in compliance with the CBA-CPLA Collective Agreement,

On June 22, 1988, the Second Division referred the case to the Court En Banc en consulta. In its resolution
dated August 30, 1988, the Court En Banc accepted the case.

On petitioners' motion, the Court En Banc issued a resolution directing the Northern Luzon Command to
submit a report on whether the resolution of January 6, 1988 was served on respondents. Copy of said
resolution for Conrado Balweg and the CPLA was received by Celso Martinez on October 4, 1988.

On August 24, 1989, the Court En Banc resolved to order the arrest of respondent Balweg. The Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was directed to arrest respondent Balweg and incarcerate him
until he complies with the aforementioned resolution of this Court (Rollo, pp. 152-154).

On September 6, 1989, respondent Balweg, thru his counsel Atty. Romeo Bringas filed an urgent motion to
lift the order of arrest alleging among others that he has not defied any lawful order of this Court. He
pointed out that he is not residing nor holding office at the Cordillera House. He also denied having
authorized Celso Martinez or anybody to receive any mail matter or resolution in his behalf at the Cordillera
House or elsewhere. In his motion he also requested a period of thirty (30) days to file his comment on the
petition.

In their comment and opposition to the urgent motion filed on September 15, 1989, petitioners argued that
the urgent motion dated September 6, 1989 is a mere scrap of paper as it was not verified by respondent
Balweg but by a certain Ama Mariano Agosto who claims to be the Deputy Chief Executive of the
Cordillera Bodong Administration.

On September 27,1989, respondent Balweg, thru his counsel, filed a reply to petitioners' comment and
opposition. The reply was verified by respondent Balweg and subscribed before the Assistant Clerk of Court
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Luzviminda Puno of this Court. On even date respondent Balweg also filed his compliance/comment of the
resolutions of this Court dated November 23, 1987, January 6, 1988 and August 30, 1988.

On October 27,1989, the Court En Banc resolved to lift, effective immediately, the order of arrest it had
issued on August 24, 1989. It also exonerated respondent Balweg from the charge of contempt. This Court
noted that respondent Balweg has not defied the order of this Court as he never resided at the place where
said order was served. Respondent Balweg was required to appear before Executive Judge Stella Dadivas-
Farrales and make a return of the writ of habeas corpus (Rollo, pp. 190-191).

In his return of the writ of habeas corpus dated November 3, 1989, respondent Balweg alleged inter
alia that Daniel Ngaya-an is not in his custody; that he has not ordered the apprehension of Daniel; that he
has nothing to do with the disappearance of Daniel; that he learned of Daniel's disappearance in the radio
and newspaper reports; that the petition does not specifically state his participation in the disappearance of
Daniel so that the petition states no cause of action against him.

Despite notice served on December 26, 1989, petitioners failed to produce their witnesses in the hearing
scheduled on February 5, 1990. To avoid delay, Executive Judge Stella Dadivas-Farrales allowed
respondent Balweg to present his evidence. In his testimony respondent Balweg confirmed the statements
contained in his return of the writ of habeas corpus dated November 3, 1989 which was marked as Exhibit
"I ". His compliance/comment filed on September 27, 1989 before this Court, marked as Exhibit "2" was
also offered together with Exhibit "1" as part of the testimony of respondent Balweg, Atty. Noe Villanueva,
who appeared as counsel for petitioners, cross-examined respondent Balweg.

On April 30,1990, pursuant to the resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 1, 1990, allowing Atty. Noe
Villanueva to present evidence for the petitioner, Judge Stella Dadivas-Farrales heard the testimony of
Carmencita Ngaya-an, the wife of Daniel Ngaya-an. In her testimony she declared that her husband left
Kalinga-Apayao to attend a seminar of the Cordillera People's Alliance on September 7, 1987; that on
October 5, 1987 on his way home her husband was abducted; that on October 6, 1987 she was informed by
her uncle Gavino Laoen that her husband was captured by the CPLA at Cagaluan Gate; that together with
her brothers, sisters, and relatives numbering about 50, on the same day, they proceeded to the Cagaluan
Gate to talk with the CPLA; that at the Cagaluan Gate she talked with Saginayao Appag alias "Ka Sulong",
the Commander of the CPLA; that Saginayao Appag informed her that they talked to her husband but "they
let him leave" and "sent him away"; that she retorted that if it is true that her husband left them he should be
in their home; that they left the barracks and searched the surroundings at the Cagaluan Gate and in the
river; that the search lasted for 10 days but they were not able to find Daniel Ngaya-an; that she knows
Conrado Balweg alias "Ka Ambo", because she saw him before; that "Ka Ambo" wrote a letter dated
October 20, 1987 to Barangay Captain Balway requesting for a conference; that they did not go to Captain
Balway for a conference because they were afraid that if they do not consent to the wishes of "Ka Ambo"
they will be imprisoned.

Ramon Edduba, another witness for the petitioners, testified that on October 5, 1987, at around 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon, while he was standing in front of the restaurant at the Cagaluan Gate, a jeep arrived with
Daniel Ngaya-an as one of the passengers seating in the front portion of the jeep; that as Daniel was about to
step down from the jeep, Saginayao Appag together with four (4) other men carrying long firearms, one of
whom he identified was "Ka Ambo", the "Assistant" of Saginayao Appag, approached the former and got
some papers from him; that after Daniel refused to drink liquor "Ka Sulong" and his men tied his hand and
feet with a rope; that Daniel shouted for help when he was carried to the detachment but nobody helped
him; that after that he boarded a jeepney and left the place. On direct examination he identified the affidavit
he executed on November 19, 1987. When cross-examined he admitted to Atty. Romeo Bringas the counsel

130 | P a g e
for respondent Balweg that he did not know the full name of "Ka Ambo" and the other companions of
Saginayao Appag.

Petitioners formally offered Exhibit "A", the letter dated October 20,1987 of "Ka Ambo" in the Ilocano
dialect with a translation in the English language by Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito and Exhibit "B", the
affidavit dated November 17,1987 of witness Ramon Edduba, after which they rested their case.

The primary issue to be resolved is whether or not Daniel Ngaya-an is unlawfully detained or restrained of
his liberty by respondent Balweg and the CPLA.

Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." (Section 1, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court).

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint.(Castriciones v. Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 65731, September 28,
1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Mizuaki Takenouchi v. Cristi et al., G.R. 82232, July 25,1988, Third
Division, Minute Resolution). It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint (Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 39 Phil. 778). It is a remedy intended to determine whether the person under detention is held under
lawful authority (Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil, 304).

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must determine whether: (1) the person in whose
behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the name of the person detaining
another; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (4) the cause of his detention
(Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court). Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully
restrained of his liberty that the petition for habeas corpus will be granted and the person detained will be
released from confinement (Gonzales v. Viola, 61 Phil. 824). If the respondents are not detaining nor
restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed the petition
should be dismissed (In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpusof Ferdinand E. Marcos, etc. v.
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, May 18, 1989, G.R. No. 88079, En Banc, Minute Resolution).

In the case at bar, petitioners miserably failed to substantiate by clear and convincing evidence that Daniel
Ngaya-an in whose behalf the petition has been filed is under the custody or is unlawfully detained and
restrained of his liberty by the respondent Balweg. The only evidence linking respondent Balweg to the
disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an is the declaration of Ramon Edduba, the lone eyewitness for the
petitioners that on October 5, 1987, at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Saginayao Appag together with
"Ka Ambo" and three other men carrying long firearms accosted Daniel Ngaya-an at the Cagaluan Gate and
thereafter with a rope tied on Daniel's hands and feet he was carried to the detachment. Witness Edduba
apparently committed an error in naming "Ka Ambo" as one of the companions of Saginayao Appag as he
declared that "Ka Ambo" is the assistant of Saginayao Appag (TSN, June 19, 1990, p. 6, Rollo, p. 231). On
cross-examination he even admitted that he does not know the full name of "Ka Ambo". In the affidavit he
executed on November 19,1987, which petitioners offered as Exhibit "B", Ramon Edduba declared that
before Daniel Ngaya-an could step down from the jeep he was approached by Saginayao Appag
accompanied by men armed with long firearms one of whom he identified as "Ka Elias". He has not
declared nor even insinuated that respondent Conrado Balweg popularly known as "Ka Ambo" the Head of
the CPLA was with the group of Saginayao Appag when Daniel Ngaya-an was accosted at the Cagaluan
Gate on October 5, 1987.

Ostensibly, the disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an was established by Ramon Edduba's testimony
corroborated by Carmencita Ngaya-an, the wife of Daniel Ngaya-an. However, the granting of the relief is

131 | P a g e
not predicated on the disappearance of a person. The petitioners must establish by competent and
convincing evidence that the missing person in whose behalf the petition is filed is under the custody of the
respondents.

Here there is no evidence that respondent Balweg, the Head of the CPLA, is responsible for the
disappearance of Daniel. Neither is there any evidence that the missing person is presently detained by
respondent Balweg. On his part respondent Balweg has not only categorically denied that Daniel Ngaya-an
is under his custody but also that he is not responsible for his disappearance.

It is possible that based on the testimony of Ramon Edduba the person responsible for the disappearance of
Daniel is respondent Saginayao Appag. However, we could not grant the relief and order respondent
Saginayao Appag to release Daniel because up to now this Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent Appag. As borne by the records of this case, the writ issued on November 23, 1987, as
well as the subsequent resolutions of this Court, were returned unserved because respondent Appag is
unknown at Cagaluan, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, the address indicated in the petition.

All law enforcement agencies of the government must join hands in locating the whereabouts of Daniel
Ngaya-an who has been missing since October 5, 1987. The National Bureau of Investigation can conduct
its own investigation so that if warranted by the result of its investigation, Saginayao Appag alias "Ka
Sulong" and all persons responsible for the abduction or disappearance of Daniel Ngaya-an can be
prosecuted for the crime they have committed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED without prejudice to reinstatement and further
proceedings, if necessary, the moment the petitioners can furnish the Court the exact address where
Saginayao Appag can be served with the legal processes of this Court. Let the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines, National Bureau of Investigation and the Commissioner of Human Rights be furnished a
copy of this recommendation for their appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

132 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

Petitioners are the wife, brother and sister of one Daniel Ngaya-an, they alleged that Daniel, while heading
home from work was forcibly taken by the CPLA and was brought to their headquarters in Apayao. They
alleged that Daniel has been deprived of his liberty by respondents and that they have no legal basis to
detain him. Several resolutions were sent to respondents via registered speed air mail for comment but these
were unanswered. A resolution sent to to Appag(one of the respondents) was also returned with a notation
that no addressee exist in such place. When the case was called twice for hearing, the respondents did not
appear. The petitioners file a motion to cite respondents for contempt. The respondents were required to
comment on the motion for contempt. Copy of the resolution was sent by registered mail to the respondents
at their respective addresses as stated in the petition. Again the copy of the resolution sent to respondent
Appag was returned unserved with the notation that the addressee is unknown. The Court En Banc then
resolved to order the arrest of respondent Balweg. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
was directed to arrest respondent Balweg and incarcerate him until he complies with the aforementioned
resolution of this Court. Respondent Balweg, thru his counsel filed an urgent motion to lift the order of
arrest alleging among others that he has not defied any lawful order of this Court. He pointed out that he is
not residing nor holding office at the place where the mails were sent. He asked for a 30 day extension that
he may be able to file his comment on the petition. The Court En Banc resolved to lift, effective
immediately, the order of arrest it had issued. It also exonerated respondent Balweg from the charge of
contempt. This Court noted that respondent Balweg has not defied the order of this Court as he never
resided at the place where said order was served.

In his return of the writ of habeas corpus respondent Balweg alleged that Daniel Ngaya-an is not in his
custody; that he has not ordered the apprehension of Daniel; that he has nothing to do with the
disappearance of Daniel; that he learned of Daniel's disappearance in the radio and newspaper reports; that
the petition does not specifically state his participation in the disappearance of Daniel so that the petition
states no cause of action against him.

Petitioners then presented their witnesses, the testimony of Carmencita Ngaya-an, the wife of petitioner and
Ramon Edubba. The wife alleged that after work, Daniel while about to head home was abducted. She was
informed by her uncle Gavino Laoen that her husband was captured by the CPLA at Cagaluan Gate; that
together with her brothers, sisters, and relatives numbering about 50, on the same day, they proceeded to the
Cagaluan Gate to talk with the CPLA; that at the Cagaluan Gate she talked with Saginayao Appag alias "Ka
Sulong", the Commander of the CPLA; that Saginayao Appag informed her that they talked to her husband
but "they let him leave" and "sent him away"; that she retorted that if it is true that her husband left them he
should be in their home; that they left the barracks and searched the surroundings at the Cagaluan Gate and
in the river; that the search lasted for 10 days but they were not able to find Daniel Ngaya-an.
Ramon Edubba for his part alleged that while he was standing in front of the restaurant at the Cagaluan
Gate, a jeep arrived with Daniel Ngaya-an as one of the passengers seating in the front portion of the jeep;
that as Daniel was about to step down from the jeep, Saginayao Appag together with four (4) other men
carrying long firearms, one of whom he identified was "Ka Ambo", the "Assistant" of Saginayao Appag,
approached the former and got some papers from him; that after Daniel refused to drink liquor "Ka Sulong"
and his men tied his hand and feet with a rope; that Daniel shouted for help when he was carried to the
detachment but nobody helped him; that after that he boarded a jeepney and left the place.

133 | P a g e
Issue:

Whether or not Daniel Ngaya-an is unlawfully detained or restrained of his liberty by respondent Balweg
and the CPLA.

Ruling:

Court ruled that the ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful
restraint It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy intended to determine whether
the person under detention is held under lawful authority. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, the
Court must determine whether: (1) the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty; (2) the name of the person detaining another; (3) the place where he is imprisoned
or restrained of his liberty; (4) the cause of his detention (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court).
Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty that the petition for habeas
corpus will be granted and the person detained will be released from confinement. In the case at bar,
petitioners miserably failed to substantiate by clear and convincing evidence that Daniel Ngaya-an in whose
behalf the petition has been filed is under the custody or is unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty
by the respondent Balweg. The granting of the relief is not predicated on the disappearance of a person. The
petitioners must establish by competent and convincing evidence that the missing person in whose behalf
the petition is filed is under the custody of the respondents. Here there is no evidence that respondent
Balweg, the Head of the CPLA, is responsible for the disappearance of Daniel. Neither is there any evidence
that the missing person is presently detained by respondent Balweg. On his part respondent Balweg has not
only categorically denied that Daniel Ngaya-an is under his custody but also that he is not responsible for
his disappearance. It is possible that based on the testimony of Ramon Edduba the person responsible for the
disappearance of Daniel is respondent Saginayao Appag. However, we could not grant the relief and order
respondent Saginayao Appag to release Daniel because up to now the Court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent Appag

134 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF

KUNTING, Petitioner.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R.
Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,1 Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring
petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.

The antecedents are as follows:

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over
Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four
counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking
and custodial investigation.

In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the
custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding
commitment order.

In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request
of Atty. Danipog, thus:

xxx

The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court, who issued the
Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his
instruction, accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should
be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer,
where the proper commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by
the prosecution.

Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.2

135 | P a g e
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for
the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1)
Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance
to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be
detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of
operation of the ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who
were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn
over Kunting to the court.1avvphil.net

In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case,
citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City,
Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected
ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed
with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other
grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No.
3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector
Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the
court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police
Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He
alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research
in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list
of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in
Lamitan, Basilan.

Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of
his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on the status of his case, he
filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action
was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified
in the records as "for safekeeping purposes only."

136 | P a g e
The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to
inquire into the cause of detention of a person,3 and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the
detainee.4 If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.5

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.6

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by
the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela
City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the
trial court.1avvphil.net

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last
sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been
charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly
charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for
the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn
over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela
City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the
transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently
awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the
Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said
motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner
Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

138 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R.
Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring
petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over
Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahipursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four
counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC.
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for
the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1)
Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance
to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be
detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of
operation of the ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who
were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn
over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case,
citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City,
Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected
ASG members were able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed
with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other
grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No.
3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector
Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the
court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police
Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He

139 | P a g e
alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research
in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list
of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in
Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation on

September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño for
representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan
to Pasig City. Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or
the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as “for
safekeeping purposes only.”

Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus can prosper

Held:

No. It cannot proper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to “all case of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to
inquire into the cause of detention of a person,[3] and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the
detainee.[4] If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by
the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela
City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the
trial court.

140 | P a g e
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.

SALIENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in
Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution 2dated March 19,
2004 denying reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents
of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners
Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his
wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the
Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:

Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before
this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in
the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to
immediately make a return.

SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed on November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial
court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one
but was simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held
that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the
minor’s detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:

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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion,
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show
cause why her own three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called "restraint"
despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to
deprive the petitioner-mother of her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and
decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals are clearly void;

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
issuing a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint
by the mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any
notion of such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender years. The petition is not
even sufficient in substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.

3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case supports rather than negates the
position of the petitioners.

4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule

5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima facie proof of
any compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY. 6

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?

Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family Code, which provides that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.

Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there
was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to
show cause and explain the custody of her very own child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners’ argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only
to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which
pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against
any person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition
is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance
142 | P a g e
with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23,
2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.

Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and
parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the
country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of
their son and not the maternal grandparents.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did
not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in
court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. 9Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. 11 Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code12 unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others,
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 13

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from
seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that within fifteen
days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order
requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the
court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.
Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003.
Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial
court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10, 2003 and the Resolutiondated
March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

143 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

144 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:
 Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's
parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house,
but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son.
 Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus
and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to produce
and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be
discharged from restraint.
 Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order
of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of
restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was
likewise denied.
 Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father

Ruling:

1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari

 Salientes:
o the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise
o even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent
was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas
corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the
minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very
own child.
 Abanilla:
o the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minor’s right to
see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for
had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new
rules on custody of minors
o under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority
over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country
as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have
custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
 The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they
are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court’s
full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.
 an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action
under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
145 | P a g e
 the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

2. Habeas corpus is available to the father

 Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette
have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the
couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of
their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
 Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves
as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter
argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father
to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.

146 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 141443 August 30, 2000

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS :

AZUCENA L. GARCIA, petitioner.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Azucena L. Garcia petitions this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus in order "to free, relieve and
exonerate her from the penalty of imprisonment adjudged and imposed upon her, in gross violation of her
constitutional rights to due process of law and other fundamental rights"1 pursuant to an allegedly void
judgment rendered on April 20, 1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 86, in
Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589.

The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On October 27, 1989, herein accused, Azucena Locsin Garcia, filed an application for land registration with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 80) docketed as LRC Case No. 89-007 covering two
parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 822-C-1 and 822-C-2 with an area of 32,350 and 28,750 sq. m.,
respectively. Appended to said application were the following documents, to wit: (1) Tax Declaration No.
2273 with PIN-21-11773-1 for Lot 822-C-1; (2) Tax Declaration No. 22732 with PIN-21-11773-2 for Lot
822-C-2; Subdivision Plan Psd-19954; (4) Technical Description of Lot 822-C-1; and Technical Description
of Lot 822-C-2.

There is no evidence as to the proceedings taken, if any, in the said application for land registration. It
would appear, though, as borne out by subsequent events, that said application was abandoned because on
May 8, 1991 accused, who is the applicant in the land registration case, filed an application this time for
administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 with the Land Registration
Authority (Exh. "F"). Attached to the application for reconstitution, aside from the documents appended to
the previous application for land registration which were reproduced in the former, were the owner’s copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308462 (Exh. "N" for the prosecution which is similar to Exh. "2" for the
defense) in the name of the accused and Real Property Tax Bill-Receipts (Exhs. "12," "12-A" to "12-G").

On June 7, 1991, at the request of the accused, Edgardo Castro, Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
issued a certification (Exh. "B"; Exh. "1") stating that the original of TCT No. 308462 was among those
burned during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988.

On June 20, 1991 (not 1992 as appearing in the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589), TCT No.
308462 was ordered reconstituted, along with other TCTs in the names of other applicants, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. Q-283(91) signed by Benjamin M. Bustos, Reconstituting Officer of the Land
Registration Authority (Exh. "6").

On September 10, 1991, complainant [Antonio de] Zuzuarregui wrote the Quezon City Assessor’s Office
(Exh. "L") requesting for certification as to the authenticity of Declaration of Real Property No. 2273,
Property Index No. 21-11773-1 Piedad Estate (Exh. "L-1") and Declaration of Real Property No. 22732,
Property Index No. 21-11773-2, Piedad Estate ("Exh. L-2"), both issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin
147 | P a g e
and purportedly signed by Jose C. Gonzales, then acting City Assessor of Quezon City, because the lot
embraced by the said declarations are allegedly within the boundary of said complainant’s property per his
TCT No. 181095.

In reply to the above letter, Q.C. City Assessor Constantino P. Rosas wrote Zuzuarregui on September 11,
1991 stating that no such records (Declarations of Real Property Nos. 2273 and 22732) exist in their office
and the same appear to be spurious (Exhs. "J" and "J-1").

Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, accused, thru counsel, filed a Motion to Withdraw her application for
land registration with the RTC Q.C. (Br. 80) which was granted by the court in its Order dated September
25, 1991 (Exhs. "I" & "11").

On October 4, 1991, Zuzuarregui wrote another letter this time to Mrs. Brigida Llave, Technical Records
Section of the Bureau of Lands, NCR, Q.C. (Exh. "C") requesting for certification as to the authenticity of
the documents attached to the letter, namely Annex "1" – xerox copy of Plan Psd-19954 of Lot 822-C in the
name of Domingo R. Locsin; Annex "2" – xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 822-C-1, Psd-
19954, also in the name of Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. "C-2"); and Annex "3" – xerox copy of the technical
description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, likewise in the name of Domingo R. Locsin (Exh. "C-3", all of
which were appended to and used in support of the above-mentioned application for administrative
reconstitution. Said xerox copies of the plan and technical descriptions were respectively referred to Brigida
Llave of the Technical Records Section and Engr. Elpidio de Lara of the Technical Services Section of the
Bureau of Lands, for their Comments (Exh. "C-1").

In Llave’s reply of October 7, 1991 (Exh. "E"), she stated that the alleged plan, Psd-19954, is non-existing
in their files and called attention to the fact that she has no signature over her stamped name "Brigida R.
Llave" on said plan. De Lara, for his part, in an inter–office memorandum dated October 14, 1991 (Exh.
"D"), disputed the authenticity of the technical descriptions (Annexes "2" and "3" to the letter of
Zuzuarregui) by stating that the signatures thereon are not his (T.S.N., April 1, 1994, p. 10.)

Based on the above developments tending to discredit the authenticity and credibility of the documents
presented by the accused in support of her application for reconstitution with the LRA, on complaint of
Zuzuarregui, Benjamin Bustos caused a review of his previous order giving due course to the reconstitution
of TCT No. 308462 and on the basis of his findings, recalled and set aside, said previous order as far as TCT
No. 308462 is concerned in a Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991. From said Supplemental Order,
herein accused interposed an appeal to the LRA Administrator.

On or about November 11, 1991, Zuzuarregui instituted a criminal complaint with the Fiscal’s Office of
Quezon City charging the herein accused of falsifying the technical descriptions and tax declarations all
issued in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, father of the accused. Said complaint was dismissed in an order
dated May 15, 1992. On July 16, 1992, Zuzuarregui filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dismissal (Exh. "14"").

xxx

Meanwhile, on August 14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a
letter from herein complainant Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT
No. 308462 is not shown as among those filed in their office (Exh. "A").

On September 18, 1992, Zuzuarregui’s Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing his criminal
complaint against the accused was granted in a resolution issued by Asst. City Prosecutor Dimaranan Vidal

148 | P a g e
(Exh. "15"). Accordingly, herein accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of public
documents in three separate criminal informations filed with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92, the first being for falsification of technical description of land and the other
two being for falsification of Declarations of Real Property (Exhs. "13"; "13-B" and 13-C").

In the meantime, upon request of certain Miguel V. Sison, Jr., Officer in Charge, Director IV, Office of the
Executive Secretary, Presidential Action Center, Malacañang, the National Bureau of Investigation
conducted an examination of both the specimen and questioned signatures of Vicente Coloyan, former
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the questioned signatures being those appearing on TCT No. 308462. On
March 9, 1993, Director Epimaco Velasco of the NBI wrote Miguel V. Sison, Jr. (Exh. "3") transmitting
copy of their findings contained in a Questioned Document Report No. 151-393, dated March 9, 1993 (Exh.
"4") signed by Rogelio G. Azores, Document Examiner IV of the NBI (Exh. "4-B"), as approved by Arcadio
A. Ramos, Chief of the Questioned Document Division (Exh. "4-C") and noted by Manuel C. Roura,
Deputy Director, Technical Services (Exh. "4-D"). The conclusion arrived at as per the Report is that the
questioned and standard signatures of Vicenter [sic] Coloyan were written by one and the same person.

On October 13, 1993, in response to a request of Rogelio Azores who rendered the above Questioned
Document Report, Quezon City Assosor [sic] Constantino P. Rosas issued a Certification (Exh. "K") to the
effect that Tax Declarations Nos. 22731 for Lot 822-C-1 Piedad Estate and 22732 for Lot 822-C-2 "Piedad
Estate, both in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, do not appear in their Office Tax Map, Property Index
System as well as in the Assessment Roll.

On April 15, 1994, Assistant Quezon City Assessor Benjamin Kasala issued still another Certification to the
effect that per assessment records of their office, there is no property whether land or improvement
registered for taxation purposes in the name of accused Garcia (Exh. "M").

Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public documents filed by the herein
complainant against the herein accused were raffled to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the
Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a
decision penned by the latter, dated May 17, 1994, the herein accused was acquitted of all the above charges
on reasonable doubt (Exh. "16-C").

On June 9, 1994, in the course of the trial of the present case, counsel for the accused, Atty. Ciriaco O.
Atienza, wrote the Land Registration Authority (Exh. "9") requesting, among others, clarification on the
finality of an order of reconstitution, apparently referring to the order of August 20, 1991 by Reconstituting
Officer Bustos (Exh. "6," supra.) which was later set aside in a Supplemental Order of the same officer
dated October 8, 1991. x x x

On August 5, 1994, herein complainant wrote another letter-request this time addressed to Mr. Ernesto
Erive, Land Management Services Chief of Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Exh. "V"), for the latter to
certify as to the authenticity of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, in the name of
Domingo Locsin attached to the letter-request which was one of the documents submitted by the accused in
support of her application for administrative reconstitution. In reply thereto, Erive wrote Zuzuarregui on
August 18, 1994 (Exh. "U") informing the latter that their office (Department of Environment and Natural
resources, National Capital Region) has no record of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954 and, hence, said technical
description was not prepared by their office.

On September 30, 1994, the LRA Administrator Reynaldo Maulit came out with a Resolution (Exh. "20")
on the appeal interposed by the accused affirming the finality of LRA Administrative Reconstitution Order
No. Q-283(91) dated August 20, 1991 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute,

149 | P a g e
among others, the original of TCT No. 308462 in the name of petitioner-appellant Azucena L. Garcia,
accused herein and, therefore, the Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991 could not have validly
amended the aforestated order of August 20, 1991. It added, however, that the reconstitution does not
confirm nor adjudicate ownership over the property subject thereof citing the case of Serra, Serra vs. Court
of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (Exh. "S").2

Thus, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N. Coloyan, and introducing
or using said TCT in support of her application for reconstitution of title. Similarly, in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-94-53590 and Q-94-53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries in Declaration of Real
Property Nos. 22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of Jose C. Gonzales, and
introducing or using the same in support of her application before the Land Registration Administration
(LRA).

In its Decision dated April 20, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of falsification
of public documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, and subsequently this
Court, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999.

In the instant petition, petitioner only questions the validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case No.
Q-94-53589. She contends that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of
the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy
of habeas corpus. Hence, in her case, the fundamental unfairness of the judgment, when viewed in light of
the record, renders the same subject to attack for being violative of her right to due process of law.
Petitioner explains that this fundamental unfairness stems from the omission and failure of the trial court,
the prosecution and the defense counsel "to formally project into the evidentiary stream the evidence
decisive on the merits of the case, consisting of official determinations and findings3 on the genuineness and
authenticity of Vicente Coloyan’s signature on the owner’s copy of TCT No. 308462, which underlay the
different official acts of office holders participating in the proceeding on administrative reconstitution of the
original of said [TCT] No. 308462 of the Q.C. Register of Deeds."4

Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial judge was totally silent on the official findings and
determinations that Coloyan’s signature on the owner’s copy of the TCT No. 308462 was genuine. Instead,
the trial judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing on the photocopy of
TCT No. 308462 is not his. Petitioner points out that the unfairness of such reliance becomes apparent when
official determinations and findings as to the genuineness of Coloyan’s signature on TCT No. 308462 are
considered.

Petitioner then alleges that the prosecution failed to call the attention of the trial court to these official
determinations and findings which constituted exculpatory evidence in her favor. Petitioner further faults the
prosecution in willfully presenting Coloyan as a witness to disclaim his signature notwithstanding
indications in the record that he was hired and was possibly a corrupt witness. She maintains that "the
prosecution should have exerted their best efforts to safeguard the trial process against this type of witness,
who from all reasonable indicators is a paid and perjured witness."5

Petitioner likewise claims that she was denied due process of law by reason of her being represented by
ineffective counsel. Petitioner illustrates that her counsel failed to formally offer in evidence exhibits,
consisting of the official acts of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and officials of the LRA,6 for the
specific purpose of proving the genuineness of Coloyan’s signature. Petitioner’s counsel also took no steps
to bar Coloyan from being presented as a witness for the prosecution and was not especially alert to the
danger or risk of a perjured witness. In this regard, petitioner maintains that her counsel could have asked

150 | P a g e
for a deferment of the trial to give him time to make a full investigation of the circumstances attending the
presentation of Coloyan as a witness.

Petitioner concludes that the foregoing arguments and precedents warrant the grant of preliminary injunctive
relief in the form of a status quo order, and, after consideration of the merits of the case, a writ of habeas
corpus annulling the judgment of conviction rendered against her.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, states that the writ of habeas corpus is a
remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Consequently, a person
discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.

Furthermore, the ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter which falls
within the exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court. The OSG stresses that a writ of habeas
corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error.
As such, the writ will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law committed by a court in the
exercise of its functions. The OSG also points out that the ground invoked by petitioner is one which has
been considered, passed upon and found to be without merit not only by the Court of Appeals but by this
Court as well. The OSG is of the view that the instant petition is merely intended to delay the administration
of justice.

We deny the petition.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint.7 Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if
found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.8 However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not
issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail,9 or is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order.10 In the case at
bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for habeas corpus having been convicted by
final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document and use thereof. Said judgment is already
final and executory. Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999, or eight (8)
months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out that petitioner is still out on bail. To
this petitioner merely replied that:

For purposes of habeas corpus, "RESTRAINT" is not confined to imprisonment or actual physical custody.
Recent federal jurisprudence has extended this to accused under final conviction, who are out on bail, and to
convicts on parole. Such jurisprudence is part of Anglo-American jueisprudence (sic), which is highly
persuasive in this jurisdiction because our law on Habeas Corpus is of Anglo-American origin.11

Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the writ prayed for should not be granted. Indeed,
we have held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality
of his detention.12Petitioner, however, has failed to persuade this Court that the proceedings before the trial
court were attended by violations of her right to due process, or for that matter, other constitutional rights.

It is apparent from the arguments advanced by petitioner that the purpose of this petition is to cause this
Court to once again re-examine and pass judgment upon the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence
presented, especially the credibility of Coloyan as a witness. The Decision dated April 20, 1995 of the Court
of Appeals, affirming the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution dated October 27, 1998 of
the Third Division of this Court, finding that no reversible error was committed by the trial court, should

151 | P a g e
have impressed upon petitioner that issues relating to the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence have
already been settled and thus, can no longer be reviewed anew by this Court. As early as the 1913 case
of Trono Felipe v. Director of Prisons,13 we have laid down the rule that an application for habeas
corpus cannot function as a writ of error. We explained therein that:

But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for the correction of such errors.14 Court cannot, in habeas
corpusproceedings, review the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been rendered, and
the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found
by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or to pass upon the
correctness of conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a
commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case
is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that the
court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the
penalty. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in
the form and manner prescribed by law.15

As to the charge that the prosecution committed "manifest prosecutorial misconduct," we find the same
bereft of merit. First, the existence of exculpatory evidence is a matter of defense. As such, it is principally
the duty of the accused, not the prosecution, to bring its existence to the attention of the court. Second,
whether the Orders of Reconstitution issued by the reconstitution officer and the LRA administrator on
August 20, 1991 and September 30, 1994, respectively, as well as the reconstituted TCT No. 308462
constitute sufficient evidence to exonerate petitioner from criminal liability, involves appreciation and
weighing of evidence, and for reasons already stated, this Court is proscribed from again considering. Even
petitioner’s accusation that Coloyan was a paid and perjured witness was not supported by evidence.

Similarly, apart from her bare allegations, petitioner offered no convincing evidence to substantiate her
claim that the ineffectiveness of her counsel deprived her of her right to counsel. We specifically note that
petitioner’s own documentary evidence in support of the instant petition actually belies her allegation that
her counsel failed to adduce exculpatory evidence. Petitioner’s Formal Offer of Exhibits before the trial
court shows that among the evidence offered by her counsel were the following:

1âwphi1
Exhibit(s) Description(s) Purpose(s)

xxx xxx xxx

3, 4 and 4-A 4-B, (a) NBI Director's Letter dated March
4-C and 4-D 9, 1993, (Exh. 3) transmitting to Hon.
Miguel V. Sison, Jr the NBI
Questioned Documents Report No.
151-393
(b) Questioned NBI Documents
Report No. 151-391 dated March 9,
1993
(1) To prove that the NBI examined
TCT No. 308462 and the signature of
Vicente N. Coloyan
(2) To prove that the NBI findings is
that the signature of Vicente N.
Coloyan appearing n (sic) TCT No.
308462 is written by one and the
same Vicente N. Coloyan, Acting
Register of Deeds, whose standard
signatures appear on various titles on
file with the Registry of Deeds,

152 | P a g e
 Quezon City

(3) to prove that this Questioned

Documents Report No. 151-393
submitted by Document Examiner
Rogelio G. Azores was approved by
NBI

(4) To prove that TCT No. 308462 is

genuine, not falsified

xxx xxx xxx

6 Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-
283 (91) issued on August 20, 1991
by Land Registration Authority
(LRA) through the Reconstitution
Officer, Atty. Benjamin Busto
(1) To prove that the LRA approved
the Administrative Reconstitution of
the Accused's TCT No. 308462 for
Lot 822-C-1 and Lot 822-C-2, Piedad
Estate

(2) To prove that this Adm.

Reconstitution Order had already
acquired finality when the
reconstitution of TCT No.308462 was
recalled by Atty. Busto

(3) To prove that TCT No. 308462 is

genuine, not falsified16 (Underscoring
ours)

It appears, however, that these documents were among the official acts repeatedly cited by petitioner as
presupposing official determination and findings that Coloyan’s signature on TCT No. 308462 was genuine
and, therefore, allegedly constituted evidence exempting petitioner from criminal liability. Petitioner faulted
her counsel in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 for being ineffective in that her counsel allegedly failed to
formally offer in evidence the said documents but the record shows that her counsel did not fail to do
so.1âwphi1

Significantly, it is not disputed that petitioner appealed the adverse Decision or judgment of conviction
dated April 20, 1995 of the RTC of Quezon City to the Court of Appeals; that the Court of Appeals and later
this Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner; and that Entry of Judgment was made on August 8,
1999. The petitioner, therefore, may not validly resort to this present petition for habeas corpus in lieu of her
lost or dismissed appeal in the said criminal case. The petition of herein petitioner who is out on bail,
appears to be patently intended for delay.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Azucena L. Garcia, having failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

153 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-
IGNACIO of Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP P/SR. SUPT.
RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group, Camp Crame,
Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.

Emerito M. Salva & Associates; Juanito L. Andrade; and Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners.

REGALADO, J.:

Submitted for resolution in the present special civil action are: (1) the basic petition
for certiorari and mandamus with a petition for habeas corpus, to review the resolution issued by
respondent Court of Appeals, dated
February 18, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261;1 (2) the Urgent Motion2 and Supplemental Urgent
Motion3 for Immediate Action on Petition for Habeas corpus; and (3) the Urgent Petition to Declare Judge
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. and First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio for Contempt and to
Annul Proceedings (with Immediate Prayer for another Cease and Desist Order).4

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and
one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide fot has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the
amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so
long as it Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-
M-93 to 3644-M-93.5 Both accused posted their respective cash bail bonds and were subsequently released
from detention.

On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to enable him "to review the evidence on record and determine
once more the proper crimes chargeable against the accused,"6 which was granted by Judge Villajuan in an
order dated November 16, 1993.7 Thereafter, pursuant to Department Order No. 369 of the Department of
Justice, respondent Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan and was instructed to conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal cases filed against herein
petitioners.8

By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion dated November 23, 19939 filed by respondent
prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the prosecution's
request for change of venue shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the preliminary
154 | P a g e
investigation being conducted by the former shall have been terminated. 10 It appears that on December 2,
1993, private complainants, through their counsel, Atty. Silvestre R. Bello III, had filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Change of Venue of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, purportedly to
safeguard the lives of the victims and their witnesses, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 11

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-
M-93, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex
parte Motion to Withdraw Informations in said cases. 12 This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on
December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. 13 On the same
day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms 14 which were subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos of Branch 10, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and were docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-
93. No bail having been recommended for the crime of murder, Judge Pornillos ordered the arrest of herein
petitioners. 15On December 23, 1993, said presiding judge issued an order setting the arraignment of the
accused for December 27, 1993. 16

On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the absence of
respondent prosecutor. On even date, petitioners filed before Judge Villajuan a Motion for Reconsideration
of his order of December 15, 1993 which granted the motion to withdraw the original informations. 17

Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack

of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. 18 At the court session set
for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion
to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be entered for petitioners when the latter
refused to enter their plea. 19

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was
issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners,
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, and setting the arraignment of
the accused therein for February 8, 1994. 20 On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in
the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court
of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners'
motion to quash filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 and 4007-M-93. As earlier stated, respondent
court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

I. On the Main Petition

The main issue in this case involves a determination of the set

of informations under which herein petitioners should be tried, that is, (a) the first set of informations for
homicide and frustrated homicide in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, or (b) the subsequent informations for murder, frustrated murder, and
illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93. Several corollary but
equally important issues have likewise been addressed to us for resolution, to wit:

1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the
prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110;

155 | P a g e
 2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations was immediately
final and executory;

3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a) the designated public prosecutor
allegedly had no authority to file the second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof
constituted forum shopping; and

4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos.
4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.

We shall discuss these issues seriatim.

1. It is petitioners' submission that the prosecution's failure to serve them a copy of the motion to withdraw
the original informations and to set said motion for hearing constitutes a violation of their right to be
informed of the proceedings against them, as well as a violation of Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court. Hence, so they contend, the ex parte motion should be considered as a worthless scrap of paper
and Judge Villajuan had no authority to act on it. Ergo, the order granting the same is null and void.

Petitioners advance the theory that respondent prosecutor should have amended the original informations
instead of withdrawing the same and filing new ones. They postulate that the principle of nolle
prosequi does not apply in this case since the withdrawal or dismissal of an information is addressed solely
to the sound and judicious discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny it and the
prosecution cannot impose its opinion on the court. It is further stressed that in case there is a need to
change the nature of the offense charged, that is, from homicide to murder, by adding the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the only legal and proper remedy is through the filing of the corresponding
amended information; and that the withdrawal of an information is allowed only where the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not included in the offense originally charged.

Normally, an accused would not object to the dismissal of an information against him because it is to his
best interest not to oppose the same. Contrarily, if the accused should deem such conditional or provisional
dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him, he could object to such dismissal and insist that the case be
heard and decided on the merits. 21 However, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the
trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and
granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In
actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the
filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense.
Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant
petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to
dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid
presentation of their real position.

Petitioners' contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new
ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to
ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of
murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of
guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones.
It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is
strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.

156 | P a g e
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that —

The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing,
or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a
competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on
the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have
the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari. 22

Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the
same was thereby deemed cured. This is especially so in this case since, on his order, the original
informations were reinstated in Branch 14 of the trial court.

The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
when the case is already in court, he cannot impose
his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought
therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval. 23 The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

We reiterate once again the doctrine we enunciated and explained in Crespo vs. Mogul, etc., et al.: 24

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted
to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. And, if after such re-investigation the prosecution finds
a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed
course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 25

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It is not denied that in the present case, the court granted the motion of respondent prosecutor for the
suspension of the proceedings until the
re-investigation thereof shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the prosecutor arrived at a finding that
petitioners should have been charged with murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms.
This prompted him to file an ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide. Although the motion did not state the reasons for the withdrawal of the informations,
nevertheless, the court in the exercise of its discretion granted the same, as a consequence of which a new
set of informations was thereafter filed and raffled to another branch of the court. Petitioners now question
the propriety of the procedure adopted by the prosecution, insisting that an amendment, not a new
information, was required under the circumstances.

It must here be emphasized that respondent prosecutor sought, and was subsequently granted, permission by
the court to dismiss the original informations. It cannot therefore be validly claimed that the prosecutor
exceeded his authority in withdrawing those informations because the same bore the imprimatur of the
court. The issue is thus focused on whether or not under the given situation the court acted correctly in
dismissing the original informations rather than ordering the amendment thereof.

It has been observed that while the Rules of Court gives the accused the right to move for the quashal of the
information, it is silent with respect to the right of the prosecutor to ask for a dismissal or withdrawal
thereof. 26 A perusal of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure will show that there are only two provisions
concerning the dismissal of an information other than on motion of the accused, namely, Section 14 of Rule
110 and Section 11 of Rule 119. But then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a dismissal by the
court when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but make no mention of a dismissal made upon
application of the prosecution. That is not necessarily so.

It is true that Section 11, Rule 119 is virtually a restatement of Section 14, Rule 110, providing as it does
that:

Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good
cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper
offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Rule 119 is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is necessarily being presented,
hence the trial court is now in a better position to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted
of the offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It would primarily be the function of the court
to motu proprio order the dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the appropriate information. We do
not discount the possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal and substitution
at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that would be a rare situation. This provision,
therefore, is more directly and principally directed to the trial court to invest it with the requisite authority to
direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations therein contemplated.

Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the prosecution of offenses. Section 14
thereof, quoted infra, provides in its second paragraph the procedure and requisites for the substitution of a
defective information by the correct one. Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the permissible stage
for effecting that substitution is "at any time before judgment," unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that
"it appears . . . that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The situation under said

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Section 14 contemplates a longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing of the information up to
and before trial. Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be
discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be
perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially
determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such
nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore,
that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information
and the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.

It is interesting to note that in the American jurisdiction, such right is specifically recognized under Rule 48
(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the entry of a nolle prosequi by the
Government is a permissible right, although requiring in all cases the approval of the court in the exercise of
its judicial discretion. 27As a matter of fact, the prosecuting attorney is given the broad power, sole authority
and discretion to enter a nolle prosequi provided he does not act arbitrarily 28 and subject to the discretion of
the court.

In several cases, we have also impliedly recognized the propriety of such a procedure particularly in those
instances where the prosecution is allowed to dismiss or withdraw an information on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. We have even gone further by imposing upon the fiscal, as he was then called, the
duty to move for the dismissal of the information if he is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to
establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of the accused. 29

In this case now before us, what is involved is a dismissal effected at the instance of the prosecutor by
reason of a mistake in charging the proper offense, in order that new informations can be filed. The problem
that may be posited, and should now be resolved, is when the fiscal may be allowed to move to dismiss an
information and when he should merely move to amend it.

Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:

Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or

form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court
can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily
include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.

It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the amendment of the information
may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 30 the accused therein
were originally charged with homicide and were released on bail. However, the then provincial fiscal, after

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a review of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing complained of was
perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information for murder
was filed against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without the amount of bail being fixed, the new
charge being a capital offense.

The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 106 of the 1940 Rules
of Court (now Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), thus:

Here these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that the herein accused were not yet
arraigned before the competent court when the complaint for homicide was amended so as to
charge the crime of murder. Upon the authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore
be made even as to substance in order that the proper charge may be made. The claim that
such amendment can only refer to matters of specification affecting the elements constituting
the crime is not correct, for there is nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the
amendment should only be limited to matters of specification. The change may also be made
even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

Be that as it may, it is quite plausible under Section 14 of Rule 110 that, instead of an amendment, an
information for homicide may also be dismissed before the accused pleads, to give way to the filing of a
new information for murder. This may be deduced from the pronouncement of the Court in the aforecited
case of Dimalibot, to wit:

This clearly appears from the second part of Section 13 of Rule 106 which says that, if it
appears before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court may dismiss the original information and order the filing of a new one provided the
defendant may not be placed in double jeopardy. If a new information may be ordered at any
time before judgment no reason is seen why the court may not order the amendment of the
information if its purpose is to make it conformable to the true nature of the crime
committed. . . .

In the subsequent case of Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, et al., 31 however, Section 14 of Rule 110 was
clarified to mean as follows:

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may
be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution

necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and

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 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or
to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or
is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the
rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the original informations, there
having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more
importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before herein
petitioners were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made
at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be
prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached.
Consequently, we hold that although the offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily
include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error.
A contrary ruling, to paraphrase from our former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for
formal nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right to speedy trial was
never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after the motion to withdraw the original
informations was granted.

2. The controversy over the jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain and act upon the new informations
for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms, is grounded on three points of
disagreement.

Firstly, it is argued that the new informations were prematurely filed considering that the order granting the
withdrawal of the original informations had not yet become final and executory and that, as a matter of fact,
the same was subsequently reconsidered and the case reinstated by Judge Villajuan. Therefore, so
petitioners postulate, Judge Pornillos could not acquire jurisdiction over the same offense involving the
same incident and the same accused.

Secondly, petitioners contend that the dismissal of the original informations and the filing of new ones
which were raffled to another branch of the court constituted forum shopping, and was tainted with malice
considering the indecent haste with which the motion to withdraw the informations was filed, the order
granting the same was issued, and the new informations were filed, all of which took place on the same day.
Pursuant to the doctrinal ruling that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts, it is
theorized that the cognizance of the case taken by Judge Villajuan barred Judge Pornillos from assuming
jurisdiction thereover.

Finally, the designation of respondent Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio (who was then First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal) as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was arbitrary and without
any justifiable reason. It follows, therefore, so petitioners vigorously argue, that in the absence of such

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authority, the informations should be considered null and void by reason of which Judge Pornillos did not
acquire jurisdiction over the same.

On the other hand, respondents question the propriety of petitioners' filing of a petition
for certiorari prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals against the order of the lower court
denying petitioners' motion to quash, claiming that the proper remedy was to proceed to trial on the merits
and thereafter raise on appeal, as special defenses, the grounds invoked in the motion to quash.

It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before
he is called on to plead is not equivalent
to an acquittal, 32 and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 33 It is not a final
disposition of the case. 34 Rather, it partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and
leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution. 35

A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An order of dismissal which is actually an acquittal is

immediately final and cannot be reconsidered. 36 Furthermore, an acquittal is always based on the merits,
that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond
reasonable doubt; but a dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the
evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance. 37 For dismissal to be a bar under
double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal.

All these go to show, therefore, that the dismissal of Criminal Cases

Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein petitioners. Consequently, the same
did not immediately become final, hence petitioners could still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
Moreover, such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38 Since
jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new informations
even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it affect the
jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.

In American legal practice, where a motion for an order of nolle prosequi is made, the only power to deny
the motion would be based on failure of the district attorney to judiciously exercise his discretion. 39 In most
cases, the motion will be readily granted and should not be refused unless the court has some knowledge
that it is based on an improper reason or a corrupt motive. But such a motion to dismiss will not also be
approved unless the court is satisfied that the administration of justice requires that the prosecution be
ended, or if there appears to be a clear violation of the law. 40 Whatever may be the reason therefor, a denial
of the motion to withdraw should not be construed as a denigration of the authority of the special prosecutor
to control and direct the prosecution of the case, 41 since the disposition of the case already rests in the
sound discretion of the court.

This brings us to the question as to whether or not an order of dismissal may be subsequently set aside and
the information reinstated. Again, in American jurisprudence, the authorities differ somewhat as to whether
a nolle prosequi may be set aside and the cause reinstated. 42 Some cases hold that the nolle prosequi may
be recalled and that the accused may be tried on the same information,43 but before it can be retraced, set
aside, cancelled, or struck off, the permission or assent of the court must be had and obtained, and such
cancellation or retraction must be duly entered. According to other authorities, however, the entry of an
unconditional nolle prosequi, not on the ground that the information is insufficient on its face, is an end to
the prosecution of that information, and such nolle prosequi cannot afterward be vacated and further
proceedings had in that case.44

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Still in some cases, it has been held that a nolle prosequi may be set aside by leave of court, so as to
reinstate proceedings on the information, or unless it was entered by mistake. 45 In our jurisdiction, we
follow the rule which allows an order of dismissal to be set aside by leave of court. In one case, it was held
that in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, the court may, in the interest of justice, dismiss
a criminal case provisionally, that is, without prejudice to reinstating it before the order becomes final or to
the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense. 46

The rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring jurisdiction will retain it to the end
to the exclusion of other tribunals, is not to be given unyielding effect in all cases and it does not apply
where the jurisdiction of the first court has come to an end in any legal way, such as by nolle
prosequi. 47 The rule on exclusions is intended to prevent confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to
prevent a person from being twice tried for the same offense, but no accused has a vested right to be tried in
any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when one court of concurrent jurisdiction voluntarily
relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the case, there can be no legal or logical reason for
preventing the other court from proceeding. 48 With much more reason will this rule apply where only
branches of the same court, and not different courts, are involved in the jurisdictional conflict.

There was no forum shopping in the lower court with respect to the case involved. While the procedure
adopted by the prosecution was somewhat cumbersome, it was not in bad faith and, accordingly, it did not
affect the legality of the proceedings. There is no showing, and petitioners failed to prove otherwise, that the
assignment by raffle of the new informations to another branch of the same court was intended to prejudice
herein petitioners, or to place them under less favorable circumstances, or to find a court which would act
favorably on the prosecution's case.

The authority of the special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice to sign and file informations
has long been recognized in this jurisdiction and it has been held that such information cannot be quashed
on that account. There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, holding of investigations, and
conducting prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law
be permitted to assume these functions. 49 And any irregularity in the appointment does not necessarily
invalidate the same if he may be considered a de facto officer. 50

Of course, where the person who signed the information was disqualified from appointment to such
position, the information is invalid and the court does not acquire jurisdiction to try the accused
thereon. 51 Such is not, however, the situation obtaining in the case at bar. It will be noted that respondent
prosecutor was designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle the re-investigation
and prosecution of the case against petitioners pursuant to Department Order No. 369. Petitioners failed to
show any irregularity in the issuance of said directive.

At any rate, the power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice under Presidential
Decree No. 1275 had been broadened beyond the confines of the old law, that is, Section 1679 of the
Revised Administrative Code, wherein the power of the Secretary was then limited only to certain instances.
Pertinently, in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., 52 we said:

The Court notes, however; that Department of Justice Order No. 85 was issued pursuant to,
among others, P.D. No. 1275 issued on 11 April 1978 which provides:

Sec. 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control

of the Secretary of Justice. — There is hereby created and established a
National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of

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 the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution
Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided,
which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
all cases involving violations of penal laws.

The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice

includes the authority to act directly on any matter within the jurisdiction of
the Prosecution Staff, the Regional State Prosecution Office or the Office of
the Provincial or City Fiscal and to review, modify or revoke any decision or
action of the Chief of said staff or office.

The power of supervision and control vested in the Secretary of Justice under P.D. No. 1275
had thus been broadened beyond the confines of the old law, i.e., Section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, where the power of the Secretary of Justice to designate acting
fiscals or prosecutors to handle a particular case was limited to instances "when a provincial
fiscal shall be disqualified by personal interest to act in a particular case or when for any
reason he shall be unable, or shall fail to discharge any of the duties of his position." Indeed,
the limitation upon which petitioners rely no longer subsisted under P.D. No. 1275.

Having been duly designated in accordance with law, the panel of prosecutors had complete
control of the investigation and prosecution of the case. . . .

3. Petitioners similarly dispute the legality of their arraignment on January 24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos
entered a plea of not guilty for them after they refused to plead, without furnishing them copies of the
information with the list of witnesses, after merely reading the informations against them and asking
whether they understood the same, which were allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1, Rule 116.
Petitioners aver that they were requesting for the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted to have a
final copy of the order of January 24, 1994 which was merely read in open court, and to take the necessary
steps to question the same by way of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.

In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in addition to the other pleas authorized by law, to plead
whether he is guilty or not of the crime charged. In that way and in that way only can an issue be created
upon which the trial shall proceed. 53 Section 1 (c) of Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused
refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory language, if the
accused refuses to plead, the court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are so plain and unambiguous
that no construction is necessary. It actually calls for a literal application thereof. Any explanation or
defense which petitioners would want to invoke can be properly raised during the trial, but they cannot
refuse to enter their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is deemed
to have been cured when they were again arraigned on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, and the information was read to them in the vernacular.

In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the same trial court handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93
to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over the new informations which we have likewise declared
valid, petitioners may be prosecuted thereunder.

II. On the Petition for Habeas corpus

This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the court which issued the warrant for
their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their detention should be deemed illegal.

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We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the new set of
informations. Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued on the bases of said informations filed therein and
the subsequent detention of herein petitioners pursuant thereto are valid. What instead has to be resolved is
the corollary issue of whether the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present
petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to
the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional
matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas
corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. 54 However, habeas corpus does
not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to
perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in
the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 55

Neither can we grant the writ at this stage since a writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for
the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial
should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not
ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. 56 It has to be an
exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. 57 In the absence of
special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner
in advance of a determination of his case in court. 58 In the case under consideration, petitioners have
dismally failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant of the
writ, hence their petition therefor has to be denied.

In addition, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial. In the case of Enrile vs. Salazar, etc., et al., 59 we held that:

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.

III. On the Motion to Cite for Contempt

The records show that on February 24, 1994, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, pursuant to its
resolution in Administrative Matter No. 94-1-13-RTC which is a petition for change of venue filed by the
Vinculados, requiring Judges Felipe N. Villajuan and Victoria Villalon-Pornillos to cease and desist from
hearing the criminal cases involving herein petitioners which were pending before them. 60

Subsequently, another resolution was issued in said cases, dated

March 1, 1994, with the following directive:

ACCORDINGLY, without prejudice to the final determination as to which of the two (2) sets
of information will be upheld or prevail, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan is hereby directed to transfer all the aforementioned criminal cases filed
against Mayor Honorato Galvez, et al. now in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,

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 to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle as one (1) single case
among its branches and for the branch concerned, after raffle, to proceed with all deliberate
dispatch after the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 33261 have been resolved with finality. 61

As a consequence, the seven informations which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-94-55481 to Q-
94-55487 were assigned to and are now pending trial on the merits before Branch 103 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. Petitioners now assert that Judge Salazar
and Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio proceeded with the trial of the cases despite the aforestated directives in the
above cited resolutions. We find no merit in the motion to cite them for contempt.

The records reveal that there was a manifestation dated May 31, 1994 62 filed by the Solicitor General
wherein the latter manifested his conformity to the agreement made between the prosecution and the
defense before Judge Salazar, the pertinent part of which agreement is as follows:

1. During the hearing on May 26, 1994, the prosecution, through Senior State Prosecutor
Dennis Villa-Ignacio, the defense through Justice Alfredo Lazaro, and this Honorable Court
agreed that the trial in these cases shall proceed on condition that: (a) the defense shall not be
deemed to have waived any issue or objection it has raised before the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. 114046; and (b) that the trial shall also be without prejudice to whatever decision and
resolution the Supreme Court may render in the case before it.

Counsel for petitioners, retired Justice Alfredo Lazaro, takes issue with said agreement on the pretension
that the same is not the true agreement of the parties, but he failed to state what they actually agreed upon.
Withal, the resolutions of this Court in the petition for change of venue, as well as the cease and desist order
issued therein, are clearly directed against the two aforenamed regional trial judges in Malolos, Bulacan. By
no stretch of the imagination can we interpret the same to include Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. of Quezon
City.

For that matter, the issues involved in this petition for certiorari do not necessarily require a suspension of
the proceedings before the present trial court considering that the main petition hinges only on a
determination of which set of informations shall constitute the indictments against petitioners and for which
charges they shall stand trial. Whichever set of informations prevails, the evidence of the prosecution and
defense will more or less be the same and can be utilized for the charges therein. Hence, no cogent reason
exists for the suspension of the proceedings before the court below.

As a final word, while it may well be that both sets of information validly exist for the nonce, to allow both
of them to subsist will only serve to confuse and complicate the proceedings in the cases therein. Brushing
aside procedural technicalities, therefore, it becomes exigent to now consider and declare the four
informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms as having amended and
superseded the original three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide, there being no substantial
rights of herein petitioners which may be affected thereby. Correspondingly, the three informations for
homicide and frustrated homicide should be ordered withdrawn from the Quezon City trial court's docket.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition

for certiorari and mandamus together with the petition for habeas corpus; DENYING, for lack of merit, the
motion to cite respondent judge and prosecutor for contempt and to annul proceedings; and ORDERING the
withdrawal and invalidation of the three informations for homicide and frustrated homicide against
petitioners from the docket of Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

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Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

DIGEST

Facts:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and
one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge
Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court.
On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before
Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24,
1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was
issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatementof the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the
accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of
Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’
motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in
its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that there
was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been
placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance
of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new
informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new
informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly,
their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.

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Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the new
ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would want to
ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital offense of
murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of
guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones.
It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is
strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting the
motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an
irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court
still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases
is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”

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 EN BANC

G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that
respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and
second, that petitioner be granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly
collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found
petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the
suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently
serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa with rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
When arraigned on January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."3

During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in
the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find
petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help
because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything
but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with
his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed
by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen
revealed that petitioner raped her. Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they
lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.4

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in
her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a
baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5
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In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age
and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had
been holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the
defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.6

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced
him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support
the child, Leahlyn Mendoza.7

On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was medically consistent with the
time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we
gave credence to the prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by
normal delivery.9 Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; costs of the suit and to provide
support for the child Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.

SO ORDERED.10

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo
de Villa's guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the
case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was
the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the
automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity.11 This
information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.

Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to
determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.12 This relief was implicitly
denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001.

On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein
he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.15

Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a
sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of
Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-
relator, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container A."

Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were
placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to

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transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).17 During
transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.

Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza,
those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The
identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made
known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.18

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that
Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of
a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples,
including Leahlyn's.19

Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:

DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA

IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON
THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE,
CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.20

xxx xxx xxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY

BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS
CONDUCTED.21

Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.

In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the
factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial,
considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since
this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.

In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001
Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of
what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety
of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by
virtue of a final and executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the same
factual scenario.

The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any
unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto".22 Issuance of the writ necessitates
that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,23 we
stated that "[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."24

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant
171 | P a g e
to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.

Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very
limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,25 we ruled
that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.26

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction,
without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges
neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.

In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long
passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case
of Abriol v. Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a
writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral
challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual
is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting
squarely within their jurisdiction.28 The reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v.
Court of Appeals:29 a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. 30 A record
must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple
expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.

Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and
manner prescribed by law.31 In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court's appreciation of the
evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ.32 A
survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a
high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under
extraordinary circumstances.33 We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas
corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus
is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of
jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the
writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment.

Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where
an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the
denial of an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons,36 this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.37Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals38 this
Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of

172 | P a g e
habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states
that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face,
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.39

In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the scope of review allowable in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not
designed to interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special
circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus
would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether
the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may
thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the
judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an
assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of
the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.

First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-
pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court
sympathizes with petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right
of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.

We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test claims
that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.42 In this instance, we note that the record is replete with
errors committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of
counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that
the attorney's performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the
outcome of the trial would have been different with competent counsel.43 The purpose of the right to
effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.44

The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must
examine whether counsel's conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an
extent that the trial did not produce a fair and just result.45 The proper measure of attorney performance is
"reasonable" under the prevailing professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation
received fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.46 For the petition to succeed, the strong
presumption that the counsel's conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable professional assistance
must be overcome.47

In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a certain
Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole
explanation that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition
filed in his favor."48 In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be
prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of
Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court" received by this Court on September 14,
1999.49 Petitioner alleged that his counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and heartbreaking event",
considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and
dignity."50

173 | P a g e
While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no
showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.

In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-
examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents
and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked
to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new
DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas
corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.

Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate
the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.

It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's
guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and
distinct from the question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio,51 we ruled
that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or
not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the
victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in
determining an individual's guilt.

In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our
Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child.
This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on
automatic review.

The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is
only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that
the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the
acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.

Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to
the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1,
Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment.

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In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e.,
the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as
a result of the rape.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long
attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an
examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within
the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment.52 It is essential that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure
it.53

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find
that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such
evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was
concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of
negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however,
this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for
negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including
the latter's mistakes and negligence.55 It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.56

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel,
we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn
Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive
identification as its bases.57 The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the
victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.58Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to
conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims
that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our
conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence
by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario,
and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., joins Carpio and Callejo, Sr., JJ., in their separate opinion.
Carpio, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., on leave.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I concur with the ponencia. The DNA evidence presented by petitioner-relator is not material and relevant to
the crime of rape. Even assuming petitioner is not the father of the child that was conceived within the
period of the rape, such fact does not prove that petitioner could not have committed the crime. The
remedies of habeas corpus and new trial are thus unavailing in this case.

However, this case should not close the door to a convicted felon who after final judgment acquires DNA
results exonerating him of the crime for which he was convicted. Legal relief is still available, for instance,
to a felon convicted by final judgment of rape who subsequently gains access to DNA results showing that
the semen in the victim's vagina does not match that of the convicted felon.

While final judgments enjoy the presumption of correctness, the confining and traditional legal procedures
must respond to the revolutionary way that DNA results have been proving the innocence of convicts.
American jurisprudence has shown the way in this regard.

Before the enactment of statutes in some states providing for post-conviction DNA testing, American courts
had no precedents to work on to justify post-conviction DNA testing and the reversal of final judgments of
conviction when the DNA results turned out to be exculpatory. Before the passage of the DNA testing
statutes, it was unclear under what right and procedure a convict was entitled to post-conviction DNA
testing. Even in the absence of statutes, American courts allowed post-conviction DNA testing by requiring
the convict to apply for such testing before the verdict could be vacated.1 The application enables the courts
to determine the basis for the application and to set the standards in case the request is granted. Once the
DNA result confirms the innocence of the convict, American courts conduct a motion in limine hearing on
admissibility or order a new trial.2 The prosecution usually refuses to re-try the case and the convict is
released.

Under American jurisprudence, post-conviction DNA testing is availed through a petition for habeas corpus
and motion for new trial. These conventional modes of relief, however, have built-in restrictions that pose
problems to the granting of post-conviction DNA testing.

In habeas corpus cases, relief could not be had unless a constitutional violation was committed during the
convict's trial. In a motion for new trial, the convict must show that the DNA test is a newly discovered
evidence and must not be time-barred to warrant a new trial. Despite these legal obstacles, American courts
granted, albeit restrictively, the request for post-conviction DNA testing on a case-by-case basis. The
approach to the legal issues varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

176 | P a g e
In Summerville v. Warden State Prison3 the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled that when evidence is so
strong that innocence is highly likely and that evidence alone establishes innocence, that in itself is already a
basis fro habeas corpus review of convictions and imprisonment. Thus, habeas corpus warranted the
granting of a new trial based on the petitioner's claim of actual innocence. In People v. Callace,4 the New
York court considered post-conviction DNA testing as newly discovered evidence because the type of DNA
analysis available at the post-conviction stage was not available at the time of the trial. In State v.
Thomas,5 fundamental fairness allowed the convict to post-conviction DNA testing even when the request
was already stale.

Habeas corpus review and new trial proved to be narrow remedies as American courts still adhere to the
strict requirements of these two models of relief. Nonetheless, post-conviction DNA testing has been
granted on other grounds. When the application of DNA testing has strong indications that the result could
potentially exonerate the convict, American courts recognized the convict's right to exculpatory evidence. In
Dabbs v. Vergari,6 citing Brady v. Maryland,7 the court categorically upheld the convict's constitutional
right to exculpatory evidence despite the absence of a law providing a right to post-conviction discovery.
DNA results exonerated Charles Dabbs and his conviction was eventually vacated.8 On other cases,9 the
exculpatory potential of DNA evidence compelled the American courts, in the interest of justice, to allow
access to post-conviction DNA testing.

The rectification of a wrong is the underlying reason for the allowance of post-conviction DNA testing and
the eventual reversal of the verdict based on exclusionary DNA result. Even the most stringent of rules have
to give way upon a showing that there is a strong probability that DNA result could prove the convict's
actual innocence. For ultimately, it is the primary duty of the court to prevent the miscarriage of justice.

Every person has a right to avail of a new technology that irrefutably proves his innocence despite a prior
final conviction, provided the new technology was not available during his trial. This right is part of a
person's constitutional right to due process of law. A person convicted by final judgment does not lose his
constitutional right to due process, and he may invoke it whenever there is a compelling and valid ground to
do so.

The 1987 Constitution expressly empowers the Court to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enhancement of constitutional rights."10 Even in the absence of a law allowing post-conviction DNA testing,
the Court under its constitutional mandate may order a new trial if the post-conviction DNA testing will
establish that the convicted felon could not have possibly committed the crime. This is the case when the
post-conviction DNA testing shows that the semen in the victim's vagina does not match that of the
convicted felon.

A new trial on the ground of post-conviction DNA testing is different from a new trial under Rule
121,11 which is available only before final judgment. Unlike a new trial under Rule 121, a new trial for post-
conviction DNA testing does not vacate the judgment of conviction, which stands until recalled by the court
as a result of the new trial. A new trial after final conviction may be ordered only on the sole ground that
DNA testing will establish that the convicted felon could not have committed the crime. Moreover, DNA
testing must not have been available or possible during the original trial.

Thus, I submit that a felon convicted by final judgment who could establish through DNA testing that he
could not have committed the crime is not without remedy to prove his innocence and regain his liberty.

177 | P a g e
 SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

I concur with the ponencia and the separate concurring opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio that the
convicted felon must be allowed an opportunity to adduce DNA evidence. However, such a remedy is sui
generis to give the convicted felon a chance to adduce DNA evidence until Rule 121 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is revised anew. Such a remedy is akin to a motion for a new trial in the original case
on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment.

DIGEST

FACTS:

At about 10 in the morning, 12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke up to find De Villa on top of her. She was
unable to call for help because De Villa covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. He then
proceeded to rape her – and eventually Aileen became pregnant. Her mother noticed the pregnancy and
confronted her about it, and Aileen eventually admitted that she was raped by De Villa. A criminal
complaint was then filed against the petitioner by Aileen’s parents. Aileen was examined by Dr. Cosidon,
who confirmed her pregnancy (she was already 8 months pregnant at that time), and found healed
lacerations in her hymen. During the trial, De Villa pleaded not guilty because at the time of the alleged
rape, he was already 67 years old, and was incapable of an erection. He also interposed an alibi that he was
not in the scene of the crime at the time of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the trial court for the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, as well as the payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza – the putative child born of the rape. Three years after the decision,
June (the son of Reynaldo) alleged that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a
scientific test that could determine whether Reynaldo was Leahlyn’s father. They sought for DNA testing to
resolve the issue of paternity, but the same was denied. At the petitioner’s insistence, they gathered samples
from Leahlyn, from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from Reynaldo himself and was submitted to the
DNA Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report showing that there was no match
between the DNA samples.

ISSUE: Was the DNA result a valid basis for habeas corpus, new trial, and acquittal?

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RULING:

NO TO ALL COUNTS. (1) As to Habeas Corpus: The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ,
therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that
review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only
in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess. This Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not
be thus used.

As to new trial: A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight
that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of
the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of
knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the
part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

As to acquittal: Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner
and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father
of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza’s testimony and
positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of
the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to
conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims
that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. The
court’s conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

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 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband
some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her
husband in consortium.

On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful
restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.

Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari
pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with
another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.

On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to
nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7

What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8

On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m.,
without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.

In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:

(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano
Ilusorio;

(b) Whether the same is relevant; and

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 (c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9

The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their
lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.

On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution
of October 11, 2000.10

On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano
Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed
by the Court.11

On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 ,
2001.12

The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her
arguments that have been resolved in the decision.

Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:

First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and
that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her
desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano
Ilusorio to live with her.

Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and
Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of
pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away
Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since
Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the
ones controlling the corporations.15

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that
he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.

Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have
the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the
Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.

We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his
wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.

As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be
threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the
Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete.
We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that
181 | P a g e
findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the
Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show
that this is an exceptional instance.

Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code
support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care
for each other. We agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from
bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.22

On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let
his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been
rendered moot by the death of subject.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

182 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos.
For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married
with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-
Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused
the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner
filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents
refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that
would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does
not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his
full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by
any other process.

183 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
allegedly the child of petitioners.

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born
on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident
of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.
Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take
care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told
Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to
Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida
then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly
the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the
first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother
of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.1 She avers that Angelita refused to return
to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and
Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical
records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident
184 | P a g e
and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of
his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez
was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.3

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong,
Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said
the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil
registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the
minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and
John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court
decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition

for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from
her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to
petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this
Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing
Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.6

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the
order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita
peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The
appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced
by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower
court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,9 and
disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and
directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita
Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent at the time of the filing of the
petition herein.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant
petition alleging:

185 | P a g e
 THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD
LIKEWISE PROVEN.

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION

OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS"
AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO
WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.11

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
of custody over a child.13 It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity
is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be
resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor
named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who
between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to
prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the
writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their
right of custody over the said minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence
presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or
order.15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may
scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable
to the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

186 | P a g e
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that
after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived
with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in
1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period
of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records,
log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a
son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that
Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his
legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez
had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez
instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the
law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth.
Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate
must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31,
1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-
law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial
court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order
and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ
of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test19 for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

187 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

188 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child,
Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita
Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his
parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of
the habeas corpus in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.

RULING:

Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto.
The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in
habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumption,
including those as identity of the person.

The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by the
witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical
records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented.
Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child.
Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living together with his
legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez,
the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or midwife in
attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days
after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally married,
which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a "common-law wife."

Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had
strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the
midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.

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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30978 September 30, 1974

FORTUNATO MEDINA, petitioner,

vs.
GEN. MANUEL T. YAN, BRIG. GEN VICENTE RAVAL, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that
judgment be rendered:

(1) Annuling and setting aside all the actuations, orders, and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals,
more particularly the resolution dated February 1, 1969, denying petitioner's motion for certification of this
case to the Supreme Court; the resolution dated March 13, 1969 denying petitioner's "Urgent Motion for
Release of Petitioner-Detainee", the resolution dated June 10, 1969 denying petitioner's "Motion for
Reconsideration"; and the resolution dated June 21, 1969 requiring Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to show cause
why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt of court and suspended from the practice of
law as member of the Philippine Bar;

(2) Prohibiting respondent Court of Appeals from enforcing the aforesaid resolution dated June 21, 1969,
regarding the contempt and suspension charge against aforenamed Amelito R. Mutuc, as well as from
proceeding further with the case at bar; and

(3) Ordering the respondent Court of Appeals to certify the appeal and to have all the records of the same
forwarded to this Court.

Pending these proceedings a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued ex parte was sought, to enjoin,
restrain and prohibit the respondent Court of Appeals from proceeding further with this case, more
particularly with the enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, requiring Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to
explain why he should not be held for contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law.

On September 4, 1969, this Court adopted a resolution restraining the respondent Court of Appeals from
proceeding further with case No. CA-G.R. No. 42658-R, entitled "Fortunato Medina, petitioner-appellee vs.
Gen. Manuel T. Yan and Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval, respondents-appellants", more particularly with the
enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, re: Contempt and Suspension of Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc."
190 | P a g e
For a clear perspective of the present petition, the events leading thereto are set forth as follows:

At 6:00 o'clock in the morning of November 23, 1968 petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who
was in Saigon, South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an American company, was arrested and
apprehended by the South Vietnam Police and some members of the Philippine Civic Action Group
(PHILCAG) at the instance of the Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody until 6:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day, when he was flown to Manila under escort by two Philippine
Military Attache personnel aboard an Air Vietnam plane, arriving in Manila about 9:00 o'clock that same
evening. At the Manila International Airport, he was met and arrested by a team of Intelligence Service
Officers of the Philippine Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, where he was
interrogated and kept in custody until the morning of the following day, November 24, 1968, when he was
turned over to the lst PC Zone Headquarters at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In the early morning
of November 27, 1968 petitioner Medina was transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command Officer
at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga. At 11:00 o'clock the same morning he was delivered to the custody of the Chief
of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the absence of the Municipal Judge.

On November 29, 1968 petitioner Medina, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat.
This Court, acting on the petition, issued on the same day the writ of habeas corpus, made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch.

On December 3, 1968, a trial on the merits was held by the Honorable Judge Honorato B. Masakayan,
Presiding Judge, Branch V, Quezon City branch, Court of First Instance of Rizal.

On January 2, 1969, the Honorable Judge Masakayan rendered a decision ordering the respondents or
whoever acts in their place and stead, to immediately set free and release petitioner Fortunato Medina from
custody. On January 9, 1969, the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondent, filed a notice of appeal to
the Court of Appeals "on the ground that the said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence
adduced in the case." Acting on said "Notice of Appeal", the lower court in its order of January 15, 1969,
ordered that "the record of the case together with evidence, oral and documentary, be transmitted to the
Court of Appeals."

On January 27, 1969 Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for petitioner Medina, filed a "Motion for Certification
of Appeal to the Supreme Court," which motion was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the
ground that since questions of fact are involved in the appeal, the proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the
Court of Appeals, and that if the appeal were certified to the Supreme Court, appellants will be estopped
from raising questions of fact and will, therefore, be deprived of due process of law.

The motion for certification of appeal to the Supreme Court was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals
in a resolution dated February 1, 1969. On February 14, 1969, pending appeal, Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc filed
an "Urgent Motion for Release" without bond, of the petitioner Medina, to which counsel for the
respondents filed an opposition in its answer dated February 24, 1969.

The motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in a resolution rendered on March 13, 1969, which
we quote:

For resolution by this Court is the motion dated February 14, 1969, filed by petitioner-
appellee praying that he be ordered released without bail during the pendency of this appeal.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition thereto.

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 As the trial court which rendered judgment did not fix the bond for the release of petitioner
pending appeal by respondents and as said court has now lost jurisdiction over the case, LET
PETITIONER BE RELEASED PENDING APPEAL UPON FILING A SURETY BOND
OF P5,000.00.

A motion to reconsider the above-quoted resolution of the Court of Appeals, was denied by said court in its
resolution of June 10, 1969.

Before the respondent Court of Appeals (4th Division) could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
the following news item attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc, petitioner's counsel of record, appeared in the
May 8, 1969 issue of the Manila Times, on pp. 1 and 22-A thereof:

Mutuc Hits Appeals Court Ruling

A division of the Court of Appeals was denounced by former Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc
yesterday for, he said, "knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank injustice' on a
dissident suspect.

Mutuc spoke of the case of Fortunato Medina, a Filipino worker who was arrested by armed
forces and intelligence officers in Saigon last year and forcibly flown to Manila. Since his
arrest last Nov. 23, Medina has been detained without any criminal case being filed in court
against him. He is now at the Arayat municipal jail.

The case in the Court of Appeals arose from a petition for habeas corpus filed by Mutuc with
the Supreme Court. The high court had given due course to the case and made the writ
returnable to the Quezon City court of first instance.

Detention Illegal

The lower court later ruled that Medina's detention was illegal since there was no pending
criminal case against him. The court ordered his immediate release. But the solicitor general's
office appealed the ruling to the CA.

Mutuc then filed an urgent motion before the CA for Medina's release without posting bail on
the basis of the lower court's findings and the fact that the man is a pauper.

Mutuc said the CA fourth division denied this motion and ordered that Medina post a
P5,000.00 bail bond for his provisional liberty.

Reconsideration

Arguing that Medina's detention is illegal, Mutuc sought for the reconsideration of the CA
order. The solicitor general's office opposed this latest motion, and this is now pending
before the CA.

Mutuc said in his statement:

"It is unthinkable, deplorable, and shocking to see in our midst — in a country

which has prided itself as being a proud example of a vibrant democracy and a

192 | P a g e
 firm adherent to the rule of law — this said law spectacle of a man kept
illegally for 165 days without any criminal complaint pending against him."

Extremely Dubious

Mutuc said that the appeal of the Solicitor General was filed under "extremely dubious
circumstances" because the notice of appeal was filed even before the copy of the decision of
the lower court was mailed to him.

On May 9, 1969, the issue of the Manila Times, pp. 1 and 14-A, carried a news item that petitioner Medina
had escaped from confinement in the municipal jail of Arayat, Pampanga, upon advice of his counsel, Atty.
Amelito Mutuc. The same issue of the Manila Times, p. 14-A thereof, carried a statement of Atty. Mutuc to
this effect:

I have advised him (Medina) to escape. After all, his detention is illegal. It is the only way to
regain his freedom.

Atty. Mutuc commenting upon a proposed action of the Office of the Solicitor General to have him cited for
contempt and to institute disbarment proceedings against him, issued the following statement appearing in
the May 11, 1969, p. 1, issue of the Manila Times:

I am ready and willing to be imprisoned : or stripped of my privilege as a lawyer if the

Supreme Court so decrees that my cause is not just and that I am in error.

On June 21, 1969 the Court of Appeals issued a resolution as follows:

Considering that the statements attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc as well as the news items
based thereon, as above set forth, are grossly defiant offensive and derogatory to the dignity
and integrity of the members of the Fourth Division of this Court; that they are evidently
intended to browbeat, intimidate and hold them in contempt and ridicule by imputing to them
the act of "knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank injustice", and that said
statements and news reports tend to degrade and obstruct the free, just and impartial
administration of justice on a matter then actually pending consideration by this Court; and

Considering further that the act of Atty. Amelito Mutuc of advising, encouraging and
practically assisting in the escape of the petitioner-appellee, Fortunato Medina, from the
custody of the law as a detention prisoner, in utter disregard of the order of this Court
requiring him to post a bond of P5,000.00 for his release, constitutes a deliberate and wanton
violation of his oath as a lawyer, particularly that portion thereof where he swears that he will
"obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities" of the Republic
of the Philippines and will conduct himself as a lawyer with "all good fidelity as well to the
courts" as to his clients;

WHEREFORE, Atty. Amelito Mutuc is hereby required to show cause within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be held liable and dealt with for
contempt of court, and why he should not be suspended under Rule 138, Section 28, of the
Rules of Court, from the practice of law as a member of the Philippine Bar.

As already adverted to above, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks to annul
the above-quoted resolution and all other pertinent orders, resolutions, of respondent Court of Appeals, and
193 | P a g e
prohibit it from proceeding further with the case, and to compel it to certify said case to this Court on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The present controversy centers upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal brought
to it by the Solicitor General from the judgment or the Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan, presiding judge,
Branch V, Court of First Instance of Rizal, ordering the release of petitioner Fortunato Medina from custody
of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga.

Petitioner argues that where a petition for habeas corpus has been originally filed with the Supreme Court,
as in this case, and this Court makes the writ returnable to a lower court, it does so merely for purposes of
expediency, convenience and a speedy and inexpensive determination of the proceedings, and the role of the
lower court is just to receive evidence for the Supreme Court, as if the Supreme Court assigned one of its
members to receive evidence on the case. Hence, any appeal from the judgment of the court to which the
writ was made returnable, must be taken to the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeals, and the case
would be before the Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction and not on account of its appellate
jurisdiction.

The stand taken by petitioner is devoid of merit.

The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been definitely ruled upon by Us in the case
of Saulo vs. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960) wherein We held that the court to
which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body,
whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this Court decides to act on the
"recommendation", but that such court acquire the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the
law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from
confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further clarifying Our ruling, We
stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the
merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his custody, if not appealed on
time, can become final just as it may in ordinary case. The pertinent fact and Our ruling in said case follow:

In G.R. No. L-14819, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court by and in
behalf of petitioner Alfredo B. Saulo. We issued, on December 24, 1958, a writ ordering
respondent Pelagio Cruz, as the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, to
submit, within five (5) days from notice, an answer returnable to the Court of First Instance
of Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon such findings, the lower court rendered decision, concluding that the filing of Criminal
Case No. 46410 amounted to the delivery of accused petitioner, who was arrested without
warrant, to the proper court as provided under Section 17, Rule 100 of the Rules of Court
(citing Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil., 859). The Court consequently denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Hence, this appeal:

However, petitioners appeal appears to have been filed out of time, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed eleven (11) days
after a copy of the lower court's decision, denying the petition, was served upon petitioner's
counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriffs return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours
from notice of judgment:

194 | P a g e
 SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the
clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four
(24) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it
appeals from the judgment rendered.

It has been consistently held that the reglamentary period for appeal is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional on the courts and that an appeal filed out of time may be sought to be
dismissed at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court.

In petitioner's "manifestation" dated October 12, 1959, it is contended that since the case for
habeas corpus was heard by the Manila Court of First Instance, "not by virtue of its original
jurisdiction but merely by delegation", this Court should have the final say regarding the
issues raised in the petition, and only its decisions, not that of the court of First Instance,
should be regarded as operative. The logic is more apparent than real. While the petition for
habeas corpus was originally filed with this Court, the only question that was immediately
involved was the propriety of the issuance of a writ that would order the respondent to show
cause why the detention of the person in whose behalf the writ was asked for should not be
considered illegal, and that, therefore, the petitioner be ordered discharged from custody. The
Rules authorize that once the writ is issued the same may be made returnable before a Court
of First Instance (Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rules of Court), and not necessarily to us. The court
designated does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and
conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until we decide to act on the "recommendation".
By filing a notice of appeal with the Court below, the appellant impliedly admitted that the
decision appealed was not merely recommendatory or fact-finding.

In our resolution dated March 19, 1959, resolving the question of jurisdiction of the lower
court, we stated the following:

"Moreover, it is apparent from sections 12 to 15 of said Rule 102 that the court or judge to
whom the writ is returned shall have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and
the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his
discharge from confinement, should it appear satisfactorily "that he is unlawfully imprisoned
or restrained,"

xxx xxx xxx

"In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law,
made returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which
the writ is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses full authority to examine
all issues raised in the case and to settle the same. In the language of the
American jurisprudence:

"After a return to a writ, the court or judge to whom the return is made must
pass upon all questions of both law and fact and determine the ultimate
question whether the prisoner is wrongfully restrained of his liberty. It is
necessary for the court to determine the weight and credibility of evidence
where the testimony is conflicting.

"... With further reference to habeas corpus proceedings in Federal courts, it is

expressly provided by statute that the court or judge before whom the prisoner

195 | P a g e
 may be brought shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case, by bearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the
prisoner as law and justice may require. (25 Am. Jur., p. 245.)"

In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for
determination on the merits (See 39 C.J.S p. 603, sec. 58 and case cited therein), and its
findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his continued custody, if not,
appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case. (Saulo vs. Brig. Gen.
Cruz, etc., 109 Phil., 378, 379, 381-383) (Emphasis ours.)

We also advert to the earlier case of Saulo vs. Brig. Gen. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (March 19, 1959), wherein this
Court, citing Sections 12 to 15 of Rule 102 (the same provisions as in the present Rules) stated that the court
or judge to whom the writ is returnable shall have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the
law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from
confinement, should it appear that he is being unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. The Court ruled:

In other words, said writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons,
in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent. Once authority over the latter has thus been established, the
appellate court issuing the writ, or the court of first instance to which the writ has been made
returnable — acting in place of the appellate court — may render a decision, which — like
other decisions of the Supreme Court and of courts of first instance — may be enforced
anywhere in the Philippines.

In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to
a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ is returned or the judge
thereof possesses full authority to examine all issues raised in the case and to settle the same.

It is clear, therefore, that when this Court issued the writ of habeas corpus making the same returnable
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, said court acquired the power and authority
to determine the merits of the case, and not merely to act as a referee, in the same manner as We would have
if the writ had been returnable before this Court. (See C.J.S 603, citing Ex parte Smith, 300 P. 635; Ex parte
Gonsher,. 294 P. 159; People vs. Booker, 51 Cal. 317.)

Mr. Justice Castro correctly observed during the deliberation of the Court in this case, that there is no valid
reason why a habeas corpus case originally filed in the Court of First Instance should be appealed to the
Court of Appeals, while one filed originally with the Supreme Court and made returnable to the Court of
First Instance should be appealable directly to Us, when a review of the findings of facts of the Court of
First Instance is necessary.

The view that the appeal should be made direct to this Court because when a petition for writ of habeas
corpus with Us he wants his case to be decided as expeditiously as possible, is clearly untenable; otherwise,
We would be unduly hampered in the exercise of Our discretion1 when to hear and decide directly a habeas
corpus as We did in the habeas corpus cases under Martial Law, and when We should make the writ
returnable to a Court of First Instance so that the case may not unduly clog the already over-burdened
docket of this Court.

Considering that the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, had jurisdiction to try the habeas
corpus case and render judgment thereon as though the same was originally filed with it, any judgment

196 | P a g e
rendered by it is appealable to the proper appellate court which, in this case, is the Court of Appeals,
appellants having signified in their notice of appeal their intention to raise both questions of law and fact.

The Court of Appeals being the proper court to which the appeal was brought, its actuations, orders and
resolutions in connection therewith, particularly those dated February 1, 1969, March 13, 1969, June 10,
1969 and June 21, 1969 were, therefore, done and issued in the lawful exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, as it is hereby DENIED, and respondent Court of Appeals authorized to
proceed with the determination of the appealed case, and all incidents thereof. The restraining order dated
September 4, 1969, issued by this Court against the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby LIFTED. No
costs.

So ordered.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is with regret that I find myself unable to accept the conclusion reached by my brethren. I must perforce
dissent, this with due recognition that the opinion penned by Justice Fernandez commends itself for its
thoroughness, comprehensiveness and lucidity. It must be admitted likewise that it is characterized by
sustained, even formidable, logic. If I entertain a different view then it is because I proceed from a distinct
major premise. The writ of habeas corpus, to my mind, following the classic statement of Justice Malcolm,
in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban:1 "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set
the individual at liberty."2 Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the American Constitution.3 He explained why: "Perhaps Dr. Johnson went too far in telling
Boswell, "The Habeas Corpus is the single advantage our government has over that of other countries."
Still, such great liberties as worship and speech will go on somehow, despite laws, but not liberty of the
person. Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions against ideas may break down; a prison wall is there. Only
habeas corpus can penetrate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or redress, every form
of liberty is impaired. A man in jail cannot go to church or discuss or publish or assemble or enjoy property
or go to the polls."4 From such a standpoint, it appears to me that to require in a case like the present, where
the petition was filed with this Court but subsequently indorsed to a court of first instance, that an appeal on
questions of fact should go to the Court of Appeals would be to prolong unnecessarily the period of
detention when, as events may turn out, the applicant is entitled to his liberty. Hence this dissent.

197 | P a g e
1. The opinion of the Court states: "The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been
definitely ruled upon by Us in the case of Saulo v. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960)
wherein We held that the court to which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become
merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this
Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquires the authority and the duty to
inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order
his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further
clarifying Our ruling, We stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the
case for determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining
his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case."5

I reach a different conclusion. For me the Saulo ruling goes no further than to indicate that once referred to a
lower court an application for habeas corpus could be decided by it, as was made clear in the above citation
from the opinion. It does not appear unreasonable then to assert that nothing previously decided has settled
the specific question before us, which is not the finality of the lower court decision but where to appeal the
case. It would seem, to me at least, that the principle there applied is not controlling here. Assuming the
obscurity of the Saulo opinion, it is illumined when the light of the fundamental purpose of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corps is thrown on it, namely, the speedy release from unlawful detention. Such a
fundamental postulate should not become dormant. If in a state of quiescence, it must be revived. If the
Saulo decision goes that far, however, it may be time to call for re-examination. There is, to myes Your
Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am detained by the military
authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and question the legality of
my detention?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): If I am not mistaken, Your Honor, you are referring to the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

DELEGATE ADIL: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct.

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): In that case, Your Honor, I take it that when martial law is
proclaimed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended and, therefore,
if you are apprehended and detained by the military authorities, more so, when your
apprehension and detention were for an offense against the security of the State, then you
cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and ask the courts to order your
temporary release. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, like some other individual
rights, must have to yield to the greater need of preserving the State. Here, we have to make a
choice between two values, and I say that in times of great peril, when the very safety of the
whole nation and this Constitution is at stake, we have to elect for the greater one. For, as I
have said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could
be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a
position to assert and enforce its authority.

DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21,
1972, and announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which
are in the nature of statutes, regulating, as they do, various and numerous norms of conduct
of both the private and the public sectors. Would you say, Your Honor, that such exercise of
legislative powers by the President is within his martial law authority?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee. As
martial law administrator and by virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

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Forces, the President could exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to
meet the martial situation. The Chief Executive must not be harmstrung or limited to his
traditional powers as Chief Executive. When martial law is declared, the declaration gives
rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but nonetheless necessary and
incident to the assumption of martial law authority to the end that the State may be safe.

DELEGATE ADIL: I am not at all questioning the constitutionality of the President's

assumption of powers which are not strictly executive in character. Indeed, I can concede that
when martial law is declared, the President can exercise certain judicial and legislative
powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of rebellion, insurrection,
imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and which
I want Your Honor to convince me further, is the exercise and assumption by the President or
by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have
nothing to do with the conditions of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or imminent danger
thereof. To be more specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the
decree issued by the President proclaiming a nationwide land reform or declaring land reform
throughout the Philippines. I suppose you will agree with me, Your Honor, that such a
decree, or any similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with the invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this
measure basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of
rebellion or insurrection. How could we validly say that the President's assumption of such
powers is justified by the proclamation of martial law?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated, Your Honor, we have now to
abandon the traditional concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks.
We have to look at martial law not as an immutable principle, Rather, we must view it in the
light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation thereof. The quelling of rebellion or
lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may admittedly be said to
be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could
there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the conditions
which necessitated the exercise of martial powers are not remedied? You cite as an example
the decree on land reform. Your Honor will have to admit that one of the major causes of
social unrest among peasantry in our society is the deplorable treatment society has given to
our peasants. As early as the 1930's, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to
the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing
the government by force. Were we to adopt the traditional concept of martial law, we would
be confined to merely putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the
maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to establish an
enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our
Constitution and the Republic, I say that martial law, being the ultimate weapon of survival
provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills
and the seething furies deep in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense,
therefore, there is a profound relationship between the exercise by the martial law
administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate objective of martial law.
And I may add that in the ultimate analysis, the only known limitation to martial law powers
is the convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the
people and, of course, the verdict of history itself.

199 | P a g e
 DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Your Honor, just for purpose of discussion, may I know from
you whether there has been an occasion in this country where any past President had made
use of his martial law power?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I am glad that you asked that question, Your Honor,
because it seems that we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935
Constitution, the martial law provision has never been availed of by the President. I recall,
Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had occasion to declare
martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed
legislative and judicial powers. We must, of course, realize that during the time of President
Laurel, the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the
outside. The threats therefore, were not internal in origin and character as those which
prompted President Marcos to issue his historic proclamation. If, in case — as what
happened during the time of President Laurel — the declaration of martial law necessitated
the exercise of legislative powers by the martial law administrator, I say that greater
necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are posed
not by invaders but by the rebellious and seditious elements, both of the left and right, from
within. I say that because every rebellion, whether in this country or in other foreign
countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established
order. Rebellions or the acts of rebellion are usually preceded by long suffering of those who
ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It
is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the rebels until they can no
longer stand those sufferings to the point that, like a volcano, it must sooner erupt. In this
context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law.
The Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie
behind the rebellious movement, even if in the process, he should exercise legislative and
judicial powers. For what benefit would it be after having put down a rebellion through the
exercise of martial power if another rebellion is again in the offing because the root causes
which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in capturing the rebel
leaders and their followers, imprison them for life or, better still, kill in the field, but
someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another
movement. Great causes of every human undertaking do not usually die with the men behind
those causes. Unless the root causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of
another rebellion and, logical the endless and vicious exercise of martial law authority. This
reminds me of the wise words of an old man in our town: That if you are going to clear your
field of weeds and grasses, you should not merely cut them, but dig them out.

PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): With the indulgence of the Gentleman from La Union,
the Chair would want to have a recess for at least ten minutes.

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for
it after the grueling interpellations by some of our colleagues here, but before we recess, may
I move for the approval of Section 4?

PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Are there any objections? There being none, Section 4
is approved.

It is for the foregoing reasons that I find continued martial law to be a political question under the new
Charter. The present Constitution does not give the Supreme Court any power to 'cheek the exercise of a
supremely political prerogative. If there is any checking or review of martial law, the Constitution gives it,

200 | P a g e
not to the Supreme Court, but to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the checking function is vested in the
people. Whether the National Assembly expresses displeasure and withdraws its confidence from the Prime
Minister through election of a successor or the Prime Minister asks the President to dissolve the National
Assembly under Article VIII, Section 13, the issue of martial law ultimately rests with the people. Anything
dependent upon the popular will is, of course, political. Although the interim National Assembly has not yet
been convened, the intent of the Constitutional Convention to make the question political is clear.

Exclusive of the Transitory Provisions, other provisions of the present Charter may be cited. The Bill of
Rights, Article IV, Section 15 had added "or imminent danger thereof" to the 1935 provision. It now reads
—

SEC. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it.

Article IX, Section 16, another new provision reads —

SEC. 16. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the nineteen hundred
and thirty-five Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or
conferred upon any official shall be deemed, and are hereby, vested in the Prime Minister,
unless the National Assembly provides otherwise.

All the foregoing features of the new Constitution strengthen and do not decrease the exclusivity and
political nature of the power to proclaim martial law and to lift it.

XIV

GRANTING THAT THE CONTINUATION OF

MARTIAL LAW IS NOT POLITICAL BUT
JUSTICIABLE, IT IS STILL VALID UNDER
THE TEST OF ARBITRARINESS

Even if we grant that the continuation of martial law and the determination when to lift it are justiciable in
character, Our decision is still the same. Correctness of the President's acts, I must repeat, is not the test.
Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to determine when martial law should he lifted, the test is still
arbitrariness.

Aside from asserting that there was no basis for the initial proclamation of martial law, the petitioners insist
there is no real emergency in the country today. Petitioner Diokno cites various newspaper items reporting
statements of the President and defense officials. Among them are assurances of the President that reservists
won't undergo combat duty, statements of Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile citing gains in peace and order,
disclosures of commanding generals that the Mindanao rebellion is crushed and Tarlac is now peaceful, and
reports from Nueva Ecija that the rebel backbone is broken. (Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Immediate Release dated June 29, 1973.)

The petitioners assert that the "actual state of war aspect was dropped from general orders as early as
September 30, 1972 and that the transformation of a New Society has become the new theme.

201 | P a g e
 It is the second purpose — the building of a New Society — that is now being emphasized
everywhere. The instruments of mass communication that have been allowed to often drum
this theme without ceasing. Very little space and time is del district. (Emphasis ours.)

Fernando, J., dissenting:

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

It is with regret that I find myself unable to accept the conclusion reached by my brethren. I must perforce
dissent, this with due recognition that the opinion penned by Justice Fernandez commends itself for its
thoroughness, comprehensiveness and lucidity. It must be admitted likewise that it is characterized by
sustained, even formidable, logic. If I entertain a different view then it is because I proceed from a distinct
major premise. The writ of habeas corpus, to my mind, following the classic statement of Justice Malcolm,
in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban:1 "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set
the individual at liberty."2 Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the American Constitution.3 He explained why: "Perhaps Dr. Johnson went too far in telling
Boswell, "The Habeas Corpus is the single advantage our government has over that of other countries."
Still, such great liberties as worship and speech will go on somehow, despite laws, but not liberty of the
person. Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions against ideas may break down; a prison wall is there. Only
habeas corpus can penetrate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or redress, every form
of liberty is impaired. A man in jail cannot go to church or discuss or publish or assemble or enjoy property
or go to the polls."4 From such a standpoint, it appears to me that to require in a case like the present, where
the petition was filed with this Court but subsequently indorsed to a court of first instance, that an appeal on
questions of fact should go to the Court of Appeals would be to prolong unnecessarily the period of
detention when, as events may turn out, the applicant is entitled to his liberty. Hence this dissent.

1. The opinion of the Court states: "The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been
definitely ruled upon by Us in the case of Saulo v. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960)
wherein We held that the court to which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become
merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this
Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquires the authority and the duty to
inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order
his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further
clarifying Our ruling, We stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the
case for determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining
his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case."5

I reach a different conclusion. For me the Saulo ruling goes no further than to indicate that once referred to a
lower court an application for habeas corpus could be decided by it, as was made clear in the above citation
from the opinion. It does not appear unreasonable then to assert that nothing previously decided has settled
the specific question before us, which is not the finality of the lower court decision but where to appeal the
case. It would seem, to me at least, that the principle there applied is not controlling here. Assuming the

202 | P a g e
obscurity of the Saulo opinion, it is illumined when the light of the fundamental purpose of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corps is thrown on it, namely, the speedy release from unlawful detention. Such a
fundamental postulate should not become dormant. If in a state of quiescence, it must be revived. If the
Saulo decision goes that far, however, it may be time to call for re-examination. There is, to myes Your
Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am detained by the military
authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and question the legality of
my detention?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): If I am not mistaken, Your Honor, you are referring to the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

DELEGATE ADIL: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct.

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): In that case, Your Honor, I take it that when martial law is
proclaimed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended and, therefore,
if you are apprehended and detained by the military authorities, more so, when your
apprehension and detention were for an offense against the security of the State, then you
cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and ask the courts to order your
temporary release. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, like some other individual
rights, must have to yield to the greater need of preserving the State. Here, we have to make a
choice between two values, and I say that in times of great peril, when the very safety of the
whole nation and this Constitution is at stake, we have to elect for the greater one. For, as I
have said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could
be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a
position to assert and enforce its authority.

DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21,
1972, and announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which
are in the nature of statutes, regulating, as they do, various and numerous norms of conduct
of both the private and the public sectors. Would you say, Your Honor, that such exercise of
legislative powers by the President is within his martial law authority?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee. As
martial law administrator and by virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, the President could exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to
meet the martial situation. The Chief Executive must not be harmstrung or limited to his
traditional powers as Chief Executive. When martial law is declared, the declaration gives
rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but nonetheless necessary and
incident to the assumption of martial law authority to the end that the State may be safe.

DELEGATE ADIL: I am not at all questioning the constitutionality of the President's

assumption of powers which are not strictly executive in character. Indeed, I can concede that
when martial law is declared, the President can exercise certain judicial and legislative
powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of rebellion, insurrection,
imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and which
I want Your Honor to convince me further, is the exercise and assumption by the President or
by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have
nothing to do with the conditions of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or imminent danger
thereof. To be more specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the
decree issued by the President proclaiming a nationwide land reform or declaring land reform

203 | P a g e
throughout the Philippines. I suppose you will agree with me, Your Honor, that such a
decree, or any similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with the invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this
measure basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of
rebellion or insurrection. How could we validly say that the President's assumption of such
powers is justified by the proclamation of martial law?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated, Your Honor, we have now to
abandon the traditional concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks.
We have to look at martial law not as an immutable principle, Rather, we must view it in the
light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation thereof. The quelling of rebellion or
lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may admittedly be said to
be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could
there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the conditions
which necessitated the exercise of martial powers are not remedied? You cite as an example
the decree on land reform. Your Honor will have to admit that one of the major causes of
social unrest among peasantry in our society is the deplorable treatment society has given to
our peasants. As early as the 1930's, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to
the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing
the government by force. Were we to adopt the traditional concept of martial law, we would
be confined to merely putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the
maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to establish an
enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our
Constitution and the Republic, I say that martial law, being the ultimate weapon of survival
provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills
and the seething furies deep in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense,
therefore, there is a profound relationship between the exercise by the martial law
administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate objective of martial law.
And I may add that in the ultimate analysis, the only known limitation to martial law powers
is the convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the
people and, of course, the verdict of history itself.

DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Your Honor, just for purpose of discussion, may I know from
you whether there has been an occasion in this country where any past President had made
use of his martial law power?

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I am glad that you asked that question, Your Honor,
because it seems that we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935
Constitution, the martial law provision has never been availed of by the President. I recall,
Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had occasion to declare
martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed
legislative and judicial powers. We must, of course, realize that during the time of President
Laurel, the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the
outside. The threats therefore, were not internal in origin and character as those which
prompted President Marcos to issue his historic proclamation. If, in case — as what
happened during the time of President Laurel — the declaration of martial law necessitated
the exercise of legislative powers by the martial law administrator, I say that greater
necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are posed
not by invaders but by the rebellious and seditious elements, both of the left and right, from
within. I say that because every rebellion, whether in this country or in other foreign

204 | P a g e
 countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established
order. Rebellions or the acts of rebellion are usually preceded by long suffering of those who
ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It
is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the rebels until they can no
longer stand those sufferings to the point that, like a volcano, it must sooner erupt. In this
context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law.
The Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie
behind the rebellious movement, even if in the process, he should exercise legislative and
judicial powers. For what benefit would it be after having put down a rebellion through the
exercise of martial power if another rebellion is again in the offing because the root causes
which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in capturing the rebel
leaders and their followers, imprison them for life or, better still, kill in the field, but
someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another
movement. Great causes of every human undertaking do not usually die with the men behind
those causes. Unless the root causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of
another rebellion and, logical the endless and vicious exercise of martial law authority. This
reminds me of the wise words of an old man in our town: That if you are going to clear your
field of weeds and grasses, you should not merely cut them, but dig them out.

PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): With the indulgence of the Gentleman from La Union,
the Chair would want to have a recess for at least ten minutes.

DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for
it after the grueling interpellations by some of our colleagues here, but before we recess, may
I move for the approval of Section 4?

PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Are there any objections? There being none, Section 4
is approved.

It is for the foregoing reasons that I find continued martial law to be a political question under the new
Charter. The present Constitution does not give the Supreme Court any power to 'cheek the exercise of a
supremely political prerogative. If there is any checking or review of martial law, the Constitution gives it,
not to the Supreme Court, but to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the checking function is vested in the
people. Whether the National Assembly expresses displeasure and withdraws its confidence from the Prime
Minister through election of a successor or the Prime Minister asks the President to dissolve the National
Assembly under Article VIII, Section 13, the issue of martial law ultimately rests with the people. Anything
dependent upon the popular will is, of course, political. Although the interim National Assembly has not yet
been convened, the intent of the Constitutional Convention to make the question political is clear.

Exclusive of the Transitory Provisions, other provisions of the present Charter may be cited. The Bill of
Rights, Article IV, Section 15 had added "or imminent danger thereof" to the 1935 provision. It now reads
—

SEC. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it.

Article IX, Section 16, another new provision reads —

205 | P a g e
 SEC. 16. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the nineteen hundred
and thirty-five Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or
conferred upon any official shall be deemed, and are hereby, vested in the Prime Minister,
unless the National Assembly provides otherwise.

All the foregoing features of the new Constitution strengthen and do not decrease the exclusivity and
political nature of the power to proclaim martial law and to lift it.

XIV

GRANTING THAT THE CONTINUATION OF

MARTIAL LAW IS NOT POLITICAL BUT
JUSTICIABLE, IT IS STILL VALID UNDER
THE TEST OF ARBITRARINESS

Even if we grant that the continuation of martial law and the determination when to lift it are justiciable in
character, Our decision is still the same. Correctness of the President's acts, I must repeat, is not the test.
Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to determine when martial law should he lifted, the test is still
arbitrariness.

Aside from asserting that there was no basis for the initial proclamation of martial law, the petitioners insist
there is no real emergency in the country today. Petitioner Diokno cites various newspaper items reporting
statements of the President and defense officials. Among them are assurances of the President that reservists
won't undergo combat duty, statements of Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile citing gains in peace and order,
disclosures of commanding generals that the Mindanao rebellion is crushed and Tarlac is now peaceful, and
reports from Nueva Ecija that the rebel backbone is broken. (Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Immediate Release dated June 29, 1973.)

The petitioners assert that the "actual state of war aspect was dropped from general orders as early as
September 30, 1972 and that the transformation of a New Society has become the new theme.

It is the second purpose — the building of a New Society — that is now being emphasized
everywhere. The instruments of mass communication that have been allowed to often drum
this theme without ceasing. Very little space and time is del district. (Emphasis ours.)

Fernando, J., dissenting:

206 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that
judgment be rendered:

(1) Annulling and setting aside all the actuations, orders, and resolutions of the respondent Court of
Appeals, more particularly the resolution dated February 1, 1969, denying petitioner’s motion for
certification of this case to the Supreme Court; the resolution dated March 13, 1969 denying petitioner’s
"Urgent Motion for Release of Petitioner-Detainee", the resolution dated June 10, 1969 denying petitioner’s
"Motion for Reconsideration"; and the resolution dated June 21, 1969 requiring Atty. Amelito R, Mutuc to
show cause why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt of court and suspended from the
practice of law as member of the Philippine Bar;
(2) Prohibiting respondent Court of Appeals from enforcing the aforesaid resolution dated June 21, 1969,
regarding the contempt and suspension charge against aforenamed Amelito R. Mutuc, as well as from
proceeding further with the case at bar; and
(3) Ordering the respondent Court of Appeals to certify the appeal and to have all the records of the same
forwarded to this Court.

Pending these proceedings a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued ex parte was sought, to enjoin,
restrain and prohibit the respondent Court of Appeals from proceeding further with this case, more
particularly with the enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, requiring Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to
explain why he should not be held for contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law.

On September 4, 1969, this Court adopted a resolution restraining the respondent Court of Appeals from
proceeding further with case No. CA-G.R. No. 42658-R, entitled "Fortunato Medina, petitioner-appellee v.
Gen. Manuel T. Yan and Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval, respondents-appellants", more particularly with the
enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, re: Contempt and Suspension of Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc."

For a clear perspective of the present petition, the events leading thereto are set forth as follows:
At 6:00 o’clock in the morning of November 23, 1968 petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who
was in Saigon, South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an American company, was arrested and
apprehended by the South Vietnam police and some members of the Philippine Civic Action Group
(PHILCAG) at the instance of the Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody until 6:00
o’clock in the evening of the same day, when he was flown to Manila under escort by two Philippine
Military Attache personnel aboard an Air Vietnam plane, arriving in Manila about 9:00 o’clock that same
evening. At the Manila International Airport, he was met and arrested by a team of Intelligence Service
Officers of the Philippine Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, where he was
interrogated and kept in custody until the morning of the following day, November 24, 1968, when he was
turned over to the 1st PC Zone Headquarters at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In the early
morning of November 27, 1968 petitioner Medina was transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command
Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga. At 11:00 o’clock the same morning he was delivered to the custody of
the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the absence of the Municipal Judge.

On November 29, 1968 petitioner Medina, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat.
This Court, acting on the petition, issued on the same day the writ of habeas corpus, made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch.

207 | P a g e
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Mutuc violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

"Considering that the statements attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc, as well as the news items based thereon,
as above set forth, are grossly defiant, offensive and derogatory to the dignity and integrity of the members
of the Fourth Division of this Court; that they are evidently intended to browbeat, intimidate and hold them
in contempt and ridicule by imputing to them the act of ‘knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and
rank injustice’, and that said statements and news reports tend to degrade and obstruct the free, just and
impartial administration of justice on a matter then actually pending consideration by this Court; and
"Considering further that the act of Atty. Amelito Mutuc of advising, encouraging and practically assisting
in the escape of the petitioner-appellee, Fortunato Medina, from the custody of the law as a detention
prisoner, in utter disregard of the order of this Court requiring him to post a bond of P5,000.00 for his
release, constitutes a deliberate and wanton violation of his oath as a lawyer, particularly that portion thereof
where he swears that he will obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities’ of
the Republic of the Philippines and ‘will conduct himself as a lawyer’ with ‘all good fidelity as well to the
courts’ as to his clients;

WHEREFORE, Atty. Amelito Mutuc is hereby required to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of notice hereof why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt of court, and why he should
not be suspended under Rule 138, Section 28, of the Rules of Court, from the practice of law as a member of
the Philippine Bar."

208 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15474 August 31, 1960

ALFREDO B. SAULO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BRIG. GENERAL PELAGIO CRUZ, ETC., respondent-appellee.

Alberto M.K. Jamir for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General E. Barot and Acting Solicitor General P. P. de Castro for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In G.R. No. L-14819, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court by and in behalf of petitioner
Alfredo B. Saulo. We issued, on December 24, 1958, a writ ordering respondent Pelagio Cruz, as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, to submit, within five (5) days from notice, an answer
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.

At the hearing in the court below, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground
that, inasmuch as petitioner was confined in the Philippine Constabulary stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, the Manila court was without jurisdiction to entertain the case consonant with Section 2, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court. Upon the remanding of the particular issue to us by the trial judge, we overruled this
contention in our resolution of March 19, 1959, and accordingly, we ordered the return of the records to the
lower court for its appropriate action on the merits of the petition.

The case was submitted to the lower court for decision solely on the facts appearing in petitioner's pleadings
and admitted by the respondent. According to the lower court:

After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with three criminal cases
(Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons,
robberies and kidnappings, Alfredo B. Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ
of habeas corpus has been presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on
November 12, 1958, to seek refuge therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian Embassy
surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18, 1958, since which date he has
remained in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. One of the
two criminal cases for rebellion having been dismissed with respect to him on motion of the
prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases (Nos. 13681 and 39253). When the
corresponding order for his temporary release was served, the herein respondent Commanding
General of the Philippine Constabulary commanded one of his subordinates to with hold the release
of Saulo on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said criminal
case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the Fiscal of Manila, for alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable
by prision mayor to death, so that the said Court of First Instance might conduct the corresponding
preliminary investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary investigation was still
going on, that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court, as already stated, on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by

209 | P a g e
 reason of the pendency of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is illegal and void. Said court
gave due course to the application and directed the respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above related and alleged in
the application, with the plea that "the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of
Republic Act No. 1700 filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient reason for
continuing the detention of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for his discharge
under the case aforesaid."

Upon such findings, the lower rendered decision, concluding that the filing of Criminal Case No. 46410
amounted to the delivery of accused-petitioner, who was arrested without warrant, to the proper court as
provided under Section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court (citing Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil.,
859). The Court consequently denied the petition for habeas corpus. Hence, this appeal.

However, petitioner's appeal to have been filed out of time, as pointed out by the Solicitor General. The
records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court's
decision, denying the petition, was served upon petitioner's counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's
return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his
appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of judgment:

Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpus case shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within
twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals
from the judgment rendered.

It has been consistently held that the reglementary period for appeal is not mandatory but jurisdictional on
the courts and that an appeal filed out of the time may be sought to be dismissed at any stage of the
proceedings in the appellate court.1

In petitioner's "manifestation" dated October 12, 1959 it is contented that since the case for habeas
corpus was heard by the Manila Court of First Instance, "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely
by delegation", this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only its
decision, not that of the Court of First Instance, should be regarded as operative. The logic is more than real.
While the petition for habeas corpus was originally filed with this Court, the only question that was
immediately involved was the propriety of the issuance of a writ that would order the respondent to show
cause why the detention of the person in whose behalf the writ was asked for should not be considered
illegal, and that, therefore, the petitioner be ordered discharged from custody. The Rules authorize that once
the writ is issued, the same may be made returnable before a Court of First Instance (Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rules
of Court), and not necessarily to us. The court designated does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until we decide to act
on the "recommendation". By filing a notice of appeal with the Court below, the appellant impliedly
admitted that the decision appealed was not merely recommendatory or fact-finding.

In our resolution dated March 19, 1959, resolving the question of jurisdiction of the lower court, we stated
the following:

Moreover, it is apparent from sections 12 to 15 of said Rule 102 that the court or judge to whom the
writ is returned shall have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to

210 | P a g e
 the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement, should
it appear satisfactorily "that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained.

xxx xxx xxx

In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to a court
other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses
full authority to examine all issues raised in the case and to settle the same. In the language of the
American jurisprudence:

"After a return to a writ, the court or judge to whom the return is made must pass upon all questions
of both law and fact and determine the ultimate question whether the prisoner is wrongfully
restrained of his liberty. It is necessary for the court to determine the eight and credibility of the
evidence where the testimony is conflicting.

". . . With further reference to habeas corpus proceedings in Federal courts, it is expressly provided
by statute that the court or judge before whom the prisoner may be brought shall proceed in a
summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and
thereupon to dispose of the prisoner as law and justice may require." (25 Am. Jur., p. 245, Emphasis
ours)

In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination
on the merits (See 39 C.J.S. p. 603, sec. 58 and case cited therein), and its findings, either for the release of
the detainee or for sustaining his continued custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may
in an ordinary case.

We, accordingly, have no alternative than to dismiss the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

211 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with three criminal cases
(Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies
and kidnappings, Alfredo B. Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been
presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on November 12, 1958, to seek refuge
therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine
Government on November 18, 1958, since which date he has remained in the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. One of the two criminal cases for rebellion having been
dismissed with respect to him on motion of the prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases
(Nos. 13681 and 39253). When the corresponding order for his temporary release was served, the herein
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary commanded one of his subordinates to
with hold the release of Saulo on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Said criminal case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the Fiscal of Manila, for
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable
byprision mayor to death, so that the said Court of First Instance might conduct the corresponding
preliminary investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary investigation was still going on,
that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, as
already stated, on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of the
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is illegal and void. Said court gave due course to the application and
directed the respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above related and alleged in
the application, with the plea that "the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of Republic Act
No. 1700 filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient reason for continuing the detention
of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for his discharge under the case aforesaid."

Issues

Whether or not denial of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is illegal and void.

Ruling

Petitioner’s appeal has been filed out of time. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed
eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court’s decision, denying the petition, was served upon
petitioner’s counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of
judgment: Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpuscase shall be
perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four
(24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment
rendered.

The appeal is hereby dismissed.

212 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007

FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor
children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case here.
Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7, 1993 in
Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born
on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12,
2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three
sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of
her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought
the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to
Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that
petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not
be returned to her custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that
petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of
heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody
of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours
of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed
that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was
only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a
certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip
213 | P a g e
were enrolled there. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section
5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3

For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven out by
petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s
alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against
her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her
in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.4

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to take cognizance
of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody
of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation
rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody
should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99
of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this
recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists
that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA
8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx xxx

214 | P a g e
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and
BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129
– that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.8 (emphases supplied)

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors:

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-
SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be
made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or
where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred
his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation
of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the
case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpuscase will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].10

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be
issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that
may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family

215 | P a g e
court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions,
interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of
all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On leave)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(No part)
CANCIO C. GARCIA**
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

216 | P a g e
 DIGEST

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing
with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.

Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the
ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under
the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists
that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance
of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

217 | P a g e
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion2 read:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in
substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic
Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to
her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact,
whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her
daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there
and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3 that respondent was no longer
residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another
218 | P a g e
petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the

latter.

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction
of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple
answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court
also possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but
concurrent – and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on
him or her by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has
territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a
law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by
expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court – or any court for
that matter – to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the
courts but only from the legislature.

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
219 | P a g e
Supreme Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which
can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed
any other way.

We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know
the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from
family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is
being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing
three major issues regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original
jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater
sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee
that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369
did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a
minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that
the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature
of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-
being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be
avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction
over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioner’s
submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
220 | P a g e
 foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same
manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus
enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of
Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof,
on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a
Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may
also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. (Emphasis
supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for
damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:

"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s
survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
life."

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute,
and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the
case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy
"to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the
guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought
into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted

221 | P a g e
 conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129
― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the
petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than
the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable
anywhere within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No.
70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban,, J., Chairman, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, on leave.

222 | P a g e
 DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter. After 3
years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO
in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants
that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find
them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner
filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case
since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The
judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE:

W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD:

Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because
it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be
transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family
courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it
meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.

223 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

UDK-14071 July 17, 2009

MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER, Petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS or his representative, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then President
Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12 days,
including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.1

In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition should be denied
for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the petition was neither
signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not
accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioner’s detention or commitment order.

The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds: petitioner’s prison sentence
was never commuted by then President Ramos; he had not been granted the status of a colonist; there were
other pending cases against him warranting his continued detention2 and he was put under custody by virtue
of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply
with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the technical requirements for
a habeas corpuspetition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with where the allegations in
the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid
Prison,3 we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally.
The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal.4 Indeed, in the landmark
case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,5 this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is
evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no
application therefor. So long as this Court sits, technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which
is deficient in form, such as petitioner’s petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its
allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.6

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.7 The writ
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective
defense of personal freedom.8

Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty
of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending
the habeas corpusremedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to technicalities
224 | P a g e
not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks
to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the
right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of
technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.9

Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.10 However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by
virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.11

It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995.12 On June 24, 1996, he
was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of ₱102,235.56.13

Based on petitioner’s prison records,14 he began serving his sentence on July 24, 1997. He claims that after
having served good conduct time allowance for 14 years, three months and 12 days,15 he should now be
released from prison.

We disagree.

A convict may be released on parole after serving the minimum period of his sentence. However, the
pendency of another criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released
on parole.16Unfortunately, petitioner is again on trial in Criminal Case No. 94-6988 for estafa.17 The case
was filed as early as 1996 but he was arraigned only on October 6, 2008. He pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him. Pre-trial was set on January 26, 2009.18 Clearly, he is disqualified from being released on
parole and consequently must serve out the entirety of his sentence.

We note the issuance of a warrant for petitioner’s arrest on March 8, 1996, the date he was first set for
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 94-6988. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ
cannot be issued and petitioner cannot be discharged since he has been charged with another criminal
offense.19 His continued detention is without doubt warranted under the circumstances.

Petitioner asserts that his sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995 was commuted by then President Ramos.
However, he presented no proof of such commutation. Other than indorsements by the Chief
Justice,20 Public Attorney’s Office21 and Undersecretary of the Department of Justice,22 no document
purporting to be the commutation of his sentence by then President Ramos was attached in his petition and
225 | P a g e
in his subsequent missives to this Court. His barren claim of commutation therefore deserves scant
consideration, lest we be accused of usurping the President’s sole prerogative to commute petitioner’s
sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995.23

Having established that petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court
process, we see no need to discuss petitioner’s other arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

NO CASE DIGEST

226 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156983. September 23, 2003]

In the Matter of the Application for the Habeas Corpus of JOSE VICTOR RIGOR y
DANAO, petitioner, vs. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Hopeful that he may be released from incarceration, petitioner Jose Victor Rigor y Danao filed the
present petition for habeas corpus seeking that the penalty imposed on him by the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City (Branch 214) in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1235-D and MC-99-1236-D be reduced to
six months and one day of prision correccional in each case, and that he be set free, having served more
than a year of imprisonment.
Per the Joint Decision dated August 31, 2001 of the RTC, petitioner was convicted of illegal sale and
possession of methampethamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt accused JOSE VICTOR RIGOR Y DANAO is hereby sentenced, as follows: in Criminal Case No.
MC-99-1235-D: SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF arresto mayor maximum to FOUR (4) YEARS
AND FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional and a fine of P5,000.00 and, in
Criminal Case No. MC-99-1236-D: SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF arresto mayor maximum to
FOUR (4) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional and a fine of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[1]

Petitioner admits that he did not appeal from said conviction, hence, it became final and
executory.[2] As of the filing of the petition, Rigor had already served one year and five months of
imprisonment.[3]
Petitioner cites several rulings of this Court and the Court of Appeals[4] wherein Republic Act No. 7659
was given retroactive effect and the accused therein set to liberty.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment opposing the petition on the grounds that
petitioner has yet to serve the maximum penalty imposed on him on his two convictions and that he must
serve these penalties successively.[6]
A cursory reading of the petition gives the impression that what petitioner seeks is that he be entitled to
enjoy the beneficial provisions of Rep. Act No. 7659 by taking into account the years of imprisonment he
had already served, and consequently, his release from prison. However, a further review of his petition
reveals that what petitioner actually asks for is the reduction of his penalty to only six months and one day
of prision correccional in each of his convictions so that he may be deemed to have served the maximum
penalty in both instances, and should now be released. Thus, the prayer in his petition states: [7]

227 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after given
due course, modify the penalties in criminal cases nos. MC-99-1235 and MC-99-1236-D by reducing the
same to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional in each case.

The relief prayed for cannot be granted for the simple reason that the Joint Decision of the trial court in
Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1235-D and MC-99-1236-D is already final and executory, petitioner having
failed to timely appeal therefrom.[8] Hence, the Court is bereft of any jurisdiction to revise, modify or alter
the penalties imposed, as prayed for in the present petition.
However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of the trial court that must be
rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional one day on the
maximum period of arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of
said penalty. The duration of arresto mayor is only from one month and one day to six months.[9] Adding
one day to the maximum penalty will place it within the range of prision correccional.[10]
Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years, four months and one day
of prision correccional is also incorrect as it is outside the range of the penalty imposable in this
case. Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, modified the penalties prescribed by
Republic Act No. 6425. Where the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is less than 250 grams, the penalty
to be imposed shall be prision correccional. Applying further the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,[11] the penalty imposable is reduced to any period
within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to the medium period of prision correccional as the maximum
term, or an indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to prision correccional in its
medium period ranging from two years and four months and one day to four years and two months, as
maximum.[12]
Hence, the penalty of imprisonment in each of Criminal Case No. MC-99-1235-D and Criminal Case
No. MC-99-1236-D, should have been from six months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four years and two
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
In line with the ruling of the Court in People vs. Barro, Sr., to wit:

However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was
never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the accused who did not appeal can be corrected to make
it conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and
executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.[13]

the error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed
by law as it is within the Courts duty and inherent power. As held in People vs. Gatward, to wit:

But a judgment which ordains a penalty which does not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which is an
impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is necessarily void, since the error goes into the
very essence of the penalty and does not merely arise from the misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a
judgment can never become final and executory.[14]

Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be
in accordance with law and nothing else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to the
petitioner nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.
Contrary to petitioners position, the trial court took into consideration the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7659. The penalties imposed by the trial court, as duly corrected above, are within the ambit of Rep. Act No.
7659, and there is nothing more to reduce.

228 | P a g e
 Even assuming that the petition seeks that Rep. Act No. 7659 be retroactively applied to his benefit,
still, he cannot be released from detention at this point. Petitioner apparently had an erroneous appreciation
of the law and jurisprudence, or worse, was ill advised as to its implications.
As aptly pointed out by the OSG, petitioner first must successively serve the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on his two convictions up to its maximum term before he can be released.
Under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, when an offender has to serve two or more penalties, he
should serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Otherwise said penalties shall
be executed successively, following the order of their respective severity, in such case, the second sentence
will not commence to run until the expiration of the first.[15]
The nature of petitioners sentences does not allow its simultaneous service; hence he must serve it
successively.[16] Not only that he must serve it successively, he must also serve it up to its maximum
term. In the case of Angeles vs. Director of New Bilibid Prisons[17] cited by petitioner, the petition
for habeas corpus was not granted because it appeared that petitioner has only served the minimum of his
sentence.
Petitioner must therefore first serve the penalty in Crim. Case No. MC-99-1235-D up to its maximum
term, before service of the penalty in Crim. Case No. MC-99-1236-D also up to its maximum term, or a
total maximum period of eight years and four months.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

However, in the interest of justice to the end that the correct periods of imprisonment are imposed, the
sentences on petitioner in the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (Branch 214)
in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1235-D and MC-99-1236-D are MODIFIED, as follows: Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum; and in Criminal Case No. MC-99-1236-D, petitioner is sentenced to
suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
Let the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (Branch 214) be furnished a copy of herein
Resolution for guidance on the proper imposition of penalties in similar cases, as discussed in the text of the
Resolution.
Likewise, let the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison be furnished a copy of the Resolution for the
enforcement of the corrected penalties.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

NO CASE DIGEST

229 | P a g e
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952 December 24, 2008

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, former Clerk of Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court
Stenographers THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO B. ARGAME, MARICAR N. EUGENIO, and
RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M. RESURRECCION, all of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant case stemmed from the judicial audit conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
in all seven (7) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including Branch 276 then
presided by herein respondent Judge Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was prompted by reports
of perceived irregular disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said court.

In its Memorandum1 dated January 25, 2004 and submitted to the OCA, the audit team reported that for the
period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the subject
matters of which are classified into (a) hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal possession of
firearms; and (d) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. The records for 22 of these cases were not presented to the audit team, while the case folders of
about a hundred cases did not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The audit team also noted a
huge disparity in the number of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276 as against those raffled in
the other branches, which led the team to doubt if the raffle had been conducted with strict regularity
considering the fact that Judge Perello was the Executive Judge that time.

The audit team likewise reported several substantive and procedural lapses relative to the disposition
of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276, such as (a) failure of the branch clerk of court to present to the audit
team the case folders of 22 petitions and to send notices/summons to the Office of the Solicitor General or
the Office of the City Prosecutor; (b) lack of return of the writs issued to the officials of the Bureau of
Corrections; (c) absence of certificate of detention/confinement from the Bureau of Corrections; (d) absence
of copies of the judgment of conviction; (e) failure of the court stenographer to transcribe the stenographic
notes and attach the transcript to the records of each case; and (f) failure on the part of the court interpreter
to prepare the Minutes of the court sessions or hearings.

Finally, the audit team observed that in some of the petitions for habeas corpus, respondent Judge Perello
erred in ordering the release of the prisoners before they have served the full term of their sentence.

Thus, the audit team recommended to the OCA to consider the judicial audit report as an administrative
complaint against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of Court Atty. Luis Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law,
230 | P a g e
grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct; and (b) Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio
Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion for gross
inefficiency.

In its Resolution dated March 2, 2005, the Court adopted the aforesaid recommendation.2

The OCA, through its 1st Indorsement dated September 9, 2005, directed the herein respondents to comment
on the audit team's recommendations.3

In her Comment4 dated October 10, 2005, Judge Perello opined that "the Audit Team that evaluated these
Habeas corpus cases filed with this Court are probably not lawyers, hence, are not conversant with the
Constitution, with jurisprudence, and the Rules on the grant of the Writ of Habeas corpus and the
retroactivity of laws." She insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the prisoners who were serving
their sentence for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act were in
accordance with law and jurisprudence. For those convicted of illegal possession of firearms under the old
law (Presidential Decree No. 1866), she applied retroactively the provisions of the amendatory law or R.A.
No. 8294,5 pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for the retroactive application
of laws that are favorable to the accused even to those already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as
R.A. No. 8294 imposed the penalty of six (6) years only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to
those prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight (8) years already. For those convicted for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the amendatory law or R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mainly because it aggravated the penalty and is therefore
not favorable to them.

To refute the accusations against her, Judge Perello enumerated her credentials and qualifications and
alleged that most of her decisions were upheld by the Court attesting to her competence in applying the law.
She claimed that in all the petitions she granted, the prisoners therein were all cleared by the National
Bureau of Investigation to have no pending cases. The Bureau of Corrections was always directed to
produce the records and reason for the confinement of the concerned prisoners. If from the records, the
prisoner was found to have already served more than the maximum of the imposable penalty, then she
would order the release of the prisoner in open court, without fear or favor. Judge Perello asserted that she
had served with utmost dedication and honesty in all her more than 40 years of government service.

For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of Court, explained in his Comment6 that while he failed
to present the case folders and records of 22 petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was conducted
at their branch, there was an agreement between him and the audit team that the latter could pick up these
folders and records before the end of their audit. However, the audit team failed to return to get these case
records. He claimed to be baffled as to how his alleged failure to make the records available to the audit
team could constitute gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and grave misconduct. Atty.
Bucayon likewise manifested that he had transferred to the Public Attorney's Office of the Department of
Justice as of July 26, 2004 and was issued a clearance by the OCA.

On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion averred in his Comment7 that all petitions for habeas
corpushave their corresponding Minutes but these were not attached to the records because the Branch
Clerk of Court refused to put his remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that he always made it a
point to prepare the Minutes and his co-employees could attest to this fact.

Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, all Stenographers of
Branch 276, submitted their Joint Comment8 dated October 12, 2005 and Joint Supplemental
Comment9 dated October 19, 2005. According to them, Branch 276 had the heaviest case load among all the

231 | P a g e
branches in Muntinlupa City. Despite this, they allegedly religiously attended the hearings and transcribed
their notes thereafter. With respect to the petitions for habeas corpus, they saw no need to transcribe their
stenographic notes as the proceedings therein were non-adversarial in nature. They prioritized those cases
which were adversarial and on appeal.

In the Agenda Report10 dated March 9, 2006, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. submitted
the following recommendations:

1. respondent Judge Norma C. Perello be FOUND GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE

LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE and be meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for three (3) months
without salary and benefit;

2. the complaint against Atty. Luis Bucayon be DISMISSED for being moot and academic;

3. respondents Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman and respondent Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion be FOUND GUILTY of
SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).11

The Court thereafter referred the administrative matter to Justice Conrado Molina, Consultant of OCA, for
investigation, report and recommendation.12

On August 1, 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.13 All the respondents manifested that they were submitting the
case for decision.

On November 21, 2007, Justice Molina submitted his report and adopted entirely the recommendations of
the Court Administrator.14

We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator as adopted by the Investigating Justice, but modify
the recommendation in regard to the penalty imposed upon Judge Perello.

It is the contention of Judge Perello that the prisoners she released were all convicted under the old law,
R.A. No. 6425, and not under the new law, R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which imposes the penalty of life imprisonment to death regardless of the
quantity of the drug involved.15 She maintains that the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as these prisoners are concerned for the main reason that it would not be favorable
to them. Thus, according to Judge Perello, the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as interpreted in the case
of People v. Simon,16 must be applied to the released prisoners. Citing the Simon case, she insisted that the
maximum imposable penalty for violation of R.A. No. 6425 where the quantity involved is 750 grams or
less is six (6) months only, which was the reason why she ordered the immediate release of the prisoners
because they had already served two (2) years of imprisonment.

While we agree with respondent judge that R.A. No. 9165 cannot be retroactively applied to the prisoners
involved in the cases audited, we, however, are not impressed with Judge Perello's justification in granting
the writs. Such ratiocination on her part betrays a lack of understanding of the rule on graduation of
penalties. Nowhere in the cited case of Simon does it state that the maximum penalty shall be six (6) months
where the quantity is less than 750 grams. The Simon case clarified the penalty to be imposed vis-à-vis the
quantity of the drug involved, such that prision correccional shall be imposed if the drug is below 250
grams; prision mayor if the quantity is from 250 to 499 grams; and reclusion temporal if the drug is from
500 to 750 grams.17 The same case likewise declared that while modifying circumstances may be
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appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees,
in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional.18

The penalty of prision correccional is composed of three periods ─ the minimum which ranges from 6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, the medium which is from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months, and the maximum which ranges from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. As found by the
audit team, Judge Perello considered only the minimum period of prision correccional in granting the writs
for habeas corpus such that when the prisoners had served imprisonment for a period of two (2) years, she
immediately ordered their release. This is clearly erroneous because the petition for habeas corpus cannot
be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to
its maximum term.19 The maximum range of prision correccional is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years. This is the period which the prisoners must have served before their applications for writs of habeas
corpus may be granted.

In obstinately granting the writs of habeas corpus even if the convicted prisoners had only served the
minimum period of their sentence, Judge Perello displayed a blatant disregard of the rule on graduation of
penalties as well as settled jurisprudence tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. As a trial judge,
respondent is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, she is expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." Judges are
expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.20 He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of
Law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than
that would be gross ignorance of the law.21 Judge Perello must thereby have more than a cursory knowledge
of the law on graduation of penalties and the imposable penalty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Indeed, the facts obtaining in this case speak of other dubious circumstances affecting Judge Perello's
integrity and competence too glaring to ignore.

Notably, the record shows that Judge Perello granted the writs of habeas corpus even without the pertinent
copies of detention and judgment of conviction.22 This is contrary to the provisions of Section 3(d) of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 3. Requisites of application therefor. - Application for the writ shall be by petition signed and
verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, of by some person in his behalf, and shall
set forth:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be procured without
impairing the efficiency of the remedy; xxx.

The Rules clearly require that a copy of the commitment or cause of detention must accompany the
application for the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, Judge Perello deviated from the guidelines laid down
in Section 3(d) of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been
formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of
law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law
itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of
law.23 Indeed, Judge Perello's stubborn unwillingness to act in accordance with the rules and settled

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jurisprudence shows her refusal to reform herself and to correct a wrong, tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.

Be that as it may, however, we agree with the Court Administrator that there is no merit in the charge of
grave misconduct leveled against Judge Perello. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained
of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules.24 Here, it appears that she was not motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive. As the Court
Administrator puts it:

xxx. Except for the insinuation that there has been connivance among all court staff in railroading
the process of handling these cases, there was no showing that in releasing the petitioners
prematurely, respondent was motivated by corrupt motives. On the contrary, respondent vehemently
denies this accusation. In her comment, she stated that she protests with pain that she has always
been viewed and unjustly condemned as a wrongdoer on an erroneous impression that she had
benefited and had reaped riches for doing her job which she did with compassion, fairness and
justice as the law and jurisprudence dictates. Indeed, if respondent judge or a court employee should
be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from
direct knowledge. Charges based on mere suspicion should not be given credence.25

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge Perello had been previously charged with and found
guilty of committing several administrative infractions, namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for which she
was suspended for six (6) months;26 (2) undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals the records of a
case for which she was fined P20,000.00;27 (3) dereliction of duty for which she was fined P5,000.00;28 (4)
conduct unbecoming a judge for which she was admonished;29 and most recently (5) grave abuse of
discretion, grave abuse of authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law
and/or procedure for which she was fined in the amount of P10,000.00.30 It is therefore evident that Judge
Perello had a penchant for committing infractions during her tenure.

In sum, we find Judge Perello liable for ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and for abuse of discretion.
These are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 11 of the same
Rule provides that any of the following sanctions may be imposed upon Judge Perello:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. ─ A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. Provided, however, that forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for three (3) months on Judge Perello. In view, however, of
Judge Perello's compulsory retirement31 which makes suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is
to impose a fine on her in the maximum amount of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.

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With regard to Atty. Bucayon's liability, the charges against him all pertained to his duties as Branch Clerk
of Court. It must be noted that during the pendency of this administrative case against him, Atty. Bucayon
had transferred to the Public Attorney's Office of the Department of Justice on July 26, 2004 and was
accordingly issued a clearance by the OCA. Thus, we accept the OCA's recommendation to dismiss the
charges against him for being moot.

On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit, Argame, Eugenio and Laman, Administrative Circular 24-
9032imposes upon all court stenographers the duty to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the
transcripts of such notes to the records of each case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes
were taken. The records reveal that respondent stenographers failed to transcribe the stenographic notes and
attach them to the records of each case. By their own admission, they did not bother to transcribe the notes
as the proceedings were non-adversarial in nature. We find this explanation unacceptable considering that
the requirement under the Circular applies to all proceedings whether adversarial or not.

For their shortcomings in the transcription of the stenographic notes, respondent stenographers have shown
their utter lack of dedication to the functions of their office. As trial court stenographers, they know, or
ought to know, that they perform an important role in running the machinery of our trial court system and
that transcripts of stenographic notes are vital for the speedy disposition of cases. Their dereliction of duty
which may jeopardize public faith and confidence in our judicial system should not be countenanced. We,
thus, find respondent stenographers guilty of simple neglect of duty. While said offense carries a penalty of
one month and one day to six months suspension under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,33 we deem it reasonable and sufficient to instead impose a fine of P5,000.00, as recommended
by the OCA, considering that it was their first offense. While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a
corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also
has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy.34

Finally, as to Court Interpreter Resurreccion, the record would show that he had been remiss in his duty to
prepare the Minutes of the sessions or hearings and attach them to the records of each case. He cannot
escape liability by passing on the blame to the Branch Clerk of Court whom he claimed refused to put his
remarks on the Minutes. Resurreccion's explanation is too flimsy to excuse him from administrative
liability. Among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign "all Minutes of the session."35 After
every session they must prepare the Minutes and attach it. The Minutes is a very important document
because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of a case. It is in fact
a capsulized history of the case at a given session or hearing, for it states the date and time of the session;
the names of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who were present; the names
of the counsel for the parties who appeared; the party presenting evidence; the names of witnesses who
testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of the next hearing.36 Failure to prepare the
Minutes and attach them to the records of a case constitutes simple neglect of duty and warrants disciplinary
action. Accordingly, Resurreccion is hereby fined the same amount of P5,000.00 as recommended by the
OCA.

We take this occasion once more to impress upon all respondents that the conduct of every person
connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is circumscribed
with a heavy burden of responsibility. A public office is a public trust. Since public officers are accountable
to the people at all times, they must strictly perform their duties and responsibilities. As the administration
of justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns any omission or act that may diminish the faith of the people
in the judiciary.37

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Norma C. Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law and abuse of discretion, for which she is meted a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her

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retirement benefits. Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion are found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty,
for which they are each meted a fine of P5,000.00, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be
dealt with more severely.

For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis Bucayon II are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Parts) (No Parts)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Parts)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

NO CASE DIGEST

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