People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the
Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without
acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then
charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to
secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has
no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign
country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part
of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings
in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court
during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government established
during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government.

ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain
good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by
military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as
judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after
reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically
refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which
create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It
is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of
political complexion.

Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno

Facts: Petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) on June
201980 taking his oath on November 29 1982. On January 17 1983, the CA was reorganized into
the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to BP 129 “An Act reorganizing the Judiciary…”
which appointed petitioner as an appellate justice in the IAC, to which he accepted ceasing him
to be a member of the Judiciary. After the EDSA revolution in February 1986 brought the
reorganization of the entire government including the IAC, which was issued through EO No. 33
by President Aquino exercising his legislative powers. The Screening Committee then
recommended the return of petitioner as associate justice of the new CA assigning him to be
ranked number eleven(11), however when the appointments were signed his ranked changed
to number twenty-six (26). Petitioner now seeks the correction claiming that his transfer from
Associate Justice to a ministry of justice and now his recent reappointment did not adversely
affect his ranking n the CA. The Court en banc granted the correction of his seniority, which was
challenged via motion for reconsideration by Associate Justices Campos and Javellana
contending that the present CA is a new court, neither can petitioner claim that he was
returning to a former court for the courts where he had previously been appointed has already
ceased to exist. They also further allege that petitioner submitted the request to the wrong
party as it was supposed to be addressed to the President, and since his request was not
approved, the Supreme Court should respect the President’s decision.

Issue:

W/N the CA is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority
enjoyed by petitioner?
W/N the CA is merely a continuation of the CA and IAC?

Held: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC existing prior
to EO No. 33 for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government. At the time of the issuance of EO No. 33, President Aquino was still
exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and
legislative powers, such that she could, if she desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of BP
129 or her own EO No. 33.