113. TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES AASN vs PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.

GR NO. 170007 APR. 7, 2014

ISSUE:

Does the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction over issues with which a strike is grounded, even if such issues are

not within its competence?

RULING:

Yes. There was already an actual existing deadlock between the parties. What was lacking was the formal recognition of

the existence of such a deadlock because the union refused a declaration of deadlock. Thus, the union’s view that, at

the time the Secretary of Labor and Employment exercised her power of assumption of jurisdiction, the issue of

deadlock was neither an incidental issue to the matter of unfair labor practice nor an existing issue is incorrect. More

importantly, however, the union’s mistaken theory that the deadlock issue was neither incidental nor existing is based

on its premise that the case is all a bout the company’s alleged unfair labor practice of bargaining in bad faith, which is

the ground stated in its first Notice of Strike. The Secretary of the DOLE has been explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of

the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in

an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. And, as a matter of necessity, it

includes questions incidental to the labor dispute; that is, issues that are necessarily involved in the dispute itself, and

not just to that ascribed in the Notice of Strike or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. The totality of the

company’s Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction, including every allegation therein, also guided the Secretary of Labor

and Employment in the proper determination of the labor dispute over which he or she was being asked to assume

jurisdiction.

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114. A. SORIANO AVIATION vs EMPLOYEES ASSN OF A. SORIANO AVIATION

GR NO. 166879 AUG. 14, 2009

ISSUE:

Whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the "No

Strike-No Lockout" clause of the CBA and, if in the affirmative, whether individual respondents are deemed to have lost

their employment status on account thereof?

RULING:

The Court rules in the affirmative. The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97,

the first strike or the mechanics' refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the

management-imposed new work schedule. Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without complying with

the procedural requirements, then the same is a violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA.

Respecting the second strike, where the Union complied with procedural requirements, the same was not a violation of

the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No Lockout" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement

(CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is

conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It

would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. In the present case, the Union

believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on strike on account of the 30-day

suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-busting, among others.

The Court holds that the second strike became invalid due to the commission of illegal action in its course.

The Union committed illegal acts during the strike. The Union members' repeated name-calling, harassment and threats

of bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of

placards, banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to

doubt reliability of its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.

That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the

strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264

does it require that violence must be continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike. The acts

complained of including the display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the part of the company

and its officers, apparently with the end in view of intimidating the company's clientele, are, given the nature of its
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business, that serious as to make the "second strike" illegal. Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners

and placards, coupled with the name-calling and harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted to to coerce the

resolution of the dispute — the very evil which Art. 264 seeks to prevent.

As to the issue of loss of employment of those who participated in the illegal strike:

The liability for prohibited acts has thus to be determined on an individual basis. A perusal of the Labor Arbiter's

Decision, which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC, shows that on account of the staging of the illegal strike, individual

respondents were all deemed to have lost their employment, without distinction as to their respective participation.

Of the participants in the illegal strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in the case of union

officers or knowingly participated in the commission of violent acts during the illegal strike in the case of union

members, the records do not indicate. While respondent Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no

indication if he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The Court not being a trier of facts, the remand of the case to

the NLRC is in order only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of individual respondents and their

respective liability, if any.

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115. TOYOTA MOTORS PHILS., CORP LABOR UNION vs TOYOTA MOTORS PHILS CORP EMPLOYEES UNION

GR NO. 135806 AUG. 8, 2002

ISSUE:

Can a labor union not yet being issued with a certificate of registration validly file a petition for certification election?

RULING:

No. If a labor organization’s application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, a labor

organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of registration has

been issued, the propriety of its registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration

proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the

issuance of an order for certification election. In the present case, since TMPCEWU had not acquired legal personality

for the reason that its composition, being a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it cannot validly file a

petition for election, more so can it become a bargaining representative of the workers in the company.

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116. TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION vs CA

GR. NO. 143013-14, December 18, 2000

ISSUE:

Despite assumption orders from the Secretary of Labor, can a union validly hold a strike against its employer?

RULING:

No. It is clear from Article 263 of the Labor Code that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a

labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically

enjoining the intended orimpending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order

directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically

carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption

order. Also, Article 264 provides that “No strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Secretary or after certification or subm ission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or

during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.” The rationale of this

prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority,

that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. It was

held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he

has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.

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117. CHUA vs NLRC

GR NO. 105775 FEB 8, 1993

ISSUE:

Can a union member in an unlawful and violent strike constitute a valid cause for his dismissal from employment?

RULING:

Yes. His participation in the unlawful and violent strike, which strike resulted in multiple deaths and extensive

property damage, constituted serious misconduct on his part. Since his participation in the unlawful and violent strike

was amply shown by substantial evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding that the dismissal of Chua was valid being

based on lawful or authorized cause. On the issue of granting financial assistance, the Court disagrees with the

Labor Arbiter that Chua should be entitled to it. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court considers that such

award of "financial assistance" was obviously unjustified. This Court has several times ruled that "financial assistance",

whatever form it might assume, is permissible where the employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instances

where the cause of dismissal was something other than serious misconduct on the part of the employee or other cause

reflecting adversely on the employee's moral character.

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118. ESCARIO ET AL. vs NLRC

GR NO. 160302 SEPT 27, 2010

ISSUE:

Won, they are entitled to back wages during the illegal strike?

RULING:

Petitioners not entitled to backwages despite their reinstatement.A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor. Back-wages are

not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they do not render work

for the employer during the period of the illegal strike.With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for

a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the

employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally

locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working.Under the principle of a fair day’s

wage for a fair day’s labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during the period of the strike (even if the

strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike. Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the

dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the latter’s time.