Hatford Fire Insurance Co. vs. California et.

Al

FACTS: Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants violated
the Sherman Act by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to
change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies to conform
with the policies the defendant insurers wanted to sell. The District Court granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the District Court's conclusion that the
defendants were entitled to antitrust immunity under §2(b) of the McCarran Ferguson Act, which
exempts from federal regulation the business of insurance, except to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were entitled to antitrust immunity?

RULING: NO. Even assuming that a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction
over foreign conduct in an appriopriate case, international comity would not counsel
against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here. The only substantial
question in this case is whether "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law." Socit Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 482
U.S. 522, 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That question must
be answered in the negative, since the London reinsurers do not argue that British law
requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by United States law or claim that their
compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible. Pp. 27-32.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I,
concluding that a "boycott" for purposes of §3(b) of the Act occurs where,
in order to coerce a target into certain terms on onetransaction, parties
refuse to engage in other, unrelated transactions with the target. It is not a
"boycott" but rather a concerted agreement to terms (a "cartelization")
where parties refuse to engage in a particular transaction until the terms
of that transaction are agreeable. Under the foregoing test, the allegations
of a "boycott" in this case, construed most favorably to the respondents,
are sufficient to sustain most of the relevant counts of complaint against a
motion to dismiss. Pp. 2-12.
Filartiga vs. Pena – Irala

FACTS: Dolly Filartiga, daugther of Dr. Joel Filartiga, went to United States. While in the United States,
she learned that Pena – Irala was also at the United States. She then filed a deportation case against
Pena. the Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested Pena and his companion, both of whom were
subsequently ordered deported on April 5, 1979 following a hearing. Almost immediately, Dolly caused
Pena to be served with a summons and civil complaint at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where he was being
held pending deportation. The complaint alleged that Pena had wrongfully caused Joelito's (broter of
Dolly) death by torture and sought compensatory and punitive damages of $ 10,000,000. The Filartigas
also sought to enjoin Pena's deportation to ensure his availability for testimony at trial. (2) The cause of
action is stated as arising under "wrongful death statutes; the U. N. Charter; the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights; the U. N. Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary
international law of human rights and the law of nations," as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Article II, sec. 2
and the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution. Jurisdiction is claimed under the general federal
question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and, principally on this appeal, under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1350. (3) Judge Nickerson stayed the order of deportation, and Pena immediately moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that subject matter jurisdiction was absent and for forum non
conveniens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fena – Irala is subject to jurisdiction of the United States due to the fact that he
committed torture against Joelito which was a customary norm under international law?

RULING: YES. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, torture may be considered to violate law of nations.
The prohibition against torture has become part of customary international law. Various United Nations
declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1975 Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Torture further portrays the fact that prohibition against torture has
become part of customary international law. Torture has been officially renounced in the vast majority
of nations and this is the reason why this court concluded that torture violates the law of nations. The
court found that torture perpetrated by a person invested with official authority violates universally
accepted human rights norms, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Whenever an alleged torturer
is found and served with process by an alien within US territory, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 applies and provides
federal jurisdiction.
Hilao vs. Marcos

FACTS: Marcos, his family, Ver and others loyal to Marcos fled to Hawaii in February, 1986. One month
later, a number of lawsuits were filed against Marcos, Ver, and/or Imee MarcosManotoc, claiming that
the plaintiffs had been arrested and tortured, or were the families of people arrested, tortured, and
executed between 1971 and 1986. On November 1, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Estate from transferring or secreting any assets in order to preserve the
possibility of collecting a judgment. The Estate had earlier been enjoined from transferring or secreting
assets in an action brought by the Republic of the Philippines against Ferdinand Marcos. That
preliminary injunction had been appealed, and was affirmed. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862
F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S.Ct. 1933, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989).
When the preliminary injunction in that case was dissolved due to a settlement, the plaintiffs in this
action immediately sought the continuation of that injunction. The district court granted the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos, who was still a public official of the Philippines when the alleged acts
were commited, is exempted from the jursidiction of Hawaii?

RULING: NO. However, we have previously rejected the Estate's argument that FSIA immunizes alleged
acts of torture and execution by a foreign official. On appeal from entry of default judgment against
Imee Marcos-Manotoc, we rejected Marcos-Manotoc's assertion that she was entitled to sovereign
immunity because her challenged actions were premised on her authority as a government agent.
Estate I, 978 F.2d at 497. In Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir.1990), we had held
that FSIA does not immunize a foreign official engaged in acts beyond the scope of his authority.

Where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered
individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has
empowered him to do.

Although sometimes criticized as a ruler and at times invested with extraordinary powers, Ferdinand
Marcos does not appear to have had the authority of an absolute autocrat. He was not the state, but the
head of the state, bound by the laws that applied to him. Our courts have had no difficulty in
distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in law.
As in the case of the deposed Venezuelan ruler, Marcos Perez Jimenez, the latter acts are as adjudicable
and redressable as would be a dictator's act of rape.