The Superiority of a Political Lottery in Third Millennium (A Swiftian Modest Proposal)

Author(s): Josephine Reardon

Source: Iran & the Caucasus, Vol. 3/4 (1999/2000), pp. 387-388
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030802
Accessed: 13-10-2017 19:05 UTC

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 THE SUPERIORITY OF A POLITICAL LOTMRY
IN THIRD MILLENNIUM
(A SWIMAN MODEST PROPOSAL)

JOSEPHINE REARDON
Cleveland

There need be no special acclaim for the Attic forn of democracy simply becaus
Attic, but its essential features have long been forgotten while distant variants are allowed
resent it within public discourse if not within the Political Science classroom.
It was not a utopian system: it was based upon a very Stoic conception of citizen
bility: the citizen was personally responsible for governance, and representation was
ter of a vote because there was not, as in Rome, two tiers of citizenship (the people and th
All were citizens; therefore, selection was by lottery even as the US military draft was in
of the Vietnam War. If governance was potentially in the hands of all citizens, then
tion of all citizens was equally crucial to successful governance. School (Greek for lei
was to be used by citizens to prepare themselves for state service. Finally, the vote of
bly of all citizens was used for two primary purposes: 1. Legislative approval or disap
2. Ostracism.
The latter institution was an instrument that the people could use to depose or cu
governors, potential or real. The assembly could deny certain persons the right to take par
selection process by lottery by exiling them from the city for a set term. It should be ev
the modern citizen puts far more intellectual effort into a jury-trial than he/she might i
tion campaign. The ostracism placed that sort ofjudicial focus on the political process
didates for deselection had to defend themselves publically, which meant that the pr
review of their public behaviors as state officers. They were not mouthing pious prom
present politicos do, but rather had to defend their record on the facts.
Although there are numerous examples of the misuse of ostracism, the institution
rarely been judged on its potential as a component of a democratic system.
The Roman system of republican governance saw a real split between those who
those who voted and fought. The Imperial regime was simply the rise of the generalis
out of the only truly Roman democratic institution, the army. A vote, whether in the Re
the Imperium, was, as today, essentially a beauty contest in which the voters were m
through outright vote purchase, with present gold or promised credit. The winners w
bers of a select few, an elite, who would otherwise be forced to use more brutal mean
out the leaders fiom among themselves. They had no special incentive to give the "
greater responsibility or training other than that required by the military itself.
Some small thought will bring the reader to the realization that this description fits t
sent situation in the majority of the world's "democracies" as well as it did Imperial
The present desire to institute Universal Human Rights has been largely unsucc
because present institutions, social and political, militate against their general imposit
without personal empowerment and responsibility are not cogent adjuncts to huma
ment; they are meaningless abstractions, which receive attention only after thiey hav
ribly denied: the continuous recourse to genocide and ethinic cleanlsing tells us more
modern situation than can any handbook of international law. Modern republican go
call themselves democracies while oftcen ignoring the majority of the population unt
tion process, and thien determine even that through largely financial and public relational
This is everywhere evident; nonetheless, thie voice of the people has incrementally increas

JRA & CAUCASU, vol. 3-4, 1999-2000, pp. 387.386 0 Inrnationa Pubicains of Irnianl Studies

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JOSEPHINE REARDON
the last century in most "democratic" countries because the people in the West have become more
financially important to govemment: the tax-base has vastly increased in almost all successful
modem democracies. Yet, the parties and people in government remain an elite in most states
with the habits of an elite: using the people as a jury to select among them and denying the peo-
ple anymore education or power than is minimally needed to fulfill that selection function and
the necessary military service required of all.
In some states the majority and the elite are nearly coterninous; in others (the majority of
states), the elite are a tiny fraction of a larger, illiterate and often ethnically different majority.
Why has the citizenship law, which guarantees all citizens equivalent rights in almost all so-
called democratic countries, been systematically flauted or ignored in even the richest countries?
My answer is simple: all present governments fail to and resist attempting to require the active
participation of all citizens in govemance, for a number of often cit reasons, all of them spe-
cious. Because the citizens are viewed as tax cows, they are treated as largely uninvolved con-
sumers, whose needs are minimally defined and whose fears are maximally catered to.
If every citizen as citizen were liable to office, then preparation for that liability (education)
would be a careful concem of all citizens. If the choice were by lot so that no clique or party
could skew the universal potential, then all citizens would begin to assume similar rights and
responsibilities: they could not deny rights to others without denying, potentially, rights to them-
selves. Presently, this is an arguable outcome, but the system in place assures groups m power
that they need not fear any dispossession of perquisites if they choose to deny them to any other
group or party. In a lottery based, universal service state, party politics would be fractionalized.
Pardes would come into existence around particular issues, but their constituents would change
as the issues changed. Political parties merely engaged in maintaining altemate periods of access
to power (the Republicans and Democrats in the US, for example) would be a completely mean-
ingless exercise, even as they are subtextually today.
A modern Attic govemment could be installed immediately in a small city or state, but would
have to grow organically into a large state or confederation. As in Athens, specialists would con-
tinue to be hired on a contractual basis: Athens wisely depended upon mercenary Sarmatians and
Scythians for its police force, and thereby, kept power out of the hands of potential local cliques.
A lottery for a federal or confederational legislator would choose from among those already cho-
sen and expenrenced in city and provincial government, as long as they had not been removed
from the running by ostracism.
The lottery would be a pyrnamid - all citizens would be available for local, minimum wage,
service as mayors or aldermen (needed professionals would be hired by these local councils).
Those not ostracized would be put into the next highest lottery for provincial govemment and
they in tun into the next. The people would continually be given the opportunity to deselect pos-
sible candidates and no office would be held for more than a tenn nor paid any more than a com-
paratively ranked military wage: councilors as privates and prime ministers as generals. Prime
Ministers and Ministers would be chosen from among their fellows in parliament, but parties as
such would cease to exist (a great benefit) and all office holders would be subject to regular
review and possible ostracism by public referendum.
Presidents would be eliminated, while kings and queens and other sovereign semiotic insti-
tutions could continue to flourish because their functions would be transparently limited. Such a
system could be used today in East Timor or Chechnya to insure that all the people, not merely
monied or weaponed cliques, held power. In such a government, everyone would be trwn into
the deep end of the pool of governance and I think it clear, that the majority would soon leamn to
swim and a good deal more tan that. Finally, corruption and vote rigging (inherent with the pub-
lic relations and advertisin nature of modern politics) would be far more unlikely to take hold
when mathiematical chance is thie determiner, moreover, our casino industries around the world
have proven far more trustworthy than our voting regulatory boards anad commissions.

388

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