No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EUGENE VOLOKH
Counsel of Record
Professor of Law
UCLA School of Law
Academic Affiliate
Mayer Brown LLP
405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095
(310) 206-3926
volokh@law.ucla.edu

Counsel for Petitioner

 i

QUESTION PRESENTED
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010), this Court held that “incorporated Bill of
Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according
to the same standards that protect those personal
rights against federal encroachment.’”
This Court has also held that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict a
person of a crime. The question presented is:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment, as incorpo-
rated against the States by the Fourteenth, likewise
requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict a person
of a crime.
 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED.......................................... i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v 
OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1 
JURISDICTION ..........................................................1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
INVOLVED..................................................................1 
STATEMENT ..............................................................2 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .........5 
I.  The Oregon Nonunanimous Jury Rule Is
Inconsistent with This Court’s Holding in
McDonald v. City of Chicago. ................................5 
II.  The Oregon Nonunanimous Jury Rule Is
Inconsistent with the Understanding of the
Jury Trial Right as of the Ratification of
the Sixth Amendment, as of the
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and Since Then.....................................................11 
A.  The Common Law and Early
Constitutional Commentary Uniformly
Understood “Trial by Jury” To Require
a Unanimous Verdict in Criminal
Cases. ..............................................................12 
B.  The “Trial by Jury” Was Understood as
Requiring a Unanimous Verdict at the
Time the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified. ...........................................................21 
C.  The “Trial by Jury” Has Been Seen as
Requiring Unanimity Since the
Enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment.....................................................23 
 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

III.This Court’s Review Is Warranted Because

the Oregon and Louisiana Supreme Courts
Cannot Revisit the Issue Until This Court
Acts. ......................................................................25 
IV. Stare Decisis Concerns Do Not Justify
Preserving the Apodaca Anomaly. ......................27 
A.  Justice Powell’s Solo Concurrence in
Apodaca Is Not Entitled to Stare Decisis
Effect. ..............................................................27 
B.  The Suggestion by the Apodaca
Plurality That Unanimity Is Not
Required Even in Federal Criminal
Trials Is Not Entitled to Stare Decisis
Effect. ..............................................................30 
C.  Revisiting Apodaca Would Not Unduly
Undermine Reliance Interests. ......................31 
CONCLUSION ..........................................................33 
APPENDIX A—Oregon Court of Appeals
Decision......................................................................1a 
APPENDIX B—Oregon Supreme Court Denial
of Review ....................................................................3a 
APPENDIX C—Trial Court Denial of Motion
for Unanimous Verdict Instruction ..........................4a 
APPENDIX D—Announcement of
Nonunanimous Vote on the Verdict .........................6a 
APPENDIX E—Preservation of Objection to
Nonunanimous Jury Instruction ..............................7a 
APPENDIX F—Preservation of Argument in
Petitioner’s Brief in the Oregon Court of
Appeals ......................................................................9a 
 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

APPENDIX G—Preservation of Argument in

Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Oregon
Supreme Court ........................................................14a 
 v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)

Cases 

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200

(1995) ......................................................................28

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) ....................25

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) .......... passim

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) ... 11, 24,
26

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) ...................28

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ....................26

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1969) ..................4

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ......................6

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) ..................7

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ..........................32

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) .... passim

Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) ..................24

Calcano v. United States, 543 U.S. 801 (2004).........33

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) .........29

 vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Commonwealth v. Loadholt, 923 N.E.2d 1037 (Mass.

2010) .......................................................................26

Corona v. Florida, 541 U.S. 930 (2004) ....................33

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) .... 12, 29,

33

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)......31

District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)

..................................................................................4

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)

.......................................................................... 21, 22

Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. 664 (1846) ................ 16, 17

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .............32

Goff v. Ohio, 541 U.S. 1083 (2004) ...........................33

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).................32

Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) ..................5

Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351 (1868) ...........................21

In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d

65 (Fla. 1972) .........................................................29

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 47 (Va. 2004)

................................................................................26
 vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Johnson v. Virginia, 544 U.S. 901 (2005) .................26

Ko v. New York, 542 U.S. 901 (2004) ........................33

LaFontaine v. United States, 543 U.S. 801 (2004) ...33

Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) ............23

Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ................32

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ............................6

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ...........................32

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 ............33

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)

........................................................................ passim

Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) ...........31

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) ..........................33

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164

(1989) ......................................................................28

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ..................32

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) ..............32

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) ..30

People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628 (Colo. 2007) ..............27

 viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

People v. Letner, 235 P.3d 62, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746

(Cal. 2010) ..............................................................27

Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) ..........33

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) .........................7

Prasertphong v. Arizona, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004) .......33

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74

(1980) ........................................................................1

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) .......................27

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,

Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) ................................... 4, 25

Sarr v. Wyoming, 543 U.S. 801 (2004) .....................33

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) .........30

Shields v. California, 541 U.S. 930 (2004) ...............33

Siler v. Ohio, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004) ..........................33

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)...............26

State ex rel. Smith v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792 (Or.

1972) .........................................................................3

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) ..................25

State v. Bacon, 702 A.2d 116 (Vt. 1997) ...................27

 ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

State v. Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738 (La. 2009)..................3

State v. Bowen, 168 P.3d 1208 (2007), modified on

reconsideration, 185 P.3d 1129 (2008) ....................5

State v. Cobb, 198 P.3d 978 (Or. Ct. App. 2008),

review denied, 213 P.3d 578 (Or. 2009) ..................1

State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003) .............27

State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458 (Mont. 2006) ...........27

State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001)............. 26, 27

State v. Rodriguez, 116 P.3d 92 (N.M. 2005)............27

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)..............31

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) ............... 5, 32

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) .................. 32, 33

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) ...........32

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va.

1807) .......................................................................14

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) ............28

Varacalli v. United States, 543 U.S. 801 (2004).......33

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) .......................13

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) ....................26

 x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) .........................23

Watt v. Washington, 543 U.S. 976 (2004) .................33

Wedgeworth v. Kansas, 543 U.S. 801 (2004) ............33

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.86 (1970) ....................17

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ........................32

Constitutional Provisions 

LA. CONST. art. I, § 17..................................................3

OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19..........................................29

OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 .............................................2, 3

U.S. CONST. amend. VI ................................................1

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV .............................................1

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ....................................13

Statutes 

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ......................................................1

OR. REV. STAT. § 164.135 .............................................4

OR. REV. STAT. § 819.300 .............................................4

Legislative Materials 
 xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

1 Annals of Cong. 452 (1789) ....................................16

1989 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Sen. Jt. Res. 17 (West),

enacted as OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19....................29

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866)

(statement of Sen. Howard) ..................................21

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 85 (1871)

(statement of Rep. Bingham) ................................21

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872)

(statement of Sen. Sherman).................................21

Books and Articles 

JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia,
William Cobbett 1797) ..................................... 13, 17

JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW

OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Boston, Little, Brown
1866) .......................................................................22

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ............ passim

CALIF. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT

OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM
IMPROVEMENT (1996) .............................................18

THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
 xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

AMERICAN UNION (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.

1868) .......................................................................21

NATHAN DANE, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF

AMERICAN LAW (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co.
1823) .................................................................15, 17

Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45

Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001) ...20

Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of

Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury:
Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988) ............................20

JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO

MUNICIPAL LAW (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1864) .......................................................................22

JOHN PROFFATT, TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY (San

Francisco, S. Whitney 1877) ..................................22

THEODORE SEDGWICK, TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH

GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (New York,
John S. Voorhies 1857) ..........................................22

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston, Hilliard, Gray
1833) ........................................................... 14, 15, 17
 xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury

Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1262 (2000) ......20

JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, AND

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Albany, W.C. Little 1867) 22

ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES

(Philadelphia, William Y. Birch & Abraham Small
1803) .................................................................14, 17

JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES

WILSON (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804) . 13, 17,
18, 19
 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Alonso Alvino Herrera, respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judg-
ment of the Oregon Court of Appeals in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW
The Oregon Court of Appeals decision, App., in-
fra, p. 1a, is unreported, but relies on State v. Cobb,
198 P.3d 978 (Or. Ct. App. 2008), review denied, 213
P.3d 578 (Or. 2009). The Oregon Supreme Court de-
cision denying review, App., infra, p. 3a, is unre-
ported. The trial court issued no opinion.

JURISDICTION
The Oregon Supreme Court denied review on
June 11, 2010. App., infra, p. 3a. This Court has ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See PruneYard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (“a
state constitutional provision is a ‘statute’ within the
meaning of § 1257(2),” a then-existing provision that
was analogous to the current § 1257(a)).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed * * *.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides,
 2

No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law * * *.
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to public trial by an im-
partial jury in the county in which the of-
fense shall have been committed; * * * pro-
vided, however, that in the circuit court ten
members of the jury may render a verdict of
guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict
of guilty of first degree murder, which shall
be found only by a unanimous verdict * * *.

STATEMENT
1. This case presents the important and recur-
ring question whether it is constitutional for Oregon
and Louisiana, alone among the States, to allow
criminal convictions by nonunanimous jury verdicts.
This Court recently reaffirmed that “incorpo-
rated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment.’”
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035
(2010) (plurality opinion); id. at 3058, 3064, 3068
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing
the same view as to scope of incorporation), discussed
infra p. 6, note 2. And this Court has repeatedly held
that the Sixth Amendment mandates jury unanimity
for federal convictions. See cases cited infra p. 5,
 3

Part I. But the precedential effect of Justice Powell’s

concurring opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972), has led to the same “two-track” “watered-
down” partial incorporation of the Jury Trial Clause
that this Court condemned in McDonald, 130 S. Ct.
at 3035 & n.14 (plurality opinion).
Eight of the nine Justices who decided Apodaca
would have treated federal and state criminal trials
the same way. Four Justices would have rejected a
unanimity requirement for both sorts of trials. 406
U.S. at 407–12 (plurality opinion). And four others
concluded there was a unanimity requirement for
both. Id. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 380–94 (Doug-
las, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing). Only Justice Powell believed that the jury un-
animity requirement, while binding on the federal
government, should not be incorporated against the
states. Id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). But because Justice Powell’s solo opinion dic-
tated the result in that case—affirmance of the con-
viction—the Jury Trial Clause now applies different-
ly to federal and state trials.
Two states, Louisiana and Oregon, allow non-
unanimous convictions; in both, a 10-2 vote suffices
to convict. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; OR. CONST. art. I, §
11; State v. Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743 (La. 2009)
(citing Apodaca to uphold the constitutionality of
nonunanimous verdicts); State ex rel. Smith v. Sawy-
er, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972) (same).1 And because

1 Though Oklahoma uses nonunanimous juries for some of-

fenses, it should not be classified with Oregon and Louisiana for

purposes of this petition’s analysis. Oklahoma authorizes non-
unanimous juries only for the trial of crimes that are punisha-
 4

this Court has instructed lower courts to “leav[e] to

this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions,” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), state su-
preme courts will continue to follow Apodaca even
though it has been undermined by McDonald. See in-
fra Part III.
This Court should therefore intervene to decide
whether criminal defendants ought to enjoy equal
“enforce[ment] against the States” of the Jury Trial
Clause “‘according to the same standards that pro-
tect those personal rights against federal encroach-
ment,’” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035, just as gun
owners enjoy equal enforcement of Second Amend-
ment rights against state and federal governments.
2. The prosecution argued at trial that Alonso
Herrera borrowed a friend’s car, and did not bring it
back. 1 Tr. of Proceedings 33 (Aug. 25, 2008). Herre-
ra was prosecuted for unauthorized use of a vehicle,
OR. REV. STAT. § 164.135, and for possession of a sto-
len vehicle, id. § 819.300. Oregon Court of Appeals
Excerpt of Record 2.
Before trial, Herrera’s lawyer asked for a jury in-
struction stating that the jury had to be unanimous
to render a verdict. App., infra, p. 4a. The court de-
nied the request, ibid., and instructed the jury that,
“10 or more jurors must agree on your verdict.” 1 Tr.
of Proceedings 104. Herrera’s attorney preserved her
exception to that instruction. App., infra, p. 7a.
ble by no more than six months in jail. OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
19. The Jury Trial Clause is inapplicable to such so-called “pet-
ty offenses.” Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1970)
(controlling opinion); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617, 624 (1937). The Clause’s unanimity requirement is thus
inapplicable to such offenses as well.
 5

The jury voted 10-2 to convict on the unautho-

rized use charge, and 11-1 to acquit on the posses-
sion of stolen vehicle charge. App., infra, p. 6a. On
appeal, Herrera argued that the nonunanimous jury
verdict violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. App., infra, p. 9a. The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals summarily affirmed, App., infra, p. 1a, citing
State v. Cobb, 198 P.3d 978 (Or. Ct. App. 2008), re-
view denied, 213 P.3d 578 (Or. 2009). Cobb in turn
stated, “to the extent that defendant now invokes
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), as over-
ruling Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), sub
silentio, we have previously rejected that contention.
State v. Bowen, 168 P.3d 1208 (2007), modified on re-
cons., 185 P.3d 1129 (2008).” 198 P.3d at 979 (paral-
lel citations deleted).
Herrera petitioned for review to the Oregon Su-
preme Court, renewing the arguments made below.
App. G, infra, p. 14a. The Oregon Supreme Court
denied review. App., infra, p. 3a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Oregon Nonunanimous Jury Rule Is

Inconsistent with This Court’s Holding in
McDonald v. City of Chicago.
Alonso Herrera was convicted by a 10-to-2 vote.
Two jurors concluded that the prosecution failed to
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a federal case, such a vote would not yield a
conviction, because the Sixth Amendment requires a
unanimous verdict to convict. See, e.g., Andres v.
United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1948); Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211–12 (1903); see also
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 211 (1965) (dic-
 6

tum), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Ken-

tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But because of Justice
Powell’s solo controlling opinion in Apodaca, 406
U.S. at 369–77 (Powell, J., concurring in the judg-
ment), the unanimous jury requirement of the Sixth
Amendment is not incorporated against the states.
This is a constitutional anomaly. This Court has
“abandoned ‘the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to the States only a watered-down, sub-
jective version of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.’” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (plural-
ity opinion) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
10–11 (1964)).
Instead, this Court has concluded that “it would
be ‘incongruous’ to apply different standards ‘de-
pending on whether the claim was asserted in a state
or federal court.’” Ibid. This Court has “decisively
held that incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are
all to be enforced against the States under the Four-
teenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal en-
croachment.” Ibid.2 For example, in holding that the

2 Justice Thomas’s analysis on this is consistent with the plu-

rality’s. Justice Thomas concluded that the Privileges or Im-

munities Clause applies to the states all the “individual rights
enumerated in the Constitution.” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). He noted that “privileges” or “immunities” include “the
right to a jury trial,” a right that stems from “the basic liberties
of English citizens.” Id. at 3064. And in agreeing that the Four-
teenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment “‘fully appli-
cable to the States,’” id. at 3058, he cited the passage in the
plurality opinion, id. at 3026, that says, “We have previously
held that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply with
full force to both the Federal Government and the States. Ap-
plying the standard that is well established in our case law, we
 7

Double Jeopardy Clause was incorporated, this Court

held that, “[o]nce it is decided that a particular Bill
of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American
scheme of justice,’ the same constitutional standards
apply against both the State and Federal Govern-
ments.” Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795
(1969) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (same, as to the Con-
frontation Clause); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10–11 (same,
as to the privilege against self-incrimination).
In McDonald, only one dissenting Justice argued
that Bill of Rights provisions should apply differently
to the states than to the federal government. 130 S.
Ct. at 3092–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The other
three dissenters also did not endorse that part of
Justice Stevens’ opinion. Id. at 3120 (Breyer, J.,
joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting)
(noting agreement with some parts of Justice Ste-
vens’ opinion, but not with pp. 3092–95). And both
the plurality and Justice Thomas rejected Justice
Stevens’ argument, in the course of reaching their
conclusion that the Second Amendment fully applies
to state and local governments.
The plurality opinion in McDonald did note “one
exception to this general rule” that fundamental
rights are fully incorporated against the states: “The
Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury ver-
dict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a
unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.” Id.
at 3035 n.14 (citing Apodaca).

hold that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the

States.”
 8

But the plurality opinion stressed that the Apo-

daca result was not compatible with McDonald’s re-
jection of “the two-track approach to incorporation”
(one track for the federal version of a right and one
for the state version):
[The Apodaca] ruling was the result of an
unusual division among the Justices, not an
endorsement of the two-track approach to in-
corporation. In Apodaca, eight Justices
agreed that the Sixth Amendment applies
identically to both the Federal Government
and the States.
Nonetheless, among those eight, four Jus-
tices took the view that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require unanimous jury ver-
dicts in either federal or state criminal trials,
and four other Justices took the view that the
Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury
verdicts in federal and state criminal trials.
Justice Powell’s concurrence in the judg-
ment broke the tie, and he concluded that the
Sixth Amendment requires juror unanimity
in federal, but not state, cases. Apodaca,
therefore, does not undermine the well-
established rule that incorporated Bill of
Rights protections apply identically to the
States and the Federal Government.
Ibid. (citations omitted).
Moreover, the McDonald plurality opinion re-
jected the chief justification underlying Justice Pow-
ell’s “watered-down” incorporation model—the sup-
posed need to protect state “freedom to experiment.”
Justice Powell reasoned that,
 9

[I]n holding that the Fourteenth Amendment

has incorporated “jot-for-jot and case-for-
case” every element of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court derogates principles of federalism
that are basic to our system. In the name of
uniform application of high standards of due
process, the Court has embarked upon a
course of constitutional interpretation that
deprives the States of freedom to experiment
with adjudicatory processes different from
the federal model. * * *
While the Civil War Amendments altered
substantially the balance of federalism, it
strains credulity to believe that they were in-
tended to deprive the States of all freedom to
experiment with variations in jury-trial pro-
cedure. In an age in which empirical study is
increasingly relied upon as a foundation for
decisionmaking, one of the more obvious me-
rits of our federal system is the opportunity it
affords each State, if its people so choose, to
become a “laboratory” and to experiment
with a range of trial and procedural alterna-
tives.
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 375–76 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment). But the McDonald plurality disa-
greed; it concluded that the desire for experimenta-
tion cannot justify “watered-down” incorporation,
and stressed that experimentation may happen only
within constitutional limits:
We likewise reject municipal respondents’
argument that we should depart from our es-
tablished incorporation methodology on the
ground that making the Second Amendment
binding on the States and their subdivisions
 10

is inconsistent with principles of federalism

and will stifle experimentation. * * *
There is nothing new in the argument
that, in order to respect federalism and allow
useful state experimentation, a federal con-
stitutional right should not be fully binding
on the States. * * * Throughout the era of “se-
lective incorporation,” Justice Harlan in par-
ticular, invoking the values of federalism and
state experimentation, fought a determined
rearguard action to preserve the two-track
approach.
Time and again, however, those pleas
failed. Unless we turn back the clock or adopt
a special incorporation test applicable only to
the Second Amendment, municipal respon-
dents’ argument must be rejected. Under our
precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental from an American perspective,
then, unless stare decisis counsels other-
wise,30 that guarantee is fully binding on the
States and thus limits (but by no means eli-
minates) their ability to devise solutions to
social problems * * *.
*****
Incorporation always restricts experimen-
tation and local variations, but that has not
stopped the Court from incorporating virtual-
ly every other provision of the Bill of Rights.
“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off
the table.”
130 S. Ct. at 3045–46, 3050 (plurality opinion) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
 11

Furthermore, footnote 30, which accompanies the

stare decisis reference, cites only the cases rejecting
incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause and the Se-
venth Amendment. Id. at 3046 n.30. It conspicuously
fails to cite Apodaca, thus reinforcing the doubt the
opinion had earlier cast on that case, id. at 3035
n.14.
Apodaca’s “watered-down” incorporation of the
Jury Trial Clause is thus a constitutional anomaly,
based on logic that this Court has repudiated in
McDonald, and that was inconsistent with prior
precedent even at the time of Apodaca itself. This
anomaly is inconsistent with this Court’s many hold-
ings that the Jury Trial Clause requires unanimity
in federal cases, e.g., Andres, supra. It is inconsistent
with this Court’s recent suggestions that unanimity
is indeed required by the Jury Trial Clause in state
cases. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–
02 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
477 (2000), discussed infra p. 23. It violates the
properly understood Jury Trial Clause rights of Ore-
gon and Louisiana criminal defendants. And it un-
dermines the security of other incorporated constitu-
tional rights, by maintaining a precedent that sup-
ports watering down those rights as well.

II. The Oregon Nonunanimous Jury Rule Is

Inconsistent with the Understanding of the
Jury Trial Right as of the Ratification of
the Sixth Amendment, as of the Ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Since
Then.
The Apodaca rule is incompatible with this
Court’s recent approach of ensuring that Americans
retain at least those constitutional rights that were
 12

recognized at the time of the Framing, and that have

been traditionally recognized since then. See, e.g.,
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031–34 (plurality opinion);
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312–13; Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S. 36, 50–59 (2004). The unanimity re-
quirement was seen as a fundamental part of the
right to trial by jury at the time of the Framing,
throughout the antebellum era, and when the Four-
teenth Amendment was enacted. And it has been
seen this way since, both by various Supreme Court
decisions, and in the judgment of the states, 48 of
which require unanimity for a criminal jury verdict.
The right is therefore “fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty” and “‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,’” McDonald, 130 S.
Ct. at 3036 (plurality opinion), is a privilege or im-
munity of American citizenship, id. at 3088 (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment), and thus applies to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. The Common Law and Early Constitu-

tional Commentary Uniformly Unders-
tood “Trial by Jury” To Require a Un-
animous Verdict in Criminal Cases.
The right to a unanimous jury verdict was firmly
established when the Bill of Rights was framed. Sir
William Blackstone noted it as an essential feature
of the right to trial by jury:
[T]he trial by jury ever has been, and I trust
ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the
English law. * * * [I]t is the most transcen-
dent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or
wish for, that he cannot be affected either in
his property, his liberty, or his person, but by
the unanimous consent of twelve of his
 13

neighbours and equals. A constitution, that I

may venture to affirm has, under providence,
secured the just liberties of this nation for a
long succession of ages.
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *378–79. Likewise,
Blackstone listed the requirement of “unanimous suf-
frage” on a jury as part of the protection provided by
the jury trial to “the liberties of England,” and ar-
gued that “inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the
nation [the jury trial] are fundamentally opposite to
the spirit of our constitution.” 4 id. *349–50. John
Adams took the same view in America, writing that
“it is the unanimity of the jury that preserves the
rights of mankind.” 1 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 376 (Philadelphia, William Cobbett 1797).
While the Bill of Rights was being ratified, Jus-
tice James Wilson—“who was instrumental in fram-
ing the Constitution and who served as one of the
original Members of this Court,” Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 10 (1994)—stressed the unanimity re-
quirement in his 1790–91 lectures: “To the conviction
of a crime, the undoubting and the unanimous sen-
timent of the twelve jurors is of indispensable neces-
sity.” 2 JAMES WILSON, WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE
JAMES WILSON 350 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press
1804); see also 2 id. at 306, 311, 342, 351, 360 (fur-
ther noting the unanimity requirement).
Justice Wilson’s lectures were about law general-
ly, not constitutional law as such. But he was dis-
cussing the meaning of “the trial by jury” in criminal
cases. E.g., 2 id. at 344, 348. And it is the “right to a
* * * trial, by an impartial jury” that the Sixth
Amendment enshrines as a constitutional command
(and that Article III, § 2, cl. 3, “The Trial of all
 14

Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by

Jury,” likewise enshrines). As George Hay, the Unit-
ed States Attorney in the Aaron Burr trial, put it,
“The trial by jury is a technical phrase of the com-
mon law. By its insertion in the constitution, that
part of the common law which prescribes the num-
ber, the unanimity of the jury and the right of chal-
lenge is adopted.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
55, 141 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
St. George Tucker, author of the 1803 edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, likewise treated the
Sixth Amendment as embodying the trial by jury de-
scribed by Blackstone: His footnote on the Black-
stone pages cited above (4 BLACKSTONE *349–50, in 5
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES
348–51 (Philadelphia, William Y. Birch & Abraham
Small 1803)) noted that “the trial by jury” described
in Blackstone’s text was adopted in America, and se-
cured by the Sixth Amendment. 5 TUCKER, supra, at
348–49 n.2. Tucker cited the Sixth Amendment
alongside its Virginia analog, which required “a
speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage
without whose unanimous consent [the defendant]
cannot be found guilty.” Ibid. And he wrote that
“without [the jurors’] unanimous verdict, or consent,
no person can be condemned of any crime.” 1 id. at
App. 34.
Justice Joseph Story, in his great constitutional
law treatise, likewise stressed that the constitutional
“trial by jury” is the same “great privilege” that had
been “part of that admirable common law.” 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1773, at 652 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray
1833). Justice Story endorsed the Blackstone articu-
lation of the terms of that “great privilege”: “I com-
 15

mend to the diligent perusal of every scholar, and

every legislator, the noble eulogium of Mr. Justice
Blackstone on the trial by jury.” 3 id. at 654 n.1 (cit-
ing “3 Black. Comm. 379, 380, 381; 4 Black. Comm.
349, 350,” which note the requirement of unanimity);
see also 3 id. at 652 n.1 (citing “4 Black. Comm.
349”); 3 id. at 653 n.2 (citing “4 Black. Comm[.] 349,
350”). And in a different passage, Justice Story fur-
ther confirmed that unanimity was understood as a
constitutional requirement: His discussion of the
constitutional standard for impeachment contrasted
the two-thirds requirement for conviction in an im-
peachment trial with the rule in criminal trials,
where “unanimity in the verdict of the jury is indis-
pensable.” 2 id. § 777, at 248.
Nathan Dane’s influential 1823 General Abridg-
ment and Digest of American Law similarly treated
the Bill of Rights as providing that “the jury in crim-
inal matters must be unanimous.” 6 NATHAN DANE,
GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW
226 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823).
Another volume of the same work echoes this: “The
value and excellency of [the criminal trial by jury] is
fully declared in all our constitutions, and repeatedly
in our laws. In virtue of it * * * the truth of every ac-
cusation must be established by the unanimous ver-
dict of twelve [jurors] indifferently chosen.” 7 id. 335.
A Westlaw query for “dane abr!” “dane’s abr!” &
date(< 1/1/1900) reveals that in the 1800s the Ab-
ridgment was cited by this Court 38 times, and over
950 times by all the cases in the ALLCASES-OLD
database.
Unanimity was also part of James Madison’s un-
derstanding of the right to trial by jury. Madison’s
original draft of what would become the Sixth
 16

Amendment provided for trial “by an impartial jury

of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge,
and other accustomed requisites,” 1 Annals of Cong.
452 (1789).
The proposal was ultimately revised, with the
“unanimity” language omitted, and there can be two
alternative inferences from this change. One is “that
Congress eliminated references to unanimity and to
the other ‘accustomed requisites’ of the jury because
those requisites were thought already to be implicit
in the very concept of jury.” Apodaca, 406 U.S. at
409–10 (plurality opinion). The other, which the
Apodaca plurality endorsed, “is that the deletion was
intended to have some substantive effect.” Id. at 410.
But the plurality was mistaken; the historical
evidence cited above shows that the unanimity re-
quirement was indeed seen as “implicit in the very
concept” of the Anglo-American criminal jury. Pro-
tecting the “trial by jury” safeguarded the essential
incidents of the trial, such as the unanimity re-
quirement, with no need for a detailed enumeration.
To be sure, the Jury Trial Clause did not consti-
tutionalize all details of the common-law jury. As one
early decision explained, “None would contend, at
this day, in a trial of a writ of right, for the extraor-
dinary [common-law] jury, called the grand assize,
composed of four knights, ‘girt with swords,’ and who
chose twelve other persons to be joined with them.”
Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. 664, 681–82 (1846) (hold-
ing that departures from common-law jury selection
procedures may be constitutionally permissible un-
der the Mississippi Constitution’s jury trial provi-
sion). One could argue that even the choice of twelve
as the number of jurors might be sufficiently arbi-
 17

trary and accidental that some variation would be

permitted, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.86, 90
(1970), though petitioner takes no position on that
question.
But, as Dowling put it, though “[t]he old common
law has been insensibly changed and tempered to
our situation and institutions,” “the constitution
must be construed to have adopted the generous pri-
vilege of the common law trial by jury in its essential
elements.” 13 Miss. at 682. Only those features that
were “an accidental and not an absolute part of that
institution, the mere superfluous forms and compli-
cated proceedings of the English courts” are outside
the constitutional guarantee. Ibid.
The unanimity requirement was indeed not just
an “accidental,” “superfluous” detail, but an “essen-
tial element[]” of the jury trial. It was a part of “our
[English] constitution” that protected “the liberties of
England” (Blackstone), and that was then accepted
in America (as Story stressed). It “preserve[d] the
rights of mankind” (Adams). It was “of indispensable
necessity” (Wilson), “indispensable” to a criminal
jury verdict (Story), part of the American design of
“the several powers of government” (Tucker), and
part of the trial by jury secured by “all our constitu-
tions” (Dane).
And this view shared by these authorities is no
accident, because there is nothing peripheral or arbi-
trary about the difference between a unanimous find-
ing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a finding
of guilt entered over some jurors’ dissent. As Justice
Wilson put it, “To the conviction of a crime, the un-
doubting and the unanimous sentiment of the twelve
jurors is of indispensable necessity,” 2 WILSON, su-
pra, at 350 (emphasis added). A nonunanimous jury
 18

conviction by definition means that some juror—in

petitioners’ case, two jurors—found that there was a
reasonable doubt about the verdict.
Likewise, Justice Wilson wrote that “it would be
difficult to suggest, for [the defendant’s] security, any
provision more efficacious than one, that nothing
shall be suffered to operate against him without the
unanimous consent of the delegated body.” 2 id. at
316. The unanimity requirement is distinctive in this
respect, because it is the best protection of its kind
for the defendant. The twelve-member jury size, for
instance, cannot be defended this way; one can al-
ways suggest a slightly larger jury as a theoretical
protection for the defendant, yet the jury size has to
be limited, so some arbitrary line must be drawn.
But unanimity is both a feasible protection for de-
fendants, and the most “efficacious” one for their “se-
curity.”3

3 The nonunanimous jury requirement is on balance less “effica-

cious” for the “security” of defendants, even though it allows 11-

1 or 10-2 acquittals as well as 11-1 or 10-2 convictions. First,
such splits in favor of acquittal are much rarer than such splits
in favor of conviction. See, e.g., CALIF. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT 72 (1996), http://www.courtinfo.ca.
gov/reference/documents/BlueRibbonFullReport.pdf (reporting,
based on Los Angeles County data, that 31% of all hung juries
were 11-1 or 10-2 for conviction, and only 11% were 11-1 or 10-2
for acquittal). Second, even under a unanimity rule, prosecutors
would be much less likely to retry a case after a 11-1 or 10-2
jury split for conviction than after a similar split for acquittal.
Making such a split in favor of acquitting into a legal acquittal
would thus help defendants little—but making a similar split in
favor of conviction into a legal conviction would disadvantage
defendants more.
 19

Similarly, Justice Wilson noted that jurors, who

represent the same society whose officials are prose-
cuting the defendant, may tend to sympathize with
the prosecution. In a criminal prosecution, “on one
side [is] an individual—on the other, all the members
of the society except himself—on one side, those who
are to try—on the other, he who is to be tried.” 2 id.
at 315. This means that “the representatives [i.e., the
jurors] are not indifferent, and, consequently, may
not be impartial.” Ibid.
Because of this, Justice Wilson explained, “the
evidence, upon which a citizen is condemned, should
be such as would govern the judgment of the whole
society,” ibid., which is to say evidence that all rea-
sonable members of society should accept as disposi-
tive. To provide some assurance of this, “we may re-
quire the unanimous suffrage of the deputed body
[i.e., the jury] who try, as the necessary and proper
evidence of that judgment.” Ibid.
This reasoning cannot be applied directly to jury
size, where ten or fourteen might work as a proxy for
society’s views about as well as twelve would. It can-
not be applied to some other historical features of the
jury. But the reasoning fully supports Justice Wil-
son’s conclusion that there is no substitute for un-
animity in determining whether the evidence is
“such as would govern the judgment” of all reasona-
ble members of society. Whenever a presumptively
reasonable juror finds a reasonable doubt, there is a
basis to think that “the judgment of the whole socie-
ty” may not support conviction—many other reason-
able members of society might share the minority ju-
ror’s doubts.
Justice Wilson’s arguments supporting the un-
animity requirement are powerful. And the value of
 20

the unanimity requirement in ensuring the protec-

tion of minority groups, promoting deliberation
among jurors, and making convictions more credible
to the public further supports Justice Wilson’s think-
ing. “Studies suggest that where unanimity is re-
quired, jurors evaluate evidence more thoroughly,
spend more time deliberating and take more ballots.
In contrast, where unanimity is not required juries
tend to end deliberations once the minimum number
for a quorum is reached.” AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, WITH COM-
MENTARY principle 4.B, at 24 (2005), http://www.
abanet.org/jury/pdf/final%20commentary_july_1205.
pdf.4
But whether the unanimity requirement is
wise—or for that matter whether the jury trial re-
quirement is wise—is not the main question here.
The important point is that the unanimity require-
ment was understood to be a central, “indispensable”
requirement of the right to trial by jury that the
Framers knew and constitutionalized. Whatever flex-
ibility the government may have in dispensing with
historical features of the jury that are peripheral, ac-

4 See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45

Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSY-

CHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 669 (2001) (discussing data that
tends to show that the absence of a unanimity requirement
leads to less deliberation); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes
in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1262, 1273 (2000)
(same); id. at 1264, 1298–99 (noting that the absence of a un-
animity requirement may lead to less consideration of the opi-
nions of minority groups); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler,
The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Proce-
dural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 333, 337–38 & tbl.1 (1988) (noting that the public views
unanimous juries as more accurate and fair).
 21

cidental, or unimportant, such flexibility cannot ex-

tend to the essential requirement of unanimity.

B. The “Trial by Jury” Was Understood as

Requiring a Unanimous Verdict at the
Time the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified.
The Fourteenth Amendment was said to secure
(among other rights) the right to “trial by jury.”
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 85 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Bingham); Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. How-
ard) (“right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vi-
cinage”); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) (“right to be tried by an
impartial jury”). And at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, “trial by jury” in criminal
cases continued to be understood as requiring un-
animity for conviction.
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley,
the “most famous” of the “late-19th-century legal
scholar[s]” made this clear in his “massively popular”
treatise. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 2811 (2008) (so labeling Justice Cooley and his
treatise). “The jury must unanimously concur in the
verdict.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 320 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868). And
Justice Cooley joined Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351,
358 (1868), which interpreted the Michigan Consti-
tution’s jury trial clause as implicitly guaranteeing a
jury in which “unanimous agreement” is required for
conviction.
 22

Other leading commentators of that period took

the same view: “[I]n a case in which the constitution
guarantees a jury trial,” a statute allowing “a verdict
upon anything short of the unanimous consent of the
twelve jurors” is “void.” 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
532 (Boston, Little, Brown 1866). “That term [‘jury’],
when spoken of in connection with trial by jury in
[the New York Constitution], imports a jury of twelve
men whose verdict is to be unanimous. Such must be
its acceptation to every one acquainted with the his-
tory of common law * * *.” THEODORE SEDGWICK,
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 530 (New York, John S. Voorhies
1857).
“[T]he jury [must] be unanimous in rendering
their verdict. * * * The principle once adopted has
continued as an essential part of the jury trial * * *.”
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MU-
NICIPAL LAW 78 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1864)
(so stating even though the author disapproved of
the unanimity requirement on policy grounds). “[A]
trial by jury is understood to mean—generally—a
trial by a jury of twelve men, impartially selected,
and who must unanimously concur in the guilt of the
accused before a legal conviction can be had.” JOEL
TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 366–67 (Albany, W.C. Little 1867).
“[I]t is required that the jury shall be unanimous.”
JOHN PROFFATT, TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 119 (San
Francisco, S. Whitney 1877).5

5 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 (citing the Tiffany and Sedgwick

treatises as authoritative); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301–02 (like-

 23

These sources show that, when the Fourteenth

Amendment was adopted, the right not to be con-
victed without a unanimous jury verdict was counted
“among those fundamental rights necessary to our
system of ordered liberty,” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at
3042 (plurality opinion), and as among the privileges
or immunities of American citizenship, id. at 3088
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

C. The “Trial by Jury” Has Been Seen as

Requiring Unanimity Since the Enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
More recent sources have continued to see un-
animity as an essential part of the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury. This Court has squarely held
this many times as to federal trials. See cases cited
supra p. 5, Part I. Even Justice Powell conceded this
in Apodaca. 406 U.S. at 370.
The centrality of unanimous jury trials to the
American right to trial by jury is also reflected in
this Court’s repeated references to such a require-
ment even as to state prosecutions. Thus, in Blakely,
this Court reasoned that the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard in criminal cases rested on the
“longstanding tenet[] of common-law criminal juri-
sprudence” that “the ‘truth of every accusation’
against a defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed
by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals
and neighbours.’” 542 U.S. at 301 (citing 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *349–50). “The Framers
would not have thought it too much to demand that,
wise as to the Bishop treatise); Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S.
322, 334 (1996) (likewise as to the Proffatt treatise); Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 284 (1981) (likewise as to the Sedgwick
treatise).
 24

before depriving a man of three more years of his li-

berty, the State should suffer the modest inconve-
nience of submitting its accusation to ‘the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,’ * * *
rather than a lone employee of the State.” Id. at 313–
14 (again citing Blackstone).
Likewise, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, this Court
described the unanimity requirement as an essential
part of the right to trial by jury, and an essential
protector of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test:
“[T]o guard against a spirit of oppression and
tyranny on the part of rulers,” and “as the
great bulwark of [our] civil and political li-
berties,” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States 540-541
(4th ed. 1873), trial by jury has been unders-
tood to require that “the truth of every accu-
sation, whether preferred in the shape of in-
dictment, information, or appeal, should af-
terwards be confirmed by the unanimous suf-
frage of twelve of [the defendant’s] equals
and neighbours. . . .” 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England [*349–50]
(1769).
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
These statements were not intended to reconsid-
er Apodaca; the issue was not before this Court in
those cases. But they do help show that the require-
ment of jury unanimity is a fundamental and contin-
uing part of our constitutional traditions, traditions
that still prevail throughout 48 of the 50 states. As
this Court said in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130
(1979), in holding that six-member criminal juries
must act unanimously, the “near-uniform judgment
 25

of the Nation”—there, too, with only two dissenting

states—“provides a useful guide in delimiting the
line between those jury practices that are constitu-
tionally permissible and those that are not.” Id. at
138.

III. This Court’s Review Is Warranted Because

the Oregon and Louisiana Supreme Courts
Cannot Revisit the Issue Until This Court
Acts.
Though Apodaca is inconsistent with this Court’s
more recent cases, only this Court can correct the in-
consistency. The Oregon and Louisiana Supreme
Courts are unlikely to themselves depart from Apo-
daca. As the Louisiana Supreme Court recently held,
“we are not presumptuous enough to suppose, upon
mere speculation, that the United States Supreme
Court’s still valid determination [in the plurality
opinion of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972),]
that non-unanimous 12 person jury verdicts are con-
stitutional may someday be overturned.” State v.
Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743 (La. 2009).
This Court has made clear that, “[i]t is this
Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its pre-
cedents.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in
a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leav-
ing to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997) (same). State supreme courts routinely cite
Rodriguez de Quijas, Agostini, and State Oil for the
 26

proposition that they must adhere to this Court’s ex-

isting precedents, even when those precedents ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the reasoning of later
decisions.
Thus, for instance, Commonwealth v. Loadholt,
923 N.E.2d 1037, 1053 n.10 (Mass. 2010), cited State
Oil and Rodriguez de Quijas in declining to reconsid-
er then-existing precedents holding the Second
Amendment inapplicable to the states. It took this
Court’s decision a few months later in McDonald to
overrule those precedents.
Likewise, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d
47, 60 (Va. 2004), cited Rodriguez de Quijas in “di-
rectly reject[ing] Johnson’s argument that we should
anticipate that the United States Supreme Court
may reexamine and reverse its holding in Stanford
[v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding murderers
may be executed even if they committed the murder
while under 18),] under an analysis similar to the
one that the Court applied in Atkins [v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002)].” It took this Court’s decision in Ro-
per v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), to overrule
Stanford. See Johnson v. Virginia, 544 U.S. 901
(2005) (remanding Johnson v. Commonwealth for
consideration in light of Roper).
Similarly, State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz.
2001), refused to strike down the Arizona death pe-
nalty scheme, under which a judge decided whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death. That
scheme had earlier been upheld by Walton v. Arizo-
na, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), but the reasoning of
this Court’s later decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), suggested that Walton was no
longer sound. The Arizona Supreme Court in Ring
reasoned, “[a]lthough Defendant argues that Walton
 27

cannot stand after Apprendi, we are bound by the

Supremacy Clause in such matters. Thus, we must
conclude that Walton is still the controlling authority
and that the Arizona death-penalty scheme has not
been held unconstitutional under either Apprendi or
Jones.” 25 P.3d at 1151–52. It took this Court’s deci-
sion in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), rev’g
State v. Ring, to overrule Walton.
Many other state court cases likewise rely on
Rodriguez de Quijas, Agostini, or State Oil in reject-
ing a criminal defendant’s arguments that a
precedent of this Court has been undermined by lat-
er precedents.6 These state supreme court decisions
may well be correct, given the reasoning of Rodriguez
de Quijas. But these decisions show that it is for this
Court, and not for the Oregon or Louisiana state
courts, to decide whether Apodaca survives McDo-
nald and other recent cases.

IV. Stare Decisis Concerns Do Not Justify Pre-

serving the Apodaca Anomaly.
The erroneous approach of Apodaca ought not be
preserved in the name of stare decisis.

A. Justice Powell’s Solo Concurrence in Apo-

daca Is Not Entitled to Stare Decisis Effect.
As explained above, the Apodaca concurrence’s
conclusion—that the Fourteenth Amendment only

6See, e.g., People v. Letner, 235 P.3d 62, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746,
834 (Cal. 2010); People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 631 (Colo. 2007);
State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458, 468 (Mont. 2006); State v.
Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 627 (Neb. 2003); State v. Rodriguez, 116
P.3d 92, 97–98 (N.M. 2005); State v. Bacon, 702 A.2d 116, 122
n.7 (Vt. 1997).
 28

incorporates a “watered-down” version of the Jury

Trial Cause—was inconsistent with this Court’s past
cases incorporating Bill of Rights guarantees. “Re-
maining true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine es-
tablished in prior cases better serves the values of
stare decisis than would following a more recently
decided case inconsistent with the decisions that
came before it.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995); see also, e.g., United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (overruling an ear-
lier decision on the grounds that it “lack[ed] constitu-
tional roots” and was “wholly inconsistent with earli-
er Supreme Court precedent”).
And the concurrence’s conclusion has been “un-
dermined by later decisions.” See Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting this as a factor relevant to the stare decisis
analysis); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989) (likewise). McDonald re-
jected the “watered-down incorporation” model that
the Apodaca concurrence adopted. 130 S. Ct. at 3035.
And McDonald likewise undermined the concur-
rence’s chief justification for this model, which was
the perceived need to protect state “experimentation”
in this area. See supra Part I.
The McDonald plurality opinion itself sug-
gested—in the course of rejecting the “experimenta-
tion” argument—that stare decisis would not save
the Apodaca “watered-down” incorporation doctrine.
The opinion stated that Bill of Rights provisions are
fully incorporated “unless stare decisis counsels oth-
erwise.” 130 S. Ct. at 3046 (plurality opinion). But in
the accompanying footnote, id. at 3046 n.30, it cited
only the cases rejecting incorporation of the Grand
Jury Clause and the Seventh Amendment, conspi-
 29

cuously omitting Apodaca from the list of cases that

might be preserved by stare decisis.
Moreover, Justice Powell’s reasoning is inconsis-
tent with the understanding of the right to jury trial
in 1791 and 1868, and with the traditional under-
standing of the right throughout American history.
See supra Parts II.A–.B. The opinion has thus been
undermined by later precedents that stress the im-
portance of original meaning and history to constitu-
tional interpretation. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct.
at 3031–34 (plurality opinion); Blakely, 542 U.S. at
312–13; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–59.
Justice Powell’s experimentation rationale has
also been “undermined by experience since its an-
nouncement.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
912 (2010) (noting this as a factor against the appli-
cation of stare decisis). Since Apodaca, not one state
has joined Oregon and Louisiana in their experi-
ment. Oklahoma, which had allowed nonunanimous
juries for all misdemeanors, shifted to allowing them
only in those “petty offense” cases where the Jury
Trial Clause does not apply at all, see supra note 1.
1989 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Sen. Jt. Res. 17 (West),
enacted as OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19. Occasional
calls to allow nonunanimous criminal jury verdicts in
other states have been rejected. See, e.g., In re Flori-
da Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
1972) (preserving the unanimity requirement, de-
spite the state Chief Justice’s contrary suggestion,
272 So. 2d at 66–69 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), and despite the then-recent
Apodaca decision).
Even the American Bar Association’s brief en-
dorsement of nonunanimous verdicts, on which Jus-
tice Powell’s concurring opinion relied, 406 U.S. at
 30

377, has been rejected by the ABA itself. In 1975 and

2005, the ABA reaffirmed the necessity of the un-
animity requirement. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS, standard 2.10 &
commentary, at 20, 23–24 (1975); AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, WITH
COMMENTARY, supra, principle 4.B, at 23.
Nor has there been evidence that Oregon’s and
Louisiana’s justice systems have become materially
more efficient or fair than those of other states be-
cause of their acceptance of nonunanimous verdicts.
After 40 years, there seems to be little remaining
benefit in continuing experimentation.
Stare decisis also has less applicability to frac-
tured decisions—such as Apodaca—in which no ra-
tionale received five votes. Thus, in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), this Court overruled
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
partly because “a majority of the Court [consisting of
the concurring opinion providing the fifth vote and
the dissent had] expressly disagreed with the ratio-
nale of the plurality,” so that the earlier decision had
only “questionable precedential value.” 517 U.S. at
66. Likewise, in Apodaca, five Justices disagreed
with the plurality’s rationale, and eight Justices dis-
agreed with Justice Powell’s rationale.

B. The Suggestion by the Apodaca Plurality

That Unanimity Is Not Required Even in
Federal Criminal Trials Is Not Entitled to
Stare Decisis Effect.
The Apodaca plurality’s conclusion—that the
Sixth Amendment does not mandate jury unanimity
even in federal criminal trials—was inconsistent
with a solid line of this Court’s decisions and with
 31

the Amendment’s original meaning. To the extent

that the plurality argued the contrary, its analysis
was not “well reasoned.” See Montejo v. Louisiana,
129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (noting this as a factor
in deciding whether to apply stare decisis).
Moreover, the Apodaca plurality opinion rested
its conclusion partly on the judgment that “the Sixth
Amendment itself has never been held to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.”
406 U.S. at 411. But since Apodaca, the Sixth
Amendment has indeed been held to require exactly
that. “[T]he jury verdict required by the Sixth
Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
278 (1993). “This Court has repeatedly held that, un-
der the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a
defendant to a greater potential sentence must be
found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond
a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of
the evidence.” Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.
270, 281 (2007). The Apodaca plurality’s reasoning
has thus been entirely undermined by later deci-
sions.

C. Revisiting Apodaca Would Not Unduly Un-

dermine Reliance Interests.
This Court has long recognized that correcting
erroneous decisions about judicial procedure is espe-
cially proper. “‘Considerations in favor of stare deci-
sis are at their acme in cases involving property and
contract rights, where reliance interests are in-
volved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving
procedural and evidentiary rules’ that do not produce
such reliance.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
 32

816 (2009) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,

828 (1991)).
And Apodaca has not led to reliance of the sort
that would justify retaining Apodaca’s anomalous re-
sult. Only two of the 50 states have adopted nonuna-
nimous jury verdicts. And even in those two states,
the criminal justice system has not built any complex
edifice on the basis of such verdicts. Mandating un-
animity in jury decisionmaking would not require
the revision of those states’ codes of criminal proce-
dure or evidence. Nor would reversing Apodaca un-
dermine any complex constitutional structure that
this Court has built on that case; recent decisions are
inconsistent with Apodaca, not reliant on it.
Of course, mandating jury unanimity for convic-
tion may require retrials in those cases that are on
direct review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304, 310
(1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 317 (White, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment), and
in which the objection to a nonunanimous jury was
preserved, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268
(2005). But that has been true in many cases that
have reversed erroneous precedents, including many
leading incorporation cases, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), over-
ruling in part Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). Those cases also applied to other cases that
were on direct appeal. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) (so holding as to Mapp), disapproved of as
to other matters by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314, 321–22 (1987); Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (so hold-
ing as to Batson); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375
 33

U.S. 2 (1963) (per curiam) (applying Gideon even on

habeas review, which would not be called for if Apo-
daca were overruled, given Teague). Yet this did not
stop this Court from overruling the earlier deci-
sions—even though such overruling applied to many
more states than the two implicated here.
Similarly, the rejection in Crawford, 541 U.S. at
60–62, of the Confrontation Clause framework devel-
oped in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), required
revisiting some cases in which the government had
relied on Roberts. This Court itself remanded twelve
cases for further consideration in light of Crawford:
Siler v. Ohio, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004); Watt v. Washing-
ton, 543 U.S. 976 (2004); Varacalli v. United States,
543 U.S. 801 (2004); LaFontaine v. United States,
543 U.S. 801 (2004); Calcano v. United States, 543
U.S. 801 (2004); Sarr v. Wyoming, 543 U.S. 801
(2004); Wedgeworth v. Kansas, 543 U.S. 801 (2004);
Ko v. New York, 542 U.S. 901 (2004); Goff v. Ohio,
541 U.S. 1083 (2004); Prasertphong v. Arizona, 541
U.S. 1039 (2004); Shields v. California, 541 U.S. 930
(2004); Corona v. Florida, 541 U.S. 930 (2004).
Doubtless many other cases had to be reconsidered
by lower courts. Yet that a government enacted rules
believing that they are constitutional “is not a com-
pelling interest for stare decisis. If it were, legislative
acts could prevent [this Court] from overruling our
own precedents, thereby interfering with [this
Court’s] duty ‘to say what the law is.’” Citizens Unit-
ed, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certi-
orari should be granted.
 34

Respectfully submitted.

EUGENE VOLOKH
Counsel of Record
Professor of Law
UCLA School of Law
Academic Affiliate
Mayer Brown LLP
405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90095
(310) 206-3926
volokh@law.ucla.edu
Counsel for Petitioner

SEPTEMBER 2010
APPENDIX
 1a

APPENDIX A—Oregon Court of Appeals Deci-

sion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court

080331346

A141205

ORDER OF SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Before Wollheim, Presiding Judge, and Brewer,

Chief Judge.

Respondent has moved, pursuant to ORS 138.660,

for summary affirmance on the ground that the ap-
peal does not present a substantial question of law.
The motion is granted. State v. Cobb, 224 Or App
594, 198 P3d 978 (2008), rev den, 346 Or 364 (2009).

Affirmed.

FEB 22 2010 /s
 2a

DATE Robert Wollheim,

Presiding Judge

DESIGNATION OF PREVAILING PARTY

AND AWARD OF COSTS

Prevailing party: Respondent

[ ] Costs allowed, payable by:
 3a

APPENDIX B—Oregon Supreme Court Denial

of Review

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Respondent on Review,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant,
Petitioner on Review

Court of Appeals
A141205

S058364

ORDER DENYING REVIEW

Upon consideration by the court.

The court has considered the petition for review and

orders that it be denied.

June 11, 2010 /s

DATE CHIEF JUSTICE
 4a

APPENDIX C—Trial Court Denial of Motion for

Unanimous Verdict Instruction

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF
MULTNOMAH

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 0803-31346

Excerpt from the Transcript of Proceedings for

August 25, 2008:

[22] * * * MS. HORNE [defense attorney]: I have

presented to the Court a memorandum of law in
support of a motion for a jury unanimity, an instruc-
tion for the same. I filed that this morning. * * *
[25] * * * [I]n that the Constitution of Oregon in
allowing a nonunanimous verdict does indeed violate
the federal Constitution and the defendant’s right
under the Sixth Amendment to a unanimous verdict,
we would ask that you grant him a unanimous ver-
dict in this case. * * *
MR. MICKLEY [prosecutor]: * * *
[26] * * * [T]he Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court of Oregon, and the Supreme Court of the Unit-
 5a

ed States have all confirmed Oregon’s 10-2 voting re-

quirement and I’d ask the Court to deny the motion
for unanimous jury verdict.
THE COURT: And the state of the law in Oregon
at this point makes it clear that that is the state of
the law in Oregon, and so I will deny the motion and
we will see what happens in the Supreme Court.
 6a

APPENDIX D—Announcement of Nonunanim-

ous Vote on the Verdict

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF
MULTNOMAH

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 0803-31346

Excerpt from the Transcript of Proceedings for

August 25, 2008:

[140] * * * THE COURT: * * * So were these,

both of these decisions, were they unanimous deci-
sions or not unanimous decisions? [141]
A JUROR: They were not.
THE COURT: Okay. Can you tell me what the
count was for Count 1?
A JUROR: 10 to 2.
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And what about
Count 2?
A JUROR: 11 to 1 for not guilty. * * *
 7a

APPENDIX E—Preservation of Objection to

Nonunanimous Jury Instruction

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF
MULTNOMAH

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 0803-31346

Excerpt from the Transcript of Proceedings for

August 25, 2008:

[107] * * * MS. HORNE [defense attorney]:

Judge, just so I make sure that I’ve got my — my
record for appeal as clean as possible should I need
it, no matter how fervently I argue about jury in-
structions, I always have to make an exception.
THE COURT: Absolutely. That’s fine.
MS. HORNE: I would — I would except — take
an exception to having given the standard jury in-
struction 10.13, the verdict in a felony case. You did
instruct the jurors that they could be non — other
than unanimous, and we take exception to that. * * *
THE COURT: Anything for the record, Mr. Mick-
ley [prosecutor]?
 8a

MR. MICKLEY: No, Your Honor. * * *

 9a

APPENDIX F—Preservation of Argument in

Petitioner’s Brief in the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court

080331346

A141205

APPELLANT’S BRIEF AND

EXCERPT OF RECORD[, pp. 14–17]

II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

FORBIDS CONVICTION BY LESS THAN A
UNANIMOUS VOTE.
If the United States Supreme Court were to revi-
sit the issue of nonunanimous guilty verdicts today,
it would disavow its precedent and strike down Ore-
gon’s present system. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US 404
(1972), was wrongly decided by a split Court and,
under the view of the Sixth Amendment now adopted
by a majority of the justices, is no longer good law.
 10a

A generation and more after Apodaca, Oregon

and Louisiana continue to be the only two states to
permit nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases. The
remaining forty-eight states, together with the fed-
eral government, require unanimous verdicts for
criminal convictions.
The deciding vote in Apodaca was supplied by
Justice Powell, whose rationale was that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not in-
corporate the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity re-
quirement11 against the states, leaving the unanimi-
ty requirement inapplicable in state court prosecu-
tions. Cf. Gann, 254 Or at 577 (Goodwin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the right
to a unanimous jury verdict in a criminal trial is so
fundamental to liberty under the American scheme
of justice as to amount to a due-process right”).
Justice Powell’s rationale has been so seriously
undermined by the line of cases beginning with Ap-
prendi, 530 US 466, and continuing with Blakely,
542 US 296, and United States v. Booker, 543 US 220
(2005), that it is no longer controlling. For example,
in his opinion for the Court in Blakely, Justice Scalia
explained that the by-now-well-known Apprendi rule
“reflects two longstanding tenets of common-law
criminal jurisprudence,” the first of which is “that
the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant
‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours[.]’”
Blakely, 542 US at 301, quoting 4 William Black-
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343
(1769) (emphasis added); see also Booker, 543 US at

11 That the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity is settled

law. Andres v. United States, 333 US 740, 748 (1948).

 11a

239; Apprendi, 530 US at 477 (each quoting Black-

stone identically).12
The Apprendi line of cases confirms that, as Jus-
tice Goodwin stated forty years ago,
for more than five centuries Englishmen
knew that they could not be convicted of
crime except by the unanimous verdict of
twelve peers. Moreover, by the time of the
American Revolution, the protection of un-
animity in criminal cases was one of the En-
glishman’s most cherished rights.
There is no reason to believe that the Ameri-
can colonists who adopted our Bill of Rights
abandoned their English tradition with re-
spect to trial by jury. Indeed, the evidence
strongly suggests that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed of a jury trial in all criminal cas-
es was intended to incorporate all the ele-
ments of a jury trial that were deemed pro-
tective of individual liberty in this country

12 The right of jury trial is at least as old as Article XXXIX of

Magna Carta. See Thomas Andrew Green, VERDICT ACCORDING

TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY, 1200-1800 165 (1985); FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE CON-
STITUTION: DOCUMENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY 1, 47 (D.
Brooks ed. 1993). The right came into this country by way of
Article 7 of the Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress, the
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
and the Declaration of Independence. See FROM MAGNA CARTA
TO THE CONSTITUTION at 48, 55, 59. For federal prosecutions,
the right to trial by jury was guaranteed by Article III, §2 of the
United States Constitution. The right is reiterated in the Sixth
Amendment, which applies to state court prosecutions. Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968). For additional information on
the jury trial clause’s origin, see id. at 152-153.
 12a

and in England when the Constitution was

adopted.
“Those elements were—(1) that the jury
should consist of twelve men, neither more
nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the
presence and under the superintendence of a
judge having power to instruct them as to the
law and advise them in respect of the facts;
and (3) that the verdict should be unanim-
ous.” [Patton v. United States, 281 US 276,
288 (1930).]
Gann, 254 Or at 578-579 (Goodwin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
In holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and therefore ap-
plicable in state court prosecutions, this Court stated
“that in the American states, as in the federal judi-
cial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious
offenses is a fundamental right, essential for pre-
venting miscarriages of justice and for assuring that
fair trials are provided for all defendants.” Duncan,
391 US at 157-158. Apprendi and its progeny estab-
lish that the exact same things are true about the
Sixth Amendment’s unanimous verdict guarantee.
That is, the unanimity requirement is a principle “of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934). It is “basic
in our system of jurisprudence,” In re Oliver, 333 US
257, 273 (1948), and “is necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty,” Duncan, 391
US at 149 n. 14.
 13a

It is clear that, notwithstanding Gann and Apo-

daca, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, as it incorporates the jury trial right, equally
incorporates the unanimity requirement. This re-
quirement thus applies to state prosecutions. Ore-
gon’s nonunanimous guilty verdict authority is there-
fore void. The Court erred when it instructed the
jury that it could convict by a nonunanimous vote.
The Court further erred in ordering that a judgment
of conviction be entered based on the jury’s nonuna-
nimous vote of guilty on Count One. * * *
 14a

APPENDIX G—Preservation of Argument in

Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Oregon
Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Respondent on Review,

v.

ALONSO ALVINO HERRERA,

aka Alonso Alvino Anto Herrera,
Defendant-Appellant,
Petitioner on Review

Court of Appeals
A141205

S058364

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ALONSO ALVINO

HERRERA[, pp. 12-15]

II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

FORBIDS CONVICTION BY LESS THAN A
UNANIMOUS VOTE.
If the United States Supreme Court were to revi-
sit the issue of nonunanimous guilty verdicts today,
it would disavow its precedent and strike down Ore-
gon’s present system. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US
404, 92 S Ct 1628, 32 L Ed 2d 184 (1972), was wrong-
ly decided by a split Court and, under the view of the
 15a

Sixth Amendment now adopted by a majority of the

justices, is no longer good law.
A generation and more after Apodaca, Oregon
and Louisiana continue to be the only two states to
permit nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases. The
remaining forty-eight states, together with the fed-
eral government, require unanimous verdicts for
criminal convictions.
The deciding vote in Apodaca was supplied by
Justice Powell, whose rationale was that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not in-
corporate the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity re-
quirement9 against the states, leaving the unanimity
requirement inapplicable in state court prosecutions.
Cf. Gann, 254 Or at 577 (Goodwin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“the right to a unanim-
ous jury verdict in a criminal trial is so fundamental
to liberty under the American scheme of justice as to
amount to a due-process right”).
Justice Powell’s rationale has been so seriously
undermined by the line of cases beginning with Ap-
prendi, 530 US 466, and continuing with Blakely,
542 US 296, and United States v. Booker, 543 US
220, 125 S Ct 738, 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005), that it is
no longer controlling. For example, in his opinion for
the Court in Blakely, Justice Scalia explained that
the by-now-well-known Apprendi rule “reflects two
longstanding tenets of common-law criminal juri-
sprudence,” the first of which is “that the ‘truth of
every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should after-

9 That the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity is settled

law. Andres v. United States, 333 US 740, 748, 68 S Ct 880, 92

L Ed 1055 (1948).
 16a

wards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of

twelve of his equals and neighbours[.]’” Blakely, 542
US at 301, quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 343 (1769) (emphasis
added); see also Booker, 543 US at 239; Apprendi,
530 US at 477 (each quoting Blackstone identical-
ly).10
The Apprendi line of cases confirms that, as Jus-
tice Goodwin stated forty years ago,
for more than five centuries Englishmen
knew that they could not be convicted of
crime except by the unanimous verdict of
twelve peers. Moreover, by the time of the
American Revolution, the protection of un-
animity in criminal cases was one of the En-
glishman’s most cherished rights.
There is no reason to believe that the Ameri-
can colonists who adopted our Bill of Rights
abandoned their English tradition with re-

10 The right of jury trial is at least as old as Article XXXIX of

Magna Carta. See Thomas Andrew Green, VERDICT ACCORDING

TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY, 1200-1800 165 (1985); FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE CON-
STITUTION: DOCUMENTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY 1, 47 (D.
Brooks ed. 1993). The right came into this country by way of
Article 7 of the Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress, the
Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
and the Declaration of Independence. See FROM MAGNA CARTA
TO THE CONSTITUTION at 48, 55, 59. For federal prosecutions,
the right to trial by jury was guaranteed by Article III, section 2
of the United States Constitution. The right is reiterated in the
Sixth Amendment, which applies to state court prosecutions.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491
(1968). For additional information on the jury trial clause’s ori-
gin, see id. at 152-153.
 17a

spect to trial by jury. Indeed, the evidence

strongly suggests that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed of a jury trial in all criminal cas-
es was intended to incorporate all the ele-
ments of a jury trial that were deemed pro-
tective of individual liberty in this country
and in England when the Constitution was
adopted.
“Those elements were—(1) that the jury
should consist of twelve men, neither more
nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the
presence and under the superintendence of a
judge having power to instruct them as to the
law and advise them in respect of the facts;
and (3) that the verdict should be unanim-
ous.” [Patton v. United States, 281 US 276,
288, 50 S Ct 253, 74 L Ed 854 (1930).]
Gann, 254 Or at 578-579 (Goodwin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
In holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and therefore ap-
plicable in state court prosecutions, the Supreme
Court stated “that in the American states, as in the
federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial
for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential
for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assur-
ing that fair trials are provided for all defendants.”
Duncan, 391 US at 157-158. Apprendi and its proge-
ny establish that the exact same things are true
about the Sixth Amendment’s unanimous verdict
guarantee. That is, the unanimity requirement is a
principle “of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
 18a

mental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105,

54 S Ct 330, 78 L Ed 674 (1934). It is “basic in our
system of jurisprudence,” In re Oliver, 333 US 257,
273, 68 S Ct 499, 92 L Ed 682 (1948), and “is neces-
sary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liber-
ty,” Duncan, 391 US at 149 n. 14.
It is clear that, notwithstanding Gann and Apo-
daca, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, as it incorporates the jury trial right, equally
incorporates the unanimity requirement. This re-
quirement thus applies to state prosecutions. Ore-
gon’s nonunanimous guilty verdict authority is there-
fore void. The Court erred when it instructed the
jury that it could convict by a nonunanimous vote.
The Court further erred in ordering that a judgment
of conviction be entered based on the jury’s nonuna-
nimous vote of guilty on Count One. After receiving
word of the jury’s status in open court, the Court
should have declared a mistrial. The remedy at this
stage is to reverse defendant’s conviction and order a
new trial. * * *