G.R. No. 159486-88 November 25, 2003 Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.

Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring
whatever supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice Panganiban, including
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
the material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.
EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE "The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should
PHILIPPINES, respondents. have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition
prays –
"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing
and deciding this petition;
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing
the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any
partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President
Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a
patent mockery of justice and due process.
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the
Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officio’ and that, being the now
counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending
therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide,
et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even
without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the
President or majority of his cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.
‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the
only defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by
petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia,
during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo,
p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file
its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos
and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on
14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the
resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy
sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)
"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification of 14 July
2003; viz:

‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.’
"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court several portions of the book, entitled
(Rollo, p. 48.)
‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003,
petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that –
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of
merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the ‘truth’ of the statements contained in Justice Artemio
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner
Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,’ in relation to the prejudgment committed by the Supreme
would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition
Court justices against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108;
now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of
and,
justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state that-

"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio,
‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office.1awp++i1 But the act of the public officer, if
Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of National Defense, Vice President Gloria
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme
1
Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in "(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act candidate for public office;
of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of
the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
candidate; or

"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."
would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success
or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension
taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional
of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the
official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no
presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President
of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated
his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-
member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
administration of justice.
Philippines.1âwphi1

"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant
admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for
a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court."
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in
an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court. "What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs.
Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when
President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his
- with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -
hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?"
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship,
a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
in other partisan political activities."

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" the law states:
lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof,
particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts of
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.

"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
2
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE
YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and
filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father
and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the
Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding
before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such
as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and
attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying
the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered
various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months,
he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to
receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco,
private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted
upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch
No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for
1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work
and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of
P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment
3
as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the
following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily
subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm
administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are
in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public
respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16,
1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the
Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of
the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the
Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's
namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private
respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly,
if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance
of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator, thereby
arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong
for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed
for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner
for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d),
Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for
dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the
facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that
matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care
and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein
from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided
the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a
public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted
to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid
bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized cause provided by law and after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an
employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of
the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee
of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the
executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment.
For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be
construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan
of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of
private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that
city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
4
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human
experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2)
clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company
v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for
abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and
his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family
relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized
he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his
employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions
which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as
the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he
was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization
and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the
part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified
refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination
of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial
employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that
"I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority.
His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to
be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved
to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm
operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm.
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at the respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted
house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be
his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can
have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his
confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social security It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount
xxx xxx xxx
of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in
fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited
planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged
statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that
the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment
to implied voluntary resignation.25 That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his
hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries
from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984,
and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter
dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued
service as farm administrator.27
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my
check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to
sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to
turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of
petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent
had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent
neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983, when private
respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment
and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment.
Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance
of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and,
specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements to
petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such

5
deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of
its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of
36
the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to
examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout,
there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent
cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather
unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied
voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were
in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can
qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment
can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does
not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements
under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services
of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this
case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice
of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional
Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
6
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the
names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination
of employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the
Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since
he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular
case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the
employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon
the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's
prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify
the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by
an employer was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter,
at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule
applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The public
policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the
rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of
due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable
excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code
which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty
of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that
there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed
employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and
not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give
teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The
Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that
in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder
provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and
severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his
fair and just share of what the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld
up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences
should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC
should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious
and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad
faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are
not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal
of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if,
seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary
damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
7
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave
rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims.
The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the
likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does
not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of
dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s)
salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with
recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed,
for both parties are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof.
Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer
is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called
upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps
geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and
spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases
involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues
herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed
to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and
duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties
herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended
explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of
their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is
ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs.
Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the
sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots
located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction
sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and
Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice
attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family
house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half
share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for
the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party
to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register
of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates
of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court
lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted
as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the
court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition
and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed
on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the
8
same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-
27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is
made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid
decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement
of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and
a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the
present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim
of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago
was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her
husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of
the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession
may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the
writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between
the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The
ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties
or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up
to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents
Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife
is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she
lives in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction
in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent
execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon
the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business
and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
 to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either (b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.2 where they impleaded new parties-defendants;

5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which
impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of
the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer.
which may never arise.4
(Expediente, p. 815)

(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are
together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the
all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that
dissolution of the conjugal union. the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate
share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary
the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted.
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ
another (5 times in the Supreme Court). of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
ends of justice.6
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000
in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale
because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law,
on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
on January 31, 1966.
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate
further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;
The Counterclaim

9
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction vs.
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
RESOLUTION

The Supplemental Complaint

PER CURIAM:

Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional
of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused
Responsibility.
the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two
of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two
other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels The Complaint
bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
aforesaid agreements and transactions. ₱5,000 only.3

The Amended Supplemental Complaint The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her
to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the
hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.4 This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph
₱350.
averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of
land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas
Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in
and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 5
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And Respondent's Defense
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna
supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason
of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse
is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was with the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty.
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was
the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. 10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly
remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked
respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account
for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. 12 Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13
of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action.
Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked
Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the
complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant. 15
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
Recommendation of the IBP

10
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the
complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation
to the IBP Board of Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. 18 It also noted that
respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these
reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected
respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty of violating the
prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. 20 The CBD
concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to
the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of
₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an
additional suspension of six months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service are
expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed
in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
11
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict with their official function.25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work
of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected
with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and
the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free
legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal,
civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal
services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He
even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never
took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. 31
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying
a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.321avvphi1
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the
amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of
the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless,
respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept
them.35
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at
the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust Receipts Law"
(Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9, 1994, 2petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a
pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation
(the Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the
affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why
he was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the substitution but denied the motion for leave
to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", 5 and
a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court thereafter required the Solicitor
General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General himself recommends that
petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother)
sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of
Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit"9 reads:
12
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies, organized a number
of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading Corporation, whose
purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods and
using Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the instructions directly from
me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to purchase
for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and are covered by the trust
receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the delivery
of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for
CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said
trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued by CDCP to China
Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP Mining
Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which included the trust receipts subject of
this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust receipts because the
common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and
I did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered by the
trust receipts subject of this case.
9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca was
no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay.
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust receipts subject of
this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has asked this Honorable
Court to review.
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M.
CUENCA
 Affiant
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under Section
38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca,
the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother's
affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the
People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see
that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein,
published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.) 10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized
to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which
being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to
entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are
involved therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People"11 and
"People v. Amparado".12
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new trial
to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is
no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General
ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's
finest hour, indeed.
13
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the
court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
A.C. No. 4018 March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct
while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent.
In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with
illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu,
Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It
appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.3
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent
of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all
against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of
Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He,
however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As
a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office
of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents 6 in that
petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him
(herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order." 7Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent.
Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties
of an attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants.
In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-
bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law
allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said
case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various
land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based
solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is
totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case.
The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be
done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly,
transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. 12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for
the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP
chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation. 13The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of
the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP
Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996
addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this
case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. 14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi
City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order dated
23 February 1996.
14
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's
motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records
of this case to IBP Marawi City.18 On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi
City for the reception of respondent's evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the
above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato
Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-
153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby
depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even
bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter,
complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the
matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato
Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for
the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by
respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished
Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997. 24Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No.
3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib
A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According
to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the
withdrawal of this case.26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar
Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of
this case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. 28 According to Atty.
Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City
Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
 investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days
from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case
No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by
respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a
denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way,
was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case
No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision
therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the
President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional
misconduct of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted
Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of
law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato
Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter
had already been endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he
was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service.
In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar
on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his
dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared –
15
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in
the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline
that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has
given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and
the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for
gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As
we had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the
integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot
possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38
… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.39
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010 In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance
of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
DECISION
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona
BRION, J.:
fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee
on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito
S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, 1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
Factual Background
In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of
Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e)
open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
16, 1987.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating
a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph
declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s
recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and
district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of
Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his personal interest over The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father,
Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was
of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.
rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased
wife.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that he
(the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of
The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter asserted
his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s
for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted
brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land
that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the
payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

16
 (6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the
his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 11
In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was
the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions
Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph
in the conduct of a government lawyer:
Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land
to interfere with his public duties.
was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant
had no rights over the subject land.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third
all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. 12
term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their
respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR. transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we
recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision
law to benefit relatives.15
applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though
prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999. from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he
that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office. 18
did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the
applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant
The Court’s Ruling
who had a pending case before this Court.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his
of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.10
Professional Responsibility.

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second,
when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected
with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the
administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713
for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than
the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards.
By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau.
By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to
the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge
of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent
was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this
regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee
on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how the
orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo,
dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting
party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.

17
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent
exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-
NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996 23), do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the
respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that
may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel
Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note
that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent
against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the
transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits
dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended
to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25,
2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to
being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo
agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would
be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land. 26
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were
extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to
the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel
Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his
continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government service, the
complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where
the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail
to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
18
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. 29 By
way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first,
the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government
service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to
include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. 31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by
virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering
Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently
establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 32we specifically described private practice of
law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended
to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard
against the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already
struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) 33 of
Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his
nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over
lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April
3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this
finding.
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals 35 and,
finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the
petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by
the Court of Appeals in its decision.36
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests
on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. 37 The
respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the
complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense. 39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
power.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD
P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING
PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS
& DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade
the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to
defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as
uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310
million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank
issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and
19
the general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. 5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petitionwith the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation
as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino
was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian,
Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel
Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy
Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern
Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo
O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others,
the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed
his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly
"intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedureto bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It
noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as
Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the
one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986.
The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not
seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In
its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments
were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the
ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition
in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf
of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the
substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the
prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe.
The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source
but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct
of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The
formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court
of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application
to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England.
The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The
difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time,
but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from
colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving
gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal,
positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal
reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code,"
introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in
several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George
Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about
legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth
century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do
no falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit
an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding
of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory
20
of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet,
as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement
of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually
ushered a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice — the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined
the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes
gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association
codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely
popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of
bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early
nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American
Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics
was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of
Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect
to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was
the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and
then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest
conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new
canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for
"adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a
concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf
of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon
36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept
employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was
In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he
of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40
failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal
profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.33 The
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum
The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of
Manila.
1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.36

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank,
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-
namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General
101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model
Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo
Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards were set-out
B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that
in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement
on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with
"because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and
the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content
of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure should
the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38 be taken:

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs,
traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government
lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is,
therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since
the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a
condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and
praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza
al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for
assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents
Tan, et al.
The Board decided as follows:
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
...
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes
and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department
Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977,
containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
21
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is
"advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with
the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black
and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining
department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform
the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the
institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence
in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation
plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in
the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution
and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert
the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell,
assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he
may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may
be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second
paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining
the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there
is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff
files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount
to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal
or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
22
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That
this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested
exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended
by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the "matter"contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
"drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law"
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition
of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself
involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing
the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they
are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices
of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while
a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time
or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under the second
interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. 44 We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does
an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government
lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or passed
upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-
101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial
responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We
disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza
in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its
early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank
in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of
the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade
the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which
have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various
policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily
prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private
sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card
that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that
can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering
government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of
a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is
not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify
counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent,"
and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification
motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in
the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the
Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the
23
very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly
suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by
its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must start
again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective
counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can
find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she
believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment
does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job
and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General,
the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be
endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal
of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office.
Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of
his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of
gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free
flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance
of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have
abandoned per sedisqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of
the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who "switch
sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank.
Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no
inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al.,
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of
colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example given by the proponents of
this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be
tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest
public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of
aggressive administration of government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive."64 He
opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her
last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers –
the ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular concern is a
non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate
GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests
of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former officials"
or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz:
"Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting
in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather
than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent,
or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to
disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply
retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza
was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify
respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the
point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their
concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.
Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to
deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was
indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total
amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant
but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the
return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum deposited,
the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of
24
the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to
comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant
a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two
blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant
deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the
same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the
checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant deposited
the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or
payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited
amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained
unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to submit his answer within 15
days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having never
physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the
amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained
thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was introduced
to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself
and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the
fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G)
they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa
holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they could no longer extend their said status and have
to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent visa under Section
3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the
requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I
also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of show money
separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be included as her
dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer
to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration
lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given
an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the
processing of the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant
and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was coursed through
me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to
their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the
complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself began to
wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding the matter and the
following facts were revealed to me:
 1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not really her money but
money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her son Marcus
Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son could have
been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law and the
Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made to pay for quite
huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to undersigned and my family
that I was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and surprisingly they want to
recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime 1997;
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the
refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who
approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents
needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove
his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue
his personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau
of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from
complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the
"late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza
regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this Atty.
Mendoza referred to by respondent.

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of money is now being
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry
sought to be recovered from me;
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity
of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the same and reads:
therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present my standby loan
application has not been released and was informed that the same would only be forthcoming second week of August.
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
The same should have been released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid,
latter to interfere with his public duties."
according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report with modification, thus:
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August
2003.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering
all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of
respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby
respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due
DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment.
notice and without just cause.
This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts
and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report 5 recommending the disbarment of
respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions
respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from
than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible
complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to
public office.7
a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by
complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint)
where he stated thus: It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty
cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa
with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing would
Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense remains
happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose
unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present
sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January
the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been
this year, that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some important papers were
naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
there is no day since January that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress of the same."
him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. In the
case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the

25
charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several
times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be
believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil
evidentiary value.
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions were
also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:
1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March 1999.
Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal money on said date. No more reasons
and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the
Bureau or from my own personal money.
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are still being compiled
and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway,
I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April
20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000
respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable
me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early return of your money
but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I
issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to
personally return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of which are on the following:
May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
26
June 4, 1999-200,000
I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their due
dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t call me
anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all
other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I issued to you.
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I requested for stop payment
- instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it
would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank. However,
I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I
am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed by
the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited
with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is violative of
Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from
one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several worthless
checks, thereby compounding his case.
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the effect "transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial
papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals."21
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.22
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being Llamas.
a member of the bar.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those alleged that:
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who,
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings.
lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral
If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available).
ground for the revocation of such privilege.24

Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC,
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
Br. 224, QC.
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers,
and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that (not 257), Parañaque, MM.
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should
be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.26
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the
legal profession.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar
"who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 27
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a professional tax.
certain person.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.30 Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he
received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department
of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred
to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
vs. Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent. Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

MENDOZA, J.:
27
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case
was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998,
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in
respondent alleged:5
his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at
least three years."
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060
of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud
Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled
to practice law.
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that
"being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article
316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
xxx xxx xxx

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return
up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals
and is still pending.
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a
limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30
hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section
4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt,
he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as
an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and
pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited"
practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432,
§4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs
of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for
that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National

28
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or
association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.1âwphi1.nêt
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio
Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December
1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working
in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
29
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives
for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the
exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement
of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for
its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment
of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of
Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of
the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member
in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where
the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which
they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership
fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed
by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound
to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State,
and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the
amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
A.C. No. 11139, April 19, 2016
30
PHILCOMSAT* HOLDINGS CORPORATION, DULY REPRESENTED BY ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, Complainant, v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND ATTY. SIKINI C. LABASTILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated August 20, 2009 filed by complainant PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation,
represented by Erlinda I. Bildner2 (complainant), against respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (Atty. Lokin, Jr.) and Atty. Sikini C.
Labastilla (Atty. Labastilla; collectively, respondents) before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of respondents for insinuating that the Sandiganbayan received the amount of
P2,000,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The Facts
The Complaint alleged that sometime in June 2007, the Senate, through its Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, conducted an investigation concerning the anomalies that plagued the PHILCOMSAT group of companies, which
includes complainant, particularly in its huge disbursements of monies and/or assets. In the course of the said investigation, the
Senate examined various financial records and documents of the company, which at that time, were under the control and
management of Atty. Lokin, Jr. and his co-directors. Among the records examined by the Senate was an entry in complainant's
checkbook stub which reads "Cash for Sandiganbayan, tro, potc-philcomsat case - P2,000,000"3 (subject checkbook entry). It was
then discovered that the check was issued in connection with complainant's injunction case against Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) before the Sandiganbayan, which was filed by Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s group, as its
representatives, with Atty. Labastilla as its external counsel (POTC case). As the investigation was publicized by the media, the
Sandiganbayan learned about the subject checkbook entry and, accordingly, motu proprio initiated indirect contempt proceedings
against respondents, along several others, which was docketed as Case No. SB-07-SCA-0054 (indirect contempt case).5
After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution6 dated May 7, 2009, finding respondents guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and, accordingly, sentenced each of them to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00 and to
suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months.7 In finding respondents guilty, the Sandiganbayan opined that: (a) any person
reading the subject checkbook entry would come to the conclusion that a check in the amount of P2,000,000.00 was issued to the
Sandiganbayan in exchange for the latter's issuance of a TRO, thereby degrading its integrity and honor; (b) Atty. Lokin, Jr. caused
the creation of the said entry in complainant's checkbook which as testified upon by complainant's bookkeeper, Desideria D. Casas,
was the proximate cause thereof;8 and (c) circumstantial evidence showed that Atty. Labastilla conspired with Atty. Lokin, Jr. in
causing such contemptuous entry, considering, inter alia, that the former was the counsel who applied for a TRO and that he
admitted receipt of the proceeds of the check, although allegedly for legal fees9and that Sheriffs Manuel Gregorio Mendoza Torio
and Romulo C. Barrozo of the Sandiganbayan similarly testified that such TRO was only effected/served upon payment of the
corresponding fees.10
Following the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan's May 7, 2009 Resolution, the complainant instituted the instant complaint.
In his defense, Atty. Lokin, Jr. maintained that he did not perform acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
insisting that the Sandiganbayan's findings in the indirect contempt case were erroneous and contrary to the pertinent evidence and
records. He likewise pointed out that the Sandiganbayan ruling was appealed - albeit not by him but by Atty. Labastilla - to the
Court, i.e., G.R. No. 187699,11 which appeal remains unresolved. Therefore, it cannot be the basis for his administrative liability. 12
For his part, Atty. Labastilla harped on the fact that an appeal questioning the Sandiganbayan ruling is still pending before the
Court; thus, it was premature to file an administrative complaint against him. He further maintained that he had no participation in
the creation of the subject checkbook entry and, even if he had any such participation, there was nothing contemptuous about it.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation14 dated January 23, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Lokin, Jr.
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year. However, Atty. Labastilla was absolved from any administrative liability. 15
Similar to the Sandiganbayan, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Lokin, Jr. responsible for the creation of the subject
checkbook entry. In this relation, it was pointed out that while Atty. Lokin, Jr. offered an explanation regarding the said entry,
such explanation was more in the nature of an avoidance and confession posturing, and therefore, was not helpful to his cause as
it only served to further implicate him in the making of the aforesaid entry. 16
On the other hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found no evidence showing that Atty. Labastilla had any participation in
the making of the subject checkbook entry, and as such, could not be reasonably implicated therein. In absolving Atty. Labastilla,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner stressed that the instant administrative case's concern was only with the actual making of the
subject checkbook entry, and not as to whether Atty. Labastilla actually participated in the disbursement of the proceeds of the
check and/or in the attempt to bribe any officials and employees of the Sandiganbayan to obtain a TRO. 17
In a Resolution18 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation. Atty. Lokin, Jr. moved for reconsideration, 19 but the same was denied in a Resolution20 dated June 6, 2015 with
modification increasing the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to three (3) years.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
As will be explained hereunder, the Court: (a) concurs with the IBP's findings as to Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s administrative liability; and
(b) disagrees with the IBP's recommendation to absolve Atty. Labastilla from administrative liability.
At the outset, the Court notes that the indirect contempt case originally filed before the Sandiganbayan is in the nature of a criminal
contempt.21 "[C]riminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrespute or
disrespect."22 "[C]riminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized
society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused,
and the proceedings to punish it are punitive."23
Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the filing of an administrative case against
them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan's ruling in the aforesaid case is premature on the premise that their conviction has not
attained finality. It is well-settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer
despite being involved in the same set of facts. Case law instructs that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the lawyer's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them
administratively.24 In Spouses Saunders v. Pagano-Calde:25
[A]dministrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final
resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless
to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal
case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. 26 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To note, while it is undisputed that Atty. Labastilla indeed filed a petition before the Court questioning the Sandiganbayan
ruling, i.e., G.R.. No. 187699, records are bereft of any showing that Atty. Lokin, Jr. joined Atty. Labastilla in said petition or that
he separately filed an appeal on his own. Thus, the Sandiganbayan ruling had long become deemed final and executory as to him.
Moreover, Atty. Labastilla's appeal before the Court was already resolved through a Minute Resolution 27 dated August 3, 2009
denying the same for failure to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in issuing the challenged
ruling. Atty. Labastilla twice moved for reconsideration, but were denied with finality in Resolutions dated February 1, 2010 28 and
August 11, 2010.29 In light of the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan's ruling that respondents committed contumacious acts which tend
to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of such court has become final and executory and, thus, conclusive as to them, at least
in the indirect contempt case.30
31
In this administrative case, the Court, after a thorough assessment of the merits of the case, finds itself in agreement with the IBP's
finding that the subject checkbook entry contained a contumacious imputation against the Sandiganbayan, i.e., that a check in the
amount of P2,000,000.00 was issued and given to the Sandiganbayan in order to secure a favorable TRO in the POTC case. As
the records show, Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one who caused the making of the subject checkbook entry, considering that: (a) during
the time the said entry was made, complainant's financial records and documents were under his and his co-directors' control and
management; (b) the complainant's bookkeeper, Desideria D. Casas, categorically testified that it was Atty. Lokin, Jr. who
requested for the issuance and disbursement of the check in the amount of P2,000,000.00, and that he was also the one who
instructed her to write the subject checkbook entry in the complainant's checkbook; 31 (c) Atty. Lokin, Jr. never denied participation
and knowledge of the issuance of the check and the consequent creation of the subject checkbook entry; 32 and (c) when asked to
explain during the Senate investigation, Atty. Lokin, Jr. failed to give a credible justification for the making of such entry, and
instead, resorted to avoidance and confession posturing.33 Thus, the IBP correctly concluded that Atty. Lokin, Jr. caused the making
of the subject checkbook entry in complainant's financial records.
However, the Court does not agree with the IBP's finding that Atty. Labastilla could not reasonably be implicated in the making
of the subject checkbook entry. The Court is more inclined to concur with the Sandiganbayan's findings in the indirect contempt
case that Atty. Labastilla also had a hand, direct or indirect, in the creation of the subject checkbook entry in light of the following
circumstances: (a) he was complainant's external counsel who applied for the TRO in the POTC case; (b) he admitted receipt of
the proceeds of the check in the amount of P2,000,000.00, although allegedly for legal fees but with no supporting evidence
therefor;34 (c) the TRO was only effected/served upon payment of the corresponding fees per the testimonies of Sheriffs Manuel
Gregorio Mendoza Torio and Romulo C. Barrozo of the Sandiganbayan;35 and (d) the TRO and the aforesaid check were both
dated September 23, 2005, thereby establishing an unmistakeable connection between the TRO and the check. 36 Moreover, and as
correctly pointed out by complainant, while Atty. Labastilla claims that he received the amount of P2,000,000.00 as payment for
his legal fees, he failed to properly account the aforesaid amount. 37 In addition, complainant's summary of legal fees paid to Atty.
Labastilla did not reflect the P2,000,000.00 check which he purportedly received as legal fees. 38 Therefore, Atty. Labastilla should
also be held administratively liable for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry.
As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the
courts, such as the subject checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed corruption against the Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn
duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations. 39This is the
very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty
violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.
Furthermore, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"
for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high
regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. 40 It must be reiterated that as an officer
of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.
Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the
honor, prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.41 In this case, respondents compromised the integrity of the judiciary by
maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the Sandiganbayan through the subject checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents also
violated Canon 7 of the CPR and, thus, should be held administratively liable therefor.
Anent the proper penalty to be meted to respondents, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts
which tend to erode the public confidence in the courts, put the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice system into disrepute,
the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Baculi v. Battung,42 the Court meted the
aforesaid penalty to a lawyer for his disrespect to the courts, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court imposes upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry. On the other hand,
since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one directly responsible for the making of the subject checkbook entry, the Court deems it appropriate
to impose upon him the graver penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by
the IBP.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla are found GUILTY of violating Canons 7 and
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no
law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period such authority was ever given to him.
of one (1) year, effective upon the receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
Let copies of this Decision be attached to respondents' personal record as members of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro
country for their information and guidance. bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He
agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled
by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondent’s present clients were the
A.C. No. 7054 December 4, 2009
defendants.

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing
vs.
the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted
ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.
that these petitions were all based on valid grounds – the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying
unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the
DECISION complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the
complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment
and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to
PER CURIAM:
protect the interests of his clients.

In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment
Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following
(covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his
violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

(1) The respondent’s abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment
(CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment
complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately
before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and
rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a
overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC) and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer case rendered
majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-
against the respondent’s clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent
of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the
also repeatedly attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer
complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to
case;
the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case. 6

(2) The respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant
frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and
and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn
his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that
the disbarment case was filed because the complainant’s counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
(3) The respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order
considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed
issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in
by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to
the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent
harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of
also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood. 4
the KDC.

(4) The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients.

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating
(5) The respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent
judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:

(6) The respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and
32
majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru
means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-
shopping.9
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent
of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his
clients.10
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of
title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of
the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the respondent was
dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts
to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. 12
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondent’s explanation that he had no intention
to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by
claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement.
The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondent’s argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second
complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on
behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No.
03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.13 On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.14
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
The Court’s Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint
invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,
Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse
of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension
to six (6) months.16
Abuse of court procedures and processes
33
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court
procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In
dismissing the respondent’s petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of
petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the
ejectment case.17
Second, notwithstanding the CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTC’s and the
RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.18
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885)
for annulment of the complainant’s title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions
were both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the petition.19
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this
time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings
from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the
alleged nullity of the complainant’s title because the property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts – the
petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainant’s title and the
petition for declaratory relief – reveal the respondent’s persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions
of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules
in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By
his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting
in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.20
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 21 as well as
the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both
violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. 23
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts’ jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but
substantively erroneous) move, the respondent’s subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only
demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect
to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful
detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with
the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic
fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as
follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt
of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration … thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by
keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of
alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the
prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) …24
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no
other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and
void."25 These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment.
Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall
separately discuss below.
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position
and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false
claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. 30
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating
the lawyer’s duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court
to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31 The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court
makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and
truthfully in his work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any
manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. 34In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to
deal candidly with the court.35
In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which reads:

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which was
CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public
lands26 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed
that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x
Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent
signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this underhanded manner, the respondent
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor. 36 He
sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. 37The recital of what the
respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment expressly prohibits.
of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this
wise:
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid
pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the
plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED
AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.27[Underscoring and emphasis theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondent’s application for
temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse party’s motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that RTC-
Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondent’s application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed
by the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the
name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the
counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The
respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the
same time, the respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or
appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed
the said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the
same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
… how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the
Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the
Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty.
Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing
to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable
to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances

34
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan’s finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.38 maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the
bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case with the end in
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals,
him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of
31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent’s off-hand explanation
the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he ‘will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same’; and that he ‘will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.’ Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client
committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who
must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and
received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two
common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
law firms with which he was previously associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondent’s explanation
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.45
of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without
the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
We cannot give credence to the respondent’s claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the complainant,
Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor
disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case
General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended
against the respondent.
petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way
of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs – his clients and the
Republic. The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with very little
relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer
of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice – an issue where the complainant’s personal motives have little
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized
relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged
appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter’s
wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. 40 The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in
a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional
misconduct.41 . . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and
does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
The Respondent’s Defenses

xxx
We find no merit in the respondent’s defenses.

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of
even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.43 As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject
prosecutor.461avvphi1
of inquiry.

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to file the
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from
present disbarment case.
the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules
immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith. Conclusion

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he
filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting
theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims;
these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against
his clients.
On the respondent’s allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same
defense he raised in the first disbarment case.44 As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer’s discretion in acting
for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to
live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-
year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended
penalty of suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows
the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold
that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any
significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the

35
expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot
accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized
him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before
the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then
has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public,
the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath;
Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed,
and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.
A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT
JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented
by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely,
Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant,
the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without
his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case
which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation,
discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer
connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing
to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon,
Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the
Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper.
36
The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty
of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of
expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement
of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil
case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of
the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-
Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B.
De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter
of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the
AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October
1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and
Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed
with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997,
Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they
did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by
then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact.
Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them
and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of
record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the
demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is
belied by the Manifestation1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed
a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating
the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from
their previous dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed
them.1âwphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings;
nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances
and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
G.R. No. 89591-96 January 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In
said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time,
sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial
court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty.
Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our
resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262, 1 the latter accepted
cases and continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification on
the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from
appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of
Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as
prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should
forthwith be issued?"2
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion
seeking the revocation of the trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial
jail.1âwphi1.nêt
37
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify whether
the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7,
1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to
be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with
the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional
trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and
the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus, the trial court's order dated August
8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at
San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his
profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private respondent
"is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not
only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to
defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law.1âwphi1 He
is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. 3 He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance.4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined
in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all
deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355,
including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique,
effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior written permission
of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San Jose, Antique and to
the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging
as follows:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court
of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been
appearing in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized
to do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes
with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good
government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal
court in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court
employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would
commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed
influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in
the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as
present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted
and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information
it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order
and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to
investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge,
Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent,
Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the
alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also
been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this
Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law,
but for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much
less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous
as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality,
said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned;
that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the
attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al.
for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits',
as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and answer to District Judge
Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due
hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:
38
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a
resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious
person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his complaint
against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel
Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent
appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita,
Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for
illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case No.
39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible
entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant
in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the following entries in
his daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1
hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his
daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in
his office although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on
December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent
appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his daily time record that
he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible explanation for
this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it
appear that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when
 as a matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus
Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil
Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully
recommends that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended,
again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita,
Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the
evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had
appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission
of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein
that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a
member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the
Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services
of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that
in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service
to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under
the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love
of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction
than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the
admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First
Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against
respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of
Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing
lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."2 However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed that respondent has
39
never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was
an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was
patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against
petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at
10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged that he is
"a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."7 However, the complaint-
affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a
practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it
was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit.
Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained
the same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful
statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel,
a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without
authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized
practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished
because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 11
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the
public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on
record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was,
indeed, the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a
itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or
practice of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; 12 appearing before court
hearings as an attorney;13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
bar;14 or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that
he is not licensed to do so.15
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part,
on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law.
Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and
act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer,
the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.
the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation
thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant, recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;

DECISION
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement
Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent
matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees. violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.4
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in
recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No.
T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal profession from his
Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely
dealt with.5
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession
and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.6
2610.2

We agree with the findings of the IBP.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for
legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and
9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct 8 and are mandated to serve their clients
with competence and diligence.9 They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
therewith shall render them liable.10

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
40
Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s savings deposit from Planter’s
Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise
agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents
of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that
the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonable fees.11
Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the
complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus
consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it. 12As found by the Investigating Commissioner,
complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after
three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his
discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes
an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of the legal profession require
that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. 13
Respondent’s admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability.
A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain
cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds:
1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.
16 17
In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic
postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his
rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only
as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer
possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is
demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s cause. 18
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed
to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice,
and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within
thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his
compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 7056 September 13, 2006
41
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth and justice above everything else, even
above their own and their client's interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their convictions against all odds; to carry
on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for the weak, the oppressed and the marginalized. For
failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent must be sanctioned.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Plus Builders Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful
and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:
"On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, DARAB
CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De
Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez
and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called [tenants/farmers] x x x.
"On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in favor of
petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.
"[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases above-mentioned alleging
under oath that they were 'MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN' or mere tenants of subject properties,
acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were transferred to
Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.
"On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca, filed
a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due course to the
same x x x.
"On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who
represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were 'bona fide' members of the [Kalayaan Development Cooperative]
(KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the Decision on March
14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x x.
"On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of
Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a 'Motion for Leave of Court to Allow Correction
of Caption and Amendment of Judgment' (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated November 15, 1999 x
x x) with a prayer 'x x x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION representing
the following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the] pleading.' Also, a Contract of Retainership dated
April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x KDC represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x x
'counsel on record' x x x.
"After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a Petition for
Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution
with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x before the DARAB Central Office,
Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas). x x
x.
"On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, was issued
on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated August 24, 2001, as a
result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.
"Emboldened by the two (2) TRO's coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an Indirect Contempt
case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo Garcia and [its] counsel
Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.
"Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB Central Office refused
to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TRO's, Petitioners decided to elevate the matter to the
Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on [December]
20, 2001 stating that:
'WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees no
impediment for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial adjudicator.
'SO ORDERED.'
"This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a Petition, but said Petition was
dismissed with finality x x x.
"Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified "Action to Quiet Title" before the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and maliciously stop the
enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999. x x
x.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as [KDC] LEGAL
SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation of the Rules on
the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the Retainership Contract submitted by Respondent
before the PARAD of Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be collected as counsel on record for
the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used [for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the
practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to become "counsel on record [sic] x x x.
"On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and dismissed the case
on the ground of 'res judicata' because the Court of Appeals ruled that, 'x x x the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator
of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x' and that, prescription does not run against registered
land. x x x."2
42
In his Answer3 dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the action to quiet title
in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his clients. According to him, they sincerely
and honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had already ripened into ownership. He explained thus:
"Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner in the decisions of
PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB CASE
NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99) the
said farmers, are not precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an opinion or belief that
they could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely because of the undisputed fact that they
have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted possession for more than fifty (50) years.
x x x.
"It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the land through
prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No. 2763-03,
before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in DARAB CASE
No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-031-99,
[i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did not in any way, involve [the] question
of ownership of the subject property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03, (Action to Quiet Title),
filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.
xxx xxx xxx
"As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion [of] what legal strategy or cause of
action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right to interfere with or
dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights and interests of said farmers under the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC, Imus, Cavite,
Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before the Ombudsman), as a
lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and
protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if they are poor and uneducated like the said
farmers."4
In a Reply5 dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession of the subject land by respondent's
clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants maintained that the PARAD Decision,
which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, clearly stated that these clients were mere tenants of the
land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by respondent in good faith, especially when he had previously acknowledged
the rights of complainants as landowners.
On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina, commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.7 Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously concealed the defeat of his clients in the case before
the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts,"8 in order to secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As
a result, he was able to delay the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15, 1999.
Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law was
neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of respondent to do so led to the presumption that
the allegation was true.
Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the investigating commissioner. In Resolution
No. XVII-2005-172,9 the board of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of IBP Commissioner Espina.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, 10 pursuant to Rule 139-B
Section 12(b).
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal
system,11 protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law.12 They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially
with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood
in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice.13Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.14
15
Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession. Thus, while lawyers owe fidelity
to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by arguing a case that has repeatedly been
rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes.
These acts constitute serious transgression of their professional oath.16
In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show, however, that his course
of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision
dated November 15, 1999.
It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a different forum to
pursue his clients' lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that
complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently repudiated his previous
admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to
obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision.
Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of ownership of the land, he cannot
feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and complainants, as correctly
observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.
The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his clients were pauper litigants. His prayer
for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income, 17was granted by the trial court. Earlier,
however, he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal office for a fee of P20,000, in addition to P2,500 per
appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he even alleged that they were willing to post a bond to answer for damages,
43
in the event that the court ruled in favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his clients could not afford to pay
the appropriate court fees.
In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law.
This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice, 18 as explained in Choa v. Chiongson:19
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's
case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he 'will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer's
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions against the other party."20
Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to challenge the
allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of
the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that respondent, who held himself out as a law
partner of the "KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was rendering legal services together with persons not licensed
to practice law. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it. 21
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:
"Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
'Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.'"
The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,22 which we quote:
"The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject
to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid
of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law." 23
Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line with jurisprudence,
he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. 24
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the court
administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 5916 July 1, 2003
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
"The Complaint arose from the [respondent’s] persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks totaling
[t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for
previous checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that
[respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to ‘forthwith effect immediate settlement of my outstanding
obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000.’
Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a ‘request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from
June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao.’ Needless
to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made
good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness."2
In his Answer3 dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he
was unable to comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid
ground for disciplinary action because of the following:
"(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice;
"(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that the offense with
which the respondent is being charged by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is
self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC,
which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank,
through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which
is a crime involving moral turpitude;
44
"(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for the issuance
of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily,
the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not
countenance;
"(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless
check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, to warrant
his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
"(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because,
the door to the law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and
unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere
issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit
of the doubt."4
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply. 5 Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the
case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several
cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed
himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorney’s fees). Complainant agreed to give him
until July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorney’s fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be
called, respondent suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainant’s counsel objected and
Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud
voice, "It’s up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is more important." 6 And, despite the objection and the warning, he
arrogantly left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,7 Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the attorney’s oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the latter’s claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that
involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that ‘‘[w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is
beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1) but four counts of violation of BP 22."8 The "refusal [by respondent]
to pay his indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards complainant’s counsel and the [commission sufficiently]
warrant the imposition of sanctions against him."9Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,10 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records of
the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 11 In so doing, the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as
payment for his loan from complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks, he contends that
such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he made several promises to pay his debt
promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any
wrongdoing and transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept the former’s
plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no obligation to accept it, considering respondent’s previous failure
to comply with earlier payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the payment of his debts, yet failed again to
fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier
attitude in incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of
those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.12
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of
such act to public interest and public order.13
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." In Co v. Bernardino,14 the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an
act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
"The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume
jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569
[1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to
show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the
court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
"The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part,
though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation
to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
"While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the transaction
between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct
merits condemnation from this Court.
"As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can
exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x
In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction
to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a
general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
45
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent
to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him x x x.
"Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for
attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which
show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time
the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of
prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's
character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney,
the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the
July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance
the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his
membership therein.15
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very
important personal matter to attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and
asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without
the consent of complainant and the investigating commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.16 It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. 17 In this case, respondent fell short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.18
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, in line with Co v. Bernardino, 19 Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.20 and
Saburnido v. Madroño21 -- which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient in
this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who
shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and
imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.1 Respondent, who was already married with three children, had an affair
with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof.
Complainant got pregnant and respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child
as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent started to refuse recognizing the child
and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and forgiveness from this Court. He
submitted certificates from government and civic organizations appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance
from religious groups, and certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro. 2
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon.3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003) recommending the exoneration of
respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the suspension of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public
Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has shown integrity
and moral uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful
indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after taking his oath as member of the bar. 4
should have filed a case for support where the paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present administrative
case to get support from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, asking
whether or not respondent is still connected with said office despite having been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied
on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still connected with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary and benefits;
and that this was the first time that they received communication concerning respondent’s administrative case.13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties and received salary and benefits
in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for reconsideration thus the case has not yet attained finality. 14
In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it just and reasonable to convert
the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension imposed on him by the Court
in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO YEARS suspension effective from date of receipt of herein
Resolution.
Complainant’s further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillo’s record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August 15, 2003, stating that the motion
furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of Justice including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.5
of Occidental Mindoro.

On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondent’s motion for reconsideration should be denied
A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006
since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not supporting his child. 6

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,

On August 25, 2003, respondent’s wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that respondent is loving and
vs.
"maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with complainant, such was only
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.

because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case after respondent ended their illicit affair.
DECISION
Complainant also used threat to compel respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers
that respondent is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely affected by his suspension.7
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts acknowledging and giving support
to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then he shall comply unconditionally.8 In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16,
2004, complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for
malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyn’s letter. 9

Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed
On January 13, 2004, complainant’s counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her children, respondent has not
by Donato Salonga and complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair the damage done to them.10
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her
mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961. 5
On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainant’s Comment, reiterated his willingness to support the child if only to
show his
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s
death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he allowed a
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for the months of March to December 2005 in certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the
the amount of ₱2,000.00 each.11 name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia’s name was the
signature of Pronebo.
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her and her three children that
respondent had to support complainant’s daughter when it is not clear who the child’s father is. Livelyn argues that complainant
46
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation 7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in
part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na
nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso
sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO
at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo
Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang
pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang
reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year. 10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998.
Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance
of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the
deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule
1.01,12 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. 13 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on
the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents
of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent’s conduct is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized
documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to
comply with the mandates of the law.14
47
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs
an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein
are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That
is the only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the said
document. Simply put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the document.15
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative
proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent
lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial
commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 218 of complainant’s affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos
C. Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law.
This allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.
He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty.
Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the
latter’s personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
A.C. No. 5442 January 26, 2004
MERCEDES NAVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN P. SORONGON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Mercedes Nava has charged Atty. Benjamin P. Sorongon with dishonest conduct and representing clients with conflicting interest,
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Letter1 dated June 23, 1999, she alleged that the respondent had been
her counsel for many years and had represented her in various cases. The respondent informed her of his intention to withdraw as
her counsel in two of her cases: Civil Case No. 21417 2 and CA-G.R. SP No. 37002.3 In his Letter dated November 27, 1996, the
respondent explained, thus:
Due to my recent stroke which resulted in the paralysis of my right body, I was advised by my doctor not to handle
civil cases which are complicated in nature and which entailed paper works because it will aggravate my illness.4
As a postscript, the respondent proposed to be retained as the complainant’s counsel in Criminal Cases Nos. 44181 5 and
79688,6 considering that the said cases did not involve too much paper work. Thus, on December 4, 1996, Atty. Sorongon filed
his withdrawal as counsel in Civil Case No. 21417 and in Criminal Cases Nos. 76986-89. The trial court granted the same.7
The complainant further alleged that albeit the fact that she continuously paid for the services of the respondent, the latter
represented other clients with hostile interests and filed cases against her on their behalf. 8
It appears that the complainant had issued several checks which were dishonored on the ground that her account with the bank had
been closed, and that the respondent assisted one Francisco Atas in collecting the amounts due thereon. The respondent sent a
Demand Letter9 dated September 18, 1998 to the complainant. Upon her failure to settle the obligation, the respondent himself
assisted Atas in filing a formal complaint against the complainant before the city prosecutor’s office for seventeen (17) counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.10
The respondent also claimed that the complainant and her counsel Atty. Althea Tugado announced in open court, during the hearing
of Criminal Cases Nos. 51472-73 and 52266-69 that a disbarment case had been filed against him. Because of this, the complainant
and her counsel are guilty of violating the confidential nature of this case. 16
In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2003, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that the certifications
submitted by the complainant to prove that the respondent was still her counsel on record as of June 1999 in Criminal Case No.
44181,17 Criminal Case No. 7968818 and Civil Case No. 4270719 belied the respondent’s assertion that his attorney-client
relationship with the complainant had long been terminated. According to the Commissioner, at the time the respondent accepted
his engagement as Francisco Atas’ counsel and filed a case against the complainant, he was still acting as counsel for the latter in
a number of cases. It was recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. 20
Thereafter, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XV-2003-354 dated
June 21, 2003 finding that the respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to penalty to conform to the evidence, and considering the
respondent’s clear violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interests, Atty. Benjamin P. Sorongon
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a Warning that a similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

The complainant thereafter sent a Letter to the respondent dated November 23, 1998,11 expressing her disbelief at the cases he
When the respondent learned of the said IBP resolution, he promptly moved for the reconsideration 21 of the same, alleging that no
filed against her and reminding the respondent of his ethical and moral responsibility as her lawyer.
formal investigation had been conducted. He prayed that Resolution No. XV-2003-354 be set aside, and that a new one ordering
the reception of evidence of the parties be entered, and that the case thereafter be dismissed. 22
The complainant prayed that an investigation be conducted regarding "this unfortunate actuation and deplorable behavior as well
as the respondent’s double standard attitude."12
In a Resolution dated September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration, since
pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Board has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter
In his Comment, the respondent admitted that the complainant was one of his clients and that it was one of his friends, Tubin Nava, already endorsed to the Supreme Court.
who asked him to represent her. Initially, he handled only one case for the complainant, but later acceded to represent her in other
cases, with or without attorney’s fees. The respondent further made a litany of the progress and successes on the cases he handled
A perusal of the records will show that indeed, no formal investigation was conducted by the IBP in the instant case before it
for the complainant, including lack of compensation for services rendered.1avvphil.net
issued the questioned resolution.

The respondent also admitted having represented Francisco Atas in the case against the complainant, but he asserted that he had
not violated any of the canons of professional ethics. He insisted that his attorney-client relationship with the complainant had
ceased as early as 1996, and assuming that it had not been terminated, the "supervening event" incapacitated him from further
performing his obligations. He averred that no conflict of interest existed, since his retainer with the complainant had been limited
to only two estafa cases and that his client Atas did not know anything that would prejudice the complainant. The fact that the
complaint was filed only after he handled the cases for Atas against the complainant shows that the instant case was filed in
retaliation, to force the respondent into withdrawing as Atas’ counsel. 13
In her reply, the complainant pointed out that the respondent admitted being the complainant’s counsel from the years 1993 to
1995; and that he did not withdraw as her counsel in the other cases before the respondent filed the complaint for estafa in behalf
of Atas. The complainant averred that even assuming that the respondent had withdrawn as her counsel, he should still not have
accepted cases against her as to do so would be to violate Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 14
The respondent maintained his position that he did not violate any rule or canon, and reiterated his defense that the cases he had
handled in behalf of the complainant had nothing to do whatsoever with the case filed by him in behalf of Atas. He insisted that
their attorney-client relationship had long been terminated. The respondent also asserted that as an officer of the court, it is his
solemn duty and obligation to bring to justice anyone committing a crime.15
In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement.23 The Court may dispense with the normal referral
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and the question raised is simple. 24 Similarly, if no further
factual determination is necessary, the Court may decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record.25
As we held in Delos Santos v. Robiso:26
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a
complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that
further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings
submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an
opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice. …27
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.
It is DIRECTED to act on this referral with dispatch.
ADM. CASE No. 5134 December 14, 2005

48
TIRSO UYTENGSU III, Complainant, Thereafter, the IBP submitted their resolution dated 29 June 2002 approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the
vs. investigating commissioner, dismissing the complaint against respondent.7 Complainant filed his motion for reconsideration8 but
ATTY. JOSEPH M. BADUEL, Respondent. was denied by the IBP in its resolution dated 19 October 2002 on the ground that the IBP no longer had jurisdiction to consider
and resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.9 This notwithstanding, the Court remanded10 the administrative case for
immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration on the merits to the IBP in the Court’s resolution dated 20 January 2003.11
RESOLUTION

On 27 February 2004, the IBP filed its resolution adopting and approving the investigating commissioner’s report and
Tinga, J.:
recommendation denying complainant’s motion for reconsideration.12

A sworn letter-complaint1 dated 1 July 19992 was filed by Tirso Uytengsu III (complainant) against Atty. Joseph M. Baduel
Subsequently, on 1 July 2004,13 complainant filed a petition for review on certiorari14 assailing the resolution of the IBP dated 27
(respondent) for violation of Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
February 2004.

Complainant is one of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. He and his co-heirs had a pending patent application. He alleges that
In his petition for review, complainant questions the findings of the IBP that complainant’s allegations were based on hearsay and
sometime in December 1998 respondent requested him to sign a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing Luis Wee (Wee)
in finding that Kokseng had the authority to execute the special power of attorney in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo.
and/or Thomas Jacobo (Jacobo) to claim, demand, acknowledge and receive on his behalf the certificates of title from the Register
of Deeds, General Santos City, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and from any government office or agency due
to complainant and his co-heirs by reason of their application for Homestead Patent II.A. No. 37 142 (E 37 124) over Lot 924-A We dismiss the complaint.
Cad. II-013120-D with an area of 5.3876 hectares and II.A. No. 116303 over Lot No. 924-B Cad. II-013120-D with an area of
5,1526 hectares, both situated in Lagao, General Santos City.
At the outset, the Court finds that herein respondent was in fact the counsel in the homestead patent application of the heirs of
Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. This can be deduced from the letters15 dated 9 October 1991 and 15 January 1993, addressed to respondent by
Complainant refused to sign the SPA as he wanted to obtain the documents personally. Subsequently though, before he could get Victoria Villasor-Inong (Villasor-Inong), Accounts Liquidation Officer III of the Board of Liquidators of General Santos City.
the title and other documents, complainant learned that respondent caused to have the SPA signed by Connie U. Kokseng
(Kokseng), the former guardian of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. Complainant maintains that the document signed by Kokseng
In said letters, Villasor-Inong communicated to respondent the requirements for the grant of the homestead patent to herein
was the same SPA which was presented to him for signature by respondent in December 1998. As a result, the titles and other
complainant and his co-heirs. From the tenor of the letters, it would seem that respondent actively participated in representing
documents were received and taken by other persons without his or his co-heirs’ knowledge and consent.
complainant and his co-heirs in their patent application for the subject land. Apparently, he stood as counsel for the heirs of Tirso
Uytengsu, Jr.
Complainant contends that the said SPA was prepared and notarized by the law office of respondent and the latter stood as a
witness to the public instrument. Complainant further avers that respondent used to do some legal work for him and knew fully
With that ostensible representation and without any evidence to show that complainant or his co-heirs withdrew such authority
well that Kokseng has already ceased to be his and his co-heirs’ guardian when the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 of Cebu City
from respondent, the latter himself can even claim the certificates of titles and other documents with regard to the homestead
terminated the letters of guardianship over her youngest sibling on 30 August 1985 in the case entitled "In the Matter of
patents.
Guardianship of Tirso M. Uytengsu III, Kathleen Anne M. Uytengsu, and Barbara Anne M. Uytengsu," docketed as SP Proc. No.
3039-R.
It should be remembered that the first letter of Villasor-Inong addressed to respondent was on 9 October 1991.16The addressees of
the said letter were "The Heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr., Rep. by Connie Uytengsu Kokseng, c/o Atty. Joseph Baduel."
In essence, complainant asserts that respondent caused Kokseng to execute an SPA in favor of Wee and/or Jacobo to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. even if he knew that Kokseng had no authority to do so.
Complainant also presented a letter17 dated 23 September 1992 addressed to Villasor-Inong by the general manager of the Board
of Liquidators, directing the former to personally contact the heirs of Tirso Uytengsu, Jr. to ascertain who among the persons
Respondent in his comment,4 argues that the allegations of complainant are purely hearsay. He stresses that complaint was
giving conflicting directives as to the course of the patent application is the true authorized representative of the heirs of Tirso
instituted to harass him because he was the counsel of an opposing litigant against complainant’s corporation in an ejectment case
Uytengsu, Jr.
entitled "General Milling Corporation v. Cebu Autometic Motors, Inc. and Tirso Uytengsu III."

After four (4) months, respondent received from Villasor Inong another letter, 18 dated 15 January 1993, also attached to
On 9 August 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
complainant’s position paper and petition for review, furnishing respondent the requirements needed for the homestead patent
recommendation.5
application of complainant and his co-heirs.

Notices of hearing were sent to both parties between 11 January 2001 and 8 May 2001. However, no actual hearings were
Complainant himself submitted all the aforementioned letters clearly showing that respondent was indeed the counsel or
conducted then due to the unavailability of either or both parties. Finally, on 26 June 2001, both parties appeared before the
representative of complainant in the application for patent.
investigating commissioner. They were then directed to file their position papers and their respective replies thereto.

The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency and the general rules of ordinary agency apply to such
Investigating Commissioner Tyrone Cimafranca submitted his Report and Recommendation dated 2 April 2002, recommending
relation.19 The extent of authority of a lawyer, when acting on behalf of his client outside of court, is measured by the same test as
the dismissal of the case. The Commissioner characterized the evidence against respondent as hearsay. Moreover, the
that which is applied to an ordinary agent.20
Commissioner concluded that Kokseng had legal basis to execute the SPA in favor of a substitute, the records showing that
complainant and his co-heirs have constituted Kokseng as their attorney-in-fact for the purpose of filing the homestead application.6

49
Such being the case, even respondent himself can acquire the certificates of title and other documents without need of an SPA affirm his allegations. Neither did he present any witness, whether expert nor otherwise, to attest to the genuiness of the signature
from complainant and his co-heirs. of respondent which was allegedly found in the SPA, if that was his objective.

In addition, the Court agrees with the investigating commissioner that the allegations of complainant constitutes mere hearsay This is not to say that complainant was not given any advice by the Court to make the proper attachment to pleadings. As early as
evidence and may not be admissible in any proceeding. 21 July 1999, Atty. Erlinda C. Versoza, the then Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, sent word to complainant through a
letter that
In Marcelo v. Javier,21 it was held that:
complainant’s letter-complaint must be verified and the supporting documents duly authenticated.28
In all cases the determination whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion, mindful always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and should be As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probatio, qui decit, non
resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit.29
professional standards. In cases of lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is correctional in nature,
should be inflicted. In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceedings, observance of due process, as in other
It is also worth noting that complainant’s claim that he suffered damage and prejudice due to the alleged unauthorized procurement
judicial determination, is imperative along with presumption of innocence in favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden of
of the certificates of titles and other documents was not substantiated by independent evidence. Complainant’s silence as to the
proof is on the complainant to overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.22
extent of the alleged damage and the lack of material evidence to show that his rights were impaired by the acts of respondent
would lead this Court to believe that complainant has suffered no or minimal injury, should there be any.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. The case must be
As held in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan,30 "no right of action is given where no injury is sustained. A wrongful violation
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.23
of a legal right is not a sufficient element of a cause of action unless it has resulted in an injury causing loss or damage. There must
be therefore, both wrongful violation and damages. The one without the other is not sufficient." 31
In the case at bar, other than the bare assertions of complainant, the evidence presented by the latter does not suffice to tip the scale
of justice to his side.
Complainant made no statement on whether or not, at present, other persons who procured the certificates of title and other
documents are still in possession of the same. He also has not stated the direct injury that was produced by the acts of respondent.
It should be stressed that in administrative proceedings, complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint.
We cannot depend on mere conjectures and speculations. There must be substantial evidence to support respondent’s guilt. 24
With all the foregoing, the Court finds that complainant did not overcome the presumption of innocence of respondent.

Complainant averred that: (1) the SPA which the respondent asked him to sign was the same document that Kokseng executed;
We need not dwell on the other factual issues of the case as it involves the presentation of concrete evidence that, sadly,
(2) the document was notarized by a notary public from the office of the respondent; and (3) the respondent was a witness in the
complainant was not able to offer.
SPA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case against respondent is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
As correctly observed by the investigating commissioner, all the aforementioned charges are not based on his personal knowledge
of the acts complained of but acquired from other sources.
A.C. No. 6656 May 4, 2006
[Formerly CBD-98-591]
Complainant charges that respondent committed an act meriting disbarment when the latter caused to have a special power of
attorney, which the former reused to sign earlier, executed by Mrs. Connie Kokseng, former guardian of complainant and his co-
heirs, authorizing certain individuals to secure the release from the Register of Deeds and other government offices in General BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant,
Santos City, titles and other documents pertaining to complainant’s and his co-heirs’ homestead application. However, this charge vs.
is not based on his own personal knowledge of the acts complained of but acquired from another source. In other words, what he ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-LOZADA,* Respondent.
offered in evidence to prove his charge is a second-hand version. Complainant identified his source but failed to present any sworn
statement or affidavit of said witness. In other words, what he presented in evidence to prove his charge is hearsay.25
RESOLUTION

The hearsay rule provides that no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open to test by cross-
examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as provided otherwise by the rules on evidence, by rules of court, or
by statute. The chief reasons for the rule are that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and are
not subject to cross-examination.26
He did not submit to this Court or to the IBP any witness or documentary evidence to support his claim that respondent has indeed
caused the execution of the disputed special power of attorney. Furthermore, complainant in his reply27 to respondent’s comment
stated that he has a credible witness in the person of Edward U. Kokseng, son of Kokseng, who has first hand knowledge of
Kokseng’s signing of the SPA. However, he failed to present his witness before the IBP or submitted an affidavit of his witness to
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our December 13, 2005 resolution finding her guilty of
violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory
decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her

50
December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully
protected.
Respondent’s contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the
date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against
lawyers.1 And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,2 we declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does
not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of
the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission
of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter
them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s
Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer….3 (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the
inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated
power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid
down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing
of administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as
void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense, respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume she was familiar
with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the implications of her loan agreement with complainant
in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering the fiduciary
character of respondent’s relationship with complainant, the nature of their agreement and complainant’s lack of independent
advice when she entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor compelling reason to reconsider our earlier resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
hereby declared null and void.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
information and guidance.
51
G.R. No. 81093 March 6, 1990
PORAC TRUCKING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth Division), HON. EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, In his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC-Macabebe, Pampanga (Branch LV) and EMERENCIANA GUEVARRA, respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Atlee T. Viray for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Emerenciana Guevarra, plaintiff-appellee v.
Porac Trucking Inc., defendant-appellant," 1 promulgated on July 20, 1987, and the Resolution of the same court dated December
15, 1987, 2 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner Porac Trucking, Inc. [hereafter, simply PORAC
TRUCKING].
The case at bar arose from a complaint for damages filed by the private respondent Emerenciana Guevarra in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch LV at San Fernando, Pampanga 3 against PORAC TRUCKING and Albert Mercado, in a joint and several capacity,
arising from a collision incident involving the truck owned by the petitioner while driven by a certain Albert Mercado, and the
mini Isuzu cargo truck of Guevarra.
The lower court issued summons directed to Albert Mercado and PORAC TRUCKING, ordering them to answer the complaint.
While Albert Mercado received the personal service of summons on April 28, 1984, a certain Hermie Lansangan, according to the
Sheriff, refused to receive the copy of the summons for PORAC TRUCKING. Thus the Sheriff's return on PORAC TRUCKING,
dated April 28, 1984, remains unsigned.
On June 11, 1984, the lower court declared PORAC TRUCKING in default.
Later, a certain Atty. Rodolfo Macalin filed a "Motion for Leave to File Answer Beyond Reglementary Period" attaching thereto
the answer of the supposed defendants. Thereafter, the lower court took this "appearance" of Atty. Macalino to mean the voluntary
submission by PORAC TRUCKING to its jurisdiction.
On June 21, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of Guevarra and against defendants Mercado and PORAC
TRUCKING.
A motion for execution was filed by Guevarra on August 14, 1985 and the writ was subsequently issued on August 23, 1985.
It was only on November 12, 1985 that the petitioner, represented by its in-house counsel, filed a "Petition for Relief from Judgment
with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction." This time, the lawyer was not Atty. Macalino. Although a
restraining order was issued against the implementation of the writ of execution, the lower court eventually issued a resolution
dismissing the "Petition for Relief from Judgment . . ."
On April 8, 1986, the petitioner appealed alleging that the defect in the service of summons was never cured by the unauthorized
appearance of Atty. Macalino. 4 On the merits, the petitioner alleges that the appellee Guevarra has waived all claims from the
accident with the execution of her "Affidavit of Desistance."
In the said "Affidavit of Desistance" or "Release of Claim," it appears that Guevarra had received from First Integrated Bonding
and Insurance Co., Inc. (FIBICI), insurer of her vehicle, the amount of P19,579.80. This amount was in turn received by FIBICI
from Rico General Insurance, the insurer of PORAC TRUCKING, with the stated purpose that:
. . . this RELEASE may be pleaded in bar to any suit of (sic) proceeding which I/WE or anyone in my/our
behalf, may have taken or may be taken in connection with the accident hereinbefore mentioned . . . 5
And that is where Atty. Macalino's role begins and ends as far as this case is concerned. Certainly, the lawyer of the insurance
company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the insured in all subsequent litigations arising from the accident. And this is
as it should be, notwithstanding the claims of one Edgardo Simon, Manager of Rico General Insurance, who declared under oath
that when he learned of the pendency of the civil case against the driver and the PORAC TRUCKING, he himself had instructed
their house counsel, Atty. Macalino, to represent PORAC TRUCKING. Simon, however, specifically stated that he never informed
PORAC TRUCKING about the move. Neither was Atty. Macalino ever hired by PORAC TRUCKING to represent it in any case.

It would seem now that this elaborate scheme was devised to insure the right to subrogation of Rico General Insurance in case a
However, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment appealed from and dissolving the
judgment favorable to PORAC TRUCKING were to be rendered. And yet as an officer of the court, Atty. Macalino should have
preliminary injunction it earlier issued enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution, in effect granting the claim filed by
known better than to appear in a case on behalf of another at the mere prodding of his client.
Guevarra against PORAC TRUCKING.

However we leave the hearing of the merits of the case to the trial court since the private respondent had failed to comment 10 on
On August 14, 1988, the petitioner filed this petition for review after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent
the veracity of the called "Release of Claims." Nevertheless this document must be presented in evidence and litigated on by the
court on December 15, 1987.
parties to establish once and for all the extent of their interests for a full satisfaction of their claims.

The only issue for our resolution is whether or not the summons was properly served on the petitioner so as to confer jurisdiction
on the then Court of First Instance over PORAC TRUCKING, the then defendant.
Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
In any case, the unsolicited appearance of Atty. Rodolfo Macalino, in the absence of a client-lawyer relationship with the petitioner
corporation, is unbecoming of a member of the bar, to say the least. The remanding of the case must be without prejudice to the
investigation of his actuations. The presiding judge of the court a quo is hereby ordered to undertake this investigation and report
to the court his findings and recommendations within thirty days from receipt hereof.

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership — If the defendant is a corporation WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in SET ASIDE. The case is
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the REMANDED to the trial court for the proper proceedings.
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
G.R. No. L-35830 July 24, 1990
As held in Delta Motor Sales Corp. v. Mangosing 6 cited in the recent case of Rebollido v. Court of Appeals: 7
FORTUNATA MERCADO, BASILIA CUEVAS MERCADO, SOTERA MERCADO and TRINIDAD
The purpose of the rule is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper MERCADO, petitioners,
notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons may be served on a representative so integrated vs.
with the corporation that such person will know what to do with legal papers served on him or in other Hon. ALBERTO Q. UBAY as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXII, LUCINA SAMONTE
words to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. and TRINIDAD M. SAMONTE, respondents.

In the present case, the summons was supposed to have been received by a certain Hermie Lansangan who refused to acknowledge Gregorio M. Familiar for petitioners.
the receipt thereof. He refused to sign for the petitioner corporation. And rightly so, for he was certainly not the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of the directors of PORAC TRUCKING. As a matter of fact, the capacity, if any, in which
Alfredo I. Molo for private respondents.
Lansangan would bind the corporation was never established. It appears that the only relationship Lansangan had with the
petitioner corporation was that he acted as middle man for specific delivery contracts. 8

In some cases, the Court has been liberal in bending this rule whenever the resulting circumstance would facilitate the
administration of justice, and in requiring only "substantial compliance". 9 These exceptions were allowed only because of the MEDIALDEA, J.:
peculiar circumstances attending the case, namely that: 1) there was actual receipt of the summons by the person served, meaning
the possession of the copy of the summons was transferred from the Sheriff to the person served; 2) there was a signature on the
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
Sheriff's return or receipt by the person served; and 3) there was actual receipt of the summons by then defendant corporation, now
of preliminary injunction. Petitioners seek to enjoin and restrain respondent judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No.
petitioner, through the person on whom the legal papers were actually served.
C-2442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to annul a final and
executory judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Cavite (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. TM-223.
In the case at bar, none of these requisites is present, nor do they appear to have been complied with. Hence the case should be
returned to the trial court for the proper hearing on the merits in order to preclude any possible infringement of due process.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

And who is Atty. Rodolfo Macalino? He is the lawyer of Rico General Insurance Corporation, the insurer of PORAC TRUCKING.
On May 18, 1966, petitioners filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, docketed as Civil
Rico General Insurance Corporation worked for a settlement of the claim arising from the said accident with First Integrated
Case No. TM-223, against Antonio, Ely and respondents Lucina and Trinidad, all surnamed Samonte and who are brothers and
Bonding and Insurance, the insurer of Emerenciana Guevarra.
sisters.

52
On June 27, 1966, the defendants were served with a copy of the complaint and summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte
who acknowledged receipt thereof.
On July 11, 1966, all the defendants in the above-numbered case, thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed their answer to the
complaint. Later, on January 4,1967, the said defendants, thru the same counsel, filed their amended answer.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Cavite (now RTC) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against all
the defendants in the civil case, including private respondents. Since no appeal was made by any of the defendants from the
decision of the trial court, the same became final and executory and the court issued the corresponding writ of execution.
However, before the writ could be carried out by the provincial sheriff, all the defendants, thru the same counsel, Atty. Danilo
Pine, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution issued by the
trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM-223. On July 9, 1971, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On May 27, 1972, respondent Lucina Samonte and Trinidad Samonte brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now RTC) docketed as Case No.
C-2442, for the annulment of the final judgment rendered by the trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM-223, alleging the following
matters: that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Danilo Pine to file an answer in their behalf as defendants in Case No.
TM 223, and that the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the writ of execution in the same case
was without their knowledge and participation.
Petitioners' motion to dismiss the action was denied by the CFI of Rizal. Thus, the instant petition was filed.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the action for annulment of the final and
executory judgment rendered by the CFI of Cavite.
The applicable law is Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," which was the law in
force when the disputed action for annulment was filed on May 27, 1972 in the CFI of Rizal. This is based on the principle that
the facts alleged in the complaint and the law in force at the time of commencement of action determine the jurisdiction of a court
(Lum Bing v. Ibanez 92 Phil. 799; Rodriguez v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172; Salao v. Crisostomo, No. L-29146, August 5, 1985, 138
SCRA 17; Tolentino v. Social Security Commission No. L-28870, September 6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428; Philippine Overseas
Drilling, etc. v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 55703, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 79).
Section 44(a) of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 then vested original jurisdiction in the Courts of First Instance over all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation and an action for the annulment of a judgment
and an order of a court of justice belongs to this category (Vda. de Ursua v. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622). A court of first instance or a
branch thereof has the authority and the jurisdiction as provided for by law to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by
another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the ruling laid down in the cases of (Dulap v. Court
of Appeals, No. L-28306, December 18, 1971, 42 SCRA 537; Gianan v. Imperial, No. L-37963, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 755
and Francisco v. Aquino, Nos. L-33235-36, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 149 which overturned the contrary rulings in Mas v. Dumara-
og No. L-16252, September 29,1964,12 SCRA 34; J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Torres, et al., No. L-24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA
1169; and Sterling Investment Corporation, et al. v. Ruiz, etc. et al., No. L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318). Thus, in an
action to annul a final judgment or order, the choice of which court the action should be filed is not left to the parties; by legal
mandate the action should be filed with the Court of First Instance. The question is in what place (with what particular court of
first instance) the action should be commenced and tried (Dulap, supra). The issue therefore to be resolved in the instant case is
not one of jurisdiction but of venue-whether it was properly laid in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the
judgment rendered by the CFI of Cavite.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Court fixes the venue in Courts of First Instance, as follows:
53
SEC. 2. Venue in Court of First Instance — (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title to, or for recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants besides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
The complaint filed by respondent with the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of judgment states that they reside at Caloocan City
and that petitioners, as defendants, reside at Cavite (p. 48, Rollo). Since the action for annulment of judgment is a personal one,
the venue of the action in this case should be either CFI of Caloocan or CFI of Cavite at the election of the plaintiff. Clearly, venue
was improperly laid in the CFI of Rizal and respondent judge should have dismissed the action for annulment of judgment on the
ground of improper venue.
It is significant to state at this point that although the prevailing rule before B. P. 129 was that courts of first instance and their
branches have jurisdiction to annul each other's final judgments and orders as ruled in Dulap and subsequent cases, fundamental
principles still dictate that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the
branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action sought to be
annulled (Gianan v. Imperial, supra).i•t•c-aüsl Moreover, despite the re-examination by this Court of the old ruling in Mas v.
Dumara-og, supra, recent decisions still uphold its rationale that pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference
should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, No. L-45825, June 30,
1988, 163 SCRA 237; Republic v. Reyes, Nos.
L-30263-65, October 30, 1987; Parco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 262).
While the foregoing discussion may no longer find any application at this time with the effectivity of Batas Pambansa, Blg. 129,
enacted on August 10, 1981, which transferred the jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment to the Court of Appeals, it
was deemed necessary if only to bring light and settle the existing confusion and chaos among judges of the different courts of
first instance and their branches concerning the application of the old laws on jurisdiction and venue over this kind of action.
Probably, this confusion was the underlying reason of the Legislature behind the transfer of jurisdiction over annulment of
judgments from the trial courts to the Court of Appeals under B.P. 129.
Even if We were to disregard, for the sake of argument, the issue on jurisdiction of and venue in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in the annulment suit, We found, upon perusal of the records, that no sufficient grounds exist to justify the annulment of the
final judgment of the Cavite court. Certain requisites must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for
annulment. A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Santiago v. Ceniza, No. L-17322, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 494).
None of the aforementioned grounds was shown to exist to support the annulment action. The contention of private respondents
that they were not served with summons in Case No. TM-223 in the Cavite court is untenable. In their memorandum filed with
this Court, they admit that they were served with summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt
thereof. The receipt of summons is shown by the return submitted by the sheriff to the Court of First Instance of Cavite. Apart
from the presumption that the sheriff had regularly performed his functions, records amply show that all the defendants, including
private respondents had filed their answer in Case No. TM-223 thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine. And when final judgment had
been rendered by the CFI of Cavite against respondents and a writ of execution issued by the trial court, the private respondents,
thru the same counsel, Atty. Pine even instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin the execution of the judgment of
the Cavite court. Respondents now allege that they have not authorized Atty. Danilo Pine to appear in their behalf as defendants
in Case No. TM-223 or to file the petition for certiorari with the appellate court. Such allegation is devoid of merit.
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents
had not personally appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer by and the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect
appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents standing in court. It is hard to believe that on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been
authorized or employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided adversely against private
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty
respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from
of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and
enforcing the decision rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter.
recommending that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This
was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14
It is an important fundamental principle in Our judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice,
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by
to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel
subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment
compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of
of the administration of justice (Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, supra; Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 52498, July 19, 1982, 115
the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
SCRA 117).

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial
Court) is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. C-2442. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these
peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to
vs.
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." 17
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having
uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point
during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the
same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the
cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and
thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3Weeks passed but Atty.
Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what
he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had
done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had,
in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty.
Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the
information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness, 19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us
to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There
is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an
indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in
arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended
the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would
have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants
that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty
to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we
give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case
amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x
on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.
resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the
investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits. 7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree
the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such
with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose
agreement.8 Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in
of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal
arms without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or
officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's
oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a
54
military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason
for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were
we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to
consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit,
during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material
damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. 23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first
offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is
definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge
himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the
AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.
A.C. No. 3731 September 7, 2007
MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant) filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent)
for "obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and
of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an
administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."
The Facts
Complainant alleged the following:
1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which raised the same issues. 1Tanlioco is an
agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainant’s spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an
Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation.2 The RTC’s judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals3 and the Supreme Court.4
55
2. Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. The
RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. 5
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. 6
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she misused the rules of
procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.7
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the complaint lodged against her. 8
After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Comment,9 respondent submitted her Comment alleging the following:
1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also not authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit.10
2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the "Attorney’s Oath" and performed duties in accordance with Section 20 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.11
3. Respondent’s client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal remedies to obtain benefits secured for him by law. 12
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not confront the issues of her disbarment
squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with finality by the courts.13
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days from notice. 14
On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed to comply with the 25 March
1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.15
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for failure
to comply with the Court’s 25 March 1992 Resolution. The Court also required respondent to Comment on the complainant’s 2
June 1992 Manifestation.16
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially complied with the Court’s orders relative
to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had transferred to the Public Attorney’s Office and since she was no longer a
"BALA lawyer," the cases involved in this proceeding had become moot and academic.17
On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case against respondent "has not been mooted and
nothing set out in her ‘Manifestation’ excuses her failure to obey this Court’s Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7 October
1992."18 The Court had also resolved to impose a fine of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply
with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.19
On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation stating that respondent had not complied with the Court’s orders. 20
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of respondent for detention at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated that respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992
Resolutions.21
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent for five days and released her on 25 October
1993.22
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for hearing
and decision.23
On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder. Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal personality to file this
case.24 Respondent also alleged that she was merely protecting the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of
office. Respondent contended that "she had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being disciplined by the
latter if only to impart truth and justice."25
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19 September 2003. Complainant’s counsel
asserted that respondent had been practicing law in the midst of her suspension and this constituted a violation of the suspension
order which she wanted to be lifted.40 Investigating Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid ground to lift the
suspension order.41 Respondent requested that her detention for five days at the NBI be converted into a five-year suspension, one
year for every day of detention such that she would have served five years of indefinite suspension.42
Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their Verified Position Papers. 43

On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and
recommendation to the IBP. Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of justice.26
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or multiplication of suits should be
avoided,27 and respondent’s acts were tantamount to forum-shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court
processes and proceedings.28
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondent’s motion did not state valid grounds to convince the
Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that by continuing to practice law, "she is flaunting her defiance of the
Supreme Court by showing that she can hoodwink another branch of government."44Complainant also prayed for respondent’s
disbarment due to the gravity of her offense.45
In respondent’s Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the property that was litigated
was owned by complainant’s wife. She asserted that she never betrayed her client’s cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath,
and it was complainant who filed this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated
due to lack of merit.46

Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution in a Preliminary
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995. 29 The want
Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that in this Preliminary Investigation case, she recommended its
of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language used.
dismissal because the offended party was not the real party-in-interest.47

On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30 March 1996. The IBP
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality to file the disbarment complaint against her; hence, it should
Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating Commissioner Jose’s recommendation that respondent be "suspended
have been dismissed outright.48
indefinitely from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to
violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice
of law."30 Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her "outright disbarment."31 After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004.
The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Raval’s Report and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for her "manifest
flagrant misconduct in disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension."49
In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the IBP Resolution suspending respondent indefinitely. 32

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended respondent’s
On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to circularize the resolution
indefinite suspension. "The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration,
of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending respondent indefinitely from the practice of law. 33
without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter — it does not imply agreement or
approval."50 Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section
On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99 informing all courts that 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
respondent had been suspended indefinitely.
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. —
On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Consider the Case Closed and Terminated. Respondent apologized for her
demeanor and prayed that the suspension be lifted.34
xxx

On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for report and recommendation. 35
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
On 29 August 2003, Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing. together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Respondent claimed that she did not receive any notice of the OCA’s Circular on her indefinite suspension. 36 Respondent alleged (Emphasis supplied)
that the Court Resolution which she received merely noted the IBP’s Resolution on her indefinite suspension. 37 Respondent
claimed that she only knew of the suspension when she filed an application for a judicial position in Mandaluyong City. 38
Necessarily, the Court will now give its "final action" on this complaint.

In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite her suspension
The Ruling of the Court
because she believed that a notation by the Court in the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an implementation of the IBP’s
Resolution on her indefinite suspension.39
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP’s findings. However, the
Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on respondent.

56
Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis51 and they belong to a class of their own.52 They are neither civil nor
criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer.53 They involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance.54
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This
Court requires that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public may repose
confidence.55 "Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to their clients.
Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to continue as officers
of the Court."56
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings. 57
The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the Court’s lawful orders in two instances:
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome."66 "A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an
administrative complaint against a lawyer."67
In Heck v. Santos,68 the Court held that "any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings."
The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered
injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is
the proof or failure of proof of the charges.69
Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson,70the Court
enunciated that "while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s
rights, they should not forget that they are first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice." Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. "To permit lawyers to resort
to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state —
the administration of justice."71

Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed cases for Specific
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice.
Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same
However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November 1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for
issues. The Court held that "an important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts
failure to heed the Court’s order.
and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.72 Indeed, "while a lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice." 73
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on complainant’s manifestation. She
instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds
alleged that she had substantially complied with the Court’s orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993 Resolution
of the law. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the
stated that nothing set out in respondent’s manifestation excused her failure to obey the Court’s Resolutions.
Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.

These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 58 of the Rules of
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders
of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders.
of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. 59Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal
irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
inadequately, or selectively."60 Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."61
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Respondent also
violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is consequently warranted.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.62 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period ofTHREE
YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Respondent’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the
person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose." 63 attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,64 the Court held that failure to comply with the Court’s directive to comment on a letter-complaint
constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect. In Cuizon v. Macalino,65 a lawyer’s failure to comply with the A.C. No. 5379 May 9, 2003
Court’s Resolutions requiring him to file his comment was one of the infractions that merited his disbarment.
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant,
Furthermore, respondent’s defenses are untenable. Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is not the real party-in-interest vs.
since the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s wife. The Court is not persuaded with this defense. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does RESOLUTION
not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
57
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G.
Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and
violating the lawyer's oath.1
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas
and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention." 2 Upon personal verification with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December
14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management
Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite
the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of
the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as Annex "1".
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was
issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched
the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI
at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They
argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered
and was detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was
not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing
thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. 3
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation
with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Peña, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December
15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion
subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's
calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful
performance of his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are
guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 9 The
courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 10 While
a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause,
his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating
that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they
craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention.
Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an
untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they
resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to
be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of
the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused
was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date "tentatively"
scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and
immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have
accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality
to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.13

In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation as
prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.14
follows:

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and
Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the
Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the
three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
Bar for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other
ends of justice.15
hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit.5

Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution
liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However,
No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the
prompt and sound administration of justice.16 Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty
the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty.
of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6

58
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent
Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would
no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by
WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF
the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958
presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners. into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they
considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while
negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents. resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

CASTRO, J.: On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred
to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and
October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association- However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of
the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the 2. Take your meals within the office.
FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such
acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable
with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
cots have been prepared.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal
Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or
about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their
respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and
The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of
to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
the Management.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid
snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for
letter of May 21, 1958.
"deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor
wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider
the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make

59
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to
break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building.
Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them,
in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the
said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the
picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal
charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the
Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of
the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining
the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies'
building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted
hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal
charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If
by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed
by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion"
against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies
giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and
to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office
of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening
committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges
which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure
clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office,
the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were
most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however
stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president
of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers &
60
Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees
Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed
retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up
to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875.
The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their
right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not
return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as
regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses
therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965
a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for
reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the
letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking
members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the
Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard
to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June
2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of
speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered special delivery
mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive
efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open
for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference
with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through
their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA
9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt
to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition
regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to
bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president
in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as
constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d
621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a
time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees
or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,
constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the
concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation. 1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it
is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is
true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for
work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the
employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc.,
213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and
occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they
would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair
labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees
individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what
the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus
to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the
purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking
employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support
of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to
the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance,
profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members
of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by
the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and
not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work
ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the
letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the
form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being
thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the
criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of
subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to
interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that
there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse
effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p.
323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding
and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
61
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their
implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral
circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in
themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered,
the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with
an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited
therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective
bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners,
as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was
served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees
as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions.
And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that
the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the
Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were
individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of
special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three
truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line
posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers.lâwphî1.ñèt Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed,
and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction
from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies'
buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by registered
special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958.
But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a
member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all
were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union
members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough
incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges
who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel
Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers,
the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these
alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference
that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their
business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that
there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not
actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter
alia:
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against
 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves
that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated
April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as
material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with
the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could
have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the
strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to
refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the
sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as
the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved
by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse
being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents'
letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-
offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands
within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes
into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing
his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2,
1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents'
head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that
when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending
criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members
were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute,
however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents
whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This
is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active
unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused
readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges
filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second
day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work.
62
Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent
than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial
Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the
strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver
of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them."
(Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines
Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission
of strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had
chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the
unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved in unpleasant
incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands
of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement
in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a
unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes,
p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis
supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination
committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia
admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-
strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's
screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20,
1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed
responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of
that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers
whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose
participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct
and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely
shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent
to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend
himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on
June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three,
were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead,
several of them later received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2
June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while
picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate
your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month
pay for every year of your service in the Group Company.
 Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M.
OLBES
President,
Insurance Life
Acting
President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts
with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped
or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was
refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the
overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had
abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to
whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one
who received them and later directed them — when Olbes refused them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel
manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra
were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage — who testified
anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of
the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness
required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar
reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination
although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at
various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men,
the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the
excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason
for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct.
904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not
persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the
employee relieved from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for
the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies.
We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales,
president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls
were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its
Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official
rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies.
63
It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the
exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures
could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. But
assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip — which the respondents never denied or tried
to
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor
dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees
of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist
to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are
expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers,
Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede
to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made,
is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional
and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer
unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn
publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring
opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.)
(Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but
also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public
Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover,
the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of
Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made
by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that
time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor
the respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were
constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on
May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts considered inimical to the interest
of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing
Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers
did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite
these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not
responsible for what happened.lâwphî1.ñèt The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see
Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the
Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente
Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the
personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were
sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in
the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were
not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the
legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive
on this point is the following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn
out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings
 whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on
the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is
difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be
regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA
Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory.
We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would
deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d
472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not
be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes
and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary
misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office,
they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The
reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is
opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis
of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the
Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the
interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that
they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers
and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the
picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried
to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by
one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute.
It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the
line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor
practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented
by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member
of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat"
and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) —
another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to
believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered
unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or
surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection
with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
64
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means
of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The
unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or
detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the
request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from
June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and
environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor
practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work — upon the invitation of the respondents
— they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back
pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting
to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement
with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N.
L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving
Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106
F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been
filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by
the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that
the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no
job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be
found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or
locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial
cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees
wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed?
It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike,
even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before
the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a)
(4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees
and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion
for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise
ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the
date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of
them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office,
although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused
readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from
said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found
guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents'
men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than
ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that
whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of
the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod &
Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This
Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by
serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to
justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its
employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one
month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the
employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such
termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a
scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu
Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by
substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union
of Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court
of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his
decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or
not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of
disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to
put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or
neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is
settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him
is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act
upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.
(Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-
20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read
however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the
action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused
their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political
pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of
the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino
was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant
65
Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice.
This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the
light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether
the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies
the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting
character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's
interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even
the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose
discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts
to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some
legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can
be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the
union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the
ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or
behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a
just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the
pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts
with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's
decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the
respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of
the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may
escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears
in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored
sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular
ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to
the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts,
judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a
salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as
lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil.
1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and
members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this
Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding
out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's
particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished
to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members
of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of
their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit
against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit1 with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition
of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion
to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public
document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date
when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory
to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty.
Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat
ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines
Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the
Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is
presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a
disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with
the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer
repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
66
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and
grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s clients filed a case for falsification of public
document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver
document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already
in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt
for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19,
2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere
filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment
case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about
1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the
tricycle’s passengers.3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation,
he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from
reporting the accident to the authorities.4
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer
allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,5 the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as
judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence,
industry and character of a trial judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case
filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report,
recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to
prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon,
as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in
fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered
the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225,6 adopting and approving the Investigating
Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it
had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP
for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.8 On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for reconsideration.10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008.11 On
August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of
orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent
Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Court’s Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation
of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code
provides:
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of
the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that
the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive
language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of documents, committed to
mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious
misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government
employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative
defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which
are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and
distortions."15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal
system.16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court
hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a
certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented,
however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
67
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado
sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers,
court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of
the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and
erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. 18 So long as
the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.19 Here,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the allegations
of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the
court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006
[CBD 05-1434]
JOHNNY NG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent’s propensity to resort to undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again
committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision 2 affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),3 pertinent portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-
appellees with very slight modifications. But we cannot accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals, that
the actual writer of the said decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay should be only
one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there another reason known only to
them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law
on the part of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents failed
to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring
facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service – and all of it to the affected workers –
not to some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of
the First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the evidence before them and not
merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth.
Yes, honesty on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares
them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly
so – and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is removing
their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there
was no strike. This is the only reason for the finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the
tent; they have to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so
called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the
tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and
egress of the premises, are blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted,
no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of
money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name
we should call this new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule
and only when the money claims involved are substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.
68
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their
service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to the
impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his co-
commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and
ignorance of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case
any more. Commissioner Go and Chairman Señeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules
prohibit the inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Señeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2) other
commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in the instant case. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to
harass him and to influence the result of the cases between complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are
pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules
of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before it; that the Rules
of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that
LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not
being part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get
paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in their cases by reason of
corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable,
with impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved. 5
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and
Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending
before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon
City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office
(CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar,
respondents Paras’s and Cruz’s office instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay income
tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this act of the employer which violates
Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the employer
and the respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and 19-
03.6
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,7 respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they file multiple
actions arising from the same cause of action or brook interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought
before the CEO has nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal structures is
a cause of action completely irrelevant and unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was requested to investigate
certain nuisance structures located outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other
paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and present clear and present hazards;
the Office of the City Engineer found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor
case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or justify the construction
of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life, property
and legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client
on how to go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as
an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the
only reason the number of complainants were reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of
them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no time were they consulted regarding the tax
concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding
their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is unwarranted, unjustified and obviously
a mere retaliatory action on his part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using
improper and abusive language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three months with a
stern warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and
therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint against them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the
Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied
accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings
that does not admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the
scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts
correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language
is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10 A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful
as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 11Submitting pleadings containing countless insults
and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not part of
the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v.
Gordolla,12 the Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a
69
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and
whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 13
Respondent’s argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the
Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as
members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees,
members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort
by an attorney – in a motion for reconsideration – to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as
"neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such
words "superfluous." It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of
this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court’s attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run
short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief." Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say
that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right
direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in
our system of government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the public’s
perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondent’s
violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of
₱5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do
so.1âwphi1
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of action,
which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made by the city engineer. Respondent’s remedy should be to
question that decision, not bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our judgment for
the proper courts who should determine the propriety or sagacity of the city engineer’s action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed
the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against respondent’s conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the
attorney’s duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This requires
of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other people from so
doing and to come to his defense when he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the power, outside of G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989
his court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957)
vs.
Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more apropos would
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.

G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989

Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not engaged
as counsels to take care of their client’s tax problems, then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has
been committed by complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such acts be held liable BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.1âwphi1 vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Finally, while it may be true that Batan’s group has been greatly diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the number
is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial RESOLUTION
proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help unclogged [sic] the
dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint which
shows that the compromise agreement and waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the
same. Besides, a "compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages
compromise is no less the client’s champion in settlement out of court than he is the client’s champion in the battle in court."
(Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalo’s Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore respondent SARMIENTO, J.:
Alar[‘]s beef with the execution of these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?

The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses
All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the counter- Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17

ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:

The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
...

G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989

This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for Ayala ... 2

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R.
GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors- ... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own
petitioners, campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary ... 3
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents. ...

G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989 The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in issue, such as those
summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court ... 4
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA ...
GONZALEZ, respondents.

... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents
G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989 of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel
himself would like to do but did not even contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. 5
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents. ...
70
 [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and
exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a blatant disregard of documented and
incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the
true significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and
consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect to those in which it
arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. 6
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in BAVA which clearly
state that such membership is necessary because it is a new development in their relationship with respect
to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving
any reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ... 7
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the current campaign of this
Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary power of
courts? 8
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting
on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering
its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the
influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one
party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of
justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the trial court (in which his clients
prevailed).lâwphî1.ñèt But if we did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily
because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses
to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession." 9
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's
"first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10 And while a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and
innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking in the Decision, 11 comes
as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an
unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by
the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169,
74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new
arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my
decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique
of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he
deserves this Court's rebuke.
71
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language
amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however,
his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from receipt
hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his
record.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who
was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."
In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
 ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our
faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional
and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members
of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination,
and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear
itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty.
Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966
Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served
on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on
August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion
for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection
to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
72
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal
be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO
DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July
5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof
and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he
filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same
date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing
the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this
Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on
grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the
date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to
appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal.
Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior
that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded
to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To
said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive
or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation
17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge,"
and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President,
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in
said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
oral argument.
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and
brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen
unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you
shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But
why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam
in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from
thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out
the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from
thy brother's eyes."
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of
this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed
your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his
God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
is the Law and the Prophets."
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary,
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe
he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor
during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into
disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such
abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to
curtail these abuses.
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO
MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that
in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, xxx xxx xxx
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices.
xxx xxx xxx We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of
this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice;
dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this
the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

73
 As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason
we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may
be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide
as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and
be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us
examine the grain of his grievances.
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of
appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting
them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this
Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law,
and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of
a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought
never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and
large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power
of supervision.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the
out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of
of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have
this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may
a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon
read different justices to the same result ... .
the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not).
This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the
served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that
terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the
in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco,
Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether
particular time makes review undesirable.
that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules
themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself
the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr,
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating
these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which
in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
they are handed down.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished
was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely
by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized
ordered "dismissed".
74
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers,
like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent
danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer
is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts
and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of
justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades,
6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he
points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as
to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities
for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of
his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose,
is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character
and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116
N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to
give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the
75
merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W.
196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture
into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws,
but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
— assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax
his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect
are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at
all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may
suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which
brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:
 It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the
destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN
OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a
fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that
Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and
to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published
a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money."
Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may
make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate
publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas
197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed,
for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy
the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins,
81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce,
attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story
of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel,
lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the
law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he
was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint
against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the
public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
76
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the
judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying
that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions
of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The
Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of
the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive
him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will
be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as
well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives
and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration
of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives.
Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial
officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust,
or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based
upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right
of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit
of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding
is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney
making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more
or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting
too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
 ... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are
an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court,
and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned
the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics
of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our
system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest
to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would
be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary
that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the
courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public
good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired
by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly
established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of
whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in
respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case
of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the
decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper.
One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder.
It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the
court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
77
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him
and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed
secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the
Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has
been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his
rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court
can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646.
And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault
by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction
made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen
to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because
of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity,
or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ...
No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency
for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after
being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting
upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in
Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is
not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while
such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and
with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that
they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at
bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received
 by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that
the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a
judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in
support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.)
364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v.
Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a
judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring
the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious
attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit
as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-
litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued
in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish
for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said
right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution.
Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
78
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because
the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to
the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused
to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted
said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his
belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to
put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to
liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there
also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object
the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation
of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does
not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members
of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders
and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice
is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many
cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being
guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged
this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question.
That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction
of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining
the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity
of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and some former
members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed
in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no
moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the
prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the
rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been
resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in
a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable
by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is
no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced
by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence
in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration
were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as
if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
79
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances
and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of
callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of
this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline
and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts
of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right,
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence
of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one
of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that
one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances
and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it
may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his
petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing
his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be
not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal
talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its
members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum,"
he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could
never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all,
bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration
of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and
gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the
stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language
never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of
respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by
neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension,
which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is
best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension
shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
information and guidance.
criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary G.R. No. 162525 September 23, 2008
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*AND CESAR
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
GOCO, petitioners,
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
vs.
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C. DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
A. ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,**, respondents.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
DECISION
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct QUISUMBING, J.:
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar,
it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. G.R. SP No. 76170.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively
are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present
is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions.
As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which,
being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative
need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.
80
This case stemmed from a Complaint2 for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and
Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented
by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D.
Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts for the preliminary design,
construction and management of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public
funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor
was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the object is outside the commerce
of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public
elementary school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and lease of the future
building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer,3 APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed
the city's Answer,4 joined in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the
complaint states no cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an Answer 5 with compulsory
counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa became parties to the case when they jointly filed,
also in their capacity as taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention6 adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.
7 APPCDC's subsequent compliance.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer
to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's
complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
In its Order8 dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the
entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also granted the
prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed the
defendants to answer the city's complaint.
In its February 14, 2003 Order,9 the RTC denied reconsideration of the September 11, 2002 Order. It also granted Capalad's motion
to expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and his complaint filed by Atty.
Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed
APP and APPCDC to answer Capalad's complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed orders as mere photocopies were
submitted, and (3) lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal.10 The Court of
Appeals also denied APP and APPCDC's motion for reconsideration in its February 4, 2004 Resolution. 11
Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals.12
Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES DESPITE
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [THEREWITH]…
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY
CAPRICIOUSLY
(a.) Entertaining the taxpayers' suits of private respondents del Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their clear lack of
legal standing to file the same.
(b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory and
jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.
81
(c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers
and admitting their complaints as well as allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta to represent Capalad although Atty.
Oscar C. Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in gross violation of well settled rules and case law on
the matter.13
We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the petition on mere technicalities since they have attached
the proper documents in their motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.
Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof
he was authorized to sign the certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC.
Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.14 Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to dismiss the
petition since only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in
behalf of a corporation. Proof of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal. 15
However, it must be pointed out that in several cases,16 this Court had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural
requirements the submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this
case. The Court notes that the attachments in the motion for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors
of APPCDC authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of Appeals.17 On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing
business under the name APP, also appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition.18 When the petition
was filed on March 26, 200319 before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco was duly authorized to sign the verification and
certification except that the proof of his authority was not submitted together with the petition.
Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also
consider the same as substantial compliance.20 Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration their explanation21 that
copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance.
The affidavit of service22 supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it was thus error for the appellate
court to deny reinstatement of the petition.
Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive issues raised by petitioners, rather than
remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of
discretion in (a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b) allowing a private law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing
respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalad's
change of attorneys?
On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue where the act complained of directly involves illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa
that the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds
are not directly derived from taxation.
Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP
and APPCDC in their Answer and that this issue was not even discussed in the RTC's assailed orders.
Petitioners' contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers' suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,23 we
held:
In the case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal Neither is the law firm's appearance justified under the instances listed in Mancenido when local government officials can be
expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are represented by private counsel, such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim against said
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the officials was made in this case. Note that before it joined the complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. firm represents Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity, 40 is of no moment.

xxxx On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid
and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.
Petitioners' allegations in their Amended Complaint that the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are serviced or
paid through a disbursement of public funds are not disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality to institute We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
the same.24
Section 5,41 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise
personality to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist, albeit erroneously, that public funds are not in this case since the Pre-trial Order42 dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what
involved. Under Article 195325 of the Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the money is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts
public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local taxation or by its internal revenue allotment. will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause
them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, APP and APPCDC's lack of objection in their Answer on the personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes
waiver to raise the objection under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. 26 In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence to be
presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, 43 e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's
testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer. 44
On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence
prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as the city's counsel.
As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad
insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun
The Lazaro Law Firm, as the city's counsel, counters that the city was inutile defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed
represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the
legal advice. The city has no legal officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical considerations
contracts. Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all pleadings filed by
also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v.
Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
Court of Appeals,27 the law firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on representation
would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.28
Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalad's change of attorneys, if we can properly call it as such, considering
Capalad's claim that Atty. Sahagun was never his attorney.
We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly
who should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.
Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their
29 30 pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of technicalities" 45 for validly
Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section
dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent
481(b)(3)(i)31 of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special
judge."46 In explaining the "concededly strong language," Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of Appeals'
proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals,32 we cited that under Section 1933 of
dismissal of the case shows its "impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity" and such
Republic Act No. 5185,34 city governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function of the city
dismissal "smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court."47
fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city shall be transferred. 35 In the case of Urdaneta City,
however, the position of city legal officer is still vacant, although its charter36 was enacted way back in 1998.
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,00048each payable to this Court
within ten days from notice and we remind them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals
Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as
and judicial officers;49 abstain from offensive language before the courts;50 and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by
the city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer. Under the
the record.51Similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably,
the city's Answer was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared the city's pre-trial brief
and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question was raised against the City Prosecutor's actions until the Lazaro WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the
Law Firm entered its appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-7388
and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in
Civil Case No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun
Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC
from representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.
provides when a special legal officer may be employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality
is a party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta City and the Province of Pangasinan. And
we have consistently held that a local government unit cannot be represented by private counsel 37 as only public officers may act Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
for and in behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private lawyers. 38 Pro bono representation in
collaboration with the municipal attorney and prosecutor has not even been allowed.39
82
Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and
language, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. glaring! x x x

A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 xxxx

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs.
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net

DECISION
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of time, came this
STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily
CARPIO, J.: REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Case
xxxx
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"),
Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. [The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03, 1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM
the Code of Professional Responsibility. in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?

The Facts xxxx

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful 4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the
detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge
Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x
This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of
Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:
xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO
court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the
Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-
COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!
seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax
Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to pay
Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137. xxxx

SO ORDERED.6 7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00
to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)7 dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001
motion"), pertinent portions of which read: THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon.
Pairing Court Judge.
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
xxxx
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is
a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of

83
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a preliminary investigation 23 by the
of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed
Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!8 on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the
Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. 10 In her Explanation,
Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion;
records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case." 12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed
any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice."13She rationalized as follows:
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared
the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine
of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro
pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a
("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents
xxxx
from the practice of law for six months.29 IBP Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and
derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority." 30 Although the remarks were not
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a
style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and whole."31
disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing
judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters involved
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation, except for the
were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x 14
length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months. 32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its
recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment
of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:33
contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15

xxxx
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five
days and a fine of P1,000.16
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the
same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign
this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind
faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." 17 This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we
2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law. 18 raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view
of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused
Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP 5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over." 19At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals. 34(Emphasis supplied)
should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because "[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman." 20
The Court’s Ruling

The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed
an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence
and ignorance21 and violating
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view
of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari") 35 filed before the Court
of Appeals.

84
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders
issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court." 36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has
no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to
dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint
against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has
not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous,
there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable. 37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also
give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s
responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall
be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it
was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a
mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husband’s request but she did not
know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between
the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the
years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own
admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a
ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of
his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the
errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40
85
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption
of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s
assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for
certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.41 This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation
or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.43 This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship
of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his
client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba
acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect." 44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We
disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the
scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts
correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. 46 The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration. 47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s
cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two
administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge
Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well
raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we
suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of
possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing
and sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file the
appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of
a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code. 50
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again
we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them
as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of
this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe
sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents’ personal records as
attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Kincaid and Perkins for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of the attitude
which the judiciary should take interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of
speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding, the facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in
the order of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition are interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The
petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors
and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. Briefly stated the
specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first
told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house
for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the
justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give
him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case.
Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would
pay P50;
86
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him
over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation,
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first
count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion
"that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be
transmitted to the Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing;
documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting
that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had
instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan
and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were
forwarded to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following
information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano
who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and
published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace
Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, on account of the conduct
observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public functionary
who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so
denigrating which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which the undersigned
refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of your Honor and
due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this town to continue in his office, the protection
of the rights and interests of its inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest solemnly guaranteed by the
Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not be administered in accordance with law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad conducts as such justice of the peace, previous
to this time, some respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an administrative case
against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made
against him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace, far from charging his bad and despicable
conduct, which has roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts abovementioned,
as stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his mistaken valor and
heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and
reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt,
and ridicule. All contrary to law.
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition mentioning the investigation before the judge of first
instance, the affidavits upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and
O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia,
and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the
decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed
by the then counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial
court denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed making the following
assignments of error:
1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.
2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel
to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.
3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.
5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the defendants to show that the alleged
libelous statements were true and free from malice.
6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of
all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative and judicial, were properly before this court. As a
matter of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission of the administrative
proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not identified and that the same was immaterial, which objection was partially
sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which the attorney for the defense attempted to
destroy through his objection the very foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall continue to consider all the
proceedings as before us. Not indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The administrative
proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the
evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more
unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by
shutting off all knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the accused. The records in question are attached
to the rollo, and either on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction of the administrative
proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure "a case may be reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this court to call
in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or finally,
because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in administrative cases and of judicial proceedings
supplemental to the basis action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the proceedings
previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can not explain for it was the prosecution which tried to
incorporate Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we
feel warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of freedom of speech and press and
87
assembly and petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain misapprehensions on the
subject and to place these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic
countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal
in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Años" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non,"
which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and by
instituting Filipinos delegates.
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of
the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos
Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and
assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and
won at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions
guarantee to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to
find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, of
April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature
of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law,
for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the American people demanded
before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are
part and parcel of the Organic Law — of the Constitution — of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga
[1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm
of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus
can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless,
as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or
set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q.
B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of
Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and
to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate
or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the
conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow
[1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition
means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-
disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the
words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5
E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to
the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter.
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest
sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or
moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of
privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through
some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case
out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice
then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of
bona fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz
[1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25
Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our
Organic Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these principles.
88
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se.
The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule
words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office
are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published
in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has
not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were
believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly
seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an
investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were
submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note
that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the
recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place
the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of 1917,
secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B.,
344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was
privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been
convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the
causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs.
Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13
Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there
has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had
the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members
of the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged. A later
case and one more directly in point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note
alsoYancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of
constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service,
we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7897 November 23, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FULGENCIO CONTRERAS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellants of the crime of libel.
The articles in question appeared in the "Camarinense," a newspaper published in the Province of Ambos Camarines. The
publication of the articles and the responsibility for the same, if any are admitted by the accused.
The salient features of the articles complained of are as follows:
(From an article published June 9, 1910, entitled "The Babudo Affair.")
We cannot believe, as some suppose, that Governor Perfecto, incapable and powerless to go against the will of Major
Swann and the other Americans, succumbed to the demands of all the powerful, performing an act of shameful fawning.
There is still remains to us a little of the good opinion which we had of him when his government was inaugurated.
(From an article published July 14, 1910, entitled "Balance Semestral.")
What has been his policy during the six month? A policy of intrigue, of fawning and of a submissions. Policies of
cowardice when confronted by another man more powerful than himself, and a policy of oppression toward his fellow-
creatures. And to think that he boasts of being a Nacionalista!
What Rizal said is true: "Man is a creature of circumstances."
An ironical expression which is appropriately applied to those persons who draw their sustenance from the people but
who pay no attention to the groans of the people.
(From an article published August 4, 1910, entitled "Consummatum Est.")
Altogether the postponement in the casting of his vote in order to examine this matter more carefully and submit it to
the municipalities was a most comical farce, put on the stage in order to conceal and shroud his villainous
falsity.lawph!l.net
Because, it is falsity and villainous one too, to promise the people before the elections took place that as soon as he was
made governor he would vote for the single cedula tax, which promise was repeated — as governor — many times on
different occasions and in the presence of many persons, and then to act as did — JUDAS.
(From an article published August 4, 1910, entitled "Gobierno de Parientes.")
What nepotism! We first said that the government of Perfecto was one of favors to his partisans. We must now rectify
this and further reduce the circle, because it is not a government of favors to partisans, but exclusively a government
of "relatives."
It beats by far the motto: "When Sagasta goes up, Sagasta's adherents go up."
Perfecto practices this other one, still more lucrative: "When I go up, my relatives go up with me." ENOUGH.
This is to have neither decorum nor shame.
That these publications are libelous under the statute is beyond question. They tend directly to impeach the honesty, integrity, and
reputation of the person slandered and to expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
89
Men have the right to attack, rightly or wrongly, the policy of a public official with every argument which ability can find or
ingenuity in event. They may show, by argument good or bad, such policy to be injurious to the individual and to society. They
may demonstrate, by logic true or false, that it is destructive of human freedom and will result in the overthrow of the nation itself.
But the law does not permit men falsely to impeach the motives, attack the honesty, blacken the virtue, or injure the reputation of
that official. They may destroy, by fair means of foul, the whole fabric of his statemanship, but the law does not permit them to
attack the man himself. They may falsely charge that his policies are bad, but they may not falsely allege that he is bad.
The defendants had the right to call the attention of the public to the personal or official relations existing between Governor
Perfecto and Major Swann and other Americans. They might comment, fairly or unfairly, upon what he had actually done as a
result of those relations, and what he had actually done upon their representations and initiative. They were justified in dilating
upon those relations and acts and in demonstrating, by arguments good or bad, all of the disasters which they might claim would
follow them. But unless it was true, and they were doing it with good motives and for justifiable ends, they had no right to draw
the inference that he was a coward or that his administration was one of cowardice, or to charge that, when confronted by men
more powerful than himself, he displayed the nature of a weakling and a fawner.
The accused had also the right to call the attention to the preelection promise of the governor and his failure to fulfill that promise
after his election. They had a right to take up and discuss the reasons which he gave for his not fulfilling such promise; and they
were justified in their attempts to show what evil flowed from his failure to live up to it by any argument they chose to present.
But they had no right, unless it was true and they published it with good motives and for justifiable ends, to say that his acts were
the product of villainous falsity and that he carried out his promise in the same manner as Judas.
It is undoubted that the accused might call attention to the fact that Governor Perfecto was appointing a number of his relatives to
public office. They had a right to comment upon what they deemed to be the impropriety of such a policy and to use every argument
to sustain their contention. They had a right to call the attention of the people to what they might claim to be the disastrous effects
flowing from such a policy. But they had no right, unless it was true and they published it with good motives and for justifiable
ends, to assert that, for that reason, he was without shame or decorum in his administration of public affairs.
Men may argue, but they may not traduce. Men may differ, but they may not, for that reason, falsely charge dishonesty. Men may
look at policies from different points of view and see them in different lights, but they may not, on that account, falsely charge
criminality, immorality, lack of virtue, bad motives, evil intentions, or corrupt heart or mind. Men may falsely charge that policies
are bad, but they cannot false charge that men are bad.lawph!l.net
The attempt on the part of the defendants to prove the truth of their allegations resulted in complete failure. While they may have
before election that he did not fulfill after election and that he placed some of his relations in public office, that does not establish
the charge that he was dishonest, that he acted with villainous falsity, and that he was without shame or decorum. The proof of the
commission of an act does not establish at the same time an unjustifiable inference from that fact against the integrity and character
of the man who performed the act proved.
While the defendants were properly convicted, we are of the opinion that the ends of justice will be fully subserved in the present
case by a fine merely, instead of fine and imprisonment.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified and the defendants sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000 each, with subsidiary
imprisonment to each according to law in case of nonpayment, with costs.
July 24, 1930
In re SEVERINO LOZANO and ANASTASIO QUEVEDO.
The petitioner Jose Y. Torres as complainant in this case.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for the Government.
Severino M. Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo in their own behalf.
MALCOLM, J.:
The novel question here presented relates to the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt, the editor and the reporter of
a newspaper, for publishing and inaccurate account of the investigation of a Judge of First Instance notwithstanding the
investigation was conducted behind closed doors, and notwithstanding a resolution of this court which makes such proceedings
confidential in nature. The question arises on the petition of the Attorney-General praying the court to require the editor and the
reporter to show cause, if any they have, why they should not be punished for contempt. The answer of the editor pleads good
faith, while the answer of the reporter relies on no less than ten reasons, some material and some puerile, why the petition should
be dismissed.
Sometime ago, the complaint of an attorney against a Judge of First Instance was by resolution of this court referred to the Attorney-
General for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor-General was designated to conduct the investigation of the
charges, and pursuant to said designation, proceeded to the municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz, to take the testimony of
certain witnesses. The investigation was conducted secretly, as is customary in cases of this character. Notwithstanding, on April
29, 1930, El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano, printed an account of the investigation written
by Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an employee in the office of the Judge under investigation. The opening portion of this article,
as translated from Spanish to English, reads:
NOTES FROM CAPIZ
INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGE GARDUÑO
xxx xxx xxx
CAPIZ, April 25, 1930
The announced investigation of the administrative charges filed in the Supreme Court by ex-attorney Jose
Y. Torres against Judge Garduño was commenced on the 22nd instant in the Court of First Instance of Capiz.
The Solicitor-General, Alexander Reyes, was designated to investigate the charges in behalf of the Attorney-
General, to whom they were indorsed for investigation.
It appears that it was some three months ago that the investigation was begun in the office of the Solicitor-
General in Manila, and that, therefore, the proceedings taken here were but its continuation. The hearing
was held behind closed doors, notwithstanding my desire to attend the same in order to take notes and send
them, for publication, to the newspaper El Pueblo, which I represent as correspondent.
However, behind the screen which shut the door of the investigation room, something could be heard of
what transpired within, and to this circumstance, together with the comments offered gratis et amore in
social circles, are due the present notes of the hearing.
The remaining portion of the article purports to give an account of the evidence of the different witnesses. Regarding this account,
the complainant attorney alleges that the facts therein contained are "false, malicious, and untrue" and that "said report took sides
with the respondent judge . . . and expressed an opinion as to the merits of the same, with the object undoubtedly, to influence the
action of the investigator and the public in general and to obstruct, embarrass or impede the course of the present investigation."
In the same connection, the Attorney-General states that the newspaper report "does not contain a fair and true account of the facts
disclosed at the investigation, . . . creating a wrong impression in the mind of the public and tending to influence improperly the
action of this court in the said pending matter." Under the circumstances, the observations of the Attorney-General must necessarily
be accepted as true.
At the time of publication of the aforementioned article, there was in force a resolution of this court dated January 27, 1922, which
provided "That all proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension
90
or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the final disposition of the matter." In so far
as this resolution relates to the suspension or removal of Judges of First Instance, it finds support in section 173 of the
Administrative Code, authorizing the Supreme Court to conduct inquiries into the conduct of Judges of First Instance "and to adopt
such rules of procedure in that regard as it may deem proper." The reason for the adoption of such a rule is readily explainable and
consists in the practice of litigants and others making vindictive and malicious charges against lawyers and Judges of First Instance,
which are ruinous to the reputations of the respondent lawyers and judges. It was accordingly thought best to keep such matters
secret for the good of the administration of justice until the final outcome of the proceedings could be ascertained.
We come now to a determination of the right of the court to take action in a case of this character. It has previously been expressly
held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court (In re Kelly [1916], 35 Phil., 944). That this power
extends to administrative proceedings as well as to suits at law cannot be doubted. It is as necessary to maintain respect for the
courts, indeed to safeguard their very existence, in administrative cases concerning the removal and suspension of judges as it is
in any other class of judicial proceedings.
The rule is well established that the newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.
The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any
matters which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera
(6 R. C. L., pp. 508-515)
An examination of the authorities discloses that little attention has been directed to facts like those before us, and that in the few
cases which have given consideration to the question there exist divergence of opinions. The English courts are more stringent in
prohibiting the publication of their proceedings than are the American courts. Thus where the petitioner and her solicitor published
a copy of the transcript of the official shorthand notes in a case of a very delicate and private character in contravention of an order
directing that the cause be heard in camera, the presiding judge in England found the petitioner and her solicitor in contempt of
court but accepted their excuses and apologies (Scott vs. Scott [1912], Am. Ann. Cas., 1912-B, 540). A decision of the Supreme
Court of Iowa inclines to general or special rule the publication of testimony pending an investigation has been prohibited, a willful
violation of such rule might amount to a contempt, especially if the rule itself declared the act to be a contempt (State of Iowa vs.
Dunham [1858], 6 Iowa, 245). But in a California divorce case, although the trial court ordered that no public report of the
testimony should be made, and thereafter punished the editor of a newspaper for publishing a report of the trial, on the certiorari
the Supreme Court of California annulled the proceedings of the court under review. As explanatory of this judgment, it should be
said that a fair and true report of the testimony was published and that the result was influenced by the phraseology of the California
law (Re Shortridge [1893], 99 Cal., 526; 21 L. R. A., 755). Along similar lines is the case of Ex parte Foster ([1930], 60 L. R. A.,
631), coming from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and not holding that merely publishing a true statement of the testimony
adduced from the witnesses in the course of a public trial in the courts of justice does not authorize a finding of contempt. To
conclude our review of the pertinent decisions, we desire to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Burns
vs. State ([1911], 145 Wis., 373; 140 Am. St. Rep., 1081), where, in referring to the commendation meted out to the courts of
England, it was said: "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration
of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press."
With reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked first of all that this court is not bound to accept
any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly. What is the best for the maintenance of the Judiciary in the Philippines should be the
criterion. Here, in contrast to other jurisdictions, we need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for
there are no juries to be kept free from outside influence. Here also we are not restrained by regulatory law. The only law, and that
the judge made, which is at all applicable to the situation, is the resolution adopted by this court. That the respondents were ignorant
of this resolution is no excuse, for the very article published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closed doors and
that the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from comments in social circles. Then in writing up
the investigation, it came about that the testimony was mutilated and that the report reflected upon the action of the complainant
to his possible disadvantage.
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent.
The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under to Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizen must be preserved in all of its completenes. But license
or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means of diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.
In recent Federal case (U. S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230, 238, 239), Judge Holmes very appropriately said:
The administration of Justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither
should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid
impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publication which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court,
and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal. . . . .
As has been remarked, the parties plead ignorance in extenuation of their offense. We accept as certain this defense. It is made
known also that other newspapers, particularly in the metropolis, have been guilty of similar acts. That likewise is undoubtedly
true, but does not purge the respondents of their contempt. All facts considered, we desire on the one hand to proceed on the
corrective and not true retaliatory idea of punishment, while on the other giving due notice that practices of which the respondents
are guilty must stop.
It is the holding of the court that the respondents Severino Lazano and Anastacio Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court, and it
is the order of the court that they be punished for such contempt by the payment of a nominal sum by each of them in the amount
of twenty pesos (P20), to be turned into the office of the clerk of court within the period of fifteen days from receipt of notice, with
the admonition that if they fail to comply, further and more drastic action by the court will be necessary.
A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995
IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), per its First Vice-
President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, appellant,
NARVASA, C.J.:
Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual judges, is what is
involved in the proceeding at bar — than which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the
limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order.
1. Basic Postulates
To resolve the issue raised by those facts, application of fairly elementary and self-evident postulates is all that is needed, these
being:
91
1) that the utterance or publication by a person of falsehood or half-truths, or of slanted or distorted versions
of facts — or accusations which he made no bona fide effort previously to verify, and which he does not or
disdains to prove — cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution, and cannot be deemed an activity shielded from sanction by that
constitutional guaranty;
2) that such utterance or publication is also violative of "The Philippine Journalist's Code of Ethics"
which inter alia commands the journalist to "scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to
suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis," and makes it his duty
"to air the other side and to correct substantive errors promptly;" 1
3) that such an utterance or publication, when it is offensive to the dignity and reputation of a Court or of
the judge presiding over it or degrades or tends to place the courts in disrepute and disgrace or otherwise to
debase the administration of justice, constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such after due
proceedings; and
4) that prescinding from the obvious proposition that any aggrieved party may file a complaint to declare
the utterer or writer in contempt, the initiation of appropriate contempt proceedings against the latter by the
court is not only its prerogative but indeed its duty, imposed by the overmastering need to preserve and
protect its authority and the integrity, independence and dignity of the nation's judicial system.
2. Antecedents
This proceeding treats of Emiliano P. Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the "Manila Standard."
He describes himself as a columnist, who "incidentally happens to be a lawyer," remarking that while he values his membership
in the law profession, "such membership is neither a critical nor indispensable adjunct in the exercise of his occupation as a
newspaperman." 2 His column in the "Manila Standard" is entitled "Opinion."
Jurado had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October,
1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time,
anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society.
In light of these abnormal developments, the Chief Justice took an extraordinary step. He issued Administrative Order No. 11-93
dated January 25, 1993, "Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary," 3 reading as
follows:
WHEREAS, the Court's attention has been drawn to the many and persistent rumors and unverified reports
respecting corruption in the judiciary, said rumors and reports not only having been mentioned by media
and in anonymous communications, but having also been adverted to by certain government officials and
civic leaders.
NOW, THEREFORE, by authority of the Court, an Ad Hoc committee is hereby constituted composed of
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and former Justices of the Court, Hon. Lorenzo Relova and
Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as Members, which shall seek to ascertain the truth respecting said
reports and statements, and to this end, forthwith interview at closed-door sessions or otherwise, such
persons as may appear to it to have some knowledge of the matter and who may be appealed to to share that
knowledge with the Court, and otherwise gather such evidence as may be available. The Committee is
hereby authorized to use such facilities and personnel of the court as may be necessary or convenient in the
fulfillment of its assigned mission, and shall submit its report to the Court within thirty (30) days.
Material to the present inquiry are Jurado's published statements from late 1992 to the middle of February, 1993.
1. In his column of October 21, 1992, he wrote of "(j)udges in a number of regional trial courts in Metro
Manila (who) have become so notorious in their dealings with litigants and lawyers that they are now called
the "Magnificent Seven."" He stated that "(i)t has come to a point where lawyers and litigants try their
darndest to stay away from these judges. The answer, of course, is obvious."
2. In his February 3, 1993 column, he adverted to another group, also named "Magnificent Seven," which,
he said, should be distinguished from the first. He wrote: "When lawyers speak of the "Magnificent Seven"
one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makati's "Magnificent Seven" are a bunch of Makati
regional trial court judges who fix drug-related cases. The "Magnificent Seven" in the Supreme Court
consists of a group of justices who vote as one." 4
3. Aside from the "Magnificent Seven," he also wrote about a group which he dubbed the "Dirty Dozen." In
his column of October 21, 1992 he said that there are " . . . 12 judges who have acquired such reputation for
graft and corruption that they are collectively known as the "dirty dozen". These judges, I am told, are not
satisfied with accepting bribes; they actually sell their decisions to the litigants and "solicit" their bids for
what is clearly an auction for the judge's decision."
According to him, the most corrupt judges now are Makati's "Dirty Dozen" judges, supplanting some of
those from Pasay, Pasig and Quezon City; corruption in lower Courts had been admitted by an Executive
Judge in a Metro Manila Regional Trial Court (column of November 9, 1992); and because the "Dirty
Dozen" had given Makati the reputation of having the most corrupt RTC in the country, multi-nationals and
financing institutions explicitly stipulate in their agreements that litigation in connection with these contracts
may be held anywhere in Metro Manila except in Makati; and lawyers confirm that Makati Judges, including
some persons in the sheriffs office, are the most corrupt, where before, Pasay and Quezon City had that
dubious distinction (column of December 1, 1992).
4. In his November 9, 1992 column, he wrote about "a former appellate justice (who) "holds office" at a
restaurant near the Court of Appeals building. He is known as the contact man of five CA divisions. Lawyers
say that this former jurist really delivers." In his column of January 29, 1993, he adverted to the same
unnamed former Justice as being "known for fixing cases for five CA divisions (that is what he tells lawyers
and litigants) for a fee. And if the price is right, the lawyer of the litigant paying can even write his own
decision using a CA justice as ponente. This ex-justice holds court at the mezzanine of a restaurant owned
by the wife of a former Marcos cabinet member and which has become a meeting place for judges, CA
justices, practicing lawyers, prosecutors and even Supreme Court justices. The former CA justice also has
his own Chinese contact. After I exposed this last year, the habitues became scarce. But they are back again,
and the ex-justice is still-doing brisk business."
5. In his column of March 24, 1993, he made the claim that one can "get a temporary restraining order from
a regional trial court in Metro-Manila by paying the judge anywhere between P30,000.00 and P50,000.00."
Other columns of Jurado refer to:
a) a police from the South Capital Command . . . (to the effect) that 8 Makati judges where paid for decisions
favoring drug-traffickers and other big-time criminals, naming the judges and giving detailed accounts of
the bribery (January 30, 1993);
b) a bank, later identified by him as the Equitable Banking Corporation (Ermita Branch), which had "hosted
a lunch at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners" (January 12,
1993); 5
c) the lady secretary of an RTC Judge in Makati who allegedly makes sure, for a fee of P10,000.00 or more,
depending on how much money is at stake, that a case is raffled off to a Judge who will be "extremely
92
sympathetic," and can arrange to have the Court issue attachments or injunctions for a service fee of 1%
over and above the regular premium of the attachment or injunction bond; a Chinese-Filipino businessman
who paid this "miracle worker" P300,000.00 on top of the regular premium on the attachment/injunction
bond (October 27, 1992);
d) Executive Judge de la Rosa, who "has unilaterally decided to discard the rule that cases seeking
provisional remedies should be raffled off to the judges," thus violating the rule that no case may be assigned
in multi-sala courts without a raffle (January 28, 1993);
e) the Secretary of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), who had supposedly gotten that body to nominate
him to the Court of Appeals; and a son and a nephew of JBC members, who were also nominated to the
Court of Appeals, contrary to ethics and delicadeza (January l6, 1993; and January 29, 1993);
f) what he denominates "a major determinant of promotion," i.e., having a relative in the JBC or the Supreme
Court, or having a powerful politician as sponsor, citing specifically, the following nominees to the Court
of Appeals — Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and namesake of the Ombudsman and brother of the head of the
Presidential Management Staff; Rosalio de la Rosa, "nephew of Justice Relova and cousin of Chief Justice
Narvasa;" and the fact that nomination of some worthy individuals was blocked because they "incurred the
ire of the powers that be," e.g., Judge Maximiano Asuncion, Quezon City RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely
identified with former Senate President Salonga (January 25, 1993).
3. Events Directly Giving Rise
to the Proceeding at Bar
What may be called the seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in
the so-called "controversial case" of "Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI)," G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority. 6 A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed in respondent's behalf on September 16, 1992, which has recently
been resolved.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the "Philippine Daily Inquirer" and one or two other newspapers published, on
January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman,
it appears, had been commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and
analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT,
Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion
that the Gutierrez decision "looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT's counsel," 7
As might be expected, the Yerkes "revelations" spawned more public discussion and comment about the judiciary and the Supreme
Court itself, much of it unfavorable. There were calls for impeachment of the justices, for resignation of judges. There were
insistent and more widespread reiterations of denunciations of incompetence and corruption in the judiciary. Another derogatory
epithet for judges was coined and quickly gained currency: "Hoodlums in Robes."
It was at about this time and under these circumstances — particularly the furor caused by the Yerkes opinion that the PLDT
decision was authored by a PLDT lawyer — that Jurado wrote in his column on February 8, 1993, an item entitled, "Who will
judge the Justices?" referring among other things to" . . .
(a) report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong some
time last year — and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a pubic utility firm . . . and
that the trip . . . was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm." 8
This was the event that directly gave rise to the proceeding at bar.
a. Letter and Affidavit of PLDT
For shortly afterwards, on February 10, 1993, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, First Vice President of the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company), addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, submitting his sworn statement in confutation of "the item in the
column of Mr. Emil P. Jurado of the Manila Standard on a vacation trip supposedly taken by six Justices with their families last
year," and requesting that the Court "take such action as may be appropriate." In his affidavit, Samson made the following
averments: 9
xxx xxx xxx
While the name of the public utility which supposedly financed the alleged vacation of the Justices in
Hongkong has not been disclosed in the Jurado column, the publication thereof, taken in relation to the spate
of recent newspaper reports alleging that the decision of the Supreme Court, penned by Mr. Justice Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case involving the PLDT and Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was
supposedly ghost written by a lawyer of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or unfair inference that Emil
Jurado is alluding to PLDT in the said column; and, this in fact was the impression or perception of those
who talked to me and the other officers of the PLDT after having read the Jurado column;
4. In as much as the PLDT case against Eastern Telecommunications Philippines is still sub-judice, since
the motions for reconsideration filed by the losing litigants therein, Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. and NTC are still pending before the Court, we have tried to refrain from making any public
comments on these matters, lest any statement we make be interpreted to be an attempt on our part to unduly
influence the final decision of the Supreme Court in the above described case. However in the interest of
truth and justice, PLDT is compelled to emphatically and categorically declare that it is not the public utility
firm referred to in the Jurado column and that specifically, it has never paid for any such trip, hotel or other
accommodations for any justice of the Supreme Court or his family during their vacation, if any, in
Hongkong last year. It is not even aware that any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred
to in the Jurado column;
5. I further state that neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor anyone in his behalf has ever spoken to me or any
other responsible officer of PLDT about the matter quoted in par. 2 hereof;
6. PLDT further emphatically and categorically denies that it had ever talked to or made arrangements with
any travel agency or any person or entity in connection with any such alleged trip of the Justices and their
families to Hongkong, much less paid anything therefor to such agencies, fully or in part, in the year 1992
as referred to in Par. 2 hereinabove;
7. The travel agencies which PLDT patronizes or retains for the trips, hotels or other accommodations of its
officers and employees are:
a. Philway Travel Corporation
M-7 Prince Tower Cond.
Tordesillas St., Salcedo Village
Makati, Metro Manila
b. Citi-World Travel Mart Corp.
Suite 3-4 Ramada Midtown Arcade
M. Adriatico Street
Ermita, Manila.
The records of these travel agencies will bear out the fact that no arrangements were made by them at the
instance of PLDT for the trip referred to in the Jurado column.
93
b. Affidavit of Atty. William Veto
The Samson affidavit was followed by another submitted to the Court by Atty. William Veto, the "in-house counsel of Equitable
Banking Corporation since 1958," subscribed and sworn to on February 10, 1993, in relation to another article of Jurado. 10 Veto
deposed that on Tuesday, January 5, 1993 he had "hosted a lunch party at the Officers' Lounge, 7th Floor of the Equitable Banking
Corporation Building, Ermita Branch . . . upon prior permission . . . obtained;" that the "expenses for said party were exclusively
from my personal funds and the food was prepared in my house by my wife and served by my house help . . . and four (4) waiters
. . . hired from the nearby Barrio Fiesta Restaurant;" that among the invited guests "were members of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals who . . . were my friends of forty years since our days in law school;" and that the party was held in the lounge of the
bank instead of in "my residence" "unlike in former years . . . because my birthday happened to fall on a working day and my
friends from the Equitable Banking
Corporation . . . suggested that I hold it there (at the lounge) for their convenience because my residence is far from down town."
However, this birthday luncheon of Atty. Veto was reported in Jurado's column (in the Manila Standard issues of January 12 and
28, 1993) as having been "hosted (by the Equitable Bank) at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law
practitioners. . . ." And upon this premise, Jurado indulged in the following pontification: "When those in the judiciary fraternize
this way, what chances before the courts do other lawyers, who are not "batang club," have against others who belong to the
fraternity? In the case of prosecutors and fiscals, what chances do opposing counsels have against those in the fraternity?" (column
of January 12, 1993)
c. Information from Ad Hoc Committee
At about this time, too, the Court received information from the Ad Hoc Committee (created by Administrative Order No. 11-93)
to the following effect:
1) that by letter dated February 1, 1993, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee extended an invitation to
Atty. Emiliano Jurado to appear before it "at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of February 4, 1993 . . . (to) give the
committee information that will assist it in its task," i.e., to definitely and accurately determine the facts as
regards the published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary;
2) that despite receipt of this letter by a responsible individual at the business address of Jurado, the latter
failed to appear at the time and place indicated; that instead, in his column in the issue of Manila Standard
of February 4, 1993, Jurado stated that he was told he was being summoned by the Ad Hoc Committee, but
"(t)here is really no need to summon me. The committee can go by the many things I have written in my
column about corruption in the judiciary. Many of these column items have been borne out by subsequent
events."
3) that another letter was sent by the Chairman to Jurado, dated February 5, 1993, reiterating the Committee's
invitation, viz.:
It is regretted that you failed to respond to the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee to appear at its session
of February 4, 1992. All indications are that you are the person with the most knowledge about corruption
in the judiciary and hence, appear to be best positioned to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its function of
obtaining evidence, or leads, on the matter. You have, I believe, expressed more than once the laudable
desire that the judiciary rid itself of the incompetents and the misfits in its ranks, and we believe you will
want to help the Court do precisely that, by furnishing the Committee with competent evidence, testimonial
or otherwise. Clearly, the purging process cannot be accomplished without proof, testimonial or otherwise,
as you must no doubt realize, being yourself a lawyer.
We would like you to know that the Ad Hoc Committee created by Administrative Order No. 11-93 is simply
a fact-finding body. Its function is evidence-gathering. Although possessed of the authority to maintain and
enforce order in its proceedings, and to compel obedience to its processes, it is not an adjudicative body in
 the sense that it will pronounce persons guilty or innocent, or impose sanctions, on the basis of such proofs
as may be presented to it. That function is reserved to the Supreme Court itself, in which it is lodged by the
Constitution and the laws. Thus, at the conclusion of its evidence-gathering mission, the Ad Hoc Committee
will submit its report and recommendations to the Court which will then take such action as it deems
appropriate.
He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and reflect his beliefs, and there was no need to elaborate further on what he had
written. He expressed his firm belief that justice can be administered only by a judicial system that is itself just and incorruptible,
and the hope that this Court would view his response in this light.
He also made the following specific observations:

The Ad Hoc Committee has scheduled hearings on the 11th and 12th of February, 1993. Mr. Justice Hilario
1. The affidavit of Antonio Samson of the PLDT dated February 9, 1993 was an assertion of the affiant's
G. Davide, Jr. will preside as Chairman at these hearings since I will be unable to do so in view of earlier
belief and opinion and he (Jurado) would not comment on it except to say that while Mr. Samson is entitled
commitments. We reiterate our invitation that you come before the Committee, and you may opt to appear
to his beliefs and opinions, these "bind only him and the PLDT."
either on the 11th or 12th of February, 1993, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon."

2. Atty. William Veto's affidavit substantially corroborated what he had written in vital details; hence,
4) that notwithstanding receipt of this second letter by a certain Mr. Gerry Gil of the Manila Standard, Jurado
further substantiation would be surplusage. In fact, the Supreme Court had confirmed the story in its press
still failed to appear.
statement quoted by him (Jurado) in his January 30, 1993 column. His column about the Veto party
constitutes fair comment on the public conduct of public officers.
4. Statement of the Case:
Resolutions and Pleadings
3. The column about Executive Judge Rosalio de la Rosa merely summarized the position of Judge Teresita
Dy-Liaco Flores on the actuations of Judge de la Rosa and called the attention of the Court thereto, Judge
a. Resolution of the February 16, 1993 Flores' complaint, a copy of which had been sent to the Court Administrator, being on meriting its attention.

After considering all these circumstances, the Court by Resolution dated February 16, 1993, ordered:
1) that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the PLDT herein mentioned be duly DOCKETED,
and hereafter considered and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or
not the allegations made by Atty. Emil Jurado herein specified are true;
4. The "factual and evidentiary basis" of his column of January 30, 1993 was the police report on seven (7)
Makati judges authored by Chief Inspector Laciste Jr., of the Narcotics Branch of the RPIU, South
CAPCOM, PNP, addressed to Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada, a copy of which he had received in the
news room of the Manila Standard. The existence of the report had been affirmed by a reporter of the Manila
Standard, Jun Burgos, when he appeared at the hearing of the Ad Hoc Committee on January 11, 1993.

5. His observations in his columns of January 6 and 29, 1993 regarding the nominations of relatives in the
2) that the Clerk of Court SEND COPIES of the PLDT letter and affidavit, and of the affidavit of Atty.
Judicial and Bar Council echo the public perception, and constitute fair comment on a matter of great public
William Veto to Atty. Emil Jurado, c/o the Manila Standard, Railroad & 21 Streets, Port Area, Manila; and
interest and concern.
copies of the same PLDT letter and affidavit, to Philway Travel Corporation, M-7 Prince Tower Cond.,
Tordesillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila; and Citi-World Travel Mart Corp., Suite 3-4
Ramada Midtown Arcade, M. Adriatico Street, Ermita, Manila; 6. His columns with respect to the "RTC's Magnificent Seven" (October 20, 1992); the "RTC-Makati's Dirty
Dozen" (October 2, 1992, November 9, 1992, and December 1, 1992); the "Magnificent Seven" in the
Supreme Court (February 3,1993); 12 the lady secretary of an RTC Judge (October 27, 1992); and the former
3) that within five (5) days from their receipt of notice of this resolution and of copies of the PLDT letter
Court of Appeals Justice "fixing" cases (January 29, 1993) were all based on information given to him in
and affidavit, the Philway Travel Corporations and the Citi-World Travel Mart Corporation each FILE A
strict confidence by sources he takes to be highly reliable and credible; and he could not elaborate on the
SWORN STATEMENT affirming or denying the contents of the PLDT affidavit; and
factual and evidentiary basis of the information without endangering his sources.

4) that within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of notice of this resolution and of copies of said PLDT letter
and affidavit and of the affidavit of Atty. Veto, Atty. Emil Jurado FILE A COMMENT on said affidavits as
well as the allegations made by him in his columns, herein specified, in which he shall make known to the
Court the factual or evidentiary bases of said allegations.
b. Jurado's Comment
March 1, 1993.
As directed, Jurado filed his comment, dated March 1, 1993.
He explained that he had not "snubbed" the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee, it being in fact his desire to cooperate in any
investigation on corruption in the judiciary as this was what "his columns have always wanted to provoke." What had happened,
according to him, was that the first invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee was routed to his desk at the Manila Standard office on
the day of the hearing itself, when it was already impossible to cancel previous professional and business appointments; and the
second invitation, "if it was ever received" by his office, was never routed to him; and he had yet to see
it." 11 If the impression had been created that he had indeed "snubbed" the Ad Hoc Committee, he "sincerely apologizes."
By necessity and custom and usage, he relies as a journalist not only on first-hand knowledge but also on
information from sources he has found by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot compromise these
sources. He invokes Republic Act No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477, exempting the publisher, editor
or reporter of any publication from revealing the source of published news or information obtained in
confidence, and points out that none of the matters subject of his columns has any bearing on the security
dated of the state.
c. Resolution of March 2, 1993
Subsequent to the Resolution of February 16, 1993 and before the filing of Jurado's comment above mentioned, the Court received
the affidavits of the executive officials of the two travel agencies mentioned in the affidavit of PLDT Executive Vice-President
Vicente R. Samson — in relation to the Jurado column of February 8, 1993: that of Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr., President of the Citi-
World Travel Mart Corporation, dated February 22, 1993, and that of Mrs. Marissa de la Paz, General Manager of Philway Travel
Corporation, dated February 19, 1993. Both denied ever having made any travel arrangements for any of the Justices of the
Supreme Court or their families to Hongkong, clearly and categorically belying the Jurado article.
94
By Resolution dated March 2, 1993, the Court directed that Jurado be given copies of these two (2) affidavits and that he submit
comment thereon, if desired, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
d. Jurado's Supplemental Comment
with Request for Clarification
In response, Jurado filed a pleading entitled "Supplemental Comment with Request for Clarification" dated March 15, 1993. In
this pleading he alleged that the sworn statements of Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr. and Mrs. Marissa de la Paz are affirmations of matters
of their own personal knowledge; that he (Jurado) had no specific knowledge of "the contents of these, let alone their veracity;"
and that the affidavits "bind no one except the affiants and possibly the PLDT." He also sought clarification on two points — as
to the capacity in which he is being cited in these administrative proceedings — whether "as full time journalist or as a member of
the bar," and why he is being singled out, from all his other colleagues in media who had also written about wrongdoings in the
judiciary, and required to comment in a specific administrative matter before the Court sitting En Banc — so that he might "qualify
his comment and/or assert his right and privileges . . . .
e. Resolution of March 18, 1993
Through another Resolution, dated March 18, 1993, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to inform Jurado that the Resolutions of
February 16 and March 2, 1993 had been addressed to him (according to his own depiction) in his capacity as "a full-time
journalist" "who coincidentally happens to be a member of the bar at the same time," and granted him fifteen (15) days from
notice" to qualify his comment and/or assert his rights and privileges . . . in an appropriate manifestation or pleading."
f. Jurado's Manifestation
dated March 31, 1993
Again in response, Jurado filed a "Manifestation" under date of March 31, 1993. He moved for the termination of the proceeding
on the following posited premises:
1. The court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a
journalist.
2. The present administrative matter is not a citation for (a) direct contempt as there is no pending case or
proceeding out of which a direct contempt charge against him may arise, or (b) indirect contempt as no
formal charge for the same has been laid before the court in accordance with Section 3 (Rule 71) of the
Rules of Court.
3. His comments would be more relevant and helpful to the Court if taken together with the other evidence
and reports of other journalists gathered before the Ad Hoc Committee. He perceives no reason why his
comments should be singled out and taken up in a separate administrative proceeding.
It is against this background of the material facts and occurrences that the Court will determine Jurado's liability, if any, for the
above mentioned statements published by him, as well as "such action as may be appropriate" in the premises, as the PLDT asks.
5. Norms for Proper Exercise of
Press Freedom
a. Constitutional Law Norms
In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), the Court underscored the importance both of the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and the reality that there are fundamental and equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced
95
against and accommodated with one and the other. There, the Court stressed the importance of the public interest in the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The Court said: 13
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism
in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion
to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of
these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
. . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable
to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through
which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means
for assuring judges their independence is a free press. (Concurring in Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 [1946]).
Mr. Justice. Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence
of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close
to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must
be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press
and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important
as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the
embarrassment of the parties and the court. (In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio
Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930]).
b. Civil Law Norms
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of "abuse of rights," "one of the most dominant principles which
must be deemed always implied in any system of law." 14 It parallels too "the supreme norms of justice which the law develops"
and which are expressed in three familiar Latin maxims: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere (to live
honorably, not to injure others, and to render to every man his due). 15
Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected rights in the
Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged "to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-
truths — this would not be "to observe honesty and good faith;" it may not be used to insult others; destroy their name or reputation
or bring them into disrepute. — this would not be "to act with justice" or "give everyone his due."
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public
officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment
or accommodation between these two legitimate interest is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking
freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona
fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of
what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating
defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted
point of balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law
norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines. 17a

c. Philippine Journalist's
6. Analysis of Jurado Columns
Code of Ethics

a. Re "Public Utility Firm"

Also relevant to the determination of the propriety of Jurado's acts subject of the inquiry at bar are the norms laid down in "The
Philippine Journalist's Code of Ethics." The Code was published in the issue of February 11, 1993 of the Manila Standard, for
which Jurado writes, as part of the paper's "Anniversary Supplement." The first paragraph of the Code, 16 and its corresponding Now, Jurado's allegation in his column of February 8, 1993 — "that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total
annotations, read as follows: of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong some time last year — and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other
expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip reportedly was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public
utility firm," supra is — in the context of the facts under which it was made — easily and quickly perceived as a transparent
1. I shall scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort
accusation that the PLDT had bribed or "rewarded" six (6) justices for their votes in its favor in the case of "Philippine Long
the truth by improper omission or emphasis. I recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct
Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)," G.R. No. 94374, 18 by not only paying all their
substantive errors promptly.
expenses — i.e., hotel accommodations and all other expenses for the trip — but also by having one of its own travel agencies
arrange for such a trip.
1. Scrupulous news gathering and beat coverage is required. Relying exclusively on
the telephone or on what fellow reporters say happened at one's beat is irresponsible.
As already stated, that allegation was condemned as a lie, an outright fabrication, by the PLDT itself, through one of its responsible
officers, Mr. Vicente Samson, as well as by the heads of the two (2) travel agencies "patronized by it," Ermin Garcia, Jr. and
2. The ethical journalist does not bend the facts to suit his biases or to please Marissa de la Paz, supra.
benefactors.He gathers all the facts, forms a hypothesis, verifies it and arrives at an
honest interpretation of what happened.
That categorical denial logically and justly placed on Jurado the burden of proving the truth of his grave accusation, or showing
that it had been made through some honest mistake or error committed despite good faith efforts to arrive at the truth, or if unable
3. The duty to air the other side means that the journalist must contact the person or to do either of these things, to offer to atone for the harm caused.
persons against whom accusations are lodged. A court proceeding provides for this
balance by presenting the prosecution and then the defense. A news story or editorial
But the record discloses that Jurado did none of these things. He exerted no effort whatever to contest or qualify in any manner
column that fails to present the other side is like a court that does not hear the side
whatever the emphatic declaration of PLDT Vice-President Samson that —
of the defense.

While the name of the public utility which supposedly financed the alleged vacation of the Justices in
4. Correcting substantive errors is the mark of mature newspapers like the New York
Hongkong has not been disclosed in the Jurado column, the publication thereof, taken in relation to the spate
Times, the International Herald Tribune, and some of Manila's papers.
of recent newspaper reports alleging that the decision of the Supreme Court, penned by Mr. Justice Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case involving the PLDT and Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was
d. Right to Private Honor supposedly ghost written by a lawyer of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or unfair inference that Emil
and Reputation Jurado is alluding to PLDT in the said column; and, this in fact was the impression or perception of those
who talked to me and the other officers of the PLDT after having read the Jurado column.
In the present proceeding, there is also involved an acknowledged and important interest of individual persons: the right to private
reputation. Judges, by becoming such, are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct The record shows that he made no effort whatsoever to impugn, modify, clarify or explain Samson's positive assertion that:
which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. 17 Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept from appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having
. . . (the PLDT) has never paid for any such trip, hotel or other accommodations for any justice of the
thereby forfeited any right whatsoever to private honor and reputation. For so to rule will be simply, in the generality of cases, to
Supreme Court or his family during their vacation, if any, in Hongkong last year. It is not even aware that
discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect as a human being in society, from becoming judges, with
any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred to in the Jurado column;
obviously grievous consequences for the quality of our judges and the quality of the justice that they will dispense. Thus, the
protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as
a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free speech. . . . neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor any one in his behalf has ever spoken to me or any other responsible
officer of PLDT about the matter. . .;

96
 . . . PLDT . . . (never) talked to or made arrangements with any travel agency or any person or entity in
connection with any such alleged trip of the Justices and their families to Hongkong, much less paid
anything therefor to such agencies, fully or in part, in the year 1992 as referred to in Par. 2 hereinabove;
What appears from the record is that without first having made an effort to talk to any one from the PLDT or the Supreme Court
to ascertain the veracity of his serious accusation, Jurado went ahead and published it.
His explanation for having aired the accusation consists simply of a declaration that Samson's affidavit, as well as the affidavits of
the heads of the two travel agencies regularly patronized by it, were just assertions of the affiants' belief and opinion; and that he
(Jurado) would not comment on them except to say that while they are entitled to their beliefs and opinions, these were binding
on them only. This is upon its face evasion of duty of the most cavalier kind; sophistry of the most arrant sort. What is made plain
is that Jurado is in truth unable to challenge any of the averments in the affidavits of PLDT and its travel agencies, or otherwise
substantiate his accusation, and that his is a mere resort to semantics to justify the unjustifiable. What is made plain is that his
accusation is false, and possesses not even the saving grace of honest error.
If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as the Journalists' Code states, irresponsible, supra, then indulging in pure
speculation or gossip is even more so; and a failure to "present the other side" is equally reprehensible, being what in law amounts
to a denial of due process.
b. Re Equitable Bank Party
Jurado is also shown by the record to have so slanted his report of the birthday luncheon given by Atty. William Veto (the "in-
house counsel of Equitable Banking Corporation since 1958") as to project a completely false depiction of it. His description of
that affair (in the Manila Standard issues of January 12 and 28, 1993) as having been hosted by the Equitable Bank "at its penthouse
mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law
practitioners . . . , carries the sanctimonious postscript already quoted, putting the rhetorical question about how such fraternization
affects the chances in court of lawyers outside that charmed circle.
When confronted with Veto's affidavit to the effect that the party was given by him at his (Veto's) own expense, the food having
been prepared by his wife in his house, and served by his house help and waiters privately hired by him; that he had invited many
persons including friends of long standing, among them justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals; and that the party
had been held in the Officers' Lounge of Equitable Bank, instead of his home, as in years past, to suit the convenience of his guests
because his birthday fell on a working day, Jurado could not, or would not deign to, contradict any of those statements. He merely
stated that Veto's affidavit substantially corroborated what he had written in vital details, which is obviously far from correct.
Most importantly, the record does not show that before he published that story, Jurado ever got in touch with Veto or anyone in
Equitable Bank, Ermita Branch, to determine the accuracy of what he would later report. If he did, he would quickly have learned
that his sources, whoever or whatever they were, were not to be relied upon. If he did not, he was gravely at fault — at the very
least for disregarding the Journalist's Code of Ethics — in failing to exert bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information.
In either case, his publication of the slanted, therefore misleading and false, report of the affair is censurable. His proffered
explanation that the justices having confirmed their presence at the luncheon, thus corroborating what he had written in vital details
and making further substantiation unnecessary, and that his report constituted fair comment on the public conduct of public officers,
obviously does not at all explain why a party given by Atty. Veto was reported by him as one tendered by Equitable Bank. The
only conclusion that may rationally be drawn from these circumstances is that Jurado, unable to advance any plausible reason for
the conspicuous divergence between what in fact transpired and what he reported, again resorts to semantics and sophistry to
attempt an explanation of the unexplainable. Paraphrasing the Code of Ethics, he failed to scrupulously report and interpret the
news; on the contrary, his failure or refusal to verify such essential facts as who really hosted and tendered the luncheon and spent
for it, and his playing up of the Bank's supposed role as such host have resulted in an improper suppression of those facts and a
gross distortion of the truth about them.
c. Re Other Items
97
Jurado disregarded the truth again, and in the process vilified the Supreme Court, in the item in his column of February 3, 1993
already adverted to, 19 and more fully quoted as follows:
When lawyers speak of the "Magnificent Seven" one has to make sure which group they are referring to.
Makati's "Magnificent Seven" are a bunch of Makati regional trial court judges who fix drug related
cases. The "Magnificent Seven" in the Supreme Court consists of a group of justices who vote as one."
About the last (italicized) statement there is, as in other accusations of Jurado, not a shred of proof; and the volumes of the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) in which are reported the decisions of the Supreme Court En Banc for the year 1992 (January
to December) and for January 1993, divulge not a single non-unanimous decision or resolution where seven (7) justices voted "as
one," nor any group of decisions or resolutions where the recorded votes would even suggest the existence of such a cabal.
This is yet another accusation which Jurado is unable to substantiate otherwise than, as also already pointed out, by invoking
unnamed and confidential sources which he claims he considers highly credible and reliable and which would be imperiled by
elaborating on the information furnished by them. He would justify reliance on those sources on grounds of necessity, custom and
usage and claim the protection of Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477 from forced, revelation of
confidential news sources except when demanded by the security of the state. 20
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately, prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman
may escape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no
obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when
challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the
Journalists' Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his profession to influence popular belief and shape public
opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon
to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his
word for the reliability of those sources.
Jurado's other writings already detailed here are of the same sort. While it might be tedious to recount what has already been stated
about the nature and content of those writings, it is necessary to do so briefly in order not only to stress the gravity he makes, but
also to demonstrate that his response to the call for their substantiation has been one of unvarying intransigence: an advertance to
confidential sources with whose reliability he professes satisfaction and whom fuller disclosure would supposedly compromise.
There can be no doubt of the serious and degrading character — not only to the Court of Appeals, but also to the judiciary in
general — of his columns of November 9, 1992 and January 29, 1993 concerning an unnamed former justice of the Court of
Appeals who had allegedly turned "fixer" for five of the Court's divisions and who, for the right price, could guarantee that a party's
lawyer could write his own decision for and in the name of the ponente; and of his column of March 24, 1993 to the effect that
anywhere from P30,000 to P50,000 could buy a temporary restraining order from a regional trial court in Manila.
The litany of falsehoods, and charges made without bona fide effort at verification or substantiation, continues:
(a) Jurado's column of January 30, 1993 about eight (8) Makati judges who were "handsomely paid" for
decisions favoring drug-traffickers and other big-time criminals was based on nothing more than raw
intelligence contained is confidential police report. It does not appear that any part of that report has been
reliably confirmed.
(b) He has refused to offer any substantiation, either before the Ad Hoc Committee or in this proceeding,
for his report of October 27, 1992 concerning an unnamed lady secretary of a Makati RTC Judge who,
besides earning at least P10,000 for making sure a case is raffled off to a "sympathetic" judge, can also
arrange the issuance of attachments and injunctions for a fee of one (1%) percent over and above usual
premium for the attachment or injunction bond, a fee that in one instance amounted to P300,000.
(c) His report (columns of January 16 and 29, 1993) that the Judicial and Bar Council acted contrary to
ethics and delicadeza in nominating to the Court of Appeals a son and a nephew of its members is
completely untrue. The most cursory review of the records of the Council will show that since its
organization in 1987, there has not been a single instance of any son or nephew of a member of the Council
being nominated to the Court of Appeals during said member's incumbency; and in this connection, he
mistakenly and carelessly identified RTC Judge Rosalio de la Rosa as the nephew of Justice (and then
Member of the Judicial and Bar Council) Lorenzo Relova when the truth, which he subsequently learned
and admitted, was that the person referred to was Judge Joselito de la Rosa, the son-in-law, not the nephew,
of Justice Relova. Had he bothered to make any further verification, he would have learned that at all
sessions of the Council where the nomination of Judge Joselito de la Rosa was considered, Justice Relova
not only declined to take part in the deliberations, but actually left the conference room; and he would also
have learned that Judge Rosalio de la Rosa had never been nominated — indeed, to this date, he has not
been nominated to the Court of Appeals.
(d) He has recklessly slandered the Judicial and Bar Council by charging that it has improperly made
nominations to the Court of Appeals on considerations other than of merit or fitness, through the
manipulations of the Council's Secretary, Atty. Daniel Martinez; or because the nominee happens to be a
relative of a member of the Council (e.g., Judge Joselito de la Rosa, initially identified as Judge Rosalio de
la Rosa) or of the Supreme Court (he could name none so situated); or has powerful political sponsor
(referring to RTC Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and namesake of the Ombudsman). Acceptance of the
truth of these statements is precluded, not only by the familiar and established presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions, but also, and even more conclusively by the records of the Judicial
and Bar Council itself, which attest to the qualifications of Atty. Daniel Martinez, Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court, Judge Joselito de la Rosa, and Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr., for membership in the Appellate
Tribunal;
(e) Equally false is Jurado's report (column of January 25, 1993) that nomination to the Court of Appeals of
some worthy individuals like Quezon City RTC Judge Maximiano Asuncion, and Atty. Raul Victorino (who
was closely identified with former Senate President Salonga) had been blocked because they had "incurred
the ire of the powers that be," the truth, which could very easily have been verified, being that a pending
administrative case against Judge Asuncion had stood in the way of his nomination, and since Mr. Victorino
had been sponsored or recommended by then Senate President Salonga himself, the fact that he was not
nominated can hardly be attributed to the hostility or opposition of persons in positions of power or
influence.
(f) Jurado was similarly unfair, untruthful and unfoundedly judgmental in his reporting about Executive
Judge Rosalio de la Rosa of the Manila Regional Trial Court as:
(1) having been nominated to the Court of Appeals by the Judicial and Bar Council
chiefly, if not only, by reason of being the nephew of Justice Relova and the cousin
of Chief Justice Narvasa, the truth, as already pointed out, being that
Judge Rosalio de la Rosa had never been thus nominated to the Court of Appeals, the
nominee having been Judge Joselito de la Rosa, the son-in-law (not nephew) of
Justice Relova; and
(2) having discarded the rule that cases seeking provisional remedies should be
raffled off to the judges (column of January 28, 1993) and adopted a system of
farming out applications for temporary restraining orders, etc., among all the
branches of the court; here again, Jurado is shown to have written without thinking,
and made statements without verifying the accuracy of his information or seeking the
views of the subject of his pejorative statements; the merest inquiry would have
revealed to him that while Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 requires that no
case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without raffle (for purposes of disposition
on the merits), Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975 (Sec. 15, Par.
IV), 21 empowers Executive Judges to act on all applications for provisional remedies
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(attachments, injunctions, or temporary restraining orders, receiverships, etc.), or on
interlocutory matters before raffle, in order to "balance the workload among courts
and judges, (Sec. l, par. 2, id.), and exercise such other powers and prerogatives as
may in his judgment be necessary or incidental to the performance of his functions
as a Court Administrator" (Sec. 7, par. 1, id.) — these provisions being broad enough,
not only to authorize unilateral action by the Executive Judge himself on provisional
remedies and interlocutory matters even prior to raffle of the main case, but also to
delegate the authority to act thereon to other judges.
Jurado does not explain why: (1) he made no effort to verify the state of the rules on
the matter; (2) he precipitately assumed that the views of Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco
Flores, whose complaint on the subject he claims he merely summarized, were
necessarily correct and the acts of Judge de la Rosa necessarily wrong or improper;
and (3) he did not try to get Judge de la Rosa's side at all.
Common to all these utterances of Jurado is the failure to undertake even the most cursory verification of their objective
truth; the abdication of the journalist's duty to report and interpret the news with scrupulous fairness; and the breach of
the law's injunction that a person act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith both in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.
7. Jurado's Proffered Excuses
and Defenses
The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in justification of these published writings. That invocation is obviously
unavailing in light of the basic postulates and the established axioms or norms for the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set
forth in this opinion. 22
Jurado next puts in issue this Court's power to cite him for contempt. The issue is quickly disposed of by adverting to the familiar
principle reiterated inter alia in Zaldivar v. Gonzales: 23
. . . (T)he Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice
the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any
manner with a case before the Court (In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 [1916]; In re Severino Lozano and Anastacio
Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930]; In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 [1923]; and In re Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil.
595 [1949]). The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(i)t is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the
parties litigant" (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112 [1985]; Andres v. Cabrera, 127
SCRA 802 [1984]; Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1 [1971]; Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel,
20 SCRA 1241 [1967]; Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 [1946]).
Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence parallels a respectable
array of English decisions holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even
when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proceedings. The original doctrine laid down in People vs. Alarcon 24 — that
there is no contempt if there is no pending case — has been abandoned in subsequent rulings of this Court which have since
adopted the Moran dissent therein, 25 viz.:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A
publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is
the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts
and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority,
what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments,
 is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no
contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought
to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 416-417.) Courts would lose their utility
if public confidence in them is destroyed.
The foregoing disposes of Jurado's other contention that the present administrative matter is not a citation for direct contempt,
there being no pending case or proceeding out of which a charge of direct contempt against him may arise; this, even without
regard to the fact that the statements made by him about sojourn in Hongkong of six Justices of the Supreme Court were clearly
in relation to a case involving two (2) public utility companies, then pending in this Court. 26
His theory that there is no formal charge against him is specious. His published statements about that alleged trip are branded as
false in no uncertain terms by the sworn statement and letter of Vice-President Vicente R. Samson of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company which:
(a) "emphatically and categorically" deny that PLDT had made any arrangements with any travel agency,
or with the two travel agencies it patronized or retained, or paid anything, on account of such alleged trip;
(b) positively affirm (i) that PLDT was "not even aware that any of the justices or their families . . . (had)
made the trip referred to in the Jurado column," and (ii) that neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor anyone in his
behalf has ever spoken to . . . (said Mr. Samson) or any other responsible officer of PLDT about the matter
. . .; and
(c) beseech the Court to "take such action (on the matter) as may be appropriate.
As already stated, the Court, in its Resolution of February 16, 1993:
(a) ordered the subject of Samson's letter and affidavit docketed as an official Court proceeding to determine the truth of Jurado's
allegations about it; and
(b) directed also that Jurado be furnished copies of Atty. William Veto's affidavit on the luncheon party hosted by him (which
Jurado reported as one given by Equitable Bank) and that Jurado file comment on said affidavits as well as allegations in specified
columns of his. Jurado was also furnished copies of the affidavits later submitted by the two travel agencies mentioned in Samson's
statement, and was required to comment thereon.
It was thus made clear to him that he was being called to account for his published statements about the matters referred to, and
that action would be taken thereon against him as "may be appropriate." That that was in fact how he understood it is evident from
his submitted defenses, denying or negativing liability for contempt, direct indirect. Indeed, as journalist of no little experience
and a lawyer to boot, he cannot credibly claim an inability to understand the nature and import of the present proceedings.
Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a
journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated
differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in
the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer
for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice,
or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled
out. What has happened is that there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements branding
his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their
publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar — he has been cited in
these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account
99
as a lawyer for his statements as a
journalist. 27 This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions
as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of
public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of
the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability. At any rate, what was said about
the matter in that earlier case is equally cogent here:
Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in question in his capacity
as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. The distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he has
failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is no question of the Court's authority to call him
to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the
Court judge them only as those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But
his actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a person's acts are
determined by, and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and experience. In the case of respondent
in particular the Court will take judicial notice of the frequent appearance in his regular columns of
comments and observations utilizing legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in
pursuing his craft as a journalist he calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his
readers and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly assert that
in exercising his profession as journalist he does not somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon
his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor perhaps even possible, to come to fair, informed
and intelligent judgment of respondent's actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a
lawyer as well as a newspaperman, even supposing, which is not the case — that he may thereby be found
without accountability in this matter.
To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even were the Court to lend ear to his plea that his actions be
judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law
profession of which he is also a member.
8. The Dissents
The eloquent, well-crafted dissents of Messrs. Justices Puno and Melo that would invoke freedom of the press to purge Jurado's
conduct of any taint of contempt must now be briefly addressed.
a. Apparent Misapprehension
of Antecedents and Issue
Regrettably, there appears to be some misapprehension not only about the antecedents directly leading to the proceedings at bar
but also the basic issues involved.
The dissents appear to be of the view, for instance, that it was chiefly Jurado's failure to appear before the Ad Hoc Committee in
response to two (2) letters of invitation issued to him, that compelled the Court to order the matter to be docketed on February 16,
1993 and to require respondent Jurado to file his Comment. This is not the case at all. As is made clear in Sub-Heads 3 and 4 of
this opinion, supra, the direct cause of these proceedings was not Jurado's refusal to appear and give evidence before the Ad
Hoc Committee. The direct cause was the letters of PLDT and Atty. William Veto, supported by affidavits, denouncing certain of
his stories as false, 28 with the formerpraying that the Court take such action as may be appropriate. And it was precisely "the
matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the PLDT" that this Court ordered to "be duly DOCKETED, and hereafter considered
and acted upon as an official Court proceeding;" this, by Resolution dated February 16, 1993; the Court also requiring, in the same
Resolution, "that the Clerk of Court SEND COPIES of the PLDT letter and affidavit, and of the affidavit of Atty. William Veto to
Atty. Emil Jurado . . .," and that Jurado should comment thereon "as well as (on) the allegations made by him in his columns,
herein specified" — because of explicit claims, and indications of the falsity or, inaccuracy thereof.
There thus also appears to be some misapprehension of the basic issues, at least two of which are framed in this wise: (1) the right
of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or "invitations" to appear in administrative investigations," and (2) their right "not to
reveal confidential sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended" — which are not really involved here — in respect of
which it is theorized that the majority opinion will have an inhibiting effect on newsmen's confidential sources of information, and
thereby abridges the freedom of the press.
(1) No Summons or Subpoena
Ever Issued to Jurado
The fact is that no summons or subpoena was ever issued to Jurado by the Ad Hoc Committee; nor was the issuance of any such
or similar processes, or any punitive measures for disobedience thereto, intended or even contemplated. Like most witnesses who
gave evidence before the Committee, Jurado was merely invited to appear before it to give information in aid of its assigned task
of ascertaining the truth concerning persistent rumors and reports about corruption in the judiciary. When he declined to accept
the invitations, the Ad Hoc Committee took no action save to inform the Court thereof; and the Court itself also took no action.
There is thus absolutely no occasion to ascribe to that investigation and the invitation to appear thereat a "chilling effect" on the
by and large "hard-boiled" and self-assured members of the media fraternity. If at all, the patience and forbearance of the Court,
despite the indifference of some of its invitees and projected witnesses, appear to have generated an attitude on their part bordering
on defiant insolence.
(2) No Blanket Excuse Under RA 53
From Responding to Subpoena
Even assuming that the facts were as presented in the separate opinion, i.e., that subpoenae had in fact been issued to and served
on Jurado, his unexplained failure to obey the same would prima facie constitute constructive contempt under Section 3, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. It should be obvious that a journalist may not refuse to appear at all as required by a subpoena on the bare
plea that under R.A. No 53, he may not be compelled to disclose the source of his information. For until he knows what questions
will be put to him as witness — for which his presence has been compelled — the relevance of R.A. No. 53 cannot be ascertained.
His duty is clear. He must obey the subpoena. He must appear at the appointed place, date and hour, ready to answer questions,
and he may invoke the protection of the statute only at the appropriate time.
b. The Actual Issue
The issue therefore had nothing to do with any failure of Jurado's to obey a subpoena, none ever having been issued to him, and
the Ad Hoc Committee having foreborne to take any action at all as regards his failure to accept its invitations. The issue, as set
out in the opening sentence of this opinion, essentially concerns "(l)iability for published statements demonstrably false or
misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual judges."
Jurado is not being called to account for declining to identify the sources of his news stories, or for refusing to appear and give
testimony before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to guarantee the truth of what he publishes, but to exercise
honest and reasonable efforts to determine the truth of defamatory statements before publishing them. He is being meted the
punishment appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and defamatory of the judiciary — stories that he made no
effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable, to substantiate.
c. RA 53 Confers No Immunity from Liability
for False or Defamatory Publications
This opinion neither negates nor seeks to enervate the proposition that a newsman has a right to keep his sources confidential; that
he cannot be compelled by the courts to disclose them, as provided by R.A. 53, unless the security of the State demands such
revelation. But it does hold that he cannot invoke such right as a shield against liability for printing stories that are untrue and
derogatory of the courts, or others. The ruling, in other words, is that when called to account for publications denounced as
inaccurate and misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in the process he
disclose his sources, or (b) to refuse, on the ground that to do so would require such disclosure. In the latter event, however, he
must be ready to accept the consequences of publishing untruthful or misleading stories the truth and accuracy of which he is
100
unwilling or made no bona fide effort to prove; for R.A. 53, as amended, is quite unequivocal that the right of refusal to disclose
sources is "without prejudice to . . . liability under civil and criminal laws."
R.A. 53 thus confers no immunity from prosecution for libel or for other sanction under law. It does not declare that the publication
of any news report or information which was "related in confidence" to the journalist is not actionable; such circumstance (of
confidentiality) does not purge, the publication of its character as defamatory, if indeed it be such, and actionable on that ground.
All it does is give the journalist the right to refuse (or not to be compelled) to reveal the source of any news report published by
him which was revealed to him in confidence.
A journalist cannot say, e.g.: a person of whose veracity I have no doubt told me in confidence that Justices X and Y received a
bribe of P1M each for their votes in such and such a case, or that a certain Judge maintains a mistress, and when called to account
for such statements, absolve himself by claiming immunity under R.A. 53, or invoking press freedom.
d. A Word about "Group Libel"
There is hardly need to belabor the familiar doctrine about group libel and how it has become the familiar resort of unscrupulous
newsmen who can malign any number of anonymous members of a common profession, calling or persuasion, thereby putting an
entire institution — like the judiciary in this case — in peril of public contumely and mistrust without serious risk of being sued
for defamation. The preceding discussions have revealed Jurado's predilection for, if not his normal practice of, refusing to
specifically identify or render identifiable the persons he maligns. Thus, he speaks of the "Magnificent Seven," by merely referring
to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the "Magnificent Seven" in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices
who supposedly vote as one; the "Dirty Dozen," as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an
anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who
reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families. This resort to generalities and ambiguities is an old and
familiar but reprehensible expedient of newsmongers to avoid criminal sanctions since the American doctrine of group libel is of
restricted application in this jurisdiction. For want of a definitely identified or satisfactorily identifiable victim, there is generally
no actionable libel, but such a craven publication inevitably succeeds in putting all the members of the judiciary thus all together
referred to under a cloud of suspicion. A veteran journalist and lawyer of long standing that he is, Jurado could not have been
unaware of the foregoing realities and consequences.
e. Substantiation of News Report
Not Inconsistent with RA 53
It is argued that compelling a journalist to substantiate the news report or information confidentially revealed to him would
necessarily negate or dilute his right to refuse disclosure of its source. The argument will not stand scrutiny.
A journalist's "source" either exists or is fictitious. If the latter, plainly, the journalist is entitled to no protection or immunity
whatsoever.
If the "source" actually exists, the information furnished is either capable of independent substantiation, or it is not. If the first, the
journalist's duty is clear: ascertain, if not obtain, the evidence by which the information may be verified before publishing the
same; and if thereafter called to account therefor, present such evidence and in the process afford the party adversely affected
thereby opportunity to dispute the information or show it to be false.
If the information is not verifiable, and it is derogatory of any third party, then it ought not to be published for obvious reasons. It
would be unfair to the subject of the report, who would be without means of refuting the imputations against him. And it would
afford an unscrupulous journalist a ready device by which to smear third parties without the obligation to substantiate his
imputations by merely claiming that the information had been given to him "in confidence".
It is suggested that there is another face to the privileged character of a journalist's source of information than merely the protection
of the journalist, and that it is intended to protect also the source itself. What clearly is implied is that journalist may not reveal his
source without the latter's clearance or consent. This totally overlooks the fact that the object of a derogatory publication has at
least an equal right to know the source thereof and, if indeed traduced, to the opportunity of obtaining just satisfaction from the
traducer.
9. Need for Guidelines
Advertences to lofty principle, however eloquent and enlightening, hardly address the mundane, but immediate and very pertinent,
question of whether a journalist may put in print unverified information derogatory of the courts and judges and yet remain immune
from liability for contempt for refusing, when called upon, to demonstrate their truth on the ground of press freedom or by simply
claiming that he need not do so since (or if) it would compel him to disclose the identity of his source or sources.
The question, too, is whether or not we are prepared to say that a journalist's obligation to protect his sources of information
transcends, and is greater than, his duty to the truth; and that, accordingly, he has no obligation whatsoever to verify, or exercise
bona fide efforts to verify, the information he is given or obtain the side of the party adversely affected before he publishes the
same.
True, the pre-eminent role of a free press in keeping freedom alive and democracy in full bloom cannot be overemphasized. But it
is debatable if that role is well and truly filled by a press let loose to print what it will, without reasonable restraints designed to
assure the truth and accuracy of what is published. The value of information to a free society is in direct proportion to the truth it
contains. That value reduces to little or nothing when it is no longer possible for the public to distinguish between truth and
falsehood in news reports, and the courts are denied the mechanisms by which to make reasonably sure that only the truth reaches
print.
a. No Constitutional Protection for Deliberately
False or Recklessly Inaccurate Reports
It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to
free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of
falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme Court, 29 while asserting that
"(u)nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea," and that "(h)owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas" (citing a passage from
the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson), nonetheless made the firm pronouncement that "there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact," and "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection (although) . . .
nevertheless inevitable in free debate." "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error," it said, "materially advances society's
interest in "unhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US, at 270, 11 L Ed
2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412. They belong to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v, new Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572, 86 L Ed 1031, 62 S Ct 766 (1942).
"The use of calculated falsehood," it was observed in another case, 30 "would put a different cast on the constitutional question.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that
the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. . . . (T)he knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."
Similarly, in a 1969 case concerning a patently false accusation made against a public employee avowedly in fulfillment of a
"legal, moral, or social duty," 31 this Court, through the late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that the guaranty of free
speech cannot be considered as according protection to the disclosure of lies, gossip or rumor, viz.:
. . . Defendant's civil duty was to help the Government clean house and weed out dishonest, unfit or disloyal
officers and employees thereof, where there is reasonable ground to believe that they fall under this
category. He had no legal right, much less duty, to gossip, or foster the circulation of rumors, or jump at
conclusions and more so if they are gratuitous or groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of speech, which is
guaranteed with a view to strengthening our democratic institutions and promoting the general welfare,
101
would be a convenient excuse to engage in the vituperation of individuals, for the attainment of private,
selfish and vindictive ends, thereby hampering the operation of the Government with. administrative
investigations of charges preferred without any color or appearance of truth and with no other probable
effect than the harassment of the officer or employee concerned, to the detriment of public service and public
order.
b. No "Chilling Effect"
The fear expressed, and earlier adverted to, that the principles here affirmed would have a "chilling effect" on media professionals,
seems largely unfounded and should be inconsequential to the greater number of journalists in this country who, by and large, out
of considerations of truth, accuracy, and fair play, have commendably refrained from ventilating what would otherwise be
"sensational" or "high-visibility" stories. In merely seeking to infuse and perpetuate the same attitude and sense of responsibility
in all journalists, i.e., that there is a need to check out the truth and correctness of information before publishing it, or that, on the
other hand, recklessness and crass sensationalism should be eschewed, this decision, surely, cannot have such "chilling effect,"
and no apprehension that it would deter the determination of truth or the public exposure of wrong can reasonably be entertained.
The people's right to discover the truth is not advanced by unbridled license in reportage that would find favor only with extremist
liberalism. If it has done nothing else, this case has made clear the compelling necessity of the guidelines and parameters elsewhere
herein laid down. They are eminently reasonable, and no responsible journalist should have cause to complain of difficulty in their
observance.
10. Afterword
It seems fitting to close this opinion, with the words of Chief Justice Moran, whose pronouncements have already been earlier
quoted, 32 and are as germane today as when they were first written more than fifty (50) years ago. 33
It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public confidence should be a tribute to
judicial worth, virtue and intelligence. But compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying the courts
the power to vindicate themselves when outraged is another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes
with impunity a discontended citizen to unleash, by newspaper publications, the avalanche of his wrath and
venom upon courts and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and that justice has somewhere been
perverted, law and order require that he follow the processes provided by the Constitution and the statutes
by instituting the corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It might be suggested that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for libel. This
suggestion has, however, no rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the
judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of
justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to
time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and
prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a
judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy
to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior,
force (Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 529; Busteed v. Parson, 54 Ala. 403; Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130;
Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580; 134 N. E. 194). . . .
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy
and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing
them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the "Golden
Rule" and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.
Clearly unrepentant, exhibiting no remorse for the acts and conduct detailed here, Jurado has maintained a defiant stance. "This is
a fight I will not run from," he wrote in his column of March 21, 1993; and again, "I will not run away from a good fight," in his
column of March 23, 1993. Such an attitude discourages leniency, and leaves no choice save the application of sanctions
appropriate to the offense.
hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following
May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.4

WHEREFORE, the Court declares Atty. Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in accordance with Section 6,
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000,00).
a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the
second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor for
A.C. No. 6052 December 11, 2003 Eastern Mindanao Region."

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for regional governors and,
vs.
second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the postponement of the elections
DECISION
especially considering that preparations and notices had already been completed.

TlNGA, J.:
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be premature
considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional governor.
This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification
of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition.6
Philippines ("IBP") Regional Governors’ elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while
petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP
Chapter. Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the
present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National
proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. 7
Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws,
which reads:
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers
up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one month before the national convention, the delegates from
dynamics, to wit:
each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters
in the region.
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their
respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon,
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or
Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The
after the IBP National Convention.
governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the
second year.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with
Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation basis.
reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section
The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a
39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP
chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in
unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board
from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will automatically be the National
to wit: President for the following term.

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement of Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2) National Presidents each.
the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional
receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in
102
turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National
President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque,
Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency.8 The
transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery
of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region
qualified and willing to serve the IBP. 9
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-president and national
president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De
Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on
the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his
client’s funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned
for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act
under the IBP By-Laws.10
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members
during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of
his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice
law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied
upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of
the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainant’s money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. Finally,
on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless
to assume that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in
the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers
had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.15
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed
an Answer and Rejoinder.17

In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment 11 on the Petition.
the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position
stated in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has as yet
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors."20
contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve
the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners’ legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a
provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides
for is only an election protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only members
from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution
the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees.12
of two sub-issues, namely:

Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
his chapter membership.13 He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws,
thus:
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, (3) whether the present Petition is premature;
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature, whether respondent De Vera is
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less
than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election. Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the
present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court jurisdiction of the IBP.
which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a rules affecting the IBP, thus:
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence
is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his
IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer ....
was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship. 14
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(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall to hear and decide the present controversy.
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him, respondent De Vera argues
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election
protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the announcement of
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads: receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and
hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following
May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The
are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice just anybody.
of law in the Philippines.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the position of regional governor.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded provision in the intervening 1973 This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
Constitution21 through all the years have been the sources of this Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar.
The term "Bar" refers to the "collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys." 22 Pursuant to this power of
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior to the
supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar
casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates
Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. 23 Not long after, Republic Act No.
in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the
639724 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on
Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance
January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines,"
with Section 40.
we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated
pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before, members
of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court,
election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more
ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 25 of the
than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in
IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists
recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15, 26 the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP
were distributed to all the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for
elections, whether local or national. Section 4427 empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of
Governor for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and certified
the Board of Governors.
elected by the Chairman.32

On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the nomination
elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the
and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of the
elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election committing acts in
violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as
well as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation
stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not basis of one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering." of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election by the House of Delegates
of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the
former system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on
a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President
upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors
shall be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated
among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates
from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The grounds for
disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is
diminished as the rotation process operates.

104
The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-political33 and effective in
the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing
to the growth and progress of the Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on disqualification proceedings. Consequently,
under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper
persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He
argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur
and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring
the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth
the grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur
and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern
Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner
Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent
De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be
nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of
candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that
respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place
of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners
aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. -
....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the
chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to
gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where
he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering one’s preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of
more than one chapter at the same time.
105
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as
long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each member shall maintain
his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers
his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three
months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One
month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of
IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De
Vera’s transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance
with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Vera’s transfer was made effective sometime between
August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held
all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers
and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27,
2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead
of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of governor
of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be
barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from
which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in
the government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship.
For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the
House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member’s standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long
as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving
lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by
final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme Court
during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Court’s Decision dated 29 July
2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De
Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted
hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Vera’s statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare
the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still
undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor
the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that it has a P500 million slush
fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague," the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for All
Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions,
probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. " 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered
the same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute."44 He explained that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court
to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. 45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect
contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as "an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
106
modesty or good morals."48 The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends
on the circumstances attending the violation of the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity.1âwphi1 Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public
when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as
evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he
explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered
his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case
to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint
affects respondent De Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century
Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is
hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with
deliberate speed.
A.M. No. AC 4762 June 28, 2004
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint1 with the then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging
respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for
"having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he
was still alive, the sum of ₱763,060.00." According to complainant, respondent’s unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly
triggered the death of her husband, who died "disillusioned and embittered."2 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that
notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still
refused to pay the amount represented by the eight checks which had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty.
Presquito’s refusal to pay may be due to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC
(Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).
The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to complainant’s late husband, Mr. Virgilio M.
Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding
the sale of his piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion between Mr. Espino and
the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to respondent. 3Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and
respondent,4 the purchase price of the land was ₱1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments. 5 Pursuant to the
terms of payment in the agreement, respondent issued eight post-dated checks, totaling ₱736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered
into a joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its
development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. 7 The land was eventually titled in the name of
respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment
from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from
respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June
1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed
"fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to
respondent, stemmed from complainant’s lack of knowledge as to "the real story" of the transaction between complainant’s
husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the imputation that he was banking on the influence of his father-
in-law and uncle-in-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however, is that the nonpayment was justified
by the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had
made assurances that the land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent later found out that such road-right-
of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe.
According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of
the same until the right-of-way problem of the land had been resolved.8 Respondent’s position is that until the problem of obtaining
a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be "very
unfair and unjust" for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed and sold. 9
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of
the land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case. He
later on manifested that he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same advances and
incurred expenses.10
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997,11 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found that "the facts and credible
evidence made available in this case indubitably establish respondent’s failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics." For having failed to act with candor and fairness toward
complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and
ordered to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name
of respondent and his business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution
adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding that "respondent’s lack of fairness and
candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty
demanded of him by the Lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however,
the recommended penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondent’s gross misconduct.
Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement between respondent and
complainant’s late husband for the sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said
agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-right-of-way.
Complainant’s exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6, 1999, 13and were admitted without objections from
respondent.14
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of
the eight checks.
107
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998 until Commissioner Dulay’s report on
November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to
prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondent’s own statements
- which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to
cross-examination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen
documents to his comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino
(for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other
than his own allegations.
Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,15especially in the
light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more
time to prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14, 1998. Two
years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or
documentary evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for
travel expenses of his witnesses.16 We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented
respondent from presenting the originals of the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged advances
and costs on Mr. Espino’s behalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the
absence of testimony, respondent could have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done
himself in Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option. 17 But he did neither.
All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not present evidence because there really
was none to justify his nonpayment.18
Even if we were to excuse respondent’s procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as testimony, we agree with
Commissioner Dulay that respondent’s problems with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse
his nonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of respondent….We note that respondent
has already taken title over the property together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainant’s late husband, sign
over the property by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondent’s position vis-à-vis the widowed
complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed responsibility for the negotiations on the
road-right-of-way and was aware of the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem
only as an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of what is due her. Respondent
also alleges and blames the deceased husband of complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They
are just bare allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the business venture
and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannot be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondent’s
actuations in the whole transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the bar.
Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he has unreasonably delayed and failed
to account with complainant for a long time and the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic]
unacceptable and censurable behavior for a member of the bar.19 [citations omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties
for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late husband, 20 first by
allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was
forced to file this complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that
the property of complainant and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares’ name, the injustice of respondent’s
different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due and unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious effects to public On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
interest and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel,21 that the issuance of worthless checks received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of
constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager. 5 The notice was signed by respondent.
professional duties as a member of the bar.22 He not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but
also transgresses the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco),
promote the respect for law.
who were not members of the then current Board,6 Gerango, complainant’s predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board,
declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities,
good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members
and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their
of the bar.23 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue
removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties
to be an officer of the court.24 Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
of their positions.7

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for
annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.
xxx xxx xxx
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCO’s By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RD’s
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.

Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless checks - Lao v. Medel,25Co v. In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we find respondent’s reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO
THE SAME11
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land,
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12
which has been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.

X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL13

A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010

X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
THE LAW14
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,
vs.
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
(GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL15

DECISION
Despite the Court’s grant,16 on respondent’s motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment.
The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others recommendation.20
based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-
complaint did not indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial
It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:
court granted.2 Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied 3

1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938
the following:
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw
them.4
1.1 Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal [processes].

108
 1.2 Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyer’s oath, particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.21
Respondent’s counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of
the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent.22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but
respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had
already been previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of
merit.261avvphi1
On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent
violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer’s
Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a
lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
109
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court’s
subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed
as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.29 (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that
he had filed a case for her when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe
penalty this time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of
Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
A.C. No. 7922 October 1, 2013
MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty. Albert T. Villaseca for gross and
inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal Case No. 10309-02 – a case for
estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant
and her husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant
maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties
as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent during court hearings
but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC
to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter2 in the special
power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit
one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of
the dates of the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case
number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in handling the case resulted in her
own and her husband’s conviction.
In the Court’s Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment,4 refuting the allegations against him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he
made known to the complainant that the testimony of a handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to
produce the original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as his numerous
motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended for delay. He denied having collected appearance fees when he
did not attend the scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his services
in the other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately corrected the case number in the
notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBPs’ Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag recommended
that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villaseca’s reckless and gross negligence deprived his clients of due process; his
actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients’ life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty.
Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the RTC to submit
this pleading, and waived his right to present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a memorandum only. Commissioner
Hababag concluded that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to properly attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villaseca’s period of suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to
one (1) year.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP’s findings. We, however,
increase Atty. Villaseca’s period of suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.9
The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To
recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July
1, 2004, the RTC gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a demurrer to evidence.
110
Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without offering any explanation why he failed to do so. As a result,
the RTC issued an order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such omission constitutes inexcusable
negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from
the time the RTC granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his
right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villaseca’s actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villaseca’s failure to file a demurrer to evidence, the RTC set the initial presentation
of defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing was postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8,
2005 due to Atty. Villaseca’s failure to appear;12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty. Villaseca’s
motion;13 and the November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of Atty. Villaseca’s manifestation that his
intended first witness was unavailable.14 During the March 1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense would no
longer present any evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a memorandum. 15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until March 1, 2006 only to manifest
that he would no longer present any evidence. We are at a loss why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the
defense, considering that the accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness remained uncontroverted. To make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing on
June 6, 2007without informing him that it was already the date of the promulgation of judgment.1âwphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."16 It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence."17 It
also states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."18
Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the
liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented prosecution
evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her husband to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a
memorandum. Or, at the very least, the reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP
and to this Court. But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file,
despite the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in this first line of defense for his clients, it
should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this,
leaving the lower court with no evidence to appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his clients’ cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause. A memorandum, no matter how
lengthy, should not be made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor
of the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals
and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility
of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and he
should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client.19 A lawyer’s diligence and vigilance
is more imperative in criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. As we explained
in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title,
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of
and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts."21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBP’s recommended penalty of one year’s suspension from the practice of law
is not commensurate to Atty. Villaseca’s transgressions. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the
courts and society indicate a high degree of irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we suspended Atty. Luna B. Avance from the
practice of law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil
case entrusted to Atty. Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for reconsideration
(which she had filed way beyond the reglementary period), she told her client that she would file a petition for certiorari before
the CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She did not file this petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission.
Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped appearing as counsel for her client without notifying the latter.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27,
1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis
pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was
granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt
of Court.3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:

ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal matter entrusted to him involved not
merely money or property, but the very liberty and livelihood of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
handle the complainant’s criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and to champion ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Honor. May we know
their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, from the record if the Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.
Atty. Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
clients. INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.
All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients’ cause; his failure to exercise due diligence in attending
to their interest in the criminal case caused them grave prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed your office to register lis pendens
the practice of law to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose of protecting of the complaint in connection with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
the interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public. Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.
WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 ATTY. BUGARING: May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds was furnished with a
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years, copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.
with more severely.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not
informed by the receiving clerk of our office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office morning the subpoena, your Honor.
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this receiving
clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,
irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There is
Cavite, respondent. no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.
DE LEON, JR., J.: COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done.
contempt of court.1âwphi1.nêt ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet come
home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor

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 please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that
COURT:
offend You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he has
this Court your Honor please. not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have
an orderly proceedings in this case.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering that the order
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape. we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written opposition your
Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor please
if this representation is being …. COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refusal of
the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty.
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May 1 have the record please.
Honor please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am willing now to
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.
testify.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly. Because this Court
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt
believes that the root of the matter started from that. After the submission of the …. What are you suppose to submit?
proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. BUGARING: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.
going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented. documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing…. COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence.
4
ATTY. BARZAGA : Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records. ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please …
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits COURT:
which are Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment.
part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor please….
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings
proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the
and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your
meanwhile.
evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor. smoothly.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga? ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedings. With
a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed that the motion
trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor
for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record
of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996,
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
March 29, 1996, respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from
Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register regarding this notice of LisCOURT: Pendens And this Court declares that you are out of order.
pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we
pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the
have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor.
attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the
annotation of the lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your Honor.COURT:
However, If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.
your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows,
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court of this representation ever since I
'Wherefore in view of the above, the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province of
appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248,
51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).' COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence. ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

112
COURT: Do that right away. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of
the Court for an orderly proceeding.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented. While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not…. out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows
better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment. Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,'
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want. Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place
him under detention.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance,
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules. even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of
Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse. commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor
please, I've been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor.
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00. 6
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I
am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order citing
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please. him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996. 7
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the
Honor.
annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of
you see to it that this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo) court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video camera who
was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation
to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court)
the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December
5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being
disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of
P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996
issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED
RETURNED to the petitioner.

The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman
was in tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER
being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court. OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE
OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 11
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and
right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the
second call, Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful
of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
considering that the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
We disagree.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to
argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation.
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Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a
fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court,
or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both,
if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing
the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client – by persisting
to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was
bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656).
He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes,
in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, "Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct
Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect
December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which on November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered
enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case". the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and
within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.
duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the administration of
justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out
of the original fine of P3,000.00.
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in
behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise
G.R. No. L-27662 October 29, 1968
(pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which
obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing Officer of Regional
his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law,
Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with
fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to
"exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using
said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the
Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. 12 FERNANDO, J.:

Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing
counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding,
and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administrative of justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as
in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. 14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in
the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity
to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during
he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.15
114
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give due course to a certiorari and
prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and
earnest protestations of petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more fully
explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, through its
referee, considered a complaint filed against it by the other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision
after he and a physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February 24, 1967.1 Then came,
according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7, 1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present
evidence on his behalf.2 It was denied in an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as
employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was also pointed out in such order that
there was no plea in such motion for reconsideration for such decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic." 3 It was then alleged
in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner
was not aware of any decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its counsel. 4 After a
denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was
granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14,
1967, by virtue of the above writ of execution.5
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due process, the actuation of respondent
Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought,
seeking a writ of preliminary injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of
petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all the proceedings in RO4-WC
Case No. 5503, thereafter making the injunction permanent, and ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00
as attorney'sfees. Thus was imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as subsequent
pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662 (Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to
dismiss) to the petition for prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders from
this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later pleadings, revealed quite a
different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due
process having been summarily disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the serious and debilitating ailment
of tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition should be, as it is hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be deemed conclusive, can yield no other
conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded
evidence, it appears that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week and
receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was assigned in the Research Division which
conducted research on rat traps and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the
claimant and his witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was
polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of work was also warm and humid in view of the
products being manufactured by the respondent. He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy
objects in the painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used. Sometime in July, 1966
while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood
or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic,
active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon.
According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the
lungs. When he was admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other anti-TB drugs.
His clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing followed by expectoration of fresh blood
amounting to two glassful [when] he was brought to the Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From
that hospital he was transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending physician testified
further that the right lung had bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the
left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but
the illness was not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified on cross examination that the
nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance
in view of the enormous inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's present condition.
According to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness through the general manager and in view of the
respondent's refusal to pay him disability compensation despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim." 6
115
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case ... whether ... there is sufficient or
substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The
evidence on record is crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point that the
illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view of his work as laborer involving strenuous
physical exertion which brought about the lowering of his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to
the extent that he was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on record that
claimant was sick upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was normal in every respect during the first period of
his employment and the disease of pulmonary tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was
assigned in the research division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's exposure to his work
aggravated the illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to dispute the work connection as there is no showing that
claimant's ailment was due to the lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the
respondent."7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to rely on the alleged deprivation of
due process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been disregarded. No further attention should
be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed
to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of petitioner for its four-page
memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need
not detain us further as it ought never to have been raised in the first place.
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel
Corpuz. Petitioner would emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel, who was
without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it had not received a copy of a
decision which could not thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein. 9 As set
forth in such reply memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on March 10,
1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said decision alleging that he was no longer
handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already
Atty, Camacho who was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of the case."10 In
view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty. Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around
he handed the copy of the decision to the receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name
of the Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of Decision, ..." 11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for Petitioner refused to receive the
copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when
in fact and truth the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by the
attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection on the actuation of counsel for
petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have
this Court believe that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it was stated that a
copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why
Guzman did not serve a copy of the decision to him. He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part
to accept a copy of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the duties of a service
officer, fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission would
appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire to rely on every conceivable may be difficult to approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty standard took
defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent unconcern.
most favorable light on a course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear counsel
of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility aside, it made evident why, to repeat the
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. With treble costs against
effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such a constitutional requirement. An
A.C. No. 6289 December 16, 2004
effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own
counsel. True, there was a denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no reason
why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such misinformation, if there where no such JULIAN MALONSO, complainant,
attempt to mislead. vs.
ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was merely performing its official
function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by
its failure to follow the regular procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from what the law requires, if there
were no such intervening cause that resulted in his going astray. How could petitioner escape responsibility?
DECISION

Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit thereby? The answer cannot be in
doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just
claim. For it is to be noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to respondent Abitria
on the facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need for the compensation due him was and the consequent
temptation to settle for less if in the meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the TINGA, J.:
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it were an honest mistake, the
consequences were still deplorable.
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are
paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even the Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it could validly avoid its liability to do so.1
under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its
employment was indeed compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of November 21,
1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a In a Complaint2 for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed
valid defense. It did not do so because it could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered his appearance as Malonso’s counsel in the expropriation proceedings
situated are impressive for their number and unanimity.13 initiated by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally
representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the NAPOCOR by way of attorney’s fees
and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-owner of Malonso’s property.3
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty of justice and fairness, would be
the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if
such a gross perversion of its dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification of In his Answer,4 respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was
all our efforts to promote social justice14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection to labor. 15 engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa,
as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.5 The Contract states in part:
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due respondent Abitria. The unseemly
conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof. The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:

It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite another thing, and this is to put it I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment
at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what of just compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR;
is justly due and demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-stricken man suffering
from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following conditions:
beyond the means of our poverty stricken masses.

A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and other related
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be kept in mind by everyone who is
activities;
enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious
responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and far from honorable. What happens B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees;
then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal

116
 C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY: In his Reply,7 Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, considering that while the Contract of Legal
Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much
later date, 27 November 1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since he already had his
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members;
own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume
of work involved;
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by SANDAMA and his law firm is a
continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
a later date. Likewise, as a member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organization’s commitments. 8

i.) Attorney’s Fees of FIRST PARTY;

The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:

ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;

iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said member executed a special power of
attorney6 in favor of Elfa, which served as the latter’s authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized
Elfa in the following manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 92 New York St. Cubao,
Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA,
nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, upang
gumanap at umakda para sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation proceedings against several
lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
On April 1, 1997, a "Contract of Legal Services" was entered into between the law firm "Principe Villano and Clemente
Law Offices" and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation)
represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation
proceedings. Complainant is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan" in favor of Danilo Elfa
appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPC’s Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the expropriation cases by
paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred
Pesos (P103,413,200.00).

1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa pagbebenta ng akin/aming More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was represented therein by
lupa, sa National Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na may Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From
Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants."

2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano man maging sa About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his "Notice of Entry of
hukuman o alin man sa mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng Appearance" (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in
akin/aming lupa; said case.

3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat, matuwid at makabubuti para
sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng karapatan at kapangyarihang
lumagda sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G. Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN
MAN SIYA DAPAT AT WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter
that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the respondent’s law firm to represent them in
the expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an "Opposition" to respondent’s entry of appearance and motion to separate
legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Attorney’s Lien" claiming 40% of the selling price of the properties
being expropriated by NPC.

DITO’Y AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang kumilos at magsagawa upang
isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang dito ay iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang
kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang mismong nagsasagawa, at dito’y AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng
kanyang gawin na nasa aming naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na Karapatang ito.
On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Adverse Claim" before the Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming
40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to
be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.

117
 On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted by the lot owners and
NPC for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the compromise agreement
between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed.9
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate being, and respondent’s law firm.
SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of
the properties being expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not
SANDAMA, and that said power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into the Contract of Legal Services. Thus,
the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could not be derived from the said documents.10
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the
profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to
protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law profession, the improvement of the
administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. 19Despite its duty to
police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" and "to abstain from
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."20 Respect for law is gravely eroded when
lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very
rules formulated for their observance.21 For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the explanation 22 of Atty. Carlos L.
Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for respondent’s case that:

…Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from two years to one year
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from the above-mentioned documents. A
suspension. Since there was already a consensus, the Board did not hold a formal voting. A formal voting became
contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries.
unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that the decision of the Board became unanimous.
Even Elfa, the attorney-in-fact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation proceedings and thus Atty. Principe
has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its members. I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was observed and the Rules governing the
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both parties, Atty. Principe was guilty of
misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. 11 In The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from the wrongful condemnation and that
representing himself as Malonso’s and the other lot owners’ legal counsel in the face of the latter’s opposition, Atty. Principe was only the guilty are meted out their just due. These rules cannot be taken lightly. 23
found to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-owner of properties being
expropriated and his filing of several actions to frustrate the implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241
make his conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension from the practice
which was reached through a mere consensus, and not through a formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As
of law. 12
to the issue of the protracted investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the investigation
period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
In its Resolution13 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
CBD Case No. 01-848
Sec. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
Julian Malonso v. Atty. Pete Principe
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer
oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this proceed ex parte.
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless
10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.

...
In his Appeal Memorandum,14 respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 has no factual and legal basis, the
complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15 According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to investigate the Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. — (a) …
instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension granted by the
Supreme Court.16 Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere
consensus, and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there were only five (5) (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
governors present.17 Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known
intention to run for IBP National President.18 together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:

We find for the respondent.

118
 Sec. 6. Board of Governors. — the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall
be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each
Region….
…
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time and place as it shall designate.
A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business….
From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a
review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for
this rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body
and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body
which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.24 Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Board’s resolution. Without a vote having been
taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01-848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a fellow lawyer and fellow governor’s
reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline
and protection of its members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost
entirely on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be deplored. 25 And yet the IBP Board of Governors,
despite clear evidence to the contrary, and without any remorse, even asserted that "due process was observed and the Rules
governing the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied."
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the case. 26 However, on many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public
interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.27 In
view of the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it. 28
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, there is need to dwell first on a dimension of
expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its own.
There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination by the courts of the authority
of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of commissioners, of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the
suit, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. 29 During this stage, the main bone of contention is the
valuation of the property concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not more, than the first stage which refers to the
issue of "public purpose." But as it frequently happens, as in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested.
Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the
leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the
services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of
court and relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the same order
which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally
resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise
119
agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer
in the person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members and from that
of its officers who manage and run its affairs.30 The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors,
officers and employees, are its sole liabilities.31 Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of
a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former. 32 Thus, as summed
by the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation
cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as
that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene and claim from the individual
landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondent’s firm so as to
make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed
towards the promotion of the landowners’ common interest. It presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and
represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members,
with whom he entered into a contract for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his
firm’s services. After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of
authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of the selling price of the lands to be
expropriated, the same amount which was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA.
Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked
for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA
get the funds to pay for the legal fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondent’s legal services were disengaged by SANDAMA’s new President Yolanda Bautista around the same time when
the SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit.
With all these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of his lawful
compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the prevailing attitude of the
SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the
landowners. The hairline distinction between SANDAMA and its individual members’ interests and properties, flowing as it does
from a legal fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to promote business intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is
simply too tenuous, impractical and even unfair in view of the circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying the penalty recommended. While filing
the claim for attorney’s fees against the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that
he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his
firm’s services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent
and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their
properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the appraisers,
and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with
NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the compromise
agreement for the court’s approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondent’s law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having
received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to
SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business
venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. 33 It is but natural that he Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former
protect his interest, most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.34 position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement computed as follows:

Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into by the lot owners and 3. CRISANTO CONOS
NAPOCOR.35 Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the
ultimate outcome of an independent action to recover attorney’s fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such Backwages:
action against SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his
services.36 Such independent action may be the proper venue to show entitlement to the attorney’s fees he is claiming, and for his Basic Wage:
client to refute the same. 37 If respondent could resort to such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome and portends
to be more protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason to preclude him from filing mere motions such as the ones he resorted
to for the purpose of providing what he perceives to be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not proscribed 2/21/98 – 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.
from seeking recovery of attorney’s fees for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. As to whether P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
he would succeed in the quest, that is another story which obviously does not have to be resolved in this case. 10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or 11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.
unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00
the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. 38Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. 39 P239,236.40
13th Month Pay:
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply 1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36
with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.
SILP
A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006 2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33 mos.
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355] P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS, complainants, P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12 = 1,117.50
vs.
1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20 mos.
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12 = 2,083.33 4,053.05

DECISION
P263,225.81

CARPIO MORALES, J.: xxxx

7. RONALD SAMBAJON
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose (same as Conos) 263,225.81
A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, 9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," (same as Conos) 263,225.81
for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents. Said case
was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike. Total Backwages P2,370,674.38

By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal Strike case, and declared the employer-
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages including the various monetary
clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed:
claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's
fees of all sums owing to complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for lack of merit.
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution. 5
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for
union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC

120
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February 27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn
to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent,
the Labor Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order dated March 9, 2004. 6
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the
administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, "frustrated"
the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent, together with his clients
Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203.7
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an
investigation of the administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be
reprimanded therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an Officer of the Court on
whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to seek redress against
a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the
performance of his duties as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and preserve
his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due execution of the questioned RELEASE
WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING
resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the identities of the
herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true
and real identities of person executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of regularity unless proven otherwise,
such was proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed the despicable act would seem to
be fairly debatable under the circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation
of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
121
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC, assailed the IBP Board Resolution.
The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel
received the Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could not
reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the present petition, in the interest of
justice, this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those whom he met face to face before
Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens
to add though that he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before Arbiter
Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan16 claim otherwise, however. And the Minutes17 of the
proceedings before the National Conciliation Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast,
Inc., Labor Dispute," which minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's claim that he had not met
complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004 on the request of his clients who
"told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective
quitclaims and waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the parties who executed the
Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients'
interest, especially given the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His answers to
the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your client would go to the deserving
employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call it before a precedent in
February of 1998 when my client directly made settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original
complainants, Your Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because
it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a dispute settled between the parties is that we let
them do the discussion, we'll let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to
say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not terminate as in this case,
Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the signing of the
documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2, so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent
them in that proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG: The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?

My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet there would be a signing of ATTY. SUING:
Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.
ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no complaints, Your Honor.
When you say they whom are you referring to?
COMM. HABABAG:
ATTY. SUING:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you just rely on your
precedent, is that what you mean?
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:

Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking and it is my client who knows
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give us a simple
them better than I do, Your Honor.
[sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single
document where all the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your Honor, is that
COMM. HABABAG: so that each of them will be there together and they will identify themselves, see each other para ho
siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in
February of 2004 it was made for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the document that I
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office because
prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one document.
there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release, it that clear?

COMM. HABABAG:
ATTY. SUING:

Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?
Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:

I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there are already people there, the
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended for the payment of these
seven complainants plus another woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
workers?

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

ATTY. SUING:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
I did not ask.
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

COMM. HABABAG:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?
xxxx

ATTY. SUING:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive
COMM. HABABAG: witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would

122
exert vigilance to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his presence at the Office ATTY. SUING:
of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
ATTY. SUING:
COMM. HABABAG:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s] are properly signed and that
these people are properly identified and verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver and
Santos.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang nagmakinilya nito?

That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a compromise agreement with his clients
MR. RODIL:
in which he "did not participate" and from which no problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of
going to the Labor Arbiter's office — "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed
the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.20 That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his COMM. HABABAG:
clients' interest. But he was not and he did not.
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang gumawa nito?
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence." A lawyer
serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes
MR. RODIL:
entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of
his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of
law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the Matagal na ho yan eh.
client.
xxxx
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure of care
and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All
that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. x x COMM. HABABAG:
x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente Santos para pirmahan
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
MR. RODIL:
COMM. HABABAG:
Si attorney po.
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong Receipt Waiver
and Quitclaim? ATTY. SUING:

MR. RODIL: Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?

Sila po. MR. RODIL:

COMM. HABABAG: Yong mga tao.

Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong Receipt Waiver and xxxx
Quitclaim?
COMM. HABABAG:
MR. RODIL:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release
Si Atty. Suing po. waiver and Quitclaim?
123
MR. RODIL: Okay.

Kay attorney po. ATTY. SUING:

COMM. HABABAG: Your Honor,…

Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney? COMM. HABABAG:

ATTY. SUING: Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?

Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong. MR. RODIL:

COMM. HABABAG: Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.

Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

MR. RODIL: Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent attempt not to incriminate
him (respondent). His client contradicted respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared
was not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not involved in releasing to the
Opo.
complainants the money for and in consideration of the execution of the documents.

COMM. HABABAG:
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause.
Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito. Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.24
MR. RODIL:
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law
Opo serious po.
was enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."

COMM. HABABAG: While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand
as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and
MR. RODIL: is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Opo.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
throughout the country.
COMM. HABABAG:

G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932

Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

MR. RODIL: vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Atty. Suing po.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
COMM. HABABAG: Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

124
 On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for
P8,600.1awphil.net
VICKERS, J.:
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the
account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint,
amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.
without a special finding as to costs.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
from August 1, 1930.

The trial court erred:

1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment
rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the
Court o First Instance of Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street,
Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of
condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered
in said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the
appellant corporation.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment
from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the
balance of the said judgment.
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil
case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest
bidder for the said property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects only the desire of the
said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the appellant bank.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer
certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from
him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder
of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose
testimony on direct examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la
presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce
de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; ¿quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado,
cual es esta consideracion de valor? — R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos
veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el señor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses
mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"
P. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era encargado de este asunto.
P. ¿Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? — R. Era encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad
siempre llamaba yo al señor Pecson. Entonces hable al señor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.

8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint
TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses?
with costs.
Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas.

On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and
P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," ¿a que bienes se referia el ? — R. Al terreno
against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924,
de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the
clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties
described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the P. ¿Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? — R. Paco, primeramente,
proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. los dos ambos.

Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at P. Pero este Exhibit 1, ¿a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco.
public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

125
 P. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, ¿le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted
a dejar sus bienes? — R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. ¿Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el señor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en
deber a favor del Banco Nacional? — R. No recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.
JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno
de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin
yo dije que queria yo comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, ¿recibio usted algun
centimo de dinero del Banco? — R. Nada, absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant
replied that he did not remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo,
Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to
be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is
necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of
the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
126
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on
the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant
claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and
that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us
that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was
willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is
not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons
empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the
bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought
the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO
EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-
OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L.
LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791,
Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters
on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and
offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered
the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and
placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of
the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called
in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987,
the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony
Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union
of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto
Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW
CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in
the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an
operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts,
together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the
picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the
leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-
five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent
Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes
beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the
Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by
their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this
effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case
of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March
30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from
the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the
law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before
it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings
in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and
inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For
"it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies."4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-
stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and
adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any
attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
127
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes
contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it
is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of
justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets
intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity
and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC July 29, 2002
IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE
HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
KAPUNAN, J.:
On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the
case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080)1 which was then pending resolution:
Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera concerning
the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before the Court. The statements are italicized for ready
identification:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with
two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed
by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices ---considering that it
has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in pro-Estrada
decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, " the group said.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
 Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
xxx
"People are getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged." Said lawyer Leonard de Vera of the
Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would
trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor
turned out to be true.
"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must
prevail."
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.2
In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that he "suggested that the Court must
take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and reports" that "the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of
the Plunder Law" to protect the credibility of the Court.3 He explained therein:
(4) In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of the Honorable Members who were being unfairly dragged
and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side of the issue, was being viciously attacked. To remain silent
at this time when the Honorable Court was under siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to influence the
court in their decision would and could lend credence to these reports coming from anonymous sources. 4
Respondent admitted further to "having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition
by [former President Joseph] Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness" because
he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by such rumors.5
Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the people were "getting dangerously
passionate...emotionally charged," pending the court’s resolution on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the
validity of the Plunder Law, respondent claimed that such statement was "factually accurate." 6 He also argued that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court declaring the
Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II." 7
Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that "the people wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that
is basically wrong" as an expression of his opinion and as "historically correct," citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos through people power in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of pressure from the
people who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for being a farce, and that Estrada step down
because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino people. 8
128
While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court, to
destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.9
After a careful consideration of respondent’s arguments, the Court finds his explanation unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty
of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of wrongs for the violation of said rights 10 must be allowed to decide
cases independently, free of outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of democracy,
as well as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect
them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.11
Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person
guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. 12
Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it would declare the Plunder Law
unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the people—
as utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover statements
aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and authority, and interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is
not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. 13
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of
such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein.14 It is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues
presented before them.15 The court has previously held that--
xxx As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-
defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.16
In People vs. Godoy,17 this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings and decisions of the court and
discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity
with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public
confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are
said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-
being in society by obstructing the course of justice.18
Clearly, respondent’s utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk another
series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because
such statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to force the Court to
decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such statements show disrespect not only for the Court
but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating
the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case
tried fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences. 19
It is respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the
fair administration of justice20 and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondent’s utterances as
quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of
good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is hereby FINED in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva,
in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting
in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better
understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the
parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime.
After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido
Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence
although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically
by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former
conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation
does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang
conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be
confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of
Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the
Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same
with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y
de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said
motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which
the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a
committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A.
Bernabe.
129
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by
respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be
conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due
to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request
for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner
Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view
of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and
upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation
being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his
committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being
investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R.
No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had
any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the
administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found
guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's oral and personal
request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any
evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had
expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are
inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in
the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his
committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so
that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or
confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva
asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the
investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a
criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been
designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it
is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal
is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said
fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according
to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not
included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the
other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence.
Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the
hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista
he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original
case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine
Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be
convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and
convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may
and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista. properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for
which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence,
discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role
authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the
of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this
Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public
offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less
cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the
severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case,
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary
not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not
may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United
States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion
arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to
investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary
less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies action and penalty. No costs.
respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said
investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970
if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation,
if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation,
he could not be compelled to do so. EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO, ALBERTO
SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ, EFRAIN S. MACLANG,
of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of
ET AL., respondents.
Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation
in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondent's office
but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS), Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr.
proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin
photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for respondents.
respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had
concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask
questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella
y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to CASTRO, J.:
ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the
questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he,
respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul
of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th
did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us. Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training
on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court whether the general court-martial, convened on
April 6, 1968 to try the case against the petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on March 23, a
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula (who claimed to have been
headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions wounded in the incident) against some of the herein petitioners. The proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue
of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel could be decided. On June 23, 1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court.1
Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by
this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.

130
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial, but no sooner had the proceedings
resumed than another hitch developed. This came about as the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn
came to this Court, seeking relief against certain orders of the general court-martial.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general
court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended
that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for
political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After
deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo,
Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col. Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the
petitioners' position that for each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their stand and
adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory
challenge; and that with respect to the specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptory
challenge." They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the other hand the court-
martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of the court-martial denying their
challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor
incident, coupled with the fact that it became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly
influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to eleven
such challenges, one for each specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as members of the general court-martial
to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceeding with the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented showing
that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own
counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court. As a preliminary
consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition on the ground that it has no power to review the proceedings
of the court-martial, "except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced," and that at any rate
the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them within the military justice system.
I denied by the trial judge. In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that
mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true
that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion — what in the language
of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.3 This is precisely the point
at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in overruling the petitioners'
challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the exercise of the corrective powers of
this Court. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to this Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue
thrust upon it. Nor will the fact that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review considering
that the questions raised are questions of law.4
And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right
to a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper
accounts of what had come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their case. The
petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports
to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino
"massacre victims were given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone to
131
Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969
which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election
campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The petitioners
argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and that, in overruling their challenge for cause based
on this ground, the general court-martial committed a grave abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard v. Maxwell.8
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In
Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in
Vanderburgh County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to
the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against him during the
six or seven months preceding his trial." In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout the community, ... was clearly
reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury
box. Eight out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion permeating their minds, it would
be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence
that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the
processes of the average man. ... Where one's life is at stake — and accounting for the frailties of human
nature — we can only say that in the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not
meet the constitutional standard.9
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial publicity. 10 In the earlier case
of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity, the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial
discrimination in the selection of the jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is
hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with defendants' custody stating
that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed
by the press to the jury. 12
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the kidnapping of three of its
employees, and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving
picture film was taken of him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted
of interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping and murder. The
interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for
a change of venue but their motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had requested
that jurors be excused for cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory challenges, but these challenges for cause had been
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the
people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally
confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who has ever watched
television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw
and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial — at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent
court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow
formality. 13
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of due process.
The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without injustice to the person immediately
concerned," basing its position on the fact that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that
this must be shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances. The State paints too broadly
in this contention, for this Court itself has found instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a
prerequisite to reversal. This is such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
 deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a argue that "for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and that with respect
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total
lacking in due process. 14 of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since
in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general court-
martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court
observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature of We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense counsel's other requests that the jury be
asked whether they had read or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we assume that some
We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true meaning, intent and scope of
of this material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
Article of War 18. As will hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory
challenge. The number of specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a common
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become trial, are of no moment.
increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that
known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military
the balance is never weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an
and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law,
independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from
this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should
news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or
not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no
something the judge should have sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the
mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After
fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives;
December 17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate
the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take
General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law,
such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference.
encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject
was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one
to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measure. 15
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause."

In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility
of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was
not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from
massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial 16 either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided.
Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of
those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that
the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the
suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
II
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall
not be challenged except for cause." The general court-martial originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense
was entitled to only one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that the defense
was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to exercise their right to challenge on the ground that this
Court had earlier restrained further proceedings in the court-martial.
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore
because there are eleven charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand,
By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground therefor to exist or to be stated. It may
be used before, during, or after challenges for cause, or against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause,
or against a new member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith excused from duty
with the court-martial.
The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential to the fairness
of trial by jury. 18
As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal cases, or at least in capital ones,
there is in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain
number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a peremptory challenge; a provision full
of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded
on two reasons: 1) As every one must be sensible, what sudden impression and unaccountable prejudices
we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner
(when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally
disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a reason for his dislike.
2) Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror,
perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill
consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19
The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court
is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. ... 20

132
As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in
common. Three overriding reasons compel us to this conclusion.
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the
court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing,
It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the
televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against
accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts
complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily
which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."
that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge.
For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of
specifications and/or charges a determinant. Reference is made by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
argument that for each specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and with respect
to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized
U.S. military law, and it is unmistakable from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or common trial, CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22 harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the word, "each side," as used in the said Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by
article in reference to the defense, should be construed to mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge using intemperate language.
Advocate to Prosecute; Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action), 29 (Closed
Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities — Effect of), unequivocally speak of and refer to the "accused" in the
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
singular.

ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one separate peremptory challenge,
the present petition is denied. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No
pronouncement as to costs. .
public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated
for complainant’s failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of
respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of
articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan"
which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he
prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled
in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against
the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The
actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.36(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41the therein
complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of
respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant
fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it
cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent
refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation
and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
133
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge,
Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-
compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees
and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the
respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the
respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated
October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated
December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his
lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance
of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the
complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason
of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he
should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7,
1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for
improper conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or
Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the
erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority
and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this
particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him,
"the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they
will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
134
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the various statements made by Atty.
Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the
Court portions of which read as follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court, the
complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is
firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your
administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant
concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned
with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices
designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created, but the
Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly
rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is
that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration
and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in
confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and
determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and
progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. — PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they refused to grant to
the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge
Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IX
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal
Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of
the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of
the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our
Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't
be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to
the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible
help and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution
which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid
appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice,
for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic)
of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved
by records of both cases mentioned above. 16
 xxx xxx xxx RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have
materiality to the case.
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices, against
practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the xxx xxx xxx
beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if
maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our
with close relation. 17
government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost
on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme —
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently,
reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's
another for the poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his acts.
client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous
records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.
and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded
and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and
laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather,
effective January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with
the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality
render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality
of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will
the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct
not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's of the country, for their information and guidance.
Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass
on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means
August 23, 2016
by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have
known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have
emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly A.C. No. 7178
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must
advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
VICENTE M. GIMENA, Complainant
intimidation, and innuendo."22
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR T. SABIO, Respondent
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the
Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t
is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. DECISION
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under jardeleza, J.:
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed by Vicente M. Gimena (complainant) against Atty. Salvador T. Sabio (respondent)
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS for gross negligence in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99 (case). Complainant laments that his company, Simon Peter
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Equipment and Construction Systems, Inc. (company) lost in the case because respondent filed an unsigned position paper and
ignored the order of the labor arbiter directing him to sign the pleading. Aware of the unfavorable decision, respondent did not
even bother to inform complainant of the same. The adverse decision became final and executory, robbing complainant of a chance
xxx xxx xxx
to file a timely appeal.

RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or behavior
before the courts. Facts

135
Complainant is the president and general manager of the company.2 In his Complaint3 dated March 7, 2006, he narrated that he
engaged the legal services of respondent in relation to a case for illegal dismissa l 4 filed against him and the company. All the
pleadings and orders were directed to respondent because the company no longer had active presence in Bacolod, save for the
stockpile of construction equipment found in Barangay Mansilingan.5Sometime in February 2000, complainant signed the
verification page of the position paper for the case and sent it to respondent for his signature. However, respondent filed the
position paper without signing it.6 The labor arbiter noticed the unsigned pleading and directed respondent to sign it within 10 days
from notice.7 Respondent did not comply with the directive.
In a Decision8 dated October 21, 2004, the labor arbiter ruled against the company and noted that: "[the company J filed an unsigned
position paper which cannot be considered as such. Despite the order to Atty. Salvador Sabio to sign said position paper, the order
was deemed to have been taken for granted " 9
Respondent received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not
notify complainant about it.10 Complainant only learned of the Decision after a writ of execution was served on the company on
June 2005 and by that time, it was already too late to file an appeal. 11
Complainant stressed that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law on two (2) occasions: first was in the
case of Cordova v. Labayen,12 where respondent was suspended for six (6) months, and the second was in the case of Credito v.
Sabio,13 where he was suspended for one (1) year. The latter case involved facts analogous to the present Complaint.
In his Comment,14 respondent countered that complainant engaged his services in 2000. Complainant, however, did not pay the
expenses and attorney's fees for the preparation and filing of the position paper in the amount of ₱20,000.00.15 The lack of payment
contributed to respondent's oversight in the filing of the unsigned position paper. 16 Respondent also insisted that the unfavorable
Decision of the labor rbiter is based on the merits and not due to default. 17 Respondent further explained that he was not able
inform complainant of the outcome of the case because he does not know the address of the company after it allegedly abandoned
its place of business in Barangay Mansilingan, without leaving any forwarding address.18 Respondent claimed that complainant
only communicated to him when the writ of execution was issued on July 27, 2005.19 He faulted complainant and the company for
being remiss in their legal obligation to be in constant communication with him as to the status of the case. 20
Moreover, respondent averred that the filing of the administrative case against him is tainted with ill will to compensate for
complainant's failure to post a bond to stay the writ of execution and the sale of the construction equipment levied
upon.21 Respondent submitted that if it were true that he was negligent in the handling of the case, then why did complainant, the
company and the third party claimants still avail ofhis services as attorney-in-fact in the auction sale?22
In his Reply,23 complainant insisted that the acceptance fee of respondent was ₱50,000.00. Complainant paid respondent
₱20,000.00 as advance payment, but which was without a receipt because complainant trusted him.24The remaining P30,000.00
was also paid to respondent, as evidenced by photocopies of deposit slips to his Banco De Oro account. 25
We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation. During the mandatory
conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (the Commission), complainant and respondent were asked to discuss
their complaint and defense, respectively. For the first time, respondent raised the issue of lack of attorney-client relationship. He
pointed out that he and complainant had never met each other and that there was no formal engagement of his services. 26 The
parties did not enter into stipulation of facts and limited the issues to the following:
a) Whether or not there was attorney-client relationship between respondent and the company in RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99;
b) If in the affirmative, whether or not respondent was negligent in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99 and whether such
negligence renders him liable underthe Code of Professional Responsibility.27
136
The Commission ordered the parties to file their verified position papers. Respondent, in his Position Paper,28reiterated that he
cannot be expected to render legal services to the company and the complainant because no formal contract for legal retainer
services was execute.29
On December 2, 2008, the Commission issued its Report and Recommendation 30 fmding respondent guilty of gross negligence.
IBP Recommendation
As regards the first issue, the Investigating Commissioner Atty. Randall C. Tabayoyong (the Investigating Commissioner) ruled
that there is indeed an attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent. Respondent's assertion that he was not a
counsel of record in the case is belied by his own admission in the Comment he filed before the Commission. 31 In paragraph 1 of
his Comment, respondent stated that he was "engaged by complainant in 2000 regarding the labor case of the [company]."32 Then,
in paragraph 2, he averred that he was not paid for legal expenses and legal charges for the filing of the position paper. 33 More, the
Order and Decision of the labor arbiter referred to respondent as the counsel of the company. 34
With respect to the second issue, the Investigating Commissioner declared that the evidence on record sufficiently supports the
charges of negligence against respondent.35 Again, it was respondent's own admissions that put the final nail on his coffin.
Respondent neither denied that he filed an unsigned pleading nor refuted the claim that he did not inform complainant of the
outcome of the case and the due date of the appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission. He only offered excuses,
which the Investigating Commissioner found as "reprehensible" and "downright misleading." 36
The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for the
negligence that he committed in handling the case referred to him. 37 Weight was also given to the fact that respondent was
previously suspended for the same offense in Credito. 38 Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a warning that a similar violation in the future will merit a heavier penalty.39
The recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution 40 dated April 16, 2010.
Respondent filed a Motion for reconsideration41 but the same was denied.42
Issue
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
Ruling
We concur with the findings of the IBP, with the addition that respondent also violated Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We also find that a longer period of suspension is warranted in view of the number of times that respondent had
been disciplined administratively.
There is attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant
The contention of respondent that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and the company is, at best,
flimsy.1âwphi1 It is improper for him to capitalize on the fact that no formal contract for legal retainer was signed by the parties,
for formality is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney. 43 The contract may be express or implied and it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An attorney
impliedly accepts the relation when he acts on behalf of his client in pursuance of the request made by the latter. 44
Respondent acted on behalf of the company and the complainant in relation to the case. Albeit unsigned, he allowed his name to
appear as "counsel for respondent"45 in the position paper that he filed before the labor arbiter. He never called the attention of the
labor court that he was not the counsel of the company. More importantly, he admitted in his Comment that the complainant
engaged his legal services. Respondent cannot plead the same before us then later on deny it before the IBP to save him from his
omissions. Estoppel works against him. Basic is the rule that an admissiop. made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making it for such is conclusive as to him, and all proofs to the contrary shall be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the said party or not.46
Respondent is grossly negligent in
handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99
Respondent is a repeat offender
This is not the first time that respondent was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In Credito,57 the then members of the Third
Division found respondent guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to the present
case, respondent's legal services were engaged in connection with a labor suit. The labor case went up to us only to be dismissed
due to respondent's failure to attach the required certification on nonforum shopping and to pay the total revised docket and other
legal fees. Respondent also kept his clients in the dark as to the fact that their petition was dismissed.
Prior to Credito, respondent was also held administratively liable in Cordova58 for instigating his clients to file a complaint against
a judge to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders.

All told, respondent seems unfazed by the sanctions we have so far imposed upon him. He did not learn from his previous
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
suspensions and continued with his negligent ways. In Tejano v. Baterina,59 we imposed a longer period of suspension on account
and diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.47 He must exercise the
of the lawyer's previous suspension for negligence in handling a case. We found the lawyer's pattern of neglecting his duty to his
diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the case that he is handling. This is true whether he accepted the case for free
clients and his propensity to disrespect the authority of the courts unacceptable.60
or in consideration of a fee.

For this reason, we impose upon the respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice oflaw for three (3) years.
A lawyer is presumed to be prompt and diligent in the performance of his obligations and in the protection of his client's interest
and in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the court.48 Here, however, this presumption is overturned by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was grossly negligent as counsel of the company and complainant in the case. WHEREFORE, for violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty.
Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Every law student is taught that an unsigned pleading creates no legal effect, such that the party may be deemed not to have filed
a pleading at all. Yet, respondent, a long standing legal practitioner, did not sign a position paper that he filed in a labor suit
allegedly due to oversight. What more, he claimed that his client's failure to pay legal expenses and attorney's fees contributed to Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts and the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
such oversight. These actuations of respondent demean the legal profession. Lawyering is not primarily concerned with money- respondent's personal file.
making; rather, public service and administration of justice are the tenets of the profession.49 Due to respondent's negligence, the
labor arbiter did not consider the position paper of the company and the complainant. This circumstance deprived the company of
the chance to explain its side of the controversy - an unfortunate incident brought about by its own counsel.

Respondent's inattention is further highlighted by his disobedience to the labor arbiter's directive that he sign the position paper.
His conduct evinces a willful disregard to his duty as officer of the court. This alone warrants the imposition of administrative
liability.

Respondent's irresponsibility went beyond the unsigned pleading and refusal to obey court orders; he also admittedly failed to
apprise the company and the complainant of the adverse decision against them. He even had the audacity to place the blame on his
client for not communicating to him as regards the status of the case. He furthermore justified his omission by saying that he was
not aware of the address of the company. The foregoing excuses should be rejected. As the IBP correctly observed, respondent
overlooked the attached affidavit of the complainant in the unsigned position paper, which clearly indicates that the principal office
address of the company is at Quirino Highway, Sacred Heart Village IV, Novaliches, Caloocan City. 50 Respondent himself had
notarized the affidavit.51 Thus, contrary to his contention, it appears from the records that he was fully aware of the address of the
company. There was no justifiable reason for him not to notify complainant and the company of the adverse decision against them.

Respondent's conduct is inconsistent with Rule 18.04 of the Code, which requires that "[a] lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information."

In Alcala v. De Vera,52 we ruled that the failure of a lawyer to notify his client of a decision against him manifests a total lack of
dedication or devotion to his client's interest expected under the lawyer's oath and the then Canons of Professional Ethics. 53

Then in Garcia v. Manuel, 54 we decreed that the failure of a lawyer to inform his client of the status of the case signifies bad faith,
for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary; thus, the ever present need to inform clients of the
developments of the case. 55 It is only in this manner that the trust and faith of the client in his counsel will remain unimpaired. 56

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