IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

249 SCRA 538

October 25 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to develop
and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and
when ISA’s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is itself
an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was
issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land
located in Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated 16 November
1982, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private
respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise
its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of
private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same
to the NSC.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.

HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not possess
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the
Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may thus be
properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and
liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties,
functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring
agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency and, by way
of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision
having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
ANTONIO MECANO VS. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292),
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains
that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the
first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily
conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada
issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service.
Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force “Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the
same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Court’s power of judicial
review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a public office, as
that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception is when it
comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to
control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the president’s power
to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per year.
To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50
million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.

Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition
is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist,
there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary.
BAGAOISAN VS NAT'L TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5, 2003.

DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN
DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO

JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by
ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

1. The petitioner was terminated from his position in the national tobacco administration as a result of the executive order issued
by President Estrada mandating for the stream lining of the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the
department of agriculture.

2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the ossp.

3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and
a temporary restraining order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of
termination and from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.

4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to the position
similar to the one that they hold before.

5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC.

6. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of executive order by the
president.

HELD: YES.

According to the Supreme Court, the president has the power to reorganize an office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency as provided under Executive Order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive
agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public service.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for
lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. No costs.
Title : MARIANO J. PIMENTEL vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Citation : G.R. No. L-53581-83

December 19, 1980

Ponente : ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts :

Herein petitioners are the contestants while herein private respondents are the contestees in Election Cases Nos. 8, 9
and 10 which are pending before the court of First Instance of Quirino. Petitioners-contestants allege that they were duly certified
candidates for mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Diffun, Quirino Province, in the
general elections held last January 30, 1980 but that they were not considered as such by the Municipal Board of Canvasser
who, consequently, did not count the votes in their favor (having considered the same as stray votes) and proceeded of proclaim
the contestees as the duly elected officials.

Petitioners contestants contend that had it not been for the said error in the appreciation of the votes cast in their favor, they
would have certainly emerged as the winners in said election. They therefore pray of said Court of First Instance of Quirino - (1)
to fix the bond to be filed by them: (2) to cause to be brought to the court the registration list, the unused ballots and the
documents used in all of the precincts of the municipality of Diffun; (3) to order the examination of the ballots, using the necessary
officers with emoluments to be fixed by said court: (4) to order the votes cast in favor of contestants to be counted in their favor;
and (5) to annul the proclamation of the contestees and to declare the contestants as the duly elected officials of Diffun.

On March 20, 1980, the CFI of Quirino issued an order denying the motion of the contestees. On that same day the
counsel for the contestees orally moved for reconsideration of said order; but the court denied said motion for reconsideration
in an order of even date. Accordingly, the court ordered the opening of the ballot boxes and the counting of the votes as reflected
in the ballots and not in the election returns.

On March 22, 1980, the contestees filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the CFI of Quirino from enforcing its orders of March 20, 1980. Acting on said petition,
the COMELEC issued on March 25, 1980 Resolution No. 9592. In view of such resolution of the COMELEC, the CFI of Quirino
issued on April 1, 1980, an order postponing the hearing of Election Cases Nos. 8, 9 and 10 "until such time that a superior
Court orders otherwise or after the petition for certiorari, etc., filed by contestees with the Commission on Elections has been
resolved." Contestants moved for a reconsideration of said order but the CFI of Quirino denied the same.

Thus, on April 10, 1980, the contestants filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to annul Resolution No. 9592 of the Commission on Elections.

Issue :

Whether or not the Resolution issued by the Comelec is valid.

Held :

No. While it is true that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
involving cases appealable to it, the grant of jurisdiction is not by virtue of the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, but by express legislative fiat, namely, Sec. 30 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296). to wit:

SEC. 30. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. — The Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs s and process in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

No such legislative grant of jurisdiction exists in the case of the Commission on Elections. Consequently, respondents'
contention that the Commission on Elections has Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or man mandamus involving
election cases cognizable by the Courts of First Instance and appealable to said Commission cannot be sustained. It results,
therefore, that Resolution, that Resolution No. 9592 was issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. Resolution No. 9592, issued by the
Commission on Elections in EAC No. 1-80 is hereby declared null and void and said Commission is permanently enjoined from
taking any further action on said case except to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against private respondents.
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they
having allegedly been foundto be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Fiveof these six
dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. TheBoard found the dismissals to be illegal because affected
without formal chargeshaving been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, andordered the remand of the
cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinaryproceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By
Resolution,the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSISappealed to the SC and affirmed the
decision of the CSC with a modification thatit eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the investigationand
reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs ofthe deceased sought execution of the order from
the CSC which was granted.GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does nothave any power
to execute its resolution or judgment.Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.Ratio : The Civil
Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and theCommission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested
by theConstitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civilservice, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It
has the authority to hear anddecide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to iton appeal.The Civil
Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure
on administrativedisciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by theconstitutional and statutory provisions.
The provisions are analogous andentirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman byPD 807, subject
to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In lightof all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would
appearabsurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority toenforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obviousthat the
authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authorityto see that what has been decided is carried out.

Hence, the grant to a tribunal oragency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of authority toenforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law
otherwiseprovides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation ofdisciplinary administrative proceedings, or the
continuation of any thenpending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the bindingforce of the Resolution
of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, itmakes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent
topayment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree auseless exercise.
Title : ALEJANDRO V. DONATO, JR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REG OFFICE NO. 1

Citation : G.R. No. 165788

February 7, 2007

Ponente : CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts :

Petitioner Alejandro Donato, Jr. was a secondary school teacher at the San Pedro Apartado National High School in
Alcala, Pangasinan while Gil C. Arce was the Assessment Clerk II at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the same
municipality. On October 5, 1998, the Management Information Office of the CSC in Diliman, Quezon City received an
anonymous letter-complaint requesting an investigation on the alleged dishonest act committed by Donato, Jr. It was alleged
that Donato, Jr., falsely representing himself as Arce during the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in 1995,2
took the said examination in behalf of the latter.

Subsequently, a trial-type hearing was conducted where the parties, particularly Donato, Jr. and Arce, were given the
opportunity to proffer documentary and testimonial evidence. Thereafter, the CSCRO 1, through Lorenzo S. Danipog, Director
IV, rendered Decision No. 2001-1137 dated May 30, 2001 in Administrative Case No. 99-27, dismissing Donato, Jr. and Arce
from the service for dishonesty and falsification of official document.

Issue:

Whether or not there was irregularity in the proceeding undertaken by respondent.

Held:

As a general rule, factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are
conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Such minimum requirements have been satisfied in this case for, in fact,
hearings were conducted by the CSCRO 1 and the petitioner and Arce actively participated therein and even submitted their
respective evidence. Moreover, they were able to seek reconsideration of the decision of the CSCRO 1 and, subsequently, to
elevate the case for review to the CSC and the CA.

The CSCRO 1 in this case, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is not bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence in the adjudication of cases, subject only to limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As earlier
opined, these basic requirements of due process have been complied with by the CSC, including the CSCRO 1.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error when it affirmed the resolutions of the CSC finding the petitioner guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of official document. The petitioner has miserably failed to present any cogent reason for the Court
to deviate from the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally
held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.
CIR v. CA, CITY TRUST BANKING CORP.

GR No. 86785, November 21, 1991

234 SCRA 348

FACTS: Respondent corporation Citytrust filed a refund of overpaid taxes with the BIR by which the latter denied on the ground
of prescription. Citytrust filed a petition for review before the CTA. The case was submitted for decision based solely on the
pleadings and evidence submitted by the respondent because the CIR could not present any evidence by reason of the repeated
failure of the Tax Credit/Refud Division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case, as well as the investigation report thereon,
to the Solicitor General. CTA rendered the decision ordering BIR to grant the respondent's request for tax refund amounting to
P 13.3 million.

ISSUE: Failure of the CIR to present evidence to support the case of the government, should the respondent's claim be granted?

HELD: Not yet. It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the errors committed by its agents.
In the performance of its governmental functions, the State cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers. Although
the Government may generally be estopped through the affirmative acts of public officers acting within their authority, their
neglect or omission of public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should not produce that effect.

Nowhere is the aforestated rule more true than in the field of taxation. It is axiomatic that the Government cannot and must not
be estopped particularly in matters involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation through which the government agencies
continue to operate and with which the State effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents. The errors of certain
administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the Government's financial position, especially in the case at bar
where the amount involves millions of pesos the collection whereof, if justified, stands to be prejudiced just because of
bureaucratic lethargy. Thus, it is proper that the case be remanded back to the CTA for further proceedings and reception of
evidence.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges
is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment
of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken
as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits
for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and
the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF
CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted
cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary
of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and
has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern,
more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly
delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing
rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation
of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty
obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:

No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1)
R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered,
and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as
to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs
renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed,
the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative
officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the
date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the
date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the
judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of
execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177
which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and
not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without
any other evidence whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall
within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes
in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither
signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and
specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried
out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall
take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict."
The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The
question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already
imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative
officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To
begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution
procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not
providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of
Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the
said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being
an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances
when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted
upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over
seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the
power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may
be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No.
7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation
of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits
the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year
reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with
the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Isidro Cariño vs The Commission on Human Rights

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to
air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and
on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension
of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an
action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and
issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human
rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights
violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein.
The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

***INVESTIGATION – gathering of facts VS. ADJUDICATION – judgement

For investigation as part of admin work need not require notice and hearing, as compared to adjudication.

Generally, admin agencies cannot issue subpoena – unless otherwise provided by the law.

***When there is power to issue subpoena, there is a power to contempt. Because it is in the nature of judicial power.

***Adjustment of rates is quasi-legislative. Any amendment to the IRR must be published.

***Rules can be changed, except when vested rights are affected.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF
HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION. (which previously was until 75
years old)

ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92

ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON

MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C.
CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER

RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT

ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS'
RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT
IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT
THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE
PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND
HEARING.

THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT
IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY
THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENT

What is performed here is quasi-legislative. What is to be implemented is an IRR based on an already passed law. No need for
public hearing. There was a violation of the substantial due process – property right was restricted.
CASE DIGEST : RESTITUTO YNOT VS IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of
the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting
the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see
how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case,
the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed
a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
Title : RUFINO O. ESLAO vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Citation : G.R. No. 108310

September 1, 1994

Ponente : FELICIANO, J.:

Facts :

On 9 December 1988, Pangasinan State University (PSU) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation
operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project was part of the commitment of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under
the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project
agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.

On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment of honoraria and per diems
of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant
Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents
("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems
corresponding to their specific roles and functions.

The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 and on 1 February 1989, PSU issued Voucher No. 8902007
representing the amount of P70, 375 for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the
approved honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of National
Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53.
Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was
being complied with.

On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess payments of honoraria,
issued a "Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925 from the amount of P70,37 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned
earlier. The resident auditor based his action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7
August 1980, issued by the Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21
June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the schedule for honoraria and per diems applicable
to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.

Issue :

Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a "special project" and that there were excess of payments of honoraria.

Held :

The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted Project, the PSU personnels involved in the project shall be
paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA.

COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or
regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government – i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The
COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and
administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in appropriate
case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme Court.
TOLEDO V CSC and COMELEC

29

JAN

202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras

Facts:

Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information
Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57 years old. Toledo’s appointment
papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However,
no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP—which prohibits the appointment of
persons 57 years old or above into government service without prior CSC approval—was secured. Petitioner then reported for
work.

Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP (Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies),
and CSC Memo Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledo’s appointment. Petitioner
appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N CSRPAP provision is valid

Held:

No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision prohibiting appointment or
reinstatement into government service of any person already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.

Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also provided that rules and
regulations shall become effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new
CSC adopted the CSRPAP. No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition was purely
created by CSC.

IRR cannot go beyond what the law allows.

The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it was meant to implement. It
cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may
legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition
or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any provision respecting age as a factor in
employment—there was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC
was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it.

Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for
the reason that said rules were never published as required by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a “mere
reiteration of existing law” and “circularized” cannot stand as formerly discussed.

Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.
American Tobacco Company vs Director of Patents

The American Tobacco Company (ACT) was a party to a trademark case pending before the Philippine Patent Office. ATC
challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases”
as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings.

ATC argued that the same set of Rules provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and
directly prepared by the Director and signed by him” hence it is improper for the director to designate a lower ranking official as
hearing officers to hear the case; that it is clear that under the Rules, the Director must personally hear the case otherwise, there
will be a violation of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents is a violation of due process.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this
does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency
will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him
from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts,
on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those
of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual
taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his
right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the
record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of
responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however,
required that to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer
who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION VS JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ

FACTS:

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the
authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services
to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to
acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but
it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling
act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards
which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory
powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting
its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided
by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-
judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of
legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some
standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise
of the delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory
and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing was made
in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

***Fixing of rates = quasi-judicial, requires public hearing. But an agency that has rate-fixing that exercises generic powers, no
need public hearing. ***Fixing of rates is an adjudicating process due to the conflicting rights.

***Rate fixing needs publication before and after the public hearing.

***Quasi-legislative – all; quasi-judicial – particular.

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP V NLRC

Facts:

In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a
casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed
as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's
"General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-
designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was
transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until
he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a
monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and
unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision
dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985
(Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal
on a technicality.

Held:

Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall
be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on
April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension
of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol
v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and
executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the
private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in
punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission

14 SCRA 620 (1965)

FACTS:

The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not
to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.

Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that
anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commission’s order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical
purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its “permission” amounted to “prohibition”.

Issue:

Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?

Held:

None.

1. Test for determining the existence of authority

“The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the power is
necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head before
the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight
in judicial litigation.

The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission to
prohibit.

2. Commission without power to impose prohibition

“The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in discrimination and violation of
constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute,
and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without
such condition against double listing.
Title : HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR Citation : G.R. No. 163980
August 3, 2006 Ponente : TINGA, J.: Facts :

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation and development of what is
now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a
national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing
instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded
portion to maximize the number of families who can

effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing progra

m. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president,
Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
of 2003." Issue : Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No.
9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the
Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department
order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized
by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;

whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive;
and

whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied
with.

HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because
Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby
authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this
title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated
by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it
is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule
shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or
specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed
in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons
who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Prohibition granted.