1 What is semi-presidentialism and

where is it found?
Robert Elgie

The aim of this book is to identify the impact of semi-presidentialism on the

process of democratization outside Europe. Semi-presidentialism is where there
is both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister who is
responsible to the legislature. Does this form of government help or hinder
democratization in general terms? Do different forms of semi-presidentialism
have different effects? Alternatively, does semi-presidentialism have no independ-
ent effect on democratization? Or is the effect of semi-presidentialism contin-
gent upon the particular circumstances of the country in which it operates?
These questions are important. They are important in a ‘real world’ context.
As we shall see, on the basis of the above definition there are fifty-four semi-
presidential regimes in the world. In other words, just under one-third of all the
countries currently in existence have adopted a basic semi-presidential form of
government. Moreover, many of these countries are in Africa, the former Soviet
Union and Asia, often in places where democracy has yet to establish a firm
foundation. So, if we can find some answers to the above questions, then we
have the opportunity to shape the political development of some of the most
fragile democracies on the planet.
These questions are also important in an academic context. They address the
general debate about democratic consolidation and institutional choices. We now
take it for granted that institutions have some effect on political behaviour and that
institutions help to shape the choices of social and political actors. But what effect
do they have? How precisely do they shape the choices of political actors? In this
context, semi-presidentialism merits particular investigation. For such a wide-
spread form of government, very little work has been conducted on the topic. The
concept of semi-presidentialism was first identified by Maurice Duverger in the
1970s (particularly Duverger 1978, 1980). However, for a long time there was
very little systematic study of this form of government. There was one edited book
in English on semi-presidentialism in Europe (Elgie 1999), another book in Italian
(Ceccanti et al., 1996) and one in Spanish (Nogueira Alcalá 1986). Recently,
though, perhaps because the number of semi-presidential countries has increased,
more attention has been focused on the topic (including Elgie 2005; Frison-Roche
2005; Moestrup 2004; Protsyk 2005; Shugart 2005). This book adds to the
now vibrant research agenda on semi-presidentialism by addressing fundamental
2 R. Elgie
issues about the relationship between semi-presidential institutions and demo-
cratic performance outside Europe.
This chapter introduces the book as a whole. It does so by reviewing the
concept of semi-presidentialism and by identifying the set of semi-presidential
countries currently in existence on the basis of the definition given above. It then
briefly reviews the existing literature on semi-presidentialism and outlines the
logic behind the structure of the book, as well as the specific organization of the
country case studies.

What is semi-presidentialism and where do we find it?

The meaning of semi-presidentialism is, to say the least, highly contested. There are
competing definitions of the term. Elsewhere, I have reviewed the development of
the concept in some detail (Elgie 1999). I have also defended a particular under-
standing of semi-presidentialism (ibid.; Elgie 2005). I am aware that this under-
standing is still contentious and I have been in conversations where even the most
mild-mannered of political scientists have become almost apoplectic with rage
when I have tried to defend it. Undaunted, in this section I will reiterate my under-
standing of the concept. I will not go through the origins and history of the concept
of semi-presidentialism once again. However, I will outline the basic positions in
the debate over the term. I will justify my definition of semi-presidentialism and I
will identify the current set of semi-presidential countries on the basis of it.
The original definition of semi-presidentialism was provided by Maurice
Duverger. As he developed the concept, his definition of the term changed
subtly but significantly. All the same, his seemingly final and certainly most
well-known definition was provided more than twenty-five years ago (Duverger
1980, 166). According to this definition:

[A] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution

which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the repub-
lic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable
powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers
who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only
if the parliament does not show its opposition to them.

In the years that followed, most people adopted the basics of Duverger’s
understanding of semi-presidentialism. However, some writers altered the
wording of his definition and/or the application of the concept. For example,
Sartori (1997, 131–2) argued that a system was semi-presidential if it had the
following five characteristics:

1 The head of state (president) is elected by popular vote – either directly or

indirectly – for a fixed term of office.
2 The head of state shares the executive power with a prime minister, thus
entering a dual authority structure whose three defining criteria are:
 What is semi-presidentialism? 3
3 The president is independent from parliament, but is not entitled to govern
alone or directly and therefore his will must be conveyed and processed via
his government.
4 Conversely, the prime minister and his cabinet are president-independent in
that they are parliament-dependent: they are subject to either parliamentary
confidence or no-confidence (or both), and in either case need the support of
a parliamentary majority.
5 The dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism allows for different bal-
ances and also for shifting prevalences of power within the executive, under
the strict condition that the ‘autonomy potential’ of each component unit of
the executive does subsist.

This definition is consistent with the one proposed by Duverger. It differs,

though, because it specifically requires semi-presidential systems to exhibit
some sort of basic balance of power between the president and prime minister.
For Sartori, while the balance may shift in favour of the president at one time
and in favour of the prime minister at another, overall there must be a system of
dual authority if we are to classify a country as semi-presidential.
For his part, Lijphart emphasized a particular aspect of Sartori’s definition
when applying the concept. He stated that semi-presidentialism ‘does not
mean either a synthesis of the parliamentary and presidential types or an
intermediate category more or less halfway between them’ (Lijphart 1992, 8).
In other words, he suggested that the essence of semi-presidentialism is not
that there must be a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers.
Rather, he stated, ‘it entails an alternation of parliamentary and presidential
phases, depending on whether or not the president’s party has a majority in
the legislature’ (ibid., his emphasis). Even though Sartori acknowledged that
there can be different balances of power under semi-presidentialism, Lijphart
takes this aspect of Sartori’s definition one stage further. Even though he
failed to give a specific definition of semi-presidentialism, he adopted the
idea of alternating phases of presidential and parliamentary government as
the defining characteristic of semi-presidentialism. Consistent with this
approach, in later work Lijphart has argued that semi-presidential systems
‘actually make it possible for the president to be even more powerful than in
most pure presidential systems’ (Lijphart 2004, 102). Thus, Lijphart seems to
entertain the idea that on occasions there can be hyper-presidentialism in
semi-presidential systems, as long as the system also exhibits times when the
prime minister is an influential actor – indeed, perhaps the most influential
actor within the system.
What is common to this work is the importance the writers place on the
powers of the president and prime minister in the understanding of the concept.
Sartori makes this point very forcefully. He argues that neither Austria, Iceland
nor Ireland should be classed as semi-presidential. This is because in all three
countries the president is merely a figurehead. Indeed, for Sartori, Austria and
Iceland should not be classed as semi-presidential even though on paper their
4 R. Elgie
president would appear to enjoy quite considerable constitutional powers. He
argues:

the Austrian and Icelandic presidents (not the Irish one) are strong only on
paper, that is, are constitutionally given powers that the living constitution
relegates to inanation. . . . But when the material constitution deprives a
president of powers that remain a dead letter of the formal constitution, then
a ‘dead element’ surely cannot establish the nature of a political form and
the class to which is belongs.
(Ibid.)

In other words, for Sartori the powers of the president are integral to the under-
standing of the term. Moreover, what matters is not the powers that presidents
enjoy on paper, but the powers they wield in practice. In order to determine
whether or not a country is semi-presidential, he argues, we need to know how
power is actually exercised in a country. If we find that there is a basic balance
of power between a directly elected president and a prime minister responsible
to parliament, then we can class the country as semi-presidential. If not, then we
should class the country as either parliamentary if the president is weak or presi-
dential if the president is strong.
In other work I have argued that this way of defining semi-presidentialism is
problematic. In particular, I have argued that any mention of the respective
powers of the president and prime minister should be eliminated from the defini-
tion of the term (Elgie 1999, 2005). The reason why is that the inclusion of any
mention of powers allows different writers to come up with different lists of
semi-presidential countries. For example, writing before the wave of democrat-
ization in the early 1990s, Lijphart (1992, 9) implied that France was the only
semi-presidential democracy in the world. Writing around the same time, Stepan
and Skach (1993, 3), who follow Duverger’s definition, identified two semi-
presidential countries, France and Portugal. By contrast, writing in the same
period, Sartori argued that France and Finland were semi-presidential, that Por-
tugal had been semi-presidential from 1976 to 1982, and that Sri Lanka was at
the edge of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism (Sartori 1997, ch. 7).1
When we go beyond this early work the disagreement as to which countries
should be classed as semi-presidential only increases. This can be seen very
clearly when writers started to examine the process of democratization in
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, Easter
(1997, 190) identified only three mixed systems in all the countries in this region
– Lithuania, Moldova and Poland – plus Mongolia. By contrast, focusing only
on Central and Eastern Europe and even then excluding a number of potential
candidates such as Macedonia and Moldova, von Beyme (2001, 16) identified
no fewer than eight semi-presidential countries – Belarus, Croatia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia2 and Ukraine. Indeed, Bahro et al. (1998, 208)
went further still, stating that ‘the majority of post-communist states on the terri-
tory of the former Soviet Union plus Mongolia, as well as Poland, Romania,
 What is semi-presidentialism? 5
Bulgaria and also Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia comply with this
scheme’.
The list of semi-presidential countries varies so much from one writer to
another because each writer has free rein to decide what constitutes the level
of ‘quite considerable [presidential] powers’ that are required for semi-
presidentialism. As a result, some writers interpret semi-presidentialism in a way
that excludes countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland and Slovenia,
where the president’s powers are deemed to be not considerable enough. This
would be consistent with Sartori’s position. Other writers interpret semi-
presidentialism in a way that excludes those countries as well as other countries,
such as Belarus and Russia, where the president’s powers are considered to be
too considerable. This would be consistent with the position of Stepan and
Skach. Yet other writers are happy to include all these countries, presumably on
the assumption that the term ‘quite considerable’ covers a vast range of possible
powers. This is the approach taken by Bahro et al. If we gathered together every
list of semi-presidential countries in existence, then we might be able to identify
a core of apparently ‘uncontroversial’ examples – probably France, Mongolia
and Poland and perhaps Lithuania too. However, even if we were able to
identify a common set of countries, we would not have a common definition on
which to base the list. In sum, including a clause along the lines that presidents
must enjoy ‘quite considerable powers’ in the definition of semi-presidentialism
means that there is an inherent subjectivity in the way people identify examples
of the concept.
The fact that there is a basic subjectivity in the way many people define semi-
presidentialism is of more than just semantic importance. This is because it
affects the judgements people make about the respective advantages and
disadvantages of this regime type and, indeed, others too. For example, if we
define semi-presidentialism so as to include the majority of countries in the
former Soviet Union as semi-presidential, including countries such as Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and so on, then the record of this
type of government looks poor. However, if we define semi-presidentialism so
as to exclude these countries as semi-presidential and include only ‘uncontrover-
sial’ countries such as Lithuania, Poland and Romania, then semi-presidentialism’s
record looks much better. Even so, if we do exclude them, then naturally enough
the record of presidentialism looks worse because countries such as Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan are invariably classed as presiden-
tial if they are not classed as semi-presidential. In other words, the fact that the
list of semi-presidential countries varies so much from one writer to another
means that often like is not being compared with like. This situation compro-
mises the general debate about institututional design. We do not have a suffi-
ciently large n for this sort of definitional problem to wash out in any statistical
analysis. Thus, how can we say that presidentialism is worse than semi-
presidentialism, or vice versa, or that they are equally bad and that parliamen-
tarism is better, when each writer has a different understanding of these concepts
and bases his/her conclusions on a different set of examples?
6 R. Elgie
Worse still, by including the criterion of ‘quite considerable powers’, or an
equivalent clause, in the definition of semi-presidentialism, writers may unwit-
tingly predetermine their judgements about the concept. For example, a seem-
ingly ‘commonsense’ way of understanding semi-presidentialism is to say that it
is a mixed system where there is a basic balance of presidential and prime minis-
terial powers. I have argued above that this is the sort of logic Sartori adopts.
However, if we define semi-presidentialism in this way, then we should not be
surprised to find that semi-presidential countries are often associated with intra-
executive conflict. In consolidated democracies, such conflict may lead to polit-
ical deadlock. In fragile democracies, it may lead to either the president or the
prime minister, or both, trying to go beyond the constitution and perhaps seeking
the support of the military in order to assert control. Either way, the result may
be either inefficient and/or destabilizing decision making and may lead writers
to recommend that semi-presidentialism should be avoided. The problem,
though, is that this judgement is based on a logic that comes very close to being
circular. If we define semi-presidentialism as the situation where there is an
actual balance of power between the leading political figures in the system, then
we should not be surprised to find that there is in fact a balance of power
between them as well as all that goes with it. So, by including reference to
powers in the definition of semi-presidentialism, we may end up with a major
problem of endogeneity. In other words, we may be putting the methodological
cart before the horse.
In the introduction to this chapter I made the point that the debate about
regime types has important ‘real world’ implications. Given these implications,
we need to try to make sure that this debate is conducted as rigorously as pos-
sible. I argue that we can do so only if we exclude all reference to the powers of
presidents and prime ministers from any definition of semi-presidentialism.3
Therefore, I have proposed the following definition:

Semi-presidentialism is where a popularly elected fixed-term president

exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to the
legislature.

On the basis of this definition, we only need to read the constitution of a country
in order to determine whether or not it is semi-presidential. We do not need to
know how powers are exercised in practice. Moreover, we only need to read
very limited aspects of a constitution in order to determine whether or not a
country is semi-presidential. Is the president directly elected and is the govern-
ment responsible to parliament? If so, then the country is semi-presidential. If
not, then it belongs to another category. All of this means that it is much easier
to establish an ‘uncontroversial’ list of semi-presidential countries than if we
include reference to any amount of presidential and prime ministerial powers as
a criterion. Moreover, by defining semi-presidentialism in this way, we do not
prejudge the way in which semi-presidential countries operate. As we shall see,
the list of semi-presidential systems includes countries where the president has
 What is semi-presidentialism? 7
great powers, countries where the president has few powers and countries where
there is a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers. Thus, we avoid
the potential for endogeneity problems associated with case selection. Overall,
we arrive at a much less subjective way of defining semi-presidentialism and
one which gives us greater potential to make rigorous judgements about the
advantages and disadvantages of this type of regime.
That said, we cannot eliminate all subjectivity from the definition of semi-
presidentialism. The nature of constitutional law is such that some countries do
not fall neatly into one category or another. For example, in Slovakia the presid-
ent can be recalled by a popular referendum. So, strictly speaking, the president
does not necessarily serve for a fixed term. In this case, we have to decide
whether we continue to classify Slovakia as semi-presidential or whether we
create a new category for Slovakia and countries like it. My judgement call is
that we should continue to classify Slovakia as semi-presidential. Unlike the
direct election of the president and the responsibility of the government to the
legislature, a recall vote is intended to be an extraordinary and, hence, arguably
non-constitutive political feature. True, another writer may argue that it is con-
stitutive and choose to create a new category for Slovakia and other countries
that have this unusual constitutional feature. However, even if s/he did so, at
least the guidelines would still be clear as to when a country should be classed
as semi-presidential or when it should be placed in the new category alongside
Slovakia. Indeed, if we made this choice, then we would place Iceland alongside
Slovakia in this separate category. Thus, the classification process would still be
reasonably objective. The same is not true if we include powers as part of the
definition of semi-presidentialism. In that case, we have no guidelines as to
where the thresholds between parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism and presi-
dentialism lie. As a result, individual writers are able to make their own choices
and very varied lists of countries appear. So deciding to classify Slovakia as
semi-presidential even though its president can be subject to a recall vote is an
inherently less subjective exercise than deciding to classify Slovakia as
parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential as a function of how many
powers the president has. Even though there is still ambiguity as to how we
should classify Slovakia on the basis of my understanding of the term, the ambi-
guity is of a different nature from definitions that classify countries with refer-
ence to the actual powers of political actors.
There are other judgement calls to be made when adopting my definition of
semi-presidentialism. For example, in Argentina the head of the government is
responsible to the legislature, but the cabinet is not. Again, a judgement call
must be made. In this case, I exclude Argentina from the list of semi-presidential
systems because there is no collective cabinet responsibility. Others, though,
may wish to ignore the individual responsibility of the head of government and
classify Argentina as presidential or create a new category for countries where
there is individual but not collective responsibility. A further case involves a
number of countries such as Azerbaijan, Mozambique and South Korea. In these
countries the constitution states that the prime minister is appointed with the
8 R. Elgie
consent of parliament, but that parliament may only recommend the removal of
the prime minister and the president may decide to ignore the parliamentary
vote. Thus, it appears as if the prime minister and cabinet are not really respons-
ible to the legislature at all. However, here I include these countries as
semi-presidential because the need for parliamentary consent implies that
constitutionally such consent may be withheld. Thus, these countries are very
close to the standard requirement for semi-presidentialism whereby the legis-
lature has some say in determining the life of the government. It may well be the
case that in some or all of these countries and others like them parliament may
be the puppet of the president and may in fact never have even contemplated
withholding its consent to a presidential nominee. Even so, in order to be as
consistent as possible, I do not classify countries by way of reference to how
powers are exercised in practice. As a result, I classify these countries as semi-
presidential.
On the basis of this definition, I calculate that there are currently fifty-five
semi-presidential countries in the world. (See Table 1.1 for the list of semi-presi-
dential countries as of 1 January 2006.) Clearly, in some of these countries the
democratic system is purely nominal. So I am not implying that there are fifty-
four democratic semi-presidential countries. I am simply saying that according
to available constitutional sources, and having made a number of constitutional
judgement calls, all of these countries currently have at least a basic form of
semi-presidentialism. Other countries have been semi-presidential at one time
but have since chosen a different form of government. The most famous
example is the Weimar Republic in inter-war Germany. More recently, Moldova
was semi-presidential from 1991 to 2000, as were the Comoros from 1978 to
1984 and 1992 to 1999. Other countries have fluctuated between different
regime types. For example, Senegal was presidential from 1963 to 1970, semi-
presidential from 1970 to 1983, presidential from 1983 to 1991 and semi-
presidential since that time. Other countries may adopt semi-presidentialism at
some future point. In December 2005 voters in the Democratic Republic of
Congo approved a semi-presidential constitution that took force in late 2006.
The draft constitution for a state of Palestine drawn up under the auspices of the
Palestinian National Authority in 2003 makes provision for a semi-presidential
form of government. Whatever may or may not happen in the future, around 30
per cent of all independent states currently have a semi-presidential form of
government.
There is a fundamental objection to my approach, namely that the list of
countries classed as semi-presidential on the basis of my definition is counter-
intuitive. There are three versions of this objection. The first version comes from
country specialists. These are the people who are sometimes transformed in dis-
cussion from being polite and unassuming political scientists into area studies
specialists who are red with rage. For specialists on Irish politics, Ireland is
parliamentary. It simply cannot be semi-presidential. It goes against everything
that for decades everyone has been trained to understand about Irish politics. By
the same token, for most Russian experts, Russia is not semi-presidential. It is
 What is semi-presidentialism? 9
Table 1.1 Semi-presidential countries

Algeria Haiti Rwanda

Angola Iceland São Tome e Principe
Armenia Ireland Senegal
Austria Kazakhstan Singapore
Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Slovakia
Belarus Lithuania Slovenia
Bulgaria Macedonia South Korea
Burkina Faso Madagascar Sri Lanka
Cameroon Mali Taiwan
Cape Verde Mauritania Tajikistan
Central African Republic Mongolia Tanzania
Chad Mozambique Timor-Leste
Croatia Namibia Togo
Egypt Niger Tunisia
Finland Peru Ukraine
France Poland Uzbekistan
Gabon Portugal Yemen
Georgia Romania
Guinea-Bissau Russia

super-presidential or hyper-presidential. South Korean experts overwhelmingly

classify their country as presidential. To class it as semi-presidential is to court
academic ostracism. And so on. Indeed, Duverger faced a very similar reaction
from the French academic community when he classed France as semi-presidential.
To this day, the vast majority of French political scientists (or constitutional
lawyers) refuse even to entertain the notion that there is such a category as semi-
presidentialism, never mind that France should be classed as such. This objec-
tion is very difficult to counter because it is often made in irrational terms. The
opposition to the classification of particular countries is often kneejerk rather
than reasoned. So, the fact that for decades Ireland has been classed as
parliamentary is no reason to continue to do so if it is now more logical to class
it as semi-presidential. After all, the concept of semi-presidentialism is relatively
new, so no country can have been classed as semi-presidential for very long.
Undoubtedly, the (re)classification as a country as semi-presidential is some-
times difficult for country experts to accept. However, unless there is a general
argument about how regime types should be defined that suggests the (re)classi-
fication is incorrect, then the fact that it may just be going against the academic
grain to classify a particular country as semi-presidential is simply unconvincing.
The second version of this objection is often made by comparativists. The
objection here is that my list brings together in one category countries that
should be placed in quite separate categories because political practice varies so
greatly the one from the other. So politics in Iceland is so different from politics
in Chad that it is wrong to call them both semi-presidential. In fact, this criticism
is simply another way of saying that we should include reference to powers
when we define regime types. The logic of this criticism is that we should put
only countries that operate in roughly the same way in the category of
10 R. Elgie
semi-presidentialism. I will not repeat my objection to this way of defining
regimes. I will simply add that people who make this argument often include an
equally diverse set of countries in their list of parliamentary and presidential
regimes. The way presidentialism works in the United States is clearly very dif-
ferent from the way it works in Ecuador, yet everyone classes both as presiden-
tial. Equally, the way parliamentarism works in the United Kingdom is very
different from the way it works in Denmark, yet everyone classes both as
parliamentary. So there is nothing inherently counter-intuitive in having coun-
tries with very different forms of political practice placed in the same category.
The third type of objection is also made by comparativists and is similar to
the previous argument but nonetheless is somewhat different and more
challenging. The purpose of defining parliamentarism, presidentialism, semi-
presidentialism, etc., is to determine the relative performance of each regime type.
If we find that one is better than another, then we can recommend that countries
should adopt that form of government. If we find that one performs very badly,
then we can advise against its adoption. However, comparativists might argue that
we can engage in this exercise only if we include similar types of countries in the
same category. If not, then we cannot make any sort of recommendation. For
example, if we argue in favour of semi-presidentialism, then what exactly are we
arguing in favour of, given the list of semi-presidential countries is so broad? Are
we arguing in favour of Irish-style semi-presidentialism where the president is a
figurehead, French-style semi-presidentialism where the president and prime
minister share power, or Namibian-style semi-presidentialism where the president
is absolutely dominant? To put this criticism more formally, if the list of semi-
presidential countries contains such varied forms of political practice, we cannot
use semi-presidentialism as an independent variable.
This criticism seems powerful. However, I would argue that my approach is
perfectly consistent with it. In my view, we should end the debate about whether
parliamentarism, presidentialism or semi-presidentialism is best. We should not
take any of these categories as our independent variable. This is because all
regime types contain a wide variety of political practice. Instead, we should
discuss the relative merits of different sub-types within any given regime type
and take these sub-types as our independent variables. For example, rather than
discussing the merits of semi-presidentialism grosso modo, we might discuss the
relative merits of, for example, presidentialized semi-presidential systems, like
Namibia, balanced semi-presidential systems, like Poland, and parliamentarized
semi-presidential systems, like Ireland (see Elgie 2005). We might hypothesize
that the latter systems are likely to perform better than the first two. Obviously,
we have the opportunity to interact these independent variables with others, such
as the electoral system, and control for yet others, such as GDP and so on. Thus,
depending on the findings, we might advise decision makers to adopt a particu-
lar form of semi-presidentialism, perhaps an Irish-style or Slovenian-style semi-
presidentialism rather than a French-style or Polish-style semi-presidentialism.
This would be a more useful recommendation than either the adoption or rejec-
tion of semi-presidentialism as a whole. And again, any such recommendation
 What is semi-presidentialism? 11
could be combined with further recommendations about the inclusion or exclu-
sion of other institutional variables that we have found to be significant, propor-
tional representation, federalism and so on.
This way of thinking about comparative politics is very close to the main-
stream. For example, in his now classic essay Linz (1994) discusses the varying
effects of exactly the same three forms or sub-types of semi-presidentialism that
I identified in the previous paragraph. More recently, Matthew Shugart (2005,
327) has outlined a similar understanding of semi-presidentialism. He identifies
a set of semi-presidential countries, including Austria, Bulgaria, France and
Russia, where political practice varies greatly from one country to another.
Within this set of countries, he then distinguishes between premier–presidential
systems where the president has no discretion to dismiss the prime minister,
including Bulgaria and France, and president–parliamentary regimes where dis-
cretion does exist, including Austria and Russia. Having drawn conclusions
about how these two (sub)types of semi-presidentialism operate, he states:
‘Developing further the nature of the relationship between presidents, assem-
blies, and cabinets in both subtypes of semi-presidentialism and under different
party-system characteristics should be a high priority in ongoing research on
executive–legislative relations’ (ibid., 344). This logic is entirely consistent with
the one proposed in this chapter. Indeed, I would argue that my way of under-
standing semi-presidentialism is consistent with the way Duverger understood
the term more than twenty-five years ago. He states the ‘constitutions of Austria,
Iceland and Ireland are semi-presidential. Political practice is parliamentary’
(1980, 167). To Sartori (1997, 126), this was evidence that Duverger had classi-
fied Ireland as parliamentary. To me, it suggests that Duverger classified Ireland
as semi-presidential, but that he was placing it in a sub-type of semi-presidential
countries where presidents had very few powers. This interpretation is consistent
with the language Duverger used throughout his 1980 English-language article
and in his later work on semi-presidentialism (Duverger 1996).4 It is also exactly
how I understand the situation in these countries. Overall, while it may appear as
if my approach to the study of semi-presidentialism is controversial because of
the seemingly counter-intuitive list of semi-presidential countries that it gener-
ates, I would argue that it is very much in the mainstream of the study of com-
parative politics and of semi-presidentialism as well.

The structure of the book

This book examines the impact of semi-presidentialism on democratic perform-
ance. In particular, we explore the effect of semi-presidentialism in terms of both
level of democracy and democratic survival in young democracies outside Europe.
We provide an overview of the general performance of semi-presidentialism
across the world. We look at the impact of semi-presidential structures in a
regional context, thus controlling for specific regional factors that might influ-
ence the performance of this form of government. We also look at the impact of
semi-presidentialism in individual countries, examining the specific form of
12 R. Elgie
semi-presidentialism in those countries and identifying whether it had any
particular impact on the survival and performance of democracy.
The next two chapters address the concept of semi-presidentialism generally.
In Chapter 2, Gianfranco Pasquino discusses the experience of semi-presidentialism
mainly from the perspective of Western Europe. This is the region where semi-
presidentialism was first introduced and where we have had the greatest
opportunity to examine the performance of various different types of semi-
presidential systems. In his chapter, Professor Pasquino reflects on the perform-
ance of West European semi-presidentialism and argues that in this context at
least semi-presidentialism, or at least certain forms of it, has performed well. In
Chapter 3, Sophia Moestrup widens the perspective. She conducts a large-n study
of semi-presidentialism the aim of which is to provide an overall view of the
average impact of semi-presidentialism on the democratic performance of young
democracies. In particular, she looks at the effects of semi-presidentialism on the
level of democracy and on the chances of democratic survival in new demo-
cracies. In contrast to the conclusions from the West European experience, where
semi-presidentialism has usually operated in the context of consolidated demo-
cracies, Sophia Moestrup shows that in general terms semi-presidentialism has
not performed very well when it has been introduced in countries where
democracy is fragile.
The next two chapters focus on two regions of the world where semi-
presidentialism is particularly prevalent. In Chapter 4, Gérard Conac examines
the performance of semi-presidentialism in francophone countries. In Chapter 5,
François Frison-Roche identifies the performance of semi-presidentialism in
post-communist countries. One of the difficulties in determining the impact of
institutions on democratic performance is to separate out the independent effect
of institutional structures from the context in which they operate. While large-n
comparative studies are useful in providing general findings about regime types,
regional studies are also useful because they help to control for socio-cultural
factors that may be present in particular areas and not others but that may have a
profound impact on the performance of countries in those areas. Chapters 4 and
5 help to throw light on the impact of the ‘regional’ context in which semi-
presidentialism has operated, drawing attention to salient differences across
regions.
The next eight chapters are written by country specialists. Each chapter
examines a specific instance of semi-presidentialism, identifying the form that
semi-presidentialism takes in each case and placing it in its appropriate histor-
ical, economic and social context. We include chapters on Guinea-Bissau, Kyr-
gyzstan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Taiwan and Timor-Leste.
The choice of country cases is guided by two factors. First, we wish to examine
examples of successful semi-presidentialism, failed semi-presidentialism and
mixed outcomes in terms of democratic survival. This ensures that we have a
broad range of performance as regards our dependent variable, namely demo-
cratic performance. On this basis, the following countries can be considered suc-
cessful: Madagascar, Taiwan and Mongolia. The following countries can be
 What is semi-presidentialism? 13
considered failed: Niger, Guinea-Bissau and Kyrgyzstan. The mixed cases are
Mozambique and Timor-Leste. Second, we focus on the performance of coun-
tries in specific regions. This strategy is designed to build on the logic of Chap-
ters 4 and 5 so as to help control for more general contexts within which
particular forms of semi-presidentialism operate. Thus, we choose examples
from the set of francophone sub-Saharan African countries (Madagascar and
Niger), lusophone countries, including two from sub-Saharan Africa (Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique and Timor-Leste), Eurasian/Asian post-communist coun-
tries (Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia) and South East Asian countries (Taiwan and
Timor-Leste). This should allow us to consider a broad range of semi-
presidential experiences, but hopefully protects us from the accusation that we
are comparing apples with oranges.
A key task of any edited volume is to ensure that as far as possible the con-
tributors speak with one voice. To this end, each of the country case study
authors was asked to follow the same basic chapter structure. We asked authors
to provide a narrative that outlines why semi-presidentialism was chosen; a
description of the constitutional powers of the main actors in the system, thus
establishing the form of semi-presidential that can be found in each case; and a
further narrative that tries to identify the independent effect of the particular
form of semi-presidentialism on the performance of democracy in that country.
This organization allows us to extract the relevant information from the country
case studies, while maintaining an overall coherence to the context of the book.
We now begin by turning to the experience of semi-presidentialism in Western
Europe.

Notes
1 Sartori also states that Russia became semi-presidential in 1993, but that, like Sri
Lanka, it stands at the ‘extreme edge of the category’ (1997, 138 n. 9).
2 The 1990 constitution of the Republic of Serbia is semi-presidential. However, until
2003 the Republic of Serbia was part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and since
2003 it has been a constituent part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
Neither the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nor the State Union of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro is semi-presidential.
3 Indeed, I argue that the same point applies to the definition of all regime types, includ-
ing presidentialism and parliamentarism (Elgie 1998).
4 If my interpretation of Duverger is correct, then it implies that he ignored the clause in
his definition about presidents needing ‘quite considerable powers’, or that he inter-
preted the clause very loosely.