Cerberus Protection Concept

Cerberus®
Protection concept
Introduction
Fire & Security Products

Siemens Building Technologies
Data and design subject to change
without notice. / Supply subject to
availability.
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Siemens Building Technologies AG
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1 The purpose of this brochure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 How to use this brochure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 The way to the protection concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1 Security Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4 Physical and electronic protection categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 General considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Protection category 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6 Optimal combination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 Surveillance types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1 A: Perimeter surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 B: Peripheral surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3 C1: Total room volumetric surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4 C2: Partial room volumetric surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.5 D: Object surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.6 E: Hold–up alarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.7 F: Access control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6 How to assemble the puzzle that never fits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1 Step 1: Gather Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2 Step 2: Create a zoning scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3 Step 3: Select Applicable Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.4 Step 4: Edit The Selected Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.5 Step 5: Assemble And Supplement The Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.6 Step 6: Check For Weak Spots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.7 Step 7: Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Siemens Building Technologies 07.2002

II
Siemens Building Technologies 07.2002

There’s more to an
integrated security system
than meets the eye
It’s more than hardware. It’s more than
system design. It starts with a thor-
ough understanding of the desired ob-
jective, and what it takes to solve the
problems involved. A successful sys-
tem integrates knowledge, philosophy
and hardware.
1 The purpose of this brochure
This brochure is intended as a guideline for the project engineer and should help to de-
sign protection concepts for any type of premises. It can by no means replace a proper
risk analysis, but it can help to find a quick solution where time for a thorough analysis is
not available.
The brochure provides a number of PARTIAL CONCEPTS which can be put together like
the pieces of a puzzle. The peculiarity is, that this puzzle will never quite fit. Every project
is unique and has to be treated as such, in order to avoid weak spots in the concept. The
gaps between the prefabricated puzzle pieces will have to be filled individually and the
pieces themselves will eventually have to be modified to fulfill their purpose correctly.
These partial concepts can be considered as the building blocks used to construct a
house. They hold together only by the mortar that is put in between, and they sometimes
have to be shaped to purpose. Sometimes specially made elements are required where
the prefab blocks are insufficient.
The partial concepts provided in this brochure are no more and no less than a collection of
ideas. For each particular case, the applicable items must be picked out and eventually
be supplemented by additional measures.
Siemens Building Technologies e003009b

Fire & Security Products 07.2002
2 How to use this brochure
This brochure comes in two volumes : Volume 1 contains basic knowledge. Volume 2
provides tha actual partial concepts. Please note that the brochure makes some as-
sumptions which cover the majority of applications. However, to avoid pitfalls by not rec-
ognizing the exceptional case, there is a prerequisite:
– You should be familiar with the generalities of security planning which are treated in
other documents of the CRP. The chapter ” THE WAY TO THE PROTECTION CON-
CEPT ” in this brochure provides an overview of this process.
The chapter ” PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC PROTECTION CATEGORIES ” will help

you to classify your problem, and the chapter ”SURVEILLANCE TYPES ” introduces
you to the systematics of electronic security.
There is no such thing as ” the typical museum ” or the ” typical threat situation ”, every
project is an individual. Therefore it is not possible to make standard concepts for banks,
hotels etc. What is possible, however, is to standardize partial concepts which can be put
together like a mosaic.
– To learn how to assemble this mosaic, read the chapter ” HOW TO ASSEMBLE THE
PUZZLE THAT NEVER FITS ”.
You will find the pieces of that puzzle in Volume 2 ” PARTIAL CONCEPTS ”.
Now, when this has set you on the right road and you’re in the middle of your work,
– never forget that the these partial concepts can only cover some prevalent threats
and risks. Others might be present which must be recognized and considered.
– For each particular case, the applicable items must be picked out and possibly be
supplemented by additional measures.
It is very easy to forget little details which can be very important for security.
AVOID PITFALLS,
THINK
!!!

3 The way to the protection concept
3.1 Security Planning

Risk management is done in three phases:
– The first phase consists of establishing a SECURITY POLICY. This should be done at
a corporate level by the management of the enterprise. The result is a series of global
security objectives which determine the subsequent phases.
– The second phase is the actual SECURITY PLANNING. This consists mainly of a
careful analysis of the risk situation and setting of the proper priorities.
– The third phase deals with RISK REDUCTION. This is the conceptual work. The pro-
tection requirements are determined, compared with existing protection and operation-
al requirements. A strategy is developed and used as basis for protection plan and sys-
tems concept.
Overall concept of dealing with the risk

Corporate
policy
Corporate Corporate
objectives operations
Risk
examination
Basic decisions on the

limits of acceptability
SECURITY Formulated objectives

(Proposals)to safeguard
POLICY corporate operations
Security Risk recognition

planning and assessment
Risk evaluation
(Acceptability of risks)
Laying–down of priori–
SECURITY ties for dealing with
PLANNING the risk
Increased Protection
risks requirements
Protection concept /
Protection plan
RISK
REDUCTION Protection realized

Although this brochure concentrates on intrusion protection, we should not forget, that it
will never be possible to separate the other aspects of security, such as fire detection,
technical hazards etc. from our considerations. Arson could be used to divert attention or
a technical problem could be the first sign of an attempted intrusion. A good security con-
cept will always include all these aspects and establish the necessary interactions be-
tween the different systems.
ETC.
GAS
TECH.HAZARDS
FIRE
INTRUSION
PREVENTIVE SECURITY PERSONNEL INTEGRATION

MEASURES
DETECTION ALARMING VALUES LIVES
COUNTER OPERATION
OPERATIVE INFOR–
SITUATION MEASURES TRAINING
MEASURES MATION
MATERIALS ACTIVE INTEGRATION INSURANCE

SECURITY MEASURES
In the present context, it is assumed that the global security objectives are established
and available. Sometimes, the risk analysis has also already been done and the priorities
set. If not, it is of the utmost importance to do this now.
Risk analysis is a very complex and demanding matter which can not be treated in suffi-
cient detail in the context of this brochure. Literature is available about the subject and
should be consulted extensively. The following very brief outline should help to under-
stand the subsequent chapters:

In risk analysis, the risk is defined as the product of the probability of a certain event and
its effect on the enterprise:
RISK = PROBABILITY x EFFECT
The first thing to do is therefore the definition and qualification of the assets to be pro-
tected, noting also their geographical location within the premises. The EFFECT in case
of loss or damage should be estimated and quantified.
The next thing will be the assessment of possible THREATS and their probabilities. This
is an extremely difficult task, since we cannot normally know who will attack at which time
and with what kind of equipment. Since knowledge of the expected threat is crucial to
define the necessary countermeasures, we must at least try to make a good guess.
The local criminal and political situation should be given consideration and the exposure
of the enterprise (politically and geographically) should be estimated. This will give at
least certain clues about possible aggressors. We must try to get an idea about their mo-
tives, mentality, group size, equipment and training, since this will considerably influence
the selection of protection equipment.
With the above knowledge it is now possible to estimate the RISKS. It has become possi-
ble to define risk levels and assign priorities.
DISASTER TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE
MAJOR RISK
MEDIUM RISK TO BE
DETERMINED
SMALL RISK
ACCEPTABLE
MINOR RISK

It is quite clear, that very often not much time is available to do this analysis, but it should
never be omitted. In simple cases, it can even be done very briefly. If we keep the follow-
ing scheme in mind, we will at least consider all relevant factors and come up with a strat-
egy and a concept that makes sense.
Risk evaluation
GLOBAL
OBJECTIVES
SUMMARY
RISK RECOGNITION
AND
ASSESSMENT RISK MATRIX
RISK EVALUATION
(ACCEPTABILITY)
DETAILED OBJECTIVES
PRIORITIES
FOR
RISK REDUCTION
PRIORITY LIST
SECURITY
PLANNING
RISK REGULATIONS
REDUCTION
LEAKS,WEAK POINTS OPERATIONAL REQUIREM.
EXISTING SHIELDS ACCESSABILITIES
EXISTING BARRIERS POSSIBILITY FOR
INTERVENTION
PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS,
SECURITY ANALYSIS
MEASURES
SYSTEM CONCEPT
ZONING
PROTECTION
CONCEPT /
PLAN
EXECUTION DETAILED PLANS

OF
PLANS

One of the most important things in risk reduction, is to establish a scheme of security
zones. Like the layers of an onion, outer zones will protect the inner zones. An intruder will
have to overcome the obstacles presented by the zone boundaries before he can reach
his goal. The time delay created this way allows one to get the intervention forces on the
spot before too much harm can be done. The obstacles might even deter the intruder to
the point where he refrains from his attack.
Zoning scheme
(Example)
OWNER PROTECTED
CONTROLLED
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ
HIGH SECURITY
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ SI
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
A A
CP
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÎÎÎÎÎ
O
SI
ÎÎÎÎÎ
ÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ A+
LEGAL DEMARCATION
BARRIER + DETECTION
ÊÊÊÊÊ
ÊÊÊÊÊ STRONG BARRIER (DELAY)
CP CHECKPOINT
O CONTROLLED ENTRY
A ACCESS CONTROL (CARD)
A+ ACCESS CONTROL (CARD + CODE)
SI INTERMITTENT SECURITY PATROL
PERMANENT SURVEILLANCE

The zoning scheme also helps to organize the systems concept. By assigning certain
measures to certain zones, it becomes easy to determine what has to be done where and
thereby avoid uneven distribution of available funds.
Of course we should try to make this security zoning scheme congruent with any existing
fire compartmentation (or vice versa!). This can save very much money in mechanical
security. A fire partition door e.g. is usually of quite good quality and, with very little modifi-
cations, will also do a good job for access control. A wall which is good enough to hold off
an intruder from valuable goods will on the other hand usually also be an acceptable fire
partition.
We can now compare the requirements with any already existing security measures. The
difference between the requirements and the existing items defines what has to be add-
ed, in other words, we can start to plan the systems concept.
BARRIERS
SHIELDS
THREAT,
ACTION EFFECT
LIKELIHOOD
PROTECTION
PLANS
MEASURES
REQUIRE–
MENTS
OBJECTIVES
RISKS

4 Physical and electronic protection categories
4.1 General considerations
Given enough time, any physical or electronic protection can be penetrated. And the best
electronic burglar detection brings nothing if not backed up by the necessary physical
protection in order to delay the intruder until intervention can arrive.
It is therefore obvious, that a good level of security can only be obtained by striking a care-
ful balance between physical and electronic protection. But there are also strong eco-
nomic reasons to match the two types of protection, because only this way the available
money can be applied optimally.
Although this is no substitute for careful detailed planning, categorizing physical and
electronic protection can provide some help to achieve a well balanced concept. The fol-
lowing chapter provides one such categorizing scheme which has proved its practical
value in many cases.

4.2 Protection category 0
General protection objective :

To offer such resistance to the would–be aggressor that he abandons his plans.
Individual protection objectives :
Physical protection Alarm technology Organization
Hinder
– simple, forced entry

into protected area or
– simple, forced
access to protected
assets
Burglary Theft
10


To offer such resistance to the would–be aggressor, or signal intrusion at his preferred
points of entry so that he is deterred from further action.

Totally prevent Detect and indicate : Create awareness
amongst neighbours for
prompt response to
– simple, forced entry – entry into restricted unusual circumstances
and record informations
into protected area or area at typical break–in
about incidents and
points or
aggressors
– simple, forced – theft of monitored
access to protected property
assets
and if possible transmit Enable the call–out of
signal to a central intervention forces
station
Burglary Theft
Alarm
or CMS
11


To offer such resistance to the would–be aggressor, delaying his progress to such an
extent, and to signal his entry at the critical break–in points as to allow a good chance of
counter–action.

Hinder and delay Detect : Ensure the call–out of
intervention forces and
– forced entry into – attack on or approach Enable intervention

protected area or to critical break–in before crime
points and accomplished
– forced access to – entry into protected
protected assets area or
– attack on or approach
to protected assets
and transmit signal to

intervention control
centre
Burglary Theft
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍ
Alarm
CMS
12


To offer such resistance to the would–be aggressor and signal his entry in the protected
area as to totally prevent progress until counteraction is effective.

Totally prevent Detect : Ensure intervention
before crime
– forced entry into – attack on protected accomplished
protected area or area or
– forced access to – approach to protected

protected assets area
until counteraction is and transmit signal to

effective intervention control
centre
Burglary
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
ÍÍÍÍÍÍÍ
Alarm
Intervention force
13

4.6 Optimal combination
In the ideal case, physical and electronic protection categories should match. If either
type of protection cannot be implemented as desired, e.g. because an existing building
cannot accommodate the required modifications to its structure, this lack can to some
extent be compensated for by additional means in the other type. (As an example this
could be faster, more comprehensive electronic detection as compensation for a wall
which can not be reinforced as necessary.)
In any case, proper application of this principle leads automatically to a zoning scheme
with protection categories increasing from the outside of the protected premises towards
the object to be protected. This confirms the principle stated in the chapter ” Security
Planning ”.
Environment of the area or object to be protected

Cat.0 Cat.0
Cat.1 Cat.1
Cat.2
Cat.2
Area or object to
be protected
Cat.3
Cat.2
Cat.2
Cat.1
Cat.0
14

5 Surveillance types
A Perimeter surveillance
B Peripheral surveillance
C
C Volumetric surveillance
D
D Object surveillance
B
E
E Holdup alarm
F Access control
C
C
5.1 A: Perimeter surveillance

(outdoor surveillance)
Objective:
Report intrusion into surrounding premises.
Characteristics Applicable systems

– Early detection and alarming, before – Infrared barriers
the periphery of the building is – Microwave systems
reached
– Leaky cable
– Movement within the inner security – Fiber optics
zones possible
– Ground pressure system
– E–Field
– Sophisticated planning because of – Vibration detection
environmental influences – Microphonic cable
– Taut wire
– Alarm wire
– Elaborate infrastructure necessary
– Video motion detection
(fences, walls, CCTV surveillance etc.)
– etc.
15

5.2 B: Peripheral surveillance
(surveillance of the shell of the building)
Objective:
Report an attack on the periphery of a building

– Early detection and alarming, before – Magnetic contacts
or while the building is entered – Electromech. contacts
– Movement outside and within the – Surface protection
building possible – Vibration detectors
– Glass break detectors (active or passive)
– Monitored windows and doors must be
kept closed
– Retrofitting a building is costly
5.3 C1: Total room volumetric surveillance
Objective:
Report movement within a room

– Alarm only upon movement in – Passive infrared detectors
surveyed area – Ultrasonic detectors
– Partial surveillance of building possible – Dual detectors (PIR/US)
– Microwave detectors
– Ideal for rooms in which the objects to – Acoustic detectors (microphones)
be protected are located far apart
– Simple installation
– Careful planning necessary
– No movement in surveyed area

allowed while system active
16

5.4 C2: Partial room volumetric surveillance
Objective:
Report movement within certain areas of a room

– Surveillance limited to certain areas of – Passive infrared detectors
a room – Ultrasonic detectors
– Frequently designed as intruder traps – Dual detectors (PIR/US)
– Microwave detectors
– Simple installation
– Infrared barriers
– Acoustic detectors (microphones)
– Limited freedom of movement
adjacent to surveyed area
5.5 D: Object surveillance
Objective:
Report attack on individual objects

– Controlled protection of specific – Seismic detectors
objects – Surface protection (e.g.alarm wires)
– Picture surveillance detectors
– Free movement around protected – Magnetic contacts
objects is possible – Electromech. contacts
– Capacitive detectors
– Alarm only upon attack on the object – etc.
17

5.6 E: Hold–up alarm
Objectives:
Silent or audible alarm in case of a threat
Visual recording of the threat

– Manual action required – Alarm button (wall– or table mount)
– Foot contact rail
– Type and location of alarm triggering – Wireless alarm devices
devices depending on the employee’s – Photographic camera
possibilities in case of direct or indirect
threats – CCTV camera
– Can trigger still or motion picture

recording
– Usually armed only when personnel

present
5.7 F: Access control
Objectives:
Restrict access to certain areas to certain persons at certain times

– Permits regulation of personnel traffic – Card access systems
( ” people filter ”, determines who can – Biometric systems
go where at which time )
– Time control systems
– Requires personal piece of
identification
– Combination with biometric criteria
(PIN code, voice, fingerprint etc. )
possible
– Traffic can be logged, based on time
and place criteria
– Usually autonomous system
– Requires mechanically suitable doors
18

6 How to assemble the puzzle that never fits
6.1 Step 1: Gather Information
Before security planning can begin, the Security Policy must have been established
(usually by the owner of the premises to be protected or by his security consultant). This
provides the Global Objectives. If these are not available, we have to gather the neces-
sary information direct. If there is no time (no money) available to make a thorough analy-
sis, this can also be done in a quick and simple way. There is only one question we have to
answer:
WHAT DO WE WANT TO PROTECT

AGAINST WHAT ( OR WHOM ) ?
The answers to the first WHAT can fill many pages. They will inform us about the type,
location, size and value of the objects to be protected, about existing security elements,
operational requirements, accessibilities, intervention possibilities etc., etc. If in any way
possible, this should include plans of the premises and it is very helpful to have photos of
the most sensitive areas.
But even more important are the answers to the second WHAT: What is the threat?
These are very often hard to get. Frequently we have to make ”educated guesses” based
on our own knowledge of the local level of criminality, the exposure of the premises and
probably some previous attacks to that particular customer’s premises.
A checklist can be a great help to assemble this data, but be aware that no checklist can
ever be complete. Use it as a guideline only and supplement it with your own ideas.
6.2 Step 2: Create a zoning scheme
The most sensible thing to do now, is to take the overall plans and mark them with a secu-
rity zoning scheme. Ideally, these zones should be concentric, with the highest security
zone being the innermost. This way every outer zone provides protection (obstacles for
the intruder) for the inner ones. If you do this three dimensionally (or as a series of over-
lays for the different floors) you will be able to pinpoint inter–floor weak spots (zone
boundaries jumping more than one zone level per partition).
Since the security level is bound to increase from an outward lying public area towards
the innermost zone with the highest security requirements, one possible guidance for
creating the zoning scheme are the protection categories explained in earlier chapters.
19

Environment of the area or object to be protected
Cat.0 Cat.0
Cat.1 Cat.1
Cat.2
Cat.2
Area or object to
be protected
Cat.3
Cat.2
Cat.2
Cat.1
Cat.0
For every zone the protection category increases by one. A minimum of three security
zones is recommended.
Of course your zoning scheme should later also consider the boundaries of your partial
concepts, but it may also be necessary to modify the partial concepts to fit the zoning !
This will be dealt with in step 5.
6.3 Step 3: Select Applicable Concepts

You should now check, which of the available partial concepts ( out of Volume 2 of this
brochure ) fit the project on hand. For a bank you will probably find a prefabricated partial
concept for all vital points, but a pharmaceutical lab could e.g. include areas like
– storage of dangerous materials

– emergency power plant
– data processing center
– development offices
– etc.
The only direct equivalent you would find, is the DATA PROCESSING. But the VAULT
concept might give you some ideas about how to protect the dangerous materials storage
and the MANAGEMENT FLOOR concept could help for protection of the development
offices.
20

SECURITY PLANNING
Prioritized
Objectives
etc.
PROTECTION CONCEPT
Private Residence
Military etc.
Data Processing Cashiers
Museum Shops
Bank Vault
– Vault VIP Office
– Cashiers Warehouse
– Data processing
Data Processing partial concepts
– VIP Office
SYSTEMS CONCEPT
The sensible thing to do, is to select the closest fit and adapt it to the actual situation. This
is the next step. But what, if there is none which would at least partially fit ? For that part
you will have to start from scratch and build your own partial concept. Of course you will
use the same structure as you find in the existing ones. This is described in the next chap-
ter.
6.4 Step 4: Edit The Selected Concepts

Each partial concept is structured the same way. You will have to edit it, so that it fits the
case you are dealing with. Use copies of each sheet, mark them with your data and put
them in the project file. Now, this is the structure of the partial concepts (Take volume 2
and select one as a reference, so that you understand how this works):
– First comes a typical floor plan marked with a typical arrangement of detectors. You
will of course have to replace this with the actual plan of your project, a copy of which
you should attach if you use the concept sheet as a working tool.
21

– This is followed by a risk matrix, showing typical threats and a number of possible
objects (those of the typical floor plan ). The matrix has empty spaces, so that you can
fill these in with the addional items important in your project. The typically pronounced
risks are shaded, to give you a basic idea, but you can use the boxes to make your
own quick risk estimation. ( Remember: Risk is the product of the probability [1....5] of
an event and its effect [1....5] )
– The next paragraph lists the typical objectives of protection. Tick the boxes for those
which are true for your case or mark them with a priority number [1....5]. Add more
objectives as required.
– Then follow lists of possible measures, grouped in 4 categories: Structural, opera-
tional and electronic measures and alarm organization. Again: Tick the boxes or mark
them with priorities, and add more if you need. Since alarm organization is something
very tightly connected to the local situation, only general guidelines can be provided
in the partial concepts. The detailed alarm organization is something which is to be
defined in the systems concept, hence more information on this subject can be found
in the CRP guidelines for the systems concept.
6.5 Step 5: Assemble And Supplement The Concepts

This is the most difficult, the most important and the most interesting part of the work:
You have now a number of pieces of a (three dimensional !) puzzle, and you know that
they will not entirely fit. You will have to fill in the gaps with something reasonable, lest the
intruder find the weak spot !
Technical plant
Computer room
VIP Office
Archive
Entry checkpoint
22

First of all, you will have to check for collisions with your pre–established zoning scheme.
You may find exaggerations, e.g. when two high security zones meet wall to wall. You will
not have to protect this wall from both sides! But you may also find weak spots or places
where, with a slight modification of the pre–established zoning scheme, you can cover
your requirements in a simpler way, i.e. more economically.
When this is done and you have marked the plans with the necessary details, you can
start ”to put the mortar between the tiles”, i.e. to fill the gaps with the necessary security
items which are not yet included in the partial concepts (additional detectors, cameras,
security windows, insurance policies etc.). Of course this work should follow the same red
line as you have by now experienced using the partial concepts. There are no fixed rules
for this. Try to be smarter than the expected intruder, and use a lot of common sense.
THINK !
At the end, if there remains time, it is a good thing to edit an overall concept as a summary
of the partial ones. This has two advantages:
– First of all, it gives you a chance to think things over, to simplify and standardize. If you
find your partial concepts to differ too much, re–edit them and find a common line. The
simpler the solution, the better it will be, because it will be easier to understand and to
handle.
– The second benefit is, that you have something to give to the customer which proves
that you have tried to solve his problem and not only to sell him a system. Again: The
simpler the solution, the easier to understand and the better the chances that the cu-
stomer will buy.
6.6 Step 6: Check For Weak Spots
And now, last but not least :
GO OVER IT AGAIN .....
This is worth while. You might find weak spots you have overlooked before, but this is not
the main reason for it. The actual problem is, that intruders, like everybody else, always
go the easiest way.
With your protection concept you have put up some obstacles. This means that you have
eliminated the old weak spots, but new ones have appeared now that formerly were not
there.
It is very important to achieve a uniform level of protection. If the intruder does not
know where to attack because no spot is weaker than the others, he will most probably
not attack at all and look for an easier target. Moreover this also results in a uniform, and
therefore most economic, application of the available funds.
23

ŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ
6.7 Step 7: Implementation
The result of steps 1...6 is the protection concept. Nothing has been determined so far as
to types of detectors and their application. Neither have control units, or their operating
concept been touched. These are the topics documented under the title ”Systems Con-
cept” in the CRP. They closely tie the concept to specific features of a certain hardware.
There are, however, interactions between the features of the hardware and the protection
concept which should be kept in mind. This is of special importance, if several types of
systems must be integrated, like CCTV, Fire Detection, Access Control etc. The diagram
below gives an overview of the entire planning process. Never forget, that the weakest
link determines the strength of the entire chain!
There is a very close relation between protection concept and systems concept. The pro-
tection concept can stand alone, but the systems concept must always be based on the
protection concept. Both concepts together should accompany any proposal to a cus-
tomer, so that he is able to see how we intend to solve his security problem.
24

SECURITY PLANNING
Prioritized
Objectives
etc. PROTECTION CONCEPT

Private Residence
Military etc.
Data Processing Cashiers
Museum Shops
Bank Vault
– Vault VIP Office
– Cashiers Warehouse
– Data processing Data Processing partial concepts etc.
– VIP Office
Op. Concept
Alarm Concept
etc. etc.
SYSTEMS CONCEPT
Access Control Seismic detectors
Holdup US detectors
Object PIR detectors CCTV
Volumetric Surv.contact Access control
Periphery – electromech. Intrusion
Perimeter – magnetic control unit Accessories
– Surveill. Contact etc. Alarm Devices
– Fence Detection IR Barriers Op. Terminal
Fence Detection Control Unit
appl. rules
– Microph.Cable
– Vibr.Detectors
– Cut through
Installation
Wiring
INSTALLATION CONCEPT
Location
Comm.Report COMMISSIONING
User Training
Proj. File
Tests
– Wiring
– Detectors
– Cntl Unit
– Alarms
Maint.rules MAINTENANCE
Maintenance
contract
25

Siemens Building Technologies AG
Alte Landstrasse 411
CH8708 Männedorf
Phone +41 1 − 922 61 11
Fax +41 1 − 922 64 50
www.cerberus.ch
26
Siemens Buildingno.
Document Technologies
e003009b Manual Back
CRPI
Edition 07.2002 Section 4

Cerberus Protection Concept

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1 The purpose of this brochure

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The chapter ” PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC PROTECTION CATEGORIES ” will help

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3.1 Security Planning

Overall concept of dealing with the risk

Basic decisions on the

SECURITY Formulated objectives

Security Risk recognition

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PREVENTIVE SECURITY PERSONNEL INTEGRATION

DETECTION ALARMING VALUES LIVES

MATERIALS ACTIVE INTEGRATION INSURANCE

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RISK = PROBABILITY x EFFECT

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EXECUTION DETAILED PLANS

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A ACCESS CONTROL (CARD)

A+ ACCESS CONTROL (CARD + CODE)

SI INTERMITTENT SECURITY PATROL

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4.1 General considerations

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General protection objective :

Individual protection objectives :

Physical protection Alarm technology Organization

– simple, forced entry

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General protection objective :

Individual protection objectives :

Physical protection Alarm technology Organization

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General protection objective :

Individual protection objectives :

Physical protection Alarm technology Organization

– forced entry into – attack on or approach Enable intervention

and transmit signal to

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General protection objective :

Individual protection objectives :

Physical protection Alarm technology Organization

– forced access to – approach to protected

until counteraction is and transmit signal to

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Environment of the area or object to be protected

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5.1 A: Perimeter surveillance

Characteristics Applicable systems

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Characteristics Applicable systems

– Retrofitting a building is costly

5.3 C1: Total room volumetric surveillance

Characteristics Applicable systems

– Careful planning necessary