ADMIN LAW GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES OF LGUS: EMINENT DOMAIN

Title: City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo G.R. No. 142971

Date: May 7, 2002
Ponente: Davide, Jr., C.J.
THE CITY OF CEBU, SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO,
petitioner respondents
FACTS
 On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses
Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they needed the parcels of land owned by the respondents
for public purpose because they are planning to construct a public road which will serve as an access or relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in
Cebu City.
 However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose of expropriation was not for
public purpose but for the benefit of the Cebu Holdings, Inc. They alleged that the petitioner could simply buy directly
the property from them at its fair market value just like what they did with the neighboring lots and the price offered
was very low. They also alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.
 From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.
The parties executed an agreement and submitted to the trial wherein they declared that they have partially settled
the case in consideration of the stipulations in the agreement.
 Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed Palermo M. Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to
be the commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioner’s
report contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents.
 But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioner’s report was inaccurate
since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. Then the commissioners submit an amendment
which made the just compensation costs P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation at P20,826,339.50. They also alleged that just compensation should be based on the prevailing market
price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. However, the Court of Appeals was not
convinced and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
 The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted that just compensation should be determined
on September 17, 1993, as of the date of the filing of the complaint and not at the time the property was actually
taken in 1994.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. NO
RATIO
 Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.
 In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section
19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking.
 The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule
in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of
the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property
as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
 While Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
 Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection. It is therefore
too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in
pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully
relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such
 facts. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It
cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.
 More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to
be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the
parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith.
RULING
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the
petition in this case is hereby DENIED.
(SANTOS, 2B 2017-2018)