Premature Contract

Case
55. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997]

FACTS:
Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC
PLASTIC are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC).
MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election,
SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration.
As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed.
MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a
certification election. MR- denied
A pre-election conference was held, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file employees
based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit
the list, it was given a stern warning by DOLE that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to
be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters. [2] But the PPC again failed
to appear. SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference. On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer the
conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration of MNMPP were still pending resolution
before the Med-Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective bargaining agreement
between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election. [4]

MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been finally decided by the DOLE and that
the execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the representation case did not bar the holding of a certification
election. [5]
On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more, reiterating its warning that should the
company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the list to be submitted by private respondent MNMPP and
petitioner SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the company’s right to the exclusion proceedings
would be deemed waived. [6]
But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP
agreed to hold the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list of employees submitted by MNMPP,
without prejudice to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17, 1991. [7] Thereafter, they
agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social Security System. [8]
On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally set for October 6, 1992. But
SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the list
furnished by the SSS. [9] It also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a
Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification election and asked that the certification election held
on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification as required by law; (2)
its opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to setting the date of the certification election had not
been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the SSS; and (4) SAMAHANs President
moved to strike out his signature at the back of the official ballot. [10]
The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over SAMAHANs objection KAMAPI was allowed to
participate. The following were results of the election: [11]
No. of Eligible Voters..98
Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic,...56
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0
No Union1
No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3
Total no of Votes Cast..62
On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election
In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of SAMAHAN and upheld
the election of MNMPP.
Appeal and MR –denied

ISSUE: Whether a CBA prematurely renewed is a bar to the holding of a certification election.

HELD: No.
Petitioner’s contention that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings,
rendered the certification election moot and academic. Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, 4 provides:

The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or
during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.

ALU-TUCP v. Trajano [21] where we held that the representation case will not be adversely affected by a CBA registered
before or during the freedom period or during the pendency of the representation case.
In ALU v. Calleja, [22] we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election. Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the representation
case and after the filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice the
certification election nor render it moot.

When Applied
Case
56. Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 178 [1989] –
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents. G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989

FACTS:
*Associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed GAW Trading, Inc. that majority of the latter's employees have authorized
ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW Trading Inc., in the same Letter for a
conference for the execution of an initial Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);
*GAW Trading Inc. received the Letter of ALU and responded its recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent for the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for conference and/or negotiation
*On the following day, ALU in behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. signed and excuted the
Collective Bargaining
*On the other hand, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW
(NAMGAW) undertook a ... Strike ... after it failed to get the management of GAW Trading Inc.
*In response, GAW Trading Inc. filed a petition for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, dated June 1, 1986 (Annex
H) and which strike Labor Arbiter Tumamak held as illegal in a decision.
*Another intervenor, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation ... filed a Certification Election petition
(ANNEX J), but as found by Med-Arbiter Cumba in its (sic) Order dated Ju ne 11, 1986 (ANNEX K), without having
complied (sic) the subscription requirement for which it was merely considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in
the other petition for direct recogbnition as bargaining agent filed on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL) as found in the same order
*In the meantime, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by ALU and GAW Trading Inc. (ANNEX F) was duly
filed May 27, 1986 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Region VII, Cebu city;
*Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter Candido M. Cumba in his order of June 11, 1986 (Annex K) ruled for the holding of a
ceritfication election in all branches of GAW Trading Inc. in Cebu City, as to which ALU filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 19, 1986 (ANNEX L) which was treated as an appeal on that questioned Order for which reason
the entire record of subject certification case was forwarded for the Director, Bureau of LAbor Relations, Ministry of Labor
and Employment,
*Bureau of Labor Relations Director Cresencio B. Trajano, rendered a Decision on August 13, 1986 (Annex B) granting
ALU's appeal (Motion for Reconsideration) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter Order of June 11, 1986 (Annex K),
on the ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable;
*The aforesaid decision of then Director Trajano was thereafter reversed by respondent director in her aforecited decision
which is now assailed in this action. A motion for reconsideration of ALU 3 appears to have been disregarded, hence, its
present resort grounded on grave abuse of discretion by public respondent.
*Public respondent ordered the holding of a certification election ruling that the "contract bar rule" relied upon by her
predecessor does not apply in the present controversy. According to the decision of said respondent, the collective
bargaining agreement involved herein is defective because it "was not duly submitted in accordance with Section I, Rule
IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130." It was further observed that "(t)here is no proof
tending to show that the CBA has been posted in at least two conspicuous places in the 1 establishment at least five days
before its ratification and that it has been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit."
Hence, this petition of certiorari was submitted.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by
contending that such contract bar rule does not apply to this case.
HELD:
We find no reversible error.
A careful consideration of the fact, yields the conclusion that the collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed
defective hence unproductive of the legal effects attributed to it by the former director in his decision which was
subsequently and properly reversed.
We have previously held that the mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following
jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees'
representative in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2)
proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code.
In the present case, the standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious, to say the least. It may be
recalled that respondent company, in a letter dated May 12, 1986 and addressed to petitioner, merely indicated that it was
"not against the desire of (its) workers" and required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by the majority thereof
in a meeting to be held on the same date. 5 The only express recognition of petitioner as said employees' bargaining
representative that We see in the records is in the collective bargaining agreement entered into two days
thereafter. 6 Evidently, there was precipitate haste on the part of respondent company in recognizing petitioner union,
which recognition appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit. Furthermore, at the time of the supposed recognition, the employer was obviously
aware that there were other unions existing in the unit. As earlier stated, respondent company's letter is dated May 12, 1986
while the two other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter, SPFL and Philippine Social Security Labor
Union (PSSLU, for short), went on strike earlier on May 9, 1986. The unusual promptitude in the recognition of petitioner
union by respondent company as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in GAW Trading, Inc. under the
fluid and amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was decidedly unwarranted and improvident.
t bears mention that even in cases where it was the then Minister of Labor himself who directly certified the union as the
bargaining representative, this Court voided such certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal
certainty whether the union enjoyed a majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a certification election at a
proper time would not necessarily be a mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally
certify a union.
Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective bargaining is the finding of respondent director that one hundred
eighty-one( 181) of the two hundred eighty-one (281) workers who "ratified" the same now " strongly and vehemently deny
and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification of the CBA. " 10 Although petitioner claims that only sev en (7) of
the repudiating group of workers belong to the total number who allegedly ratified the agreement, nevertheless such
substantiated contention weighed against the factujal that the controverted contract will not promote industrial stability .
The Court has long since declared that:
“... Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select represen tatives
can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from the contract which do not
foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any
stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because
it does nto establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law. 1”
NOTE: There are is another Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 127 [1989], one digested by Irene (Case
#24). In so far as this case is concerned, below are the discussion pertaining to contract bar
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR
UNION (PSSLU); SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL) and GAW TRADING, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-77282 May 5, 1989
Ruling: Contract bar is not applicable on this case.
Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select representatives can be justified only where
stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from the contract which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where
the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the
employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law.

Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed agreement
was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been filed on
May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of thirty percent (30%) of the workers in the
bargaining unit, the same was enough to initiate said certification election.

Exception
Case
57. Port Workers Union etc. v. Undersecretary of Labor, 207 SCRA 329 [1992]

FACTS
Associate Port Checker’s and Worker’s Union (APCWU), the incumbent union of International Container Terminal
Services Inc (ICTSI), was due to expire on April 14, 1990.
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of
at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were submitted eleven (11) days after the filing of the petition.
Petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention. Another petition for certification
election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU). The consent signatures of which was
submitted 35 days after filing of the petition.
APCWU filed a motion to dismiss the aforementioned petitions for non-compliance with the requirement set forth in
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules:
“In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order
the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last 60 days of the collective bargaining agreement
and supported by at least 25% of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the 60-day
freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The 25% requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition,
otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed.”
The Med-Arbiter upheld the contention of APCWU and dismissed the consolidated petitions for certification election.
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor, arguing that Art. 256 of the Labor Code did not require the written consent to be
submitted simultaneously with the petition. DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter.
ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement ratified by a majority of the workers in
the bargaining unit.
PWUP is now claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in the application of Art 256.
Art. 256. Representation issue in Organized establishment.
“In organized establishments, when a verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is
filed before the DOLE within the 60-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Med-arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot, when the verified petition is supported by at least 25% of
all the employees in the bargaining unti to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.”
ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Art.256 of the Labor Code as implemented by Section6, Rule V, Book V
of the Implementing Rules. Moreover Under Section 10, Rule V, Book V, decisions of the Secretary in certification election
cases shall be final and unappealable.
In Tupas vs Inciong, While the petition of TUPAS for certification election may have the written support of 30% of all the
workers of the bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed fact that UMI, the rival union has the clear majority of the said
workers as shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641 have not only ratified the collective
bargaining agreement concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there
is no more need for holding of certification election.
APCWU questions PWUP’s personality in view of lack of consent signatures in its petition and that it has no authority to
represent SAMADA and PEALU, which had not appealed. APCWU also invokes the Tupas case and maintains that the
ratification of the new CBA by majority of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated
the agreement.
Sol-Gen agrees with PWUP, that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. That Art 256
should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Art 4 of the Labor Code
Art. 4. Construction in favor of Labor.
“all doubts in the interpretation and application of the provisions of this code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”
Issue:
Whether the ratification of the new CBA as held in the Tupas case renders the certification election moot and academic.
Held:
No. Petitioner-respondents in this case were referring to the contract-bar rule, where the law prohibits the holding of a
certification election during the lifetime of the CBA. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely entered into, apparently
in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be
imperative.In Phil. Asso. Of Free Labor union vs Estrella, any stability that does not establish the type of inductrial peace
contemplated by law must be subordinated to the employees freedom to choose their representative.
For the rule in the TUPAS case to apply, there must first be, a ratification of the CBA, and second, affirmation of
membership in the negotiating union. In the case at bar, the second requirement has not been established. The records does
not show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA have also formally affiliated with APCWU. Mere
ratification of the CBS does not signify their affirmation in the negotiating union or bargaining agent.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V provides that the representation case shall not be adversely affected by the collective agreement
submitted before or during the last 60 days of the subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case.
As the new CBA was entered when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the
final agreement between ICTSI and its workers.
However, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of the workers with the
management. As such, the court orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective between
the parties, subject to the results and effects of the certification election to be called for.

Not Registered CBA

Case
58. Registered CBA Assn. of Independent Unions v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219 [1999]
G.R. No. 120505 March 25, 1999
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (AIUP), JOEL DENSING,
HENEDINO MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), CENAPRO CHEMICAL CORPORATION
and/or GO SING CHAN in his capacity as Managing Director, respondents.

Facts:
Densing, et al were casual EEs of CENAPRO Chemicals (CENAPRO). In CENAPRO, the CBA representative of
all rank-and-file EEs was CENAPRO Employee’s Association (CCEA), with which CENAPRO had a CBA. This
CBA excluded casual EEs from membership in the union.

The casual EEs who have rendered at least 1-6 years of service sought regularization of their employment with
CENAPRO. When this was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with AIUP.
Afterwards, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which was opposed by CENAPRO and CCEA, on the
basis of the contract bar rule.

On May 4 and July 3, 1990, the AIUP-sponsored union (Union) filed a notice of strike and other necessary
documentation with the DOLE, citing as grounds the acts of CENAPRO as constituting ULP, specifically the
coercion of EEs and systematic union-busting. The Union proceeded to stage a strike on July 23, 1990, in the
course of which, the Union perpetrated illegal acts such as padlocking the company gates, as well as
preventing/coercing other non-striking EEs from reporting for work. Because of the illegal acts, CENAPRO filed a
petition for injunction with the NLRC, which then granted a TRO to enjoin the Union from conducting further
illegal acts. On July 24, 1990, the Union filed a complaint for ULP and illegal lockout and in response, CENAPRO
filed an illegal strike complaint the day after.

The LA consolidated the complaints and decided that the strike conducted by the Union was illegal, and dismissed
the charge for illegal lockout and ULP. 5 Union officers were declared to have lost their employment status, while
15 union members were not reinstated because of execution of quitclaims in favor of CENAPRO. 6 workers, some
of which composed the group of Densing et al, were ordered reinstated, but on a later order, 2 EEs were excluded
from reinstatement and backwage payment.

Both parties appealed to the LA decision, and pending resolution of the appeals, AIUP moved for execution of the
LA’s decision regarding reinstatement of some of its members. This was granted by an issued order, with
CENAPRO later moving that they pay separation pay on the premise of strained relations between the parties. This
opposition was overruled by the LA, which issued a 2nd writ of execution directing actual, if not payroll,
reinstatement.

Upon appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the LA in toto and reiterated the LA’s Order for reinstatement
of the Densing group. Upon an MR from CENAPRO, the NLRC later modified its decision, ordering payment of
separation pay (1 mo/year of service) without backwages. Meanwhile, Densing was declared to have lost his
employment status. Therefore, AIUP filed a petition for review on certiorari to reinstate the LA decision ordering
reinstatement and payment of backwages.

Issues
WON the AIUP-sponsored Union committed an illegal strike. YES.

However, petition is granted. NLRC decision set aside, LA decision ordering separation pay and full backwages
reinstated.

Held:
The Court first pointed out that the complaints of the Densing group on the grounds of ULP were adjudged as
baseless by the LA, and approved by the SC, as the “acts of harassment and insults” were found to actually be
scolding for little mistakes and memoranda for tardiness. Furthermore, it was found that the allegations of
overworking were actually uncorroborated by testimony as the petitioners were not able to enumerate when and
how they were made to overwork.

The Court also affirmed the NLRC ruling that the strike staged by the AIUP was in the nature of a
union-recognition strike, defined as “a calculated move to compel the employer to recognize one's union, and not
the other contending group, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining
agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal
certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit”.

It was noted that when the petition for certification election was filed by AUIP, there was an existing CBA between
the respondent company and CCEA, the incumbent CBA representative of all rank-and-file EEs. The argument that
the petition should have not been entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a CBA has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for
intervention may be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement.
Outside the period, as in the present case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention cannot be
allowed. Therefore, there was no clear act of union busting found.

From the evidence at hand, the Court found that the strike was indeed illegal, since:
1. The strikers did commit illegal acts such as barricading to prevent passage of CENAPRO’s truck, as well as
padlocking the gate and preventing ingress and egress of workers,
2. The strikers violated the TRO.

The Court noted that:

“A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of
their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a
means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law
provides limits for its exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the
Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:

a) Commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or

b) Obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or
c) Obstruct public thoroughfares.

Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid
where the means employed are illegal.”
It follows, therefore, that the dismissal of the union officers was justified and valid, as their dismissal was a
consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them. The Court also found that there was no lockout, as the
workers themselves did stop working because of the strike.

Finally, on the matter of the fate of the 4 workers, the Court found that they are indeed entitled to reinstatement, as
it was found that the erring strikers were not duly identified by the testimony. For the severest administrative
penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be duly identified. Simply referring to them as "strikers",
"AIU strikers" "complainants in this case" is not enough to justify their dismissal.

Expired CBA
Case
59. Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. No.
141471 [2000] –

Facts: On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL),
initiated the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years of the CBA's
five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, Eleanor Ambas was elected as the new union President. Ambas
wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by
the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the
said CBA.
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
petitioner but this was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.
Sometime in January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its intention to
strike for its refusal to bargain. Subsequently, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on
a new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner, which
notified the union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its Board of Trustees. In the
meantime, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday
which she protested. Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on
March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the union received
petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include
Ambas' dismissal.
On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped
the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition for certification
election. On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor and
Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union president to return to work and
for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the
striking members except Ambas.
On December 2, 1996, the Sec of labor issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts and
directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
hence, the instant appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by
another legitimate labor organization.

Ruling: Yes, guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain.

In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for certification
election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso
facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the
sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " .… If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232,8 in
relation to Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code.

No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day
freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal
effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have
been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies. The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of
the workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith
and for the stipulated original period.

In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by ACEC,
allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May
26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by
the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Suspension of Certification Election

Case
60. United CMC Textile Workers Union v. BLR, 128 SCRA 316 [1984]

Facts: Petitioner United CMC Textile Workers Union is the incumbent collective bargaining representative of all rank and
file workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a union seeking representation as the bargaining agent of
the rank and file workers. Petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that
CENTEX had “helped and cooperated in the organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the
organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the company who are members of the complainant
union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside the company
premises on August 21, 1978 and the following days thereafter.
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file workers of
CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification election during the 12 months period prior to the filing of the
petition; 2) the petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the rank and file workers of
CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the
petition is filed within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there is no legal
impediment to the filing of the petition.[2] Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on
September 27, 1978 on the grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a
prejudicial question and bars the holding of the certification election; and 2) PAFLU failed to comply with the 30%
requirement for mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are
required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby
qualified voters could choose either PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at all.This
was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the challenged Resolution, dated May
25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order certification election where several unions are contending for
representation and when there is doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a
petition for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in CBA negotiations must occur prior to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the certification election proceedings
as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of the election.

Held: (SC issued a TRO)

The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the affirmative. Under settled
jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars
proceedings for a certification election,[10] the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would
not be free.The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented
on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public official by virtue of the Motion to
Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was
instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in point:
chanroblespublishingcompany “There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed
purposely to forestall the certification election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its established
practice of suspending the election proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason
being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, ‘if there is a union dominated by the company, to which some of the
workers belong, an election among workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes
of the said workers and employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.’ (Manila
Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10
“And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that
until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election. (Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126) “Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255ULP, the Workers Union
should be ordered dissolved as a company dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a waste of energy
and money to all parties concerned.”[12] chanroblespublishingcompany The rationale for the suspension of the election
proceedings has been further amplified as follows: “What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette
Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization
objecting to the participation in a certification election of a companydominated union, as a result of which a complaint for
an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a
proceeding before such voting could take place. In the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: ‘As correctly pointed
out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a complaint for
unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged
therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or
employer. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company
union as the employees’ bargaining representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the
unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered
useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next year, the same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper
Mills Employees and Workers Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with the
CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a
certification election, the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers
belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of
the said workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the company
dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is equally true, however, that the
opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed and maintained
by the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and
suffer prejudice by the certification election, the reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the
other members controlled and dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is easily understandable why it should be thus.
There would be an impairment of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a company-dominated union were
allowed to participate in a certification election. The timid, the timorous, and the fainthearted in the ranks of labor could
easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the
exclusive representative of labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to
bargain. There would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire as to whether a
labor organization that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before the certification
election.”[13] With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial question, the
necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.

Party and Issue

Case
61. Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]

It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this petition was filed on the question of whether or not a pending
certification election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a motion on the part of the
employer Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the firm and trade name of Machinery and Steel Products Engineering
MASPE alleging an unfair labor practice against one of the contending parties, private respondent MASPE Workers
Union, the other being private respondent Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it due course.
The unfair labor practice imputed to such labor union consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated by an illegal
strike. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds therein alleged
"appear not to be indubitable A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, this petition was filed.
Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Goodrich (Marikina Factory)
Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU. 1 such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse to the
claim of petitioner. This petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo To
quote from its pertinent portion: "On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion to dismiss or hold case in
abeyance, in CIR Case No. 2759-MC. In said motion, we called attention to the admission of MASPE Workers Union as
intervenor in the case. We stated that the intervenor union, its officers and members had committed various acts of unfair
labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation. We called attention to our formal
charge of unfair labor practice against the intervenor union. We called attention to the fact that in the charge of unfair
labor practice among the reliefs prayed for were to declare respondents therein collectively and individually guilty of
unfair labor practice; to declare the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in pursuance of said unfair labor
practice illegal to declare the MASPE Workers Union as consequently having lost all rights and privileges accorded by law
to a legitimate labor union; and to declare all individual respondents therein and others as having lost their employment
status by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them. We then pointed out that unless the case for unfair labor
practice against MASPE Workers Union, its officers and members is decided the status of that union and its members who
are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested certification election and the outcome thereof). * * *
Unfortunately, the respondent Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our motion to dismiss or hold case in
abeyance. * * * ." 2 It remains only to be added that subsequently the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied a motion
for reconsideration, failing "to find sufficient justification to alter or to modify the aforesaid Order." 3
To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.
1. As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. decision: "There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to
whether or not a certification election may be stayed at the instance of the employer, pending the determination of an unfair
labor practice case filed by it against certain employees affiliated with respondent-unions. That is a matter of which this
Court has not had an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette
Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the
participation in a certification election of a company dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor
practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before
such voting could take place." 4
2. This is the more relevant excerpt: "The unique situation before us, however, is exactly the reverse. It is management that
would have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by some of its employees concluded, before
it would agree to the holding of a certification election. That is the stand of petitioner. It does not carry conviction. The
reason that justifies the postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a labor union,
precisely calls for a different conclusion. If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its way, the
result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of labor's
prerogatives. The difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the personnel who had
not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. This is not to say that management is to be precluded from filing an
unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether
intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it.
It is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear
engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring the full force of
its undeniable power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There is no valid reason then for the
postponement sought. This is one instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret.
Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by petitioner a contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial
Peace Act, which speaks of the labor organizations 'designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.' The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only
some of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a
certification election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are
employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case." 5
3. Even on the assumption that the vigorous condenmation of the strike and the picketing were attended by violence, it does
not automatically follow that thereby the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification
election for having automatically lost their jobs. So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich decision: 6 What was set
forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador would indicate that it was during the picketing, certainly not
peaceful, that the imputed acts of violence did occur. It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on both sides
because management did not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was with the unruly disruptive tactics of
labor. This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character, irrespective of the parties responsible. It is merely
to explain what cannot be justified. Nonetheless, did the acts in question call for an automatic finding of illegality? Again,
the order issued on February 4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court, Shell Oil Workers' Union v.
Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. There it was clearly held: 'A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be
placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid
stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to
strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of
course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to
as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the
means employed.' It must be pointed out likewise that the facts as there found would seem to indicate a greater degree of
violence. Thus: 'Respondent Court must have been unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the
effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the
mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact
Opposition
Case
62. Protection Technology v. Sec. of DOLE, 242 SCRA 99 [1995]
FACTS:
Private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Protection — Alliance of Nationalist and
Genuine Labor Organizations ("Union"), a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, filed a Petition
for certification election to determine the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
regular rank and file employees of petitioner Protection Technology Inc. ("Company”)

The Company stated that the Union was not a legitimate labor organization capable of filing the petition because it had
failed to submit its books of account with the Bureau of Labor Relations ("BLR") at the time it was registered as a
legitimate labor organization. Pursuant to the Court's ruling in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, submission of such documentation is a "mandatory" requirement before a union can
exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization

Med Arbiter Fadrigon dismissed the Union's petition and held further that the submission of the books of account,
consisting of journals, ledgers and other accounting books, was one of several "preventive measures against commission of
fraud" arising from "improper or incorrect recording of union funds, inefficient administration and even malversation of
union funds."

The Union appealed to the Secretary, DOLE, contending that the Labor Code and Progressive Development
"never mentioned journals and ledgers" as part of the documentation requirements for registration of a newlyorganized
local union. 4

public respondent DOLE Undersecretary Laguesma, set aside the Order of the Med Arbiter, holding that the requirement to
submit books of account applies only to labor organizations already existing for at least a year. Undersecretary Laguesma
ordered the holding of a certification election. He also took note of the Union's submission of a paper captioned a
"Statement of Income and Expenses” which contained only one entry and certified correct by the Union secretary, attested
by the Union president and duly subscribed.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was unsuccessful, as such the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking to annul the Resolution and Order of the public respondent DOLE
Undersecretary as products of grave abuse of discretion.

Court issued a TRO upon petitioner's posting of a sufficient cash bond. However a certification election was conducted on
10 November 1994 in the presence and under the supervision of DOLE representation officers. Of the fiftyeight (58) votes
validly cast, the Union obtained fiftythree (53) votes.
In a Manifestation dated 17 November 1994, the Union prayed that the main Petition should be considered moot and
academic since the results of the certification election showed that an "overwhelming majority" of the
employees had chosen it to be their collective bargaining representative visavis management. 10
Upon the other hand, in a Manifestation and Motion dated 25 November 1994, the Company moved that public respondents
be "admonished" for hastily conducting the certification election, "just to accommodate" the Union

Issue:

WON the Union’s submission of its statement of accounts in lieu of books of account is a sufficient for the application for
registration of a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, or a local or chapter of such a federation, as a
legitimate labor organization, so as to determine its capacity to file a petition for certification election and/or to reap the
fruits thereof.

Held:

The Company contends that the statement of income and expenses submitted by the Union is actually an annual financial
statement which is required, under Articles 234 and 241(11) of the Labor Code, to be submitted by unions organized and
existing for a period of at least one year or more prior to the filing of their application for registration as a legitimate labor
organization. Having reference to ordinary ACCOUNTING PRACTICE, such document cannot possibly be the "books of
account" demanded both by the Progressive case and by Section 3, Rule 2 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, as a prerequisite for due registration of a newly organized union affiliated with a federation. 13

Undersecretary Laguesma on the other hand contends that submission of the statement of income and expenses is
"substantial compliance" with the requirements of the law for the registration of labor organizations because a newly
organized union like the private respondent, operating for just four (4) months prior to the filing of its application for
registration with the BLR, was in no position to submit books of account, for "it (had) no daily transaction to be entered
everyday in the books except the receipt of union dues from its members which are remitted to it only during certain periods
of time." 14

The juridical existence of the Union as a legitimate labor organization had commenced from the moment its application for
registration was approved; "its subsequent noncompliance with the requirements of the Labor Code relative to the keeping
of books of account, would only be a ground for the cancellation of its registration." Until such due cancellation is made, the
Union is not to be prevented from exercising its rights, powers and privileges as a legitimate labor organization. 15

The Union, adds that the DOLE Undersecretary's factual findings and administrative interpretation of the Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules, an area within his special expertise which is entitled to great respect by the courts and "should no
longer be subject to the review of this Honorable Supreme Court.

In accordance with the decision in the Progressive case: In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements found in Rule II Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, quotes as follows:

“(c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and bylaws,
set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.”

****the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and
attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and bylaws, set of officers
and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same
rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union
affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements
because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer
required in the case of the formation of a local or chapter.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the
BLR:

1) A chapter certificate within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and bylaws, a statement on the set of officers and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor
organization.

Although the federation with which the Union is affiliated submitted documents purporting to show that the latter
had offered books of account to support its (the Union's) application for registration as a legitimate labor
organization, what had been actually submitted to the BLR by the Union was a mere "financial statement,"
Books of account are different from financial statements. In generally accepted accounting practice, the former consist of
journals, ledgers and other accounting books (which are registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue) containing a
record of individual transactions wherein monies are received and disbursed by an establishment or entity; entries are made
on such books on a daytoday basis. Statements of accounts or financial reports, upon the other hand, merely summarize
such individual transactions as have been set out in the books of account and are usually prepared at the end of an
accounting period. They do not set out or repeat the basic data (i.e., the individual transactions) on which they are based and
are, therefore, much less informative sources of cash flow information. Further, Books of account are kept and handled by
bookkeepers (employees) of the company or agency; financial statements may be audited statements, i.e., prepared by
external independent auditors (certified public accountants).

It is immaterial that the Union, having been organized for less than a year before its application for registration
with the BLR. The accounting books can and must be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain no detailed or extensive
entries as yet. The applicant local or chapter must demonstrate to the BLR that it is entitled to registered status because it
has in place a system for accounting for members' contributions to its fund even before it actually receives dues or fees from
its members. The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and diversion in the course of the subsequent
formation and growth of the Union fund.

The Court is not closing its eyes to the certification election. The certification election was held in the presence of
representatives of the DOLE and presumably reflected the free and democratic will of the workers of petitioner Company.
The Court will not set aside that will, in the absence of compelling reasons to do so. Nevertheless, private respondent Union
must comply with all the requirements of registration as a legitimate labor organization. It must submit the required books
of account, duly certified and attested, with the Bureau of Labor Relations before it may enjoy the fruits of its certification
election victory and before it may exercise the rights of a legitimate labor organization. Registration is a condition sine qua
non for the acquisition of legal personality by a labor organization.

Effect, Pending Petition, Cancellation Trade Union Registration

Case
63. Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, 203 SCRA 596 [1991]
Facts: On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered
union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations alleging that the
petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no
longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged that there was a mass
resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989. On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It
stated that the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303) employees was a product of fraud.
On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in BLR
Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159
and in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for deferment of the resolution of the
case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90. On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR
6-19-90 for being dilatory.
On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the
holding of a certification election. It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that UCECA
was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file
employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied. On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau
conducted a pre-election conference. Hence, ACAE filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with SC.
Issue:
1. Whether a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification election is a bar to the
resolution of a prior petition for certification election.

2. Whether the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for
certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of
Appeals.

Ruling:
1. No. The Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification
election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union.
The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform
such act absent an order directing a cancellation.

2. No. Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be
jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary.

SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service
Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications may also be filed with
the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately
transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt
thereof.
Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be jointly
approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining whose
opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall
deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is
concerned, we rule against the petitioner.
The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance there being compliance with the twenty
(20%) percent support signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this matter appear to be
supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They shall not be disturbed
by the Court in the absence of proof of reversible error. (See Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v.
Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]) On the basis of its
findings, it was only proper for the public respondent to order the holding of a certification election which is mandatorily
required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180:
Section 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the
appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the
conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the
rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."
WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are AFFIRMED.

64. Progressive Dev’t. Corp. v. Laguesma, 271 SCRA 593 [1998]

Facts:
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for certification election with
the Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees of the Progressive
Development Corporation (Pizza Hut).
Petitioner filed a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the
respondent Union's registration making it void and invalid. The motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent Union's
registration was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the ratification
of the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were two sets of supposed
attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June 26, 1993; that the alleged
chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318 members when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were
much less; and b) while the application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the
organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated
June 26, 1993 or one (1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the
issuance of the charter certification and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter.

Despite of the petition questioning the registration NLM the Med-Arbiter directed the holding of a certification election
among petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order explained:
x x x Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor organization in contemplation of law and shall
remain as such until its very charter certificate is canceled.The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in
connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in the
cancellation proceedings.

Defense of Union:As to the contention that the certification election proceedings should be suspended in view of the
pending case for the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be stressed that the pendency of a
cancellation case is not a ground for the dismissal or suspension of a representation proceedings considering that a
registered labor organization continues to be a legitimate one entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto until a final valid
order is issued canceling such registration.

Issue:Whether or not CE shall be suspended upon the pendency of a petition questioning the validity of registration of a
union.

Held:If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the
face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate
labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's registration
could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the
Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election. These measures
are necessary - and may be undertaken simultaneously - if the spirit behind the Labor Code's requirements for registration
are to be given flesh and blood. Registration requirements specifically afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds
or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. Such requirements are a valid exercise of the police power, because the
activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest
and should be protected. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a
labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the
labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for certification
election in a bargaining unit.
As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation Labor,[18] "[t]he employer needs the assurance that the
union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to
the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a legitimate labor organization
are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The invalidity of respondent Union's registration
would negate its legal personality to participate in certification election.
Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights and
privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which are
constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions are engaged directly affect
the public interest and should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's requirements for the
acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in order.
Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would have been more prudent for
the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's request for the suspension of proceedings in the
certification election case, until the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have been resolved. Failure of the
Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of discretion.

65. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997]

FACTS
Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election,
alleging that there were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to represent. SAMAHAN
countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration. As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the
bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on March 5, 1991, reversed the decision
of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank and file employees of the PPC. The
PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion was denied. Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary
of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank
and file employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company
failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning by the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the
next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the
eligible voters. [2] But the PPC again failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial
Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final warning.
On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election alleging the same grounds alleged by it in
its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition raising the following
arguments: (1) that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of a certification election under
Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results of the election showed that intervenor
was resoundingly repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify the alleged discrepancies in the list of employees
furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the election are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
ISSUE
The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees
participated in the activity.
HELD
The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid. Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have a valid
election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The certification election results show
that more than a majority, i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS,
cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.
The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis for
determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing
Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3) months preceding the filing of the
petition for certification election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of the majority because, instead
of only 98 employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs petition for certification
election.
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the
majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of certification election is the
most democratic method of determining the employees choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means
whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees
themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

Decertification
Case
66. S.S. Ventures Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559 SCRA 435 [2008]
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures), a PEZA-registered export firm with principal place of business at
Phase I-PEZA-Bataan Export Zone, Mariveles, Bataan, is in the business of manufacturing sports shoes. Respondent S.S.
Ventures Labor Union (Union), on the other hand, is a labor organization registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) under Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003.
On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition
for certification election in behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures, 82
of which belong to
______________________
* Additional member as per Special Order No. 509 dated July 1, 2008.
terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents supporting the petition.

On August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition[1] to cancel the Unions certificate of registration invoking the grounds set
forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code.[2] Docketed as Case No. RO300-0008-CP-002 of the same DOLE regional office,
the petition alleged the following:

(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer
connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the adoption/ratification of
its constitution and by-laws held on January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union forged the signatures of these 82
former employees to make it appear they took part in the organizational meeting and adoption and ratification of the
constitution;

(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond
Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;

(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and

(4) The Unions application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197-employee complement.Since more or less 82 of the 500[3] signatures were forged or
invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439 minimum (2197 total
employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.[4]

In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[5] the Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and
alleged that: (1) the organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball court in
Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees adverted to in Ventures petition were qualified Union members for, although they have
been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; (3) it had complied
with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members; and (4) the double signatures were inadvertent
human error.

In its supplemental reply memorandum[6] filed on March 20, 2001, with attachments, Ventures cited other
instances of fraud and misrepresentation, claiming that the affidavits executed by 82 alleged Union members show that they
were deceived into signing paper minutes or were harassed to signing their attendance in the organizational meeting.
Ventures added that some employees signed the affidavits denying having attended such meeting.
In a Decision dated April 6, 2001, Regional Director Ana C. Dione of DOLE-Region III found for Ventures, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

Viewed in the light of all the foregoing, this office hereby grants the petition. WHEREFORE, this
office resolved to CANCEL Certificate of Registration No. [RO300-00-02-UR-0003] dated 28 February
2000 of respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union-Independent.

So Ordered.[7]

Aggrieved, the Union interposed a motion for reconsideration, a recourse which appeared to have been forwarded to the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). Although it would later find this motion to have been belatedly filed, the BLR, over the
objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge, gave it due course and treated it as an appeal.

Despite Ventures motion to expunge the appeal,[8] the BLR Director rendered on October 11, 2002 a decision[9] in
BLR-A-C-60-6-11-01, granting the Unions appeal and reversing the decision of Dione. The fallo of the BLRs decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of Director Ana C. Dione dated 6 April
2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. S.S. Ventures Labor Union-Independent shall remain in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations.
SO ORDERED.[10]

Ventures sought reconsideration of the above decision but was denied by the BLR.
 Ventures then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the recourse docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 74749. On October 20, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision,[11] dismissing Ventures petition. Ventures
motion for reconsideration met a similar fate.[12]

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner Ventures raising the following grounds:
I.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE
SUBSTANTIAL AND OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PETITIONER
SHOWING THAT RESPONDENT UNION PERPETRATED FRAUD, FORGERY,
MISREPRESENTATION AND MISSTATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION AND
RATIFICATION OF ITS CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, AND IN THE PREPARATION OF THE
LIST OF MEMBERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ALLEGED ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING BY
HOLDING THAT:

A.

THE 87 AFFIDAVITS OF ALLEGED UNION MEMBERS HAVE NO EVIDENTIARY

WEIGHT.

B.

THE INCLUSION OF THE 82 EMPLOYEES IN THE LIST OF ATTENDEES TO THE

JANUARY 9, 2000 MEETING IS AN INTERNAL MATTER WITHIN THE AMBIT OF
THE WORKERS RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND OUTSIDE THE SPHERE
OF INFLUENCE (OF) THIS OFFICE (PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE) AND
THE PETITIONER.

II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE
BLATANT PROCEDURAL LAPSES OF THE RESPONDENT UNION IN THE FILING OF ITS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL.

A.

BY GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY

THE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED BEYOND
THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

B.

BY ADMITTING THE APPEAL FILED BY ATTY. ERNESTO R. ARELLANO AND

HOLDING THAT THE SAME DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING
UNDER SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91.

III.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 TO JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, MISSTATEMENTS AND FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENT UNION.[13]
The petition lacks merit.

The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 3[14] of the Constitution and
such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged. Once
registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant
right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may
be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor
organization.[15] Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a)[16] of
the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the adoption or ratification of the unions
constitution and like documents. The Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a union, it is not enough to show
that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation,
false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the
adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the
constitution or by-laws, among other documents.[17]

Essentially, Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of the Union sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard, Ventures makes much of, first, the
separate hand-written statements of 82 employees who, in gist, alleged that they were unwilling or harassed signatories to
the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting.

We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated written statements submitted
by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the
nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Unions filing of a petition for certification election on March
21, 2000. We have in precedent cases[18] said that the employees withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of
the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered
to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for
certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot
work to nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not
abuse its discretion nor gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary
weight.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the
corresponding papers is not ministerial on the part of the BLR. Far from it. After a labor organization has filed the necessary
registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art. 234[19] of the Labor Code
have been sedulously complied with.[20] If the unions application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities,
especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a
legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these considerations, the issuance to the Union of Certificate of
Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities.

Second, Ventures draws attention to the inclusion of 82 individuals to the list of participants in the January 9,
2000 organizational meeting. Ventures submits that the 82, being no longer connected with the company, should not have
been counted as attendees in the meeting and the ratification proceedings immediately afterwards.

The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to
the Unions cause for, as determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of signatures or misrepresentation with
respect to these individuals are without basis.[21] The Court need not delve into the question of whether these 82 dismissed
individuals were still Union members qualified to vote and affix their signature on its application for registration and
supporting documents. Suffice it to say that, as aptly observed by the CA, the procedure for acquiring or losing union
membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members are matters internal to the union and
flow from its right to self-organization.

To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals active participation in the Unions organizational meeting and the
signing ceremonies thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without the 82,
would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted, to wit:

Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal
personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations
upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

xxxx

(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.

The BLR, based on its official records, answered the poser in the affirmative. Wrote the BLR:

It is imperative to look into the records of respondent union with this Bureau pursuant to our role as
a central registry of union and CBA records under Article 231 of the Labor Code and Rule XVII of the rules
implementing Book V of the Labor Code, as amended x x x.

In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of [542]
members x x x. This number easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in
the establishment. Even subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within
440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees.

Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better
addressed in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference x x x. The issue
 surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is
not a ground to cancel union registration. (Emphasis added.)

The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would
not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003. As
the Union tenably explained without rebuttal from Ventures, the double entries are no more than normal human error,
effected without malice. Even the labor arbiter who found for Ventures sided with the Union in its explanation on the
absence of malice.[22]

The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to
self-organization. Accordingly, we can accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR: [F]or fraud and
misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code], the nature of
the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union
members.[23]

In its Comment, the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition, no certification
election has yet been conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the delay has gone far enough and
can no longer be allowed to continue. The CA is right when it said that Ventures should not interfere in the certification
election by actively and persistently opposing the certification election of the Union. A certification election is exclusively
the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal personality to challenge it.[24] In fact, jurisprudence frowns on
the employers interference in a certification election for such interference unduly creates the impression that it intends to
establish a company union.[25]

Ventures allegations on forum shopping and the procedural lapse supposedly committed by the BLR in allowing a belatedly
filed motion for reconsideration need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that this Court has consistently ruled that the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice.[26] So it
must be in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated October 20, 2003 and January 19, 2004,
respectively, of the CA are AFFIRMED. S.S. Ventures Labor Union shall remain in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations, unless it has in the meantime lost its legitimacy for causes set forth in the Labor Code. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.