SPECPRO ASSIGNMENT (December 6, 2016) - October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.
Justice Santos 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.
Rule 77. Section 4. Estate, how administered.
1. Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
June 8, 2006
I. Relevant Facts:
- Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
residing in the Philippines with an adopted daughter Kyle
Guersey.
- Audrey died leaving a will which bequeathed her entire estate
to Richard and designated him as executor. The will was
probated in the Orphan’s Court Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. The
court also named Atty. Alonzo Ancheta (Petitioner) as ancillary
executor.
- Richard later married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
(respondent) in 1981.
- October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was admitted for probate in
then CFI of Rizal in a special proceeding No. 9625. Petitioner
then made an inventory on Audrey’s properties.
- July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s
Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A.
- Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. M-888.
Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate, apportioning them between Richard and Kyle.
- The motion and project of partition was granted and approved
by the trial court. The trial court also issued an Order on April 7,
1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the
joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided
interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest).
- This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati
property should be given to respondent.
- The trial court found merit in the opposition, disapproved the
project of partition and adjudicated the entire ¾ undivided
interest to respondent.
- October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals
(CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.
- Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of
Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance
with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be
wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since
Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests
of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
II. Issues:
1. WON the orders can no longer be set aside.
2. WON the project of partition should be allowed.
III. Rulings:
1. The orders may be set aside.
Generally, a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988.
The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure
to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the
terms of her will.
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Records bear the fact that the filing of the
project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto, and the order
of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991. Since the action for annulment was filed in
1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
2. The project of partition should be disallowed.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law
of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
of another state or country.
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. Petitioner admitted that
he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered
extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of
the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the
decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is
tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in testate or intestate
proceeding. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included
in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the
2. Aranas v. Mercado RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents. be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its
judicial duty.
FACTS:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
1. Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita, and their five properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be
children and 2 grandchildren including Thelma, petitioner. submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless
2. Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation
corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. He assigned his real properties or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to
Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
3. Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
the petition considering that there was no opposition. As the administrator, Teresita
submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdiofor the consideration and approval by
the RTC. However, claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted.
4. Teresita filed a compliance with the ordersupporting her inventory with copies
certificates of stocks from Mervir Realty, the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio
involving real properties and the certificate of stock issued of Cebu Emerson, but
again Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.
5. RTC held that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties
that should be included . The Court hereby denied the administratrix’s motion for
approval of inventory and ordered the said administratrix to re–do the inventory of
properties.
6. CA reversed the decision of the RTC by GADALEJ and affirmed the inventory
submitted by Teresita.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of
certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime.

RULING:

The answer is in the negative.

3. Lebin v. Mirasol 1. RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their failure to timely
file a record on appeal. Such appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional,
Lebin v Mirasol because failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules
GR No. 164255 of court causes the judgment or final order to become final as to preclude the
07 September 2011 appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment or final
order.
Under heading: Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in testate 2. According to Section 39 of BP 129, the rule stating that filing of a record on
or intestate proceedings. appeal is no longer required does not include special proceedings.

Doctrine:
1. Implicit in the power of the probate court to approve disposition of property of
an estate is the power to rescind, nullify, or modify the disposition of the sale 1. RTC committed no reversible error in allocating Lot 18 to both petitioners
to conform to law or the standing policies set and fixed for the purpose. and respondent. The approval of the offer to purchase would be conditioned
2. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law upon whether the petitioners were the only actual occupants.
is mandatory and jurisdictional. [NOTE: This issue is not included under the 2. Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale,
heading of Justice’s outline, but was consistently stressed out in the case.] mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate, which requires judicial
approval before it could be executed. Implicit in the requirement for judicial
Facts: approval was that the probate court could (a) rescind or nullify disposition
1. Elbe and Erlinda Lebin (Petitioners) offered to purchase from the Estate of made without its authority or (b) modify such disposition to conform to law or
Hodges the lot where their house stands, Lot 18, located in Iloilo City. The standing policies set and fixed for the purpose, where the same was
administrator sought approval of the court, stating that petitioner was the invalidated based on falsity of factual basis, mistake, or concealment of
actual occupant of the lot, and the same was granted. material fact (i.e. the claim that petitioners were the only occupants of Lot
2. Vilma Mirasol (Respondent) also wanted to purchase the lot where their 18).
house stood, which was initially stated as Lot 4, but after a survey revealed 3. Hence, the probate court’s modification of approval of petitioner’s offer to
her house was actually built on Lot 18 and not Lot 4, filed a petition for relief purchase was within the power of the RTC to nullify or modify after it was
from the order. Pending resolution of the petition for relief, petitioners paid found to be contrary to the condition of approval.
the last installment and moved for the execution of deed of sale, which was
apparently not acted upon by the RTC.
3. RTC ruled that the petitioners and respondents are to be the owners of the
lands where their respective houses stand. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied.
4. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and an alleged record on appeal.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the record on appeal was
filed late. RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
a. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the RTC.
b. Petitioners allegedly filed a record on appeal.
c. Petitioners presented an ex-parte motion to approve the record on
appeal.
d. Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
e. RTC granted the motion to dismiss stating that the record on appeal
was filed late.
f. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
g. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
5. Hence this appeal for review on certiorari.

Issue:
1. WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for their failure to
timely file a record on appeal
2. WON the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be sold to
both petitioners and respondents in equal portions.

Ruling:
4. Romero v. CA
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C. ROMERO
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated
in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
FACTS:
 Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother, respondent
Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and
personal properties in trust for her children.
 Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly
conjugal properties of their parents.
 Petitioners claim that, their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the properties in
his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio
allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even administered drugs
that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of
Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
 Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora C.
Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
 Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were
acquired long after the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence,
the properties cannot be considered conjugal. They allege that some of the
lots were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged.
 RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners’ complaint.
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remainspending in
that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y.
Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory
heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this
case could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without
first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as to the
share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the
properties being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same
being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and established
in the intestate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
 The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
 Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. CA dismissed the
Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of the estate
left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of
an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First
Instance.
 Petitioners assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just because
the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as heirs, are
purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in
order to protect their interests. Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the
RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to
do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment
of executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to title over
property only in a provisional capacity.
RULING:
 The probate court has jurisdiction to
determine the issues in the present case
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to
provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality
not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question
should beventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of
title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.Here, the probate court had already received evidence on
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of
 the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate
proceeding.
While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over properties which
may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only
as between the representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early
as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated thus:
xxx A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima
facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or
ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit. Xxx There is also authority abroad
that where the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and persons
claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale
do not render the issue of title res judicata.
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues raised in the case at
bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate
civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the
determination of which particular properties should be included in the inventory of the
estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the properties alleged by
petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore, part of the
estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties
identified seem to be the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the
estate in the intestate proceedings.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the determination
of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the
inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxxIn the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of
ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the
conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent
which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedingsxxx (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are already
subject of an intestate proceeding, the judgment of CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104025
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
Exception:
5. COCA vs BORROMEO 171 Phil 246
DOCTRINE:
"As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience."
FACTS:
 Pangilinan spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate. They were in
possession of a homestead consisting of 2 parcels of land located at Calamba,
Mis. Occ.
Lot 1927- OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan
Lot 1112- OCT under the name of Heirs of Juan Pangilinan
 3rd lot (Lot 1920) also forms part of estate of Pangilinan Spouses
 Special proceedings was constituted in CFI-Mis. Occ. for the settlement of the
estate of Pangilinan spouses
 CFI- deferred action on the project of partition until ownership of 12 hectares
which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and 6 hectares which were
claimed by Crispen Borromeo (all 18 hectares were excluded from the inventory)
is determined in an ordinary action.
 CFI- noting no separate action had been filed to determine ownership of the 12
hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the
12 hectares claimed by Francisco Pangilinan
-did not bother to decide how remainder should be partitioned and whether
Prima Pangilinan had share on the remainder
 CONTENTIONS in Appellate Court:
 Appellants(petitioners):
-the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of 12-hectare portion of Lot 1112
 Appellees(respondents):
-the lower court did not decide the ownership of the 12 hectares when it
ordered their exclusion from the project of partition
ISSUE: How the title to the 12 hectares should be decided, whether in a separate
action or intestate proceedings?
HELD: We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general
rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
 General Rule: A probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership.
 Exception: Parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of 3rd parties are not impaired, the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.
Why? It is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one which may be
waived.
 The probate court had already received evidence on the ownership the 12-
hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title
inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the
intestate proceedings.

Rule 78, Section 1. Who are incompetenets to serve as executors or administrators
6. MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION V MARCELO JR. G.R. No.
209651 November 26, 2014
FACTS:
Jose Sr. died intestate and he was survived by his four compulsory heirs: Edward, George,
Helen and respondent Jose, Jr. MIMCO then filed a petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration before the RTC Quezon. It was opposed by Helen, Jose Jr., George who banded
with Edward. Each of them wanted to be the regular administrator. RTC appointed Edward as
the regular administrator. Jose Jr. appealed the appointment of Edward as regular administrator
before the CA but the latter affirmed RTC’s decision.
Later on Edward died so Jose Jr. moved for his appointment as new regular administrator.
However this was opposed by MIMCO, heirs of Edward and George and they nominated Atty.
Reyes as regular administrator. RTC appointed Jose Jr. on the ground that Jose Jr. is not
previously declared as unfit, there is a necessity to appoint a new regular administrator and as a
legitimate child of the decedent, he has higher interest than Atty. Reyes. Petiotioners then filed
motion for reconsideration and moved for the appointment instead of George as administrator of
Jose, Sr.’s estate but it as denied. CA affirmed stating that RTC appointing Edward as regular
administrator instead of Jose Jr. did not make a finding of Jose Jr.’s fitness and suitableness to
serve as regular administrator. Jose Jr. is competent and “not wanting in understanding and
integrity” to act as regular administration.
ISSUE: Whether Jose’s Jr. previous non-appointment as regular administrator bars his present
appointment
HELD: NO. The decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the Estate
of Jose, Sr., which decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by this Court, was not merely
a comparison of the qualifications of Edward and Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of
Edward compared to the unfitness of Jose, Jr.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who
wish to serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators — No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator who
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of
an offense involving moral turpitude.
Because Edward and Jose, Jr. are both compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., they were, at the time the
issue of administration first cropped, equally preferred to administer Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Necessarily, the courts also delved into the question of their suitableness and fitness to serve as
administrator, preferring one over the other, framing it as Edward being more fit and suited to be
administrator: 1.) Edward has kept the Marcelo family corporations and his own in good financial
condition; 2.) The trust reposed by the decedent on Edward who voted on Jose, Sr.’s behalf in a
Marcelo corporation; and 3.)Edward being made a co-signatory for money deposited for Jose,
Jr.’s own children.
Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator, more competent
than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference, manifesting none of the
disqualifications set by law. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unsuitable to administer his father’s estate.
7. Republic v Marcos II. GR Nos. 130371 & 130855. August 4, 2009
Facts:
Jan 11, 1996, RTC of Pasig City issued an order granting letters testamentary to
respondents Ferdinand Marcos II and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the
last will and testament of the late Ferdinand Marcos.
Jan 15, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for partial
reconsideration for the granting of letters testamentary to respondents. Respondent
Imelda Marcos also filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
The motions are both denied for lack of merit.
June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the RTC order granting
letters testamentary to respondents.
Mar 13, 1997, CA dismissed the petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal.
Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly provides
that:
Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was, however
denied. Hence, herein petition.
Assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS DESPITE THE
SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY REFERRING
SAID PETITION FOR A DECISION ON THE MERITS.
That the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting
letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can
be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court.
Suarez v. Judge Villarama Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the
time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not respondents
should be disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the
proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.

In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, therein petition
offered no important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the first instance.
Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and
proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner
should have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states:
II.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT RESPONDENTS IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND R.
MARCOS II SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS
EXECUTORS. (main issue)
III.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED AND DISCLAIMED
THE VERY EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.
Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are,
therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner further claims
that said actions clearly show that respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as
officers of the court.
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot
be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal
grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later
on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as
executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or
gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion.
IV.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1996, WHICH ADMITTED THE
MARCOS WILL TO PROBATE AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE
OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY IN SOLIDUM TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS WILL, WAS BASED
ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC ALONE.
The same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant consideration.
V.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT BOTH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE
TRANSFER TO THE PHILIPPINES OF THE MARCOS ASSETS
DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS BANKS.
The same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of
Ferdinand Marcos
Ruling:
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as
executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No
person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
xxxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding
orintegrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)
The grounds for opposition by petitioner to the grant of letters
testamentary are: 1) want of integrity, and 2) conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been
convicted of a number of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one
without integrity, or at least, with questionable integrity.
An appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the action taken by
the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or
administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is
shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and
discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to
serve as an executor. Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the
RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or alleged
by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification.
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against
respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed
The CA also acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the
four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction
for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears
to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a
fine for his failure to file his income tax return.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed and RTC Pasig ordered to issue
letters testamentary to Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II.
Order of Preference:
8. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
 ORDER OF PREFERENCE
 DOCTRINE : A VOID MARRIAGE MAY BE ATTACKED BOTH DIRECTLY
OR COLLATERALLY
FACTS
 Elesio died intestate on December 2, 1992
 On 1994, ELISE Quiazon represented by her mother Lourdes filed a petition
for letters of administration for the estate of Elesio at RTC Las Pinas
 Lourdes is the common law wife of Elesio and Elise is there child
 Elise claims that she is the natural child
 Elise also claims that Elesio’s marriage with AMELIA (WIFE) was bigamous
since Amelia had a subsisting marriage with another man
 Amelia opposed the petition for the administration by elise
 Amelia claims that Elesio was a resident of Tarlac , as stated in the Death
CERTIFICATE
RTC :
 Granted the petition of elise
 That the claim of Amelia is just a hearsay
 That the marriage of elesio and Amelia was void
CA:
 AFFIRMED IN TOTO
ISSUE(S)
1. WHERE SHOULD THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED BE SETTLED
SC:
Rule 73 Sec. 1 : in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death
 Resides means “actual residence” which is different from legal residence or
domicile
 Under Rule 73 , “residence rather domicile is the significant factor
 Even if the word “domicile” is used, it means residence
 This rule is applicable in statutes fixing venues
 RESIDENCE : the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode
 HENCE, RTC LAS PINA is the proper venue
 This is where the deceased stayed in his lifetime
 Death Certificate is a proof of residence
 But it is not binding to the court
 There were sufficient evidences that the deceased resided in Las pinas
 One major factor is that ELESIO went to the court upon discovering that
AMELIA had a subsisting marriage with another man
 Hence, it is impossible that Elesio still lived with Amelia in Tarlac upon his
death
ON the marriage of Elesio and Amelia
 A marriage that is void ab initio may be attacked directly and collaterally
 The applicable rule is the Civil code and not the family code
 Void marriage may be questioned even after death.
 There is not prescription
ELISE is a compulsory heir
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person
 An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited
in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor.
 Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributes RULING : RTC’S DECISION AFFIRMED
9. Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY Ill, v ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTA Y, G. R. No. 183053
October 10, 2012
RESOLUTION
*This case is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of
administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent
Facts:
1.The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.
2. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations
cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was
Eventually acquitted which in Turn Emilio I filed a case of legal separation against his
wife(Isabel) which the court ruled that the marriage is null and void.
3. On 27 September 1993 Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
4. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate
5. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that as thesurviving spouse of the decedent, he
should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; and file a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s
petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’
marriage being declared null and void.
6. However, in the original Decision, it was declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been
born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage, were legitimate children of Emilio I,
who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother the decedent, Cristina.
7. Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event
letters of administration issues to Federico. Then Emilio II filed and Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was betterequipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina. On 13 November 2000, Federico died. The trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator
8. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent
as administratrix (Isabel)
9. On appeal by certiorari, The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate
court. decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
weight to his interest in Federico’s estate based on the grounds that Emilio III, as
raised by Federico and Cristina (decedent) was acknowledged by them as a
grandchild, and that Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share
in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and
not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
10. In this MR, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her
sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate
she seeks to administer. Additionally she avers that Emilio III actions since his appointment as
administrator has caused damaged and prejudiced to the estate of Cristina, hence she (Isabel)
should be made the sole administrator of the Estate.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel is better Qualified to be an administrator of the Estate?
Held: Yes. Isabel is Better Qualified to be an administrator of the Estate .
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator,
has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
Thus, the paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate and that the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. In a number of cases, the SC
have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and
those interested therein.
The court recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent or rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment. In this Motion for Reconsideration the SC zeroed in on Emilio
III’s demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference set
forth in the Rules.
The collected Jurisprudential teaching enunciates that mere demonstration of
interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to
coadministration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6,
Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest “next
of kin,” the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be
a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court
and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
In the case at bar, based on evidence, the court took note of the following
considerations of the case: 1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing
animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back
from the time their paternal grandparents were alive 2. Corollary thereto, the
seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-
administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying
settlement thereof 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the
damage and prejudice thereof.
In addition, the court said that there considerations do not warrant the setting aside of
the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other between Emilio III and Isabel
Thus, Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable
interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence
reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Isabel was able to prove that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the
subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and
has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. He did not give a complete inventory as ordered by the probate court, 2. Emilio did not
take action on certain orders of the Probate court.
Although Emilio was able to refute in court, some of the accusations of Isabel against
him, as acting prejudicial to the estate, The SC has Not found any clarification on
Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory,
which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about. The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his
unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to “make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory” which became proven fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her
siblings, from the list of heirs.
Thus from foregoing circumstances , established by evidence, of Emilio III’s omission
and inaction It speaks volumes of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates
his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other Moreover as the facts of the case prove that it is impractical,
nay, improbable for Emilio III and Isabel to work together, it would then be detrimental
to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has show an
adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel,
Immediately interested in the said estate.
RULING: Therefore the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Previous Decision is Modified that the Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan,.
10. Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay. G.R. No. 183053 June
16,2010
I. Relevent Facts:
 On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
 At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
 Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely:
herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of
wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Ta ñedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
 Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere
baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their
mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal
grandparents. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted
visits of her grandparents.
 Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted
their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
 On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed
as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by
Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration.
 After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed
a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf.
 The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. In the course of the proceedings, on November
13, 2000, Federico died. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001,
appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate
estate.
 Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The
CA stated that the respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Also that jurisprudence has consistently held
that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
II. Issues relevant to the topic
1) In the appointment of an administrator of the estate under Sec. 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, whether Art. 992 of The Civil Code
applies.
2) Under the undisputed facts where herein petitioner was reared by
the decedent and her spouse since infancy, whether Art. 992 of The
New Civil Code applies so as to bar him from being appointed
administrator of the decedent’s estate.

III. Rulings of Supreme Court per issue
1. The SC stated that it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." The reasoning that Emilio III’s
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of
Federico’s death – wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
The order of preference is under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is not
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each
case.19 Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court.20 In the main, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by
both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
“[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision of the CA is
reversed and set aside. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio
III and respondent Isabel.
2. Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession: “The law [of
intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the deceased… Love, it is said, first
descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those
closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased
would have done so had he manifested his last will… Lastly, in default of anyone
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in
accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.”
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the
status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the
legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.Nonetheless, it must be pointed
out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.
11. TAN V. GEDORIO. G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008
I. Relevant Facts
1. Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will.
2. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of
Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to
Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition.
3. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator praying
that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special
administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the said motion arguing that none of
the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are
not residing in the country. Petitioners contended further that Romualdo does not have
the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C.
Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of Gerardo’s estate
since his death.
4. On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner,
issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix. More than a year
later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte
Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the
directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
5. Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order
appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate. Petitioners filed on
19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that petitioner Vilma should be
the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the
deceased but this was denied on July 17, 2003 by respondent Judge Francisco
Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity asRTC Executive Judge.
6. Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilmas right to be
appointed as special administratix. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Petition on
29 July 2004 as well as the motion for reconsideration on 6 December 2004.
II. Issue Relevant to the Topic Whether or not petitioners should be given priority in the
administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo,
as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children.
Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents estate.
III. Ruling of the Supreme Court
No, becauseit has been consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of
a regular administrator as provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
the selection of a special administrator. The preference under the said rule for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, andnot of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in thediscretion of the court, and is not appealable.
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs. Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo
as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of
special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment because of the
documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse
of a considerable length of time which certainly militates against her appointment .

12. San Luis v. San Luis
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
Facts:
 The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who
was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of
Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with
Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree granting
absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was
with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up
to the time of his death.
 After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of
their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A petition for
administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.
 The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that respondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her
marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is
not binding in the Philippines.
 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision.
Issue:
 Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration
Held:
 Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo
or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
 The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Therefore, this case
should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
 Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
 Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section
2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: “SEC. 2. Contents of petition for
letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x
x x.”
 An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent.
 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.
 Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family
Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows: “The regime of limited co-
ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to
the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.