PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.
957 July 12, 1976
REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of
decent human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving
their quality of life;
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the
same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;
WHEREAS, these acts not only undermine the land and housing program of the
government but also defeat the objectives of the New Society, particularly the
promotion of peace and order and the enhancement of the economic, social and
moral condition of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate
subdivision and condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and
that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and manipulations committed in
connection therewith.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order:
Title I
TITLE AND DEFINITIONS
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as THE SUBDIVISION AND
CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE.
Section 2. Definition of Terms When used in this Decree, the following terms shall,
unless the context otherwise indicates, have the following respective meanings:
(a) Person. "Person" shall mean a natural or a juridical person. A juridical
person refers to a business firm whether a corporation, partnership,
cooperative or associations or a single proprietorship.
(b) Sale or sell. "Sale" or "sell" shall include every disposition, or attempt to
dispose, for a valuable consideration, of a subdivision lot, including the
building and other improvements thereof, if any, in a subdivision project or a
condominium unit in a condominium project. "Sale" and "sell" shall also
include a contract to sell, a contract of purchase and sale, an exchange, an
attempt to sell, an option of sale or purchase, a solicitation of a sale, or an
offer to sell, directly or by an agent, or by a circular, letter, advertisement or
otherwise.
A privilege given to a member of a cooperative, corporation, partnership, or
any association and/or the issuance of a certificate or receipt evidencing or
giving the right of participation in, or right to, any land in consideration of
payment of the membership fee or dues, shall be deemed a sale within the
meaning of this definition.
(c) Buy and purchase. The "buy" and "purchase" shall include any contract to
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire for a valuable consideration a
subdivision lot, including the building and other improvements, if any, in a
subdivision project or a condominium unit in a condominium project.
(d) Subdivision project. "Subdivision project" shall mean a tract or a parcel of
land registered under Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential
purposes into individual lots with or without improvements thereon, and
offered to the public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall include
all residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas as well as open
spaces and other community and public areas in the project.
(e) Subdivision lot. "Subdivision lot" shall mean any of the lots, whether
residential, commercial, industrial, or recreational, in a subdivision project.
(f) Complex subdivision plan. "Complex subdivision plan" shall mean a
subdivision plan of a registered land wherein a street, passageway or open
space is delineated on the plan.
(g) Condominium project. "Condominium project" shall mean the entire
parcel of real property divided or to be divided primarily for residential
purposes into condominium units, including all structures thereon.
(h) Condominium unit. "Condominium unit" shall mean a part of the
condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership,
including one or more rooms or spaces located in one or more floors (or part
of parts of floors) in a building or buildings and such accessories as may be
appended thereto.
(i) Owner. "Owner" shall refer to the registered owner of the land subject of a
subdivision or a condominium project.
(j) Developer. "Developer" shall mean the person who develops or improves
the subdivision project or condominium project for and in behalf of the owner
thereof.
(k) Dealer. "Dealer" shall mean any person directly engaged as principal in
the business of buying, selling or exchanging real estate whether on a full-
time or part-time basis.
(l) Broker. "Broker" shall mean any person who, for commission or other
compensation, undertakes to sell or negotiate the sale of a real estate
belonging to another.
(m) Salesman. "Salesman" shall refer to the person regularly employed by a
broker to perform, for and in his behalf, any or all functions of a real estate
broker.
(n) Authority. "Authority" shall mean the National Housing Authority.
Title II
REGISTRATION AND LICENSE TO SELL
Section 3. National Housing Authority The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance
with the provisions of this Decree.
Section 4. Registration of Projects The registered owner of a parcel of land who
wishes to convert the same into a subdivision project shall submit his subdivision
plan to the Authority which shall act upon and approve the same, upon a finding that
the plan complies with the Subdivision Standards' and Regulations enforceable at the
time the plan is submitted. The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a
plan for a condominium project except that, in addition, said Authority shall act upon
and approve the plan with respect to the building or buildings included in the
condominium project in accordance with the National Building Code (R.A. No. 6541).
The subdivision plan, as so approved, shall then be submitted to the Director of
Lands for approval in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 44 of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended by R.A. No. 440): Provided, that it
case of complex subdivision plans, court approval shall no longer be required. The
condominium plan as likewise so approved, shall be submitted to the Register of
Deeds of the province or city in which the property lies and the same shall be acted
upon subject to the conditions and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Section 4 of the Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726).
The owner or the real estate dealer interested in the sale of lots or units, respectively,
in such subdivision project or condominium project shall register the project with the
Authority by filing therewith a sworn registration statement containing the following
information:
(a) Name of the owner;
(b) The location of the owner's principal business office, and if the owner is a
non-resident Filipino, the name and address of his agent or representative in
the Philippines is authorized to receive notice;
(c) The names and addresses of all the directors and officers of the business
firm, if the owner be a corporation, association, trust, or other entity, and of
all the partners, if it be a partnership;
 (d) The general character of the business actually transacted or to be
transacted by the owner; and
(e) A statement of the capitalization of the owner, including the authorized
and outstanding amounts of its capital stock and the proportion thereof which
is paid-up.
The following documents shall be attached to the registration statement:
(a) A copy of the subdivision plan or condominium plan as approved in
accordance with the first and second paragraphs of this section.
(b) A copy of any circular, prospectus, brochure, advertisement, letter, or
communication to be used for the public offering of the subdivision lots or
condominium units;
(c) In case of a business firm, a balance sheet showing the amount and
general character of its assets and liabilities and a copy of its articles of
incorporation or articles of partnership or association, as the case may be,
with all the amendments thereof and existing by-laws or instruments
corresponding thereto.
(d) A title to the property which is free from all liens and encumbrances:
Provided, however, that in case any subdivision lot or condominium unit is
mortgaged, it is sufficient if the instrument of mortgage contains a stipulation
that the mortgagee shall release the mortgage on any subdivision lot or
condominium unit as soon as the full purchase price for the same is paid by
the buyer.
The person filing the registration statement shall pay the registration fees prescribed
therefor by the Authority.
Thereupon, the Authority shall immediately cause to be published a notice of the
filing of the registration statement at the expense of the applicant-owner or dealer, in
two newspapers general circulation, one published in English and another in Pilipino,
once a week for two consecutive weeks, reciting that a registration statement for the
sale of subdivision lots or condominium units has been filed in the National Housing
Authority; that the aforesaid registration statement, as well as the papers attached
thereto, are open to inspection during business hours by interested parties, under
such regulations as the Authority may impose; and that copies thereof shall be
furnished to any party upon payment of the proper fees.
The subdivision project of the condominium project shall be deemed registered upon
completion of the above publication requirement. The fact of such registration shall
be evidenced by a registration certificate to be issued to the applicant-owner or
dealer.
Section 5. License to sell. Such owner or dealer to whom has been issued a
registration certificate shall not, however, be authorized to sell any subdivision lot or
condominium unit in the registered project unless he shall have first obtained a
license to sell the project within two weeks from the registration of such project.
The Authority, upon proper application therefor, shall issue to such owner or dealer of
a registered project a license to sell the project if, after an examination of the
registration statement filed by said owner or dealer and all the pertinent documents
attached thereto, he is convinced that the owner or dealer is of good repute, that his
business is financially stable, and that the proposed sale of the subdivision lots or
condominium units to the public would not be fraudulent.
Section 6. Performance Bond. No license to sell subdivision lots or condominium
units shall be issued by the Authority under Section 5 of this Decree unless the owner
or dealer shall have filed an adequate performance bond approved by said Authority
to guarantee the construction and maintenance of the roads, gutters, drainage,
sewerage, water system, lighting systems, and full development of the subdivision
project or the condominium project and the compliance by the owner or dealer with
the applicable laws and rules and regulations.
The performance bond shall be executed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
and shall authorize the Authority to use the proceeds thereof for the purposes of its
undertaking in case of forfeiture as provided in this Decree.
Section 7. Exempt transactions. A license to sell and performance bond shall not be
required in any of the following transactions:
(a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land among co-
owners and co-heirs.
 (b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser thereof and
any subsequent sale of the same lot.
(c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the account of a
mortgagee in the ordinary course of business when necessary to liquidate a
bona fide debt.
Section 8. Suspension of license to sell. Upon verified complaint by a buyer of a
subdivision lot or a condominium unit in any interested party, the Authority may, in its
discretion, immediately suspend the owner's or dealer's license to sell pending
investigation and hearing of the case as provided in Section 13 hereof.
The Authority may motu proprio suspend the license to sell if, in its opinion, any
information in the registration statement filed by the owner or dealer is or has become
misleading, incorrect, inadequate or incomplete or the sale or offering for a sale of
the subdivision or condominium project may work or tend to work a fraud upon
prospective buyers.
The suspension order may be lifted if, after notice and hearing, the Authority is
convinced that the registration statement is accurate or that any deficiency therein
has been corrected or supplemented or that the sale to the public of the subdivision
or condominium project will neither be fraudulent not result in fraud. It shall also be
lifted upon dismissal of the complaint for lack of legal basis.
Until the final entry of an order of suspension, the suspension of the right to sell the
project, though binding upon all persons notified thereof, shall be deemed
confidential unless it shall appear that the order of suspension has in the meantime
been violated.
Section 9. Revocation of registration certificate and license to sell. The Authority may,
motu proprio or upon verified complaint filed by a buyer of a subdivision lot or
condominium unit, revoke the registration of any subdivision project or condominium
project and the license to sell any subdivision lot or condominium unit in said project
by issuing an order to this effect, with his findings in respect thereto, if upon
examination into the affairs of the owner or dealer during a hearing as provided for in
Section 14 hereof, if shall appear there is satisfactory evidence that the said owner or
dealer:
(a) Is insolvent; or
(b) has violated any of the provisions of this Decree or any applicable rule or
regulation of the Authority, or any undertaking of his/its performance bond; or
(c) Has been or is engaged or is about to engage in fraudulent transactions;
or
(d) Has made any misrepresentation in any prospectus, brochure, circular or
other literature about the subdivision project or condominium project that has
been distributed to prospective buyers; or
(e) Is of bad business repute; or
(f) Does not conduct his business in accordance with law or sound business
principles.
Where the owner or dealer is a partnership or corporation or an unincorporated
association, it shall be sufficient cause for cancellation of its registration certificate
and its license to sell, if any member of such partnership or any officer or director of
such corporation or association has been guilty of any act or omission which would
be cause for refusing or revoking the registration of an individual dealer, broker or
salesman as provided in Section 11 hereof.
Section 10. Registers of subdivision lots and condominium units. A record of
subdivision lots and condominium units shall be kept in the Authority wherein shall be
entered all orders of the Authority affecting the condition or status thereof. The
registers of subdivision lots and condominium units shall be open to public inspection
subject to such reasonable rules as the Authority may prescribe.
Title III
DEALERS, BROKERS AND SALESMEN
Section 11. Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. No real estate dealer,
broker or salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdivision lots or
condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with
the applicable rules of the Authority, including the payment of the prescribed fee, he
shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman upon filing a bond, or
other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the Authority
conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided,
that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the termination of his
employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of
each year. Renewal of registration for the succeeding year shall be granted upon
written application therefor made not less than thirty nor more than sixty days before
the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the
necessity of filing further statements or information, unless specifically required by
the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall be treated as original
applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen
shall be recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the
Authority which shall be open to public inspection.
Section 12. Revocation of registration as dealers, brokers or salesmen. Registration
under the preceding section may be refused or any registration granted thereunder,
revoked by the Authority if, after reasonable notice and hearing, it shall determine
that such applicant or registrant:
1. Has violated any provision of this Decree or any rule or regulation made
hereunder; or
2. Has made a material false statement in his application for registration; or
3. Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with any sale of a
subdivision lot or condominium unit; or
4. Has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business of dealer,
broker, or salesman, as the case may be.
In case of charges against a salesman, notice thereof shall also be given the broker
or dealer employing such salesman.
Pending hearing of the case, the Authority shall have the power to order the
suspension of the dealer's, broker's, of salesman's registration; provided, that such
order shall state the cause for the suspension.
The suspension or revocation of the registration of a dealer or broker shall carry with
it all the suspension or revocation of the registrations of all his salesmen.
Title IV
PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION OF REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE
Section 13. Hearing. In the hearing for determining the existence of any ground or
grounds for the suspension and/or revocation of registration certificate and license to
sell as provided in Section 8 and 9 hereof, the following shall be complied with:
(a) Notice. No such hearing shall proceed unless the respondent is furnished
with a copy of the complaint against him or is notified in writing of the
purpose of such hearing.
(b) Venue. The hearing may be held before the officer or officers designated
by the Authority on the date and place specified in the notice.
(c) Nature of proceeding. The proceedings shall be non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of
law. The Rules of court shall not apply in said hearing except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(d) Power incidental to the hearing. For the purpose of the hearing or other
proceeding under this Decree, the officer or officers designated to hear the
complaint shall have the power to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses,
conduct ocular inspections, take depositions, and require the production of
any book, paper, correspondence, memorandum, or other record which are
deemed relevant or material to the inquiry.
Section 14. Contempt.
(a) Direct contempt. The officer or officers designated by the Authority to
hear the complaint may summarily adjudge in direct contempt any person
guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the said hearing officials
 as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same or of refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so. The person found guilty of direct contempt
under this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding Fifty (P50.00)
Pesos or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days, or both.
(b) Indirect contempt. The officer or officers designated to hear the complaint
may also adjudge any person in indirect contempt on grounds and in the
manner prescribed in Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 15. Decision. The case shall be decided within thirty (30) days from the time
the same is submitted for decision. The Decision may order the revocation of the
registration of the subdivision or condominium project, the suspension, cancellation,
or revocation of the license to sell and/or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of the
performance bond mentioned in Section 6 hereof. In case forfeiture of the bond is
ordered, the Decision may direct the provincial or city engineer to undertake or cause
the construction of roads and of other requirements for the subdivision or
condominium as stipulated in the bond, chargeable to the amount forfeited. Such
decision shall be immediately executory and shall become final after the lapse of 15
days from the date of receipt of the Decision.
Section 16. Cease and Desist Order. Whenever it shall appear to the Authority that
any person is engaged or about to engage in any act or practice which constitutes or
will constitute a violation of the provisions of this Decree, or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, it may, upon due notice and hearing as provided in Section 13 hereof,
issue a cease and desist order to enjoin such act or practices.
Section 17. Registration. All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar
instruments relative to the sale or conveyance of the subdivision lots and
condominium units, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full, shall be
registered by the seller in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the property is situated.
Whenever a subdivision plan duly approved in accordance with Section 4 hereof,
together with the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate of title, is presented to
the Register of Deeds for registration, the Register of Deeds shall register the same
in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended:
Provided, however, that it there is a street, passageway or required open space
delineated on a complex subdivision plan hereafter approved and as defined in this
Decree, the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title covering
the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that except by
way of donation in favor of a city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise
disposed of by the registered owner without the requisite approval as provided under
Section 22 of this Decree.
Section 18. Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner
or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not
be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used
for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective
measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot
or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any,
shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his
installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments
to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit
promptly after full payment thereto;
Section 19. Advertisements. Advertisements that may be made by the owner or
developer through newspaper, radio, television, leaflets, circulars or any other form
about the subdivision or the condominium or its operations or activities must reflect
the real facts and must be presented in such manner that will not tend to mislead or
deceive the public.
The owner or developer shall answerable and liable for the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures or other forms of development represented or promised in brochures,
advertisements and other sales propaganda disseminated by the owner or developer
or his agents and the same shall form part of the sales warranties enforceable
against said owner or developer, jointly and severally. Failure to comply with these
warranties shall also be punishable in accordance with the penalties provided for in
this Decree.
Section 20. Time of Completion. Every owner or developer shall construct and
provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development,
including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the
approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters,
letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance
of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time
as may be fixed by the Authority.
Section 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units
sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon
the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete
compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two
years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or
unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39
of this Decree.
Section 22. Alteration of Plans. No owner or developer shall change or alter the
roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of
subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the
written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the
absence of the latter, by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
Section 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in
a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be
forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the
owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer
may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization
interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.
Section 24. Failure to pay installments. The rights of the buyer in the event of this
failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552.
Where the transaction or contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6552 on August 26, 1972, the defaulting buyer shall be entitled to the
corresponding refund based on the installments paid after the effectivity of the law in
the absence of any provision in the contract to the contrary.
Section 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot
or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required
for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for
the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding
at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall
redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months from
such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and
delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.
Section 26. Realty Tax. Real estate tax and assessment on a lot or unit shall de paid
by the owner or developer without recourse to the buyer for as long as the title has
not passed the buyer; Provided, however, that if the buyer has actually taken
possession of and occupied the lot or unit, he shall be liable to the owner or
developer for such tax and assessment effective the year following such taking of
possession and occupancy.
Section 27. Other Charges. No owner or developer shall levy upon any lot or buyer a
fee for an alleged community benefit. Fees to finance services for common comfort,
security and sanitation may be collected only by a properly organized homeowners
association and only with the consent of a majority of the lot or unit buyers actually
residing in the subdivision or condominium project.
Section 28. Access to Public Offices in the Subdivisions. No owner or developer
shall deny any person free access to any government office or public establishment
located within the subdivision or which may be reached only by passing through the
subdivision.
Section 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision
without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a
public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained
according to the requirement of the government and authorities concerned.
Section 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. The owner or developer of a
subdivision project or condominium project shall initiate the organization of a
homeowners association among the buyers and residents of the projects for the
purpose of promoting and protecting their mutual interest and assist in their
community development.
Section 31. Donations of roads and open spaces to local government. The
registered owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project, upon
completion of the development of said project may, at his option, convey by way of
donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or
municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the
city or municipality concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be
converted to any other purpose or purposes unless after hearing, the proposed
conversion is approved by the Authority.
Section 32. Phases of Subdivision. For purposes of complying with the provisions of
this Decree, the owner or developer may divide the development and sale of the
subdivision into phases, each phase to cover not less than ten hectares. The
requirement imposed by this Decree on the subdivision as a whole shall be deemed
imposed on each phase.
Section 33. Nullity of waivers. Any condition, stipulation, or provision in contract of
sale whereby any person waives compliance with any provision of this Decree or of
any rule or regulation issued thereunder shall be void.
Section 34. Visitorial powers. This Authority, through its duly authorized
representative may, at any time, make an examination into the business affairs,
administration, and condition of any person, corporation, partnership, cooperative, or
association engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots and condominium
units. For this purpose, the official authorized so to do shall have the authority to
examine under oath the directors, officers, stockholders or members of any
corporation, partnership, association, cooperative or other persons associated or
connected with the business and to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum in
relation to any investigation that may arise therefrom.
The Authority may also authorize the Provincial, City or Municipal Engineer, as the
case may be, to conduct an ocular inspection of the project to determine whether the
development of said project conforms to the standards and specifications prescribed
by the government.
The books, papers, letters, and other documents belonging to the person or entities
herein mentioned shall be open to inspection by the Authority or its duly authorized
representative.
Section 35. Take-over Development. The Authority, may take over or cause the
development and completion of the subdivision or condominium project at the
expenses of the owner or developer, jointly and severally, in cases where the owner
or developer has refused or failed to develop or complete the development of the
project as provided for in this Decree.
The Authority may, after such take-over, demand, collect and receive from the buyers
the installment payments due on the lots, which shall be utilized for the development
of the subdivision.
Section 36. Rules and Regulations. The Authority shall issue the necessary
standards, rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the provisions of
this Decree. Such standards, rules and regulations shall take effect immediately after
their publication three times a week for two consecutive weeks in any newspaper of
general circulation.
Section 37. Deputization of law enforcement agencies. The Authority may deputize
the Philippine Constabulary or any law enforcement agency in the execution of its
final orders, rulings or decisions.
Section 38. Administrative Fines. The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not
exceeding ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any
rule or regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable
through writs of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 39. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this
Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, That
in the case of corporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President,
Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the
business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/or the
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
Section 40. Liability of controlling persons. Every person who directly or indirectly
controls any person liable under any provision of this Decree or of any rule or
regulation issued thereunder shall be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person unless the controlling person acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.

Section 41. Other remedies. The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under
existing laws.

Section 42. Repealing clause. All laws, executive orders, rules and regulations or
part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 43. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon its approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-six.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6552
AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO BUYERS OF REAL ESTATE ON
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS. (Rep. Act No. 6552)
Section 1. This Act shall be known as the "Realty Installment Buyer Act."
Section 2. It is hereby declared a public policy to protect buyers of real estate on
installment payments against onerous and oppressive conditions.
Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate
on installment payments, including residential condominium apartments but excluding
industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants under Republic Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as amended by Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-three hundred eighty-nine, where the buyer has paid at least two years of
installments, the buyer is entitled to the following rights in case he defaults in the
payment of succeeding installments:
(a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within the
total grace period earned by him which is hereby fixed at the rate of one
month grace period for every one year of installment payments made:
Provided, That this right shall be exercised by the buyer only once in every
five years of the life of the contract and its extensions, if any.
(b) If the contract is canceled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty per cent of
the total payments made, and, after five years of installments, an additional
five per cent every year but not to exceed ninety per cent of the total
payments made: Provided, That the actual cancellation of the contract shall
take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and
upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the
computation of the total number of installment payments made.lawphi1™
Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller
shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the
installment became due.
If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the
seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice
of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.
Section 5. Under Section 3 and 4, the buyer shall have the right to sell his rights or
assign the same to another person or to reinstate the contract by updating the
account during the grace period and before actual cancellation of the contract. The
deed of sale or assignment shall be done by notarial act.
Section 6. The buyer shall have the right to pay in advance any installment or the full
unpaid balance of the purchase price any time without interest and to have such full
payment of the purchase price annotated in the certificate of title covering the
property.
Section 7. Any stipulation in any contract hereafter entered into contrary to the
provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6, shall be null and void.
Section 8. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, no other
provision shall be affected thereby.lawphi1™
Section 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: August 26, 1972.
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and G.R. No. 157537
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR,
SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, (the property).
BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA,
CONSOLACION, LEONORA and Present:
ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and
represented by CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, mother of the petitioners.[2] On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B.
LEONORA B. GO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
Petitioners, BERSAMIN, Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of
DEL CASTILLO, and 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00.[3] On March 2,
-versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property,[4] but Servacio refused to
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, [5] they
Respondents. Promulgated: sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte
September 7, 2011 (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse
without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of
17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.).
Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver,[1] whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null
and void.[6]
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.[7]
On October 3, 2002,[8] the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property
of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there
were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina);
that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being
heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when
the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was
grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.[9]
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that:
xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the
other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is
valid.[10] Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the matter as authority, [11] the RTC
opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
says [sic]
Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the
spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the
community property in order to pay outstanding obligation
of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner
and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court
for the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any
sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property
affected without said formalities shall be null and void,
except as regards the portion that belongs to the vendor
as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the
liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited
only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the
particular property involved, but not to the corpus of the
property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to
mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal of the
conjugal property without the required formality, is not
however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity
so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after
liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving
spouse who made the contract. [underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on
the provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the
alienation by the surviving spouse of the community property that
jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made by the
surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly
void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be
valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the
vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the
surviving spouse of a portion of the community property that will
eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically there is
no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the
17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than
what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get
as their share in the final partition of the property. So the sale is still
valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration[13] prompted the petitioners to
appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and
that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito
both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid

to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and
that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering
that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.[14]
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this
Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute
that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil
Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the
other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.[16]The ensuing implied
ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas
share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or
abstract quota in Martas share.[18]Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.[19]Consequently, the sale by Protacio,
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.[20]This result
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest).[21]
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed,
such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the
shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each of the heirs
had already received a certain allotted portion at the time of the sale, and that
Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them.
However, they did not present any public document on the allocation among her
heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they aver
that the conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly,
pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether
the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might
not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about
is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court
of Appeals,[23] to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner
is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of
the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-
owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common
property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-
owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-
owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale
of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx[24]
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs
of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The
following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really
would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said
transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after
liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction
 is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus
alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the
conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife,
then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that
corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined
only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a
disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it
has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made
by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is
void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to
that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold
become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other
heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by
prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-
11764, Jan.31, 1959.)[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
REYNALDO BALOLOY and G.R. No. 157767 property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds
ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE, issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his name. The respondent
Petitioners, later discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the property of his
father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to form part of Lot
Present: No. 3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent, even if the
PUNO, J., Chairman, residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,* Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
CALLEJO, SR., prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous, uninterrupted and
TINGA, and open possession of the property in the concept of owners for more than 60 years.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing,
Promulgated: judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
ALFREDO HULAR,
Respondent. September 9, 2004 a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in
x--------------------------------------------------x question;

DECISION b) Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing

plaintiff in his peaceful possession in the land in question;

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51081, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871.
c) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in
question, and to declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper,
form, document or proceeding the defendants may have, as null
and void and without any effect whatsoever as far as the land in
question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of the
plaintiff;
d) In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in
favor of the plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned;

The antecedents are as follows:
On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of
real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy,
namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed
Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that his father, Astrologo
Hular, was the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Sitio Page, Biriran,
Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part of
Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado Baloloy,
the petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over the
e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as
attorneys fee plus P500.00 for every appearance or hearing of
his lawyer in court; P1,500.00 as consultation fee; P5,000.00 as
incidental litigation expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable
in the premises.[3]
 The Evidence of the Respondent
The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana
Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran,
Juban, Sorsogon, designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major
portion of the property, where a house of strong materials was constructed, was
agricultural, while the rest was residential. The respondent also averred that the
Spouses Estopin declared the property in their names under Tax Declaration No.
4790. On the north of the agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to
Biriran, while north of the residential portion was a creek (canal) and the property of
Iluminado.
When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale[4] on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot
No. 3347, which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of
Astrologo Hular, married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 1961,
Lagata executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] over the residential portion of the
property with an area of 287 square meters, including the house constructed thereon,
in favor of Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent, then resided
in the property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hulars permission to
construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter
agreed. In l977, Lorenza Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential land in the
latters name under Tax Declaration No. 6841.[6]
Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square
meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North,
Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Page; West, Pedro Grepal and
Esteban Grepal.[7]Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on lands in
Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following
boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino Estopin;
West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot No. 3353
and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to
4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under Tax
Declaration No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion)
Alejandro Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.[8]
On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No.
3353 with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado.[9] The latter
declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5359. [10] Iluminado filed
an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of Lot No.
3353 on January 5, 1960.[11]He indicated in his application that the property was not
occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public land. In support
thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased about one-
half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of absolute sale attached to said
affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-half portion, but for economic
reasons, no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that the
improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees.[12] The Bureau of Lands
processed the application in due course.
In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 near
the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his family, including his children, forthwith
resided in said house.
On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources
approved Iluminados application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No.
3353 with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540
was thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.[13]
On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale
over a portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito
Hije, the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminados children.[14]
Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his
house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a
big portion of Lot No. 3353.[15]
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased
father. When Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his
children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among
others,[16] who continued to reside in their house.[17]
Sometime in l991, the respondents house helper was cleaning the backyard,
but was prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their
father Iluminado owned the land where the respondents house was located. To
determine the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of
Balbedina, Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a
Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353[18]showing that the house of Iluminado was
constructed on Lot No. 3353[19] near the road behind the houses owned by Astrologo
and Alfredo.[20] The engineer discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata
to Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only.[21]
In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that
Iluminados house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter
purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular
purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion
of Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that the
respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and
OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and even if the respondent
was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions had long since
prescribed. The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court
to DISMISS this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof,
and/or DECIDE it in favor of the defendants by UPHOLDING the
sanctity of OCT No. P-16540 and ordering plaintiff to:
1. RESPECT defendants proprietary rights and interests on the
property in question covered by OCT No. P-16540;
2. VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set
foot on it ever again;
3. PAY defendants:
a) MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH;
b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED
PROFITS at P1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED
UP TO THE TIME OF PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL
RATE OF INTEREST;
c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00
d) ATTYS FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES
of P100,000.00; and
e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.
DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies
consistent with law and equity.[22]
The Evidence for the Petitioners
Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his
house on Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the
presence of his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353
certified by a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No. 3353
had an area of 9,302 square meters.[23]
As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on
February 7, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy
siblings and those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353. [24] In the
said sketch plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No.
3347 had an area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hulars claim over the
property, the petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with
the Municipal Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
respondent. The falloof the decision reads:
a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question,
consisting of 1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled
to the peaceful possession thereof;
b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far
as the land in question is concerned within fifteen (15) days
counted from the finality of the decision, failing in which, the
Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to execute the necessary
document of reconveyance of the title in favor of the plaintiff
after an approved survey plan is made;
c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in
question at their own expense within fifteen (15) days after
the decision has become final;
d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. P5,000.00 as
incidental litigation expenses;
e/ To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[25]
The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area of 1,405
square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin owned, and
which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court
also held that Iluminado committed fraud in securing the free patent and the title for
the property in question, and that when Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of
absolute sale on the residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it
formed part of Lot No. 3353.It further held that the action of the plaintiff to nullify the
title and patent was imprescriptible.
The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit Tax
Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of
Astrologo Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that Lot
No. 3347 was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been mooted by
its decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial
court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Present Petition
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their
petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are:
(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the
respondent in the trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners
for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for
reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and for damages; and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property
through acquisitive prescription.
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of
the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this
Court.[26]
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, to
declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its
reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019
and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and
(c) damages and attorneys fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by
Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his
parents died intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his
siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil
Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment
of the debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-
participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and
enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner
may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. [27] Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such
judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner
thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the
subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were
aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the
prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated
to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent
sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent
No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the
Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.[28] The absence of the respondents
siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof,
including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.[29]
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that
he failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and
that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the
requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under
a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the
evidence of that of his opponent.[30] He who claims a better right to real estate
property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also the identity
thereof.[31] In Huy v. Huy,[32] we held that where a property subject of controversy is
duly registered under the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such
title should be given weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens
Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name appears therein.[33]Such holder is entitled to the possession of the
property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was
coconut, and not residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of
absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of
Astrologo Hular, she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter
constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased
from Balbedina, now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along
with their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed their
houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father Iluminado; hence,
they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit that,
whether the house of Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the
property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered
by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject
property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In
contrast, the RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale
executed by Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666
square meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot
was actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square
meters to Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square
meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot No. 3347
was declared as part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The
trial court concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute
sale executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of
Lot No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with
an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less.[35] When she sold the property to
Martiniano Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the
property of Lino Estopin.There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the
south and of Lino Estopin on the north. In the
meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was established between the
property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino Estopin on the north. Thereafter,
a cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The
property of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of
Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an
area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the
construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, which was a part of Lot No. 3353,
was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina declared, under Tax Declaration No.
391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651 square meters and was coconut
land[36] and that his property was bounded on the south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin
declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for taxation purposes, in which he stated that
his property was bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran. [37] Clearly, then,
Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary the trail (road) going to Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that
Biriran. Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do
you confirm that?
Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an A Yes, Sir.
area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951. [38] Under the
deed of absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) Q From whom?
owned by Lino Estopin.[39]The English translation of the deed of sale attached as A From Irene Griarte.
page 85 to the RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court relied
upon, is incorrect. Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the A I was not there.
boundary of the property on the south is con camino, Lino Estopin, while the English
version of the deed, indicates that the property is bounded on the south by Lino Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from
Estopin. Being an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties Irene Griarte?
therefore should prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in A No, Sir.
Tax Declaration No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south
by a trail,[40] and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin. Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually
drafted and executed?
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how A There was.
the Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondents reliance on
the testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Q Have you seen the document?
Porfirio Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and A I did not see but there was a document.
the deed of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a
Astrologo Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced. document, is that it?
A In my belief there was a document.
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent,
Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not
that there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale: see a document?
A I insist there was a document.
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a
way back in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; 41 document?
to 44? A Well, during the sale that document was used.
A 1941.
Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document,
purchase? but I insist there was a document.
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property.
Q Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that there
was a document when you contend that you did not see any?
 A There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a
document. You cannot sell a property without document?
(sic)
Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.
Q But you did not see any document?
Atty. Diesta:
Already answered.
Witness:
A I did not see.
Atty. Dealca:
Q You said that that document was used when the property was sold
by Lino Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .
A In 1961. Yes.[41]
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even
an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure
to adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim that his
father acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must
prevail.[42]
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax
declarations over the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino
Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961.
The documents are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed
ownership over the disputed property and that Lino Estopin acquired the same from
her. After all, such tax declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of
ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
acquisitive prescription.[43]
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790
covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim
that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the
name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In
the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to
the respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the boundary of
the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the
petitioners claim.[44] Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the
ground that it was mooted by its decision.
Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of
Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a
total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his
name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin
and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminados claim of ownership of
Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A propos is our
ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45]
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in
assessing the totality of the evidence
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants
and possessors of the subject lot just because it is adjacent to their
titled property. Precisely, the boundaries of defendants titled property
were determined, delineated and surveyed during the cadastral
survey of Dipolog and thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in
order that the extent of their property will be known and fixed. Since
the subject lot was already found to be outside their titled property,
defendants have no basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots for that
matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of the cadastral survey as a
process of determining the exact boundaries of adjoining properties
will be defeated.
Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre
and Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and
 possession over the adjacent subject lot.Examining said title, we
note that: (1) the cadastral survey of Dipolog was conducted from
January, 1923 to November 1925; (2) defendants titled property was
one of those lots surveyed and this was designated as Lot No. 2623;
(3) during the survey, it was already determined and known that Lot
No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast, southeast, southwest and
west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our narration of facts, the
subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which was originally
identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the
subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357
was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment
rendered on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral
Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923
when the cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos.
2623 and 4443 were already determined and delineated. Since the
subject lot was surveyed to be part of Lot No. 4443, it means that
during that time defendants predecessors-in-interest never claimed
ownership or possession over the subject lot. Otherwise, they would
have complained so that the subject lot could be excluded from Lot
No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent lots. It is
obvious then that defendants predecessors only claimed Lot No.
2623 and they pursued their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to
them. The contention of defendants that they and their
predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed the subject lot
since time immemorial therefore is not true.[46]
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata
sold to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[47] we ruled that:
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and
enforceable and that it was perfected at the very moment that the
parties agreed upon the thing which was the object of the sale and
upon the price. The parties herein had agreed on the parcel of land
that petitioner would purchase from respondent PNR, and the same
was described therein; thus, petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set
aside the technical description in this agreement and insist that it is
the legal owner of the property erroneously described in the
certificate of title.Petitioner can only claim right of ownership over the
parcel of land that was the object of the deed of sale and nothing
else.[48]
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana
Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only a
portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is
understandable, since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by
Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana
Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not
own. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the
respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their
right to cross-examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative
weight. The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale which he
(Balbedina) executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said
affidavit, it was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951
only a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under the said
deed of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of 4,651 square meters.
The affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms
of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
...
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in
favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio
Notary Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Rodolfo P. Cunanan[49] cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even
buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a
portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under
the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners.

Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347
under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the
property was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.

Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of
Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition
to his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free
patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of

the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent
is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, G.R. No. 165427 1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St.,
Petitioner, Present: Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the
name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan.[5]
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson, 2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave.,
BRION, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the
- versus - BERSAMIN, name of Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.[6]
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ. 3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Promulgated: the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan
Respondent. Samoy.[7]
March 21, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the
DECISION name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy.[8]

5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan
against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had
affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties
involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered
in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy. [9]
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon
City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located
in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel
St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique
Heights.[10]

This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in
1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until
petitioner gave birth to respondents son on October 12, 1979.[3]
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. [4] Five
parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are
briefly described as follows:
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part
ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.[11] Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to respondent.[12]However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked
together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting
to P15,500,000.00.[15] Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioners claim of
cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds
without any contribution from petitioner.[17]
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for
almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife
usually in the wee hours of the morning.[18] Petitioner likewise claimed that they
acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she
and respondent established.[19]
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from
his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions. [20] He
countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with
petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal
wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife
was then a heavy gambler.[21] Respondent added that he also purchased the said
properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or
construction of a new building.[22]
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.[23] In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give
considerable weight to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired
not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share. [24]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indivisoowner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial
courts decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral
attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper
to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.[25]
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal,
explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title
covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather
than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in
the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court
determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties itself an
issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-
ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for
partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to
subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to
the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said
principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the
admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the
parties name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of
reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make
the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action
involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-
owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants
whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition
may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first,
the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property
sought to be partitioned and, second assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the
court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason
that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without
first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely
what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellants
claim of co-ownership.[26]
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains
an admission against respondents interest as to the existence
of co-ownership between the parties.
 III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere
expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving
claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot
be outweighed by respondents self-serving assertion to the
contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.[27]
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel
has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate
courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said
matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the
general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Courts jurisdiction in
petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The
issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on
the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was
collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-
ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we
explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises
and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that
event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second
stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself
and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same
is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of
co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even
lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.[31]
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued
over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.[33] The certificate
referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses title with the
certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used.[35]
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of
ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in
the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the
registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over
the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. [37]Needless to say,
registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence
thereof.
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial partition agreement
serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have
admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the
negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts
alleged by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of
law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.[39]
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of
questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the
right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own
interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive
whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the
rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.[40]
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters.
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she
intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial
courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Unlike the trial court, we do
not commiserate with respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent
was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest
as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. But we note that in the
first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a
right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of representing himself
and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and
escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but
himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of
the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole
owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may
have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees in
respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONOR B. CRUZ, G.R. No. 164110
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 12, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] dated September
16, 2003and the Resolution[2] dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69250.The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision[3] dated October 22, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed
the Decision[4] dated September 20, 1999 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Taal, Batangas ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a portion of
the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners
of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay
Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house
intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.[6]
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the
property and was surprised to see a part of respondents house intruding unto a
portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent
to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their
property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.[7]
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry
against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in
favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to
justify defendants construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.[9]The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant or any person acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver
the possession of the area illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering
the defendant to pay plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees of
P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTCs ruling
in a Decision dated October 22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed]
from is hereby affirmed intoto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTCs decision. The
Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner
Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which
gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.[12] The Court of Appeals decision further
held that petitioners remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different
recourse with the appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October 2001
as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court of Taal, Batangas, Branch 86, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is
 entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as
Civil Case No. 71-T.
SO ORDERED.[13]
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-
OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE
RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE
PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS
ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF
THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE
CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE
OTHER CO-OWNER.[14]
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF
SIMPLE STRATEGY.[15]
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of
Appeals decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner
of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property
warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that
person.
In her memorandum,[16] petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge
of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a
basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to
any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum[17] counters that the
complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not
through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further
argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not
just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of
co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who
was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held
that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to
another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to
devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common,
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly
prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate
relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in
such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the
construct a house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co- premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25,
ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the
their rights. construction.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-
owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of
an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19] The construction of a
house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling
under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16,
2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69250 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs
against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right
to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification through strategy or stealth.

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because

respondents entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the
consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this
sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with
co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into
the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could
be categorized as possession by stealth.[20]Moreover, respondents act of getting only
the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to
stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she
utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts
constitute forcible entry.

Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the petitioner learned about it.[21] Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it
was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the
 [G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]
LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S.
ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and
VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well
as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned
by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez
married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single,
Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. [1] On 20
February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private
respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have
been executed on 23 June 1995[2] by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.[3] Petitioner
claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently
refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an
action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br.
49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private
respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and
the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in
the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda of appeal.Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor even
inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading
with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of
the MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon
petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house
without any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner
was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the houses
toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who
failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the
Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On
18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the
acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the
specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court
must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to
a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and
(b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
 Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to
this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to
effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding.[4]
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the
courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before
them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice.[5] Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on mere technicalities.[6]
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of
petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.[7] Under
the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records that counsel was
negligent in not adequately protecting his clients interest, which necessarily calls for a
liberal construction of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals - [8]
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation
where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to
appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has
been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now
constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and
review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements
that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[9]
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural
infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides,
substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the
present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any partition
agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in
question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the
dispute on the property held in common.
In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco[10] we held:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked
into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the
courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or
unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for
one lawyer to sell ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every
process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also
a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-
ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the
notion of co-ownership[11] was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this
controversy in the interest of substantial justice.Certiorari should therefore be granted
to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which
two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically
divided.[12] Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private right of ownership,
which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things
subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to
which it refers is one and the same.[13]
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-
owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object
which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects,
and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations
of the co-owners.[14]
the Deed of Absolute Salevoluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected.Partition needs to be effected to protect her
right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia
Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No.
289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the
PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to
effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion
appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of
the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and
he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.[15]
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-

ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the
properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.[16]

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner

can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may
validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-
owners.[18] But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate
part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by
a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.[19]

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
 [G.R. No. 110644. October 30, 1998]
THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, represented by Lucio Salamat and
Danilo Salamat, VALENTA DIZON GARCIA, represented by Raymundo
D. Garcia, Jr. as Attorney-in-Fact, THE HEIRS OF ANSELMA REYES
DIZON, represented by Catalina Dizon Espinosa, petitioners,
vs. NATIVIDAD DIZON TAMAYO, THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO DIZON,
represented by Angela R. Dizon, THE HEIRS OF GAUDENCIO DIZON,
represented by Maria Dizon Jocson, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children
Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the
properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 10384.[1]
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to
his sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document
bearing the signatures of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses. [2]
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum
of P4,000 to his sister Salud. The sale was evidenced by a notarized document which
bore the signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as
witnesses.[3] Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951 leaving his daughters Priscila D.
Rivera and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial
partition of real properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by the refusal
of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of
the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon among his heirs. Respondents refusal
stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of land covered by OCT
10384 where she presently resides, claiming that her father donated it to her
sometime in 1936 with the conformity of the other heirs. The subject property is also
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10376 in the name of
respondent.
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the
deceased Agustin Dizon to herein respondent partook of the nature of a donation
which required the observance of certain formalities set by law. Nevertheless, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of Agustin Dizon is in order, let
a project of partition be drawn pursuant to Sec 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court assigning
to each heir the specific share to which he is entitled taking into consideration the
disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon Salamat and the adjudication of Lot 2557,
Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D owned by Natividad Dizon Tamayo, together with the
improvements thereon, in her favor and the house owned by Valenta Dizon Garcia,
executing, if necessary, proper instruments of conveyance for confirmation and
approval by the Court.
Parties are enjoined to draw the prospect of partition as equitably and equally as
possible with the least inconvenience and disruption of those in possession or in
actual occupation of the property. Should the parties fail to come up with an
acceptable project of partition, the Court will appoint commissioners as authorized by
Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court, who will be guided by the dispositive portion hereof.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the partition are to be shared
equally by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT
10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while
respondent claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the consent
of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent Natividad presented a private
document of conformity which was allegedly signed and executed by her elder
brother, Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it is
marred by the unexplained erasures and alterations.
 The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC, stated that
notwithstanding the unexplained erasures and alterations, a cursory reading of the
signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that
there was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin Dizon to Natividad Dizon
Tamayo[4] in 1936.
The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by Eduardo, of the oral
donation of the subject land made by his father to respondent Natividad, in 1936,
coupled with the tax declaration and payment of taxes in respondents name would
show that the trial court did not err in ruling that the subject land should pertain to
Natividad Tamayo as inheritance from her parents.
We reverse.
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to
another cannot take effect as a donation unless embodied in a public document.
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a
public document.Moreover, the document which was presented by respondent in
support of her claim that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a
mere private document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother,
Eduardo in 1956.[5] It may not be amiss to point out that the brothers Eduardo and
Gaudencio had already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon
Salamat even before 1950.
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said document and
made the dubious observation that x x x a cursory reading of the signed statement of
Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, shows that there was an oral
donation x x x.
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly
satisfy the requirements of the rule on ancient documents on accounts of
unexplained alterations.
An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30)
years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion.[6]
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred
by unexplained erasures and alterations. While the document was originally penned
in black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the number
fifty-six (56) to make it appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in
1956. Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black pentel pen and the three
other signatures[7] of the alleged witnesses to the execution of the document at the
lower portion of the document were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean that
the witnesses attested to the veracity of the document 5 years earlier, if the
document was executed in 1956 or 15 years later, if we are to give credence to
respondents claim, that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of the
signatories, namely, Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as
witnesses two days after the death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier
mentioned, had already sold his hereditary rights to his elder sister Salud in 1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent,
albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it is true
that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into title by
prescription,[8] it is well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the property. It
is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-
owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with
each owner being a trustee for each other[9] and possession of a co-owner shall not
be regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them. Mere
actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was
adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
 In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals,[10] we had occasion to state that a
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the
property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon and
the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not
borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession
which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-
owners.
x x x x x x x x x.[13]
It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal
acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire ownership over said property through
acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely allowed her sister
Valenta to build a house on the lot[14] is pure hearsay as respondent herself could
have testified on the matter but chose not to.

The elements in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to ouster cestui que trustor other co-owners (2) that such
positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.[11]
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar. There are
two houses standing on the subject property. One is the house where respondent
presently resides while the other is a house built by respondents sister Valenta.
Records show that the house on Lot 227 where the respondent lives is actually the
ancestral house of the Dizons although respondent has remodelled it, constructed a
piggery and has planted trees thereon.[12] Respondent herself testified:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, who is in the possession of this particular residential land in Bo. San
Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the
name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376
is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not
conclusive evidence of ownership.[15]
As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned
lot, the parties should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states that:
Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and
reimbursements for expenses made. x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Lot
2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384 is
hereby declared to belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A I am in possession of that land, Sir.

Q Do you have your residential house there?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that you have your residential house there, since when have you
stayed there?

A I was born there, Sir.

Q And you are staying there up to the present?

A Yes, sir.
 In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: G.R. No. 161720 heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria,
ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R. Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria
RENTINO, LUCIA RESTAR, RODOLFO Present: Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA
R. RAMOS, MANUEL RESTAR, NENITA R. PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman, In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint
BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,* Affidavit[1] he executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
ROSELLE R. MATORRE, POLICARPIO CORONA, Declaration No. 6696[2] in Restars name covering a 5,918[3] square meter parcel of
RESTAR and ADOLFO RESTAR CARPIO MORALES, and land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ. the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his
- versus - name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.
HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON, namely:
RUDY R. CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restars
NILDA C. JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No.
and NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF 11134[4] in his name.
PERPETUA R. STA. MARIA, namely
GEORGE STA. MARIA, LILIA M. On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta.
MANIAGO, DERLY M. CONCEPCION, Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores surviving
GERVY STA. MARIA, DORY M. INDULO; sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a
HEIRS OF MARIA R. ROSE, namely: Complaint[5] against Flores heirs for partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of
TERESITA R. MALOCO, ROLANDO ROSE, documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction before the Regional
EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA R. Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.
PASTRANA, DOMINICA RESTAR- Flores brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being
RELOJERO and PACIENCIA RESTAR unwilling co-plaintiffs.
MANARES,
Respondents. The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores,
Promulgated: they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to
November 22, 2005 1991; after Flores death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to
hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, to which they (the plaintiffs)
agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be
xx- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xx divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the
defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners
thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.

DECISION By Answer[6] filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores
claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more
than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And
CARPIO MORALES, J.: they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores
death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance
her childrens education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already
finished their respective courses.[7]
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the
new Tax Declaration in 1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands
situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of
their father Restar;[8] and an extra-judicial partition was subsequently executed on
September 28, 1973 by Restars heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc,
dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. [9]
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,[10] alleged that the complaint did
not state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the
partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer [11] acknowledged
Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters,
was sold to him as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981. [12] He thus
prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot among Restars
heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores. [13]
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores share in Restars
estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the
trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute
repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by
prescription.[14]
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him,
the trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores signature in the purported
Deed of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the
parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been executed,
Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his name
in a straight manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents
dated 1980 was crooked, and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores
wifes signature which read Esmea in the deed, and not as Esmenia.[15]
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999.[16]
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate
court, by Decision of October 29, 2002.[17] reversed the decision of the trial court, it
finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the
lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance
to them by Restar.
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his
other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there
a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that
barred the
plaintiffs claim of ownership.[18]
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately
take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest
brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his childrens
education.[19]
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by
Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial courts rejection thereof.
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED
in so far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are
concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant Policarpio
Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 3, dated June 30, 1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said
court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by
adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686,
is hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants
Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES
RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
 HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES
RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS
1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE
CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS.[20]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
xxx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-
owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription[21] where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership.[22]
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title,
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.
Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by
extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate
court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record. [23]
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply
support petitioners claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had
been duly met.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners
of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however,
much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the
complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and
exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in
1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in
his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot.
And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the
adverse claim.[24]
 Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article
1137 of the New Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval.
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar
adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from
his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one
Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to
have the land declared in his name. It was admitted by the parties
during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of
Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that
from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar
(Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by
Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one
parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and
Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit 20). If they were
able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the
inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the
inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that
time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar,
were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial
partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all
the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of
29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed
the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after
Flores death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse
possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax
declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive
prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse
possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the
action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and
his heirs. [25]
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession,
they constitute evidence of great weight[26] and can be the basis of a claim of
ownership through prescription.[27]
As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the
produce of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.
[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas
each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few
gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of
palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at
least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for
cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole
7/8 share of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at
the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan.[28]
Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of
facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect,
they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting
the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs:
the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and
possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and
irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and
continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.
And Flores adverse possession was continued by his heirs.
The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to
immediately take legal action to protect their rights forbearance toward Flores and/or
his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their childrens
education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not
any of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed
their college education in 1977?

The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more
than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the
concept of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted
or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence,
he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is
unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial
court is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.