1
III.
A. 1. JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. VERANOAC NO. 8198, JULY 15, 2014
FACTS:
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the “Alabang Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. In
a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges were dropped
for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to
ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of them case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in
investigations of the drug trade. This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during
one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three
clients using the letterhead of the DOJ. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as
founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of
complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly
irregular and unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use
the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the
bar. For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed
disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it
to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government
prosecutor. Atty. Lozano’s verified Complaint-Affidavit was filed with the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP. The Commissioner noted that both
complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of Jimenez and
Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges. However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ
Secretary. This act of “feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly
irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the
same or any similar action.
HELD:
After a careful review of the records, we agree with the IBP in finding
reasonable grounds to hold respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the
provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner, states that “a lawyer shall rely
upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.” We believe that other
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in
the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a
member of the bar. The statements and others made during the hearing establish
respondent’s admission that 1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary
despite the fact that the case was still pending before the latter; and
2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on
official DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in
view of “expediting the case. ”The way respondent conducted himself
manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from
a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively
avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence , the outcome
of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith in the judicial process is diluted. Rule
1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule
15.06, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.” The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a
lawyer “to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness. ”Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause
must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to
remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short
of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap
on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense. Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in
relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately.
2. A.C. No. 10579 – Legal Ethics – Borrowing From Clients Not Appropriate
Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a
realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He
also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge

and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s
demands.
On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his
personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being
prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s
negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out that the
filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang
was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her
the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative
complaint against Agtang.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to
return the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed
from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for
three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.
HELD:
No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light.
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that
“a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than
the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value
of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In
other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and
even had the temerity that it was all the client’s idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various
amounts from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not
deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster.
2
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his
client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from
Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to
complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to
the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other
judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise
would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases
are filed directly with the Court.

3. A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules
on Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed by
the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen)
against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a
notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing
notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the
requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never
commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform
notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission,
however, was never renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence
supporting their allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of
notarization in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan
and Mortgage Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before
Atty. Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale,3 dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two
Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009,
notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt,5 dated January 24,
2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial
authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas
(Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed
the same to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita)
against Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty.
Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented
3
before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned
to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that
a certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents
for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive
Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint
against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-
Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial
Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and
thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge
conducted a hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their
letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that
the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas
were not his secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that
Atty. Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to
December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he
was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty.
Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he
performed notarial functions without commission and recommended that he be
fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the
recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows
that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just
beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also
proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section
11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the
commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not
commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must be
emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the
court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules
on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, at all times.13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary
action for notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an
expired commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by
the Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In
Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being
commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after the
expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified
from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired
commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed
notarial work in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan
without the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty
insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as
notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years.
Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn
4
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he
could not have complied with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the
Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that
time. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation
of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate
administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent
or in acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and
to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through
the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the
respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain
Atty. Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is
ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report
and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
4. FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving
his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services
included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC. Atty. Guico
asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Chu called Atty.
Guico to inform him that he had raised P300,000.00 for the purpose. On that
occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00,
which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office. The amount was received without issuing
any receipt.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00
from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC?
RULING OF THE IBP: IBP found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu. and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of
his act of extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt
for the legal profession.
RULING OF THE COURT:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant
to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant
evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as
penalty.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his
witnesses, especially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft
decision that had been printed on used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office,
sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by
demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision.
In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal
Profession. Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his
professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others,
and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment,
because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain
faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception,
5
including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients
and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the
Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S.
GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02,
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
5. Antonina S. Sosa Vs. Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza; A.C. No. 8776; March 23, 2015
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel
V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) filed on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms.
Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising
from non-payment of debt.[1]
This Court, in a Resolution dated April 18, 2012, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2]
On May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation. The
IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law for six (6) months,
likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt with legal interest.[3]
On December 10, 2013, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution and the records of the case.[4]
The Factual Background
Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of twenty-five
thousand pesos (P25,000.00) to be paid not later than September 25, 2006. They
agreed that a penalty or collection charge of ten percent (10%) per month shall
accrue in case of default.[5]
To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note
and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.[6]
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon demand to
pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated check. She acceded and

deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty. Mendoza’s promise that he would
later pay. The check was subsequently returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally
deposited it sometime in October 2006; it was “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.”
Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera (Atty.
Cabrera), to legally address Atty. Mendoza’s failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter[7] to Atty. Mendoza demanding
payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored
the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the Registry Receipt and Registry
Return Receipt.[8] Likewise, he did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain
why he failed to pay.
In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa filed the
complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Acting on the complaint, this Court required Atty. Mendoza to comment on the
complaint in a Resolution dated January 10, 2011.[9] He filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension on March 18, 2011,[10] which this Court granted in a Resolution dated
October 19, 2011. Atty. Mendoza finally filed his Brief Comment on January 10,
2012.[11]
Atty. Mendoza admitted in his Brief Comment the existence of the loan and that it
is a valid obligation. However, he alleged that he only received One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) from one Elenita Cruz (Elenita), a friend of the
complainant. Atty. Mendoza did not attach an affidavit from Elenita nor any
evidence proving that he only received P100,000.00.[12]
The Proceedings before the IBP
On July 4, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor issued the Notice
of Mandatory Conference/Hearing scheduled on August 16, 2012.
When the case was called for hearing, only Atty. Cabrera appeared. Atty. Cabrera
marked the complainant’s documentary exhibits and the mandatory conference
was subsequently declared terminated. The parties were then directed to submit
their respective verified position papers, documentary exhibits and/or affidavits of
their witnesses, if any, within fifteen (15) days.
6
In her position paper,[13] Ms. Sosa reiterated her allegations in her Complaint-
Affidavit. She argued that Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also
civilly.
Atty. Mendoza, in his Manifestation,[14] admitted that (i) he arrived late during the
scheduled hearing; (ii) he had on hand Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
(iii) he was advised by the Hearing Officer to communicate with the complainant’s
counsel; and (iv) the validity of his obligation and that he has to pay the same.
Atty. Mendoza did not make good his offer to pay despite the express
manifestation he made.[15]
The IBP Findings
The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only
administratively but also civilly. He gave credence to Ms. Sosa’s allegations that
Atty. Mendoza failed to pay the loan despite Ms. Sosa’s attempts to collect. He
also took notice of Atty. Mendoza’s admission that the obligation is valid.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner. In a Resolution dated May 11, 2013, the IBP ruled:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that [the
respondent] is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty.
Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) to [the complainant] with legal interest.
The Court’s Ruling
We adopt with modification the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in
his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission
to and continued practice of law.[16] Any wrongdoing, whether professional or
non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary
action.[17]

Gross misconduct is defined as “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment.”[18]
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong
conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in
character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment.
We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of
P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt
showing he received P500,000.00.[19] Although he initially denied getting this
amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any
evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without
qualification as to the amount.[20]
Also undisputed is the fact that Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon
maturity but Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the
postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he
would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse,
the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did
not dispute.
Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing
with the IBP Investigating Officer.[21] He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to
Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late.
We find Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him
to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact,
Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his
obligation because of his manifestation that he already had the money.[22]
It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa’s request for settlement
after claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying he had
the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place. Atty. Mendoza was also
not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00
and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation
remains outstanding after all these years.
7
In Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez[23] this Court sitting en banc held:
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s
faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times,
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [Emphasis supplied.]
Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his
obligation,[24] Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his
admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire
financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico.
[25]
We also reiterate that –
[A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent
and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him.[26] [Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.]
The facts and evidence in this case clearly establish Atty. Mendoza’s failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well.[27]

To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful
conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by Atty. Mendoza’s act of
interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to
pay a valid and just debt.[28]
While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its
recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal
interest.
We take exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is
solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for
collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases
alone deters us from agreeing with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative
complaint before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of
liability, while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance
of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.[29]
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to
continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of
justice.[30] The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from
the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[31]
We are aware that jurisprudence has allowed a complainant in a disbarment case
to collect an outstanding debt from a lawyer.[32] However, in the recent case of
Heenan v. Atty. Espejo,[33] this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP’s
recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from
the complainant. We said in this case:
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only
concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings
have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do
8
not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the complainant.[34][Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.]
We note that as in the facts of the present case, the respondent-lawyer in the
Heenan case also did not deny the validity of her loan nor did she proffer any
reason for issuing unfunded checks.
As a final note, we understand the frustration of, and sympathize with Ms. Sosa in
her present situation. However, because the matter before us is not a civil action
for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding
loan. We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any
future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty.
Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without prejudice to any action we
may take that is not based on the violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
SO ORDERED.
6. ACA v. SALVADO A.C. No. 10952 | January 26, 2016
FACTS:
Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for disbarment against
Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty.
Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty.
Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several
businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same
occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a
guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;

and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the
latter had various clients and investors.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-
dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal
amount plus interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank.
Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient
funds or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty.
Salvado. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant’s
calls and text messages. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his
lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.
Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado,
directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00. Atty.
Salvado refused to receive the said notice.
Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to personally serve the
demand letter. A certain “Mark” who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty.
Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in the province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado.
Complainant quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about
to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he
had not forgotten his debt. During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured
complainant that he was working on “something” to pay his obligations. He still
refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had previously
entered into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in
some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting business.
Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his business,
but it was Atty. Divina’s earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an
investment.
The checks he issued were merely intended as security or evidence of
investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he
would request complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed
up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the
checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as
collateral.
9
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.
IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification –
increased the period of suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.
ISSUE: WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he violated CPR and the
Lawyer’s Oath
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by
lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to
make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For
the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant’s being beguiled to part
with his money and believe Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical
human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person
like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado’s
stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or another, influenced
complainant’s decision to invest.
The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence” deserves scant consideration.
Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and
the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the
worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended
and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel, the Court wrote
that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the
erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his
professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty.
Salvado’s business relationship with complainant. His issuance of the subject
checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated
Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado’s deceiving attempts to evade
payment of his obligations.
DISPOSITION: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
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