G.R. Nos.
187308 & 187517 September 18, 2013 registered, however, a deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to
HILARIA BAGAYAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS,
MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review oncertiorari1are the Resolutions2 dated
January 6, 20093 and Order4 dated March 16, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 (RTC) which dismissed on the ground
of res judicata the twin petitions of Hilaria Bagayas (petitioner) for
amendment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 375657 and
375658,docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) Nos. 08-34 and 08-35.
The Facts
On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint5 for annulment of sale and
partition before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-42, claiming that
Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas
(respondents) intended to exclude her from inheriting from the estate of her
legally adoptive parents, Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente
(Eligia), by falsifying a deed of absolute sale (deed of absolute sale)
purportedly executed by the deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia)
transferring two parcels of land (subject lands) registered in their names to
their biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando
Bagayas6 (Orlando).7Said deed, which was supposedly executed on October
7, 1974,8 bore the signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her
signature thereon as she had long been dead since August 21, 1971. 9 By
virtue of the same instrument, however, the Bagayas brothers were able to
secure in their favor TCT Nos. 37565710 and 37565811 over the subject
lands.
As a matter of course, trial ensued on the merits of the case. Petitioner
presented herself and five other witnesses to prove the allegations in her
complaint. Respondents likewise testified in their defense denying any
knowledge of the alleged adoption of petitioner by Maximino and Eligia, and
pointing out that petitioner had not even lived with the family.12 Furthermore,
Rogelio claimed13 that after their parents had died, he and Orlando executed
a document denominated as Deed of Extra judicial Succession14 (deed of
extra judicial succession) over the subject lands toeffect the transfer of titles
thereof to their names. Before the deed of extra judicial succession could be
them was discovered from the old files of Maximino, which they used by
"reason of convenience" to acquire title to the said lands. 15
In a Decision16 dated March 24, 2008 dismissing the case a quo , the RTC
summarized the threshold issues for resolution, to wit:
[1] Whether or not petitioner is an adopted child of the late spouses
Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente;
[2] Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 1974
is valid;
[3] Whether or not plaintiff can ask for partition of the subject
properties assuming that she is an adopted child of the late spouses
Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente and assuming further that
the subject deed of sale is invalid; and
[4] Is the prevailing party entitled to damages?17
With respect to the first issue, the RTC declared petitioner to be anadopted
child of Maximino and Eligia on the strength of the order of adoption, which it
considered as more reliable than the oral testimonies of respondents denying
the fact of adoption.18 On the issue of the validity of the questioned deed of
absolute sale, the RTC ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a mere
surplusage, as the subject lands belonged exclusively to Maximino who
could alienate the same without the consent of his wife.19
The RTC further held that, even though petitioner is an adopted child, she
could not ask for partition of the subject lands as she was not able to prove
any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale.
Moreover, the action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a
collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.20
Insisting that the subject lands were conjugal properties of Maximino and
Eligia, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration21 from the aforesaid
Decision, which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution22 dated June
17,2008 holding that while it may have committed a mistake in declaring the
subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino (since the defendants
therein already admitted during the pre-trial conference that the subject lands
are the conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia), the action was
nevertheless dismissible on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the
title of Rogelio and Orlando.23 Citing the case of Tapuroc v. Loquellano
Vda.de Mende,24 it observed that the action for the declaration of nullity of
deed of sale is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens
certificate of title.25
No appeal was taken from the RTC’s Decision dated March 24, 2008or the
Resolution dated June 17, 2008, thereby allowing the same to lapse into
finality.
Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on August 1, 2008, twin
petitions26 before the same RTC, docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35, for
the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include her name and
those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the
extent of one-third of the lands covered therein.27 The petitions were
anchored on Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,28 otherwise
known as the "Property Registration Decree," which provides as follows:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration,
or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the
same be [sic] Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner [sic] of other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the [sic] Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that x x x
new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created;
x x x; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant of any other relief upon such terms
and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider
proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give
the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that
nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or
other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith,
or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. x x x.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To substantiate her "interest" in the subject lands, petitioner capitalized on
the finding of the RTC in its Decision dated March 24, 2008that she is the
adopted child of Maximino and Eligia, and that the signature of the latter in
the deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to Rogelio and
Orlando was falsified.29
The petitions were dismissed30 by the RTC, however, on the ground of res
judicata . The RTC ruled that the causes of action in the two cases filed by
petitioner are similar in that the ultimate objective would be her inclusion as
co-owner of the subject lands and, eventually, the partition thereof.31 Since
judgment had already been rendered on the matter, and petitioner had
allowed the same to attain finality, the principle of res judicata barred further
litigation thereon.32
Dissatisfied, petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration33 that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 (for annulment of sale and partition)on the
ground that it was a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando did
not amount to a judgment on the merits, thus, precluding the applicability of
res judicata.34 The motion was resolved against petitioner, and the dismissal
of LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 (for amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and
375658) was upheld by the RTC in an Order35 dated March16, 2009. Hence,
the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the dismissal of the earlier
complaint on the ground that it is in the nature of a collateral attack on the
certificates of title constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition under Section
108 of PD 1529.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that Civil Case No. 04-42 was a complaint
for annulment of sale and partition. In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff
seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and
second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. An action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. 36 The
determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition. As held in the case of Municipality of
Biñan v. Garcia:37
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate
in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In
either case – i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting
is decreed – the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.38 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner could
not ask for the partition of the subject lands, even though she is an adopted
child, because "she was not able to prove any of the instances that would
invalidate the deed of absolute sale"39 purportedly executed by Maximino
and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a consequence of the RTC’s
finding that, since the subject lands belonged exclusively to Maximino, there
was no need to secure the consent of his wife who was long dead before the
sale took place. For this reason, the forgery of Eligia's signature on the
questioned deed was held to be inconsequential. However, on
reconsideration, the RTC declared that it committed a mistake in holding the
subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino "since there was already
an admission by the defendants during the pre-trial conference that the
subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses Maximino
Bagayas and Eligia Clemente."40 Nonetheless, the RTC sustained its
dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on the ground that it constituted a collateral
attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.41 (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of
ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties
to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in
Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to bylaw means ownership
which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.42 (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of
sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject lands and not any
Torrens certificate of title over the same.
Be that as it may, considering that petitioner failed to appeal from the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42, the judgment therein is final and may no
longer be reviewed.
The crucial issue, therefore, to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of
LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 on the ground of res judicata.
It must be pointed out that LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 praying that judgment
be rendered directing the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac to include petitioner's
name, those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to
the extent of one-third of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 375657and 375658,
were predicated on the theory43 that Section 108 of PD 1529 is a mode of
directly attacking the certificates of title issued to the Bagayas brothers. On
the contrary, however, the Court observes that the amendment of TCT Nos.
375657 and 375658 under Section 108 of PD 1529 is actually not the direct
attack on said certificates of title contemplated under Section 4844 of the
same law. Jurisprudence instructs that an action or proceeding is deemed to
be an attack on a certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the same,
thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the certificate of title was
decreed.45 Corollary thereto, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to
whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification or fraud can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated in
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.:46
It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title
was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding.
The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.47 (Citations omitted)
Contrary to the foregoing characterization, Section 108 of PD 1529 explicitly
states that said provision "shall not be construed to give the court authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration." In fact, based on settled
jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD 1529 is limited only to seven instances or
situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon
the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering
a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) ruling.52 Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under
when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when Section 108 of PD 1529.
the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the
marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will In fine, while LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 are technically not barred by the
thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and prior judgment in Civil Case No. 04-42 as they involve different causes of
has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its action, the dismissal of said petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos.375657
dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or and 375658 is nonetheless proper for reasons discussed above. The remedy
alteration of title.48 Hence, the same cannot be said to constitute an attack on then of petitioner is to institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
a certificate of title as defined by case law.1âwphi1 That said, the Court estate of the deceased spouses Maximino and Eligia.
proceeds to resolve the issue as to whether or not the dismissal of
petitioner’s twin petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
375658 was proper.
SO ORDERED
Petitioner claims that the determination of the RTC in Civil Case No.04-42
that she is an adopted child and that the signature of her adoptive mother
Eligia in the deed of absolute sale transferring the subject land to Rogelio
and Orlando was forged amounts to a new interest that should be reflected
on the certificates of title of said land, or provides a reasonable ground for
the amendment thereof.

The Court disagrees for two reasons:

First. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's
adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed,
no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed.
Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of
Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-
ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the amendment
of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of determining such rights.49

Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section

108 of PD 1529 because the present controversy involves not the
amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and Orlando
but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased.
As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela,50 the prevailing rule is
that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summary in nature,
contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but
certainly not controversial issues.51Relief under said legal provision can only
be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or hat there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the
controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, G.R. No. 193161 Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there
Petitioner, are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for
Present: herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the
natural son of Florentino Manungas.[5] Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a
- versus - VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
Waiver of Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her
PERALTA, rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia
ABAD, Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and MENDOZA, and intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the
FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO, SERENO,* JJ. properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving
Respondents. heirs.[6]
Promulgated:
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed
August 22, 2011 Parreo, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x properties and person of her incompetent aunt.[7]
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No.
DECISION 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros
Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court
VELASCO, JR., J.: (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that
Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the
The Case answer was filed beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by
the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the
reversal of the April 30, 2009 Decision[1] and July 21, 2010 Resolution[2] of spouses Salinas to the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Decision of the MTC.[8] On appeal to this Court, defendants petition was
Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreo v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final
Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas on April 20, 1998.[9]
(Manungas). The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated
November 4, 2002[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the
City, Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas
of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2
Diosdado Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
of respondent Florencia Avila Parreo (Parreo) as the special administrator of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.[10]The petition was
the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging that
Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead. Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas
claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
The Facts Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and
that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, appointing Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the
while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother.[4] Avila was survived by his dispositive portion of which reads:
wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate Parreo is hereby appointed as Special Administrator of the
on March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The
 Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the
amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. [12] In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreos appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but
which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that
Parreo was not fit to become a special administrator having already been
fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that
Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he
is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering
the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special
Administrator.[13]
Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued
its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead.
The CA further reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the estate.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Order dated November 4, 2002 setting
aside the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special
administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de
Manungas, and denying the property bond posted by
Florencia Parreo [is] hereby declared NULL and
VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 15, 2009[15] which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the
latter remedy is available.[16]
The Court a Quo in denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration grossly violated the rule that once a
decision or order is final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.[17]
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to
annul the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as
judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of
Florencia Parreo as special administrator.[18]
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course
to oppositors petition that is flawed.[19]
The Courts Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of
whether the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari
cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreo should have appealed the
RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the
Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreo having
failed to file the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order
cannot be the subject of review even by this Court. However, Diosdados
position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a final
order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,[20] the Court stated what an
interlocutory order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally
dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
 obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above
pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually
be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator
as an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of
letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v.
Ocampo,[21] the Court succinctly held, The appointment or removal of special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002
is clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The
proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus,
Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the
petition well within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a
motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus,
petitioner argues that respondents failure to move for the reconsideration of
the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general
rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores:[22]
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary
remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only
when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where
another adequate remedy is available for the correction of
the error. x x x However, there are several exceptions
where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior
filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination
of the issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November
4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no
need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several
instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order.[23]
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still
prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised
by both petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the
contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children
precludes succession by collateral relatives to his
estate;
 Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas inherits the latters property by
operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order
appointing Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the
estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set
aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v.
Lacuata-Gabriel,[24]it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to
the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court
ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were
the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been
settled that the selection or removal of special administrators
is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. The probate court may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion,
such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues
of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper
in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and
is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles,
interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in
Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special
adminsitrator. Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for
that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
so ordered by the court.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would,
therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in
preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice
would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its
discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to
appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to
the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the
November 4, 2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment
of Florencia Avila Parreo as Special Administrator on the
ground that it found merit in Diosdados contention that he is
the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The
evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related
to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in
preserving the latters estate. On the other hand, Florencia,
 who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was
still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested
in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a
wise administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the
Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of
Florencia Avila Parreo as special administrator
constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court
exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious
manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of

Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino
Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long
been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance
of a Decree of Final Distribution. [27] With the termination of the intestate
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir
of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a
debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There
is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.

Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the
trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the
special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002 Order
is necessarily reinstated and Parreos appointment as special administrator is
revived.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN
declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special
Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated May
15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreo
is REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia
Manungas.

SO ORDERED.
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID G.R. No. 188921 1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995
AMANDO C. ROMERO, situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
Petitioners, 16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290013 in the name of
Present: Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by Declaration of
Real Property No. 16142.
- versus - 2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995
situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
Promulgated:
405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
April 18, 2012 3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995
AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO
situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
C. ROMERO,
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
praying for the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 14
April 2009 and the subsequent Resolution[2] dated 21 July 2009.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioners which alleged grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated
14 December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued by Judge Maria Susana T.
Baua in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said
Resolutions dismissed petitioners complaint against private respondents
Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death on 18 October 1974, their
mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who
held several real and personal properties in trust for her children.[3] Since that
year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties,
businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly
conjugal properties of their parents. These included the following real and
personal properties:
Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante
Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.
4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995
situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an
area of one thousand square meters under Declaration of Real Property No.
406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.
5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-
227224 situated in Barrio Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of four hundred ninety-four square meters under TCT No.
113514 in the name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.
6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered
under Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law, but registrable under Act
3344 as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified as a
warehouse, is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.
7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan,
containing an area of more or less two hundred four square meters under
Declaration of Real Property No. 16139. It is not yet registered under Act 496
or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is covered by
Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.
8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred
forty-six square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 724 and TCT
No. 284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.
9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, containing an area of more or less one thousand two hundred
fifty-six square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 725 and TCT
No. 284242 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero.[4]
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio
through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the
above-mentioned properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed
by their mother, Aurora.[5] Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon
her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable.
Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their
contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended)[6] against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed
their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after
the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot
be considered conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos.
290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were
paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio
purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them.
The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora
herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November 2006, since her
authority to do so had never been revoked or modified.
On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing
petitioners complaint, stating thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in that
no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero, nor a
partition, has been effected among his compulsory heirs. Thus, the
contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be
adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without first getting a
definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as to the share of
each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties
being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same being
paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and established in the
intestate proceedings.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an
action to recover the title or possession of lands until such lands have
actually been assigned. The court ruled that plaintiffs must first cause the
termination of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before
this case could be entertained by the Court.[8]
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering
the said Resolutions, petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA. On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed judgment dismissing the
Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate
left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of
an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First
Instance (CFI).[9] The CA based its judgment on the findings of the RTC that
the inventory of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to the CFI included
the same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.
Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate
court may rule on issues pertaining to title over property only in a provisional
capacity. They assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just
because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as
heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil
action in order to protect their interests.
Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this
case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance
of title, despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of
the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
Ruling of the Court
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the
present case
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or
intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.[10] They cite Ongsingco v. Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] and
several cases which state that when questions arise as to ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed
by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, the intestate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate these
questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the properties
enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by
respondent Aurora Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a
separate civil action to resolve title.[13]
The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both
arose out of facts different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved
a summary settlement for the estate of the decedent, in which a parcel of
land representing the share of decedents nephews and nieces was already
covered by a TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of
partition issued by the probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et
al., had to file a separate civil action for quieting of their title and for
damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the propriety of the
probate courts order to amend the Complaint for quieting of title before the
regular court. More importantly, Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving
third parties who were not heirs, and not privy to the intestate proceedings in
the probate court. The present action was instituted precisely by heirs of
Judge Romero, against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother,
who is the administrator of the estate.
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally
pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may
be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed
upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be
ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general
rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of
the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion
for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.[15] (Citations omitted.)
While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated
thus:
xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons
not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case of In
re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa
Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has
power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included
therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although
such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice
to the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on
the ownership or existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as
between the representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too
well established by the authorities to require argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to
determine questions of title, as for example, as between the estate and
persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale
do not render the issue of title res judicata.[17] (Citations omitted, emphasis
supplied.)
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated
in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title
or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has
listed the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties
of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the
respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same
real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.[18]
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they
also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor
their claim, they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence
form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots
are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that
Vittorio subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased
person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate,
has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the
purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and
expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate
among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature
of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass
whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a
necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to
the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the
distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to
the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily
has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who
are all parties to the proceedings.[20] xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the
estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order
adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the
estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership
and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been
paid.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action
Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule
on their Complaint, the submission of the issues in this case to the probate
court is merely optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they argue,
they still have the right to bring these issues in a separate civil action, if they
so choose. They argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules
of Court is not applicable to the present case.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an executor or
administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the
title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be
maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the
court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed
for paying debts has expired.
Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these
heirs may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the
suit, or has allegedly participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail. There is nothing on the
record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are
really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain
properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romeros acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the
sole jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v. Abesamis,[21] the Court
stated:
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a
pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before
final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed
out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not
specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an
estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court.[22]
Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They
are, in effect, questioning the validity of the sales made by the administrator,
an issue that can only be properly threshed out by the probate court.
Paragraph 13 of petitioners Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora C.
Romero to and in favor of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities since all
were simulated, entered into without the intent and volition of Defendant
Aurora C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress and fraud and not
supported with any valid or sufficient consideration and with the sole
depraved intentions of depriving the other
compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share in
the estate.[23] (Emphasis omitted.)
Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property
under administration is the recognition that the probate court has the power
to rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under administration that
was effected without its authority.[24] That petitioners have the prerogative of
choosing where to file their action for nullification whether with the probate
court or the regular court is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of
Appeals:
xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited
jurisdiction, as a probate court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a
trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by
the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of
the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman
claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of
an heir by the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary
rights.[25] (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by
petitioners co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court,
because it is the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of
the property, and that has jurisdiction over Auroras actions and dispositions
as administrator. In Peaverde v. Peaverde,[26] the Court even adjudged the
petitioners guilty of forum-shopping for filing a separate civil action despite
the pendency of the said petitioners own case seeking that letters of
administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners
in Peaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:
The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which
seeks letters of administration for the estate of Mariano Peaverde; and (2)
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peaverde and the annulment of titles
in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.
Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in
the estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously owned in
common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is also what they hoped to
obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.
Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate
distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly
sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for the
"Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peaverde. In both cases,
petitioners would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of
Mariano Peaverde, albeit indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.
Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-
19471 and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no
question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are
identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife
of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in the
estate of Mariano --- are the same, such relief being founded on the same
facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife, Victorina.[27]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are
already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14
April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO
Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON,"
AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the
RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless
on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-
77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners
who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding
that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as
the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory
heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of:
(a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a
passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on
which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance
was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or
not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint
is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely
on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless
of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship
cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined
in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement
should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-
2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding
to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in
an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for

the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,

appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether

the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which
dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state
a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed,
Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in
the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by
Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by
the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and
the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in
its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded
to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an
account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that
petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established before
a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at
bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of
Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right
to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it
is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent
not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on
plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have
the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2,
Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial
courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this
Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993])
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such
cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to
that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two
women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario)
both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario
contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the
only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The
award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely
an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon
the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue
here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this
case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However,
here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-
appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively
established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to
such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special
proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present
case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or
forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a
declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate
special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this
axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the
trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate
court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed
to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite
the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the
Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . .
.[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that
the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the
court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila
preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name
of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise
prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits
which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows;
that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling,
they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to
institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication
and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the
therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants
of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994
that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the
therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which
in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein
respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners
to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept
the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special
proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him
and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by
his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera;
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse
of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during
the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved
incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court,
following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of
appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts findings
of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the
persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said
certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence
presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the
alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and
[their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should
not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only
heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who
was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding,
Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the
decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to
reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the
decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion
on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of
Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said
judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among
other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas
share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted
daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her
adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate
court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul
the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud,
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in
the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties
agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until
after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for
trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed,
she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order
setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to
her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April
27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the
records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally terminated as
Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
(Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his
share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in
the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742;
Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate
of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988[35] the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.[37]
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is
the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be
contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September
24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or

intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-
CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia),
Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa),
Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria
D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010
Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte
and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for
annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein respondents
heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two
(2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and
Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique),
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the
marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in
Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos.
(P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536and P-20551 (P-8348)7 issued on
February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique,
in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa
and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7,
1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of
saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted
by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas
additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes
as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that
the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of
the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,
the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by
spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years,
holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27,
2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held that,
while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA
found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering
spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and
Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died.
It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent
saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that
as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as
they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be
minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey
failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to
have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS
FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH
RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY
DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her
in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which
read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children
and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro
indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria
were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding
uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule
covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in
the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent
sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon,
Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect
to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have
acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the
moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell
their undivided share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property
is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and
shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the
court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony
of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as
the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the
power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is
granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even
then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with
Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives
sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized,
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the
ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person
knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its
defects from the moment it was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique
Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja
Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary
and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and
enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"
(Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do
not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of
the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated
July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of
the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at
the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16
share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive
true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification. period of 10 years.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties
have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only
sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer." 20 On
this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-
owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be
holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied
constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the
Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." As such, it is
only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to
₱ 5,000.0021 each or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with
legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010
Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion
Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late
Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D.
Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERSof the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead
properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-
14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri,
Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan
to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the
total amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed
from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum
thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no

application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived
of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10

years from the time the cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with
sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed