Effects of Word-of-Mouth and Product-

Attribute Information on Persuasion: An

Accessibility-Diagnosticity Perspective
PAUL M. HERR
FRANK R. KARDES
JOHN KIM*

The effects of word-of-mouth (WOM) communications and specific attribute infor-

mation on product evaluations were investigated. A face-to-face WOM communi-
cation was more persuasive than a printed format (experiment 1). Although a strong
WOM effect was found, this effect was reduced or eliminated when a prior impression
of the target brand was available from memory or when extremely negative attribute
information was presented (experiment 2). The results suggest that diverse, seem-
ingly unrelated judgmental phenomena—such as the vividness effect, the perse-
verance effect, and the negativity effect—can be explained through the accessibility-
diagnosticity model.

S everal studies have shown that word-of-mouth

(WOM) communications often exert a strong in-
fluence on judgments of products. For example, con-
sumers frequently rely on WOM when selecting an au-
tomotive diagnostic center (Engel, Blackwell, and
Kegerreis 1969), when choosing a physician (Feldman
and Spencer 1965), or when considering the purchase
ofa new product or service (Arndt 1967; Brown and
Reingen 1987; Reingen and Kernan 1986; Richins
1983).
Prior research has focused primarily on the effects
of communicator characteristics (e.g., similarity,
credibility, trustworthiness) on interpersonal influence
(Bearden and Etzel 1982; Bearden, Netemeyer, and
Teel 1989; Price, Feick, and Higie 1989). Our research
focuses on the manner in which information is pre-
sented (vividly vs. pallidly) and on the type of evidence
available for processing (anecdotal vs. detailed attri-
bute information). Our goal is to investigate the me-
'Paul M. Herr is assistant professor of marketing. Graduate
School of Business, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN 46223.
Frank R. Kardes is associate professor of marketing. College of
Business Administration, University ofCincinnati, Cincinnati, OH
45221. John Kim was a doctoral student at the University ofCin-
cinnati and is currently assistant professor of marketing. School of
Business Administration, Oakland University, Rochester Hills, Ml
48309. The authors wish to thank Russell Fazio, Richard Olshavsky,
Martha Powell, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments on an earlier version ofthis article.
diation of WOM effects on persuasion and to identify
additional moderating variables.
One factor that is likely to mediate the effects of
WOM on judgment is information vividness. Vividly
presented information is inherently interesting, atten-
tion drawing, and thought provoking. Consequently,
vividly (as opposed to pallidly) presented information
tends to have a stronger influence on product judg-
ments (for reviews, see Kisielius and Sternthal 1986;
Nisbett and Ross 1980). However, the disproportionate
effect of vividly presented information on judgment is
unwarranted because manner of presentation does not
influence the diagnostic or probative value of infor-
mation.
Taylor and Thompson's (1982) well-known review
revealed that the vast majority of empirical investi-
gations of the vividness hypothesis found effects of
vividness on memory but not on judgment. Moreover,
the few judgmental vividness effects that were observed
are difficult to interpret because vividness was con-
founded with other informational variables.' Finally,
they argue that judgmental vividness effects should be
found only when the information context provides an
opportunity for differential encoding of vivid versus
pallid information.
Consider the Borgida and Nisbett (1977) experi-
ment. College students received either extensive and
detailed course evaluations based on ratings from a
large sample of students or brief, face-to-face, course
comments from a single individual. Vivid WOM in-

454
© 1991 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH. Inc. • Vol. 17»March 1991
All rights reserved. 0O9J-53OI/9l/l7O4.O0O2$O2.0O
EFFECTS OF WORD OF MOUTH
formation had a greater impact on course choices rel-
ative to the extensive but pallid course evaluations.
However, this study has been criticized because the
WOM communications and the course evaluations dif-
fered on many relevant dimensions (i.e., amount of
information, information content, base rate vs. case
information).
We avoided these confounds in the present experi-
ment by developing a control condition in which
amount ofinformation, information content, and type
of information were held constant. The only factor
influenced by our vividness manipulation was the
manner in which information was presented: half of
the subjects were exposed to anecdotal information
presented in a face-to-face manner (the vivid WOM
condition), and half were exposed to the exact same
information presented in a printed mode (the pallid
condition). In addition, extensive and detailed Con-
sumer Reports information about product features was
provided to allow selective encoding of evidence.
HI: Word-of-mouth communications should have a
greater impact on product judgments relative to
less vivid printed information.
EXPERIMENT 1
Overview
Eighty-four undergraduates were randomly assigned
to one of four conditions in a 2 (WOM or printed
anecdote) X 2 (positive or negative anecdote) factorial
design. Anecdotal information was presented either in
a face-to-face (vivid) manner or in a printed (pallid)
format. Anecdotal information and detailed Consumer
Reports product attribute information were evalua-
tively inconsistent to permit assessment ofthe relative
impact of anecdotal versus attribute information.
Attribute Information
Subjects received information, "condensed from
Consumer Reports," about a new personal computer
(PC). The description contained a brief summary of
standard features (this summary was held constant
across conditions), a ranking (the brand was ranked
either third or seventeenth best of the 20 models
tested), and information about seven attributes (mem-
ory, monitor, keyboard, hard-drive system, printer
port, graphics, and clock speed). In positive-valence
conditions, all attributes were described favorably (e.g.,
640-KB memory, high-quality color monitor, separate
cursor control and function keys on the keyboard),
whereas in negative-valence conditions, attributes were
described less favorably (e.g., 512-KB memory, low-
quality monochrome monitor, inconveniently located
cursor control and function keys on the keyboard).
455
Anecdotal Information
Subjects participated in small groups of four to six.
One member ofthe group was a confederate who de-
livered the face-to-face, WOM communication after
subjects had read the product description. None ofthe
subjects knew the confederate. The confederate stated
that she owned a computer similar to the described
brand, and, in positive-anecdote conditions, she added,
"It's the best computer I've ever owned. It's really easy
to use, and I haven't had a single problem with it." In
contrast, in negative-anecdote conditions she said, "It's
the worst computer I've ever owned. It's really hard
to use, and I've had nothing but problems with it."
The experimenter asked the confederate to write the
brand name of her computer on a slip of paper, said
it was the described brand, and thanked and dismissed
her. In pallid conditions, the same anecdotes were pre-
sented verbatim in a printed format transcribed from
a ''Consumer Reports telephone interview with a col-
lege student."
Attitude Measures
After the confederate's departure, subjects evaluated
the target product on three 11-point scales anchored
by 0 and 10 (bad/good, favorable/unfavorable, desir-
able/undesirable). These ratings were averaged to form
a single brand-attitude index (Cronbach's alpha = .95,
Attribute Relevance Measures
Subjects may focus more on vivid WOM informa-
tion than on attribute information because vivid in-
formation is more attention drawing or because the
attributes may be perceived as irrelevant (Borgida and
Nisbett 1977). To rule out the second possibility, we
administered attribute-relevance measures. For each
of the seven attributes, subjects estimated the per-
centage of high- versus low-quality PCs possessing the
attribute in question on scales from 0 (0 percent) to
10 (100 percent). Low quality was defined as average
or low quality to ensure that mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories would be employed. Bayesian
likelihood ratios were computed from these subjective
probabilities by dividing the probability that a low-
quality PC possesses a given attribute from the prob-
ability that a high-quality PC possesses the attribute.
Attribute relevance or diagnosticity is expressed as the
magnitude of the likelihood ratio or its reciprocal,
whichever is larger (Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom 1983).
Results
Brand attitudes as a function of anecdote format
and valence are presented in the following tabulation.
456
Anecdote formal
Anecdote valence WOM Printed
Positive 6.75 3.70
Negative 3.53 6.87
Higher scores indicate more favorable overall evaluations.
Cell size is 18 for the negative printed anecdote format
(lower right entry), and 19 otherwise.
A 2 X 2 between-subjects analysis of variance performed
on brand attitudes yielded the predicted vividness-by-va-
lence interaction (F(l,71) = 111.73, p < .001, co^ = .59).
The main effects were not significant (F's < 1).
Simple-effect tests were performed to interpret the in-
teraction while controlling for the compounding of alpha.
In positive-anecdote conditions, more favorable brand
attitudes were formed in WOM than in print conditions
(X= 6.75 vs. 3.70; F(l,71) = 49.50, p < .001, oP- = .28).
Conversely, in negative-anecdote conditions, less favor-
able brand attitudes were formed in WOM than in print
conditions (X = 3.53 vs. 6.87; F(l,71) = 60.24,/? < .001,
oj^ = .32). Thus, anecdotal information had a stronger
impact on brand attitudes when it was presented in a vivid,
face-to-face manner as opposed to a pallid, printed format.
The observed vividness effect is even more impressive
when one considers the diagnostic value ofthe attribute
information that was provided. If an attribute is equally
likely to be associated with a high- or low-quality product,
that attribute does not enable the consumer to determine
whether a product is high or low in quality. Thus, the
attribute is nondiagnostic, and the likelihood ratio will
equal 1. To the extent that the likelihood ratio differs
from unity, a given piece of information is considered to
be informative or diagnostic'
• Likelihood ratios were computed and averaged across
the seven target attributes, and this index was subjected
'Bayes's theorem prescribes how beliefs should be updated in
light of new evidence (for an excellent review, see Fischhoff and
Beyth-Marom 1983). The theorem states that
P(HIA) P(AIH) ^^ P(H)
P(H/A) P(AIH) P(H)'
in which, reading from right to left, P(H)IP(H) refers to the prior
odds that the target product is a high- (as opposed to low) quality
product; P(A/H)/P{A/H) is the likelihood ratio, which represents
the degree to which attribute A ini^plies a high- (as opposed to low)
quality product; and P(H/A)/PiH/A) refers to the posterior odds
that H is true given ^. If the probability of observing A given that
H is true is different from the probability of observing A when H is
not true, the likelihood ratio will differ from 1, and the posterior
odds will differ from the prior odds. The values ofthe numerator
and denominator ofthe likelihood ratio are independent. Thus, A
may imply H even if .4 is unlikely given H. provided that A is even
more unlikely given H. Similarly, A may be nondiagnostic even if
A is likely given H. provided that A is equally likely given H. Con-
sumers tend to overlook these possibilities because they tend to
focus on the numerator and neglect the denominator ofthe likeli-
hood ratio (the pseudodiagnosticity efTect; see Fischhoff and Beyth-
Marom 1983; Hoch and Deighton 1989).
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
to a 2 (anecdote vividness) X 2 (attribute valence) analysis
of variance. The attributes were perceived as more diag-
nostic in negative {X = 4.63) than in positive {X = 2.61)
valence conditions (F(l,71) = 6.78, p < .02). Moreover,
likelihood ratios differed significantly from I in both neg-
ative (F(l,36) = 39.05,/7 < .001) and positive (F(l,37) =
26.04, /7 < .001) conditions. Anecdote vividness did not
influence the perceived diagnosticity of the attributes ( F
< 1), and the vividness-by-valence interaction also was
not significant (F < 1).
Thus, the results provide direct support for the prop-
osition that negative infonnation is more informative than
positive information, in the sense that it helps consumers
discriminate between low- and high-quality products
(Mizerski 1982; Wright 1974). More important, the results
indicate that robust anecdote vividness effects on judg-
ment were obtained even though highly relevant attribute
information was available.
Discussion
The results of experiment 1 indicate that WOM
communications have a strong impact on product
judgments, relative to less vivid printed communica-
tions. Moreover, favorable brand attitudes are formed
when a single, favorable WOM communication is
presented, even when extensive, diagnostic attribute
information is available. In contrast, the judgmental
effects of printed anecdotal information are over-
whelmed by detailed attribute information. Hence, the
manner in which information is presented can produce
strong judgmental effects, even when the diagnostic
value ofthis information is controlled.
These findings suggest that vividly (as opposed to
pallidly) presented information is more accessible from
memory and is weighed more heavily in judgment (see
also Kisielius and Sternthal 1984, 1986; McGill and
Anand 1989). Several studies have shown that, as in-
formation accessibility increases, the likelihood with
which this information is used as an input for judgment
and choice also increases (e.g., Biehal and Chakravarti
1986; Higgins and King 1981; Wyer and Srull 1986).
Ease of retrieval is an important determinant of in-
formation utilization.
To summarize, the results of experiment 1 suggest
that information accessibility mediates the effects of
WOM on persuasion. Experiment 2 was designed to
extend these findings by investigating variables thought
to moderate the effects of WOM on judgment (for an
excellent discussion of the moderator-mediator dis-
tinction, see Baron and Kenny 1986).^ The accessi-
bility-diagnosticity model was used to identify possible
moderators.
^Moderator variables influence the direction or strength ofthe
relationship between two variables, whereas mediator variables ex-
plain how one variable influences another (Baron and Kenny 1986).
For a phenomenon to be understood, both enabling (mediating)
and limiting (moderating) conditions must be specified.
EFFECTS OF WORD OF MOUTH
THE ACCESSIBILITY-DIAGNOSTICITY
MODEL
According to the accessibility-diagnosticity model,
accessible information is not used as an input for judg-
ment and choice when more diagnostic or probative
information is available (Feldman and Lynch 1988;
Lynch, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988). A piece of
information is perceived as diagnostic if it helps the
consumer assign a product to one (and only one) cog-
nitive category. In contrast, information that is am-
biguous (i.e., information that has multiple interpre-
tations; see Hoch and Deighton 1989) or that implies
multiple possible categorizations is nondiagnostic.
Hence, diagnosticity refers to the extent to which a
given piece ofinformation discriminates between al-
ternative hypotheses, interpretations, or categoriza-
tions.
To briefly summarize the Feldman and Lynch
model, the probability that any piece of information
will be used as an input for judgment or choice depends
on (1) the accessibility ofthe input, (2) the accessibility
of alternative inputs, and (3) the diagnosticity or per-
ceived relevance of the inputs. Any factor that in-
creases the accessibility of an input (such as a vividness
manipulation) should also increase the likelihood with
which that input will be used. Further, any factor that
increases the accessibility of one input should decrease
the accessibility and use of alternative inputs. Finally,
diagnostic inputs that strongly suggest one categori-
zation over alternative possibilities are more likely to
be used than inputs that are ambiguous with respect
to category membership (i.e., multiple categorizations
are possible).
The model emphasizes that perceived (as opposed
to objective) diagnosticity determines the likelihood
ofinformation utilization. Therefore, inferential biases
are possible when consumers overestimate the diag-
nostic value of a given piece of information. For ex-
ample, consumers are likely to overestimate the valid-
ity of their prior impressions for several reasons. Prior
impressions are remarkably persistent and resistant to
change because (1) ambiguous information is inter-
preted as consistent with the impression, (2) impres-
sion-consistent, nonambiguous information supports
and increases one's confidence in the impression, and
(3) impression-inconsistent, nonambiguous informa-
tion is discounted or ignored (Hoch and Deighton
1989; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979, 1984). Hence, ex-
posure to any type ofinformation, even contradictory
information, will increase confidence in the validity
of prior impressions.
Consumers also tend to hold expectations about the
diagnosticity of positive, neutral, and negative cues.
Recent research on the negativity effect in impression
formation has shown that extremely negative attributes
generally have strong implications for category mem-
457
bership, whereas less negative features are commonly
possessed by high-, average-, and low-quality products
(Skowronski and Carlston 1987, 1989). For example,
poor handling (an extremely negative attribute) is per-
ceived as characteristic of only low-quality automo-
biles, but average handling (a neutral feature) can be
found in many high-, average-, and low-quality au-
tomobiles. Extremely negative information is useful
for categorizing a product as low in quality, whereas
less negative information is less useful. In general, ex-
tremely negative cues are less ambiguous than positive
or neutral cues (for exceptions, see Skowronski and
Carlston 1987, 1989), especially in product-judgment
contexts (as suggested by the results of experiment 1
and by Mizerski [1982]; Wright 1974).
Hence, the impact of vivid and accessible WOM in-
formation should be reduced when more diagnostic
information is available. Prior impressions are high in
perceived diagnosticity because they suggest one in-
terpretation of evidence to the exclusion of others. Ex-
tremely negative attribute information is diagnostic
because it suggests one categorization (i.e., low quality)
over other possibilities.
H2: Vivid WOM communications should have a
reduced effect on product judgments when a
prior impression of the product is available
(vs. not available) from memory.
H3: Vivid WOM communications should have a
reduced effect on product judgments when
extremely negative attribute information is
available (vs. not available).
EXPERIMENT 2
Overview
One hundred and twenty undergraduates were ran-
domly assigned to one of 24 conditions in a 3 (positive,
neutral, or negative attributes) X 2 (impression or
memory set) X 2 (positive or negative WOM) X 2
(counterbalancing order: judgment before recall or vice
versa) factorial design. Attribute valence and WOM
valence were manipulated orthogonally to permit as-
sessment ofthe relative contribution ofthese two types
ofinformation to overall judgments.
Procedure
When subjects arrived at the laboratory, processing
goals were manipulated through experimental in-
structions, attribute information about the target
product (a new automobile) was provided, a WOM
communication was delivered by a confederate, and
judgment and recall measures were administered.
Subjects were told either to form a coherent, overall
impression ofthe described brand (impression set) or
to memorize the attributes of the described brand
458
TABLE 1
OVERALL EVALUATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF PROCESSING
OBJECTIVES. ATTRIBUTE VALENCE, ANO ANECDOTE
VALENCE (EXPERIMENT 2)
Memory set Impression set
Attribute Positive Negative Positive
valence WOM WOM WOM
Positive 9.10, 8.20^ 8.33.6
Neutral 6.44. 5.49b 5.41b
Negative 1.45. 1.85. 1.89.
NOTE. Higher scores indicate more favorable overall evaluations. Means in
the same row not sharing a common subscript differ at p < .05. n = 10 per cell
(except in the lower right entry, for which n = 9).
(memory set). The description contained a brief sum-
mary of standard features, a ranking (the brand was
ranked sixth, twentieth, or thirty-fourth best ofthe 40
brands tested), and information about nine important
attributes (engine performance, transmission, han-
dling, braking, ride, noise, displays, seating, and reli-
ability). The attributes were described favorably (e.g.,
braking was smooth), neutrally (e.g., braking was usu-
ally smooth), or unfavorably (e.g., braking was abrupt).
Subjects participated in small groups of four to six.
After subjects had read the description, the confederate
said that the car seemed similar to a car her father
owns. In positive WOM conditions she added, "It's
the best car he's ever had. He hasn't spent a dime on
repairs since he bought it. He says if it ever wears out
he'll get another just like it." In negative WOM con-
ditions she said, "It's the worst car he's ever had. It
seems like it's always in the shop being repaired. I think
he's spent more to keep it running than it originally
cost him." The experimenter asked her to write the
brand name of the car on a slip of paper, said it was
the described brand, and thanked and dismissed her.
Judgment and Recall Measures
After dismissal of the confederate, subjects were
asked to recall as much attribute information as pos-
sible within a three-minute period, rate each attribute
on scales ranging from 0 (extremely low quality) to 10
(extremely high quality), and judge the overall quality
of the target product. Finally, subjects were thanked
and debriefed.
Two judges coded the recall protocols using a gist
criterion, and high interrater reliability was attained
(97 percent). Attribute ratings were averaged to form
a single brand attitude index (Cronbach's alpha = .98,
p < .001). This index correlated highly with the overall
quality measure (r = .94, p < .001).
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
Results
Effects of Prior Impressions on Judgmental Vivid-
ness Effects. Overall product evaluations as a func-
tion of processing goals, attribute valence, and WOM
valence are presented in Table 1. To test the hypothesis
that vivid WOM communications should have a re-
Negative
WOM
duced effect on product judgments when a prior
impression ofthe product is available (vs. not avail-
7.38c able) from memory (Hypothesis 2), a series of planned
4.71b contrasts was performed on overall product judg-
2.21. ments.^ Because prior impressions are less likely to be
available in memory set than in impression set con-
ditions (Hastie and Park 1986; Kardes 1986; Lichten-
stein and Srull 1985, 1987), WOM effects on judgment
should be weaker in impression set than in memory
set conditions. Consistent with this prediction, in pos-
itive-attribute conditions, a significant WOM effect was
obtained in the memory set condition (X = 9.10 vs.
8.20, p < .05). However, unexpectedly, a significant
WOM effect was also found in the impression set con-
dition {X = 8.33 vs. 7.38, p < .05). Thus, partial sup-
port for Hypothesis 2 was found in positive-attribute
conditions.
A different pattern of results was found when neutral
attributes were presented. In the memory set condition,
more favorable judgments were formed in positive-
than in negative-WOM conditions (X = 6.44 vs. 5.49,
p < .05). Although a robust WOM effect on judgment
was obtained in the memory set condition, no WOM
effect was found in the impression set condition {X
= 5.41 vs. 4.71, NS). Thus, consistent support for Hy-
pothesis 2 was found in neutral attribute conditions.
EffTects of Negative-Attribute Information on Judg-
mental Vividness Effects. To test the hypothesis that
the presence of extremely negative attribute infor-
mation reduces the effect of anecdotal WOM com-
munications on judgment (Hypothesis 3), planned
comparisons were performed separately in memory set
and in impression set conditions. Although robust
WOM effects on judgment were found when positive
'Planned comparisons should be performed instead of overall F-
tests when interactions involving differences between specific cells
are predicted (Hays 1981; Keppel 1982; Kirk 1982). Nevertheless,
the reader may be interested in the results of omnibus F-tests. A 2
(impression or memory set) X 3 (positive, neutral, or negative at-
tributes) X 2 (positive or negative WOM) X 2 (counterbalancing
order) between-subjects analysis of variance was performed on
overall evaluations. Counterbalancing order produced no significant
main effects or interactions. Main effects were found for processing
goal (F(l,95) = 6.97,/>< .01), attribute valence (F(2,95) = 474.44.
p < .001), and WOM valence (F(l,95) = 7.90, p < .01). More fa-
vorable evaluations were formed in memory set than in impression
set conditions, and more favorable evaluations were formed as at-
tribute and WOM information increased in favorability. Significant
processing goal by attribute valence (f(2,95) = 5.92, p < .01) and
attribute valence by WOM valence (/=^(2,95) = 5 . 8 l , p < .01) inter-
actions were also found.
EFFECTS OF WORD OF MOUTH
or neutral attributes were presented to memory set
subjects, the WOM effect was eliminated when ex-
tremely negative attributes were presented to memory
set subjects (X = 1.45 vs. 1.85, NS). Similarly, in
impression set conditions, no WOM effect was found
when extremely negative attributes were presented
(X = 1.89 vs. 2.21, NS). Thus, consistent support
was found for Hypothesis 3 across processing-goal
(impression vs. memory set) conditions.
Judgment-Recall Correlations/Positive-Attribute
Conditions. Judgment-recall correlations were ex-
amined to facilitate interpretation of the unexpected
WOM effect on judgment obtained in the positive at-
tribute-impression set cell. Prior research has shown
that an impression set induces subjects to engage in
on-line processing and to form separate evaluation-
based and attribute-based representations in memory
(Hastie and Park 1986; Kardes 1986; Lichtenstein and
Srull 1985, 1987). Because independent representa-
tions are formed, a lack of correspondence between
judgment and recall is likely to be observed. In con-
trast, a memory set prompts subjects to form an attri-
bute-based representation in memory (no evaluation-
based representation is formed). When memory set
subjects are subsequently asked to evaluate a product,
a judgment is .computed on the basis ofinformation
that is retrieved directly from the attribute-based rep-
resentation. Consequently, a strong judgment-recall
correlation is likely to be observed.
Consistent with this model, significant judgment-
recall correlations were found in memory set condi-
tions (r = .51 and .59 for positive- and negative-WOM
conditions, respectively, p < .05). Moreover, in
impression set conditions, a nonsignificant relation-
ship between judgment and recall was found in the
positive-WOM cell (r = .26, NS). However, in the
impression set-negative WOM cell, a significant cor-
relation between judgment and recall was obtained (r
= .64,> < .05). This unexpected finding implies that
judgments formed in this cell were influenced signif-
icantly by memory for attributes. However, the un-
certainty created by the inconsistency between the at-
tribute versus the WOM information may have
prompted subjects to adjust their judgments toward a
more moderate position. This type ofjudgmental shift
is observed frequently under conditions of uncertainty
because a moderate stance is justified easily and is al-
tered readily as additional information becomes avail-
able (Cialdini et al. 1973; Jaccard and Wood 1988).
Judgment-Recall Correlations/Neutral-Attribute
Conditions. As expected, nonsignificant judgment-
recall correlations were found in impression set con-
ditions {p > .20). Unexpectedly, in memory set con-
ditions, judgment-recall correlations differed as a
function of WOM valence. In the positive-WOM cell,
an inverse relationship between judgment and recall
459
was obtained (r = -.70, p < .05), whereas, in the neg-
ative-WOM cell, the judgment-recall correlation was
not significant (p > .20). Thus, in the positive-WOM
cell, as the number of neutral attributes that could be
recalled increased, less favorable overall judgments
were formed. In the negative-WOM cell, relatively
unfavorable overall judgments were formed regardless
of the number of neutral attributes available from
memory.
Judgment-Recall Correlations/Negative-Attribute
Conditions. Finally, in negative-attribute conditions,
nonsignificant judgment-recall correlations were found
across impression/memory set conditions {p > .20)
and across WOM-valence conditions {p > .20). These
results imply that on-line judgments were formed in
both impression and memory set conditions. This
finding is consistent with previous research demon-
strating that extremely negative information can
prompt spontaneous judgment formation (Bettman
and Weitz 1983; Weiner 1985).
Discussion
Although WOM communications were found to
have a strong impact on product judgments in exper-
iment 1, this effect was reduced when a well-defined
prior impression was available from memory or when
extremely negative attribute information was encoun-
tered. Unexpectedly, a WOM effect on judgment was
found when positive attributes were presented to
impression set subjects. Analyses of the relationship
between judgment and recall, however, suggest that
these subjects failed to form a clear, well-defined
impression ofthe target product in the negative-WOM
condition, presumably because the uncertainty created
by the attribute valence-WOM valence inconsistency
prompted a judgmental shift toward moderation
(Cialdini et al. 1973; Jaccard and Wood 1988).
When extremely negative attributes were presented,
vivid WOM communications had no effect on product
judgments. Because extremely negative information is
perceived as highly diagnostic (experiment 1) and be-
cause diagnostic information can reduce the judg-
mental impact of less diagnostic but more accessible
inputs, judgmental vividness effects were eliminated
completely when extremely negative attribute infor-
mation was provided.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Consistent with the accessibility-diagnosticity model
(Feldman and Lynch 1988; Lynch et al. 1988), the re-
sults suggest that information accessibility mediates
the effects of WOM information on product judgments
(experiment 1). However, information-accessibility ef-
fects on judgment are reduced, when more diagnostic
information, such as prior impressions or extremely
460
negative attribute information, is available (experi-
ment 2). Thus, information accessibility mediates the
effects of vividly presented information on judgment,
and the perceived diagnosticity of other available in-
puts moderates these effects.
The results also imply that judgmental vividness ef-
fects are not as elusive as implied by previous research
(Taylor and Thompson 1982). Robust vividness effects
on judgment were obtained in two experiments em-
ploying two different product classes. Consistent with
the accessibility-diagnosticity model, the results sug-
gest that judgmental vividness effects are not elusive
when (1) the judgment context provides the oppor-
tunity for differential encoding of vivid versus pallid
information, (2) prior impressions are unavailable
from memory, and (3) information having extremely
negative judgmental implications is unavailable for
processing. Many ofthe studies included in Taylor and
Thompson's (1982) highly cited review failed to meet
these criteria, and, consequently, judgmental vividness
effects were unlikely to be observed.
In addition to shedding light on the vividness con-
troversy, the accessibility-diagnosticity model has the
capacity to synthesize and integrate a wide variety of
seemingly disparate judgmental phenomena. For ex-
ample, the results of our experiments suggest that the
vividness effect (Kisielius and Sternthal 1984, 1986),
the perseverance effect (Lord et al. 1979, 1984), and
the negativity effect (Skowronski and Carlston 1987,
1989) can be explained through the accessibility-di-
agnosticity model.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that WOM communi-
cations have a greater impact on product judgments
than less vivid printed infbrmation even when infor-
mation content is held constant. Although the manner
in which information is presented does not affect its
probative value, vividly presented information has a
disproportionate effect on judgment. Furthermore,
consumers are likely to overestimate the diagnosticity
of accessible information because alternative inputs
are likely to be overlooked.
Using the same methodology but a different product
class, experiment 2 showed that the judgmental effects
of accessible WOM information are reduced when
other more diagnostic pieces ofinformation are avail-
able. Consumers trust their own opinions more than
they trust the opinions of others (Hoch and Deighton
1989). Other individuals are likely to exhibit knowl-
edge or reporting biases (see Wood and Eagly 1981),
and, consequently, information provided by other
sources is often ambiguous (i.e., multiple interpreta-
tions are possible). In contrast, self-generated infor-
mation is less likely to be contaminated by knowledge
or reporting biases (although, under certain circum-
stances, self-deception has been observed; see, e.g.,
Berglas and Jones 1978; Gur and Sackeim 1979).
Moreover, selective encoding and selective retrieval
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
processes induce consumers to overestimate the valid-
ity of their prior impressions.
In consumer settings, negative information tends to
be more diagnostic or informative than positive or
neutral information. Negative attributes strongly im-
ply membership in one category (i.e., low quality) to
the exclusion of others, whereas positive or neutral
attributes are more ambiguous with respect to category
membership. Positive and neutral features are asso-
ciated with many high-, medium-, and low-quality
products. Negative features, on the other hand, have
stronger implications for categorization. Even when
many positive features are exhibited (e.g., the soup has
fresh meat, fresh Grade-A potatoes, and fresh vita-
min-rich vegetables), a single extremely negative fea-
ture (e.g., the broth is rancid) can be highly informa-
tive. Consequently, negative-attribute information is
weighed heavily in judgment.
In conclusion, WOM communications often have a
strong impact on product judgments because infor-
mation received in a face-to-face manner is more ac-
cessible than information presented in a less vivid
manner. Although WOM information is highly acces-
sible from memory, its itnpact on judgment is reduced
when more diagnostic information is available. Prior
impressions are easy to interpret, and they influence
encoding and retrieval processes in a manner that re-
duces the correspondence between objective and per-
ceived cue diagnosticity. Consequently, prior beliefs
(as opposed to other possible beliefs) are held with a
high degree of confidence. Similarly, negative infor-
mation tends to suggest one categorization over others.
Information that strongly implies one hypothesis, in-
terpretation, or categorization over other possibilities
is weighed heavily in judgment, regardless of whether
alternative possibilities are improbable or are simply
overlooked.
[Received June 1990. Revised August 1990.]
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