G.R. No.

L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.

Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against
the following observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of
actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only
to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to
the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional
conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient
reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to
in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners'
counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with
respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were
obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property,
why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez
challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however,
to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More
than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the
issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which
did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso
Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his
wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing
fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio
Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that
courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the
ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear,
however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of
the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic
civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same
reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs.
Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels
appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the
movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court
assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution.
Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since
the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had
staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance
of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their
counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought,
on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the
reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he
filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied
his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in
the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ
of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due
to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for
reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the
movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with
deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of
antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on
a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that
they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had
been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was
delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper
remedy" when we said that.
 In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged,
but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent
action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied
stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful
claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases
7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting
satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been
instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out
of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that
said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the
controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not
the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance
of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively,
for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of
their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to
the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with
the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she
instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the
same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9,
1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted
the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the
said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the
pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more
assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the
latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each
counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in
construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible
for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had
rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty.
Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to
the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October,
1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of
"Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion
discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified
in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against
the petitioners.

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,

vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of
adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot
with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that
Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of
April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the
house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal
abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered
that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City.
He had brought his car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974;
Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three
executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26,
1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to
know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as
the man wearing eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted
that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his
son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He
declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the
nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and
San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the
respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not
file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his
abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning
one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs.
Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the
Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the
complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or
suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings
were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented
evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses.
The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June
1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa
Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint
recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be
married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the
complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel
at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,
complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon
as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed
himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled
complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on
the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening
when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June
1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait
until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family
way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to
comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which
he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid
of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9,
1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded
twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant
became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July,
1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who
appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the
respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is
deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence
produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that
respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel
(Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed
at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When
she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling
him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year,
telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to
Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City
in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter
to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by
a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission
of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she
gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a
witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for
money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit
complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts
up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony
of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November
3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not
because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule
138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with
her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it
is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the
allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend
or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our
Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No.
104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter
of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules
of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient
and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated
in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.

G.R. No. L-9152 December 28, 1956

JOSEFINA MORTEL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, and CESAR ASPIRAS, defendants-appelle.

Concepcion Zacarias for appellant.

Anacleto F. Aspiras in his own behalf and for his co-appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

In October 1954 Josefina Mortel filed in the Manila court of first instance a complaint against Anacleto F. Aspiras and Cesar
Aspiras (Civil Case No. 24414) alleging substantially:

That posing as a bachelor Anacleto courted her in 1952 in Romblon province, and persuaded her to come to manila for
their wedding; that for such purposes he arrived in the city, and stayed in the house of her sister in Pasay, where Anacleto,
repeating his assurances of marriage lived with her as her husband; that subsequently, heeding plaintiff's insistence on
the wedding, Anacleto accompanied her to the City Hall to obtain a marriage license; that there he introduced her son
Cesar to her as a nephew, and then left them both in the building, after saying that Cesar already knew what to do; that
with the help of Atty. Moises Espino both obtained a marriage license; that several days later plaintiff was made to marry
Cesar Aspiras in the presence of Anacleto, who led her to believe she was really marrying him thru Cesar Aspiras as a
proxy; that after such marriage ceremony she continued to live with Anacleto as his wife — never with Cesar, with whom
she never had amorous relations; and that she had a baby born January 24, 1954 of defendant Anacleto Aspiras, who
turned out to be married to another woman.

She asked annulment of her marriage to Cesar Aspiras, and for judgment requiring defendants to pay her, jointly and
severally, a monthly allowance of P150.00 and damages in the total sum of P72,580.00.

On November 9, 1954 defendants filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: no cause of action, and prior judgment in Civil
Case No. 19115 of the same court. .

On February 11, 1955, the court issued an order saying,

Upon motion of the defendants this case is dismissed it being a repetition of civil Case No. 19115 (Josefina
Mortel vs. Anacleto Aspiras and Cesar Aspiras) which was dismissed upon separate motions of the parties in the order of
this Court of April 11, 1953.

The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in a court resolution explaining that this case "is a
reiteration substantially of the old case No. 19115" . . . which was "dismissed upon separate motions of both parties" and
such "dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court".

Consequently the plaintiff appealed to this Court alleging error in the application of Rule 30 section 4, inasmuch as the
matter was governed by sec. 1 of same Rule 30.

Civil Case No. 19115 was admittedly filed March 1953. The allegations of the complaint therein were practically the same
as those in the present litigation; before filing of the answer, plaintiff Josefina Mortel submitted on April 9, 1953 a motion
to dismiss her complaint "stating that she was in fact and in truth married to the defendant Cesar Aspiras and Anacleto F.
Aspiras participated in the solemnization of the marriage as the father of Cesar Aspiras, and that she filed her said
complaint at the height of anger and thus the contents thereof did not represent her true sentiments" (29 Record on
Appeal). It is also admitted that on April 1, 1953 the defendants in said Civil Case No. 19115 presented a motion to dismiss,
asserting the plaintiff had no cause of action because she "was a school teacher, knew that she contracted the marriage
with Cesar Aspiras and that there were no misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated against her." (15, 29 Record on Appeal.)

There is no question that on April 11, 1953 the court issued, in said civil case, an order stating, "upon separate motions of
both parties the complaint is hereby dismissed".

For the sake of clearness the rules cited by both sides are quoted:

SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff . — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that. . . .

SEC. 4. Effect of dismissal on the grounds. — Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates an adjudication upon the merits. (Rule 30, Rules of Court.)

There is another reason that may be pertinent:

SEC. 2. By order of the court. — Except as provided in the preceeding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. . . . Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. . . .

In the light of the above provisions, let us examine what transpired in Civil Case No. 19115. Before the answer was made,
plaintiff filed a "Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss"; and she asked the court "that the complaint . . . be withdrawn
and/or dismissed". At first glance her pleading does not fall exactly within the letter of the "notice" contemplated by
section 1. In addition it asked for a court order of dismissal.

But if it does not fall under section 1, it may be considered as a motion which the court could dispose of under section 2.
When acting under such section to court could consult the wishes of the defendant. The defendant may object; but the
court may order dismissal, and such order is without prejudice. Wherefore if the defendant agrees, the order is
a fortiori also without prejudice. Unless otherwise expressly stated, of course.1awphil.net

Now then, the defendant's motion to dismiss in April 1953 could in legal contemplation be deemed a conformity to
plaintiff's motion to withdraw. Therefore, the court's order upon both motions should be without prejudice, under section
2.

On the other hand, viewing the pleading with liberality a and seeing thru the form to the substance, the plaintiff's "motion
to withdraw or dismiss" of April 9 amounted practically to a "notice" of dismissal, before service of the answer, because
it advised the defendants of plaintiff's desire to withdraw. Its caption did not alter nor disguise its nature as plaintiff's
statement of her determination to drop the matter. It contemplated, it is true, a court order of dismissal; but it was not
thereby taken out of the purview of section 1, since even after a "notice" given under said section, a court's order of
dismissal would not be incongrous. Defendant's conformity, if openly given, would be surplusage, and would not modify
the ensuing juridical situation.

As we see section 1, when the plaintiff files the notice, the matter is dismissed without the necessity of a court order; but
a court order may subsequently be entered definitely taking cognizance of the withdrawal and shelving the expediente,
without thereby throwing the matter out of the scope of said section 1 (b).
Being then of the opinion that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19115 could be classified either under section 1 or under
section 2, we cannot but declare section 4 to the inapplicable. In other words, we hold the dismissal to be without
prejudice. At most, defendants may contend that the order of April 11, 1953 was also an order sustaining their motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, such order barring subsequent litigation. In fact such was their contention in the court
below. (p. 27 Record on Appeal.) However, we do not believe that the court's order meant to declare that plaintiff had no
cause of action. It did not say, "For the reasons stated in defendant's motion" the case is dismissed. It merely stated "upon
separate motions of both parties the complaint is dismissed" — which ordinarily could mean "since both parties ask for
dismissal, the case is dismissed". In all probability the court did not stop to consider the merits of the controversy. Indeed
it would be a debatable point whether the court could still properly delve into the merits of the case after plaintiff had
withdrawn. b

Anyway, even granting that the court's order also held that no cause of action existed, the situation would be one wherein
the order was both provisional and final in character (if that is legally possible). Then it would not be fair to apply such
finality to plaintiff, since she would thereby be forever barred from submitting her claim to the courts, although she had
reasons to believe the order was a provisional dismissal. On the other hand, considering the order as provisional,
defendants would not be unduly prejudiced nor definitely harmed, because they are not deprived of the opportunity to
defend themselves. Defendants should have insisted either that the court make a specific ruling upon their motion or that
the dismissal be expressly made with prejudice.lawphil.net

It may be stated that in this connection that we are all the more inclined to permit this new litigation, because in another
expediente we have just decided, (of which we may take judicial notice) (Adm. Case No. 154, Mortel vs. Aspiras), evidence
has been introduced indicating that the plaintiff's motion for dismissal had been prepared at the request of defendant
Anacleto Aspiras who promised plaintiff full support, — and that there is prima facie merit to her claims for annulment
and damages.

This is verily one instance requiring liberal construction of the Rules for the purpose of assisting the parties to obtain just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of their controversies — without regard to technical objections that do not square
with the ends of justice.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to
serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not
be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and
a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint
and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his
Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.
Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their
conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to
complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason
was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to
respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus
which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution
dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing
on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex
parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August
1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do
so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be
deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly
considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986.
Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The
Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the
first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then
married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14);
it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant
and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the
Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence
(ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their
marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation
and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13,
16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status
explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15);
they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986,
pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their
married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance
until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22);
she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed
before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan,
where a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an
administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated from the
service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29).

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14
July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan
Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior
marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as
to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent
has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the
second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that
her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being
a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which
holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan
Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage
to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his
unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his
gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and
to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether
the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well
of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe
of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract
a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him
through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage
with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral
conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error
forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's
Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to
all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that
respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under
threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant
further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced
abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal
knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred
that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of which was
respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house who
assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in
all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila
Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days
(Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around
three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and
then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor
rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an
abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext
that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and
nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and she
was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front
of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).

Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray
examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never
came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but
he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp.
8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was
never presented to refute the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As
special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to
wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees
barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise
contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had
carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of
respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern
(pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to
believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days
where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she
would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban
and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but
their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with
respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however,
are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp.
43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by
sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of
intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any
intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered
submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of
the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar,
under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec.
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him.
With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are
bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the
testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the
latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding,
respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person
to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards
of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States
v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it
is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA
439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about
ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years
suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as
having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v.
Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at
bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual
gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would
flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason
to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile
to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is
not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore
serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not
render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of
law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of
immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the
moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies
that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his
position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent
Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described
therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and
praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent
"be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part
of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their
house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on
the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth
with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on
the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay
on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with
his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents,
otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock
that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the
outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after
August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him.
Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her
aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).

The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He
testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December,
1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for
seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed
her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had
sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity.
He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my
common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed
the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-
25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).

xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she
surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged
rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's
exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted,
and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could
not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of
marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he,
respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis,
treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that
he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar
examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a
married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar
examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified
from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.

xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION

Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently
removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape
nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended
to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that
he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and
unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the
permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of
attorneys."

In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action",
since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and
that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the
case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit
a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge
of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That
the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as
follows:

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna
(t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already
married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent
and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she
was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her
(t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told
respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in
1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister
Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had
already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga,
Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home
to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n.
29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent
(t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The
affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on
February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18
years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he
began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery;
that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he
found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that
from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife;
that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her
husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place,
nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate
from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned
to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate
from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her'
(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention
to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state
said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated;
and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor
General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed
his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he
was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation
with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent
be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case
was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times,
and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia
Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.

The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation
with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.

It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant
and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this
count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section
25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration
is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it
is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority,
and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will
give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing
In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-
making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes
and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the
general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory
grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of
a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may
consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the
decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically
any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual
intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to
kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the
law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.

Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and
that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He
also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle
and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could
not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be
a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability.
He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a
principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good
moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless
rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would
be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine
Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and
his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of
lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only
to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.

The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this
is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by
the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that
his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost
13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to
extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations
with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining
adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece
is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the
privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).

The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against
him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the
complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which
state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings
of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.

SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced
in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge
in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely,
the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file
the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore
is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to
his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly
erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective
term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other
people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not
satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d]
744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612).
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived
an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status,
did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or
now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of
attorneys.

A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989

PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.

Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred the Petition to
the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.

During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent and his counsel
appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the hearing. The hearing scheduled for
24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon failure of complainant to appear
before the Office of the Solicitor General.

This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set
the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of
their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.

The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988 because only complainant
appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was
again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither complainant nor her counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988
was once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was
rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.

In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to appear at the hearing
on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter submit the case for
resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989.

On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:

1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan Tinio.

Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as shown on the document;

2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan.

Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the child as shown on the document:

3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital.

Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital and
for which respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors;

4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical Clinic.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy at said clinic and for which respondent paid
the bill for hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors;

5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the children:

6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing respondent either singly or with the rest of the family during happier
times.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived together as husband and wife and begot two
children and the respondent admits these through the pictures:

7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the schooling of the children as he himself signed the
correspondence and was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1

Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors submitted to us its findings
and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:

Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became lovers. Beginning in 1976,
the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now
about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner
discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior
marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10) years
later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and
aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's parents in supporting her children who were then already in school.
Respondent's parents gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.

After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP Investigating
Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and his having begotten two (2) children by
her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, we
agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the
practice of law "not for having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the
suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.

The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not merely because he has
failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also because for a prolonged period of time, he
lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character
that is required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral
turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law until further orders
from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the Commission and to this
Court that respondent is supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate children and that he has given
up his immoral course of conduct.

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant
Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the
Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days
from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version
of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an answer
to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the
Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting
of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled
for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989.
The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order
of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had already
"reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to
appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion
to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either
party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted
to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the
future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born.
In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his
job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to
stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with
respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent
Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same
time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that
he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would,
however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his
legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children
in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken
his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant,
compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig,
gave her custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and
continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and
respondent had been reconciled with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him
as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required
to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership
in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued possession ... of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to
note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to
the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel,
the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the
marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral
conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who
consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another
woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a married
woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with
another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his
own daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders
from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the
Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

[A.C. No. 5252. May 20, 2004]

PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross misconduct and as being unfit
to continue his membership in the Bar. In a three-page complaint-affidavit complainant averred that respondent obtained
a loan from the former and, to secure the repayment thereof, drew and issued two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first
check (No. 0350973) was presented for payment upon maturity, the same was dishonored for insufficient funds. According
to complainant, respondent, acting with malice and deceit, dated the second check January 24, 1996, so that, once
presented for payment, it would be, considering, in passing, that the loan was incurred on 23 November 1996, a stale
check. She alleged that, despite repeated verbal and written demands, respondent had failed to make good his obligation.

Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice. In a letter,
dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked that the complaint be now considered submitted for resolution in view of
the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of the Court requiring him to file his comment. In a resolution, dated 06
December 2000, the Court noted the letter of complainant, and it directed that the complaint be thereby referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the complaint, respondent continued to ignore
the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The
complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his having been duly notified of the hearing by personal
service effected on 12 February 2002. Respondents failure to appear prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to grant
the request of complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An order was issued setting the proceedings on 18
March 2002 for such reception of evidence. A copy of the order was served on respondent on 28 February 2002 at his
given address.

On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of PTT, requesting for a
resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was already committed to attend a hearing at
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20 March 2002.

The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainants evidence ex-parte was held, but the same was
without loss of right on the part of respondent to conduct, if desired, a cross-examination of the witness. The evidence of
complainant showed that complainant used to avail of the notarial services of Atty. Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura,
Ermita, Manila. In 1995, respondent requested complainant, and the latter agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the
baptismal of his daughter. In November 1996, respondent accompanied by a certain Arlene went to the residence of
complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent the sum of P60,000.00 payable with interest at 5% a
month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank Checks No. 35073 and No. 35076, each for P31,800.00, dated 23
December 1996 and 24 January 1996, respectively. When presented for collection Check No. 035073 was dishonored by
the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The other check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24
January 1996, was not accepted for being a stale check.

Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to be futile. Several demand letters were
sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainants lawyer, but these letters also failed to elicit any response. A
criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for
Check No. 035073. Finding probable cause, the complaint was subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A
warrant of arrest was issued by the court, but respondent somehow succeeded in evading apprehension. Sometime in
November 2000, respondent went to the house of complainant and promised to pay the checks within a months
time. Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of arrest withheld but, again, respondent failed to make good
his promise.

The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer was directed to transcribe
the stenographic notes as soon as possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An order was issued to this effect, and a copy
thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.

On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear despite due notice. In
light of the manifestation of complainant that she had no other witness to present and was ready to close her evidence,
she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a formal offer and respondent was given a like period to
thereupon submit his comment and/or opposition thereto. The order, dated 22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza
on 28 May 2002. The formal offer of complainants evidence was deemed submitted for resolution on 25 June
2002 pending proof of service of a copy thereof upon respondent and the filing of the necessary comment or opposition
thereto by the latter.

In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of evidence for respondent on 13 November
2002 in order to give him another opportunity to rebut the evidence of complainant. Respondent again failed to appear
on the date set therefor, prompting the Commission to rule on the admissibility of Exhibits A to D with their
submarkings. There being no appearance on the part of respondent despite due notice, the case was considered
submitted for resolution by the Commission in its order of 26 February 2003.

The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending the suspension of
respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that he be ordered to pay to
complainant the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to complainant.
The Court adopts the recommendation.

A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice, or
misconduct in office.[1] The word conduct used in the rules is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his
professional duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative[2] and are
broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. [3] Such
misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law,[4] in serious doubt.

Respondents issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just obligation for nearly eight
years is appalling[5] and hardly deserves compassion from the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is hereby ordered suspended from
the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt hereof. This decision is without prejudice to the
outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him. Let copies of this decision be
spread on his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8392 June 29, 2010

[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175 ]

ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)1 with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she
detailed in her Position Paper2 as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In October 2007,
respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group
known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his
visits became scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent
brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs.
When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to
wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members including a
certain Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak, pale and walking
barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious group refused to release
her, however, without the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1
Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy
for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first
wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit3 of Delia dated February 5,
2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo4 dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage5 between
respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the Marriage Contract6 between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National
Statistics Office Certification7 dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April
27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and
certified machine copy of the Resolution8 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the
Information9 lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and
Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of herein complainant.

Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order10 of the Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his
Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to "properly make [his] defense in a verified
pleading,"11 he did not file any Answer.1avvphi1

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly notified, only
complainant’s counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.

Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation12 dated September 29,
2008, found that:

[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly
immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

xxxx

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a
lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the
disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her.
In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and
Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her
to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave] the
undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.13 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution14 dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating
Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation well taken.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.15 When a lawyer’s moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to
the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.16

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges brought
against him, suggesting that they are true.17 Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that he would come up
with his defense "in a verified pleading," he never did.

Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he also
violated the Lawyer’s Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The April 30, 2008 Resolution18 of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainant’s charge against respondent and Bernardita
Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of strengthening the
allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physical restraint employed by Atty.
Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by
the two women and police officers, complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have
been physically detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to restrict
her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be impossible
for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to
Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders
coming from respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely. That can
be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez
would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and feet.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against respondent, his therein co-
respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and that the allegations against him remain
unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed
in an administrative case against a lawyer.20

In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has
ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.21

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the records of respondent in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.