G.R. No.
L-63915 December 29, 1986 General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES
P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in
demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in
the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to
move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1
Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that
there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication
must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General,
he claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and,
on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative;
that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the
subject decision was concurred in only by three justices
and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4
refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only
for the internal administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published;
that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code
providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the
arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the
Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason. is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with but simply because they did
not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can
think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is
no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill
of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government.
Page 1 of 49 Legal Writing
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only
the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they
are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions
issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only
four justices were categorically for publication in the
Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication
could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due
publication without indicating where it should be made.
11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership
of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter
and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication
need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform
the function of communicating, the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though,
is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no
amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a
law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does,
it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the
political departments of the government in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have
no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to
the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Page 2 of 49 Legal Writing
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the
instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees

are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so
if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation,

they retain the authority to review the work of their
delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their
lights, through their freedom of expression and their
right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as

above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or
as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified
by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Page 3 of 49 Legal Writing

G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should
be collected without unnecessary hindrance On the other
hand, such collection should be made in accordance with
law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile
the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and
the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which
is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the
Collector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private respondent
Algue as legitimate business expenses in its income tax
returns. The corollary issue is whether or not the appeal
of the private respondent from the decision of the
Collector of Internal Revenue was made on time and in
accordance with law.
We deal first with the procedural question.
The record shows that on January 14, 1965, the private
respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in
engineering, construction and other allied activities,
received a letter from the petitioner assessing it in the
total amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes
for the years 1958 and 1959.1 On January 18, 1965,
Algue flied a letter of protest or request for
reconsideration, which letter was stamp received on the
same day in the office of the petitioner. 2 On March 12,
1965, a warrant of distraint and levy was presented to
the private respondent, through its counsel, Atty. Alberto
Guevara, Jr., who refused to receive it on the ground of
the pending protest. 3 A search of the protest in the
dockets of the case proved fruitless. Atty. Guevara
produced his file copy and gave a photostat to BIR agent
Ramon Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant. 4 On
April 7, 1965, Atty. Guevara was finally informed that
the BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it
was only then that he accepted the warrant of distraint
and levy earlier sought to be served.5 Sixteen days later,
on April 23, 1965, Algue filed a petition for review of
the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
with the Court of Tax Appeals.6
The above chronology shows that the petition was filed
seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appeal
may be made within thirty days after receipt of the
decision or ruling challenged.7 It is true that as a rule the
warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of
the assessment" 8 and renders hopeless a request for
reconsideration," 9 being "tantamount to an outright
denial thereof and makes the said request deemed
rejected." 10 But there is a special circumstance in the
case at bar that prevents application of this accepted
doctrine.
The proven fact is that four days after the private
respondent received the petitioner's notice of assessment,
it filed its letter of protest. This was apparently not taken
into account before the warrant of distraint and levy was
issued; indeed, such protest could not be located in the
office of the petitioner. It was only after Atty. Guevara
gave the BIR a copy of the protest that it was, if at all,
considered by the tax authorities. During the intervening
period, the warrant was premature and could therefore
not be served.
As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted," 11 the
protest filed by private respondent was not pro forma
and was based on strong legal considerations. It thus had
the effect of suspending on January 18, 1965, when it
was filed, the reglementary period which started on the
date the assessment was received, viz., January 14, 1965.
The period started running again only on April 7, 1965,
when the private respondent was definitely informed of
the implied rejection of the said protest and the warrant
was finally served on it. Hence, when the appeal was
filed on April 23, 1965, only 20 days of the reglementary
period had been consumed.
Now for the substantive question.
The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of
P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not
an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense.
The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it differently.
Agreeing with Algue, it held that the said amount had
been legitimately paid by the private respondent for
actual services rendered. The payment was in the form
of promotional fees. These were collected by the Payees
for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation of the Philippines and its
subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that the petitioner
had Originally claimed these promotional fees to be
personal holding company income 12 but later
conformed to the decision of the respondent court
rejecting this assertion.13 In fact, as the said court found,
the amount was earned through the joint efforts of the
persons among whom it was distributed It has been
established that the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Company had earlier appointed Algue as
its agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil
manufacturing process. Pursuant to such authority,
Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara,
Edith, O'Farell, and Pablo Sanchez, worked for the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation,
inducing other persons to invest in it.14 Ultimately, after
its incorporation largely through the promotion of the
said persons, this new corporation purchased the PSEDC
properties.15 For this sale, Algue received as agent a
commission of P126,000.00, and it was from this
commission that the P75,000.00 promotional fees were
paid to the aforenamed individuals.16
There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their
respective shares of the fees in their income tax returns
and paid the corresponding taxes thereon.17 The Court
of Tax Appeals also found, after examining the
evidence, that no distribution of dividends was
involved.18
Page 4 of 49 Legal Writing
The petitioner claims that these payments are fictitious
because most of the payees are members of the same
family in control of Algue. It is argued that no indication
was made as to how such payments were made, whether
by check or in cash, and there is not enough
substantiation of such payments. In short, the petitioner
suggests a tax dodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate
assessment by involving an imaginary deduction.
We find that these suspicions were adequately met by
the private respondent when its President, Alberto
Guevara, and the accountant, Cecilia V. de Jesus,
testified that the payments were not made in one lump
sum but periodically and in different amounts as each
payee's need arose. 19 It should be remembered that this
was a family corporation where strict business
procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of
receipts was not required. Even so, at the end of the year,
when the books were to be closed, each payee made an
accounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to
make up the total of P75,000.00. 20 Admittedly,
everything seemed to be informal. This arrangement was
understandable, however, in view of the close
relationship among the persons in the family
corporation.
We agree with the respondent court that the amount of
the promotional fees was not excessive. The total
commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Co. to the private respondent was
P125,000.00. 21 After deducting the said fees, Algue
still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the
transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the
total commission. This was a reasonable proportion,
considering that it was the payees who did practically
everything, from the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of
the Sugar Estate properties. This finding of the
respondent court is in accord with the following
provision of the Tax Code:
SEC. 30. Deductions from gross income.--In computing
net income there shall be allowed as deductions —
(a) Expenses:
(1) In general.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered; ... 22
and Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 70 (1), reading
as follows:
SEC. 70. Compensation for personal services.--Among
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
carrying on any trade or business may be included a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation
for personal services actually rendered. The test of
deductibility in the case of compensation payments is
whether they are reasonable and are, in fact, payments
purely for service. This test and deductibility in the case
of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable
and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test and
its practical application may be further stated and
illustrated as follows:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in
fact as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. (a)
An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a
distribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur
in the case of a corporation having few stockholders,
Practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the
salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar
services, and the excessive payment correspond or bear a
close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers of
employees, it would seem likely that the salaries are not
paid wholly for services rendered, but the excessive
payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. . .
. (Promulgated Feb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18, 325.)
It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees
were not in the regular employ of Algue nor were they
its controlling stockholders. 23
The Solicitor General is correct when he says that the
burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the
claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find
that the onus has been discharged satisfactorily. The
private respondent has proved that the payment of the
fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the
efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and
prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental
enterprise and involve themselves in a new business
requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and
should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed.
It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization
society. Without taxes, the government would be
paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and
operate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing
authorities, every person who is able to must contribute
his share in the running of the government. The
government for its part, is expected to respond in the
form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to
improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral
and material values. This symbiotic relationship is the
rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous
notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those
in the seat of power.
But even as we concede the inevitability and
indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all
democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not,
then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts
will then come to his succor. For all the awesome power
of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks
if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the
law has not been observed.
We hold that the appeal of the private respondent from
the decision of the petitioner was filed on time with the
respondent court in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125.
And we also find that the claimed deduction by the
private respondent was permitted under the Internal
Revenue Code and should therefore not have been
disallowed by the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 5 of 49 Legal Writing
 [G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D.
WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante
and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy
laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit,
"to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on,
roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how
long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view
of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on
the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the
proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY;
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth
Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said
Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of
our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is
a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and
as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents,
A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public
Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Page 6 of 49 Legal Writing
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30
p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2,
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first
indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the
approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with
the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his
second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act
No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of
and traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The
rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early
Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed
in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction
therefore is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v.
Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman
v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence
to the ’necessity’ of the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets.
Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the
President, may contain provisions controlling or
regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to
any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public
Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy
laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit,
"to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on,
roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely
the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of
public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of
some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law.
Page 7 of 49 Legal Writing
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal
(72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law,
because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is
to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a
state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the
court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise
and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the
halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694;
36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R.
Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and
in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26,
1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the
principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle
of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States
and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed
by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of
certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and
regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute
an unlawful interference with legitimate business or
trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548
was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of
our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is
a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People v.
Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing
civilization is bringing within the police power of the state
today things which were not thought of as being within
such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of
the individuals of the state, have brought within the police
power many questions for regulation which formerly were
not so considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for
is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Page 8 of 49 Legal Writing
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO,
defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in
American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first
luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion
(relating to the status of an Indian) with words which,
with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to
introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every
point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest
interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling
power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they
have any, the political existence of a people, the personal
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to
be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice,
we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the
facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so
called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the
"non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and,
lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi
and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived
of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison
at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial
board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr.,
presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes
have been made for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro,
which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and
proved that unless some other measure
is taken for the Mangyan work of this
province, no successful result will be
obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to
obliged them to live in one place in
order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary
in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of
the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient
for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only
solicit homesteads on this reservation providing
that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of
the provincial board of Mindoro was approved
by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21,
1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial
governor of Mindoro issued executive order No.
2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by
Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly
approve by the Honorable, the Secretary
of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr.,
provincial governor of Mindoro,
pursuant to the provisions of section
2145 of the revised Administrative
Code, do hereby direct that all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the
Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on
the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not
later than December 31, 1917.
Page 9 of 49 Legal Writing
 "Any Mangyan who shall refuse to
comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative
Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same
province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary
measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria
have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act
No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that
Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff
of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by
virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and
2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro
and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes
in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on
the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The
action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore,
becomes the paramount question which the court is
called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads
as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina
upon sites selected by provincial governor. —
With the prior approval of the Department Head,
the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there
should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which
read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take
up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian
who shall refuse to comply with the directions
lawfully given by a provincial governor,
pursuant to section two thousand one hundred
and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation
upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisonment for a period
not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145
is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of
this section, if we may be permitted to use such
terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative
Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of
various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547,
specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act
No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the
term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of
the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its
proper category, and in order to understand the policy of
the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference
to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first
of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude
assumed by the authorities towards these "non-
Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on
the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY
THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having
reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI,
Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the
governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip
II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest
of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the
Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on
May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO
"POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the
Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law,
and in order that they may forget the blunders of
their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that
they may live in harmony and in a civilized
manner, it has always been endeavored, with
great care and special attention, to use all the
means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with
success, our Council of the Indies and other
religious persons met at various times; the
prelates of new Spain assembled by order of
Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the
year one thousand five hundred and forty-six —
all of which meetings were actuated with a
desire to serve God an our Kingdom.
Page 10 of 49 Legal Writing
 At these meetings it was resolved that indios be
made to live in communities, and not to live in
places divided and separated from one another
by sierras and mountains, wherein they are
deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits
and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of
our ministers and from that which gives rise to
those human necessities which men are obliged
to give one another. Having realized that
convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted
and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and
moderation the concentration of the indios into
reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with
such forbearance and gentleness, without
causing inconveniences, so that those who
would not presently settle and who would see
the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own
accord, present themselves, and it is ordained
that they be not required to pay taxes more than
what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we
hereby order and decree that the same be
complied with in all the remaining parts of the
Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat
compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573.
Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS
LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones
shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long,
wherein the indios can have their live stock that
they may not be mixed with those of the
Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT
DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD
BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios
shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided
they shall not be deprived of the lands and
granaries which they may have in the places left
by them. We hereby order that no change shall
be made in this respect, and that they be allowed
to retain the lands held by them previously so
that they may cultivate them and profit
therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED
WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or
any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove the pueblos or the reducciones once
constituted and founded, without our express
order or that of the viceroy, president, or the
royal district court, provided, however, that the
encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a
change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these
claims are often made for private interests and
not for those of the indios, we hereby order that
this law be always complied with, otherwise the
change will be considered fraudulently obtained.
The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN
THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there
be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same
reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses,
there should be two mayors and two aldermen,
also indios; and, even if the town be a big one,
there should, nevertheless, be more than two
mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than
eighty indios but not less than forty, there should
be not more than one mayor and one alderman,
who should annually elect nine others, in the
presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on
November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581.
At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at
Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at
Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I,
Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE
SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
Page 11 of 49 Legal Writing
 We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards,
negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reducciones and towns and towns of the
indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate
with the indios are men of troublesome nature,
of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and
vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the
wrongs done them, the indios would leave their
towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos,
and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with
their bad customs, idleness, and also some of
their blunders and vices which may corrupt and
pervert the goal which we desire to reach with
regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of
grave penalties upon the commission of the acts
above-mentioned which should not be tolerated
in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents,
governors, and courts take great care in
executing the law within their powers and avail
themselves of the cooperation of the ministers
who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos
and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos),
who are children of indias and born among
them, and who are to inherit their houses and
haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it
appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them
from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp.
228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish
government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the
less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating
them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January
14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right
that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as
an integral part of a nation should respect and
obey the laws in force therein; while, on other
hand, it is the duty to conscience and to
humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation,
and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to
grasp the moral and material advantages that
may be acquired in those towns under the
protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national
honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the
social life of the civilized and Christian towns;
to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon
wherein is located the seat of the representative
of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the
governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-
denial of the missionary fathers who have even
sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the
principles of Christianity, but the means and the
preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been
sufficient in certain cases and in those which
have not been guarded against, thus giving and
customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation
of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands
and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the
national laws on the part of all who reside within
the territory under its control, I have proceeded
in the premises by giving the most careful study
of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the
moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious
opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics,
and missionaries of the provinces of Northern
Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous
conformity of the meeting held with the
Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of
the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of
the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate
conviction of the inevitable necessity of
proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races,
as well as of the manner and the only form of
accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose
of carrying out these objects, I hereby
promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the
Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be
governed by the common law, save those
exceptions prescribed in this decree which are
bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different
pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated
for each of these races — which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those
which live isolated and roaming about without
forming a town nor a home; another, made up of
those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the
officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the
work of having these races learn these rules. These
rules shall have executive character, beginning
with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner
prescribed below.
Page 12 of 49 Legal Writing
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with
the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all
the means which their zeal may suggest to them,
to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of
the towns or settlement already subdued, and
shall adopt the necessary regulations for the
appointment of local authorities, if there be none
as yet; for the construction of courts and schools,
and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the
administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first
day of next July, so that at the beginning of the
fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of
the archipelago, with the only exception that in
the first two years they shall not be obliged to
render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements
are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be
obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only
in case of absolute necessity shall a new
residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
purpose the place most convenient for them and
which prejudices the least their interest; and, in
either of these cases, an effort must be made to
establish their homes with the reach of the sound
of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new
towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of
the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the
Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the
inhabitants of the new towns understand all the
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty
which they have as to where and now they shall
till their lands and sell the products thereof, with
the only exception of the tobacco which shall be
bought by the Hacienda at the same price and
conditions allowed other producers, and with the
prohibition against these new towns as well as
the others from engaging in commerce of any
other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express
prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever
should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion
of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for
eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the
State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in
returns for their voluntary submission: to live in
towns; unity among their families; concession of
good lands and the right to cultivate them in the
manner they wish and in the way them deem
most productive; support during a year, and
clothes upon effecting submission; respect for
their habits and customs in so far as the same are
not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of
their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions
and families of recognized honesty who shall
teach, direct, protect, and give them security and
trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions
and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a
kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that
those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the
direct charge of the authorities of the province or
district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article,
who voluntarily admit the advantages offered,
shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting
their new towns, of constructing their town hall,
schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the
Christians; provided, the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter
do not have the good conditions of location and
cultivations, and provided further the putting of
families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the
prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and
advantages offered them, continue in their
rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and
vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office
shall proceed with the organization of the
divisions of the Army which, in conjunction
with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have
to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their
dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and
confiscate their products and cattle. Such a
punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a
year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the
zones where such operations shall take place and
everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and
missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities,
and other subordinates to may authority, civil as
well as military authorities, shall give the most
effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in
all that is within the attributes and the scope of the
authority of each.
Page 13 of 49 Legal Writing
 13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan
races found in some of the provinces in the
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend
to visit, the preceding provisions shall
conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency
as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall
attend to and decide all the questions relative to
the application of the foregoing regulations that
may be brought to it for consultations by the
chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be
necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree,
shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions.
(Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY
THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by
the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a
perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the
inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved
and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions
have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should
here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the
Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain
their tribal organization and government and
under which many of these tribes are now living
in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine
Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this
end in view, to name the prerequisites for the
organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission
and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine
Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for
the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This
transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It
divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial
districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to
appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was
not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for
the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau
to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes"
which shall have general supervision over the public
affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives(
sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to
recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the
territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and
the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been
provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts
Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and
the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no.
83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing
for the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township
Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio
charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of
these laws have been carried forward into the
Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws
concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on
April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549,
550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were
enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc,
Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an
example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
Page 14 of 49 Legal Writing
 No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR
THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted
by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the
Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable
to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is
authorized, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among
them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those
conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled "An Act providing for the establishment
of local civil Governments in the townships and
settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course
necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to
comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall
be to aid the Manguianes of his province to
acquire the knowledge and experience necessary
for successful local popular government, and his
supervision and control over them shall be
exercised to this end, an to the end that law and
order and individual freedom shall be
maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial
board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes
has advanced sufficiently to make such a course
practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven,
inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and
eighty-seven, as a township, and the
geographical limits of such township shall be
fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy
enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two
of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by
the Commission in the enactment of laws,'
passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen
hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No.
1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in
general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two
Administrative Codes retained the provisions in
questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for
their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory,
are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President
McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the
term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in
section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the
Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and
"non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since
the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These
terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145,
2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as
well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the
term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec.
2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No.
2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-
Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a
religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those
who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians,
would be those who do not profess the Christian religion.
In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be
cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and
certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de
las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby,
"The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p.
300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to
1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Page 15 of 49 Legal Writing
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we
shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical
signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions
of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the
authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in
the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers
similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented
in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature
has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other
acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial
Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this
article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of
the article applicable only in specially organized
provinces. The specially organized provinces are the
Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes,
and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the
Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the
powers of local self-government. They do not, however,
exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines
which is not granted popular representation.
Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized
provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians
and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law
specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative
Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against
the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a
particular people, because of their religion, or to a
particular province because of its location, but the whole
intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and
unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce
the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so
many years had these people under his jurisdiction,
recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples,
commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See
Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines,
United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session
on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the
People of the United States as to the future political
status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351;
letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to
relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253,
387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of
1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of
non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic
investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . .
with special view to determining the most practicable
means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here
arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection
with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the
husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In
discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law
which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of
so-called non-Christians or members of
uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that
province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We
hold also that the fact that the accused is shown
to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low
order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of
execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a
member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of
the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and
who had these people under his authority, was the
former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of
provinces, organized under the Special Provincial
Government Act, a letter which later received
recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated
by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question
has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been
baptized or who are children of persons who
have been recently baptized are, for the purposes
of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing
legislation for the tribes in these islands which
are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon
any suitable designation which will fit all cases.
The number of individual tribes is so great that
it is almost out of the question to enumerate all
of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt
the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the
Commission was not so much to legislate for
people having any particular religious belief as
for those lacking sufficient advancement so that
they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
Page 16 of 49 Legal Writing
 The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in
itself change the degree of civilization to which
the person baptized has attained at the time the
act of baptism is performed. For practical
purposes, therefore, you will give the member of
so-called "wild tribes" of your province the
benefit of the doubt even though they may
recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they
are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities
or what form of government shall be afforded to
them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested
to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable,
the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the
necessary instructions given to the governors of
the provinces organized under the Provincial
Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p.
214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum
furnished a member of this court, has the following to
say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification
is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the
expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the
Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather
than of religious denomination, for the hold that
it is indicative of religious denomination will
make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of
the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the
cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was
requested on the point, who, by return indorsement,
agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal
Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907,
reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of
non-Christian tribes" from the payment of
cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue
has interpreted this provision of law to mean not
that persons who profess some form of Christian
worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and
that all other person are exempt; he has
interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving
tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian
tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that
all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax
so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the
country in a civilized condition. In other words,
it is not so much a matter of a man's form of
religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it
is more dependent on whether he is living in a
civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as
a recruit. So far, this question has not come up
as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living
with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not
be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this
office that he was exempt from the cedula tax,
inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office,
however, continued to collect cedula taxes from
all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen,
etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion
of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by
men belonging to the nationalities mentioned.
Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition
similar to that which exist in Manila also exists
in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula
taxes are therefore being collected by this Office
in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground
that civilized people are subject to such taxes,
and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal
Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by
the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial
treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been
raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes
when they come in from the hills for the
purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine
Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the
information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact
that they do not profess Christianity, but because
of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands classed as members of non-Christian
tribes may be divided into three classes in so far
as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Page 17 of 49 Legal Writing
 Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe
leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had
and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he
thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that
community and from and after the date when he
so attaches himself to the community the same
cedula and other taxes are due from him as from
other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same
rule should apply to him as to persons arriving
from foreign countries or reaching the age of
eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such
period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula,
as the case may be, should be furnished him
without penalty and without requiring him to
pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that
the prime factors in determining whether or not
a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not
the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or
failure to maintain tribal relations with some of
the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life,
degree of advancement in civilization and
connection or lack of connection with some
civilized community. For this reason so called
"Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed
by this office as members of non-Christian tribes
in so far as the application of the Internal
Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though
they belong to no well recognized tribe, their
mode of life, degree of advancement and so
forth are practically the same as those of the
Igorrots and members of other recognized non-
Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed
by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector
of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and
Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a
transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for
consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the
opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-
Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the
Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he
remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of
a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he
commit an infraction of the law and does the person
selling same lay himself liable under the provision of
Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General
Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities
hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted
constructions, it is probable that is probable that
the person in question remains a non-Christian,
so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both
he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the
provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise
you that these should be the constructions place
upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase
non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions
of the Administrative code which we are
studying, we submit that said phrase does not
have its natural meaning which would include
all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands,
whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or
uncivilized, but simply refers to those
uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes
of the Philippines who, living without home or
fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond
the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in
its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian
tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual,
but, without dwelling on the difficulties which
later would be occasioned by the phrase,
adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized
portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in
the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act
No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be
understood as equivalent to members of
uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law,
but because to give it its lateral meaning would
make the law null and unconstitutional as
making distinctions base the religion of the
individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no
less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population
in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or
Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol.
1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon.
Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be
used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared
in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-
division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical
and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes,"
which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and
not to religion.
Page 18 of 49 Legal Writing
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary,
inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-
Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state
approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the
Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H.
Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian
signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan,"
"negro." It may be that the use of this word is
applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but
nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times
without doubt this name was given to those of
that island who bear it to-day, but its employed
in three Filipino languages shows that the radical
ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day
forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists
and signifies "ancient," from which we can
deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by
the modern invaders, in whose language they
were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number
approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no
desire for community life, and, as indicated in the
preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring
them under any form of municipal government. (See
Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22,
23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the
Commission to the policy adopted by the United States
for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings
with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on
argument, to be practically identical with that followed
by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even
before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to
the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs.
Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane
designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After
quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act
avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian
nations as an object sought by the United States, and
proposes to effect this object by civilizing and
converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians
is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118
U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the
United States Constitution which gives Congress "power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court
then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position
of the Indians in the United States (a more extended
account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the
borders of the United States, both before and
since the Revolution, to the people of the United
States, has always been an anomalous one and of
a complex character.
Following the policy of the European
Governments in the discovery of American
towards the Indians who were found here, the
colonies before the Revolution and the States
and the United States since, have recognized in
the Indians a possessory right to the soil over
which they roamed and hunted and established
occasional villages. But they asserted an
ultimate title in the land itself, by which the
Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it
to other nations or peoples without the consent
of this paramount authority. When a tribe
wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it,
or the State or the United States wished to
purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only
mode in which this could be done. The United
States recognized no right in private persons, or
in other nations, to make such a purchase by
treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves
these relation are equally difficult to define.
They were, and always have been, regarded as
having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not
as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the
power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws
of the Union or of the State within whose limits
they resided.
Page 19 of 49 Legal Writing
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is
within the competency of Congress. These
Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arise the duty of protection, and
with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen . . . The power of the General
Government over these remnants of race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers,
is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must
exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all
the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913],
231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether
the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such
that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the
admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court
looked to the reports of the different superintendent
charged with guarding their interests and founds that
these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and
protection of the government "like reservation Indians in
general." Continuing, the court said "that during the
Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were
treated as wards requiring special protection, where
subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the
alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly
authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without
the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been
held that it is not within the power of the courts to
overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good
reason, the subject has always been deemed political in
nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial
department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905],
197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897],
168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264;
Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace
vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger
[1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co.
[1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S..,
598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N.
S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets
apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full
authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures
as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full
protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.
Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and
executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and
which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook
([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against
Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of
Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to
the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in
substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in
the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their
tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general
habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to
maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that
whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty
of violating any of the laws of the United States, they
were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of
the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the
return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation
situated some place within the limits of the Indian
Territory — had departed therefrom without permission
from the Government; and, at the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest
and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had
caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian
Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the
validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus.
The second question, of much greater importance,
related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold
the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned
to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the
Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court
reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its
dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then,
continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the
government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of
regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes,
confer upon certain officers of the Government almost
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . .
Page 20 of 49 Legal Writing
Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely
vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need
not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power
rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the
power must be upheld." The decision concluded as
follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views,
leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning
of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court, or before a federal
judge, in all cases where he may be confined or
in custody under color of authority of the United
States or where he is restrained of liberty in
violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent,
being commander of the military department of
the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under
color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing
by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to
do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of
expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as
they obey the laws and do not trespass on
forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of
authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged
from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just
quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi,
the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of
the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a
writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse
[1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear
case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that
Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that
Indians have been taken from different parts of the
country and placed on these reservation, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on
the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the
Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when
once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps,
just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as
existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes
in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is
that the Legislature could not delegate this power to
provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended,
the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and
avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the
delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will,
however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his
instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early
Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed
in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction
therefore is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman
vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed.,
141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted
to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the
approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80)
was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of
the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one
hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated
bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States
Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all
Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a
good deal, especially in view of the long established
practice of the Department, before saying that this
language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation
obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned.
Page 21 of 49 Legal Writing
The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In
the absence of special provisions naturally it would be
exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge
Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once
accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here
conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial
board, as the official representatives of the province, are
better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better
fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly
remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and
unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain
and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for
the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The
inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between
individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is
answerable — the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction
is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional
guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore
stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued
meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief
leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification
of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-
Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a
low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate
between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those
portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law,
providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution — and
these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is
then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously
expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to
exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other.
(Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially
different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a
legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high
civilization, which the savage never understood,
and never can understand. Liberty exists in
proportion to wholesome restraint; the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more
liberty we have . . . that man is free who is
protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p.
393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one
caught to desire and in not being forced to do
what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit
of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no
unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under
conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley
vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in
each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.
There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common
good. On any other basis, organized society
could not exist with safety to its members.
Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could
not exist under the operation of a principle
which recognizes the right of each individual
person to use his own, whether in respect of his
person or his property, regardless of the injury
that may be done to others . . .
Page 22 of 49 Legal Writing
 There is, of course, a sphere with which the
individual may asserts the supremacy of his own
will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government — especially of any free
government existing under a written
Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally true that in very well-
ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members, the rights
of the individual in respect of his liberty may at
times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the
general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S.,
11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong;
it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual.
(Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of
freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by
this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a
long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty
includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to
pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose
one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of
locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the
opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done
by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs.
Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland
[1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S.,
274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State
vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258,
261.)
One thought which runs through all these different
conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it
is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of
the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever
and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of
rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed
rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of
the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise
within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall
vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away
except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case
before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic
in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due
process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society." To constitute
"due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which
is especially true where much must be left to the
discretion of the administrative officers in applying a
law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and
blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced
by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty
and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due
process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall
be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers
of the legislative department of the Government; second,
that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third,
that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of
a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and
necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909],
212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which
is applicable to all of a class. The classification must
have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the
logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates
to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of
Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall
not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude
exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that
the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place
subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has
force in the Philippine.
Page 23 of 49 Legal Writing
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by
adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268
to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and
involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary,
peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S.
[1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is
possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form
such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs.
Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional
provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under
which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held
valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all
that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become
almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its
purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to
is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly
[1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is
the right of the government to restrain liberty by the
exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . .
"is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs.
Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried
onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on
reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and
the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this
power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs.
Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915],
31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable
basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we
should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible,
such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will
be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5)
the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao
reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those
Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao,
the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13,
1918, made a trip to the place. There he found
that the site selected is a good one; that
creditable progress has been made in the
clearing of forests, construction of buildings,
etc., that there appears to be encouraging
reaction by the boys to the work of the school
the requirements of which they appear to meet
with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks
which are necessarily a somewhat trying period
for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the
period of less than one year since the beginning
of the institution definitely justify its
continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting
against that segregation. Such was naturally to
be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior,
upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the
present policy over those who prefer to
live a nomadic life and evade the
influence of civilization. The
Government will follow its policy to
organize them into political
communities and to educate their
children with the object of making them
useful citizens of this country. To permit
them to live a wayfaring life will
ultimately result in a burden to the state
and on account of their ignorance, they
will commit crimes and make
depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those
who may want to abuse them."
Page 24 of 49 Legal Writing
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged
with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has
adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly
civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the
adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy
whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system
and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the
Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government
control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one
place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and
maintain amicable relations among them and
with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural
economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and
of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing
influence have been continued among the non-
Christian people. These people are being taught
and guided to improve their living conditions in
order that they may fully appreciate the benefits
of civilization. Those of them who are still given
to nomadic habits are being persuaded to
abandon their wild habitat and settle in
organized settlements. They are being made to
understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into
fixed and per manent communities, thus
bringing them under the control of the
Government, to aid them to live and work,
protect them from involuntary servitude and
abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their
civilized brothers. In short, they are being
impressed with the purposes and objectives of
the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification
with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the
country. (See Report of the Department for
1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to
establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208,
2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau
of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the
Government towards the non-Christian people in the
following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region
inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster
by all adequate means and in a systematical,
rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
economic, social, and political development of
those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence
between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating
the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the
Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government,
may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and
arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts
to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and
apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned,
the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have
on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a
nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of
civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of
the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to
do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather
together the children for educational purposes, and to
improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin
the process of civilization. this method was termed in
Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea
adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the
same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few
reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and
in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes
protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created
free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is
not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are
not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed,
they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos.
But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon
the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is
concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting
the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are
again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops
and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country.
Page 25 of 49 Legal Writing
It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by
the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a
position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not
advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The
State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the
Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and
evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction — burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not
bringing any benefit to the State but instead
injuring and damaging its interests, what will
ultimately become of these people with the sort
of liberty they wish to preserve and for which
they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State
and on account of their ignorance they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not
they will be subjected to involuntary servitude
by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a
right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty
as the right to do anything they will — going
from one place to another in the mountains,
burning and destroying forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not
practising the same rightfully, how can they
allege that they are being deprived thereof
without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no
person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law' apply to a class of persons
who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is
and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and
defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the
case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question.
It will mean that this people should be let along
in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of
coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like
the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization.
The latter measure was adopted as the one more
in accord with humanity and with national
conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-
Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of
the Government is indeed encouraging and the
signs of the times point to a day which is not far
distant when they will become useful citizens. In
the light of what has already been accomplished
which has been winning the gratitude of most of
the backward people, shall we give up the noble
work simply because a certain element,
believing that their personal interests would be
injured by such a measure has come forward and
challenged the authority of the Government to
lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall
we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even
blood only to redeem this people from the claws
of ignorance and superstition, now willingly
retire because there has been erroneously
invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law? To allow
them to successfully invoke that Constitutional
guaranty at this time will leave the Government
without recourse to pursue the works of
civilizing them and making them useful citizens.
They will thus left in a permanent state of
savagery and become a vulnerable point to
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the
ability of the nation to deal with our backward
brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed
to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living
conditions. They are being made to understand
that they object of the government is to organize
them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and
work. Their children are being educated in a
school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that
their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or
put them in a condition compelled to do services
for another. They do not work for anybody but
for themselves. There is, therefore, no
involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and
prohibited from emigrating to some other places
under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this
connection is invited to the fact that this people,
living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have
permanent individual property.
Page 26 of 49 Legal Writing
 They move from one place to another as the
conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the
property of the nation, the greater part being
lands of public domain. Wandering from one
place to another on the public lands, why can not
the government adopt a measure to concentrate
them in a certain fixed place on the public lands,
instead of permitting them to roam all over the
entire territory? This measure is necessary both
in the interest of the public as owner of the lands
about which they are roving and for the proper
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives
of the government. For as people accustomed to
nomadic habit, they will always long to return to
the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and
unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not
make them live together and the noble intention
of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to
answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the
right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could
be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ?
To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The
early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141)
Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not
possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same
law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians.
Without any doubt, this law and other similar were
accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional,
we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in
a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is
asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed
Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the
official into whose hands are given the enforcement of
the law would have little or not motive to oppress these
people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be
that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the
law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-
treat any person thus confined, there always exists the
power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and
the courts are always open for a redress of grievances.
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally
challenged and no particular case of oppression is called
to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the
Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far,
consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of
the individual members of society be subordinated to the
will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the
beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or
philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it
has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the
Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must
realize that the very existence of government renders
imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some
extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the
class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go
in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and
for a along time to come will be, impossible for the
courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts
unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the
other two branches of the government in this progressive
march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police
power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady
requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this
decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude
which the courts should assume towards the settled
policy of the Government. In a late decision with which
we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University
(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy
as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that
comes before the courts is, in the last analysis,
determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of
cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior
case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is
perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will
best promote the public welfare in its probable operation
as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a
thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its
influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must
be made from time to time as sound reason and a true
sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines
with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been
in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent
governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to
unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality.
Page 27 of 49 Legal Writing
If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is
to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be
populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill
this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as
we have said, for their own good and the good of the
country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to

overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of
the best considered case is toward non-interference on
the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the
moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the
aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to
take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S.,
1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions
which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law,
with a view to the effectuation of the general
governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but
with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section

2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does
not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section
2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion
of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained

of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes
against petitioners. So ordered.

Page 28 of 49 Legal Writing

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS,
JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES
G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance
of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government
named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued,
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of the following personal property to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense," which
is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4)
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme
Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the
same null and void, and commanding the respondents,
their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants
in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1)
that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects
of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences
of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively
to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11
Indeed, it has been held:
Page 29 of 49 Legal Writing
 . . . that the Government's action in gaining
possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the
personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional
rights of or any one were invaded, they were the
rights of the corporation and not the rights of the
other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question
of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only
by one whose rights have been invaded.
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants
whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed;
nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another.
Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501,
511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to
the personal defendants but embraces only the
corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States,
[1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized
in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things,
two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches
and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid
or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is
in the negative, whether said documents, papers and
things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search
warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would
be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely
to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of
the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Page 30 of 49 Legal Writing
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure
of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
— that the things to be seized be particularly described
— as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in
line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the
theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by
means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against
those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may
be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already
given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion
of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal
Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened
in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20
After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's
constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion,
and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness
in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to
all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy
has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as it used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then
just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless
and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,
without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and
so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with
the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to
the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions.
Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition.
The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches — state or federal — it
was logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of
the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional Right by
Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure.
Page 31 of 49 Legal Writing
 To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that
the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way —
by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to
the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is,
therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of
any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and
truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest
law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to
the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge
to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of
those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of
the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of
the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of
the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House
No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the
premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook,
John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized
in the offices of the corporations above referred to
include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for
the exclusion of which they have a standing under the
latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the
United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding
their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced,
not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory
now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the
allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do
not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it
being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized
in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that
the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Page 32 of 49 Legal Writing
G.R. No. 76532 January 26, 1987
DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO, petitioner,
vs.
CAPT. JUAN DE LEON (P.N.), respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this special civil action of quo warranto, petitioner
Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao asserts that he is the lawful holder
of the position of Chief of the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center — Aquaculture Department, and
seeks to prevent Juan de Leon, a retired navy captain,
from usurping and taking over or occupying the said
office and from exercising the functions and
responsibilities of such office.
The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
(SEAFDEC) was established by an Agreement that was
signed in Bangkok on 28 December 1967 by the
Governments of the following countries: Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 1 The
general purpose of the SEAFDEC is "to contribute to the
promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast
Asia," 2 which purpose is to be realized by carrying out
the following functions:
(i) to train fisheries technicians of the
Southeast Asian countries;
(ii) to study such fisheries techniques as
are suited to the fisheries in Southeast
Asia;
(iii) to develop fishing grounds and to
conduct investigation of fisheries
resources and research in fisheries
oceanography in Southeast Asia;
(iv) to collect and analyze information
related to the fisheries in Southeast
Asia;
(v) to provide the Members with the
results of studies and researches by the
Center and other information; and
(vi) to handle other matters related to the
functions referred to in (i) to (v) of this
Article. 3
The SEAFDEC has the following principal organs: the
Council, where each member government is represented
by one Director and an Alternate Director; the
Secretariat, which consists of a Secretary-General a
Deputy Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff; and
such Departments as may be created by the Council. 4
Each Department consists of a Department-Chief, a
Deputy Department-Chief and Department staff. In July
3-7, 1973, the SEAFDEC Council at its sixth meeting
held in Kuala Lumpur, approved the establishment of an
Aquaculture Department in the province of Iloilo,
Philippines. The Government of the Philippines has
granted certain tax exemption privileges to the
Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC as well as to
foreign (non Philippine) citizens serving on the technical
and scientific staff of the Aquaculture Department. 5
Under Article 6 (2) (vi) of the Agreement Establishing
the SEAFDEC, the power to appoint Department-Chiefs
rests in the Council of the SEAFDEC. Article 10 of the
Agreement further provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Department-Chief shall be
appointed by the Council upon the
recommendation of the government of
the member country in whose territory
the Department is located and the
Deputy Department-Chief shall be
appointed by the Council upon the
recommendation of the government of
Japan.
3. The term of office of the Department-
Chief and the Deputy Department-Chief
shall be two years and they may be re-
appointed.
4. The Department staff shall be
appointed by the Department-Chief.
... (Emphasis supplied)
Just before and immediately after the February 1986
revolution in the country, the position of Department-
Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, was
held by Dr. Alfredo C. Santiago, Jr. Dr. Santiago was
prevailed upon to withdraw as Chief of the Aquaculture
Department and to surrender his office to the petitioner.
By a letter dated 8 April 1986, the Minister of
Agriculture and Food, acting "by authority of the
President," nominated the petitioner as Chief of the
Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC. 6 This
recommendation was immediately transmitted to the
Secretary-General of SEAFDEC, who holds office in
Bangkok, Thailand.
By an urgent telex dated 8 April 1986 addressed to the
petitioner, the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC
acknowledged receipt of the petitioner's "nomination by
the President of the Philippines as new Chief for the
SEAFDEC AQD." 7 The Secretary General advised the
petitioner, in the same telex that pending Council
approval of his nomination, the petitioner was requested
"to serve as [Officer-in-charge] for AQD effective
today" and was authorized "to take necessary actions to
ensure orderly transfer of power in both administration
and finance."
By another telex dated 11 April 1986, the Secretary
General advised the petitioner that the Secretariat had
received the favorable vote of a majority of the members
of the Council, and that, consequently, under Article 7
(2) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, "the
appointment of Dr. Flor J. Lacanilao as AQD Chief [had
been] approved by SEAFDEC Council." 8 It appears that
the Council was not then in session and we assume that
the members were canvassed by telephone, telex or other
comparable means and their votes obtained or
transmitted by the same means. 9
Page 33 of 49 Legal Writing
By a letter dated 13 June 1986, the Secretary General
formally advised the SEAFDEC Council Director for
Japan (and presumably the Council Directors for the
other member countries) that "the Secretariat has
received a unanimous vote for the appointment of Dr.
Flor J. Lacanilao as Chief of the SEAFDEC Aquaculture
Department effective 8 April 1986, for a period of two
years, as recommended by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines. 10
Accordingly, the petitioner entered upon the discharge of
the functions and duties of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC and continued to do so from
early April 1986. until about 21 November 1986.
On or about 21 November 1986, while Dr. Lacanilao
was in Tokyo, Japan attending the annual SEAFDEC
Council meeting, the respondent, attended by groups of
retainers and assistants, entered and took physical
possession of the different offices of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, i.e., its Manila Liaison Office,
its Research Stations in Binangonan, Naujan Tigbauan
and Leganes, as well as its Iloilo Liaison Office. Having
physically. occupied the office of the Aquaculture
Department, the respondent instantly undertook to
exercise the functions of the Department-Chief, and in
the process took immediate control of all purchases and
payments, stopped the issuance of checks, recalled all
motor vehicles assigned to various officers and agencies
of the Department, immediately terminated the services
of all consultants of the Department and put his own
followers in charge of the various sections and agencies
of the Department.
The petitioners and other previously appointed or
designated Aquaculture Department Officers and
employees protested and have opposed and resisted the
respondent's assertion of power and physical occupation
of the Aquaculture Department by the respondent and
his followers who have refused to vacate the offices and
stations they have physically occupied.
On 25 November 1986, immediately upon his return
from Tokyo, Dr. Lacanilao filed in this Court a sworn
Petition for Quo Warranto with prayer for preliminary
injunction dated 24 November 1986. In the afternoon of
26 November 1986, the petitioner filed an urgent ex-
parte motion for a temporary restraining order, stating
that morning, he had been served with summons issued
by Judge Eutropio Migrinio of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 151, in Civil Case No. 54091 entitled
"Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center —
Aquaculture Department, et al. vs. Flor J. Lacanilao,"
together with are strainin order issued by the same judge
purporting to restrain the petitioner from discharging the
functions and exercising the privileges pertaining to the
office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, disbursing funds of the Aquaculture
Department, using any of its facilities and vehicles and
otherwise acting in his capacity of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department.
On 27 November 1986, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Migrinio from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 54091 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, and from
implementing and enforcing his restraining order issued
in the said civil case, and further restraining the
respondent Capt. Juan de Leon from assuming and/or
continuing to exercise the functions of the office of the
Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, from
intimidating the officers and personnel of the
SEAFDEC, in particular the use of armed men in such
intimidation, and from occupying and otherwise
intervening in the functions and activities of the
Aquaculture Department.
In his Comment filed on 18 December 1986 on the
Petition for Quo Warranto in accordance with the
resolution of this Court, the respondent claims that he is
entitled to the office of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, by reason of a recommendation
in his favor embodied in a letter dated 12 November
1986 signed by the Vice President and Minister for
Foreign Affairs and addressed to the Secretary-General
of SEAFDEC. This letter reads as follows:
The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines is pleased to submit the
nomination of Juan A. de Leon as Chief
of the Aquaculture Department of
SEAFDEC for a two-year term vice Dr.
Flor J. Lacanilao. This nomination is
being submitted for consideration in the
annual meeting of the SEAFDEC
Council of Directors scheduled in Tokyo
next week in accordance with Article 10
of the SEAFDEC Agreement.
The term of Mr. de Leon shall take
effect on November 21, 1986. ...
Copies of this letter were apparently sent to the
SEAFDEC Council Directors for Japan, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
In another letter also dated 12 November 1986,
addressed to the respondent, the Vice President and
Minister for Foreign Affairs advised him that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
has approved your nomination as Chief
of the Aquaculture Department of the
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC) for a term of two
years starting November 21, 1986.
In accordance with established
procedure of the SEAFDEC nomination,
this Ministry has advised the Secretary-
General of SEAFDEC regarding your
nomination.
You are, therefore, directed to assume
the foregoing position effective
November 21, 1986, and to request, for
this purpose, the assistance of
government offices and agencies
concerned.
Page 34 of 49 Legal Writing
It was under cover of this letter that the respondent,
about nine days later, launched his physical occupation
of the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
with all the planning and dispatch of a military
campaign.
The receipt of the 12 November 1986 nomination of the
respondent as Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, caused consternation in the SEAFDEC
Council meeting in Tokyo, where Dr. lacanilao was
present. Objections were raised and the Courcil refrained
from acting on the respondent's nomination The formal
response of the SEAFDEC Council is embodied in a
letter dated 21 November 1986 addressed by Mr. K.
Kimura, Chairman of the SEAFDEC Council of
Directors, to Mr. Juanito B. Malig, Council Director for
the Philippines:
I have the honour to refer to the
Secretary-General's letter of 18
November 1986 informing the Council
Directors that the Vice President and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Government of the Philippines has
officially submitted, by his letter of 12
November 1986, the nomination of Mr.
Juan A. De Leon as Chief of the 9
Aquaculture Department, effective 21
November 1986.
In this connection, you have mentioned
to the Council Members that neither the
President of the Philippines nor the
Minister of Agriculture and Food have
withdrawn support for Dr. F.J.
Lacanilao, appointed by the Council for
a two-year term effective 8 April 1986,
as Chief of AQD.
I therefore would like to convey to you
the unanimous agreement of the Council
Members asking you to seek further
clarification on this matter and inform
SEAFDEC Council accordingly. 11
We note from this letter that the SEAFDEC Council of
Directors has not approved the nomination of respondent
as chief of the Aquaculture Department. So far as the
records of this case in this Court show, the SEAFDEC
Council has not taken any further action on such
nomination.
The recommendation in favor of the respondent must be
regarded as legally ineffective for the fundamental
reason that there existed no vacancy to which the
respondent could be nominated by the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and to which the
respondent could be appointed by the SEAFDEC
Council. Notwithstanding the insinuations of the
respondent, we have no doubt that Dr. Lacanilao was
lawfully entitled to hold the position of the Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, as of 21
November 1986 when the respondent and his assistants
and retainers introjected themselves in the offices of the
Aquaculture Department. Until the tenure of the
petitioner is lawfully terminated in accordance with the
laws and regulations governing such tenure, no
nomination for the same position can be approved and
given effect It is clear that the nomination of the
respondent for a position then lawfully filled in
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement
Establishing the SEAFDEC, did not have the effect of
removing or otherwise terminating the two-year term of
the petitioner. The power to appoint having been vested
by Article 6 of the SEAFDEC Agreement in the Council,
the, power to remove must likewise be deemed lodged in
the Council, and not in the nominating member-
government. It is worth noting that under Article 6 (2) of
the Agreement, the power to appoint the Department-
Chiefs and the Deputy Department-Chiefs cannot be
delegated by the Council to the Secretary-General. It
follows, under the present terms of the SEAFDEC
Agreement, that the power to remove cannot similarly be
delegated to the Secretary-General.
It has been suggested by the respondent that a
nomination by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department should be regarded as equivalent to an
appointment to such position, upon the ground that "by
established diplomatic procedure (sic), the appointment
to be made by the SFAFDEC Council based on such
nomination or recommendation would be merely
ministerial as the Council, again by force of
international procedure (sic) could not override or reject
such nomination." 12 This suggestion of the respondent
is bereft of any basis in the Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC and indeed flies in the face of Article 10 (2)
of that Agreement. Under Article 10 (2) of the
Agreement, two distinct acts are essential for a
Department-Chief to be lawfully entitled to his position
as such: the recommendation of the government of the
member country in whose territory the department is
located; and the appointment to such position be the
SEAFDEC Council. The recommendation by the
government of the member country must be accepted by
the Council; a Department-Chief must be acceptable to
both the host government and the Council of the
SEAFDEC. If it be assumed that the SEAFDEC Council
has in the past uniformly accepted the recommendations
of the government of the host member country, that
circumstance assuredly does not mean that the
SEAFDEC Council cannot, under its constitutional
document, reject such a recommendation. Neither can it
be supposed that the recommendation by the government
of the host member country, by itself and without more,
would be sufficient to vest lawful title to the office
concerned. It follows that the recommendation dated 12
November 1986 in favor of the respondent cannot, in
and of itself, be regarded as lawfully authorizing him to
assume the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC, and to exclude the petitioner
from that same office.
We hold, accordingly, that the petitioner is entitled to the
position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, for the duration of his term or until that term
is otherwise ended conformably with applicable law,
including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.
Page 35 of 49 Legal Writing
The respondent also argues that the position of Chief of SO ORDERED.
the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a "public
office" and therefore not a proper subject of inquiry in a
quo warranto proceeding. The respondent further asserts
that the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, is not a
corporation and that the office of the Chief of the
Aquaculture Department is not therefore a corporate
position. These arguments need not detain us for long. It
is not necessary for us here to determine the precise
nature of the position of Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. The SEAFDEC exhibits some
of the features of an intergovernmental organization,
albeit of a fairly rudimentary type. Thus, the position of
the Chief of the Aquaculture Department may be
assimilated to a position within an intergovernmental
organization. There appears nothing to prevent the
petitioner, as the lawful holder of an office within an
international organization having offices within the
territory of the Philippines, from seeking the assistance
of the courts of the Philippines in protecting his right to
such office against the pretensions of the respondent.
The respondent himself sought the assistance of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 151, by filing a
complaint for injunction and damages, in attempting to
prevent the petitioner from continuing to exercise the
rights and responsibilities attaching to the position of
Chief of the Aquaculture Department. In his complaint
for injunction, the respondent made allegations entirely
analogous to those made in petitioner's Quo Warranto
petition: his own right to the office, and the defendant's
(petitioner herein) lack of right to the same office.

We would note, finally, that the present petition relates

to a controversy between two claimants to the same
position; this is not a controversy between the
SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee,
or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the
SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no
question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the
Court, there being no plea for such immunity whether by
or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of
SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC.

The present controversy has created considerable

confusion and anxiety among the officers and employees
of the Aquaculture Department and threatens the
paralization of the important activities, and dissipation of
funds and assets, of that Department. This controversy
should be resolved forthwith. In the exercise of the broad
jurisdiction of this Court and in the interest of prompt
and substantial justice, we treat the petition in this case
as a petition for injunction, the respondent's comment as
his answer thereto and dispose of the case accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby enjoined from

assuming the position and from discharging, or
continuing to discharge, directly or indirectly, the
powers and functions of the Chief of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. All acts, contracts and
directives done or issued by the respondent, or by
persons appointed or designated by him, are invalid and
ineffective unless adopted or ratified by the petitioner or
other competent authority of the Aquaculture
Department, SEAFDEC. The Temporary Restraining
Order we issued on 27 November 1986 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Page 36 of 49 Legal Writing

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT,
petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE
TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is
whether a person who has thrice failed the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it
again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3)
chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional
grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of
the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT
three times and flunked it as many times.1 When he
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his
application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then
went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked
his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2
In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order
No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule.
The additional grounds raised were due process and
equal protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision
on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid
and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of
his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision
must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who
have initially proved their competence and preparation
for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission
to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also
well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized
medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of
the state. What we have before us in the instant
case is closely related: the regulation of access
to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s.
1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of
the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies
and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining,
high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the
current state of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality
of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in,
for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in
other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking
into account the failure or inability of the
petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise,
we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate
end of legislation and regulation in this area.
That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects
of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds
for disease or trauma.
Page 37 of 49 Legal Writing
However, the respondent judge agreed with the
petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her
reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the
admission test and said nothing about the so-called
"three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case
cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This
may be gauged at least initially by the admission test
and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule.
The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the
State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly
within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is
not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This
is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to
one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are
not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be
a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer
may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised
and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a
plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his
entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted
aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private
respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule
and give way to those better prepared. Where even those
who have qualified may still not be accommodated in
our already crowded medical schools, there is all the
more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested
and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have
to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction
exists between medical students and other students who
are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule.
The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason,
do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant,
for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility
as that of the physician and so need not be similarly
treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants
who have passed the tests are admitted and others who
have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words,
what the equal protection requires is equality among
equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the
right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it
because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his
persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not
qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent
unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is
that he is a probably better, not for the medical
profession, but for another calling that has not excited
his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster;
in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even
be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is
entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward
what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes,
of dentists who should never have left the farm and
engineers who should have studied banking and teachers
who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing
the student to the course for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise,
we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in
intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
Page 38 of 49 Legal Writing
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused,
MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias
"Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-
appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not
appealed and thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The
others have questioned their conviction and insist that
they are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and
neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the
appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact
even increase the penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary
condemnation and instant punishment meted out by what
appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven
persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor,
went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who had
complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers.
Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to
execute each one of them in cold blood without further
ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and
died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in
horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground
and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified
wife and son. The third, who was only sixteen years old,
was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had
his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate
victims were only innocent farmers and not the
dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in
three separate informations, the four who stood trial
were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be
identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muñoz,
who did not appeal, has long become final and executory
and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the
appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora,
Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a
reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in
Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz,
Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the
other seven unidentified men went to the house of
Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his son
Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest
surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed.
Mauro, who was then bathing his horse, was called by
the accused. As he approached and while under his
house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at
arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting him in the
mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time,
Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing by Millora,
evidently giving him armed support. None of them made
any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the
house his sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked
him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head
as he lay on the ground while the others looked on in
silent approval or at least without objection. They then
took the bleeding man with them to look for their third
target, Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to
go with them and direct them to her husband. They
found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro.
Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and
then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot
Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly.
Millora, Tayaba and Mislang, along with their
companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was
committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror
and the 12-year old boy made a desperate run for his life
as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the
accused then vented their violence on Aquilino, whom
Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on.
Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended
the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the
head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all
the empty shells and fled with the rest of their
companions, leaving the terrified Juana with the two
grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia
Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose
Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana
Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11
their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the
three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father
by Marvin Minora as the other accused stood by and the
mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged
away by the group. The trial court especially noted the
straightforward account given by Jose, who positively
identified Minora as the killer and described the
participation of the others, including the savage kicking
of his brother by Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to
Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed
her mind later on cross-examination and named Millora
as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by
confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate
Minora in exchange for the sum of P3,000.00 promised
by his father although she actually did not receive the
money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was
threatened with death unless she accompanied the
accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail
how Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how
Aquilino was later kicked and then also shot to death,
also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her
testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the
accused had also thought of killing because he was
"talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully
escaped after his father's murder. 16
Page 39 of 49 Legal Writing
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only
months after the killings that it occurred to these
witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this
delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly
pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses
were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they
would meet the same fate that befell their relatives.
These were humble barrio folk whose timidity did not
allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio
officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities
appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention, much
less encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the
testimony of these witnesses as painstakingly pointed
out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that
do not detract from the essential truthfulness of their
accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the
testimony of the said witnesses are emphasized by the
medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the
victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of
entrance at the upper lip left side around 1 cm. in
diameter and with the exit at the middle of the back
of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the
mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the
whole eye practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the
forehead practically opened with the brain tissue
outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of
entrance at the upper right jaw bone around 1- 1/2
cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the
back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the
middle of the left clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in
diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which
the trial court correctly rejected as false and
unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a
result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group
and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between
the Bulataos and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani
said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five
others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano
Muñoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw seven
men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after
he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen
carabao. 21 Another witness for Millora, Orlando de los
Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between
the Bulataos and the other group and declared that the
former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he
appeared hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did
not give the impression that he was telling the truth. 23
Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the
alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not
mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's
family to condole with them. 24 It is also not believable
that the group would flee because they had no more
bullets when their supposed three adversaries were
already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made
by Muñoz was described by the trial court as
preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had
been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle rustler,
let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no
firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the
Bulataos, including Mauro, who was found not in the
supposed battleground but under his house, as testified
to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City
at the time of the killings, having gone there in the
evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed
there overnight with a female companion after drinking
beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos
City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning
or June 30, 1972. 27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28
but he cannot be more credible than Mauro's own
children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified
Millora as the person who actually shot their father in
the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic
experience could not have been forgotten by these
witnesses who saw their father murdered without
warning or mercy nor could their memory of the
heartless killer have been easily wiped out from their
minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also
categorically declared that Millora was with the group
that she took to the field where her husband and
Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of
alibi. Both claimed that Mislang having complained of
cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba,
stayed in the former's house the whole night of June 29,
1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following morning of
June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them breakfast.
30 Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where
Mislang's house was located, is only two kilometers
from Balite Sur. 31 Moreover, the trial court doubted the
testimony given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated
them and spoke of having heard the gunfire narrated by
Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao
was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr.
de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that
morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed
the suspicion that Lomibao and Patrolman Liwanag, who
also testified for the accused, might have been among
the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz
and the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were
murdered. 32
Page 40 of 49 Legal Writing
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial
and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous
case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings
of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
assess their credibility. The written record will
not show that nuance of tone or voice, the
meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause
and the prompt reply, and the expression or
color or tilt of face that will affirm the truth or
expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors
could be considered by the trial judge in
weighing the conflicting declarations before
him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz
and their seven other companions, participated in the
killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described by
the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the
herein appellants should be, as they properly were,
rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more
convincing and telling evidence submitted by the
government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of
participation assigned by the court a quo to each of the
appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them.
In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as
principal and Muñoz and the other two herein appellants
only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177
and 0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the
herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of
this finding, the trial court said that there was no
evidence of conspiracy to justify holding each of the
accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the
very start, when the eleven men went out to look for the
suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement
among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom
they had condemned beforehand. They knew whom they
were looking for. They knew where to look for them.
They sought each of them with drawn and ready
weapons. When they reached Mauro Bulatao's house,
four of them went inside while the rest deployed
themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot
Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns
at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him.
Together they dragged Aquilino from the house and the
rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head while
helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with
them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her
husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muñoz
shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop
him from also killing Aquilino. There is no question that
the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design
previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a
conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in equal
degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each
member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of
murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of who
actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It
is settled that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of
murder, qualified by alevosia. There was treachery
because every one of the three victims was completely
helpless and defenseless when shot and killed by the
accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was
completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the
face. Alejandro was lying down when he was shot in the
head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the head
and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to
resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, but this was modified by Article III,
Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as
follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not
imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for
under the said article but instead reduced the same to
reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision.
The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect
lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as
before, where the offense was not attended by any
modifying circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e.,
reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in
all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original
penalty, including death, was thus maintained except
that the maximum period was not imposed because of
the constitutional prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared
for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death
penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the
original maximum period. Later, without categorically
saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and
through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio
39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods,
the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L.
Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half of
reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper
half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and
reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after
extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the
doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention
of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l)
of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to
be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite
view, which was in fact shared by many of those now
voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court,
however, is of the belief that the original interpretation
should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the
constitutional provision in question.
Page 41 of 49 Legal Writing
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby
limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods,
to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now
be divided into three new periods in keeping with the
three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those
who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not,
by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These
should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily
show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision
merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough.
And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the
language under consideration is plain, it is neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like
the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made,
would not be of much assistance either in the case at bar.
Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the
framers to abolish the death penalty, we are still not
convinced from the debates in the Constitutional
Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust
the two remaining periods by dividing them into three
shorter periods. This is not a necessary consequence of
the provision as worded. The following exchange cited
by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-
provoking but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the
death penalty from those statutes-only the death
penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried
about, because the statutes, especially in the
General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly
with death. Sometimes it has a range of
reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua
to death. And what would be the effect on the
judges, for example, if the range is reclusion
temporal to death and he can no longer impose
the death penalty? He will have difficulty in
computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the
judge will look at the specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have
difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be
equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is
a range, the range cannot go as far as death
(Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower
than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion
perpetua. But the range of the penalty for
murder consists of three periods. The maximum
period of reclusion temporal under the present
status is the minimum period for the penalty for
murder. The medium period is reclusion
perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we
now remove the death penalty, we will,
therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal up to reclusion perpetua. You cannot
divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has
a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible
penalty. Where do we get the medium period
now until such time that Congress gets around to
accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which
lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are
saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol.
I, p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers
can argue with judges about." Assuming that
Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus
of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the
intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum
period but also the other periods of the original penalty.
That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that
"the judges will be equal to their task," especially so
since he also said and we think with more definiteness-
that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose
the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand
this to mean that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers
intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what
we should determine is whether or not they also meant to
require a corresponding modification in the other periods
as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was
one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of
the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and
unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy,
assuming such intention, to state it categorically and
plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches
in vain for such a statement, express or even implied.
The writer of this opinion makes the personal
observation that this might be still another instance
where the framers meant one thing and said another-or
strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did
not say enough.
Page 42 of 49 Legal Writing
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra,
Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then
constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit
on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second
look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before,
it is not because of a change in the composition of this
body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its
mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of
new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the
tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of
this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid once
pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change
as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is
best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial
or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a
spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be
equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby
reverse the current doctrine providing for three new
periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the
Constitution. Instead, we return to our original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l)
does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is
hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present
policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the
humble farmers would have remained unpunished were
it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials,
especially the police and the prosecuting officer, who
took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The
courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still
the most potent weapons against those who, in their
arrogance, believe that they can flout the law and
frustrate justice because they have the protection of
powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED
and all the accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty
as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and
0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer three (3)
penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to
the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of
P30,000.00 for each of the deceased, or a total indemnity
of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to

certain inequities that would not have arisen under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its
modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstance
will now be both punishable with the same medium
period although the former is concededly more guilty
than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of
this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of
wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is
the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid
the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had
worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid
the same amount. When he complained because he felt
unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied:
"Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me
for a penny?'

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court

but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute
and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As
judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have
no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not
encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being

no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable
sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and
announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty
we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the
three murders they have committed in conspiracy with
the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of

Page 43 of 49 Legal Writing

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G.
ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate
constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition,
the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the
ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the
need for stability in the public service, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and decide,
setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether
prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent
Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a
standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court
allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene
and file a petition in intervention. Comment was
required of respondents on said petition. The comment
was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December
1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom
line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great
departments of government, the Executive and
Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life
of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence
of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases
like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated
in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable
constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what they say and
provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the
1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups
of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
Page 44 of 49 Legal Writing
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the
present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by
the President with or without the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments? By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely
solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction.
We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to
determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the
intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the second, third and fourth groups,
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice
of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is
apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind
that a constitutional provision must be presumed
to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and
with reference to them. "Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution
are familiar with the previous and existing laws
upon the subjects to which its provisions relate,
and upon which they express their judgment and
opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13
N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the army
from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander,
and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides
that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the
heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank
of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all
other officers of The government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. However, the Batasang
Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies,
Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint
inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of
our political history that the power of confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with
the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President with
hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is
not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a
"middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments for the first group
of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e.,
those in the second and third groups as well as those in
the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16,
Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the
Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read
as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and,
with the consent of a Commission on
Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain and all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments 7
[Emphasis supplied].
Page 45 of 49 Legal Writing
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its
counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the
frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the
proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was
manifestly expressed to make the power of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential
appointments more limited than that held by the
Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that
Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call
Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's
indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for
some of the amendments that I would
like to propose to the Committee this
morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the
power of the Commission on Appointments be
limited to the department heads, ambassadors,
generals and so on but not to the levels of
bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16,
there were two (2) major changes proposed and
approved by the Commission. These were (1) the
exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from
the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments
made under the second sentence 9 of the section from
the same requirement. The records of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be
recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed
amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26
which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the
phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR
GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last
amendment which is co-authored by
Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.)
after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the
same page, start a new sentence with: HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the
amendments one by one. The first proposed
amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus"
on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other
Commissioners, what would be the justification
of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is
actually quite low in the executive department,
and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus
would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's
proposed amendment by deletion also includes
regional directors as distinguished from merely
staff directors, because the regional directors
have quite a plenitude of powers within the
regions as distinguished from staff directors who
only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are
under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau
directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to
Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner
proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus
on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau
directors if it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will
appoint them but their appointment shall no
longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line
with the same answer of Commissioner de
Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is
the reaction of the Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
Committee feels that this matter should be
submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the
amendments one by one. We will first vote on
the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line
26, such that appointments of bureau directors
no longer need confirmation by the Commission
on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President
shall nominate, and with the consent of a
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors. . . .
Page 46 of 49 Legal Writing
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to
delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line
26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is
recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third
proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1
propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on
line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
Committee accepts the proposed amendment
because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept
an amendment to his amendment, so that after
"captain" we insert the following words: AND
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are
positions provided for in the Constitution whose
appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different
constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of
officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive
list of those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the
incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide
restate his proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the
following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN
THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER
OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is
modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of
course, that excludes those officers which the
Constitution does not require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, like the
members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very
clear from the modification made by
Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this
proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and
Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this
proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and
Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence)
The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the
second and third groups of officers can be made
by the President without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator
Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . .
. . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that
the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers
mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the
President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said
second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Page 47 of 49 Legal Writing
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said
second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the
conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General
argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well;
besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62,
1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary,
stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means
that the President, in addition to nominating and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence,
can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the
possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to
derive significance from the fact that the first sentence
speaks of nomination by the President and appointment
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only
of appointment by the President. And, this use of
different language in two (2) sentences proximate to
each other underscores a difference in message conveyed
and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned
Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers
whose appointments require no confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may
be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments under the first sentence of the same
Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of
the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in
rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely
underscore the purposive intention and deliberate
judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that,
except as to those officers whose appointments require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments by
express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art.
VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is
inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of
what they were doing and of the foreseable effects
thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive
or presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly construed
against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions
therein enumerated require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President
can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President
alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law,
lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the
President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked
officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be
appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely
declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress
may by law vest their appointment in the President, in
the courts, or in the heads of the various departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No
reason however is submitted for the use of the word
"alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of
the considered opinion, after a careful study of the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the use of the word alone" after the word "President"
in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more
than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It
will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the
following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section
1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears
immediately after the provision which makes practically
all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the Army
from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander,
and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint; ...
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In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a
general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935
Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule,
to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11
officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987
Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed
out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason
to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that
Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-
ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or
in the heads of departments, because the power to
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of
the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In
short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import
from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the
1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of
the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court,
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on
the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law
to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau
of Customs shall have one chief and one
assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as the
'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27
October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec.
601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of
Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one
chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter
known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each
receive an annual compensation in accordance
with the rates prescribed by existing law. The
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of
Customs shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No.
34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however,
Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in
harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that,
while the appointment of the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President,
as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and
power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and
to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining
thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention
should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without
costs.
SO ORDERED.
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